

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 5 p <i>EXEMPT 3-16-06 NLJ05-63</i>	12/15/64	A
<del>#2 memo</del>	<del>Chase to Bundy</del> <i>open 12-15-99</i> S 1 p	3/20/65	A
#3 memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 1 p <del><i>NSAM NLJ 015-005-6 (8102)</i></del> <i>more info released 3-16-06 NLJ05-63</i>	3/15/65	A
#3a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 1 p <i>SANITIZED 8.27.05</i> <i>NLJ 05.45</i>	3/15/65	A
#3b memo	Bundy to McCone S 1 p <i>SANITIZED 5.1.03</i> <i>NLJ 05.64</i>	3/16/65	A
<del>#4 memo</del>	<del>Leagley to Bundy</del> <i>OPEN 8.27.05</i> S 1 p <i>NLJ 05.65</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#5 memo	Smith to Holders of NSC 5618 <i>open 12-15-99</i> C 1 p	11/27/64	A
<del>#6 memo</del>	<del>Duplicate of #4</del> <i>OPEN 8.27.05</i> <i>NLJ 05.65</i>		
<del>#7 memo</del>	<del>NSAM 317</del> <i>open 12-15-99</i> S 2 p	11/15/64	A
#8 memo	<del>Duplicate of #7</del> "		
#9 memo	<del>Duplicate of #7</del> ,		
#10 memo	NSAM draft <i>EXEMPT 3.25.05</i> S 3 p <i>6.2(C)</i>	undated	A
#11 ltr	Parrott to Smith S 3 p <i>NSAM NLJ 015-005-6 (8102)</i>	11/6/64	A
#13a memo	Coyne to Bundy TS 7 p <i>EXEMPT 3.25.05</i> <i>3.3(B)(1)</i>	10/27/64	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSAM, NSAM 317--Audiosurveillance & Countermeasures Problems

Box 5

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#14 memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 1 p <i>RAW NS 015-005-6 (8/02)</i>	9/23/64	A
#14a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 5 p <del>SANITIZED 8.27.05</del> <del>NLT 05.45 SANITIZED 3.18.00 NRO 05.06</del>	9/23/64	A
#14b memo	Crockett to McCone S 2 p <del>SANITIZED 3.18.00 NRO 05.06</del>	9/12/64	A
#14c memo	<del>NSAM draft</del> <i>open 12-15-99</i> <del>S 2 p</del>	undated	A
#15 memo	Duplicate of #14a		
#15a memo	Duplicate of #14b		
#15b memo	<del>NSAM draft</del> <i>open 12-15-99</i> <del>S 2 p</del>	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSAM, NSAM 317--Audiosurveillance & Countermeasures Problems

Box 5

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

315

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

File  
BIC 5  
12/28

Mrs. Brown. Smith 5

1. Returned per your request
  2. This memo was prepared in response to earlier recommendations made by this Board.
  3. We are continuing to follow the matter closely
  4. I suggest no action is required on this by Melt B.
- J. P. Coyne

SECRET -  
EYES ONLY

W

2

March 20, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Counter-Audio Survey

1. As you know, the BOB study group is in the process of conducting a comprehensive counter-audio survey of the White House. This survey, which will take a couple months, will not hold up the submission, during the first half of April, of the BOB group's main report to the President on the security of communications in the White House. When the results of the counter-audio survey come in, they will be submitted as an addendum to the main report.
2. I asked Jim Clark to spell out for us the contents of the counter-audio survey which is now taking place. He has done so in the attached memo.

Gordon Chase

cc: Mr. Valenti  
Mr. Watson ✓

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By ng, NARA, Date 12-15-99



~~SECRET~~

2a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

March 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR GORDON CHASE

Subject: Counter-Audio Survey

The counter-audio team, under the leadership of Bob Bouck of Secret Service, now consists of ten men as follows: State - 1; Secret Service - 3; CIA - 1; Army - 3; and Air Force - 2. To handle the complex telephone situation, we have, since my memorandum of last week, added three men from the military.

This past week was devoted primarily to organization. The team assembled for orientation Monday, "walked through" the White House on Tuesday morning, and conducted a preliminary sweep of Presidential quarters on Tuesday afternoon and evening. On Wednesday and Thursday, the basic program was established and equipment was assembled.

