

**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#1a memo</del>	<del>Tyler to Acting Secretary</del> <del>S 3 p</del> <i>open 3-26-99 NLJ 97-118</i>	<del>2/9/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#2 cable</del>	<del>Deptel 263 to Paris</del> <i>"</i> <del>C 1 p</del>	<del>9/10/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#2b cable</del>	<del>Duplicate of #2</del> <i>"</i>		
<del>#3 memo</del>	<del>Neustadt to Bundy</del> <i>open 9-30-97 NLJ 97-117</i> <del>S 3 p</del>	<del>1/4/65</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#4 memo</del>	<del>NSAM 322</del> <i>open 12-15-99</i> <del>S 3 p</del> <del>[Exempt 1984]</del>	<del>12/17/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#5 memo</del>	<del>Duplicate of #4</del> <i>"</i>		
<del>#5a rpt</del>	<del>"US Comments on the UK Proposal..."</del> <i>open 2-24-94 NLJ 93-39</i> <del>S 6 p</del> <i>(Duplicate of #1a, NSF, Comm File, Common Nuc. Prolif, "NSAM 322-Guidelines...", "Box 7")</i>	<del>12/8/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#5b memo</del>	<del>NSAM 318</del> <i>open 12-15-99</i> <del>S 2 p</del> <i>(Duplicate of #1b, NSF, Comm File, Common N.P., "NSAM 322-Guidelines...", "Box 7")</i>	<del>11/14/64</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#6 memo</del>	<del>Duplicate of #4</del> <i>open 12-15-99</i>		
<del>#8 memo</del>	<del>Duplicate of #5a</del> <i>open 2-24-94 NLJ 93-39</i>		
<del>#10 memo</del>	<del>Duplicate of #5b</del> <i>open 12-15-99</i>		

FILE LOCATION

**NSF, NSAM, NSAM 322--Guidelines for Discussions on the Nuclear Defense of the Atlantic Alliance**

RESTRICTION CODES

**Box 6**

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MLF  
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12 February 1965

TO: Mr. Bundy

This is the "Tyler" memo I  
mentioned to you this afternoon.

Dick Neustadt

EUR

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1873

~~SECRET~~

FEB 9 1965

TO : The Acting Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM : EUR - William R. Tyler

SUBJECT: Future Steps on ANF/MLF: ACTION MEMORANDUM

In the month and a half since NASM 322 was issued, there have been a few official-level ANF/MLF discussions, notably between the Germans and the British. While some movement is perceptible in the respective positions, talks at this level have probably gone about as far as they can. The Erhard-Wilson meeting, which as far as we know has not yet been rescheduled, has been looked at as the first opportunity for top attention to be focused on this problem. It is not at all clear, however, that this encounter, when it takes place, will move the situation materially beyond where it now stands.

We have identified six principal areas of difference in the respective views on ANF/MLF which require resolution of some kind before a commonly-acceptable (by the UK, FRG, Italy and Dutch) position can be achieved. These are:

1. Surface Ship Force and Question of UK Participation. The British still adhere to the position Wilson presented in Washington that the surface ship force has no utility and that in any event the UK does not propose to participate in it. The Germans and Italians have, as expected, made clear to us and to the British the importance of this element to them, as well as the importance of British participation.

2. Terms of Assignment of UK Polaris and V-Bombers. The British have agreed that these systems will be subject to collective ownership, and to PALs. The Germans and Italians, however, tend to think national manning renders the concept of collective ownership meaningless and are suspicious that the British are trying to have their cake and eat it too. The question of common flags and uniforms has not been discussed, nor has the important matter of whether the day-to-day operations will be controlled by the Royal Navy or the ANF Commander, and whether the latter will have inspection rights and responsibility for deployment -- the hallmarks of true command authority.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-118

By iss, NARA Date 3-20-99

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3. Contribution of US Strategic Forces. The British still adhere formally to the position that their contribution of four subs should be matched by a US contribution. No enthusiasm has been displayed for the Minuteman idea by us, the Germans or the Italians; we can probably regard it as down for the count of ten.

4. Voting Formula. The British continue to say they require a veto, while the Germans and Italians prefer to think in terms of one US-one "European" vote, the latter cast by some system not involving vetos.

5. The Command Question. The British now appear to be thinking of a new strategic NATO supreme commander; the Germans, Dutch and Italians continue to want the ANF under SACEUR.

