

Bureau of the Budget

ROUTE SLIP

TO

*Gordon Chase*

Take necessary action ☐

Approval or signature ☐

Comment ☐

Prepare reply ☐

Discuss with me ☐

For your information ☐

See remarks below ☐

FROM

*JW Clark*

DATE

*4/7/65*

REMARKS

*These are to replace  
copies I gave you  
this afternoon. Please  
bring those to the meeting.  
Thanks -*

*JWC*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSAM - 15  
F 15  
9

AGENDA FOR MEETING WITH MR. SMITH

1. Present arrangements and responsibilities for control of documents.
  - a. How are papers of various classification handled?
  - b. When were present arrangements developed? How often reviewed?
2. How communications are used by President and staff for various kinds of matters--
  - a. plans for more secure communications.
3. Understandings as to responsibility for various aspects of security--documents, communications, control of visitors, etc.
4. Suggestions to steering group as to problem areas.
5. Other studies which bear upon this problem.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

✓  
16

March 26, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: BOB's Communications Security Study

1. A draft of BOB's study on communications security is expected to be complete by Thursday, April 1. Kermit Gordon is having a meeting at 10:00 A.M. on Saturday, April 3, to review the draft and, if appropriate, to reshape it. He would like you to be present, if at all possible.

OK // 2. I have checked with Alice and have tentatively blocked out the time on your calendar. Is this O.K.?

GC

Gordon Chase

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By out, NARA, Date 2-6-92

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET -~~  
EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

RSIM  
3/5

file 17

March 20, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Counter-Audio Survey

1. As you know, the BOB study group is in the process of conducting a comprehensive counter-audio survey of the White House. This survey, which will take a couple months, will not hold up the submission, during the first half of April, of the BOB group's main report to the President on the security of communications in the White House. When the results of the counter-audio survey come in, they will be submitted as an addendum to the main report.

2. I asked Jim Clark to spell out for us the contents of the counter-audio survey which is now taking place. He has done so in the attached memo.

of

GC

Gordon Chase

cc: Mr. Valenti  
Mr. Watson

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By DET, NARA, Date 2-6-82

SECRET - EYES ONLY

1112

~~SECRET~~

17a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

March 19, 1965

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR GORDON CHASE

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

Subject: Counter-Audio Survey

By ind, NARS, Date 2-11-80

The counter-audio team, under the leadership of Bob Bouck of Secret Service, now consists of ten men as follows: State - 1; Secret Service - 3; CIA - 1; Army - 3; and Air Force - 2. To handle the complex telephone situation, we have, since my memorandum of last week, added three men from the military.

This past week was devoted primarily to organization. The team assembled for orientation Monday, "walked through" the White House on Tuesday morning, and conducted a preliminary sweep of Presidential quarters on Tuesday afternoon and evening. On Wednesday and Thursday, the basic program was established and equipment was assembled.

There will be three phases to the comprehensive survey:

1. Intensive radio frequency (RF) checks for clandestine transmitters began on Wednesday and will continue through the course of the survey.

2. Telephone circuits will be checked to see that (1) there are no unusual transmissions or energies on the lines, and (2) there are no taps on lines or terminals within the White House. Also, power and plumbing lines will be checked as possible information carriers. These checks now under way will be conducted primarily in basement areas and will continue during the course of the survey.

3. Thorough physical search of sensitive areas (offices and quarters) will include, for example, examination of walls, light fixtures, telephone instruments, desks, furniture, etc. This involves use of highly specialized equipment, e.g., mike detectors (a new Air Force development), x-ray, fluoroscope, line fault analyzer (to detect unusual connections or appearances), infra-red viewer, ultrasonic receiver (for water pipes), etc. Walls, doors, and windows will be checked for sound leaks.

The physical inspection of sensitive areas (item 3. above) will be conducted at night and will proceed as rapidly as possible, consistent with the thoroughness required. The Presidential and other living quarters will be completed by working through this weekend. The first floor of the West Wing, starting with the President's office, will be completed by the end of next week (Sunday, March 28). Next priority will be given to Mr. Bundy's area,

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 4  
DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

~~SECRET~~

2

followed by the second floor West Wing and the pertinent areas of the East Wing. The total survey will run about two months.

Several factors account for the time required. First, the White House is a very complex facility with a great deal of old wiring and conduit, which, at the present time, is unmapped. Considerable time will be devoted to such mapping and establishing a base for an effective continuing counter-audio program.

Even after the survey, there can be no absolute assurance that the White House will be 100 percent "clean." However, it will be given the best check possible by highly trained people using latest equipment. A strong continuing program is required.

*JWC*  
JAMES W. CLARK

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

1058

18

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

March 16, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHASE

Subject: Use of Telephone Information From C&P

Your memorandum of March 1, 1965, contained certain stipulations as to the use of the telephone information submitted by C&P. It appears essential to us that this information, particularly the cable diagrams and description of direct lines which by-pass the switchboards, be available to the members of the special counter-audio team now beginning its comprehensive survey. If this information were not available, the team would have to develop it to do a meaningful job and to provide a basis for any effective and continuing counter-audio program. The team will not concern itself with the telephone service to private residences.

The proposed use of the information is consistent with the stipulation that a minimum number of people connected with our study will have access to the telephone documents on a strict "need-to-know" basis.

The survey team, under the supervision of Bob Bouck, is comprised of four specialists from the intelligence community and two members of the Secret Service. It is expected that the team will start inspection of the telephones and related areas as soon as possible this week.

*JWC*  
JAMES W. CLARK

*OK  
Clark  
inform*

*Clark will provide us  
with a list of people who  
have seen the document  
at the time he returns  
document to this office.*

*GC*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By inf, NARS, Date 2-11-80

DOWNGRADED FROM CONFIDENTIAL;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 25 YEARS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1058

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

March 16, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHASE

Subject: Use of Telephone Information From C&P

Your memorandum of March 1, 1965, contained certain stipulations as to the use of the telephone information submitted by C&P. It appears essential to us that this information, particularly the cable diagrams and description of direct lines which by-pass the switchboards, be available to the members of the special counter-audio team now beginning its comprehensive survey. If this information were not available, the team would have to develop it to do a meaningful job and to provide a basis for any effective and continuing counter-audio program. The team will not concern itself with the telephone service to private residences.

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The survey team, under the supervision of Bob Bouck, is comprised of four specialists from the intelligence community and two members of the Secret Service. It is expected that the team will start inspection of the telephones and related areas as soon as possible this week.

(Signed) James W. Clark

JAMES W. CLARK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By ing, NARS, Date 2-11-80

DOWNGRADED AND DECLASSIFIED;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 10 YEARS

~~SECRET~~



NSAM 315  
Communications

20

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 12, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Ted Clifton's "Bugging" Speech

1. Attached is a ticker quoting Clifton in Texas as saying, among other things, "Bugging is a big problem we have to handle. I have found many efforts to bug the White House." According to Clifton, the story is highly distorted and inaccurate.
2. Laitin has talked to UPI, and UPI has agreed to rewrite the story. According to Laitin, this amounts pretty much to killing it.
3. Kermit Gordon apparently talked to Bill Moyers about the subject and the possibility of surfacing BOB's "communications efficiency study" may have been raised to show how alert we are. They agreed that they would certainly do nothing until Tuesday; this would give them a chance to see whether the story grows over the weekend.
4. No one seems to be pushing the surfacing of the BOB study, and I think this is dead right. Such a surfacing would only lead to more questions and would tend to confirm the story that there is bugging in the White House. It seems to me that, if we do get a problem from this one, we should simply take the line (a) that we know of no bugging attempts and (b) that, of course, we are always on the alert for all sorts of situations that might compromise the White House. In response to the question, "How are you alert?" we would say tactfully that this is not really anybody's business.
- ✓ 5. There is nothing for you to do on this one. I will keep you informed in the event this turns into something.

DECLASSIFIED

6C  
Gordon Chase

Authority NLJ-015-005-004/6  
By plg, NARA, Date 3-25-05

SECRET

20a

UPI-113

(WHITE HOUSE--SNOOPING)

LUBBOCK, TEX.--MAJ. GEN. CHESTER V. CLIFTON, MILITARY AIDE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON, SAID TODAY THAT THERE HAVE BEEN MANY ATTEMPTS BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND EVEN BUSINESSMEN TO "BUG THE WHITE HOUSE" WITH EAVESDROPPING DEVICES.

SPEAKING AT THE 35TH SOUTHWEST JOURNALISM CONGRESS FOR STUDENTS AND TEACHERS, CLIFTON SAID:

"BUGGING IS A BIG PROBLEM WE HAVE TO HANDLE. I HAVE FOUND MANY EFFORTS TO BUG THE WHITE HOUSE."

CLIFTON SAID THE WHITE HOUSE COMBATS THESE ATTEMPTS TO SNEAK LISTENING DEVICES INTO THE NATIONJS CAPITOL BY A HIGHLY AMPLIFIED WAVE LENGTH SYSTEM.

THE WAVE LENGTH SYSTEM IS SET UP THROUGHOUT THE WHITE HOUSE.

THE ELECTRONIC WAVE IS HOOKED UP WITH A MUSIC SYSTEM AND WHEN THE PRESIDENT TALKS ON THE PHONE HE JUST TURNS UP THE MUSIC.

3/12--EG205PES

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VALENTI

SUBJECT: Communications Survey - Telephones

1. As you know, the BOB study group is taking a hard look at the White House telephone system from the point of view of security. During this phase of the study, special attention will be paid to the telephone service between the White House and the people who seem most directly concerned with the President's sensitive business - i.e., the Vice President, Rusk, McNamara, Gen. Wheeler, McCone, Ball, Vance, Bundy, Moyers, Watson, Reedy, and you. *Busby*

2. If you feel that there are others who talk to the President frequently on sensitive matters and whose lines (either on or off the White House or Signal switchboard) you think should be given special treatment, please let me know. I will have them added to the list.

*GC*  
Gordon Chase

cc: Mr. Bundy

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *hlg*, NARA, Date 3-25-05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Counter-Audio Survey of White House

1. Attached is a memo from Elmer Staats informing us that the BOB study group, as a part of its special study, will initiate a comprehensive counter-audio survey of the whole White House.

2. I have talked to Jim Clark about this one, and think it's a good idea. The survey is clearly within the bounds of this group's work and is clearly an important thing for the group to do.

*013*  
*GC*  
Gordon Chase

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By DC NARA, Date 2-6-92

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

22a

MAR 2 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY


Subject: Counter-Audio Survey of the White House

As a part of the special study now under way, it appears desirable to initiate a comprehensive counter-audio survey of the whole White House. Largely, for lack of personnel, previous surveys have been limited in scope and area of coverage.

The Secret Service will be asked to conduct this survey and to report its findings to this office through the special study group. For the purposes of the survey, the personnel and equipment available to the Secret Service will be augmented as appropriate by resources from other agencies in the intelligence community.

It is expected that the comprehensive survey will run about two months. The survey will be conducted so as to have almost no effect on White House staff. In key areas, work will be done when offices are not in use.

The collection of the considerable amount of material required for the study, particularly in the telephone area, makes it necessary to extend the reporting date contemplated in NSAM 315 to April 1. The study report need not be held up pending completion of either (a) the comprehensive counter-audio survey, or (b) the TEMPEST (compromising emanations) survey of crypto communications at the White House or the ranch. When the results of these surveys are available, they will be reviewed and submitted, with any appropriate comments or recommendations, as addenda to the main report.



ELMER B. STAATS  
Deputy Director

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 05-48  
By *isl*, NARA, Date 3-4-08

~~SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

*File ASAM 315*  
*(original in*  
*Cuba Misc*  
*Memos)*

Mr. Bundy

-2-

*23* March 2, 1965

it is desirable to maintain the CIA paramilitary capability which is presently on the shelf. CIA will probably say "no" (fish or cut bait) and State will probably say "yes" (with world scene hotting up, it may be good to have this capability in reserve). Third, State, CIA, and DOD may ask permission to offer some low-risk assistance to the new exile group, RECE (Oliva and Freyre). I am against but thus far I seem to be alone. My memo to John Crimmins on the subject is attached at Tab 4.