There will be three phases to the comprehensive survey:

1. Intensive radio frequency (RF) checks for clandestine transmitters began on Wednesday and will continue through the course of the survey.
2. Telephone circuits will be checked to see that (1) there are no unusual transmissions or energies on the lines, and (2) there are no taps on lines or terminals within the White House. Also, power and plumbing lines will be checked as possible information carriers. These checks now underway will be conducted primarily in basement areas and will continue during the course of the survey.
3. Thorough physical search of sensitive areas (offices and quarters) will include, for example, examination of walls, light fixtures, telephone instruments, desks, furniture, etc. This involves use of highly specialized equipment, e.g., mike detectors (a new Air Force development), x-ray, fluoroscope, line fault analyzer (to detect unusual connections or appearances), infra-red viewer, ultrasonic receiver (for water pipes), etc. Walls, doors, and windows will be checked for sound leaks.

The physical inspection of sensitive areas (item 3. above) will be conducted at night and will proceed as rapidly as possible, consistent with the thoroughness required. The Presidential and other living quarters will be completed by working through this weekend. The first floor of the West Wing, starting with the President's office, will be completed by the end of next week (Sunday, March 28). Next priority will be given to Mr. Bundy's area,

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By isp, NARS, Date 2-11-80

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1  
DOWNGRADED AND DECLASSIFIED  
DECLASSIFIED DATE 12-13-80

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

2

followed by the second floor West Wing and the pertinent areas of the East Wing. The total survey will run about two months.

Several factors account for the time required. First, the White House is a very complex facility with a great deal of old wiring and conduit, which, at the present time, is unmapped. Considerable time will be devoted to such mapping and establishing a base for an effective continuing counter-audio program.

Even after the survey, there can be no absolute assurance that the White House will be 100 percent "clean." However, it will be given the best check possible by highly trained people using latest equipment. A strong continuing program is required.

*JWC*  
JAMES W. CLARK

~~SECRET~~



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

15 March 1965

NSAM 1041


317

3

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy  
Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Mr. McCone has read the attached and asked  
that it be brought to your personal attention.

  
WALTER ELDER  
Executive Assistant

6.2 (c)

Attachment

cc: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 05-63  
By isl, NARA, Date 1-31-06

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

3a

15 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy  
Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

By direction of NSAM-317, USIB established a Technical Surveillance Counter-measure Committee under the temporary chairmanship of Mr. Thomas Karamessines, Assistant Deputy Director for Plans for CIA. The Committee is made up of representatives of the Intelligence Community. The work is to be carried out by two sub-committees -- one with responsibility for research and development, and the other for implementation of agreed measures.

I am of the opinion, and USIB concurs, that this Committee should have a full-time chairman. [REDACTED] CIA, who is particularly well qualified in this field, is free to accept this appointment. His selection has been concurred in by [REDACTED] of CIA, General Carroll of DIA, and Mr. Hughes of the Department of State.

Prior to making this formal appointment, I would like to have your views since the work of this Committee requires not only the support of the Intelligence Community, but that of other elements of the Department of State and Department of Defense.

There is some urgency attached to this matter since [REDACTED] is willing to serve, but is delaying a decision on other opportunities open to him until this question is resolved.

JOHN A. McCONE  
Director

cc: The Secretary of State  
  
The Secretary of Defense

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 05-45  
By iel, NARA, Date 8-27-05

E.O. 12958  
3.3(b)  
6.2(c)



EO 12958 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

~~SECRET~~

March 16, 1965

2  
3-6

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John A. McCone  
The Director of  
Central Intelligence

I think it is entirely proper to appoint Mr.

Technical Surveillance Counter-measure  
Committee. The subject is clearly an  
important one, and I am happy to concur in  
your proposal.

McGeorge Bundy

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 05-64  
By isl, NARA, Date 8-26-05

~~SECRET~~

1. Ask  
2. Ret  
4.

REGISTERED  
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

~~SECRET~~

Honorable McGeorge Bundy  
Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20501

Dear Mr. Bundy:

In reply to National Security Action Memorandum No. 317,  
dated November 15, 1964 captioned "Audiosurveillance and  
Countermeasures Problems Within the Intelligence Community,"  
this is to advise you that the memorandum was referred to  
the Federal Bureau of Investigation inasmuch as this matter  
is of primary interest to that Bureau.

