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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	Johnson and Keeny to Bundy <i>sanitized 10/27/01 NLJ 99-110</i> TS- 2 p	6/10/64	A
#2 memo	NSAM 305 TS- 3 p <i>sanitized 4/1/13 per NLJ 99-123</i>	6/16/64	A
#3 memo	Bundy to President <i>sanitized 10/27/01 NLJ 99-110</i> TS- 1 p	6/15/64	A
#4 memo	Vance to President <i>sanitized 10/27/01 NLJ 99-124</i> TS- 54 p	3/26/64	A
#5 memo	Duplicate of #2		
#6 memo	Duplicate of #2 <i>sanitized 9-9-93 NLJ 93-65</i>		

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSAM, NSAM 305--Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorization for FY 1964

Box 5

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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June 10, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Plan for FY 1964

Although this FY 1964 Dispersal Plan is only good through June 30, and a new FY 1965 paper is now under development, we still need Presidential approval of the 1964 Plan to satisfy the legal requirement for Presidential authorization to AEC to turn weapons over to the Secretary of Defense and for the Secretary of Defense in turn to make appropriate dispersals within the United States and abroad to U. S. forces and in support of non-U. S. forces. General Lemnitzer has been calling for it.

The numbers of weapons proposed for dispersal are for planning purposes only and approval of the paper will not in itself authorize dispersal of more weapons. NSAM 143 and 197 require that the actual dispersals be approved on a case-by-case basis. We, however, could question some of the planning figures but on balance we have concluded that it would be better to go to work on the 1965 planning paper when that is completed. The little time remaining crowds us in getting the necessary legal approval. In addition, it would not be possible to attack some of the planning figures at this time without arousing the military planning community including SACEUR and the NATO military group and we suggest that this 1964 paper be finessed so that we can concentrate on the new 1965 paper.

We have included a few figures in the memorandum for the President to give him some feeling of the situation which he has in large measure inherited and which results from NATO war planning of the past 15 years. One important category of weapons included in the plan (Atomic Demolition Munitions) has not received an NSAM 197 approval (approval in principle) because it is stuck between State and Defense. This will be a tough one to handle because the Department of Defense is pressing for this weapon even though the technical studies make it of more doubtful value than previously thought.

6.1 (a)

[REDACTED] New weapons in the other major categories of increase are the deployment of MK-28 bombs, tactical artillery, Nike Hercules and some ASW. All of these will be subject to NSAM 143 determinations and can be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.


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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-110
By SJ, NARA, Date 11-8-01


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-2-

We recommend that you seek Presidential concurrence in a draft NSAM presented herewith for your signature.



Charles E. Johnson



Spurgeon Keeny

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June 16, 1964

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 305

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

The President has noted the request for nuclear weapons dispersal authorization for FY 1964 contained in the Department of Defense memorandum dated March 26, 1964, and has taken the following actions in connection therewith:

1. The Atomic Energy Commission is authorized to:

a. Transfer to the Department of Defense, on call by the Secretary of Defense or his designee, sufficient numbers of separable nuclear components and complete atomic weapons to provide in Department of Defense custody as of June 30, 1964, [redacted] separable nuclear components and complete atomic weapons and up to [redacted] non-nuclear components of capsule-type weapons;

3.4(b)(9)
6.1(a)

b. Retain, as actual AEC production permits, the balance of the authorized FY 1964 stockpile not authorized for Department of Defense custody, in the custody of the Atomic Energy Commission as JCS reserve weapons, except this quantity may be further reduced on a one-for-one basis, but [redacted] weapons to replace the weapons recalled by the Atomic Energy Commission to support modernization, quality assurance and retirement programs;

3.4(b)(9)
6.1(a)

c. Replace, on a one-for-one basis to the extent practicable, any nuclear components, complete atomic weapons, or non-nuclear components in the Department of Defense custody which become irretrievably lost or damaged beyond repair.

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SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 99-123493-65

By ch NARA, Date 3-28-13

2. The Department of Defense is authorized to:

3.4(b)(9)
b.1(a)
a. Obtain custody of [] separable nuclear components and complete atomic weapons and up to [] non-nuclear components of capsule-type weapons;

b. Disperse atomic weapons in the United States without limit providing the total number of nuclear components and complete atomic weapons in Department of Defense custody does not exceed that authorized in paragraph 2a above;

