

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 rpt	Intelligence Report TS- 40 p	undated	A
#2 memo	Bowman to Bundy TS- 1 p	1/21/65	A
#3 memo	Wheeler to SecDef TS 1 p <i>sanitized 9-2-04 NW/RAC 03-14</i> <i>more info released 5/30/18 per NLJ 14-173</i>	1/18/65	A
#3a rpt	Appendix A TS 4 p <i>sanitized 9-2-04 NW/RAC 03-14</i> <i>more info released 5/1/17 per NLJ 14-173</i>	undated	A
#4 rpt	Intelligence Report TS- 28 p	undated	A
#5 memo	NSAM 311 TS 1 p <i>open 9-9-93 NLJ 93-65</i>	7/10/64	A
#6 memo	Chase to Bundy S 1 p <i>open 12-14-99</i>	1/7/65	A
#6a rpt NOT YET OPEN!	Intelligence Report Intelligence Report TS 18 p <i>sanitized 9/15/14 per RAC</i> TS 18	12/11/64 12/11/64	A A
#7 memo	Thompson to SecState <i>open 12-14-99</i> S 1 p	1/14/65	A
#8 memo	Chase to Bundy <i>sanitized per RAC, 3/04, 9-4-09</i> TS 2 p	12/7/64	A
#10 memo	<i>open 9/21/15 per NLJ/RAC 14-106</i> Chase to Bundy <i>open 12-14-99</i> TS 1 p	3/15/65	A
#11 memo	Chase to Bundy TS 1 p	3/9/65	A
#12 memo	Duplicate of #5 <i>open 9-9-93 NLJ 93-65</i>		
#14 memo	McNamara to Bundy <i>open 12-14-99</i> TS 1 p	7/20/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSAM, NSAM 311--Review of the Problem of Assurance Against any Missile Crises in Cuba

Box 5

RESTRICTION CODES

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#15 memcon	"NSAM 311" <i>sanitized per #12, 5/03-9/14/09</i> TS 4 p open 10/8/10 per NLJ/RAC 14-107	7/21/64	A
#16 memo	McCone to Bundy S 1 p <i>sanitized 015005-26 (8/02)</i> open 9/21/15 per NLJ/RAC 14-107	7/15/64	A
#16a memo	Duplicate of #5 <i>open 9-9-93 NLJ 93-65</i>		
#16b memo	Duplicate of #16		
#16e memo	Duplicate of #5 <i>open 9-9-93 NLJ 93-65</i>		
#17 memo	Duplicate of #5 "		
#18 memo	Duplicate of #5 "		
#19 memo	Bundy to SecState, SecDef <i>open 12/1/93</i> TS 1 p	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSAM, NSAM 311--Review of the Problem of Assurance Against any Missile Crises in Cuba

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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JCSM-32-65
18N 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: NSAM 311 - Review of the Problem of Assurance
Against Any Missile Crisis in Cuba (U)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 30 December 1964, subject as above. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the inclosures to that memorandum and are in general agreement with the critical judgments and policy conclusions expressed in paragraph 2 of the cover memorandum for the Principals. There are several areas, however, with which the Joint Chiefs of Staff take exception to the judgments expressed, or to which they desire to add emphasis. They note that there are two major issues upon which they have been requested to comment - the possible political situations that might transpire should the Cubans elect to shoot down a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft; and what reconnaissance capabilities the United States has now, and should have in the future, for continued surveillance of Cuba should the U-2 aircraft overflights be terminated for any reason.

2. Because these issues are distinct and because the issue of reconnaissance requires [redacted] they are treated separately. Appendix A to this memorandum expresses the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the political issues. Their views on the operational aspects are contained in Appendix B, which, because of its sensitive nature, is being [redacted]

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

[Signature]

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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of 1 pages series "A"

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automatically declassified

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Authority NY 14-173
By CS, NARA, Date 2/8/18

APPENDIX A

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POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the draft memorandum* and submit the following views on the political implications of the judgments contained therein.

a. The conclusion that the Cubans are not likely to attempt a U-2 shoot-down fails to take into account several dangerous alternatives cited in a conclusion contained in the current National Intelligence Estimate on Cuba;** that is, ". . . we believe that Castro does not intend to force the issue until after the US elections, when he will seek UN action. If this fails, there is considerable danger that he would order a shoot-down, calculating that the US would not retaliate in force or that, if it did, the resulting hue and cry would end the overflights. An impulsive reaction by Castro or even an unauthorized shoot-down is always possible."

b. Concerning UN inspection, US experience with this type of inspection has been totally unsatisfactory. In North Korea, the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams were never able to move about freely and were stymied by the Polish and Czech "neutrals." Similarly, the inspection group in Laos has never been able to perform its work satisfactorily. The control mechanism for UN surveillance flights would in all probability be the Security Council, where the Soviet Union exercises a veto. This would mean that the entire operation, such as frequency of flights, target coverage, processing of film, and photo interpretation would be subject to a Soviet veto.

* Available through SAO channels

** NIE 85-64, 5 August 1964

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
Appendix A

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By CTS, NARA, Date 4/4/17

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c. The Organization of American States (OAS) resolution of October 1962, which supports the requirement for overflights, is a key factor in overflight considerations. The resolution prevents Castro from resolving the overflight question into a Cuba versus United States problem. The United States should not jeopardize its respected status in Western Hemisphere affairs by deviating from the established OAS position.

d. The proposal by the United States of reciprocal inspections



e. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the risk of a shoot-down of a U-2 and are prepared to implement existing plans for retaliatory action. It is of particular importance

that any retaliatory action be rapid in reaction before international opinion can gain momentum against the United States or before it could be referred to the UN.

f. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that their views be included in the paper presented to the President as follows:

(1) If Castro's efforts in the UN fail, there is a real possibility that he would order a shoot-down, calculating that the United States would not retaliate in force or that, if it did, the resulting international reactions might end the overflights. An impulsive reaction by Castro or even an unauthorized shoot-down is always possible;

(2) Inspection by the UN is not likely to be satisfactory and could result in depriving the United States of needed reconnaissance data;

(3) The OAS resolution of October 1962, which supports the requirement for overflights, is a key political factor which should be emphasized in the review;

(4) The proposal for reciprocal inspection should not be advanced by the United States nor considered as an alternate to continued unilateral overflight; and

(5) The risk of shoot-down is recognized and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are prepared for rapid implementation of existing plans for retaliatory action in such an event.