6. Non-dissemination. The Germans and Italians are both sitting away from undertaking firm commitments on non-dissemination as part of an ANF agreement. This is important for the UK.

Our judgment is that, given the political will, none of these issues is inherently unresolvable with further discussion and exploration. The most difficult appear to be the question of eventual mix-manning of British submarines and the question of who has a veto. In all other areas possible compromise positions come readily to mind. However, we seriously question whether the political drive exists in Europe to make the ANF/MLF jell. The only two significant actors are the Germans and the British. Germany has an election coming up, and it is clear now that no agreement can be ratified before the election. Erhard is a relatively weak reed, there is anxiety about Franco-German relations, a distrust of the British and a feeling on the part of some that Schroeder and Von Hassel have been left out on a limb by the US after they took "activist" roles. The situation in Britain is, if anything, probably worse. Wilson's majority is tissue-thin, but even if this were not the case the political issues which come to the fore in ANF/MLF give rise to deep domestic divisions and differences. Left-wing Laborites fear rocking the boat of East-West relations or giving the Germans too big a role. The Conservatives are death on anything that looks like dismantling the deterrent. The services are troglodytic on the subject of mix-manning and the surface force. While Wilson may be serious about the ANF concept, others, such as Healey, are not. This does not add up to a platform for strong, purposeful Labor leadership.

The question arises whether in the light of this situation the US should change its present tactics at all. If we stay at our present idling speed, the probability is that nothing will happen. If we rev up too much, we run the risk of once again looking as if we were playing drill sergeant to reluctant allies.

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With a slight shift in the gears, however, we could probably increase the prospects of a meaningful exchange between Wilson and Erhard. This could be done by advising both the British and the Germans, before that meeting takes place, that we hope it can be followed up in relatively short order by a quiet multilateral stock-taking session either in Washington, London or Bonn -- to which the Dutch, Italians, Greeks and possibly the Canadians would be invited. (The question of who should have the honor of hosting such a meeting was handled like a wet diaper in December, when The Hague and Rome were promoted as the best spots.) Such a session would be low key and highly informal in nature, although it obviously could not be kept a secret (nor would it be desirable to do so). We should advise our allies that Mr. Ball, assisted by two or three official-level people, would participate in such a meeting, which might last several days. Governments would be encouraged to name knowledgeable representatives at a comparable level, but would be free to designate representatives at the Ambassadorial level if they desired.

The purpose of the meeting would be: a) to take stock, discuss and define the substantive issues involved; b) to suggest approaches toward their resolution; and c) to define the membership, locus and terms of reference for a new Working Group or reconstituted Paris Working Group to continue the multilateral discussions. An understanding in advance of this somewhat limited set of objectives would minimize the dangers of excessive public expectations and by emphasizing the low key character of the meeting might encourage participation.

The prospect of such a meeting might provide the additional stimulus needed for Wilson and Erhard to confront rather than postpone basic issues, and demonstrate more convincingly than we have so far that the US has not washed its hands of this subject.

RECOMMENDATION:

That we meet to discuss this problem, as well as the desirability of a future meeting of the Ball-Bundy-McNaughton Committee to review this question.

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2/9/65 24307

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### Origin

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**Info:**

SEP 10 5 09 PM '65

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FOR ADMIRAL SMALL, CHAIRMAN MIL

SP

L

NEA

Terms of US approval of instructions to Military Sub-Group for

NSC

## Examination of Military-Technical Aspects of Common Nuclear Force

INR

(TOPOL 178) and NSAM 322 incorporated by reference in that

CIA

instruction constitute the guidance called for by NSAM 318.

NSA

DOD

## DAC

**AEC**

RUSK

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-118  
By iss, NARA Date 3 20 99

**Drafted by:**

EUR/RPM:VBaker:pmk:9/9/65

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

EUR - John M. Leddy

**Clearances:**

L/EUR - Mr. Trippe  
~~XXXXX~~ ~~XXXXX~~ ~~XXXXX~~ ~~XXXXX~~ ~~XXXXX~~

S/S - Mr. Thompson

White House - Mr. Bundy

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CLASSIFICATION

3919

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

RECEIVED  
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE  
September 10, 1965

5/5  
Alice Marie  
9/10/65

1965 SEP 10 AM 8 54

2a

Bundy

Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
The White House

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission. (Ref.  
Leddy/Bundy telephone conversation.)

*Benjamin H. Read*

Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft cable to PARIS TOPOL.