3.4(b)(9)
b.1(a)
c. Disperse to areas outside the United States in support of U. S. forces in accordance with the area totals shown in the representative FY 1964 dispersal plan contained in Appendix A attached to the memorandum for the President dated March 26, 1964, with the provision that the total for each line item may be exceeded by no more than | in the event of unforeseen contingencies, and provided the grand total dispersed outside the U. S. (areas under foreign sovereignty and areas under full U. S. control other than the U. S.) [] Such dispersals, as applicable, will be subject to yield restriction outlined in NSAM 143 and the policy with regard to Formative Action Link (FAL) devices contained in NSAM 160;

d. Disperse nuclear weapons and provide nuclear weapon support to non-U. S. forces in accordance with the current authority as tabulated in column "Non-U. S. Forces -- Authorized FY 1962-63" (Column D) of Appendix B attached to the memorandum for the President dated March 26, 1964. The nuclear weapons dispersals tabulated in column "Non-U. S. Forces--Proposed FY 1964" (Column E) of Appendix B are for planning purposes and authority for additional dispersals for the support of non-U. S. forces, over and above those currently approved, will be requested on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the provisions of NSAM 143 and NSAM 197.

3. In order to place the Dispersal Program in phase with corresponding approved stockpile compositions, the Secretary of Defense is requested to submit a FY 1965 Dispersal Plan in time for approval as soon as practicable. Subsequent Dispersal Plans will be submitted prior to the beginning of the fiscal year to which they pertain.

4.

3.4(b)(9)

6.1(a)

McGeorge Bundy

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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
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June 15, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Plan for FY 1964

The document submitted herewith is a request from the Department of Defense for approval of a Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Plan for those weapons that will be dispersed or authorized for dispersal abroad by the end of the current fiscal year. This approval is required by law. The recommended dispersal plan has been concurred in by the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission.



6.1(a)

This form of nuclear spreading is the consequence of NATO plans developed over a long period, and though this trend may be open to question, this is not the occasion for a reversal, though I have entered a general warning at the end of my instruction.

Your approval of this document for planning purposes will not remove the requirement that the Department of Defense must request your specific authorization to deploy the weapons overseas. There will therefore be a further opportunity to review these matters when they are imminent. Tactical and strategic studies now in progress, as well as possible changes in external conditions, will undoubtedly produce modifications in dispersal plans and it is anticipated that the dispersal planning for FY 1965 may show a decrease in the overall planning figure shown in the FY 1964 Dispersal Plan.

With your concurrence, I shall send the attached NSAM to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-110
By *Sj*, NARA, Date 11-8-01



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Copy 1 of 6 copies each
of 4 pages series A

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.


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MAR 26 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Request for Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorization
for FY 1964

Enclosed as Appendices A and B is the proposed Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Plan for those weapons approved in the FY 1964 stockpile for which authority is required for the Department of Defense (DoD) to obtain custody for dispersal in support of current war plans. Proposed additional dispersals in support of non-U. S. Forces are shown for planning purposes only. Your approval of the attached plan does not constitute approval in principle (NSAM 197) or approval for dispersal for the planned additional weapons proposed in support of non-U. S. forces. Appendix A contains the total numbers of atomic weapons by geographical area to which dispersal is planned. Appendix B is a detailed breakout by areas, other than the United States, of the current on-hand inventory, the FY 1962-1963 authorized dispersals (based upon FY 1961 levels in support of non-U. S. forces and amended by the approved FY 1962 extension for U. S. forces and subsequent authorizations) and the proposed dispersal of weapons in the approved 1964 stockpile. Appendix C indicates the weapons remaining in the CONUS after the proposed dispersal.



6.1 (4)

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AS AMENDED
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING:
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
SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-124
By SJ, NARA, Date 11-8-01

Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Information
Category 10

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
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6.1(a)

The build-up of the JCS reserve is subject to first providing for the requested DoD dispersal requirements.



6.1(a)

The current authority for dispersal of nuclear weapons in support of non-U.S. forces is derived from National Security Action Memorandum No. 143, as modified, and subsequent specific authorities which have been received on a case-by-case basis. This total authority for non-U.S. forces is tabulated in Appendix B under the "Authorized FY 1962-1963" dispersal columns (Column D). The requirements tabulated in Appendix B in the "Proposed FY 1964" columns for non-U.S. forces (Column E) consist of the currently authorized dispersals and planned additional dispersals. Requests for authority to disperse weapons to

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
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~ ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954,
AS AMENDED

Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Information
Category 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

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support those additional non-U. S. capabilities proposed in Column E, for which nuclear weapon support is not now authorized, will be requested on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the provisions of NSAM 143 and NSAM 197, as appropriate.



b.1(a)

While the dispersal requirements contained in the Appendices represent the best estimate of the need in support of current and proposed war plans, some flexibility in these numbers is required to provide a capability responsive to minor changes in war plans and to certain logistics and maintenance situations which could require an increase in the numbers indicated.



b.1(a)

Attached, as Enclosure 5, in summary format, is a statement of the current dispersal authority and that proposed in this new dispersal plan.

