

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo <i>exempt 8-28-03 NW03-17 sanitized</i>	Thompson to Bundy TS 6 p <i>exempt NW DIS-004-S-1 (7/02)</i>	1/5/65	A
#2c rpt	"Report in Response to NSAM 300..." S 16 p [Partial duplicate of #4c, NSAM 300]	undated	A
#2e memo	NSAM 300 <i>open 4-17-09</i> S 2 p [Duplicate of #13, NSAM 300]	5/19/64	A
#2g ltr	Dryden to Thompson <i>open 10/16/02 per NASA guidelines</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #4g, NSAM 300]	6/30/64	A
#2i ltr	Frutkin to Kitchen <i>open 10/16/02 per NASA guidelines</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #4i, NSAM 300]	undated	A
#2j memo	Director to Asst. Administrator <i>open 10/16/02 per NASA guidelines</i> S 4 p [Duplicate of #4j, NSAM 300]	1964	A
#2l memo	Lang to Kitchen <i>exempt 7-1-04 NW/PAL03-9</i> S 13 p [Duplicate of #4l, NSAM 300]	7/29/64	A
#2n memo	Lang to Kitchen <i>exempt 7-1-04 NW/PAL03-9</i> S 16 p [Duplicate of #4n, NSAM 300]	8/22/64	A
#2p memo	Lang to Kitchen <i>exempt 7-1-04 NW/PAL03-9</i> S 9 p [Duplicate of #4p, NSAM 300]	9/3/64	A
#6a ltr	U.A. Johnson to McCone S 3 p	6/5/64	A
#5 memo	Installations... PCI 1 p	10/26/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSAM, NSAM 301--Intelligence Installations, ref. NSAM 300

Box 4

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#7 ltr <i>Sanitized 8-28-03 NW 03-17</i>	U.A. Johnson to Webb S 3 p	6/5/64	A
#8 memo	NSAM 301 S 1 p <i>open 9-10-93 NLS 93-65</i>	5/19/64	A
#3 memo	NSAM 301 " " S 1 p	5/19/64	A
#4 memo	Duplicate of #3 "		

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSAM, NSAM 301--Intelligence Installations, ref. NSAM 300

Box 4

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LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 5, 1965

S/S-127

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Comments on Report in Response to NSAM 301

In response to your memorandum of October 30, the Department of State submits the following comments on the report dated October 23, 1964 on Intelligence Installations in response to NSAM 301.

1. The Department of State appreciates fully the difficulties in attempting to develop specific plans for alternate facilities, and agrees that it is not feasible to have such plans to cover every case. At the same time, the report leaves unanswered a number of questions. There is enclosed herewith a copy of the principal comments of the representative of the Department of State at the time the enclosed report was being developed for USIB. His request that these comments accompany the report in question was apparently overlooked. It is believed that the questions raised therein would, in any event, require consideration at the time that any ad hoc decision was to be made on any particular case.

2. In response to your request, the Department of State wishes to point out certain aspects of inter-relationship between this report and the report shortly to be submitted under NSAM 300, concerning overseas communications, navigation aids, and data collection and space tracking facilities:

(a) The communications requirement to support an intelligence collection facility would be reduced to the extent that the intelligence collection capability would be reduced by ejection from a host country.

(b)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 03-17
By iss, NARA, Date 8-20-03

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(b)

[REDACTED]

3, 4
(b) (1)

(c) To the extent that the development of satellite communication systems obviate the necessity for various land-based relay and broadcast stations,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (Asmara is a case in point.)

3, 4
(b) (1)

3. It should be noted that since the commencement of this study, the political situation has appreciably improved in Chile, Brazil, and Peru and these countries at this time need no longer be considered as politically unstable or unreliable areas for the purposes of this study.

4. The Department of State is prepared to assume responsibility to provide the DCI and the Secretary of Defense with current and timely advice on the possibility of loss of intelligence facilities in specific countries, taking into consideration current and timely advice from the intelligence community.

Llewellyn E. Thompson

Llewellyn E. Thompson
Acting

Enclosure:

As noted

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The Director, INR, regards the revised CCPC report as a handy first-cut review of existing material. However, it is by no means an adequate response to NSAM 301 because it leaves substantially unanswered many of the most important questions which prompted the policy review. Since all addressees of NSAMs 300 and 301 are under pressure to move ahead with maximum speed and relevance, the Director INR believes that even at this stage there should be deeper treatment of several facets of the problem despite the many complexities involved. The policy makers predictably will need more from the intelligence community on the following subjects:


1. A more precise ordering of collection priorities, based on end-user evaluations within the intelligence community of those matters where the intelligence community itself, and not the policy making community, is the chief consumer.
2. A better indication of the comparative importance of different installations, distinguishing which are critical, which are highly desirable, and which are useful.
3. A more analytical discussion of the inter-relationship of various installations as this affects contingency planning.