OK  
my

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY JP ON 2/7/92

CLASSIFICATION

26

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Ambassy PARIS TOPOL

FOR ADMIRAL SMALL, CHAIRMAN MIL

Terms of US approval of instructions to Military Sub-Group for  
Examination of Military-Technical Aspects of Common Nuclear Force  
(TOPOL 178) and NSAM 322 incorporated by reference in that  
instruction constitute the guidance called for by NSAM 318.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-118  
By isa, NARA Date 3-20-99

EUR/RPM:VBaker:pk:9/9/65

EUR - John M. Laddy

L/EUR - Mr. Trippe  
S/S  
White House

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin  
EUR

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS TOPOL

178

AUG 16 3 54 PM '65

Info:

INFO: Amembassy ATHENS

176

SS

" BONN

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" BRUSSELS

193

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" LONDON

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" ROME

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" THE HAGUE

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NSC

DOD for ISA and GNO

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

INR

REF: POLTO 132

By ms, NARS, Date 2-11-80

CIA

NSA

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DAC

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~~BUNDY-SMITH~~  
~~BATOR~~  
~~BOWDLER~~  
~~BOWMAN~~  
~~CHASE~~  
~~COOPER~~  
~~JESSUP~~  
~~JOHNSON~~  
~~KEENE~~  
~~KOMER~~  
~~MOODY~~

We note that all other members Paris Working Group have now accepted instructions to Military Sub Group for Examination of Military-Technical aspects of a Common Nuclear Force as contained Working Group Document 92/Add 2 of July 29. You may inform members US can likewise confirm its acceptance these terms of reference.

In approving terms of reference we note from text and discussions relating to its formulation that:

1. It is clearly understood our participation in study does not in any way imply commitment to consider US national contribution, and that US position this regard does not go beyond US comments given PM Wilson on December 8 (WG Document 79).

2. It is likewise understood that in consideration of military feasibility of mixed manning proposed submarine element of force MIL will

Drafted by:

EUR/RPM:VBaker:mc 8/6/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Under Secretary

Clearances:

EUR - Mr. Leddy

RPM - Mr. Spiers

DOD - Mr. McNaughton

S/S - Mr. Thompson

AEC - Mr. Palfrey

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not rpt not deal with question political desirability and that US position remains as stated in US comments paper of December 8 (WG Document 79) to which proposed instructions refer, namely, QUOTE We consider it essential that all elements of the force be under a common command and control arrangement including permissive action links. While the/<sup>(UK)</sup>Polaris submarines could be organized at least initially on a basis of national manning, the eventual mixed manning of submarines should not be precluded if subsequent studies indicate its feasibility and desirability. UNQUOTE

We recognize question of tactics posed by increasing evidences interest other dels in mixed manning of submarines is difficult one, but USDEL should make every effort avoid any sense on part other governments that US attitude this question has changed in either direction since December, and make clear that it remains as stated NSAM 322 of which foregoing position is a part.

DOD with assistance other agencies as appropriate is undertaking preparatory work looking toward US participation in MIL beginning Sept 13.

GP -4

END.

RUSK

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 77-117

~~SECRET~~ By iss, NARA Date 9-24-97

January 4, 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR McGEORGE BUNDY

SUBJECT: The Reston Story, British Option<sup>5</sup> and the Bundesrepublik

As I said on the phone the other day, my reaction to Reston's story of December 21 (re NSAM 322) is that it was 1/8 of an inch too nice to the French, implying/<sup>not alone</sup> consultation and open doors but maybe even something like a veto. The implication arises because the words Reston used, even those in quotes, were not as carefully chosen as the words of the NSAM itself -- nature did not live up to art! Not quite.

Query: Was this intentional in the sense that the President's own feel departs ever-so-slightly from what Rusk and McNamara told the British in his presence on December 8? You'll recall that they then said "gestures yes, veto no" regarding Paris. Does LBJ in his own mind shade it a little more? A la Hubert? Or, as an alternative, was the intent to overstate the President's real view in pursuit of his private aim, expressed to us that morning, against consummating any Anglo-German deal before he personally was ready to commit himself on follow-through from our side? Reston's gloss could scarcely fail to slow down such a deal, as British observers have noticed. Or, for a second alternative, does NSAM 322 actually express the precise balance in the President's own mind, with Reston's gloss an unintended consequence of oral briefing rather than close reading from the document?