- ✓ 7. Communications Security Survey - The BOB study group has finished with the Ranch and has completed about 2/3 of the Washington portion of its work. The balance should go fairly quickly in view of the fact that we recently blasted loose the information which the group needed on the telephone system at the White House and EOB. The group will probably not examine the emergency locations. There is not much there that they can usefully do and it does not seem worth the time and effort to override Ted Clifton's objections; besides, this less urgent task can be done at some future date.
- ✓ The group is running behind schedule (report due on March 1). They asked for another month, and I gave it to them; I'm fairly confident they will meet the new deadline.

*GC*  
Gordon Chase

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 05-67  
By isl, NARA, Date 9-14-05

~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

✓  
24  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 2, 1965

Mr. Bundy,

Re your comment on the attached -  
Nothing for you to do now. Jack  
Valenti responded favorably to the  
memo on Monday evening, and all  
the necessary information has  
been released to the BOB study  
group.

GC  
Gordon Chase

~~SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

March 1, 1965

*Mr. Bundy*  
*gc: 24a*  
*tell me if I have*  
*to do anything on*  
*this*

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VALENTI

SUBJECT: Communications Efficiency - Telephones

1. The following is an add-on to my memo to you of February 25 and is in accordance with your Saturday request for more information on the question of whether or not there is a real need to pass over to the BOB study group certain material pertaining to the telephone system.
2. To recapitulate briefly, the BOB group, set up at White House direction, is in the last stage of its work. It has studied the communications security problem (including telephones) at the Ranch and completed about 2/3 of the Washington portion of its work.
3. A major task remaining for the BOB group is to assess the telephone system at the White House and EOB from a security and privacy point of view. No telephone system today can be considered completely secure unless it uses encryption or "secure voice" techniques. However, the object of this assessment is (a) to ensure that all reasonable steps are being taken to make conversations on this particular system as private and secure as possible and (b) to inform the users of the degree of risk involved at various points in the system.
4. In order to make its study, the BOB group asked the C & P, in January, to describe the system. First, the group asked for information giving the location, in the White House and in EOB, of the cable routings and of such equipment as wiring terminals and key relay equipment. This information was recently supplied to the group under appropriate security safeguards. Second, the group asked the C & P to describe (a) the location of all the phones which are served by the various White House switchboards and (b) the origins and terminations of direct lines out of the White House which do not go through a switchboard - e.g., audio, video, radio lines. This information, which is contained in the attached document, has not yet been supplied to the group.

3.3  
(b)(4)(8)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 05-67  
By *isl*, NARA, Date *9-14-05*

~~SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

Mr. Valenti

-2-

March 1, 1965

5. In essence, the problem with the attached document is that, among other things, it lists a number of phones at private addresses. The question arises as to whether or not some of these are sensitive in a political sort of way and whether or not we want to give such addresses to the BOB study group.

6. Over the weekend, I talked at some length with Jim Clark about the real needs of the study group as opposed to the group's "nice to know" needs. There appear to be the following alternative ways of handling the problem of private addresses.

Option A - We can give the group the entire book on an unamended basis.

This, of course, would be best from a purely security point of view.

First, while it is hard, at this early stage of the telephone study, to know just how much any deletions are going to hurt the findings, generally speaking, it is probably true that it is difficult to get the best possible assessment of a telephone system without knowing what the system is in its entirety. Second, it can be argued that the President would be interested in the security of the phone of anyone who, in the first instance, is important enough to have a line through a White House switchboard.

In favor of this option, one might also argue that there is no good reason for not passing all the information to the group. First, the very few people (3 or 4) who would be looking at the information are highly secure types (e.g., NSA, CIA). Second, the group, in the course of its study, has already necessarily been involved deeply in White House matters and has behaved in a secure, quiet, and responsible way. Third, WHACA, our experts, do not object to passing the information to the BOB group.

Option B - You can delete any entries that you don't want known (you could ensure the security of the numbers by instructing the operators accordingly). In this regard, if the addresses mean nothing to you on their own, you could instruct the operators to prepare a list of names of the people at the private addresses. Or, if you can see no problem with my knowing the information and you don't want to be bothered yourself, you can instruct me to get in touch with the operators and bring you a list of the private owners of switchboard numbers.

This option would presumably mean the deletion of a handful of entries and should not affect the BOB study appreciably. (My own horseback guess is that the number of really sensitive numbers will be zero. Why give such sensitive people a switchboard number when the President can simply call them through the regular phone system?)

Mr. Valenti

-3-

March 1, 1965

Option C - We can delete all the entries with private addresses except those belonging to high-level government people or of others we specifically want assessed for security (e. g., you, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Moyers, Fortas - if he has one). My further talks with Jim Clark indicate that this option will probably not hurt the BOB study too much; at the same time, if we decide to take this option, we should probably make it clear to the BOB group that they should come back at us again (with appropriate justification) if they find, upon studying the information they do receive, that they need something more about the phones at private addresses in order to come up with a first-class study.

7. How do you choose?

\_\_\_\_\_ Give the BOB group the attached unamended book under the strictest security provisions.

\_\_\_\_\_ I am making some deletions.

\_\_\_\_\_ Get me a list of the people who live at the listed private addresses and then I will make some deletions.

\_\_\_\_\_ Delete all private addresses except those belonging to high-level government officials or to others we specifically want assessed for security. BOB should come back for more (with appropriate justification) if they find, upon studying the information they do receive, that they need to know something more about the phones at private addresses in order to come up with a first-class study.

Gordon Chase

cc: Mr. Bundy



SECRET

March 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CLARK

SUBJECT: Telephone Information from C & P

1. On February 28 and March 1, 1965, I passed to you two binders which were prepared by C & P and which contain such information as (a) the location, in the White House and EOB, of the cable routings and of such equipment as wiring terminals and key relay equipment; (b) the location of all the phones which are served by the various White House switchboards; and (c) the origins and terminations of direct lines out of the White House that do not go through a switchboard - e.g., audio, video, and radio lines.
2. As per our conversation, this information is passed to you with the following stipulations:
  - (a) The documents will be studied in EOB - either Room 335, Room 446, or the NSC Conference Room. They will not be removed from the building.
  - (b) The minimum number of people, on a strict "need to know" basis, will have access to the documents.
  - (c) No copies will be made of any of the documents. Neither will any of the documents appear as text or appendices to your study group's report.
  - (d) The documents will be returned to this office, intact, when you are finished with them.

Gordon Chase

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By je/rq, NARA, Date 3-25-05

MARCH 1, 1965

MEMO TO: MR. HOPKINS  
FROM: MISS CROWE -- TELEPHONE LIST REQUESTED.

27

OFFICES:

SECY RUSK  
SECY DILLON  
SECY MC NAMARA  
ATTY GEN KATZENBACH  
PMG GRONOUSKI  
SECY UDALL  
SECY FREEMAN  
SECY CONNOR  
SECY WIRTZ  
SECY CELEBREZZE  
GEN HAROLD JOHNSON - DEFENSE  
GEN WHEELER  
ADM DAVID MCDONALD - NAVAL OPERATIONS  
DIR WEBB  
DIR GORDON  
MR. ELMER STAATS  
MR. ED MCDERMOTT  
GEN CARTER  
SECY VANCE  
AMB THOMAS MANN  
SECY NITZE  
SECY AILES  
SECY JOHN MCNAUGHTON  
SECY ZUCKERT  
DIR MCCONE  
SECY GEORGE BALL  
AMB LLOYD HAND  
CHM GARDNER ACKLEY  
MR. ADAM YARMOLINSKY  
MR. JOSEPH CALIFANO  
MR. CHARLES MURPHY  
GOV AVERELL HARRIMAN  
MR. FELTON JOHNSTON -- SENATE  
CHM SEABORG  
DIR MCCONE -- LANGLEY OFFICE  
MR. DAVID BELL  
MR. WILLIAM FOSTER -- DISARMAMENT  
GOV CHRISTIAN HERTER  
MR. SAM HUGHES -- BUDGET  
MR. ROBERT KOMER  
THE VICE PRESIDENT -- EOB OFFICE  
" " " -- CAPITOL OFFICE  
DIR CARL ROWAN

RESIDENCES:

SECY BALL  
SECY RUSK  
SECY DILLON  
SECY MCNAMARA  
SECY VANCE  
SECY FREEMAN  
SECY WIRTZ  
SECY CELEBREZZE  
DIR WEBB  
SECY UDALL  
MR. MALCOLM KILDUFF  
MR. KENNETH O'DONNELL  
MR. HOBART TAYLOR  
MR. MARVIN WATSON  
DR. JANET TRAVELL  
GEN CLIFTON  
MR. MCGEORGE BUNDY  
MR. LAWRENCE O'BRIEN  
DR. DONALD HORNIG  
MISS JUANITA ROBERTS  
MR. JACK VALENTI  
MRS. MARY JO COOK  
MR. HORACE BUSBY

S. al Switchboard  
Residence Telephones

28

Ronald N. Towns <i>Ins. v. T</i>	Lt Col Patterson
Cmdr. Josephson	Lt Col Suglia
Lt. Hirschy	Maj Wilcox
Dr. Burkley	Maj Rubley
Mr. McNally	Lt Williams
Maj Smith	Mr. Wolfe <i>W-4 A</i>
Chief Knudsen	Mr. Bales <i>"</i>
Cmdr Wilson	Mr. Hart <i>"</i>
Agt. Cohen	General Clifton
Cmdr. Barbee	Col Timmin
Maj. Stover	Maj Maschman
Mr. Paterni <i>SS</i>	Maj Johnson
Mr. Wildy <i>SS</i>	Mr. Hayes
Mr. Geeglein <i>SS</i>	Mr. Young ? <i>S/S</i>
Insp. Dahlquist	Maj Coe
Mr. Rowley	Col Connell
Mr. Behn	Insp. Gerald McCann
Insp. Kelley	Mr. DeLoach <i>FBI</i>
Mr. Bouck	Agt. Johns
Insp. Champion	Insp. Thacker
Col. McNally	Agt. Kellerman

J. Walter Coughlin SS

Lynn Meredith SS

Glenn L. Weaver SS

CNO Residence  
Qtrs A  
Naval Observatory

Mr. Bromley Smith

Mr. Powers

Mr. West

Sgt. Stadt

SMaj Russell

SMaj Waybrant

SMaj Putterman

Sgt. Antinozzi

Mr. Palmer

CWO Parrett

Mr. Doyle AT+T

General Carter  
Quarters #14, Ft McNair

General Carroll  
Quarters #64, Bolling AFB

Mr. Hughes *Support*

General Blake  
Post Telephone Exchange Building  
Ft Meade, Maryland

Mr. McCone

Maj Rogers

Col Swindal

Maj Cook

Col Soffett

Maj Hanson

Maj Odor

Sgt. Ellis

Sgt. Magan

Mrs. Lincoln

Miss Crucioli *AF and*

Maj Cross

Maj Ragland

Mr. Secor  
Louisiana Hall, #208  
So Post Fort Myer, Va.

Capt Taylor

Capt Stoughton

Maj Miller

Lt. Jacobs

SMaj Pennell

Capt Hartnett

Dr. Young

Insp. Krill

Agt. Miller

Agt. Youngblood

Insp. Peterson

Agt. Boring

Agt. Kivett

Speaker McCormack

Senator Hayden

Secy. Rusk

Secy. Dillon

Secy. McNamara

P.M. Gen. Gronouski

Secy. Udall

Secy. Freeman

Secy. Hodges

Mr. Busby

Mr. Laitin *Press Sec*

Mr. Valenti

Secy. Vance

Secy. Mann

Sgt. Glynn

Mrs. Roberts

Mr. Reedy

Mr. Moyer

Secy. Wirtz

Mrs. Carpenter

Sgt. Gaddis

Bess Abel

Douglas Cater

Carroll Welch

&

Vicky Maccamon

Mr. Connell

Mr. Humphrey



MARCH 1, 1965

29

MEMO TO: MR. HOPKINS  
FROM: MISS CROWE -- TELEPHONE LIST REQUESTED.