Sincerely,

J. WALTER YEAGLEY  
Assistant Attorney General

~~DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT PART SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(d).~~

BY h ON 12-15-93

XEROX FROM QUICK COP

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 05-15

By iol, NARA, Date 8-27-05

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

*Smith*

9  
5  
—

November 27, 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS OF NSC 5618

SUBJECT: NSC Special Committee on Technical  
Surveillance Countermeasures

National Security Action Memorandum No. 317 of November 15, 1964, included provision for (a) the dissolution of the subject committee effective as of that date, and (b) assignment to the Director of Central Intelligence of the responsibility, with advice and assistance of the United States Intelligence Board, for coordination of the conduct of technical surveillance countermeasures, and of research and development activities in the counter-audio field.

Accordingly, the document NSC 5618, "The NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures," is hereby rescinded and should be destroyed in conformance with regulations applying to the destruction of classified U. S. Government documents.

*Bromley Smith*

Bromley Smith  
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC Control No.178

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By *14*, NARA, Date *12-15-99*



~~SECRET~~

Department of Justice  
Washington 20530

6050

6

December 7 1964

1. R. Ash <sup>a</sup>  
2. Ret

REGISTERED  
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

~~SECRET~~

Honorable McGeorge Bundy  
Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20501

Dear Mr. Bundy:

In reply to National Security Action Memorandum No. 317, dated November 15, 1964 captioned "Audiosurveillance and Countermeasures Problems Within the Intelligence Community," this is to advise you that the memorandum was referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation inasmuch as this matter is of primary interest to that Bureau.

Sincerely,

*J. Walter Yeagley*

J. WALTER YEAGLEY  
Assistant Attorney General

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 05-65  
By id, NARA, Date 8-27-05

~~SECRET~~

7

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

November 15, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 317

TO: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Attorney General  
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Audiosurveillance and Countermeasures Problems  
Within the Intelligence Community

REFERENCE: Memorandum, September 23, 1964, from the Acting  
Director of Central Intelligence

1. Recent discoveries in the U.S. Embassy offices in Moscow and Warsaw have made it even more important than before to assure continued progress in coordination of the intelligence community's activities in the field of audiosurveillance and measures designed to counter hostile audiosurveillance.

2. Experience gained in the past few years prompts the following actions:

a. The Special Committee of the National Security Council on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures is hereby dissolved.

b. The Director of Central Intelligence, with the advice and assistance of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), will be responsible for coordination of technical surveillance countermeasures conducted by the intelligence community, and research and development activities in the counter-audio field. The DCI, with the concurrence of USIB, is authorized to establish and develop a specific charter for a new USIB committee to achieve interagency coordination in these fields. Subcommittees may be formed as appropriate.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NSC memo 8-31-85  
By            NABA, Date 12-14-95

c. The CIA will establish procedures with the DIA for the Department of Defense and with the FBI, for the coordination of research and development of audiosurveillance equipment and techniques suitable for use in espionage and clandestine counterintelligence.

d. The CIA and DIA will establish a mechanism for consultation on the use of audiosurveillance techniques by the military in non-intelligence investigations overseas, to the degree required to avoid undue risk to sensitive surveillance espionage operations.

3. Within the context of the above actions pertaining to arrangements for coordination, the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with member agencies of the intelligence community will continue to give priority attention to efforts to meet the objectives of the June 1962 recommendations of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as reflected in the attachment to National Security Action Memorandum 170 of July 6, 1962.

*McGeorge Bundy*

McGeorge Bundy

cc: President's Foreign Intelligence  
Advisory Board

*CHARLES GORANSON*

*NSC FILES*



SECRET

8  
November 15, 1964

**NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 317**

**TO:** The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Attorney General  
The Director of Central Intelligence

**SUBJECT:** Audiosurveillance and Countermeasures Problems  
Within the Intelligence Community

**REFERENCE:** Memorandum, September 23, 1964, from the Acting  
Director of Central Intelligence

1. Recent discoveries in the U.S. Embassy offices in Moscow and Warsaw have made it even more important than before to assure continued progress in coordination of the intelligence community's activities in the field of audiosurveillance and measures designed to counter hostile audiosurveillance.