I think it darned important to know which of these alternatives is right. I hope you do know. If you don't, I hope you can find out. The importance is partly a matter of our own administrative concerns, partly a matter of relations with London and Bonn. To wit:

1. The difference in emphasis, however slight, between the NSAM and the Reston story casts a shade of doubt on the authoritative, presidential, character of the NSAM. To that extent we've been defeated in our aim of dispelling ambiguity at bureaucratic levels. It's not the worst defeat in the world! The new ambiguity runs to the degree of caution, negativism. I see no ambiguity at all about the lack of positivism. Thank God for small favors (not so small).

Query: If we can't dispel all doubt, we need a "line" to cope with what remains. Have we got one? Tell me, please.

2. If the British see -- as I imagine they already have -- that German tendencies to stall evoke no opposition from us (or indeed may be receiving encouragement from us), they're almost bound to start considering two lines of eventual retreat from ANF: First, living without a "basket" for their submarines and bombers on the grounds

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(to Parliament) that nobody will help them weave one. Second, (if the first seems politically or ideologically repugnant to Wilson) offering some version of a European basket for the French to join with forces and the Germans with money.

Query: On a contingency basis, thinking ahead to the Wilson-Erhard visit and beyond, do we want to encourage either of these, or a variant with either (the 5-way Directory), or neither, or don't we care? By "we" I mean the President. What deadline can we fashion that will bring us back to him?

3. If the Germans see -- as I'd suppose Erhard has done -- that we won't "make" him "choose" between Paris and Washington -- everybody on the government side within the CDU, perhaps even Schroeder once he's worked out his own fall-back, will probably begin by sighing with relief and then go on to dream about some sort of outcome they can label a "success", which Johnson's magic helps them pull out of De Gaulle's hat. The "Directory" sounds to me like such a dream.

Query: If that or something like it is the Erhard reasoning, are there any realistic prospects in it? To be precise, has this dream, or a variant, any chance in Paris? If so, at what cost to us, or to London? And would either of us pay? If not, then may be we are courting disillusion in Bonn, which raises, once again, the question of six weeks ago: How are both we and London to avoid blame from Bonn for un-success? How do we get Bonn to take that outcome on itself -- and how do we help Erhard put it to his voters as a good thing, not a bad one?

I agree on Fabianism for the White House types. But how about requesting a "non-paper" on these questions from Bill Tyler?

And again, what is our deadline for discussions with the President?

4. Behind all this, there is a longer-run consideration on which I perhaps should undertake if not yet a "non-paper" then at least a watching-brief, since it is too long-run for those who must meet daily deadlines. Namely, what happens if the French are negative on anything which compromises independence for the nascent force de frappe (at least while it is nascent), and the Germans consequently stall until September, and Wilson meanwhile makes a virtue of necessity in selling his left-wing upon retaining their deterrent? What happens, that is to say, after September? May we face a reversal of the present situation? Will Bonn then want to act while London drags its feet?

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Summer 1963 again -- but two years later. That wouldn't be so nice for us as what we see right now.

Query: Is there anything worth watching or promoting in East-West relations which might transform that post-September prospect?

Of course, all the foregoing is without benefit of reading cables for two weeks -- or knowledge of what McGhee's been saying and hearing. So I may be "out of date!"

If not, let's discuss.



Richard E. Neustadt  
Consultant

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 17, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 322

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Discussions on the Nuclear  
Defense of the Atlantic Alliance

We now face very important discussions with our Allies on future plans for the nuclear defense of the Atlantic Alliance. I am sending you this memorandum to establish guidelines for this discussion.

1. Unless I give specific instructions to the contrary, I do not wish any American official in any forum to press for a binding agreement at this time. I wish to maintain the position established in our talks with Prime Minister Wilson -- namely, that the U. S. is not seeking to force its own views on any European nation, but wishes rather to find a way of responding effectively to the largest possible consensus among interested European allies.

2. At the same time I expect American negotiators to maintain the position that no agreement can be made with the U. K. that does not take account of the legitimate interests of Germany, and that similarly no agreement can be made with Germany that does not take account of the legitimate interests of other European states. The American negotiators should continue to encourage direct discussion among Europeans, and in particular they should urge the U. K. to seek agreement with Germany and vice versa.

3. I wish all American negotiators to avoid public or private quarrels with France, and to maintain in public and private the following position: We are interested in reducing our differences with France; we will never support any proposal for a nuclear force which is in fact directed against

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Authority NSC Memo 8-31-95  
By M NARA, Date 12-15-99

France; we will not sign any agreement which does not contain open doors for France; nor will we make any agreement until after French opinion and French desires have been carefully and responsibly explored.