For example

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For example, how many of Station A's requirements could Station B take up if Station A were eliminated? To what extent would which priorities be increased if existing or possible fall back sites also dried up?

4. A more satisfactory evaluation of the interconnection



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(b)(1)

What are the relative priorities and vulnerabilities of these dual installations where NSAM 300 and 301 overlap?

5. Some measure of maximum acceptable time lags between possible ejection from facilities and finding operational alternatives for critical missions. To what extent do these findings point to requirements for advance surveys, rights agreements, standby gear, equipment for interim use, the logistics of redeployment, and with rough cost estimates?

6. What currently available alternatives are there in aircraft, seaborne units and space borne facilities? These factors could be ground into or complement recommendation 5c.

7. What choices exist on long-term technological R&D

trends



trends? What are the possibilities for smaller, [REDACTED] less conspicuous facilities? What are the possibilities of miniaturization and with what rough budget costs?

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(b)(1)

While State may indeed direct specific attention to political problems and vulnerability of specific installations as recommendation 5d suggests, USIB and the intelligence community have their own responsibilities for the foresighted protection of collection capabilities and should not wait in every case for State initiative as recommendation 5d might imply.

Cleared representatives of the Department of State responsible to the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs are ready to participate with representatives of the DCI and the Secretary of Defense in further consideration of any of these problems.

* * *

Subject to the above comments, the Director, INR, concurs in the draft report as a basis for further discussion within the intelligence community and/or with the Department of Defense. He does not concur in the submission of the present

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-4-

present draft in response to NSAM 301 because it does not yet provide an adequate basis for policy consideration. He requests that the above comments accompany any further distribution of the current CCPC report.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY

#13 2

G/PM

MEMORANDUM

January 18, 1965

TO : NSAM 300 Working Group
FROM : G/PM - Joseph J. Wolf, Chairman
NSAM 300 Working Group
SUBJECT: NSAM 300

Attached are revisions of pages 3, 7 and 7a
for NSAM 300.

Att:

Revisions of pages
3, 7 and 7a

When separated from attach-
ments this memo may be down-
graded to Unclassified

G/PM:JJWolf:ss
Rm. 7320 - Ext. 3458

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY

G/PM

#13

2a

MEMORANDUM

January 6, 1965

TO : NSAM 300 Working Group
FROM : G/PM - Joseph J. Wolf, Chairman
NSAM 300 Working Group
SUBJECT: NSAM 300

Attached are revised pages 3, 7, 10 and 12 of the report circulated under date of December 16.

These changes reflect:

1. Certain additional facts about Department of State facilities and contingency plans;
2. A further evaluation of the political situation in Chile, Brazil and Peru permitting at the moment the removal of these countries from the list of those designated as politically unstable or unreliable.

Enclosure:

Revised pages 3, 7, 10, 12

When separated from attachments this memo may be downgraded to Unclassified

G/PM:JJWolf:ss
Rm. 7320 - Ext. 3458

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Downgraded at 12-year intervals
Not automatically declassified

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY

G/PM

#13

26

MEMORANDUM

December 16, 1964

TO : NSAM 300 Working Group
FROM : G/PM - Joseph J. Wolf, Chairman
NSAM 300 Working Group
SUBJECT: NSAM 300

Attached for final review on behalf of the heads of the respective responsible departments and agencies is the proposed final report under NSAM 300.

Your responses are requested not later than December 29, 1964.

Enclosure:

Report in Response to
National Security Action
Memorandum No. 300

When separated from attachment this memo may be downgraded to Unclassified

G/PM:JJWolf:ss
Rm. 7320 - Ext. 3458

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Downgraded at 12-year intervals
Not automatically declassified

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TAB A

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 19, 1964

2e

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 300

TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Administrator, National Aeronautics & Space Administration
Special Assistant to the President for Science & Technology
Director, Bureau of the Budget
Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics & Space Council
Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications

SUBJECT: Review of Alternative Communications, Navigation,
Missile and Space Tracking and Data Acquisition
Facilities.