2. Experience gained in the past few years prompts the following actions:

a. The Special Committee of the National Security Council on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures is hereby dissolved.

b. The Director of Central Intelligence, with the advice and assistance of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), will be responsible for coordination of technical surveillance countermeasures conducted by the intelligence community, and research and development activities in the counter-audio field. The DCI, with the concurrence of USIB, is authorized to establish and develop a specific charter for a new USIB committee to achieve interagency coordination in these fields. Subcommittees may be formed as appropriate.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: NSC MEMO 8-31-95  
By: [Signature] Date: 12-14-95

c. The CIA will establish procedures with the DIA for the Department of Defense and with the FBI, for the coordination of research and development of audiosurveillance equipment and techniques suitable for use in espionage and clandestine counterintelligence.

d. The CIA and DIA will establish a mechanism for consultation on the use of audiosurveillance techniques by the military in non-intelligence investigations overseas, to the degree required to avoid undue risk to sensitive surveillance espionage operations.

3. Within the context of the above actions pertaining to arrangements for coordination, the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with member agencies of the intelligence community will continue to give priority attention to efforts to meet the objectives of the June 1962 recommendations of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as reflected in the attachment to National Security Action Memorandum 170 of July 6, 1962.

151

McGeorge Bundy

cc: President's Foreign Intelligence  
Advisory Board  
Charles Johnson  
NSC Files



November 15, 1964

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 317

TO: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Attorney General  
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Audiosurveillance and Countermeasures Problems  
Within the Intelligence Community

REFERENCE: Memorandum, September 23, 1964, from the Acting  
Director of Central Intelligence

1. Recent discoveries in the U.S. Embassy offices in Moscow and Warsaw have made it even more important than before to assure continued progress in coordination of the intelligence community's activities in the field of audiosurveillance and measures designed to counter hostile audiosurveillance,

2. Experience gained in the past few years prompts the following actions:

a. The Special Committee of the National Security Council on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures is hereby dissolved.

b. The Director of Central Intelligence, with the advice and assistance of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), will be responsible for coordination of technical surveillance countermeasures conducted by the intelligence community, and research and development activities in the counter-audio field. The DCI, with the concurrence of USIB, is authorized to establish and develop a specific charter for a new USIB committee to achieve interagency coordination in these fields. Subcommittees may be formed as appropriate.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NSC memo 8-31-95  
By [Signature] NARA, Date 12-14-99



November 15, 1964

c. The CIA will establish procedures with the DIA for the Department of Defense and with the FBI, for the coordination of research and development of audiosurveillance equipment and techniques suitable for use in espionage and clandestine counterintelligence.

d. The CIA and DIA will establish a mechanism for consultation on the use of audiosurveillance techniques by the military in non-intelligence investigations overseas, to the degree required to avoid undue risk to sensitive surveillance espionage operations.

3. Within the context of the above actions pertaining to arrangements for coordination, the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with member agencies of the intelligence community will continue to give priority attention to efforts to meet the objectives of the June 1962 recommendations of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as reflected in the attachment to National Security Action Memorandum 170 of July 6, 1962.

151  
McGeorge Bundy

cc: President's Foreign Intelligence  
Advisory Board

Charles Johnson  
NSC Files



3-7x

~~SECRET~~

11

6 November 1964

Mr. Bromley Smith  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Brom:

Since you have been good enough to ask our opinion of a suggested additional paragraph to the proposed NSAM on audio-surveillance and countermeasures, I would like to make some comments.

The proposed paragraph does present some problems, for reasons which I will list below. On the other hand, a note of exhortation about continuing to get on with the job would seem to be appropriate. With this in mind, I would suggest that a new paragraph 3 be substituted for the proposed paragraph 2 e, to read about as follows:

"3. These actions are designed to further efforts to achieve urgently-needed improvements in U. S. capabilities for audiosurveillance intelligence collection and for countermeasures to defend against audiosurveillance penetrations, in keeping with the recommendations made in NSAM 170."


I think it would be better to have this as a separate paragraph, since paragraph 2 with its subsections is entirely concerned with actions.

Objection to the proposed 2 e is based on the following considerations:

1. It seems to imply, particularly in the phrase "initial measures," that very little has been done as a result of

**SANITIZED**  
Authority NJ 015005-6-6  
By [Signature], NARA, Date 6-10-02

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

NSAM 170. This is demonstrably not correct. In any case, there seems to be a certain incompatibility in talking about initial measures in the furtherance of "continued efforts."

Specific progress reports on NSAM 170 have been made five times - on the following dates: September 19, 1962; March 20, 1963; August 27, 1963; November 27, 1963; and March 12, 1964. These have been supplemented by portions of periodic reports to the FIAB.

