

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 memo	Chester Cooper for Mr. Bundy <i>Open 12-15-99</i> secret 4 p	4/28/65	A
#2a memo	Leonard Unger for Chester Cooper " secret 1 p	4/23/65	A
#2c report	Status of Non-Military Actions secret 19 p	4/23/65	A
#2e report	Non-Military Actions . . . secret 3 p <i>same N4 015-006-2-2(8102)</i>	4/23/65	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, NSAM File, NSAM 328

RESTRICTION CODES

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- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 10, 1965

~~TOP SECRET~~MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

The President has directed me to emphasize again his continuing concern for more careful control of military information on operations in Vietnam. The President continues to believe that it is very unhelpful to have detailed accounts of the size and strength of air operations against North Vietnam, and does not understand why it is not possible to avoid giving out accurate information on numbers of aircraft and the weight of bombs dropped.

The President is also dissatisfied with the rapidity of release of information respecting further troop reinforcements to ~~Vietnam~~ Vietnam and does not understand why there should have been an announcement on this subject from Saigon. This announcement seems to him inconsistent with the decisions reached on April 1 and reported in paragraph 11 of National Security Action Memorandum No. 328 dated April 6.

The President requests that the Department of State and the Department of Defense take further energetic action to improve our performance in these respects.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State 4-19-78, NSC 6-24-78
By Det/isp NARA, Date 3-6-90

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NSAM 328

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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April 28, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: First Status Report on the Forty-one Non-military
Actions in Vietnam

There is attached the first of the interagency status reports on the forty-one non-military actions in Vietnam, which the President approved in NSAM 328. You will recall that the Mission in Saigon divided these actions into four categories according to their degree of urgency and immediate feasibility. More than half fall within the Mission's category of things already being done, and the report indicates the extent to which they have been completed. In his covering memorandum, Ambassador Unger notes that seven actions are being deleted from subsequent status reports, either because they have been substantially accomplished or because of the Mission's view that they are presently undesirable or unnecessary.

In the Mission's category of those actions requiring urgent attention, the following status summaries may be of particular interest:

Item No. 6

Persuade the GVN, offering U. S. help as required, to follow through on the steps begun by General Khanh to meet Montagnard grievances.

Status: Prime Minister Quat toured Montagnard areas in mid-April and attended the opening of the Montagnard Training Center at Pleiku which will train political action cadres equipped with simple technical skills. Those accompanying him reported that his speeches contained sound appeals to recent and ancient history as a basis for one-country patriotism. He promised performance on Montagnard grievances and emphasized that his government would not make empty promises. He directed the

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/92, State Dept. Guidelines
By 18 NARA, Date 12-15-91

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Minister of Rural Affairs to prepare a program for land registration in Montagnard areas, a step which will help avoid land disputes and meet a major Montagnard grievance against ethnic Vietnamese settlers in the traditional Montagnard homeland.

Item No. 26

Urge the GVN to unify all systems of recruiting and training local officials (cadre) for the rural program. Urge future recruitment of cadre from amongst inhabitants of surrounding area based on ability.

Status: The Mission Council approved last October a concept for the use of cadre in village-hamlet administration during pacification. Since then this paper has been the point of departure for discussions with the GVN. So far the GVN has only accepted and implemented the gradual conversion of Mobile Action Cadre to survey cadre. GVN ministries have continued to use cadre proliferation as a substitute for meaningful programs. It is now anticipated that a joint GVN/U. S. policy on cadre will be developed at the Central Rural Reconstruction Council-Mission Council level; for this purpose a new proposal is being prepared at the staff level in USOM, USIS and MACV in consultation with the GVN.

Item No. 34

Organize U. S. /GVN quick-fix fire brigade teams to provide a capability for rapid survey and immediate action on such crash programs as refugees, towns hit by aircraft, and areas devastated by the Viet Cong. The teams should be supported by full U. S. /GVN resources without the necessity for recourse to normal channels.

Status: The Mission reports that it is planning to establish these teams. The required resources for this kind of responsive action have been specifically programmed into the Mission project entitled "Support of the Office for Provincial Operations". Teams composed of the province chief, the sector advisor and the provincial representative, plus their staffs and backstopped by their Saigon organizations,

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will be able to act immediately when an emergency occurs with local resources and, if necessary, have priority access to personnel, commodities and funds from Saigon.

Item No. 39

Construct a new American Embassy building in Saigon as a symbol of our determination to stay in Vietnam for as long as necessary.

Status: The House Foreign Affairs Committee has reported out favorably the bill submitted to Congress by the President on April 1, 1965. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has not yet acted. Once favorable action is taken by the Senate Committee, the Foreign Buildings Operations office can proceed with construction using funds already appropriated for FBO purposes.

Item No. 40

To attract and hold the best U.S. personnel for service in Vietnam, increase allowances, provide better leave arrangements for time with families, authorize accelerated promotions and give top level recognition and support to the statement that the way to advance is through service in Vietnam. This requires legislation.

Status: The Department of State and AID are carefully following, supporting and encouraging the Wayne-Hays bill which would provide all necessary legislative authority. If this bill does not go through, State and AID will attempt to insure that incentives for service in Vietnam are included in the Foreign Assistance Act. They are also pressing the Department of Labor to have Bureau of Employment Compensation legislation liberalized with respect to death benefits. I have asked O'Brien's office to give the bill a nudge. It is presently being cleared by BOB.