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APPENDIX B

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

(This Appendix is available through SAO Channels)

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July 10, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 311

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Review of the problem of assurance against any missile crisis in Cuba

MR. BOWDLER
TO READ & RETURN
7/14/66
Rtd 7/14/66

The President has requested that a careful study be made of all aspects of the problem of maintaining adequate assurance against an attempted reintroduction of offensive missiles into Cuba. He requests that this study be undertaken by representatives of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, with the State Department representative as chairman.

This inquiry should assess such questions as (1) the probability and prospect of a renewed Soviet attempt to introduce missiles, (2) the different levels of assurance which might be achieved by various means of obtaining information, (3) the possibility that an increase or decrease in tension with Cuba might change the urgency of the problem or the availability of various means of information, (4) the various kinds of risk which various means of assurance involve, and (5) prospective changes in the "state of the art" of different methods of surveillance.

It is expected that this group will work closely with the United States Intelligence Board, with government agencies involved in research and development, and with those responsible for policy planning. It is requested also that the chairman of the group maintain liaison with my office, through Mr. Peter Jessup and with me directly, as he thinks appropriate.

It is not expected that this review group should reach final recommendations, but rather that it should examine all aspects of this question and prepare a report showing as clearly as possible the various courses, with their premises and consequences, which may be available to the U. S. in the future. After a preliminary survey the chairman and I will agree on a completion date for this study.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 93-65

By isg, NARA, Date 11-16-92 ~~TOP SECRET~~

McGeorge Bundy

cc: Peter Jessup
Chas Johnson
for NSAM files
NSC Files

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 7, 1965

*Talk to (clerk)
Bob Brown: + Det.
Gump
Do more for us.
4:30, Wash
6*

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: NSAM 311 - Cuban Overflights

1. Secretary Rusk has called a meeting of principals for 11:30 A.M. on January 15 to discuss a paper which Tommy Thompson's committee produced on NSAM 311 - i. e. What can and should we do about our present overflights over Cuba? I have put the meeting on your calendar.

2. Within the last day or so, you should have received, via special channels, the latest version of the Thompson paper. Please let me know if you have not got it; if you haven't, I will dig it up.

attached

CC

Gordon Chase

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By rg, NARA, Date 12-14-99

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USAF REVIEWED 17 MAR 2006: SANITIZED FOR RELEASE IN PART

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DRAFT: 11 December 1964

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NRO REVIEWED 12 JUL 07 SANITIZED FOR RELEASE IN PART

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NRO QC Review/KB/05-24-07

SUBJECT: Review of the Problem of Assurance Against any Missile Crisis in Cuba (OSAM 311) REFER TO CIA

CIA REVIEWED 21-Aug-2008: SANITIZED FOR RELEASE IN PART

REFER TO USAF

REFER TO DOS

1. The Nature of the Problem.

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In examining the question of assurance against a possible missile crisis in Cuba, we have analyzed the following component elements of the problem:

- a. The minimum essential US requirement for intelligence coverage of Cuba.
- b. The likelihood that the Soviets will try to reintroduce and deploy offensive missiles in Cuba.
- c. Castro's probable actions with respect to US overflights.
- d. Handling of a Cuban complaint in the UN.
- e. Alternative US courses of action, and their implications, if the risk of a shoot-down increases.
- f. Alternative US courses of action, and their implications, in the event of an actual shoot-down.

DOS REVIEWED 03-Dec-2008: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

2. The Requirement for US Intelligence Coverage of Cuba.

- a. Although other activities within Cuba are of substantial intelligence interest, this paper has been prepared on the premise that the surveillance requirement should be determined solely by the need for timely detection of the presence of offensive missiles in Cuba. In meeting this basic requirement, ancillary intelligence obtained on other activities is regarded only as a bonus.
- b. It is our judgment that the minimum surveillance requirement now can most accurately be stated in these terms: in the absence of on-site inspection,

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jc - NARA, Date 8-14-14

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the US needs interpretable photography of about 90 per cent of Cuban territory once every four weeks.* "Interpretable photography" in this context means photography that will permit the readout of the presence of offensive missile systems, including MRBMs deployed in field sites. (A more detailed analysis of the requirement is at Annex A.) [USIB paper, 25 November 1964]

3. Likelihood of Reintroduction and Deployment of Offensive Missiles.

a. Since this paper proceeds from the premise that the US surveillance requirement should be focussed solely on insuring the ability to detect evidence of reintroduction and deployment of offensive missiles, an assessment concerning the likelihood of such Soviet action is important. We endorse the recent judgment of the intelligence community (see SMIE 85-3-64, Annex B) that:

(1) The Soviets are unlikely to reintroduce offensive missiles into Cuba in the next year or two, although such an attempt cannot be ruled out;

(2) Events elsewhere, rather than US-Cuban tensions, would probably be the controlling factor in a Soviet-Cuban decision on this issue.

* Proposed Footnote: Scheduling of missions, to achieve a sampling effect, or duplication of coverage, is not a part of the requirement. Thus, if a particular capability could produce 90 per cent coverage in a few consecutive days in the four-week period (although this is unlikely even when U-2s are used), the requirement would be satisfied.

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b. Nevertheless, US interests require that we maintain the ability to detect reintroduction and deployment. If our surveillance program were significantly reduced, it is also possible that the Soviets would be somewhat more inclined to believe that a missile deployment could be concealed. On balance, however, we still believe they would not make the attempt.

4. Castro's Challenge.

a. Castro has clearly stated his intention of challenging our U-2 flights over Cuba, and Khrushchev made promises to support this challenge. Castro has indicated that his first move will be in the United Nations; if the UN response is unsatisfactory to them, both Castro and the Soviets (prior to Khrushchev's departure from power) have indicated that a shoot-down of a US reconnaissance plane is contemplated.

b. It is our judgment that a Cuban shoot-down of a U-2 is unlikely in the immediate future, and that it is most unlikely to come without significant political warning, such as a complaint in the UN.