In addition there are studies now in progress on the damage incurred as a result of the installations discovered in the Moscow and Warsaw Embassies (which will be coming forward to you shortly) and on secure rooms.

2. The CIA/DIA Scientific Guidance Panel was set up as an early step in responding to NSAM 170. This panel made a detailed study, and its final report was forwarded to Mr. Bundy as an attachment to General Carter's letter of March 12, 1964. The panel's findings were of considerable value in helping to orient the greatly stepped-up research and development efforts in this field, which are being carried on and projected into the future by various elements of the intelligence community. The community proposes to continue to draw on the talents of individual members of this panel, and of other qualified people. It was not, however, thought necessary or desirable to continue the panel itself in existence. Therefore, we would prefer not to have a reference in the NSAM which could have the effect of perpetuating it as a body.

3. Apart from the exhortatory aspect of the proposed new paragraph, which I would hope is adequately picked up in the paragraph I have suggested above, the rest of the proposed 2 e seems to be a restatement of what has been said in 2 c and d. Thus it is not only redundant but would probably lead to some confusion and muddying up of the agreements reflected in 2 c and d. As you can imagine, these required a great deal of interagency negotiation

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~


and we would hate to have anything on record which might tend to having these agreements come unstuck.

If you in turn have problems with the countersuggestion, I would appreciate a chance to discuss it with you further.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

25X1A





Brom:

1. I don't see much purpose in going around further on this one--particularly, if the policy is to come up with an NSAM acceptable to CIA.
  
2. Since the implementing paper is to be an NSAM, I think we must defer to you and Mac as to the content of your NSC directives.
  
3. Progress in this field has been slightly better than minimal and today we are far from achieving adequate coordination and far from <sup>(b)</sup>"The most effective possible organization and management, etc." called for in (b) above.
  
4. Please let me have a copy of the NSAM you finally send out in order that I may brief the Board thereon.

Thanks, Pat

11/12/64

Mr. Bromley Smith

Brom - Pat asked me  
to return this to you with  
his penciled note of deferral  
to Mr. Bundy and you  
regarding wording of the NSAM.

Ash

Mr. Bundy:

All you need to read  
is the marked paragraph  
on page 6

If you agree, the  
NSAM can be signed

BKS  
ask CIA if it's acceptable  
to redraft - then  
we'll do it /



Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : NLJ-015-005-6-8-9

44.1

14

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

23 September 1964

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy  
Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mac:

Attached is my formal reply in connection with audio surveillance and countermeasures problems. I call your attention to State's position as regards the chairmanship of one of the proposed USIB committees.

I have also attached a draft NSAM to implement the proposed recommendations.

Faithfully yours,



Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Acting Director

25X1A

SANITIZED  
Authority NLJ 015-005-6-8  
By [Signature], NARA, Date 10/10/02

~~SECRET~~

77-1

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

14a

23 September 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT: Audio Surveillance and Countermeasures  
Problems within the United States  
Intelligence Community

- REFERENCES:
1. Memorandum from Mr. Bundy to the Chairman, United States Intelligence Board, dated 26 June 1964
  2. Memorandum from the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, dated 12 March 1964 to Mr. Bundy
  3. Memorandum from Mr. Bundy to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, dated 7 October 1963

1. This memorandum is in response to that part of the penultimate paragraph of reference (1) which requests "coordinated proposals for specific actions to achieve ... coordination of the intelligence community's resources and capabilities for research and development, [REDACTED] Response to other portions of reference (1) are in preparation and will be forwarded separately.

3.3  
(b)(1)

2. The recommendations contained in paragraph 5 herein have been concurred in by the DIA, the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (for the OSD), the Army, Navy and Air Force. The FBI interposes no objection to the recommendations. The Department of State does not concur in parts of recommendation 5c. A dissenting memorandum from State is attached.


SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 05-45

By isl, NARA, Date 8-27-05

~~SECRET~~



3. The problems of audio surveillance and countermeasures, which are many and complex, have been under continuing intensive study since the receipt of reference (3). Certain modifications of the recommendations contained in reference (2) have been worked out as a result of this study and of consultations between and among the interested departments and agencies.

4. The following discussion is pertinent to the problems:

a. Audio surveillance operations.

[Redacted]

It is also used overseas by the military services in security and criminal investigations affecting the military commands. Domestically it is used by the FBI and the military services in pursuit of their missions. Other audio (Acoustint) collection techniques are employed by components of the Department of Defense.