The Secretary of State in cooperation with the heads of other responsible departments and agencies of the Government is requested to review the continuing need for U. S. overseas land-based facilities that are now located in politically unstable or unreliable areas and which are utilized for communications, navigation, missile and space tracking, and data acquisition.

Each responsible operating agency will analyze the continuing need for its facilities now located in politically unstable or unreliable areas as identified by the Secretary of State and develop plans to meet the contingency that such facilities may become unavailable for further U. S. use.

The review should address itself to the question whether the existing and planned requirements of these programs would be best served by development of possible alternative means (such as relocation of facilities, use of mobile or floating platforms, communication satellites, etc.). Political, technical and budgetary aspects of the question should be covered.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NWJ 93-65 (#42)
By: cbu/isp, NARA, Date 2-6-09

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The agency evaluations and interagency plans will be reviewed by an interagency group comprised of representatives of the responsible agencies under the chairmanship of the representative of the Secretary of State and with additional representation from OST, the NASC, the Bureau of the Budget, and the White House staff. The working group will formulate specific program recommendations by countries or regions for consideration by the President in the near future. The first recommendations should be submitted to this office no later than June 30, 1964.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

cc: Director of Central Intelligence

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TAB B1



NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

157-3677

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11/11

2 C/AM

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

JUN 30 1964

29

Honorable Llewellyn E. Thompson
Deputy Under Secretary of State
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Thompson:

Mr. Alexis Johnson's letter of June 5 to Mr. Webb requested an evaluation of, and contingency removal plans for, facilities located in politically unstable areas. The first report, on certain countries in Africa, was due June 30. This is to advise that there are no NASA installations in these countries.

It is contemplated that a Baker-Nunn camera in Iran, operated by the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory for NASA, will be relocated in Ethiopia. Discussions between representatives of the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory and Haile Selassie I University concerning the project have already taken place and the Ethiopian Government has approved the project in principle. Construction for the facility is expected to begin within the next two or three months. The amount of land required to accommodate the Baker-Nunn facility is less than one acre. Construction cost of the building housing the camera is estimated to be approximately \$50,000. The camera and associated equipment are valued at \$125,000.

The camera will be part of an existing global network used primarily for scientific rather than operational purposes. The planning for relocation of the Baker-Nunn from Iran to Ethiopia had preceded the issuance of NSAM 300 and Mr. Johnson's letter of June 5. It is pointed out that the camera is removable and the temporary loss of one camera to the network would be neither critical nor difficult to replace.

Sincerely yours,

Hugh L. Dryden
Deputy Administrator

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NASA Guidelines
By cbm, NARA, Date 10-9-02

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TAB B2



NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546

2 i

IN REPLY REFER TO: AI

Mr. Jeffrey C. Kitchen
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Kitchen:

I have attached as NASA's second report on NSAM 300 a memorandum to me from the NASA Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition. As you will note, NASA has no facilities in Bolivia, Brazil, or British Guiana nor, in the Near East, facilities in Cyprus, Greece, Turkey or Pakistan. The attached report, therefore, addresses itself to alternative arrangements for the NASA station in Chile, with comment on Peru and Ecuador. Additionally, I have set forth below a few brief comments on the Chilean situation and on alternate locations for the SAO Baker-Nunn camera now located in Naini-Tal, India.

The solution suggested in case of the loss of the Chilean station is removal to the Philippines. However, this solution would be wasted if the loss of Peru and Ecuador followed, since a totally different recourse would be indicated in that case. Indeed, it might be desirable to move immediately to the ultimate solution (Hawaii and Fiji/Samoa) if the Chilean station is lost. A firm decision cannot be provided at this time, but a tentative recommendation is included in the attachment.

In the Near East, the only NASA station concerned is the SAO Baker-Nunn camera at Naini-Tal, India. In the event it would have to be moved, NASA would propose to move it to one of the following areas, in order of preference: Nepal (Katmandu); Afghanistan (Kabul); Ceylon (Colombo). About one acre would be required for the facility. Construction cost would be approximately \$50,000. The camera and associated equipment are valued at \$125,000.

Sincerely yours,

Arnold W. Frutkin
Assistant Administrator
for International Programs

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NASA Guidelines
By etm, NARA, Date 10-9-02

Attachment

67
1 year
int. ...

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

28

TO : AI/Assistant Administrator, International Programs DATE: 109 14 1964

FROM : T/Director, Tracking and Data Acquisition

SUBJECT: Contingency planning in response to NSAM 300 regarding Latin American Area

Requirements and Considerations

Some of the major NASA scientific satellite projects require that ground stations make contact with the satellites once per orbit. Two of the prime projects with this requirement are the Orbiting Astronomical Observatory (OAO) and the Biological Orbiting Satellite (BIOS). These satellites will have low inclination, nearly circular orbits.