OFFICES:

SECY RUSK  
SECY DILLON  
SECY MC NAMARA  
ATTY GEN KATZENBACH  
PMG GRONOUSKI  
SECY UDALL  
SECY FREEMAN  
SECY CONNOR  
SECY WIRTZ  
SECY CELEBREZZE  
GEN HAROLD JOHNSON - DEFENSE  
GEN WHEELER  
ADM DAVID MCDONALD - NAVAL OPERATIONS  
DIR WEBB  
DIR GORDON  
MR. ELMER STAATS  
MR. ED MCDERMOTT  
GEN CARTER  
SECY VANCE  
AMB THOMAS MANN  
SECY NITZE  
SECY AILES  
SECY JOHN MCNAUGHTON  
SECY ZUCKERT  
DIR MCCONE  
SECY GEORGE BALL  
AMB LLOYD HAND  
CHM GARDNER ACKLEY  
MR. ADAM YARMOLINSKY  
MR. JOSEPH CALIFANO  
MR. CHARLES MURPHY  
GOV AVERELL HARRIMAN  
MR. FELTON JOHNSTON -- SENATE  
CHM SEABORG  
DIR MCCONE -- LANGLEY OFFICE  
MR. DAVID BELL  
MR. WILLIAM FOSTER -- DISARMAMENT  
GOV CHRISTIAN HERTER  
MR. SAM HUGHES -- BUDGET  
MR. ROBERT KOMER  
THE VICE PRESIDENT -- EOB OFFICE  
" " " -- CAPITOL OFFICE  
DIR CARL ROWAN

RESIDENCES:

SECY BALL  
SECY RUSK  
SECY DILLON  
SECY MCNAMARA  
SECY VANCE  
SECY FREEMAN  
SECY WIRTZ  
SECY CELEBREZZE  
DIR WEBB  
SECY UDALL  
MR. MALCOLM KILDUFF  
MR. KENNETH O'DONNELL  
MR. HOBART TAYLOR  
MR. MARVIN WATSON  
DR. JANET TRAVELL  
GEN CLIFTON  
MR. MCGEORGE BUNDY  
MR. LAWRENCE O'BRIEN  
DR. DONALD HORNIG  
MISS JUANITA ROBERTS  
MR. JACK VALENTI  
MRS. MARY JO COOK  
MR. HORACE BUSBY

Signal Switchboard  
Residence Telephones

30

Ronald N. Towns  
Cmdr. Josephson  
Lt. Hirschy  
Dr. Burkley  
Mr. McNally  
Maj Smith  
Chief Knudsen  
Cmdr Wilson  
Agt. Cohen  
Cmdr. Barbee  
Maj. Stover  
Mr. Paterni  
Mr. Wildy  
Mr. Geeglein  
Insp. Dahlquist  
Mr. Rowley  
Mr. Behn  
Insp. Kelley  
Mr. Bouck  
Insp. Campion  
Col. McNally

Lt Col Patterson  
Lt Col Suglia  
Maj Wilcox  
Maj Rubley  
Lt Williams  
Mr. Wolfe  
Mr. Bales  
Mr. Hart  
General Clifton  
Col Timmin  
Maj Maschman  
Maj Johnson  
Mr. Hayes  
Mr. Young  
Maj Coe  
Col Connell  
Insp. Gerald McCann  
Mr. Deloach  
Agt. Johns  
Insp. Thacker  
Agt. Kellerman

J. Walter Couglin

Lynn Meredith

Glenn L. Weaver

CNO Residence  
Qtrs A  
Naval Observatory

Mr. Bromley Smith

Mr. Powers

Mr. West

Sgt. Stadt

SMaj Russell

SMaj Waybrant

SMaj Putterman

Sgt. Antinozzi

Mr. Palmer

CWO Parrett

Mr. Doyle

General Carter  
Quarters #14, Ft McNair

General Carroll  
Quarters #64, Bolling AFB

Mr. Hughs

General Blake  
Post Telephone Exchange Building  
Ft Meade, Maryland

Mr. McCone

Maj Rogers

Col Swindal

Maj Cook

Col Soffett

Maj Hanson

Maj Odor

Sgt. Ellis

Sgt. Magan

Mrs. Lincoln

Miss Crucioli

Maj Cross

Maj Ragland

Mr. Secor  
Louisiana Hall, #208  
So Post Fort Myer, Va.

Capt Taylor

Capt Stoughton

Maj Miller

Lt. Jacobs

SMaj Pennell

Capt Hartnett

Dr. Young

Insp. Krill  
Agt. Miller  
Agt. Youngblood  
Insp. Peterson  
Agt. Boring  
Agt. Kivett  
Speaker McCormack  
Senator Hayden  
Secy. Rusk  
Secy. Dillon  
Secy. McNamara  
P.M. Gen. Gronouski  
Secy. Udall  
Secy. Freeman  
Secy. Hodges  
Mr. Busby  
Mr. Laitin

Mr. Valenti  
Secy. Vance  
Secy. Mann  
Sgt. Glynn  
Mrs. Roberts  
Mr. Reedy  
Mr. Moyer  
Secy. Wirtz  
Mrs. Carpenter  
Sgt. Gaddis  
Bess Abel  
Douglas Cater  
Carroll Welch  
&  
Vicky Maccamon  
Mr. Connell  
Mr. Humphrey

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

February 25, 1965

31

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VALENTI

SUBJECT: Telephone Information from C & P

I have a feeling that I was not very clear this morning on the above subject. Here is the essence of the problem:

1. The information which C & P has provided and which the BOB study group needs includes in its listings of phone users a number of private addresses which receive either White House or Signal switchboard service.
2. The BOB study group feels it needs to know about as much of the system as possible if it is to be able to evaluate the system. At the same time, the BOB group is not interested in the names connected to the addresses except for those 10 or 20 people who are vitally concerned with highly classified material (e.g., you, Bundy, Rusk, McNamara).
3. The only reason for not wanting to pass the information as is to the BOB study group is (a) if there are a couple addresses which are highly sensitive in a political sort of way, (b) if we think the BOB group will take the trouble of trying to find out who lives at the addresses, and (c) if we think the BOB group will tell somebody about the information who shouldn't know.
4. My own inclination is to pass the information as is over to the BOB study group on the grounds (a) that they are a tightly knit, highly secure group and (b) that we necessarily have already entrusted them with highly sensitive material, which they have handled with appropriate care. If, however, there are a couple addresses which the President does not want given to anybody outside the White House, please let me know; we can have those few deleted from the material which we send to the BOB study group.
5. For your information, attached is WHACA's view of the problem. Also attached are the security guidelines which would govern the use of the C & P material.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By *jc/m*, NARA, Date 3-25-05

Gordon Chase

SECRET - SENSITIVE



WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20501

31a

WHCA


24 February 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Art McCafferty

1. Records furnished to your office by C&P Telephone Company at the request of the Clark Committee have been reviewed by this Agency.

2. The information contained in these documents should have extremely limited distribution. Suggest that the same control be placed on these documents as was placed on the relocation site plan recently submitted.

3. Recommend that the material be presented to the Clark Committee subject to the conditions of paragraph 2.

  
GEORGE J. McNALLY  
Colonel, Signal Corps  
Commanding

It is believed that the information should be digested by the Committee for their purposes and then returned to your office and destroyed.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

32

February 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Communications Efficiency -  
Collection of Information

*For Info*

1. As you may recall, I recently told you about C & P's reluctance to turn over sensitive telephone information directly to the BOB-directed study team and about the deal we worked out whereby C & P will supply the necessary information to this office instead; after appropriate review, we will pass the information on to the BOB study group.
2. The same question has arisen with respect to WHACA which is also reluctant to supply sensitive telephone information directly to the BOB study group or through its normal DCA channels. Consequently, we have worked out a deal similar to the one we worked out with C & P - i.e., WHACA will supply the information to this office; after appropriate review, we will pass the information on to the BOB study group.

✓

*GC*

Gordon Chase

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *jc/mg*, NARA, Date 3-25-05

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

33

February 10, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Communications Efficiency - *For info*  
Information on Telephones

1. One of the few hurdles that the BOB-directed study group has had concerns the gathering of the information it needs to study the security of the telephone system around the White House area. The essence of the problem is that the C & P people have been reluctant to turn the necessary information over to the BOB-directed team. Their explicit reason for this reluctance is that C & P regards the information as extremely sensitive. Implicit reasons may conceivably be (a) that C & P may fear (not unnaturally) that the BOB-directed group, after its study, will decide that C & P does not run the most efficient operation in the world, and (b) that the provision of the information needed by the BOB group will involve some substantial research work on the part of C & P.

2. In any event, after some wheel-spinning, I told the C & P people that we fully recognized the sensitivity of the information that C & P will be gathering together and assured them that senior White House staff people (probably you and/or Jack Valenti with an assist from appropriate others) would review the information before it is passed on to the BOB-directed study group. C & P accepted this procedure and is now working on putting together the information that the BOB group needs. A memo drafted by C & P, reflecting our agreement, is attached.

015  
my  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 05-48  
By isl, NARA, Date 3-4-08  
Gordon Chase

cc: Mr. Valenti

~~SECRET~~

33a

THE CHESAPEAKE AND POTOMAC TELEPHONE COMPANY

Washington, D. C., February 10, 1965

MEMORANDUM - re: White House Communications Study

The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company has been requested by the Executive Office Communication Efficiency Study Committee, a group commissioned by the President of the United States to evaluate communications security at the White House, to provide the following information by no later than February 20, 1965.

1. Cable prints showing the routing of all trunk, tie and local house cables serving both the White House and the Executive Office Building, from point of origination to point of termination.
2. Location of all key telephone relay equipment and local wiring terminals in the White House, Executive Office Building and in residences, where associated with either White House or White House Communications Agency service.
3. Location of all telephones, both on and off-premise, served by either the White House or White House Communications Agency P.B.X.'s. Off-premise station information is to include central office routing.
4. Location of both the originating and terminating ends of all audio, video, radio, facsimile, teletype, alarm and PL (private line) circuits, with central office routing where appropriate.

Because of the extremely sensitive nature of the information requested, Mr. Jack Valenti and Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistants to the President, will personally review and analyze all information developed by the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company prior to its being released to the study group.

R. J. Walter  
Accounts Manager - White House

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NJ/RAC 05-48  
By int, NARA, Date 3-4-08



8 February 1965

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## WHITE HOUSE AND EOB TELEPHONE SURVEY

1. Information that is requested from WHCA and C&P Telco is as follows:

a. Cable layouts from exchanges to the buildings, between the buildings, and in and out of the switchboards. *Point to Point* (Cable layouts include all audio, radio, video, facsimile, teletype, intercom, alarms, etc.).

*Bus off*  
*and*  
*file* b. Subscriber locations connected to the switching centers (on both manual and automatic boards) and availability to outside government and/or commercial facilities.

*Physical*  
*check* c. Location of 1A1, 1A2, 6A, etc. key equipment that is installed in all the buildings. *no records*

d. Items b and c information should include extensions on telephones in homes of VIP's and President Johnson's office.

e. Any additional information which WHCA or C&P consider as affecting the security of the telephone and other communication system, which is not protected by cryptographic means.

2. The above information is requested because of the ease with which a telephone system can be surreptitiously exploited. The more sophisticated methods require only access to the lines. Since the lines generally appear in many locations between the exchange and the instruments (in terminal boxes and equipment rooms), the information is essential. The location of subscriber sets and extensions of the main lines will also

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 05-69

By SJ, NARA, Date 12-1-05

provide information regarding privacy in the individual office.

3. After the requested information has been made available, a cursory inspection of the entire area and a detailed inspection of some of the following areas is desirable:

- a. General Clifton's offices
- b. West Wing of the White House ~~(NSC Areas)~~
- c. Executive Mansion (Sensitive Areas)
- d. WHCA Operations Areas
- e. Vice President Suite in EOB
- f. Other Offices in EOB, to include the Directors and their

**Principal Assistants:**

- (1) Bureau of Budget
- (2) National Security Council
- (3) Office of Emergency Planning
- (4) Office of Science and Technology



NSAM 315  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 26, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

This is the AT&T study that I  
discussed with you on the phone this  
afternoon.