4. Any agreement we support must be a reinforcement to our basic policy of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. We warmly support the inclusion in any agreement of strong undertakings to this end.

5. Our position on the American veto and on the European clause is as follows:

"The United States takes the position that any charter for an Atlantic Force must provide for United States' consent to the firing of the nuclear weapons. If, however, major nations of Europe some day achieve full political unity with a central political authority capable of making the decision to use nuclear weapons, the United States recognizes that this will create a new situation in which reconsideration of various provisions of the charter would be appropriate. In any event, revision of the charter would be possible only with the unanimous approval of the members."

6. Our present position on other issues is as stated on December 8 in the U.S. memorandum of comments (attached at A) on the U.K. proposal, omitting the names of specific countries in paragraph 9, and leaving that paragraph in abeyance for the time being.

7. In my judgment, the principal advantages of any agreement will be:

(1) that it will lead the U.K. out of the field of strategic deterrence and thus reduce by one the number of powers aiming at this kind of nuclear strength;

(2) that it will greatly reduce the danger of any separate nuclear adventure by the Germans; and

(3) that it will advance the principle and practice of collective strategic defense, as against the proliferation of separate nuclear deterrents.

These three advantages are of great importance to the American public and to all who care for world peace in other countries, and it is essential that they be established in any agreement.

8. The provisions of NSAM 318 (attached at B) will remain in effect (except for the action in paragraph 6 which has been completed).

9. Finally, I find nothing in the position of this government or in the posture of the alliance which makes it necessary, from the point of view of the U.S. alone, that there should be final agreement or even agreement in principle within the next three months. I may take a different view on this in the light of new evidence, but this is my clear present position, and I wish all actions by American officials to be in conformity with it. If other governments for their own reasons find it important to reach early agreement, they will make their own efforts to this end, and in that case I do not desire that we on our side should drag our feet. But I do not wish anyone at any level to give the impression that we are eager to act on a short timetable, or are attempting in any way to force our own views upon Europe.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 17, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 322

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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2. At the same time I expect American negotiators to maintain the position that no agreement can be made with the U.K. that does not take account of the legitimate interests of Germany, and that similarly no agreement can be made with Germany that does not take account of the legitimate interests of other European states. The American negotiators should continue to encourage direct discussion among Europeans, and in particular they should urge the U.K. to seek agreement with Germany and vice versa.

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By M NARA, Date 12-15-99

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(2) that it will greatly reduce the danger of any separate nuclear adventure by the Germans; and

(3) that it will advance the principle and practice of collective strategic defense, as against the proliferation of separate nuclear deterrents.


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These three advantages are of great importance to the American public and to all who care for world peace in other countries, and it is essential that they be established in any agreement.

8. The provisions of NSAM 318 (attached at B) will remain in effect (except for the action in paragraph 6 which has been completed).

9. Finally, I find nothing in the position of this government or in the posture of the alliance which makes it necessary, from the point of view of the U.S. alone, that there should be final agreement or even agreement in principle within the next three months. I may take a different view on this in the light of new evidence, but this is my clear present position, and I wish all actions by American officials to be in conformity with it. If other governments for their own reasons find it important to reach early agreement, they will make their own efforts to this end, and in that case I do not desire that we on our side should drag our feet. But I do not wish anyone at any level to give the impression that we are eager to act on a short timetable, or are attempting in any way to force our own views upon Europe.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "R. M. Johnson", written in a cursive style.

~~SECRET~~

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December 8, 1964

U. S. Comments on the UK Proposal of a Project for  
an Atlantic Nuclear Force

1. Preamble

After review of our own views and those of our allies, and after particular consideration of the proposals of HMG for an Atlantic nuclear force, we offer the following comments relating to the establishment of such a force. These comments are designed to take account both of the extended discussions which have occurred since 1962 and of the new proposals of HMG.

We believe that any successful plan must be responsive to the real requirements of as many members of the Alliance as possible. In this spirit, we emphasize that these suggestions are subject to discussion and revision in the light of the comments which will be sought from other interested governments.