This requirement is based primarily on the need to either make changes in the experimental program aboard the satellite or to make changes in the way the spacecraft functions so that it will continue to provide useful data. In this latter case, failure to contact and control the spacecraft for several orbits could result in malfunctions that could seriously damage the satellite and make it useless.

In either case, failure to provide this required ground support could lead to failures in the missions of the scientific satellites involved. The cost of the two projects mentioned above is in excess of \$250 million.

Ground Support Considerations

The NASA plan for support of satellite projects using low inclination, nearly circular orbits follows the philosophy of the NRL Vanguard Project very closely. The Vanguard Project established a series of ground stations on the west 75th meridian from Blossom Point, Maryland to Santiago, Chile, which assured at least one contact per orbit for the Vanguard Satellites.

This configuration of stations was gradually modified by NASA as missions and requirements increased in scope and complexity which resulted in requirements for other geographical locations as well. However, there are today five prime stations which provide the necessary ground support functions for low inclination, nearly circular orbits and are planned for OAO and BIOS. These stations are: Rosman, North Carolina; Ft. Myers, Florida; Quito, Ecuador; Lima, Peru; and Santiago, Chile.

Each station performs as an integrated portion of the total network ground support. Therefore, the relocation of any one of the individual stations

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NASA Guidelines
By cbm, NARA, Date 10-9-02

This document consists of 4 pages.
No. 1 of 2 Copies, Series A

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requires an analysis of the whole network configuration in order to determine how this alters the total coverage, or support, which the integrated network must provide to the spacecraft if its mission is to be successful.

The nature of the support rendered by these satellite tracking stations and the technical characteristics of the instrumentation render ships totally unsuitable as platforms. Among the factors which confirm this are the following:

- a. 24-hour on station operation, 365 days of the year.
- b. The extreme accuracy of position on earth's surface which is required.
- c. Large physical lay-out of antenna fields. (For example, the 136 Mc interferometer antenna array requires an area of 400 ft. by 400 ft. for the antenna elements alone.)
- d. The extreme accuracy of antenna orientation required.
- e. The extremely large ground area (for example 400 acres for a typical station) required to separate sensitive receiving equipment and high-powered transmitting equipment in order to prevent radio frequency interference and to provide adequate unimpaired fields of view for many of the antennas.

Only a very limited number of the required functions performed by the stations may be accomplished by ship (some telemetry) and the capital and sustaining costs involved are many times as great. The "state-of-the-art" for ships and stabilized platforms has not advanced sufficiently to either meet certain basic accuracies of the metric data to be obtained, and in many cases totally impractical from the viewpoint of area required and the costs involved.

NASA Studies Based on NSAM 300

Under the original charge received from the State Department, two out of the five ground support stations must be considered lost, namely, Peru and Chile. Under these ground rules, it appeared that a full study of network reconfiguration was necessary. This study resulted in the conclusion that satellite ground support network could be re-established with its full required capabilities if stations were established in Hawaii, and either the Fiji Islands or American Samoa. This approach not only took care of the NASA stations in the threatened sites but also supplied the support obtained from Quito.

A later State Department letter deleted Peru from the list. This caused

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a complete re-evaluation of network support capabilities. If only Chile must be considered as lost, a station in the Philippines would provide the necessary network coverage, in conjunction with the remaining existing stations. However, this Philippines station would not fit into any network plan which assumed the denial of one or more of the other South American stations.

Further Considerations

NASA is faced with the following problem. If Chile is the sole country of concern during the next approximate five years, NASA would probably make one choice. If there is any question at all concerning Peru, or Ecuador during this time period we should move toward the choice which will result in complete elimination of our dependence on South America, and will provide establishment of facilities on American territory.

Further, the whole question of Chile appears to depend on elections to be held on September 4. Santiago is a key station in the NASA networks, and much depends on whether it is available or not.

Summary of Contingency Planning

- A. Assume Chile alone is denied.
 - 1. Establish station in Philippines.
 - 2. Cost: Approximately \$7.500 million.
 - 3. Time required to implement: 27 months.
 - B. Assume Chile plus Peru and/or Ecuador are denied.
 - 1. Establish two new stations, one in Hawaii, and one in either Fiji Islands or American Samoa. A mobile station for special equatorial coverage would possibly be required.
 - 2. Cost: Approximately \$14.000 million.
 - 3. Time required to implement: 30 months.
 - 4. Note: Philippines location not useful.
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Recommendations

In the event positive action with regard to this matter is determined to be necessary, it is this Office's recommendation that NASA implement Plan B above at such time as the political outlook dictates. This would result in a Satellite Network layout that would, with the exception of Madagascar, be completely based on U.S. and British Commonwealth territories.