Ted Clifton

Gail Clifton:

Ted, can we talk about this

Monday

hgs

11/11/64  
Lod  
Kearney  
gave implementing here in  
the recommendation  
will keep you informed  
35a

THE CHESAPEAKE AND POTOMAC TELEPHONE COMPANY

Please return to

November 12, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO: Major General George Sampson,  
Defense Communications Agency

SUBJECT: Survey of Presidential Telephone Communications

PURPOSE: A survey of the President's personal telephone communications was undertaken by the Bell System at the request of the Defense Communications Agency. The purpose of this survey was to appraise the methods being employed to provide Presidential telephone service by the White House Communications Agency and, if possible, recommend improvements which would make the service more satisfactory to the President. It was established at the outset that this survey would not involve technical matters relating to the equipment being used. My viewpoint has been that of an operating traffic manager. I have, therefore, concentrated my attention on the relationship to switchboard operating of such factors as personnel, training, physical arrangements, operating methods and records.

DESCRIPTION OF THE SURVEY TO DATE: The details of this problem were first explained to me on the morning of November 3, 1964. The President's planned activities in Austin, Texas, and at the LBJ Ranch in connection with the National Election afforded an excellent opportunity to observe WHCA's operations at a temporary installation in Austin and at the more permanent installation at the Ranch. Accordingly, I flew to Austin with Col. McNally as soon as transportation could be arranged. Before leaving, I was able to observe operations at the White House Signal board in Washington.

Shortly after arrival in Austin on the evening of November 3, I observed operations at the WHCA switchboard at the Driskill Hotel for a period of several hours. During this period, the President flew to Austin from the LBJ Ranch, traveled by motorcade to the Driskill Hotel, stopped at the Hotel, left by automobile to visit various other places in Austin, and returned to the Hotel. I spent the afternoon of November 4 at the LBJ Ranch while the President was there and observed WHCA's switchboard operations at that location. Since returning to Washington I have observed operations at the White House Administrative board, which is not operated by WHCA. During the investigation, I have spent many hours with WHCA personnel discussing their mission, personnel policies, training methods and operating procedures. I have also discussed these same general matters with Mrs. Cole, Chief Operator of the White House Administrative board.

I have been assisted in this survey by two members of my own Traffic Division of the C. & P. These men are Mr. John Kane, District Traffic Manager-Government, and Mr. George Denham, District Traffic Supervisor-Government.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 05-69

By SJ, NARA, Date 12-1-05

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

### 1. Personnel

The switchboard section of WHCA is staffed by enlisted personnel who may be drawn from all branches of the military service. These men impress me as being excellent switchboard operators - dedicated, well-trained and efficient. This organization has been built up over a period of many years, and these men have accumulated invaluable experience in performing their mission. It is natural for one experienced in Bell System operations to ask if women could do this work better than men. I conclude that they could not. I am personally a great admirer of the manner in which Bell System women perform their duties. However, the total mission of the Switchboard Section of WHCA places requirements on the individual operator that women could not be expected to meet effectively. These requirements include the ability to move and function in almost any location in the continental U. S. or overseas, to operate for long hours during periods of extreme tension, and to make command decisions concerning the President's telephone communications under emergency conditions.

Management decisions should be made with a view towards the objectives to be accomplished but also with consideration of the hazards that may be involved. I believe that WHCA's ability to perform its total mission of providing telephone service to the President under all conditions would be seriously reduced if the male operators were replaced by women. At a very minimum, many years would be required to constitute a female force as competent as the force in existence today. A female force would of necessity be much larger than the current male force due to the inability of women to meet the physical demands of the assignment on an equal basis. Moreover, there does not seem to be any valid reason to assume that picked men cannot be trained to operate as well as women. It seems a far more logical choice to direct one's efforts towards improving the performance of the current male operating group to a more satisfactory level. This is the choice upon which my remaining recommendations are based. However, the remaining recommendations would be equally valid for male or female operators.

### 2. Training

I have no recommendations concerning operating techniques. The WHCA operators appear to have an excellent knowledge of their equipment and they are fast and accurate operators. I do believe, however, that they would be better equipped to handle situations requiring the use of Bell System facilities if their training included a familiarization with Bell System operating methods. In particular, they should be acquainted with our information practices, know how information records are organized, and fully understand our procedures concerning non-published numbers. The exact details of this training can, of course, be worked out with WHCA training people. I envision that it would include time spent at both toll and information boards. It should emphasize such refinements in operating as tone and courtesy, use of personalized answering phrases and use of appropriate progress reports on calls. These Bell System practices are important to WHCA because, through



the years, they have set the standard by which efficient telephone service is judged. WHCA service should therefore incorporate similar practices to the extent that this is feasible. I would also recommend that WHCA supervisory personnel spend some time with Bell System supervisory people to acquaint themselves with our methods of training and supervising operators. This comment is not directed toward any specific deficiencies that I observed. But I believe that an exchange of ideas on these subjects of common interest would prove beneficial to all concerned.

I would also recommend that the training of operators on both the Administrative and Signal boards include a visit to the other board and a familiarization with the other board's practices and records. These boards exchange calls and information constantly, and they could do so more effectively if there were more actual contacts between operating personnel.

### 3. Physical Arrangements

The physical arrangements at all three locations that I observed would be classed as poor by Bell System standards. The switchboards are located in small, crowded areas. The men are working under crowded, and in the case of the installation in Austin, distracting circumstances. It is very difficult for an operator to remain poised and polite when radio messages are coming in, other conversations are taking place nearby, and personnel are entering and leaving the room. In every instance, these conditions and distractions may have been completely unavoidable. However, they have a detrimental effect on an operator's manner and tone. In the case of room noise, this is also heard by the user of the service and may cause an adverse reaction to the service he is receiving. To the maximum extent possible, WHCA should endeavor to secure enough space for their switchboard operations to ensure that there is quiet and order around the board.

### 4. Methods and Records

The WHCA switchboard operation is not one that lends itself to an emphasis on routine operating methods. The emphasis must be placed on developing the experience and judgment of the individual operator. There are several areas, however, in which improved methods and records would certainly help the operators to complete calls more quickly.

The screening of incoming calls is a major problem at both Signal and Administrative boards. It is very easy for any telephone user in the country to reach the White House, the LBJ Ranch, or a hotel at which the President may be located, and ask to speak to the President. The decision of whether to connect an incoming call to the President's office or quarters or to dismiss the caller with the promise of a possible call-back rests with the operator. This type of secretarial screening should not be done by a switchboard operator at all. However, there is apparently not enough secretarial help around the President to perform this function. Those responsible for switchboard operation know that, if these incoming calls are not disposed of quickly, their ability to handle vital calls will be seriously impaired. Therefore, the screening is done by the various switchboard organizations. In this sort

of a situation, the switchboard operator must inevitably make mistakes and can only hope for a good batting average. The keys to a correct decision on each individual call rest with the operator's experience and with the availability of good records concerning those persons with whom the President is likely to talk. During the period when I was observing at the Driskill Hotel, approximately 200 incoming calls for the President were screened. At most times, three operators on extension telephones were engaged in this activity. If those responsible for the President's secretarial service expect the switchboard operators to continue this practice, they should be made aware of the dimensions of the problem and the possible adverse effects on switchboard operations. Ideally, a group of trained secretaries should be made available to perform this function.

The President uses the telephone a great deal and he frequently places calls personally. Habitually, he places calls by called name only. He expects these calls to be completed without delay. This raises the "number services" problem. Obviously, the switchboard operator can complete the call quickly only if he knows or can readily find the number of the called party. Each switchboard that is concerned with the President's personal calls was found to be playing this "numbers game." Every outgoing and incoming call on which the President talks personally is logged and the name and number of the other party recorded. A record of these names and numbers is maintained at each board. But these records have not been integrated. The most complete record is maintained at the White House Administrative board. An "active" card file on approximately 5,000 or 6,000 people is maintained. This complete file should be copied and made available to the WHCA. Similarly, all items in the WHCA file not involving Security should be made available to the Administrative board. I suspect that a truly active file would be somewhat smaller than the one presently maintained at the Administrative board. This complete file should be maintained at three places - the Administrative board, the Signal board and the Ranch board. It occupies very little space. Copying the file initially would be a considerable clerical task, but these files could then be kept up-to-date by relatively simple administrative procedures. The log of all Presidential calls handled by WHCA could be assembled at the Signal board. This log could be checked against the file and, if a new item not involving Security were found, a new card could be prepared in triplicate and a copy sent to the Ranch and to the Administrative board. A similar practice could be followed at the Administrative board. The advisability of maintaining a complete file of names and numbers at all permanent locations is made apparent when dispersal plans are considered.

It would not be practical to transport the complete file of names and numbers to each temporary location at which WHCA establishes service. However, a position bulletin similar to the Bell System's "multi-leaf" bulletins could be made to hold perhaps 1,000 of the most important numbers. This bulletin could be maintained at each switchboard position at all locations. The complete file could be reached by means of a call to one of the permanent locations, when necessary.


There are in existence procedures by which certain officials and members of the White House Staff keep the operators informed of their whereabouts at all times. I have not been briefed on these procedures, but I can recognize

that there is a potential gap in information if these procedures are not clearly understood by both the switchboard operators and the officials concerned. I would recommend that these procedures be reviewed jointly by representatives of WHCA and the Administrative board to make sure that there is complete agreement and a prompt sharing of information. A review of the instructions that have been given to the officials involved should also prove beneficial.

The Bell System's practices for securing non-published numbers at information are sometimes a cause of trouble to WHCA operators. I am well aware of the general policy and customer relations reasons behind these practices. However, the President simply does not understand why a number cannot be secured for him immediately or why he cannot be connected immediately to the party he is calling. There are several things that can be done to improve this situation. First, WHCA operators should understand that they must get the assistance of the Telephone Company long distance operators in order to reach non-published numbers at a distant point. Second, when WHCA is operating a temporary installation, arrangements should be made with local Telephone Company Traffic people so that WHCA can work directly with them in reaching local non-published numbers. Third, all the Bell System Companies should be asked to review their practices so that there is an effective way in which non-published numbers can be secured quickly for the President.

**SUMMARY:** It is my opinion that all parties involved in handling the President's personal telephone communications are putting forth their best efforts to provide a service that will satisfy the President. All of the staff and secretarial people around the President play such a large role in the total problem that they must of necessity be included in the solution. I would suggest that, in addition to the recommendations made above, an effort be made to discuss this problem with a member of the President's personal staff who can speak for him. Better solutions can be found if there is a better understanding of the exact causes of any dissatisfaction on the part of the President. I believe that the matter of screening incoming calls should be discussed fully. If present screening procedures are to be continued, the President's personal staff could help immensely if they would keep the WHCA and Administrative board operators informed concerning the names and numbers of people to whom the President may wish to talk and incoming calls that he would like to receive.

I do not believe that this is the type of problem that lends itself to a complete solution. Due to changing circumstances, it will remain a difficult problem to solve. However, if everyone concerned with serving the President has a full understanding of the President's requirements and of the procedures required to satisfy him, I am sure that substantial improvements can be made.

  
Division Traffic Manager



2/2/65

Mr. Rosen's secretary dictated the following:

36

1. The assistant of AT&T, C&P Telco, GSA and WHCA will be required to obtain the following information as quickly as possible:

- a. "As built" drawings on the communications cable plans of the White House, Executive Office Building, and "new building".
- b. Any drawings that show changes to existing cable plant, in or out of conduit.
- c. Cable layouts from exchanges to the buildings; between the buildings and in and out of the switchboards.

(Cable layouts include all audio, video, radio, facsimile antenna, teletype, intercom, alarms)

- c. Subscriber locations connected to the switching centers (on both manual and automatic boards) and availability to "outside" Government and/or commercial facilities.