As the President and the Prime Minister have agreed from the beginning of these discussions, no agreements or commitments are being made in this first exchange of views. Moreover, the issues before us extend far beyond the interests of our two nations alone, and any future agreement must be acceptable to the Alliance.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 93-39

By 118, NARA, Date 1-25-94

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

## 2. Objectives

We believe that any new arrangement of nuclear forces of NATO must meet the following objectives:

- a. To deter nuclear proliferation by making it possible for non-nuclear members of the Atlantic Alliance to participate in the ownership, management and control of NATO's nuclear forces through collective action and without the creation of new independent national nuclear systems.
- b. To strengthen the unity of the Alliance by providing for systematic and greatly increased collaboration and consultation in the nuclear field.

## 3. Specific Comments on the UK's proposed force.

We believe that it would be appropriate to have discussions with other interested NATO governments of a concept of an Atlantic nuclear force which might have the following components:

- a. Three or four POLARIS submarines to be transferred to the force by the British Government.
- b. Such elements of the British V-bomber force as HMG is prepared to contribute.
- c. A POLARIS surface fleet having substantially the characteristics -- if not the size -- of that contemplated in the discussions of the working group in Paris. This force should have a

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size adequate to the needs and interests of non-nuclear powers which wish to participate in it, but we are prepared to discuss reductions from the initial proposals in the light of other contributions now in contemplation.

d. Such strategic nuclear forces as the United States or France might be prepared to subscribe.

4. Characteristics of the Force

a. We consider it essential that all elements of the force be under a common command and control arrangement, including permissive action links. While the POLARIS submarines could be organized at least initially on a basis of national manning, the eventual mixed-manning of submarines should not be precluded if subsequent studies indicate its feasibility and desirability.

b. We also consider it essential to the success of this proposal that there should be a substantial UK contribution of manpower for the operation of the mixed-manned surface force, in order to insure that this arrangement commands the confidence of other participants.

c. Creation of this force should be conceived not as an addition to strategic forces that would otherwise be provided, but as a partial substitute, since it is the current expectation that presently

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programmed U. S. forces will be appropriately reduced as the new force comes into being.

d. We believe that the new force, whatever its eventual components, should have a strength of not less than 200 missiles.

e. All the weapons systems transferred to the ANF would be committed for the life of the force. In the event of dissolution of the force, submarines and bombers would revert to the national ownership of the respective contributing state. Missiles and warheads in the surface fleet would also be returned to the supplying country.

f. We are prepared to consider a change in the name of the force, but we believe a decision on the name should be reserved to later multi-lateral negotiations.

#### 5. Contribution of the United States Forces

Should the concept discussed above prove acceptable to other allies, we would be prepared to consider a contribution to this new force of certain U. S. strategic weapons provided that discussions with other allies indicate a general desire for such a contribution, and provided that it can be made on terms which are practicable for the United States.

#### 6. Non-Dissemination

The treaty establishing the new arrangements should include undertakings whereby nuclear members would agree not to disseminate

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nuclear weapons and the non-nuclear members would undertake not to acquire, or obtain control over, them.

7. Command Arrangements in Relation to NATO

We take note of the suggestion that the Atlantic missile force described above might be assigned to a separate commander. We are also familiar with the strongly expressed view of other allies that this force should be under the command of SACEUR. We think that this question of command should be left open for discussion among all interested parties.

8. Voting Arrangements-

The agreement of the United States would be required in order to fire the force. The votes of the European members should be cast in a manner agreed to by them. The voting procedure could be revised only with the agreement of all of the participating nations.

9. Periodic Meetings of the Ministers of Defense

In order to make more effective the present procedures for consultation among the Western Powers, we suggest periodic meetings of the Ministers of Defense, of the ~~United States, - United Kingdom, - France,~~ Germany, ~~and Italy.~~ These meetings would be held on an informal basis, and would consider targetting policy, new nuclear and conventional weapons

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developments, nuclear dispersal plans, future force structure, resource allocation, and strategy.

#### 10 Review Provisions

We believe any agreement should contain provisions for review of the arrangements if (a) Germany is reunified; (b) a unified Europe is established, or (c) there is a major movement toward arms control or disarmament.

As stated in 8 above, any new agreement would require the approval of all participants, and we note that in the case of the U. S. any change in control arrangements would be subject to full Constitutional approval.

The agreement should be so drafted that termination of the Force would not result in the creation of new national nuclear systems.