5. Handling of a Cuban Complaint in the UN.

a. It can be anticipated that Castro will press hard for cessation of US overflights. The US tactic should be to resist Cuban arguments (though the US would of course accept adequate UN inspection arrangements), on the basis that our continuing surveillance grows out of the 1962 missile crisis arrangements and the Cuban refusal to permit on-site inspection. With the changes in circumstances since 1962, however, the Cubans might enlist substantial support for their complaint about infringement of their sovereignty; such support might

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embolden them to try a shoot-down. The critical element in their decision is likely to be the degree of Soviet support for aggressive Cuban action; our present judgment is that the Soviets are likely to wish to avoid a confrontation with the US over Cuba.

b. If, in exchange for UN surveillance of Cuba, the US were able to offer some reciprocity (e.g., limited UN inspection of Florida ports), Castro's tactical position would be weakened. It is also possible that the USSR would be less inclined to give Castro strong support if the US had offered what appeared to provide a reasonable alternative to the use of force against our aerial surveillance. It is unlikely that an inspection system which would be acceptable to Cuba and to the UN would be as effective as our present surveillance operations. Whether Castro would be tempted to accept the reciprocity proposed is uncertain; it seems likely that minimal US conditions for adequate inspection would be unacceptable from the Cuban viewpoint. Nevertheless, the offer of such an arrangement could strengthen the position of the US in preventing a shoot-down and would provide a basis for justifying the use of force in retaliation for a shoot-down if it did occur.

c. Despite the political advantages of the above tactical approach, it could have the disadvantage of undermining the basic US position in Cuba by tending to equate their rights to inspection (which they do not now have) with our rights to overfly Cuba in lieu of ground inspection (a right we have continued to exercise). The reciprocal inspection proposal would, in our judgment, have adverse domestic political implications. In addition, since Castro would probably also insist upon including Central America within the

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reciprocal inspection proposal, this could create difficult political problems with Central American nations. (In any event, consultation with the OAS would be essential before the US advanced such a proposal.) Therefore, the US should not initially advance a proposal for reciprocal inspection. The US should be prepared to consider such a proposal only if the course of the UN debate indicates that this is an essential tactic in gaining support for our basic position. (A detailed scenario for handling the Cuban challenge in the UN is at Annex C.)

6. US Alternatives, and Their Implications, if the Risk of a Shoot-Down Increases.

a. In our judgment, current arrangements provide adequate coverage to meet our surveillance requirements, there are possible political drawbacks associated with voluntary US easing of surveillance, and, as indicated above, shoot-down of a U-2 in the immediate future is unlikely. Accordingly, the US should not consider any change in current surveillance arrangements* until either (1) some clearly preferable alternative becomes available (such as through major improvements in the state of the reconnaissance art, a development that seems unlikely for the next year or two), or (2) there is significantly increased danger of a U-2 shoot-down.

b. In view of the possibility that Castro may press his threats to shoot down a U-2, by raising the issue in the UN or through other political channels, it is important to assess the feasibility and consequences of obtaining the required surveillance coverage through other means. In addition to

* This is not, however, intended to preclude some reduction in frequency of U-2 flights provided the requirement stated above can still be met. Recent long-term weather studies indicate, for example, that for more than half of the year the requirement can be satisfied by about 6-8 U-2 flights monthly rather than the 10 or so that are now flown.

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U-2s (and on-site inspection), possible surveillance means include the following: satellites, peripheral photography, advanced aircraft, drones, balloons, SIGINT [] (SIGINT, [] value as supplements to other means,

but cannot, either individually or collectively, provide the surveillance required. They are not discussed further in this paper.) It is evident that a very large number of combinations of surveillance methods could be considered.

c. Five representative alternatives that reflect reasonably well the range of possibilities are analyzed below in terms of their intelligence, military and international political implications:

(1) Combination of Techniques I (Major Reliance on Satellites).

(a) Coverage.

(1) The required coverage of Cuba could be obtained by employing several techniques in a "package" program. Major reliance would be placed on satellite coverage (described below); this, together with peripheral photography, for which U-2s could be used and which would make a substantial contribution, would provide the area search required. More specific surveillance, such as follow-up of leads developed by satellites or other means, could be provided by sporadic U-2 flights, operating on an "as required" basis. (To the extent feasible, such sporadic U-2 flights could be programmed to avoid SAM sites, as described in paragraph 6c(2) below). The advanced aircraft (see paragraph 6c(3) below) might also be used but it would be advisable to do so, if at all, only on an intermittent basis as a limited supplement to U-2s.

Drones and balloons would not be employed in this mix because of the increased

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invitation to the Cubans to try a shoot-down (of a U-2 or drone) thus leading to a crisis.*

(11) Mi-4 photography of about 75 per cent of Cuba could be obtained monthly at an additional expense of about [] annually by a modification of existing Mi-4 operating practices. (At no increase in cost, about 57 per cent coverage of Cuba could be obtained.)**

* The capabilities of drones and balloons are described in paragraph 7b(6)(b) and (c) below.

** The modifications to "existing Mi-4 operating practices" are minor, but essential to obtaining the coverage of Cuba described, since the present Mi-4 orbital pattern covers a maximum of one-half of the island (and cannot cover a more). Required changes (assuming two flights per month) would be a choice of one of the following:

1. Fly the present orbital pattern on odd-numbered missions, covering one-half of the island and retaining the "two looks" at some priority targets that existing orbital patterns over the USSR/China area provide. Fly even-numbered missions to cover the remainder of Cuba ("fillgaps"), as well as most of the remainder of the USSR/China area, but missing coverage on this mission of some USSR/China priority targets and covering others not covered on odd-number missions. (Note: Even with existing orbits, only about one-half of the total number of priority targets is covered on each mission.)

2. Fly a nine-day synchronous orbit, as was flown on Mission 1014 (18-27 November). Practically the entire USSR/China area is searched on one mission with this type of orbit and Cuba is covered completely.

Collaterally with either choice, the orbit selected would be flown in such a manner that the satellite is over Cuba at 1000 local time -- just prior to the cumulus cloud build-up -- instead of at 1200 local time, which is the case under present practices. The extent to which this modification would affect coverage of the USSR and China requires further study.