~~e. Location of any machines that may be used on telephone lines.~~

- f. Location of 1A1, 1A2, 6A, etc., key equipment that is installed in all of the buildings.

(Information should include extensions on telephones in homes of VIP's, President Johnson's office, and communications as President Johnson travels.)

(Want to find out where the P's conversation can be intercepted)

BOB realizes that all of the above may not ~~be~~ exist. Want to see what kind of things exist in this line.

1. Get info in Texas  
2. Get something else - need further  
3. Can it be traced?  
4. The line is  
to check out where it  
can be traced  
C-P connection

2. Question  
(a) Can BOB have this info? On what part of info? Why not?  
Do we need higher level authorization?  
(b) If BOB can have info, who should tell C+P? i.e.  
Who will they believe

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 1, 1965

*fil*

37

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VALENTI

SUBJECT: Communications Efficiency

I need your help on two items related to the communications efficiency study:

1. Over the past week or so, members of the BOB-directed team have been talking to various appropriate people around the White House about their assigned project. Jim Clark and one other person would now like to talk to you. Can you give them a time on or about February 3?

✓ O.K. for February 4 at 12 o'clock. *now*

       Speak to me.

2. After they talk to you, Jim Clark and partner will also want to talk to Mrs. Roberts, Miss Fehmer, Mrs. Yates, and the Air Force sergeants (bag men). Since it is important that these people be as forthcoming as possible and since a word from you would be worth more than a thousand from me, I would appreciate it if you would brief them on the BOB-directed study and on the legitimacy of Jim Clark and partner.

       I will brief Mrs. Roberts, Miss Fehmer, Mrs. Yates, and the Air Force sergeants by the time Jim Clark and partner have their talk with me.

✓  
       Speak to me.

*GC*  
Gordon Chase

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *Dev* NARA, Date 2-6-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

38

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

February 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHASE

Subject: Schedule for Week of February 1 - 6

In connection with our study, we would like to talk during the coming week with several people on the President's immediate staff. It is essential to us that the following people be apprised of the study in advance by Mr. Valenti. When this has been done, we can call them directly and make arrangements to talk with them at a convenient time in the period Wednesday through Friday.

*UV*  
*Will be*  
*calling on*  
*Wed* { Mrs. Roberts  
Miss Fehmer  
Mr. Valenti's secretary  
Air Force sergeants

Others in the White House office to be contacted during the week are as follows:

*Wed. clean and process generally*  
Lee White  
General Clifton and aides  
Hays Redmon  
Bromly Smith  
Alice Boyce  
Bill Hopkins  
IL - NSC (through Art McCafferty)  
White House mail and records unit (through Hopkins)

It would be helpful if you called Lee White. The others we can handle directly or as indicated.

*Done*  
*2/1/65*

*Jim*

JAMES W. CLARK  
Assistant Division Chief  
(Air Force)  
Military Division

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 3-21-05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 23, 1965

39

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: White House Communications Efficiency Study

1. Attached is a memo which I asked BOB to prepare on the status of and next steps on the White House communications efficiency study. In essence, the BOB-directed group is now entering its intensive phase of the study, to include a look-see at the Ranch. The group should be able to finish up in a couple weeks; they will be visible in our offices for only about two days (this Monday and Tuesday).

2. I have been doing what I can to open various doors for the group around the White House. So far, the study seems to be proceeding quietly and efficiently. I see no reason why it won't continue this way.

OK  
m

GC

Gordon Chase

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By DEH NARA, Date 2-6-92

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

246

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

39a

JAN 22 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Subject: Next Steps on Communications Efficiency Study

The general reconnaissance phase of the study was completed on January 8. The group has now been resolved into two panels for the second and more intensive phase which should be completed about February 12. The work under each panel is discussed below, and the composition of the study group and panels is set forth in the attachment.

Panel on communications

The work of this panel will cover the following main aspects:

1. A full-scale test for possible "compromising" emanations from encrypted communications systems has been initiated. The test (known as TEMPEST) will be handled routinely by the Army Security Agency at the request of the Defense Communications Agency, but NSA staff will provide guidance and support to ensure a top-quality job. The last such test at the White House was made in 1962, and much has been learned since that time about the threat and about measuring and interpreting such emanations. The mobile equipment used on Presidential trips will also be checked, as will the facilities in Texas. Emanations from business equipment will be covered as appropriate.
2. A complete review of the non-secure telephone systems in the White House, the Executive Office Building, and the Texas facilities has been initiated. Telephone companies have been requested to provide the necessary circuit layouts after which the possibilities for compromise (primarily tapping) and for improved protection will be assessed. This review will include service to homes of principal cabinet and security advisers.
3. We will examine the privacy of communications and the points at which Presidential telephone conversations can be heard or recorded.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 05-48  
By isl, NARA, Date 3-4-08

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

2

4. There will be a review of present planning and implementation of secure communications and an assessment of prospects for improved equipment over the next few years.

Approach. The TEMPEST test will run about a month but will be largely confined to the WHCA communications center in the shelter. Some measurements will have to be taken in other areas of the White House and grounds, but these will be arranged through Secret Service and should have no impact on White House work. The other aspects of the work of this panel will involve mainly staff of the telephone companies and WHCA.

#### Panel on technical and physical security

The focus of effort of this panel will be (a) protection against the full range of techniques for clandestine listening, and (b) the handling of classified documents. Main emphasis will be placed on the former.

The introduction of clandestine listening devices, of course, involves for the most part people having access to the facilities. Thus, protection against technical penetration for clandestine listening cannot be separated from other aspects of security (physical protection, controlled access, clearances, etc.).

The work of this panel will involve the following main aspects:

1. An appraisal of the counter audio-surveillance program, a technical program to protect against clandestine listening. This will include a review of the present practices, the equipment used, training of personnel, etc.
2. A physical security survey, which will assess (a) perimeter protection, (b) entrance control, (c) control of movements within sensitive areas, and (d) area security.
3. A review of classified document flow and control.
4. An assessment of personnel clearance procedures of various categories of administrative and contractor personnel having access to the White House (e.g., employees of telephone companies, construction and utility contractors, news media, tradesmen and vendors, "char" forces, messengers, military communications personnel, etc.). Procedures for clearances of top professional staff and the substance of clearance cases will not be involved. However, the assessment will be concerned with process, e.g., who initiates clearances, the extent of investigations used for each category of personnel, who appraises the investigations, what records are kept, etc.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

3

Approach. Most of the information required for this panel's work will be developed by and in cooperation with the Secret Service and appropriate staff assistants with minimum impact on White House operations. The counter audio-surveillance study involves only Secret Service and Army personnel. A more detailed inspection of space by one panel member will be arranged through Secret Service and Mr. Chase. The classified document study will involve discussions mainly with your staff, and, to some extent, with Mrs. Roberts, Bill Hopkins, and secretaries or staff assistants in key offices. The personnel security procedures will be discussed with Mr. Lee White, Secret Service, and, for military personnel, General Clifton and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Emergency locations

We plan to review briefly the relevant situations at emergency locations. After initial discussions with General Clifton's staff, it is contemplated that two members of the study group will visit certain sites.

Executive Office Building

As requested, we plan to review the telephone security of the Executive Office Building, since it is integrally related to the White House problem. We will also look at aspects of EOB arrangements which bear on the security of (a) the White House West Wing, (b) the office of the Vice President, (c) other White House activities in the EOB, and (d) other areas considered highly sensitive.


Texas trip

This has been scheduled for January 27 and 28, as previously approved. Arrangements are being made through General Clifton and Mr. Chase.

Final discussions

We hope to complete the detailed survey by February 12. Toward the end of this period (about February 8 - 12), we would expect to have certain members of the group talk with appropriate Special Assistants.

Attachment

  
WILLIAM D. CAREY  
Executive Assistant Director

~~SECRET~~

January 22, 1965

MEMBERS OF STUDY GROUP

\*BOB James W. Clark - Assistant Division Chief (Air Force),  
Military Division

Panel on  
Communications

\*NSA Leo Rosen - Asst. Director for Research and Engineering

\*OST David Z. Robinson - Technical Specialist, Office of  
Science and Technology

\*DTM Ralph L. Clark - Deputy to Special Assistant for  
Telecommunications

\*NSA Raymond T. Tate, Chief, Radiation Engineering Section,  
Division of Communications Security

NSA [REDACTED] Chief, Telephone Engineering Group,  
Office of Telecommunications

NSA [REDACTED] Technician, Radiation Engineering Section,  
Division of Communications Security

Panel on  
Technical &  
Physical  
Security

6.2 (c)

\*CIA [REDACTED] - Chief, Technical Division

\*State G. Marvin Gentile - Deputy Assistant Secretary for  
Security

6.2 (c)

\*CIA [REDACTED] - Counter Intelligence Staff

\*Defense Joseph A. Califano, Jr. - Special Assistant to the  
Secretary of Defense

Defense John T. McEvoy, Office of Special Assistant to the  
Secretary of Defense

State Charles D. Skippon, Deputy Chief, Domestic Operations  
Division, Office of Security

\*Members of main study group

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

*Gordon Chase*

January 21, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Subject: Next Steps on Communications Efficiency Study

The general reconnaissance phase of the study was completed on January 8. The group has now been resolved into two panels for the second and more intensive phase which should be completed about February 12. The work under each panel is discussed below, and the composition of the study group and panels is set forth in the attachment.

Panel on Communications

A full-scale <sup>test</sup> ~~check~~ for possible "compromising" emanations from encrypted communications systems has been initiated. The <sup>test</sup> ~~check~~ (known as TEMPEST) will be handled routinely by the Army Security Agency at the request of the Defense Communications Agency, but NSA staff will provide guidance and support to ensure a top-quality job. The last such <sup>test</sup> ~~check~~ was made in 1962, and much has been learned since that time about the threat and about measuring and interpreting such emanations.

The test will run about a month but will be largely confined to the WHCA communications center in the shelter. Some measurements will have to be taken in other areas of the White House and grounds, but these will be arranged through Secret Service and should have no impact on White House work. The mobile equipment used on Presidential trips will also be checked, as will the facilities in Texas.

*Emanations from business equipment will be checked as necessary, appropriate.*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 05-69  
By SJ, NARA, Date 12-1-05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

A second phase of the communications study involves a complete review of the non-secure telephone systems in the White House and Executive Office Building and in Texas. We have requested the telephone companies to provide the necessary circuit layouts after which the possibilities for compromise, (primarily vulnerability to tappings) and improved protection will be assessed. This review will also examine (a) service to homes of principal cabinet and security advisers to see if reasonable precautions are observed, and (b) ways of increasing the privacy of Presidential communications.

A third phase of the <sup>communication</sup> panel's work ~~will be a review of the~~ <sup>will be plans for</sup> implementation of secure communications equipment and an assessment of prospects for improved equipment over the next few years.

#### Panel on Technical and Physical Security

The focus of effort of the second panel will be (a) protection against the full range of techniques for clandestine listening, and (b) the handling of classified documents. Main emphasis will be placed on the former.

The introduction of clandestine listening devices, of course, involves for the most part people having access to the facilities. Thus, protection against technical penetration for clandestine listening cannot be separated from other aspects of security (physical protection, controlled access, clearances, etc.).

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

The work of this panel will involve three aspects:

1. An appraisal of the counter audio-surveillance program, a technical program to protect against clandestine listening. This will involve a review of the present practices, the equipment used, training of personnel, etc.
2. A physical security survey, which will assess (a) perimeter protection, (b) entrance control, (c) control of movements within sensitive areas, and (d) classified document control.
3. An assessment of personnel clearance procedures of various categories of administrative and contractor personnel having access to the White House (e.g., employees of telephone companies, construction and utility contractors, news media, tradesmen and vendors, "char" forces, messengers, military communications personnel, etc.).

Procedures for clearances of top professional staff and the substance of clearance cases will not be involved. However, the assessment will be concerned with process, eg., who initiates clearances, the extent of investigations used for each category of personnel, who appraises the investigations, and what records are kept.