#### 11. Future Procedure

a. A meeting of representatives of interested governments should be held early in 1965. They should be asked to review these matters and to prepare recommendations for their respective Governments.

b. At an early stage in the development of these recommendations, and well before any final agreements are reached among interested parties, arrangements should be made for discussions with the Government of France.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

56

November 14, 1964

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 318

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

B

Subject: The Future of the Nuclear Defense of the Atlantic Alliance

1. In the next months we face highly important negotiations and decisions on this subject. These decisions relate not only to the MLF proposals now under discussion in Paris, but to the interests and concerns of the new British Government. It is also obvious that we shall have to take careful account of the interests and purposes of France.
2. Our own interest is, as it has been, to find the most effective means of advancing the partnership of the Atlantic Community in nuclear defense as in other matters, and to do this without giving encouragement to the spread of nuclear weapons.
3. To carry out these purposes effectively, it is essential that this Government should be united, and accordingly it is my desire that all of the activities of this Government relating to the nuclear defense of the Atlantic Alliance should be fully coordinated among the White House, the State Department and the Defense Department.
4. More specifically, I desire that all officers of this Government who travel overseas to discuss this matter should have written instructions cleared in the White House, the State Department and the Defense Department. Such instructions, where appropriate, should also be used by other officers of this Government as guidance.

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NSC memo 8-31-95  
By 12-15-94 NARA, Date

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
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 93-39  
By 1-25-94, NARA, Date

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5. I also desire that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense should make an explicit designation of those officers who are authorized to discuss these problems with the press, and that other officers should be instructed to refrain from such discussion during this period of critical negotiation. A parallel arrangement will be instituted in the White House. It is critically important that this Government should speak with one voice on this subject in the future.

6. Finally, I request that detailed recommendations and proposals should be worked out for my consideration by the end of this month so that there may be time for careful consideration and decision before my meeting with Prime Minister Wilson on December 7 and 8.



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December 17, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 322

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Discussions on the Nuclear  
Defense of the Atlantic Alliance

We now face very important discussions with our Allies on future plans for the nuclear defense of the Atlantic Alliance. I am sending you this memorandum to establish guidelines for this discussion.

1. Unless I give specific instructions to the contrary, I do not wish any American official in any forum to press for a binding agreement at this time. I wish to maintain the position established in our talks with Prime Minister Wilson -- namely, that the U. S. is not seeking to force its own views on any European nation, but wishes rather to find a way of responding effectively to the largest possible consensus among interested European allies.

2. At the same time I expect American negotiators to maintain the position that no agreement can be made with the U. K. that does not take account of the legitimate interests of Germany, and that similarly no agreement can be made with Germany that does not take account of the legitimate interests of other European states. The American negotiators should continue to encourage direct discussion among Europeans, and in particular they should urge the U. K. to seek agreement with Germany and vice versa.

3. I wish all American negotiators to avoid public or private quarrels with France, and to maintain in public and private the following position: We are interested in reducing our differences with France; we will never support any proposal for a nuclear force which is in fact directed against

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1 cc ea: NSC Files  
C. Johnson  
Kearney for Helgoland office  
Klein  
Ray Cline - CIA

Dispatched 12/21/64

Repts Nos. 736-737

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC Memo 8-3145  
By            NARA, Date 12-15-95

France; we will not sign any agreement which does not contain open doors for France; nor will we make any agreement until after French opinion and French desires have been carefully and responsibly explored.

4. Any agreement we support must be a reinforcement to our basic policy of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. We warmly support the inclusion in any agreement of strong undertakings to this end.

5. Our position on the American veto and on the European clause is as follows:

"The United States takes the position that any charter for an Atlantic Force must provide for United States' consent to the firing of the nuclear weapons. If, however, major nations of Europe some day achieve full political unity with a central political authority capable of making the decision to use nuclear weapons, the United States recognizes that this will create a new situation in which reconsideration of various provisions of the charter would be appropriate. In any event, revision of the charter would be possible only with the unanimous approval of the members."

6. Our present position on other issues is as stated on December 8 in the U.S. memorandum of comments (attached at A) on the U.K. proposal, omitting the names of specific countries in paragraph 9, and leaving that paragraph in abeyance for the time being.

7. In my judgment, the principal advantages of any agreement will be:

(1) that it will lead the U.K. out of the field of strategic deterrence and thus reduce by one the number of powers aiming at this kind of nuclear strength; and

(2) that it will greatly reduce the danger of any separate nuclear adventure by the Germans; and

(3) that it will advance the principle and practice of collective strategic defense; as against the proliferation of separate nuclear deterrents.