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(iii) The KH-4 photography provides adequate ground resolution to detect and identify MRBM fixed field sites, soft MRBM sites, and soft and hard IRBM sites, provided these missiles and sites are deployed in known patterns and signatures. It is important to note, however, that an MRBM field site of the unpatterned type, such as the San Cristobal site that was discovered in 1962, probably would not be detected or identified as a missile site from KH-4 photography. By utilizing the extensive photographic base we now hold on Cuba, however, it would be possible for photo interpreters, by exceedingly careful analysis of KH-4 photography, to make a comparative terrain study and detect disturbances of the terrain of a suspicious nature. Suspicious sightings would then have to be checked out by a high resolution capability (U-2 or [] to determine if the disturbance is associated with field MRBM sites.

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of facilities is being studied [] (9 mos lead time) that will permit [] launches from Cape Kennedy that would provide interpretable photography of at least 55 per cent of Cuba from one launching per month and of at least 85 per cent of Cuba from two launchings per month. (Other world areas, including such of China, Southeast Asia, the Congo, Indonesia and the French Pacific Ocean nuclear test facility, would also be covered.)

(v) As compared with U-2 coverage, satellite coverage would be only somewhat less timely for "search" purposes. A phenomenon observed

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could be on the average 14-15 days old in U-2 photography, and would be on the average 19 days old in satellite photography. For "quick-reaction" work, however, the appeal of both types of satellite coverage suffers significantly from a lack of timeliness. There is a delay of several days (about 5-8) for capsule recovery and photo processing, and scheduling launches on short notice would be extremely difficult. Both types of coverage, however, in particular [] coverage from Cape Kennedy, would be very appealing if delays could be accepted of about 15 days from launch before results are obtained. Satellite coverage is also relatively high in cost (about [] per launch for KH-4 and [] respectively.)

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(b) Risk. Such a package program should reduce significantly, but it would not eliminate, the risk of a shoot-down of a U-2.

(c) Political Implications.

(i) The political disadvantages of such a program would be minimal if the US was willing to publicize its improved technological capabilities and the corresponding reduction in the need for U-2 flights. (The publicity required might compel the US to relax existing security restrictions regarding its observation satellites and might require the disclosure of US satellite capabilities and of some satellite photography.)

(ii) On the other hand, even though the US would continue to assert the right to overfly Cuba "as required", it might be difficult to prevent unfavorable speculation concerning US motivations. There would also probably be some political (and possibly operational) disadvantages in sporadic U-2 (or advanced aircraft) flights as contrasted to more or less routinely scheduled flights. It is possible that reducing the frequency of U-2 flights

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would have some appeal to world opinion. But in this connection, the US would presumably always claim that only the essential minimum number of flights was being made, and would seek to avoid being committed to any specific frequency. There is therefore some question as to whether the "package" program would produce strong political advantages as a result of the impact of reducing the number of flights. Moreover, since Castro's complaints are directed at our alleged violations of Cuban sovereignty, this combination of techniques would not entirely eliminate the basis for his complaints, and it is likely that his agitation would continue.

(2) Combination of Techniques II (Major Reliance on Mulberry Pattern U-2 Flights.)

(a) As a variant to Combination I above (which would employ U-2s only sporadically), main reliance could be placed on continuing, frequent, scheduled U-2 flights, but with the flight pattern altered to take advantage of current deployment of SAMs in Cuba. SAMs are now clustered around six sites in such a way that U-2s could overfly and photograph about 80 per cent of Cuba while avoiding the SAM defense perimeters. The area covered could be increased by employing peripheral photography techniques using U-2s. Such U-2 coverage could be supplemented by available satellite coverage, and by peripheral photography from aircraft flying off the coast.

(b) Such a package program would at least initially reduce significantly the risk of a U-2 shoot-down. However, if the Cubans are determined to try a shoot-down, they could move a SAM on relatively short notice (2 to 3 days) to a location outside existing defense perimeters thereby causing the risk to rise somewhat. NRO-25x1 NRO-25x1 Relocation of a major portion of the SAMs would

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require a period of several weeks.

(c) A decision to fly U-2s in such a way as to avoid the SAM sites could lead the Cubans to draw certain conclusions concerning US intent. Since Cuban sovereignty would continue to be infringed, Cuban objections to the overflights would not be lessened and indeed, the obvious attempt to avoid the SAMs might encourage the Cubans to take more adventurous actions on the assumption that the US had indicated a desire to back away from or avoid a confrontation.

(3) Substitute Advanced Aircraft for U-2 Flights.

(a) Coverage. A high-performance, high-altitude aircraft such as the SR-71 could overfly Cuba at a speed near Mach 3 and at an altitude of approximately 80,000 feet. It could provide photography comparable in quality to U-2 photography.

(b) Risk. Such an aircraft could theoretically be intercepted by an SA-2 surface-to-air missile, but the actual kill probability would be reduced by an indeterminate amount by practical operational limitations on the system such as the state of training of crews or the adequacy of available communications. There would be little risk from an SA-2 for the first mission; some small increase in risk would result from each additional mission as the defensive system acquired information and experience. There would be some military disadvantage in employing the advanced aircraft because its "radar signature" and other characteristics would be disclosed in the process. Further, the aircraft would create sonic booms in its path over Cuba that would publicize its presence, thereby serving to influence Castro to attempt a shoot-down in order to save face with the Cuban people. Although, as compared with the risks attaching to the U-2 flights, the probability of a shoot-down on the initial

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
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COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

flights of the advanced aircraft would be significantly less, the risk over a longer term (after about 10-20 missions) might be sufficiently high that the aircraft should not be committed to regular use in the Cuba surveillance program at its present stage of development.

(c) Political Implications. Substitution of the advanced aircraft would result in approximately the same political pressures as are associated with the U-2. However, in the light of the sonic boom problem Castro might feel the necessity for increasing political pressure to stop the obvious infringement of Cuban sovereignty.

(4) UN Air and/or Ground Surveillance.

(a) Coverage. If the US receives a clear signal that the risk of a shoot-down is increasing, and if the UN debate (see paragraph 5 above) has not already occurred, the US could propose that the UN provide the personnel to operate a manned aerial surveillance effort over Cuba, or a ground inspection system in Cuba, or some combination of both. For example, U-2s might be flown on behalf of the UN by Canadian pilots; or UN ground inspection teams could operate in Cuba. To be acceptable to the US, such a scheme would have to provide continuing access to the facts the US requires concerning offensive missiles in Cuba.