Physical security and maintenance of all weapons transferred will continue to be the responsibility of the Department of Defense. The responsibilities with regard to safety will be followed in accordance with NSAM 51 of May 8, 1961, and NSAM 272 of November 13, 1963.

In order to place the dispersal action in phase with the corresponding approved stockpile composition, the Department of Defense plans to submit a FY 1965 Dispersal Plan in time for approval prior to July 1, 1964. Subsequent Dispersal Plans will be submitted prior to the beginning of the fiscal year to which they pertain.

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~~RESTRICTED DATA~~ ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954,
AS AMENDED

Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Information
Category 10

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It is requested you approve the enclosed draft National Security Action Memorandum. I have obtained the concurrence of the State Department and the Atomic Energy Commission with the proposed Dispersal Plan.

Cyrus Vance

Enclosures 5

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~~RESTRICTED DATA~~ ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954,
AS AMENDED

Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Information
Category 10

APPENDIX A (PAGES 1-3), APPENDIX B (PAGES 4-42), APPENDIX C (PAGES 1-3), AND
ENCLOSURE 5, "SUMMARY OF NUCLEAR WEAPON DISPERSAL," HAVE BEEN
WITHHELD IN THEIR ENTIRETY UNDER
E.O. 12958, SECTIONS 1.5(a), 3.4(b)(2),(5), and 6.1(a).

UNCLASSIFIED

June 16, 1964

~~TOP SECRET RESTRICTED DATA~~

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 305

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

The President has noted the request for nuclear weapons dispersal authorization for FY 1964 contained in the Department of Defense memorandum dated March 26, 1964, and has taken the following actions in connection therewith:

1. The Atomic Energy Commission is authorized to:

a. Transfer to the Department of Defense, on call by the Secretary of Defense or his designee, sufficient numbers of separable nuclear components and complete atomic weapons to provide in Department of Defense custody as of June 30, 1964, [REDACTED] separable nuclear components and complete atomic weapons and up to [REDACTED] non-nuclear components of capsule-type weapons;

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(TS)

b. Retain, as actual AEC production permits, the balance of the authorized FY 1964 stockpile not authorized for Department of Defense custody, in the custody of the Atomic Energy Commission as JCS reserve weapons, except this quantity may be further reduced on a one-for-one basis, but [REDACTED] weapons to replace the weapons recalled by the Atomic Energy Commission to support modernization, quality assurance and retirement programs;

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

c. Replace, on a one-for-one basis to the extent practicable, any nuclear components, complete atomic weapons, or non-nuclear components in the Department of Defense custody which become irretrievably lost or damaged beyond repair.

(TS)

~~TOP SECRET RESTRICTED DATA~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 93-65

By 1-8, NARA, Date 6-29-93

SANITIZED

2. The Department of Defense is authorized to:

a. Obtain custody of [REDACTED] separable nuclear components and complete atomic weapons and up to [REDACTED] non-nuclear components of capsule-type weapons;

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(TS)

b. Disperse atomic weapons in the United States without limit providing the total number of nuclear components and complete atomic weapons in Department of Defense custody does not exceed that authorized in paragraph 2a above;

c. Disperse to areas outside the United States in support of U. S. forces in accordance with the area totals shown in the representative FY 1964 dispersal plan contained in Appendix A attached to the memorandum for the President dated March 26, 1964, with the provision that the total for each line item may be exceeded by no more than [REDACTED] in the event of unforeseen contingencies, and provided the grand total dispersed outside the U. S. (areas under foreign sovereignty and areas under full U. S. control other than the U. S.) [REDACTED] Such dispersals, as applicable, will be subject to yield restriction outlined in NSAM 143 and the policy with regard to Permissive Action Link (F/L) devices contained in NSAM 160;

(b)(1)
(TS)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(TS)

d. Disperse nuclear weapons and provide nuclear weapon support to non-U. S. forces in accordance with the current authority as tabulated in column "Non-U. S. Forces -- Authorized FY 1962-63" (Column D) of Appendix B attached to the memorandum for the President dated March 26, 1964. The nuclear weapons dispersals tabulated in column "Non-U. S. Forces--Proposed FY 1964" (Column E) of Appendix B are for planning purposes and authority for additional dispersals for the support of non-U. S. forces, over and above those currently approved, will be requested on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the provisions of NSAM 143 and NSAM 197.

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4.



(b)(1)
(TS)

McGeorge Bundy