Most of the information required for this panel's work will be developed by and in cooperation with the Secret Service and appropriate staff assistance with minimum impact on the White House operations. The counter audio-surveillance study involves only Secret Service and Army personnel. A more detailed inspection of space by one panel member will be arranged through Secret Service and Mr. Chase. The classified document study will involve

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

discussions mainly with your staff, and, to some extent, with Mrs. Roberts, Bill Hopkins, and secretaries or staff assistants in key offices.

The personnel security procedures will be discussed with Mr. Lee White, Secret, and, for military personnel, with General Clifton and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

#### Emergency locations

We plan to review somewhat briefly the relevant situations at emergency locations. After initial discussions with General Clifton's staff, it is contemplated that two members of the study group, one from each panel, will visit certain sites.

#### Executive Office Building

As requested, we plan to review the telephone security of the Executive Office Building, since it is integrally related to the White House problem. We will also look at aspects of EOB arrangements which bear on the security (1) of the White House West Wing, (2) the office of the Vice President, (3) other White House activities in the EOB, and (4) other areas considered highly sensitive.

#### Texas trip

This has been scheduled for January 27 and 28, as previously approved. Arrangements are being made through Mr. Chase and General Clifton.

#### Final interviews

We hope to complete detailed survey by February 12. Toward the end of this period (about February 8 - 12), we would expect to have one or two panel members discuss relevant aspects with <sup>appropriate Secret Assistants</sup> you, Mr. Moyers, and Mr. Valenti, Mr. Reedy, and Mr. Macy.

~~SECRET~~

W. D. CAREY



~~SECRET~~

file NSAM  
315

41

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

January 12, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GORDON CHASE

Subject: Visit to Texas

This will supplement information in Mr. Carey's memorandum to Mr. Bundy on this subject.

The visit to Texas would permit the study group to visualize the penetration possibilities at both the ranch and Austin offices. Probably one working day would be needed at the ranch and one at the office in Austin.

For the detailed part of the study now in progress (and for the trip), the group is divided into two panels. One panel is concerned with communications, and thus a major portion of the time in Texas will be spent with the local telephone and WHCA people. The second panel will be concerned with general physical security, possibilities for clandestine listening, and arrangements for handling classified documents while the facilities are in use.

Because of the specialites involved, we would prefer to take eight on the trip (two panels of four). However, if this is a problem, we could limit the number to six. Mr. Bouck from Secret Service should accompany the group, so the total would be seven. The White House Communications Agency personnel at the ranch would probably be able to meet our needs for information in this area.

It is hoped that this visit would complete our concern with the Texas area. However, there is a possibility that some additional technical checks on communications may be needed at a later date. This, however, would have minimum impact on the ranch.

As to dates for the trip, I would suggest these in order of preference:

- a. Wednesday and Thursday - January 27, 28;
- b. Thursday and Friday - January 28, 29;
- c. Monday and Tuesday - January 25, 26.

We could, if more desirable, shift to the first week in February.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLTJ-015-005-004/12

~~SECRET~~

By jc/mg NARA. Date 3-25-05

Transportation can be arranged through Defense.

*James W. Clark*

James W. Clark  
Assistant Division Chief  
(Air Force)  
Military Division

~~SECRET~~  
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

*61-10000*  
*general situation*  
*at*  
*Washington*  
*1/12/65*

January 12, 1965

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-015-005-004/12  
By jc/rq NARA, Date 3-25-05

~~SECRET~~

Transportation can be arranged through Defense.

(Signed) James W. Clark  
James W. Clark  
Assistant Division Chief  
(Air Force)  
Military Division

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

January 9, 1965

Authority NLS-015-005-004/13

By jc/rq NARA, Date 3-25-05

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VALENTI

SUBJECT: Communications Security of Presidential  
Facilities in Texas

1. I refer to Mr. Bundy's meeting in the Sit Room on December 19, which was called to discuss various aspects of BOB's study concerning the security of Presidential communications. As you may recall, the President's Texas facilities are a part of the problem.
2. Attached is a memo from BOB which indicates that a BOB-directed team would like to go down to the Ranch for two days sometime between January 22 and 31 to examine arrangements at the Ranch and at Austin (a) for protection of communications against wire tapping and compromise of encryption and (b) for protection against clandestine eavesdropping and other forms of physical penetration. In its memo, BOB also asks for White House guidance in making appropriate arrangements for the visit.

GC  
Gordon Chase

\_\_\_\_\_ This is O.K. for January \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_. Get together with BOB and Ted Clifton to work out arrangements.

\_\_\_\_\_ Speak to me.

cc: Mr. Bundy

~~SECRET~~

Do we need  
to send 8 men?  
Plus SS men.

~~SECRET~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

JAN 8 1965

95  
Valent.  
Chase  
2. Let.  
410

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Subject: Inspection of Presidential Facilities in Texas

We have come to a point in the communications efficiency study where it would be desirable to review relevant arrangements at the President's ranch and, to some extent, at his office in Austin. We estimate that an inspection by the study group of about eight members could be accomplished in about two days.

The areas of concern to the group while in Texas would be similar to those in Washington and are spelled out in the statement of study procedures dated November 5, 1964. Specifically, the group would examine arrangements at these facilities (a) for protection of communications against wiretapping and compromise of encryption, and (b) for protection against clandestine eavesdropping and other forms of physical penetration. From our initial discussions, the potential problems at the Texas facilities are at least as great as, and probably greater than, those in Washington.

We would plan to ask appropriate representatives from the Secret Service and the White House Communications Agency to accompany us.

We would like to make this trip at a time convenient to all concerned and would appreciate your guidance as to appropriate arrangements for this visit. From the point of view of the study group, it can be made any time in the month of January. However, Secret Service representatives would prefer to schedule the trip after January 21, and this appears desirable to us.

*William D. Carey*

William D. Carey  
Executive Assistant Director

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NJ-015-005-004/13

By plg NARA, Date 3-25-05

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~~SECRET~~

January 9, 1965

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Gordon Chase

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\_\_\_\_\_ Speak to me.

cc: Mr. Bundy ✓

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-015-005-004/13

By plg NARA, Date 3-25-05

~~SECRET~~

95

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

JAN 8 1965

1. Chase  
2. Let.

42a

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Subject: Inspection of Presidential Facilities in Texas

We have come to a point in the communications efficiency study where it would be desirable to review relevant arrangements at the President's ranch and, to some extent, at his office in Austin. We estimate that an inspection by the study group of about eight members could be accomplished in about two days.

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*William D. Carey*

William D. Carey  
Executive Assistant Director

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-015-005-004/13  
By fc/ra, NARA, Date 3-25-05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

January 9, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VALENTI

SUBJECT: Communications Security of Presidential  
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Gordon Chase

\_\_\_\_\_ This is O.K. for January \_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_. Get together with BOB and Ted Clifton to work out arrangements.

\_\_\_\_\_ Speak to me.

cc: Mr. Bundy

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-015-005-004/13  
by plg NARA, Date 3-25-05

~~SECRET~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON ~~DC~~ D.C. 20503

JAN 8 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Subject: Inspection of Presidential Facilities in Texas

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/s/ William D. Carey

William D. Carey  
Executive Assistant Director

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-015-005-004/13  
by hlg NARA, Date 3-25-05

~~SECRET~~

NSA 315 ✓  
45

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 6, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: BOB's Communications Efficiency Study  
of the White House - Jerry Wiesner

1. BOB would like to get a go-ahead from us to call on Jerry Wiesner for assistance in conducting its study of White House communications efficiency. At a minimum, BOB would want to talk to him, with the possibility of a deeper involvement.
2. While Wiesner's participation is probably not absolutely vital, reportedly, he does have a deep knowledge in this field; he did some work in it when he was the Science Advisor, and he would most probably have some useful thoughts on the subject.
3. Both Hornig and Keeny think a Wiesner involvement would be a very good thing. It sounds O.K. to me. O.K. with you?

GC

Gordon Chase

1/6/65  
Inform BOB  
GC

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By DA NARA, Date 2-6-92 ~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 19, 1964

✓  
46  
DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWJ-015-005-004/14  
By pc/rq. NARA, Date 3-25-05

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Survey of Physical Security Arrangements and Audio Surveillance Countermeasures Covering the White House

1. You are scheduled to chair a short meeting (20 or 30 minutes) at noon today in the Situation Room regarding the communications survey of the White House. The purpose of the meeting is to brief the key White House staff on the project before BOB gets into its work in earnest. The following have been invited to attend - Valenti, Redmon (Moyers will try to make it, but probably won't be able to), Reedy, Clifton, Keeny, Bill Hopkins, Bill Carey (BOB), and Jim Clark (BOB).

2. You may want to make the following points at the meeting:

(a) You may want to give the group some background - (1) the President's request to the Dillon Committee; (2) the issuance of NSAM 315 (attached at Tab 1 along with BOB's interpretation); and (3) the President's concurrence in the BOB project.

(b) You may want to describe for the group the nature of the BOB study. For this purpose, the BOB paper at Tab 2 will be helpful. For example, on Page 1, BOB notes that its study will include, in addition to the White House, coverage of the Texas residence and office, emergency locations, and other mobile situations. On Page 3, BOB specifies the types of checks that will be made.

If you want, you can call on Bill Carey to give the group some further detail.

(c) You may want to solicit from the group any special problems and to allay any fears they may have about the survey. You may also want to ask Bill Carey whether there is anything we can do for him - e.g. I understand that he will probably need a contact point on the White House arrangements for protecting the paper flow (Bill Hopkins?).

(d) You may want to give the group some feeling for the sensitivity of the project. For example, if the project becomes public, we should treat it as routinely as possible - e.g. there have been new technological developments in the field of intelligence gathering and the BOB study is designed to insure that we are ahead of the technology.

~~SECRET~~

6C  
Gordon Chase



46a

1

SECRET WHEN WITH ATTACHMENT

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

46c


OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

November 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GORDON CHASE

I attach the Bureau of the Budget prospectus for the Special Study called for in NSAM 315. We have been over this with Kermit Gordon and it is satisfactory to him.

Before distributing more widely, and before moving ahead with the project, the Director wants to be sure Mr. Bundy has seen this version and has no objection. I would appreciate it if you would bring this to Mr. Bundy's attention promptly and let me know the results.

  
William D. Carey  
Executive Assistant Director

Attachment

SECRET WHEN WITH ATTACHMENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC Memo 4-13-98

By NSA, NARA, Date 6-24-98

October 29, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 315

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF  
THE BUDGET

SUBJECT: Survey of Physical Security Arrangements and Audio  
Surveillance Countermeasures Covering the White House

1. The President has asked that you study the organization and effectiveness of (a) physical security arrangements in the White House and (b) the measures to counter audio-surveillance penetrations of the White House, including all voice facilities used by the President and the White House staff.
2. The study is to be made in collaboration with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology. You may call upon other Government agencies and special interagency groups (e. g., the NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures) for technical and non-technical advice and assistance.
3. The report to the President, to be completed by March 1, 1965, will be sent by this office to the President's Committee on the Warren Report for any comments and recommendations it may wish to make to the President.

*McGeorge Bundy*

McGeorge Bundy

cc: Secretary of State  
Secretary of Defense  
Secretary of the Treasury  
Attorney General  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Director of the Office of Science  
and Technology

bcc: Mr. Bundy ✓  
Mr. Moyers ✓  
Maj. Gen. Clifton ✓  
C. O. White House  
Communications  
Mr. Hopkins ✓  
Mr. Chase  
NSC Files  
L. JOHNSON

*Dispatched 10/30/64.  
Repts Nos. 641-647*

~~SECRET~~

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111-58164-3117  
In Brandy C.2  
NOV - 5 1964

PROCEDURE FOR CONDUCTING PRESIDENTIAL INFORMATION SECURITY SURVEY

46d

Nature of the study

NSAM 315 requests the Director of the Budget to study the organization and effectiveness of (a) physical security arrangements in the White House, and (b) the measures to counter audio-surveillance penetrations of the White House, including all voice facilities used by the President and the White House staff. The objective of the study is to insure that knowledge of the latest techniques of intelligence gathering and intelligence protection available to the nation is brought to bear on the problem of protecting the White House information processes.