(b) Risk. Such an arrangement would eliminate the risk of a shoot-down of a US-manned U-2, but the US will face the possibility that, once having turned over surveillance operations to the UN, it will be unable to assure itself that adequate coverage is obtained. The US might seek to retain a residual right to overfly, but it is questionable whether, practically speaking,

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we could ever invoke it again except in the most extreme circumstances.

(c) Political Implications. The UN reaction to such a proposal cannot be predicted with certainty. There might be objections from many nations to the principle of UN flights over sovereign territory; on the other hand, there was substantial support for UN inspection in Cuba in 1962. (For political implications of a possible US offer of reciprocal inspection, see paragraphs 5b and 5c above.)

(5) Continue Current Program.

(a) Coverage. Even if the US received indications that the risk of a shoot-down was increasing, consideration should be given to continuing the current program. Current surveillance coverage meets US requirements.

(b) Risk. Continuing the current program would not reduce the risk of a U-2 shoot-down. (The risk could probably be reduced somewhat, however, by taking advantage of current SAM deployments in Cuba, as described in paragraph 6c(2) above. The risk could also be reduced by employing advanced ECM techniques. Use of ECM techniques raises possible problems of disclosure; see paragraph 7b(5) below.)

(c) Political Implications. This course of action would have the political advantage of presenting firm US determination in the face of the Cuban challenge. There might be some adverse international reaction because of the continuing risk of crisis. But a shoot-down would be a major step for Castro to undertake; he must anticipate, perhaps increasingly so since the Tonkin episode, that the US would retaliate. In this connection, although it is not

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yet possible to determine definitively the nature of Cuba's relations with the new Soviet Government, it appears probable, on balance, that the USSR will seek to avoid deeper involvement in Cuba.

7. US Alternatives, and Their Implications, After a Shoot-Down.

a. In the event that a U-2 is shot down, presently approved contingency planning calls for a prompt retaliatory strike against the SAMs; this appears to be a response appropriate to the occasion. It is possible, but seems unlikely, that the Soviets would counter-retaliate elsewhere (e.g., Turkey). It seems more probable that the Soviets would warn of consequences if the US persists with its "aggression"; and that the Cubans would seek with Soviet assistance to bring UN pressure against the US. If a shoot-down occurred and the US failed to retaliate, our position in the Cuba situation and world-wide would be severely damaged. Accordingly, our discussion of alternatives following a shoot-down begins with the premise that the US retaliates in every case; the alternatives relate to subsequent actions.

b. In this context, the five representative alternatives previously considered are analyzed below in terms of their intelligence, military and political implications. In addition, consideration is given to possible use of low-level reconnaissance, drones and balloons.

(1) Combination of Techniques I (Major Reliance on Satellites).

Coverage, risk and political implications would be essentially the same as discussed in paragraph 6c(1) above, except that it might, after a shoot-down, be relatively more advantageous to employ drones and/or balloons in the mix, (See paragraph 7b(6) below); and there would be an added possibility that the

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Cubans could claim they had induced the US to change its surveillance methods.

(2) Combination of Techniques II (Major Reliance on Walberry Pattern U-2 Flights). Coverage, risk and political implications would be essentially the same as described in paragraph 6c(2) above, except for the added possibility that the Cubans could claim they had induced the US to change its surveillance methods.

(3) Substitute Advanced Aircraft for U-2 Flights. Coverage, risk and political implications would be essentially the same as discussed in paragraph 6c(3) above.

(4) UN Air and/or Ground Surveillance.

(a) It is possible that, after a shoot-down followed by US retaliation, a UN offer to ban overflights or establish ground inspection might have some appeal. Coverage and risk would be as discussed in paragraph 6c(4) above. Political implications might be somewhat different, as indicated below.

(b) Although it could be anticipated that there would be Cuban and Soviet resistance to UN surveillance proposals, they might prefer this to escalation of the conflict. They might also conclude that it would be easier ultimately to get UN surveillance discontinued than to stop US overflights. For the US, this proposal would present a dilemma. The US could not be confident that coverage under UN sponsorship would be adequate or would continue as long as needed. (The US could, of course, protect itself to some extent by the use of satellites and peripheral photography.) On the other hand, it can be anticipated that world opinion, alarmed by the US-Cuban shootings, would apply pressure for the US to accept a seemingly adequate arrangement.

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(c) If the US had offered a reciprocal UN inspection arrangement before a shoot-down, such a proposal might well be revived by third parties after a shoot-down and US retaliation. There would doubtless ensue a complicated dispute over exact terms. During the period required for negotiation, the UN might make an interim demand for cessation of all provocative acts. Whether, under such circumstances, the US could continue overflights is uncertain; yet if the US stopped overflights, it would be difficult to resume them in the likely event that negotiations over reciprocal inspection collapsed. In this process, the US would run the risk of a serious erosion of the justification for overflying Cuba that grew out of the 1962 crisis.

(S) Continuous Current Program.

(a) Coverage. Would remain adequate.

(b) Risk. It is possible that the Cubans might shoot down a second U-2 after a US retaliatory attack on their SAMs, although this would be less likely if U-2 flights were resumed after a period of low-level reconnaissance (see paragraph 7b(6)(1) below). In this connection, the US might also consider employing advanced ECM techniques to provide protection for resumed U-2 flights. This would involve some disclosure of ECM information, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff might be requested to examine the military implications of the precise circumstances under which ECM might be employed, but such employment might well be justifiable. Another variant that could be considered after a shoot-down would be sending in a drone, possibly configured to resemble a U-2, as a test of Cuban intentions before resuming U-2 flights. As a further variant, one or more advanced aircraft flights could be employed prior to reinstitution of U-2 flights.

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(c) Political Implications. In the event of a second U-2 shoot-down, the US could intensify and expand its retaliatory strikes. Continued shoot-downs would seem to offer an unprofitable exchange for the Cubans, although such an exchange would increase the pressure on the Soviets to support the Cubans. A more probable Cuban reaction would seem to be increased efforts on their part to promote UN intervention. Continuing U-2 flights would maintain the US political position in the Cuba situation.

(6) Low-Level Reconnaissance, Drones and Balloons.