3.3  
(b)(1)

No coordination problem is encountered in the overt use of audio techniques, or in their domestic use.

[Redacted]

Some degree of consultation is advisable to minimize this risk.

3.3  
(b)(1)

b. Audio surveillance research and development.

The major problems in connection with audio surveillance research and development are: possible undesirable duplication; insurance of maximum effectiveness of programs;

[Redacted]

The inadvertent compromise of this security may nullify the effectiveness of an active program and

3.3  
(b)(1)



maximum compartmentation is therefore called for. Within the Federal Government, CIA, the Department of Defense, and the FBI are the major components engaged in this field.

[redacted] fully effective procedures for coordination have not yet been completed.

3.3  
(b)(1)

c. Technical surveillance countermeasures.

Each agency of the U. S. Government having sensitive installations and operations has a responsibility for protection of those installations and their personnel. Security components of these organizations maintain personnel who periodically conduct technical inspections in an attempt to determine whether the installations are secure from hostile audio penetration. A subcommittee of the National Security Council called the NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures under the chairmanship of the Department of State, has been in existence for several years. Representatives of several agencies of the U. S. Government, including the Department of Defense, FBI and CIA sit as members of this committee. In consonance with the trend in recent years to deal with continuing problems under mechanisms other than the National Security Council, I believe these functions should be brought under the United States Intelligence Board.

[redacted]

3.3  
(b)(1)

d. Technical surveillance countermeasures research and development.

Since several departments and agencies of the U. S. Government, including DOD, State, FBI and CIA, have legitimate interests

[redacted] I believe that the most effective method of coping with the problem is to designate a central point in the

3.3  
(b)(1)

intelligence community which will permit a coordinated study of these highly technical problems and review proposed R&D programs designed to meet them.

5. It is recommended that:

a. Audio surveillance operations:

(1) No additional authority or machinery is required to effect the coordination

[Redacted]

(2)

[Redacted]

3.3  
(b)(1)

b. Audio surveillance research and development:

The CIA with the DIA for the Department of Defense, and with the FBI, establish procedures for the coordination of research and development of audio surveillance equipment and techniques

[Redacted]


3.3  
(b)(1)

c. Technical surveillance countermeasures:

The National Security Council Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures be dis-established. The coordination of technical surveillance countermeasures and research and development activities in the counter-audio field would be assigned to the DCI as Chairman of USIB. The USIB would establish a new Countermeasures Committee of the USIB, to be chaired by CIA\* and supported by two subcommittees: a Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee to coordinate policy and procedures and establish standard security practices for the conduct of indoctrination of U. S. personnel;

\*This is the point on which State disagrees.

a Research and Development Subcommittee to insure a coordinated and aggressive program of research and development of advanced countersurveillance equipment and techniques. Membership of the Countermeasures Committee and of its two subcommittees will consist of representatives of CIA, DIA, State, FBI, Army, Navy, Air Force and NSA. Other agencies may be invited to participate as appropriate.

  
Marshall S. Carter

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Acting Director

Attachment

cc: President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board



14-2

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR ADMINISTRATION  
WASHINGTON

This document consists of 2 pages  
Number 1 of 5 copies, Series A.

September 12, 1964

- TO : Mr. John A. McCone  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency
- SUBJECT : Audio Surveillance and Countermeasures Problems  
Within the U. S. Intelligence Community
- REFERENCES : 1. Attached Draft of DCI memorandum to Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
2. March 12, 1964 memorandum on subject to Mr. Bundy by  
the Acting DCI  
3. April 15, 1964 memorandum on subject to Mr. Bundy by  
the Secretary of State

The Department of State is in accord generally with the referenced draft memorandum; however, it does not fully concur with the recommendations contained in paragraph 5c.

The Department of State does not object to the transfer of the present NSC Special Committee on Audio Surveillance Countermeasures to full Committee status under the USIB. However, the Department of State does take exception to the recommendation that CIA chair the proposed countermeasures committee of the USIB. The Department believes it should retain the chairmanship of any inter-agency committee on audio surveillance countermeasures for the following reasons:

- 1. The diplomatic installations abroad [redacted] are the responsibility of the Department of State.
- 2. These diplomatic establishments have been and always will be primary targets for technical penetration by the opposition.
- 3. During the past 15 years the Department of State has developed a staff of security engineers who have a firsthand knowledge of the unique problems associated with audio surveillance countermeasures. The Department of State currently has a world-wide program in fulfillment of this mission. In recognition of the

3.3  
(6)(1)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 05-66  
By isl, NARA, Date 12-7-05

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-


above, it is the Department's opinion that its experience and competence in the countermeasures program exceeds that of any other agency.