As visualized, the study would focus on arrangements for the protection of sensitive or classified information (a) communicated to or from the President and the White House staff, and (b) communicated within the White House or other Presidential location. Information would include that conveyed in documents, orally, or by non-secure telephone or teletype; the study will not concern itself with the protection of information once encrypted and placed into telecommunications channels. The locations involved in the study would include, in addition to the White House, the President's office in Texas, emergency locations, Presidential aircraft, and other mobile situations.

Primary emphasis will be given to the protection of such information from intelligence penetration and listening techniques (e.g., accoustical, electrical, electro-magnetic, x-ray, etc.) now being developed or foreseen.

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 05-69  
By SJ, NARA, Date 12-1-05

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2

This would include protection against so-called "compromising emanations" from electrical or electronic equipment, including crypto equipment, or from any other source which might convey or compromise information.

The study would cover non-secure voice and record telecommunications at the various locations. This would involve analysis of usage patterns, routing of circuits and the location of physical communications facilities, and the advisability of substituting more secure systems where appropriate. There would be an attempt to highlight for those concerned the degrees of risk involved in the use of various types of non-secure communications.

Physical security aspects of the study would involve primarily review of (a) arrangements for protection against clandestine listening ("bugging") and (b) the standards of protection accorded the flow of communications, including documents. The review would cover such matters as the adequacy of present standards in this area, the clarity of responsibility for maintaining and updating these standards, the frequency and effectiveness of checks against the standards, and improvements which might appear desirable. The more usual aspects of physical security (e.g., guards, safes, fences, etc.) would be addressed only if directly related to the central matter of protecting information. The study would not assess procedures for security clearances and personnel checks.

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3

Proposed procedure

In conducting the study, the Director would appoint a Steering Group of five - seven members chaired by a senior member of the Bureau staff. Technical members of the Steering Group would be selected from agencies, such as NSA, CIA, and State, which have substantial technical competence in the field but which do not have direct responsibility for the Presidential communications or physical security operations being studied. These technical members would be senior officials who are (a) fully familiar with the relevant operations and research in their own agencies, and (b) cognizant of related efforts of other agencies, interagency groups, and the non-governmental area. The Steering Group would also include a member from Defense and the Office of Science and Technology.

In the initial phase of the study, it is contemplated that the Steering Group would review the problem with appropriate officials of the White House, White House Communications Agency, Secret Service, and the FBI to obtain an overall grasp and to recommend to the Director (a) any immediate actions which might appear desirable, and (b) the course of a longer range survey, including the necessary technical reviews and the means for accomplishing them. In carrying on this survey, the Director would request assistance from appropriate agencies, principally NSA, CIA, FBI and other elements of Defense.

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4

From the outset, contacts will be established (and maintained during the study) with top agency officials to inform them of the survey, to secure advice on the selection of Steering Group members, to request assistance and participation as necessary, and to appraise them of appropriate developments. Throughout, existence of the study and information generated in it would be held to the fewest number of officials consistent with accomplishing the job.

The Director plans to consult with Dr. Hornig at all critical phases of the study, including the selection of the Steering Group members, the review of initial action recommendations of the Steering Group, the determination of the course of the longer range study, and the development of final conclusions and recommendations.

The Director could also seek advice and assistance from interagency and advisory committees, such as the U. S. Communications Security Board, NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance, U. S. Intelligence Board, and the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. Consultants would be employed only if it becomes apparent in later phases of the study that they could be used to advantage.

#### Final report

The Director's final report would be made to the President by March 1, 1965. The report would be transmitted by Mr. Bundy to the President's Committee on the Warren Report as provided in NSAM 315.

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~~Original~~

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December 18, 1964

468

SURVEY OF PHYSICAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND  
AUDIO SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES COVERING THE WHITE HOUSE

(National Security Action Memorandum 315)

In the last few years, there have been revolutionary improvements in the technical means of intelligence gathering. It is assumed that the Soviets are aware of and using some of the new techniques.

The purpose of the study requested initially by the President is to insure that the White House information processes (oral or documentary) are reasonably protected against these new penetration techniques. The task assigned to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, in collaboration with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology, is to bring together to examine the problem the best competence of the Government in this field, both offensive (intelligence gathering) and defensive. The locations to be studied would include, in addition to the White House, the Texas residence and office, emergency locations, and other mobile situations.

In general, four areas will be examined - (1) unencrypted communications, (2) electromagnetic and accoustical "compromising" emanations, (3) audio-surveillance penetrations (bugging), and (4) physical security as it relates to protection of information processes (papers, telephones, etc.). A steering group chaired by the Bureau and composed of experts of CIA, NSA, and State will address the problem initially in the next two weeks and advise the Director as to further steps required. A more intensive review of

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 05-48  
By isl, NARA, Date 3-4-08

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2

problem areas by expert staff would follow in January and early February. The Director may also seek advice from the U. S. Intelligence Board, the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, and specific expert individuals (e.g., Jerry Wiesner).

A report to the President, due March 1, 1965, will outline the problem, the risks involved in alternative approaches (there is no foolproof system), and appropriate recommendations for improvement and further study. The final report will be transmitted by Mr. Bundy to the President's Committee on the Warren Report for comment.

Next steps

1. Initial briefings of the steering group in the next two weeks:
  - Arrangements for protecting paper flow in the White House and other Presidential locations (standards, procedures, etc.);
  - Other physical security arrangements at such locations (being arranged through Secret Service);
  - Communications available (through Defense and White House Communications Agency);
  - Communications usage patterns;
  - Estimated penetration capabilities (briefings by FBI, NSA, and CIA being arranged).

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3

2. Illustrative follow-up studies to be accomplished with minimum disruption to work processes (when President is away, at night, etc.).

The exact type and scope of such studies will be proposed later.

- Physical security survey of sensitive areas, including radio frequency "sweeping" using latest techniques and equipment;
- Checks of telephone and electrical systems and physical search for possible audio-surveillance penetration;
- Checks of business, communications, and crypto equipment as possible intelligence emitters;
- Review of documentation and paper flow process;
- Test monitoring off premises.

3. Points of continuing contact with Presidential staff.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 18, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Survey of Physical Security Arrangements and  
Audio Surveillance Countermeasures Covering  
White House

1. Attached is a memo for your meeting tomorrow at noon  
on the above subject.

2. I need some answers on the following:

(a) I have invited only the key White House people  
to your meeting on the theory that BOB can  
brief the others when necessary. Is this O.K.?  
Or do you want such people as O'Brien, Feldman,  
Busby, and Macy?

*As: No need  
Keeny*

(b) Do you want Rowley? Or should we stick with  
White House personnel only?

(c) At Tab 2 is a pretty good paper on the nature of  
the BOB project. Do you want me to distribute  
it to the meeting participants? Or do you prefer  
to handle this orally?

*GC*  
Gordon Chase

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By Delt, NARA, Date 2-6-91

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December 18, 1964

48

SURVEY OF PHYSICAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND  
AUDIO SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES COVERING THE WHITE HOUSE

(National Security Action Memorandum 315)

In the last few years, there have been revolutionary improvements in the technical means of intelligence gathering. It is assumed that the Soviets are aware of and using some of the new techniques.

The purpose of the study requested initially by the President is to insure that the White House information processes (oral or documentary) are reasonably protected against these new penetration techniques. The task assigned to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, in collaboration with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology, is to bring together to examine the problem the best competence of the Government in this field, both offensive (intelligence gathering) and defensive. The locations to be studied would include, in addition to the White House, the Texas residence and office, emergency locations, and other mobile situations.

In general, four areas will be examined - (1) unencrypted communications, (2) electromagnetic and accoustical "compromising" emanations, (3) audio-surveillance penetrations (bugging), and (4) physical security as it relates to protection of information processes (papers, telephones, etc.). A steering group chaired by the Bureau and composed of experts of CIA, NSA, and State will address the problem initially in the next two weeks and advise the Director as to further steps required. A more intensive review of

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NJ/RAC 05-48  
By ink, NARA, Date 3-4-08

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2

problem areas by expert staff would follow in January and early February. The Director may also seek advice from the U. S. Intelligence Board, the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, and specific expert individuals (e.g., Jerry Wiesner).

A report to the President, due March 1, 1965, will outline the problem, the risks involved in alternative approaches (there is no foolproof system), and appropriate recommendations for improvement and further study. The final report will be transmitted by Mr. Bundy to the President's Committee on the Warren Report for comment.

Next steps

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  - Arrangements for protecting paper flow in the White House and other Presidential locations (standards, procedures, etc.);
  - Other physical security arrangements at such locations (being arranged through Secret Service);
  - Communications available (through Defense and White House Communications Agency);
  - Communications usage patterns;
  - Estimated penetration capabilities (briefings by FBI, NSA, and CIA being arranged).

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3

2. Illustrative follow-up studies to be accomplished with minimum disruption to work processes (when President is away, at night, etc.).

The exact type and scope of such studies will be proposed later.

- Physical security survey of sensitive areas, including radio frequency "sweeping" using latest techniques and equipment;
- Checks of telephone and electrical systems and physical search for possible audio-surveillance penetration;
- Checks of business, communications, and crypto equipment as possible intelligence emitters;
- Review of documentation and paper flow process;
- Test monitoring off premises.

3. Points of continuing contact with Presidential staff.

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

5552

49


OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

November 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GORDON CHASE

I attach the Bureau of the Budget prospectus for the Special Study called for in NSAM 315. We have been over this with Kermit Gordon and it is satisfactory to him.

Before distributing more widely, and before moving ahead with the project, the Director wants to be sure Mr. Bundy has seen this version and has no objection. I would appreciate it if you would bring this to Mr. Bundy's attention promptly and let me know the results.

  
William D. Carey

Executive Assistant Director

Attachment

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17-5B/64-5/17 <sup>5552</sup>  
The Bundy c.2  
NOV - 5 1964

PROCEDURE FOR CONDUCTING PRESIDENTIAL INFORMATION SECURITY SURVEY

49a

Nature of the study

NSAM 315 requests the Director of the Budget to study the organization and effectiveness of (a) physical security arrangements in the White House, and (b) the measures to counter audio-surveillance penetrations of the White House, including all voice facilities used by the President and the White House staff. The objective of the study is to insure that knowledge of the latest techniques of intelligence gathering and intelligence protection available to the nation is brought to bear on the problem of protecting the White House, [information processes.]

As visualized, the study would focus on arrangements for the protection of sensitive or classified information (a) communicated to or from the President and the White House staff, and (b) communicated within the White House or other Presidential location. Information would include that conveyed in documents, orally, or by non-secure telephone or teletype; the study will not concern itself with the protection of information once encrypted and placed into telecommunications channels. The locations involved in the study would include, in addition to the White House, the President's office in Texas, emergency locations, Presidential aircraft, and other mobile situations.

Primary emphasis will be given to the protection of such information from intelligence penetration and listening techniques (e.g., accoustical, electrical, electro-magnetic, x-ray, etc.) now being developed or foreseen.

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 05-69  
By Sj, NARA, Date 12-1-05

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2

This would include protection against so-called "compromising emanations" from electrical or electronic equipment, including crypto equipment, or from any other source which might convey or compromise information.

The study would cover non-secure voice and record telecommunications at the various locations. This would involve analysis of usage patterns, routing of circuits and the location of physical communications facilities, and the advisability of substituting more secure systems where appropriate. There would be an attempt to highlight for those concerned the degrees of risk involved in the use of various types of non-secure communications.