(a) Following a U-2 shoot-down and US retaliation, the US could initiate low-level reconnaissance flights over Cuba. This would be highly obnoxious to Castro, and might provoke an irrational response. However, the purpose of initiating such flights would be to provide a better basis for "compromising" on going back to high-level (U-2) flights. Low-level reconnaissance flights would of course be advantageous militarily in terms of the quality of intelligence that could be obtained.

(b) Drones alone could not provide the required quantity of coverage of Cuba unless a prohibitively large number of flights (at least 40-50 during the spring-summer period) were made monthly. Drone surveillance alone would eliminate the risk of losing a manned aircraft. Politically, resorting to drone operations alone would likely be taken as an indication of some softening of the US position. Although drones should not be employed prior to a U-2 shoot-down, they might be used advantageously as part of a mix after a shoot-down, or at least as a test of Cuban intentions before resuming U-2 flights.

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(c) Balloons can provide substantial area coverage

(about 40-70 per cent of Cuba depending upon the month) comparable to U-2 coverage in quality and at relatively low cost. Their use would involve no danger of losing a manned aircraft, but it would involve continued violation of Cuban sovereignty, which might provoke other aggressive Cuban action. In addition, unlike drones, they operate at an altitude (about 100,000 feet) at which SAMs are of little effect. While probable political reactions to balloons makes it inadvisable to employ them prior to a shoot-down, they might advantageously be included in a mix after a shoot-down.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Deputy Undersecretary

January 14, 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

THRU: S/S

FROM: G - Ambassador Thompson

SUBJECT: NSAM 311

1. John McNaughton informed me today that Mr. McNamara wished to become more directly involved in certain aspects of the NSAM 311 problem, in particular those which have been somewhat at issue between CIA and Defense. Accordingly, Mr. McNamara preferred that the meeting of principals be temporarily deferred.

2. Pending receipt of further word from DOD, I propose to take no additional action. A copy of my Committee's report on NSAM 311 has been made available to Mac Bundy as well as to the other principals, and is, therefore, available in the event unforeseen circumstances require urgent reconsideration of the issue treated in the paper.

cc: Mr. Bundy - White House
ARA - Mr. Boster

Attachment:
NSAM 311

G/PM/SWeiss/v1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By rg NARA, Date 12-14-99

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EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 7, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Cuba - NSAM 311

I talked to Sy Weiss about the progress of Ambassador Thompson's NSAM 311 study on overflights. Sy said that there are still a number of rough spots and he does not expect the Thompson paper to get to the White House in final form until about the end of the month. Sy went on to make the following points:

1. Satellites - DOD and CIA are not together on the matter of satellites; generally speaking, DOD thinks they are better than CIA does. For example, there is some disagreement as to how good satellite pictures are. Can they identify certain indicators of offensive weapons? Or can't they? What about response time? Cloud coverage?

Another problem is satellite coverage of Cuba as it might affect satellite coverage in other areas (e.g. Soviet Union, China). Then there is the matter of cost. A satellite launching costs between \$8 and \$13 million; at 25 additional launchings per year (there is a question as to whether this is the optimum number), this would be a lot of money.

2. The U-2 - There has been some discussion about reducing the number of U-2 flights; there are now 12 per month. At the present, DOD and CIA seem to agree that 6 or 8 flights per month would do the job. Sy said that we are probably flying 12 primarily to be on the safe side. The rule of thumb is 90% coverage of the island per month, and apparently 6 to 8 flights per month will do this.

3. The A-11 - Both CIA and DOD seem to agree that the A-11 is not the answer; it is not ready to go and it has sonic boom. Sy added confidentially that CIA is fussing with the language in the paper on the A-11; apparently, the findings are a little embarrassing for McCone in that the A-11 is not producing what McCone originally said it would produce.

4. Balloons - Balloons apparently can get good pictures and are tough to shoot down. On the other hand, for some reason, we can only get 40 - 70% coverage of the island (we want 90%). Also, there are failures, and a slow response time. The biggest implicit objection is that Tommy Thompson has a "thing" about

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

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NLJ/RAC 14-106

NARA, Date 08-05-2005

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this conclusion
mfs

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Mr. Bundy

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December 7, 1964

balloons. He apparently has had some bad experiences in Eastern Europe with balloons.

Sy said that one of the major objections to drones and balloons is that the Cubans would probably be less reluctant to try to knock them down; also, as with other alternatives, a change from our present course might appear as a softening of our attitude.

5. A Mix - We could use U-2's to photograph the roughly 80% of the island which is outside of SAM range; we could use other means to cover the balance.

6. General Trend of Thinking - Sy seemed to indicate that the present inclination of the Thompson group is to keep on with what we are doing until it becomes clearer that the Cubans are going to challenge us. An important consideration seems to be that we look bad to a number of different audiences if we appear to be softening.

GC

Gordon Chase

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Mr. Bundy has

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JAN 6 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: NSAM 311

The attached draft paper represents the latest version of my committee's consideration of the above subject. I have forwarded it to the Secretary with the proposal that a meeting of the principals be called in the near future for the purpose of considering it as well as for the purpose of considering what recommendations or comments might appropriately be transmitted to the President. I am, therefore, providing this copy for your information and in anticipation of your eventual participation in the meeting of the principals.

Llewellyn E. Thompson
Acting

Attachment

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 9, 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Lunch with President -
Item for McNamara

1. At lunch today you may want to give Secretary McNamara a needle on the side and ask him about the NSAM 311 exercise (Cuban Overflights). Al Friedman in DOD tells me that this one has been hung up in DOD now for some time. One reason may be that McNamara still has some questions about the requirements for intelligence in Cuba (and therefore the capabilities we need to cover these requirements). Another reason is probably that, with Vietnam cooking, NSAM 311 has been pushed to a back burner.

2. While I realize NSAM 311 (issued in July, 1964) is not a terribly pressing problem, we should probably keep moving on it. Al Friedman agrees that the best way to have this happen is a needle from you to McNamara.