Edmond C. Buckley

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (INTELLIGENCE)

174-577
2R

Mr. Thomas L. Hughes
Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Tom:

In reply to your request of 3 November, in connection with your response to NSAM 300, we have arranged to have a working group of CIA, DIA, and Department of State representatives render an informal assessment of the risk of ejection from the following U.S. installations in Latin America:

- A. The USAF Eastern Test Range Missile Impact Location Station at Fernando da Noronha Island, Brazil;
- B. The Satellite Geodetic Project Doppler Tracking Station at Sao Paulo, Brazil;
- C. NASA satellite tracking and control stations at Quito, Ecuador; Lima, Peru; and Santiago, Chile.

The interagency group examined the political situations in Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. In none of the countries did it find a high degree of risk of ejection from the U.S. facilities mentioned above. However, in view of latent political and sociological problems in these and other Latin American countries it is of course impossible to predict with certainty that such ejection will not occur in the next five years.

A detailed assessment by the interagency group is attached.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ray S. Cline".

Ray S. Cline
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

Enclosure

13 November 1964

Assessment of Risk to Certain
U.S. Installations in Latin America

There is little foreseeable risk of ejection over the next few years from either the (a) USAF Missile Impact Location Station on Fernando da Noronha, Brazil, or (b) the Tracking Station at Sao Paulo. The present regime of President Castello Branco, is well disposed toward cooperation with the U.S. and other Western governments in scientific matters and is due to remain in power until March 1967. We believe that, with some concessions to expediency, Castello Branco will succeed in maintaining control through the end of his term.

In the unlikely event that conditions in Brazil should deteriorate to such a degree that the present administration would fall, a successor regime would in all probability be dominated or influenced by military leaders friendly to the U.S. The fact that the U.S. is the principal supplier of military equipment to the Brazilian armed forces is relevant.

Brazil's current emphasis on its own space program, which includes plans to launch research rockets beginning in early 1965, strengthens the conclusions that Brazil will probably continue to cooperate wholeheartedly with U.S. space efforts. NASA has an agreement with the Brazilian Space Commission for cooperation in space research and has provided the latter with equipment. Brazil also has an agreement with Argentina for joint cooperation in space research. In addition, the Brazilian government hopes to gain U.S. support for UN sponsorship of rocket launching facilities being installed in Natal which are to be used for atmospheric and ionospheric soundings.

Although the risk of ejection is slight, either of the two U.S. installations could become targets of nationalist political attacks, as did the Fernando da Noronha site during the 1960 presidential campaign. In such an event, there is little chance that the facilities would be permanently closed down or completely taken over by Brazilians, but stiff demands with regard to compensation for the "privileges" enjoyed by the U.S. might be forthcoming.

We see little chance of ejection from any one or two of the existing satellite tracking and control stations at Quito, Lima, and Santiago.

The most uncertain assessment is for the installation at Quito, where the present military junta has factional difficulties and faces elections within a year or so. Even if this junta does not last, we believe that any successor junta or military leader would not choose to expel U.S. installations. We also see little likelihood that the military would turn over control to an elected government of such violently anti-U.S. views that our installations would be in immediate jeopardy.

The political situation in Peru has stabilized in the past year or two. This situation should remain relatively calm for several years.

The recent Chilean presidential election eliminated the greatest risk to the U.S. installations when Frei defeated the Socialist-Communist candidate. The traditionally stable Chilean political situation is likely to remain so in terms of the needs of this paper and in light of the accords being worked out by the Frei government and the U.S. copper companies.

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May 19, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 301

TO: ✓ Secretary of State
✓ Secretary of Defense
✓ Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Intelligence Installations, Reference NSAM No. 300

As a corollary to the study called for in the referenced National Security Action Memorandum, the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the Secretary of Defense is requested to review and report on significant intelligence-related installations now located in politically unstable and unreliable areas, as identified by the Secretary of State.

The continuing need for such facilities should be analyzed and alternate plans should be developed against the contingency that the areas in question may become unavailable for U. S. use.

A report should be submitted to this office by June 30, 1964.

McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-65
By WJP, NARA, Date 6-10-93

cc: Mr. Bundy
Mr. Johnson
NSC Files
R. Amery - Budget 5/21
Dr. Edelson - NASE 7-7-64
Russell Ash 8-17-64

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PRESERVATION COPY

Logged June, 1964

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May 19, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 301

TO: ✓ Secretary of State
✓ Secretary of Defense
✓ Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Intelligence Installations, Reference NSAM No. 300

As a corollary to the study called for in the referenced National Security Action Memorandum, the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the Secretary of Defense is requested to review and report on significant intelligence-related installations now located in politically unstable and unreliable areas, as identified by the Secretary of State.

The continuing need for such facilities should be analyzed and alternate plans should be developed against the contingency that the areas in question may become unavailable for U. S. use.

A report should be submitted to this office by June 30, 1964.

McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 93-65

By lip, NARA, Date 6-10-93

cc: Mr. Bundy
Mr. Johnson
NSC Files

~~SECRET~~

R. Amery - Budget 5/21
Dr. Edelson - NASC 7-7-64
Russell Ash 8-17-64

Logged June 1, 1964

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 26, 1964

INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS


CIA report responding to NSAM-301
is filed in the Codeword Folder #3.

The Report is dated July 27, 1964 and was
received here in the office October 24, 1964.


Martha B.

3955

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY
G/PM

INR - ~~Thomas Hughes~~ 

For your information.


Jeffrey C. Kitchen

*Special Agent in Charge
of Telecommunications*

3062

2336

The same letter sent to
The Honorable John A. McCone
The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance

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~~SECRET~~

June 5, 1964

Dear Jim:

As required by NSAM's 300 and 301, the State Department has prepared the attached listing of politically unstable or unreliable countries by geographic regions, to be used as a basis for a review of U.S. overseas land-based facilities. For the purpose of this requirement, the term "politically unstable or unreliable" has been defined as applying to countries from which it may become desirable or necessary over the next three to five years for the United States to remove its communications, navigation, missile and space tracking and data acquisition facilities, other than those located within the physical confines of our diplomatic missions in those countries.

The evaluation of your programs in the countries on the attached listing, and your contingency plans for alternative means of maintaining these programs, will be reviewed by an inter-agency group. Their findings and recommendations by geographic region will be forwarded to the President. Africa, excluding South Africa, - which is covered by NSAM 295, - has been designated as the first region to be covered by this review, and the program recommendations on this region are due in the White House by June 30.

The Honorable
James E. Webb,
Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration.

S/S-RO

JUN 5 1964

True copy of signed original

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 03-17
By no NARA, Date 8-20-03

~~SECRET~~

It will be appreciated, therefore, if your agency can submit the results of your evaluations and alternate contingency plans to the Office of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, no later than June 15, 1964. This will enable the inter-agency group to formulate its program recommendations on Africa within the time specified, and to submit subsequent recommendations on other regions covered by this survey in appropriate sequence as determined by the inter-agency group.

Under NSAM 301, [REDACTED]

3.4
(b)(1)

[REDACTED] I understand that this report, appropriately protected because of its sensitivity, is to be coordinated with the recommendations to the White House as required by NSAM 300.

Sincerely,

/s/ Alex,

U. Alexis Johnson

Attachment

ATTACHMENT - ~~SECRET~~Countries Considered Politically Unreliable or
Unstable within Meaning of NSAM's 300 and 301Africa

Ethiopia
Libya
Kenya
Morocco
Congo*

Latin America

Chile
Bolivia
Brazil
Peru
British Guiana

Near East

Cyprus
India
Pakistan
Greece
Turkey

Far East

South Vietnam**
Laos**

* U.S. facilities in the Congo are related to UN efforts to stabilize political conditions.

** U.S. facilities in South Vietnam and Laos are directly related to our efforts to assist those countries to counter Communist aggression.

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May 19, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 301

TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Intelligence Installations, Reference NSAM No. 300

As a corollary to the study called for in the referenced National Security Action Memorandum, the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the Secretary of Defense is requested to review and report on significant intelligence-related installations now located in politically unstable and unreliable areas, as identified by the Secretary of State.

The continuing need for such facilities should be analyzed and alternate plans should be developed against the contingency that the areas in question may become unavailable for U. S. use.

A report should be submitted to this office by June 30, 1964.

McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-65

By 128, NARA, Date 6-10-93

cc: Mr. Bundy
Mr. Johnson
NSC Files

Cy Payne 6/9

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