These three advantages are of great importance to the American public and to all who care for world peace in other countries, and it is essential that they be established in any agreement.

8. The provisions of NSAM 318 (attached at B) will remain in effect (except for the action in paragraph 6 which has been completed).

9. Finally, I find nothing in the position of this government or in the posture of the alliance which makes it necessary, from the point of view of the U. S. alone, that there should be final agreement or even agreement in principle within the next three months. I may take a different view on this in the light of new evidence, but this is my clear present position, and I wish all actions by American officials to be in conformity with it. If other governments for their own reasons find it important to reach early agreement, they will make their own efforts to this end, and in that case I do not desire that we on our side should drag our feet. But I do not wish anyone at any level to give the impression that we are eager to act on a short timetable, or are attempting in any way to force our own views upon Europe.

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A.

**\* Processing Note**

In document 8, the “Top” in the security classification markings “Top Secret” was covered with small pieces of paper and paste. This was done by the original users of the document and not the archives. Most of these have subsequently fallen off with age.

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December 8, 1964

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U. S. Comments on the UK Proposal of a Project for  
an Atlantic Nuclear Force

1. Preamble

After review of our own views and those of our allies, and after particular consideration of the proposals of HMG for an Atlantic nuclear force, we offer the following comments relating to the establishment of such a force. These comments are designed to take account both of the extended discussions which have occurred since 1962 and of the new proposals of HMG.

We believe that any successful plan must be responsive to the real requirements of as many members of the Alliance as possible. In this spirit, we emphasize that these suggestions are subject to discussion and revision in the light of the comments which will be sought from other interested governments.

As the President and the Prime Minister have agreed from the beginning of these discussions, no agreements or commitments are being made in this first exchange of views. Moreover, the issues before us extend far beyond the interests of our two nations alone, and any future agreement must be acceptable to the Alliance.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 93-39  
By sig, NARA, Date 1-25-94

## 2. Objectives

We believe that any new arrangement of nuclear forces of NATO must meet the following objectives:

- a. To deter nuclear proliferation by making it possible for non-nuclear members of the Atlantic Alliance to participate in the ownership, management and control of NATO's nuclear forces through collective action and without the creation of new independent national nuclear systems.
- b. To strengthen the unity of the Alliance by providing for systematic and greatly increased collaboration and consultation in the nuclear field.

## 3. Specific Comments on the UK's proposed force.

We believe that it would be appropriate to have discussions with other interested NATO governments of a concept of an Atlantic nuclear force which might have the following components:

- a. Three or four POLARIS submarines to be transferred to the force by the British Government.
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b. We also consider it essential to the success of this proposal that there should be a substantial UK contribution of manpower for the operation of the mixed-manned surface force, in order to insure that this arrangement commands the confidence of other participants.

c. Creation of this force should be conceived not as an addition to strategic forces that would otherwise be provided, but as a partial substitute, since it is the current expectation that presently

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f. We are prepared to consider a change in the name of the force, but we believe a decision on the name should be reserved to later multi-lateral negotiations.

#### 5. Contribution of the United States Forces

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developments, nuclear dispersal plans, future force structure, resource allocation, and strategy.

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B.

November 14, 1964

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## NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 318

## MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSESubject: The Future of the Nuclear Defense of the Atlantic Alliance

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3. To carry out these purposes effectively, it is essential that this Government should be united, and accordingly it is my desire that all of the activities of this Government relating to the nuclear defense of the Atlantic Alliance should be fully coordinated among the White House, the State Department and the Defense Department.
4. More specifically, I desire that all officers of this Government who travel overseas to discuss this matter should have written instructions cleared in the White House, the State Department and the Defense Department. Such instructions, where appropriate, should also be used by other officers of this Government as guidance.

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Authority NSC memo 8-31-95  
By My, NARA, Date 12-15-99~~DECLASSIFIED~~~~E.O. 12336, Sec. 3.4~~NEJ 73-39By isg, NARA, Date 1-25-94

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5. I also desire that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense should make an explicit designation of those officers who are authorized to discuss these problems with the press, and that other officers should be instructed to refrain from such discussion during this period of critical negotiation. A parallel arrangement will be instituted in the White House. It is critically important that this Government should speak with one voice on this subject in the future.

6. Finally, I request that detailed recommendations and proposals should be worked out for my consideration by the end of this month so that there may be time for careful consideration and decision before my meeting with Prime Minister Wilson on December 7 and 8.

/s/ LBJ

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