6C
Gordon Chase

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Authority NLJ-015-006-2-4
By abw/jc, NARA, Date 2-24-09

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 15, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: NSAM 311 (Cuban Overflights)

1. I refer to your comment at staff meeting this morning to the effect that McNamara told you that he is not holding up NSAM 311.
2. I talked to DOD's Al Friedman, who once again indicated his understanding (reportedly from Vance) that DOD still has a "job to do" on NSAM 311 and that the ball is still in DOD's court (apparently *also* involving McCone).
3. I told Al gently that there seemed to be some crossed wires - i. e., Secretary McNamara apparently did not know that DOD was holding the ball while, in fact, it apparently was. I suggested that he might want to clear this up and give me a call. I indicated that I was not trying to inject a note of urgency into the situation, but was simply trying to find out the location of the ball.
- ✓ 4. I will keep you informed.

6C
Gordon Chase

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By 18, NARA, Date 12-14-99

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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July 10, 1964

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 311 **DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 93-65

By SP, NARA, Date 11-16-92

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Review of the problem of assurance against any missile crisis in Cuba

The President has requested that a careful study be made of all aspects of the problem of maintaining adequate assurance against an attempted reintroduction of offensive missiles into Cuba. He requests that this study be undertaken by representatives of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, with the State Department representative as chairman.

This inquiry should assess such questions as (1) the probability and prospect of a renewed Soviet attempt to introduce missiles, (2) the different levels of assurance which might be achieved by various means of obtaining information, (3) the possibility that an increase or decrease in tension with Cuba might change the urgency of the problem or the availability of various means of information, (4) the various kinds of risk which various means of assurance involve, and (5) prospective changes in the "state of the art" of different methods of surveillance.

It is expected that this group will work closely with the United States Intelligence Board, with government agencies involved in research and development, and with those responsible for policy planning. It is requested also that the chairman of the group maintain liaison with my office, through Mr. Peter Jessup and with me directly, as he thinks appropriate.

It is not expected that this review group should reach final recommendations, but rather that it should examine all aspects of this question and prepare a report showing as clearly as possible the various courses, with their premises and consequences, which may be available to the U. S. in the future. After a preliminary survey the chairman and I will agree on a completion date for this study.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


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21 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: NSAM 311

Mr. McCone has appointed Ray Cline as his representative on the Hughes study group. DOD, as you know, will use McNaughton.



Peter Jessup

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

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Honorable McGeorge Bundy
White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mac:

DOD is in receipt of National Security Action Memorandum No. 311.
We are fully aware of the importance of this study.

Obviously, much of the critical input will be a Defense responsibility.
Accordingly, I have established a working group within the building
to compile the pertinent data and present it to the interagency group
representating State, Defense and CIA.

I have asked John McNaughton to be my representative on the inter-
agency group.

Sincerely,

Bob,

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Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30
By RG, NARA, Date 12-14-99

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Page 1 of 1 Pages
Sec Def Cont Nr. X - 4236

~~Rowen - Mr. Rowen~~
✓ Bundy
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G/PM

July 21, 1964

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: NSAM 311

Holif
for
lunch
tomorrow

Participants

State: Ambassador Thompson
Seymour Weiss
CIA: Mr. Cline

Defense: Mr. Rowen
General Vogt
Mr. Friedman

1. Ambassador Thompson indicated he thought it would be useful to have a preliminary discussion of where we stood on the NSAM 311 problem.

2. Mr. Cline reported that two groups had been established. The first would essentially be a sub-group which would limit itself to reporting on capabilities for collection of intelligence data. It would not attempt to make broad assessments of the implications to be drawn from the capabilities report. The regular national intelligence group will then address itself to the broad estimates required, particularly to item (1) in paragraph 2. of NSAM 311. He speculated that the findings would probably not be conclusive especially on the question of capabilities. This would present the Thompson group with the necessity for offering policy judgments especially in connection with the question of risks involved. He indicated that he would send the more detailed terms of reference (which are now being worked on) to Ambassador Thompson.

3. On the question of timing, Mr. Cline stated that he thought approximately September 1 would be the minimum required for an acceptable job by USIB. Ambassador Thompson indicated that he proposed to discuss the question of timing with McGeorge Bundy at lunch this week. It was his own view, however, that

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NLJ/APC 14-107

3y 11/18 NAR, Date 07-01-2016

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September 1 would be too late unless interim papers were available so that the Thompson group could begin its process of policy assessment. Mr. Rowen agreed and Mr. Cline indicated that he believed that initial drafts could be made available in two or three weeks.

4. Mr. Rowen asked whether, in connection with item (5) of NSAM 311, the NRO work would be taken into account. Mr. Cline confirmed that it would. Mr. Rowen went on to state that he thought a number of specific questions with regard to capabilities should be addressed. For example, how well can satellites do the job; what can be seen; how often are they required; what is the cost involved; what problems of lead time are presented; etc. Mr. Cline agreed and stated that the previous view had been that satellites were not a useful way of gathering the requisite intelligence; he suspects that the current study would reconfirm this conclusion. He went on to note, however, that the larger question was how much confidence could be assigned to whatever the estimate of intelligence gathering capability comes up with. He offered the opinion that the USIB reaction would probably be "somewhat fuzzy around the edges" in response to this issue.

5. Ambassador Thompson stated that on the basis of his discussions with the Secretary, it was his feeling that the principals would wish themselves to consider the policy issues which emerged from the study. The task of the Thompson group would be to present the range of policy implications and alternative courses of action for the principals to consider. The underlying motivation was to present to the President the full range of alternatives so that if, as seems possible, he is faced with a critical decision by this fall, he would have the full knowledge of the options available to him.

6. Ambassador Thompson also noted that one matter not explicitly covered within the five points of NSAM 311 was the political track which the Cuban problem may follow. He speculated that if the Cubans received support in the UN for their complaints against the US they might more readily risk an

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overt action against U-2 over-flights. This aspect of the problem should be developed by IO.

7. Mr. Cline offered the view that the Soviets would probably not reintroduce missiles at this time but would instead attempt to cool the Cubans down to make continued US over-flights politically more difficult. Mr. Rowen agreed, but, referring back to the earlier conversation, raised a question as to whether the study would in fact demonstrate that the U-2 was as critically required as had previously been assumed. In this connection, Mr. Cline stated that the question of whether the over-flights justification was to be judged solely in terms of missile intelligence or whether other data gathering was to be considered would eventually have to be addressed. The consensus seemed to favor addressing the broader question.