4. To date the Department of State has been solely responsible for security of all diplomatic establishments in Eastern Europe. The Department has initiated action within the present Committee on Audio Surveillance Countermeasures which has greatly enhanced the cooperation and coordination within the community. For example, the Department has invited other agencies to participate in the Department's Regional Technical Center in Frankfurt, and thus give them an opportunity to conduct inspections and gain valuable experience in Eastern Europe.

Section 5. c provides for the establishment of two subcommittees. The Department does not object to this proposal. Needless to say, the Department is interested in knowing if it is intended that CIA chair the important research and development subcommittee.

In summary, the Department of State feels that because of its responsibility for targeted installations and its predominance of experience, it should chair the proposed Audio Surveillance Countermeasures Committee under USB.

It is requested that this memorandum expressing the views of the Department of State be forwarded to Mr. McGeorge Bundy at the time the attached draft memorandum is finalized and sent to Mr. Bundy.

  
William J. Crockett

Attachment:

Draft of DCI memorandum to Mr.  
McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4921

~~SECRET~~

*orig. source*

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO.

TO: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Attorney General  
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Audio Surveillance and Countermeasures Problems  
Within the Intelligence Community

1. Recent discoveries in the <sup>U.S.</sup> ~~Moscow~~ <sup>office in Moscow</sup> Embassy have made it even more important than before to assure continued progress in coordination of the intelligence community's activities in the field of audio surveillance and measures designed to counter hostile audio surveillance.

~~that of experience gained in the past few years, of~~  
2. ~~The following steps appear appropriate in this connection;~~  
*prompt the following actions:*

a. The Special Committee of the National Security Council on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures is hereby dissolved.

b. The Director of Central Intelligence, with the advice and assistance of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), will be responsible for coordination of technical surveillance countermeasures conducted by

*and Warsaw*

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/79, State Dept. Guidelines

By 14, NARA, Date 12-15-99

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

~~SECRET~~

(The Mission to be designated by election of the member agencies)

the intelligence community, and research and development activities in the counter-audio field. The DCI, with the concurrence of USIB, is authorized to establish and develop a specific charter for a new USIB committee ~~to be chaired by CIA~~ to achieve interagency coordination in these fields. Subcommittees may be formed as appropriate.

c. The CIA will establish procedures with the DIA for the Department of Defense and with the FBI, for the coordination of research and development of audio surveillance equipment and techniques suitable for use in espionage and clandestine counterintelligence.

d. The CIA and DIA will establish a mechanism for consultation on the use of audio surveillance techniques by the military in non-intelligence investigations overseas, to the degree required to avoid undue risk to sensitive surveillance espionage operations.

2

McGeorge Bundy

cc: President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~15bDRAFTNATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO.

**TO: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Attorney General  
The Director of Central Intelligence**

**SUBJECT: Audio Surveillance and Countermeasures Problems  
Within the Intelligence Community**


1. Recent discoveries in the Moscow Embassy have made it even more important than before to assure continued progress in coordination of the intelligence community's activities in the field of audio surveillance and measures designed to counter hostile audio surveillance.

2. The following steps appear appropriate in this connection:

a. The Special Committee of the National Security Council on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures is hereby dissolved.

b. The Director of Central Intelligence, with the advice and assistance of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), will be responsible for coordination of technical surveillance countermeasures conducted by

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/05, State Dept. Guidelines  
By Mf, NARA, Date 12-15-99

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

the intelligence community, and research and development activities in the counter-audio field. The DCI, with the concurrence of USIB, is authorized to establish and develop a specific charter for a new USIB committee to achieve interagency coordination in these fields.

Subcommittees may be formed as appropriate.

c. The CIA will establish procedures with the DIA for the Department of Defense and with the FBI, for the coordination of research and development of audio surveillance equipment and techniques suitable for use in espionage and clandestine counterintelligence.

d. The CIA and DIA will establish a mechanism for consultation on the use of audio surveillance techniques by the military in non-intelligence investigations overseas, to the degree required to avoid undue risk to sensitive surveillance espionage operations.

McGeorge Bundy

cc: President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

~~SECRET~~