Physical security aspects of the study would involve primarily review of (a) arrangements for protection against clandestine listening ("bugging") and (b) the standards of protection accorded the flow of communications, including documents. The review would cover such matters as the adequacy of present standards in this area, the clarity of responsibility for maintaining and updating these standards, the frequency and effectiveness of checks against the standards, and improvements which might appear desirable. The more usual aspects of physical security (e.g., guards, safes, fences, etc.) would be addressed only if directly related to the central matter of protecting information. The study would not assess procedures for security clearances and personnel checks.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

3

Proposed procedure

In conducting the study, the Director would appoint a Steering Group of five - seven members chaired by a senior member of the Bureau staff. Technical members of the Steering Group would be selected from agencies, such as NSA, CIA, and State, which have substantial technical competence in the field but which do not have direct responsibility for the Presidential communications or physical security operations being studied. These technical members would be senior officials who are (a) fully familiar with the relevant operations and research in their own agencies, and (b) cognizant of related efforts of other agencies, interagency groups, and the non-governmental area. The Steering Group would also include a member from Defense and the Office of Science and Technology.

In the initial phase of the study, it is contemplated that the Steering Group would review the problem with appropriate officials of the White House, White House Communications Agency, Secret Service, and the FBI to obtain an overall grasp and to recommend to the Director (a) any immediate actions which might appear desirable, and (b) the course of a longer range survey, including the necessary technical reviews and the means for accomplishing them. In carrying on this survey, the Director would request assistance from appropriate agencies, principally NSA, CIA, FBI and other elements of Defense.

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From the outset, contacts will be established (and maintained during the study) with top agency officials to inform them of the survey, to secure advice on the selection of Steering Group members, to request assistance and participation as necessary, and to appraise them of appropriate developments. Throughout, existence of the study and information generated in it would be held to the fewest number of officials consistent with accomplishing the job.

The Director plans to consult with Dr. Hornig at all critical phases of the study, including the selection of the Steering Group members, the review of initial action recommendations of the Steering Group, the determination of the course of the longer range study, and the development of final conclusions and recommendations.

The Director could also seek advice and assistance from interagency and advisory committees, such as the U. S. Communications Security Board, NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance, U. S. Intelligence Board, and the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. Consultants would be employed only if it becomes apparent in later phases of the study that they could be used to advantage.

#### Final report

The Director's final report would be made to the President by March 1, 1965. The report would be transmitted by Mr. Bundy to the President's Committee on the Warren Report as provided in NSAM 315.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

50

October 29, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Communications Security Survey

Attached, for signature, is the NSAM which was discussed at the Dillon Committee meeting today; as per the discussion, a phrase on "physical security" has been added. The NSAM has been cleared with Brom Smith and Bill Carey.

6C

Gordon Chase

OK

Good

mfb

bcc Mr. Bundy  
Mr. McGowan  
Mr. Gen. Clifton

C.O. White House Communication

Mr. Hopkins

Mr. Chan

HSC R/S

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1985  
By RWT NARA, Date 2-6-92

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 27, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: NSAM on Communications Security Survey

1. Attached is the memo from Kermit Gordon clearing and returning the draft NSAM which I prepared on the above subject. In his memo, Kermit describes how BOB intends to conduct the survey.
2. Here are some actions which you may want to take.
  - (a) In the last paragraph of his memo, Kermit Gordon asks you whether or not his task force should include someone from DOD in addition to someone from NSA. He goes on to suggest that you talk to Secretary McNamara to inform him of the survey and to obtain his views on this question.
  - (b) Bill Carey asks that you hold the issuance of the NSAM until Thursday so that Kermit Gordon has a chance to touch base with other Committee members at the meeting scheduled for Thursday morning. O.K. ?
  - (c) Brom Smith has some strong reservations about the breadth of the proposed survey, which you may want to hear.

GC  
Gordon Chase

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 3.21.05

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52

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO.

To: Director of the Bureau of the Budget  
Secretary of State  
Secretary of Defense  
Secretary of the Treasury  
Attorney General  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Director of the Office of Science and Technology  
Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications  
Commanding Officer of White House Communications Agency

SUBJECT: Communications Security Survey

1. The President has instructed the Director of the Budget to conduct a study of the organization and effectiveness of communications security and related aspects of physical security in the White House and in other facilities used by the President and the White House staff.
2. The Director of the Budget will conduct the study in close collaboration with the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology. Also, the Director will call upon other Government agencies and special interagency groups (e.g., the NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures) for technical and non-technical advice and assistance.

The Director is requested to complete his report to the President by March 1, 1965. The report will also be transmitted to the President's Committee on the Warren Report, as augmented by the President's Special Assistant for Telecommunications and by the Director of the Office of Science and Technology, for such comments and recommendations to the President as the Committee may wish to make.

McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Approved: NLJ-015-005-4-17

By jc Date 3-18-05

SUGGESTED MEMBERS OF COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY SURVEY GROUP

Central Intelligence Agency, Chairman

[REDACTED]  
Chief, Technical Division  
Office of Security

White House

Dr. Donald F. Hornig  
Special Assistant to the President  
for Science and Technology (or a representative)

Colonel George J. McNally  
Commanding Officer  
White House Communications Agency

Defense Intelligence Agency

James E. Stilwell  
Counterintelligence Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Ivan Conrad  
Chief of Technical Laboratory

State Department

Charles J. Weiss  
Chief, Division of Technical Services  
Office of Security

Secret Service

Gordon M. Parks  
Communications Officer  
Headquarters Office

Robert I. Bouck  
Special Agent in Charge  
Protective Research Section

Office of Emergency Planning

James D. O'Connell  
Director of Tele-Communications Management



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5463

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

OCT 27 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY


Subject: Draft NSAM on a Communications Security Survey

I am returning the draft NSAM on this subject with minor editing.

As I view it, the study would be initiated as soon as possible after the NSAM is signed and would concentrate in the first few weeks on identifying major problems requiring immediate attention and corrective action. The more thorough technical review, which would follow, could be completed by the March 1 date.

In conducting the study, I plan to appoint and rely heavily upon a task group of five - seven members chaired by a senior member of the Bureau staff. The technical members of the task group would be selected from senior staff of agencies, such as NSA, CIA, and State, which have substantial technical competence in the field but which do not have direct responsibility for the communications and the physical security operations being studied. The task group would also include one member each from the staffs of the Office of Science and Technology and the Special Assistant for Telecommunications. As indicated in the draft NSAM, I plan to work closely with Don Hornig and Jim O'Connell throughout the study.

A question you may wish to address is whether such a task group should include a Defense member in addition to one from NSA. Defense, of course, has responsibility for operating communications through the White House Communications Agency and the Defense Communications Agency. I would suggest that you might want to call Bob McNamara to inform him of the survey and to obtain his views on this question.



Kermit Gordon  
Director

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *jc/g*, NARA, Date 3-25-05

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GROUP 3  
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;  
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

✓  
file  
54

November 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: NSAM 315 and Prospectus for Communications  
Security Survey of the White House

1. You have on your desk a grey folder on the White House communications security survey which includes a memo (copy attached) asking a number of questions on behalf of BOB. BOB has been gently needling me for some answers.
2. Have you had a chance to focus on the BOB questions? Or is this one of the subjects you intend to take up with the President at the Ranch on Tuesday (e.g. see item #2(b) of attached)?

GC  
Gordon Chase

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By Dut NARA, Date 2-6-92

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Chron  
54a  
November 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: NSAM 315 and Prospectus for Communications  
Security Survey of the White House

1. Attached at Tab 1 is a prospectus which I asked BOB to prepare and which describes how BOB intends to carry out its study on White House communications security, as directed by NSAM 315 (attached at Tab 2).
2. Kermit Gordon would like your answers on the following:
  - (a) Is the prospectus O.K. with you? (It looks O.K. to me. In general, it looks O.K. to Brom Smith, although he is still somewhat chary of the whole idea of having a large-scale study that will produce many bureaucratic recommendations which, for practical purposes, we will not be able to implement.)
  - (b) Can Kermit Gordon be assured that the President is aware of BOB's assignment? Kermit does not want to charge, unheralded, into a study of this sort which involves the President's communications. (In the event the President has not been informed, you may want to send the memo which is attached loosely at Tab 3.)
  - (c) Is it O.K. for BOB to consult with Telecommunications Advisor O'Connell during the course of the study? (Neither Brom Smith nor I see any problem with this and think it might be helpful.)
3. Bill Carey tells me that, when cleared, BOB will probably distribute the prospectus to members of the Dillon Committee and to the addressees of NSAM 315. Is this O.K.? Or do you prefer to limit distribution of the prospectus to members of the Dillon Committee and to those members of the Study Group who have a need to see it? (My own preference is the latter.)

Gordon Chase

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By jc/rj, NARA, Date 3-25-05

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: NSAM 315 and Prospectus for Communications  
Security Survey of the White House

1. Attached at Tab 1 is a prospectus which I asked BOB to prepare and which describes how BOB intends to carry out its study on White House communications security, as directed by NSAM 315 (attached at Tab 2).

2. Kermit Gordon would like your answers on the following:

OK | (a) Is the prospectus O.K. with you? (It looks O.K. to me. In general, it looks O.K. to Brom Smith, although he is still somewhat chary of the whole idea of having a large-scale study that will produce many bureaucratic recommendations which, for practical purposes, we will not be able to implement.)

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OK | (c) Is it O.K. for BOB to consult with Telecommunications Advisor O'Connell during the course of the study? (Neither Brom Smith nor I see any problem with this and think it might be helpful.)

Q → 3. Bill Carey tells me that, when cleared, BOB will probably distribute the prospectus to members of the Dillon Committee and to the addressees of NSAM 315. Is this O.K.? Or do you prefer to limit distribution of the prospectus to members of the Dillon Committee and to those members of the Study Group who have a need to see it? (My own preference is the latter.)

GC  
Gordon Chase

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By jc/g, NARA, Date 3-25-05

~~SECRET~~

Bill Carey informed  
of above,  
11/10/64  
GC

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~~SECRET~~ WHEN WITH ATTACHMENT

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.


OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

November 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GORDON CHASE

I attach the Bureau of the Budget prospectus for the Special Study called for in NSAM 315. We have been over this with Kermit Gordon and it is satisfactory to him.

Before distributing more widely, and before moving ahead with the project, the Director wants to be sure Mr. Bundy has seen this version and has no objection. I would appreciate it if you would bring this to Mr. Bundy's attention promptly and let me know the results.

  
William D. Carey

Executive Assistant Director

Attachment

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

October 29, 1964

Authority NSC Memo 4-13-98

By NS, NARA, Date 6-24-98

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 315

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF  
THE BUDGET

SUBJECT: Survey of Physical Security Arrangements and Audio  
Surveillance Countermeasures Covering the White House

1. The President has asked that you study the organization and effectiveness of (a) physical security arrangements in the White House and (b) the measures to counter audio-surveillance penetrations of the White House, including all voice facilities used by the President and the White House staff.
2. The study is to be made in collaboration with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology. You may call upon other Government agencies and special interagency groups (e. g., the NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures) for technical and non-technical advice and assistance.
3. The report to the President, to be completed by March 1, 1965, will be sent by this office to the President's Committee on the Warren Report for any comments and recommendations it may wish to make to the President.

*McGeorge Bundy*

McGeorge Bundy

cc: Secretary of State  
Secretary of Defense  
Secretary of the Treasury  
Attorney General  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Director of the Office of Science  
and Technology

bcc: Mr. Bundy  
Mr. Moyers  
Maj. Gen. Clifton  
C. O. White House  
Communications  
Mr. Hopkins  
Mr. Chase  
NSC Files

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REPRODUCTION COPY

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 6, 1964

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not sent

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: White House Communications Security Survey

1. As you may recall, at a meeting with Douglas Dillon's Committee on the Warren Report, you indicated that there was a real need to check out the security of White House communications; you were particularly concerned about the telephones.
2. As a result of your concern, the Director of the Budget has been asked to coordinate and direct a full-scale study of the problem. The study, which is to be completed by March 1, will focus on the arrangements for the protection of sensitive or classified information (a) communicated to or from you and the White House staff and (b) communicated within the White House or other Presidential location; information would include that conveyed in documents, orally, or by non-secure telephone or teletype.
3. Of possible interest, attached is a prospectus describing, in some detail, the scope of the Budget Bureau's upcoming study.

McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By je/ra, NARA, Date 3-25-05

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