8. General Vogt raised the question as to whether it might not be useful to identify additional questions of a policy nature. He cited, for example, the question of the political implications which might be drawn from a US cessation of over-flight activity. In a similar vein, Ambassador Thompson cited the question of possible precedence against the use of over-flights in other areas if the US were to cease in case of Cuba. It was agreed that identification of other possible questions would be useful. General Vogt agreed to supply a suggested list to Ambassador Thompson. It was also agreed that any suggestions along these lines should be sent to Mr. Cline so that they might be considered in the USIB context.

9. Ambassador Thompson indicated that it had been suggested that he convey to Dobrynin the US view that periphery over-flights were not adequate. Ambassador Thompson indicated that he had deferred his presentation in view of the uncompleted state of NSAM 311. There was general agreement that it was desirable not to respond further until NSAM 311 was completed. (Dobrynin will be in Russia until September.)

10. Ambassador Thompson asked whether the USIB consideration would include the possibility of a UN inspection arrangement. Mr. Cline said he did not know but thought it should

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and would explicitly propose that it do so.

11. Ambassador Thompson, emphasizing the entire sensitivity of this subject matter, indicated that he had personally speculated on the question of whether an offer for a reciprocal Cuban inspection of Florida ports (or perhaps over-flights inspection as suggested by Mr. Cline) in exchange for on-site US inspection in Cuba might not present the Cubans with a difficult problem. They would probably reject such a proposal but this would then make it more difficult for them to justify to the Russians a shoot down of a U-2. General Vogt questioned whether it would be possible, logically, to limit the Cuban inspection to Florida ports. Mr. Weiss questioned whether domestically such a proposal could be made acceptable. Ambassador Thompson stated this would be something which only the President could decide. Mr. Cline indicated that among other things we would have to be clearer in our own minds exactly what the US meant by "on-site inspections."

12. Ambassador Thompson stated that he would report further after his luncheon conversation with McGeorge Bundy.

cc: S
ISA - Mr. Rowen
CIA - Mr. Cline
WH - McGeorge Bundy

Approved: G - Ambassador Thompson
7/22/64

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
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

15 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

This will acknowledge yours of July 10th transmitting NSAM-311. I am designating Mr. Ray Cline to represent me on the group established to undertake the studies ordered by your memorandum.

In addition, I expect to inform the United States Intelligence Board of this NSAM at our meeting on Wednesday, July 15th, and will arrange appropriate USIB support for the study group.


JOHN A. McCONE
Director

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / RAC 14-107

By LCB NARA, Date 09-01-2015

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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July 10, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 311 **DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-65

By ing, NARA, Date 11-16-92

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Review of the problem of assurance against any
missile crisis in Cuba

The President has requested that a careful study be made of all aspects of the problem of maintaining adequate assurance against an attempted reintroduction of offensive missiles into Cuba.

He requests that this study be undertaken by representatives of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, with the State Department representative as chairman.

This inquiry should assess such questions as (1) the probability and prospect of a renewed Soviet attempt to introduce missiles, (2) the different levels of assurance which might be achieved by various means of obtaining information, (3) the possibility that an increase or decrease in tension with Cuba might change the urgency of the problem or the availability of various means of information, (4) the various kinds of risk which various means of assurance involve, and (5) prospective changes in the "state of the art" of different methods of surveillance.

It is expected that this group will work closely with the United States Intelligence Board, with government agencies involved in research and development, and with those responsible for policy planning. It is requested also that the chairman of the group maintain liaison with my office, through Mr. Peter Jessup and with me directly, as he thinks appropriate.

It is not expected that this review group should reach final recommendations, but rather that it should examine all aspects of this question and prepare a report showing as clearly as possible the various courses, with their premises and consequences, which may be available to the U. S. in the future. After a preliminary survey the chairman and I will agree on a completion date for this study.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

July 10, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 311 **DECLASSIFIED**

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-65

By sig, NARA, Date 11-16-92

SUBJECT: Review of the problem of assurance against any
missile crisis in Cuba

The President has requested that a careful study be made of all aspects of the problem of maintaining adequate assurance against an attempted reintroduction of offensive missiles into Cuba. He requests that this study be undertaken by representatives of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, with the State Department representative as chairman.

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McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

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July 10, 1964

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 31 **DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

REF 93-65

By 128, NARA, Date 11-16-92

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Review of the problem of assurance against any missile crisis in Cuba

The President has requested that a careful study be made of all aspects of the problem of maintaining adequate assurance against an attempted reintroduction of offensive missiles into Cuba. He requests that this study be undertaken by representatives of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, with the State Department representative as chairman.

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McGeorge Bundy

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cc: Peter Jessup
Chas Johnson
for NSAM files
NSC Files

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July 10, 1964

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 311 **DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-65

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

By W.D., NARA, Date 11-16-92

SUBJECT: Review of the problem of assurance against any missile crisis in Cuba

The President has requested that a careful study be made of all aspects of the problem of maintaining adequate assurance against an attempted reintroduction of offensive missiles into Cuba. He requests that this study be undertaken by representatives of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, with the State Department representative as chairman.

This inquiry should assess such questions as (1) the probability and prospect of a renewed Soviet attempt to introduce missiles, (2) the different levels of assurance which might be achieved by various means of obtaining information, (3) the possibility that an increase or decrease in tension with Cuba might change the urgency of the problem or the availability of various means of information, (4) the various kinds of risk which various means of assurance involve, and (5) prospective changes in the "state of the art" of different methods of surveillance.

It is expected that this group will work closely with the United States Intelligence Board, with government agencies involved in research and development, and with those responsible for policy planning. It is requested also that the chairman of the group maintain liaison with my office, through Mr. Peter Jessup and with me directly, as he thinks appropriate.

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McGeorge Bundy

~~TOP SECRET~~

cc: Peter Jessup
Chas Johnson
for NSAM files
NSC Files

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TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Review of Overhead Reconnaissance of Cuba

In order to carry out the President's instruction, would you designate a representative to participate in an interdepartmental group, to be chaired by the State Department representative, which will review all technical and policy aspects of the overhead reconnaissance of Cuba in the light of the current international situation, changing intelligence requirements, and the operational readiness of additional reconnaissance methods.

The group will work closely with the United States Intelligence Board, those Government agencies involved in research and development and those responsible for policy planning. Its comprehensive report should be available for the President this fall.

McGeorge Bundy

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *rg*, NARA, Date *12-14-99*