In addition to these urgent actions the USIS report on the status of Item No. 25, to provide psychological operations teams to accompany the ARVN on all operations, is worth noting. Each division now has


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a psychological warfare company attached, and each regiment is supported by a psychological warfare team drawn from the company attached to the division. Results so far have been spotty; but one recent engagement in support of a military operation in the 7th Division area demonstrates the potential of these operations. Operation "Thang Long 27" came about when ARVN intelligence reported that the hardcore VC 514th Battalion was in western Dinh Tuong Province. It was assumed that if the ARVN would approach from the east the VC would retreat along a prescribed route to the west as they had done on two previous occasions. Therefore, on the night before the operation, ARVN units formed a semi-circle at a location half a day's march further west of the VC position. It then began a fake operation from the east, sending deceptive radio messages on non-existent troop movements and, using a loudspeaker aircraft as well as leaflets, urging civilians to evacuate a town five kilometers north of the VC stronghold. Meanwhile, the main force of VC troops withdrew to the west, as they had done in the past, where they met a Vietnamese Marine battalion and two regular regiments supported by M-113 armored troop carriers. An estimated 104 VC were killed, 37 were wounded and 90 were captured. During the next week more than 30 Chieu Hoi returnees were counted.

In the related list of actions proposed by CIA, Ambassador Johnson thus far has approved three; a separate report will be submitted on their status.


Chester L. Cooper

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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April 23, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHESTER COOPER, THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Status of Non-Military Actions (Forty-one Points)

Attached at Tab A is the first status report on Non-Military Actions. This status report is forwarded for your use in keeping the President informed of where we stand on the Non-Military Actions he approved in National Security Action Memorandum No. 328. The report, prepared in my office, is based on individual status reports submitted by the appropriate action agency.

As decided at the last Coordinating Committee meeting April 21, this first report includes a list of action items that will henceforth be dropped from regular status reports, either because they have been substantially accomplished or because dialogue with the Mission has indicated they are undesirable at this time, or their aim can be better accomplished by other means. I should emphasize the item as such is not being dropped from further consideration, but is being eliminated as an active item in the status report. There are seven such items, listed at Tab B, with an explanation of the reasons they are being dropped.

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Leonard Unger
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Far Eastern Affairs

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ry, NARA, Date 12-15-99

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NON-MILITARY ACTIONS ON WHICH REGULAR WEEKLY REPORTS
ARE NOT CONSIDERED NECESSARY

APRIL 23, 1965

11. Construct a teaching hospital in Saigon identified with the US, but affiliated with the University of Saigon Medical School to train Vietnamese doctors and nurses and provide improved medical care.

Comment: A large teaching hospital for the Medical School of the Saigon University is not recommended as an aid project at this time. USOM estimates that a minimum of five years is required to complete such a project even if it is designed to be staffed and operated initially by Americans and certainly even a longer period is involved if it is to be run mainly by the Vietnamese. Given the current situation the Mission does not feel it is wise to divert its energies and resources to this end. If the situation improves during the next year, we will re-examine this proposal.

13. Promote an expansion of Peace Corps/Operation Brotherhood-type operations in countryside using, for example, Filipino and Chinat personnel. These personnel, like those of IVS, have a proven capacity to work effectively with the villager. Such operations will also expand Free World aid.

Comment: Currently the GVN and USOM are more concerned with effectively placing and utilizing the services of this type of personnel already in Viet-Nam than in increasing their numbers.

Vice Premier Tuyen has stated that he sees little or no need for additional third country nationals at this time. In those cases where there is a definite need, security, and available administrative support for the technicians, the mission will utilize third country personnel. There is a growing body of evidence, to which the GVN is sensitive, that Chinese and/or Filipino personnel are unacceptable to certain local Vietnamese communities. The USOM must be mindful of this situation where it exists. Where and when the GVN requests such assistance, the USOM will do all in its power to satisfy such requests.

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Authority NY 015-006-2-2
By [signature] NARA, Date 6/10/02

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24. Create a national counterespionage organization to improve the security of GVN information and operations.

Comment: This task was begun several years ago as the Vietnamese Central Intelligence Organization Internal Operations Division, commonly called the Special Operations Corps (SOC). There are 216 personnel in SOC, of whom a high percentage, 106, are case officers, and there is one or more SOC case officer assigned to each province. A counter-intelligence component, eventually about 200 strong, will be added to the SOC. By July 1, 1965 the Mission will have trained and operationally activated 105 counter-intelligence officers to augment the existing 106 SOC officers. The CI component will be operationally targeted against DRV Central Research Agency (CRA) and Viet Cong agents infiltrated into GVN ministries and civil service.

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██████████ the scheduled personnel increase of this national counter-espionage entity to about 500 by the end of 1966 is operationally realistic. This is a new field of activity for the GVN in which they must walk before they run. There is no short-cut to CE/CI professionalism. There will be some modification of the SOC field organization in the next few months, however, to increase its proximity to RVNAF tactical units. SOC's six regional offices are now co-located (in the same town) with the six police regional directorates. SOC will open about nine new offices to make it co-located also with the various ARVN corps and division headquarters. No further action is recommended in excess of that above stated.

31. Establish a special US purchase fund for distribution to province chiefs to meet emergency needs not covered by authorized funds.

Comment: A GVN letter, dated 31 December 1964, established an Imprest Fund of VN\$1,000,000 integrated with the Provincial Budget to be used to meet unforeseen and emergency expenditures related to the pacification program. Replenishment of the fund up to the maximum amount is authorized and documents are to be transmitted directly to the Provincial Treasury for approval and release of accountability rather than being submitted to Saigon. Therefore, the establishment of a special US Purchase Plaster Fund for distribution to Province Chiefs to meet emergency needs is unnecessary and would duplicate an already established fund.

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35. Assign hand-picked US officers to work directly, continuously and exclusively with each special interest group. Such groups to include the Buddhists, Catholics, sects, Montagnards, students and labor. Ideally, these should be provided from within Mission resources.

Comment: The Mission indicated that personnel of various agencies were already working on a full-time basis with major interest groups and on a part-time basis with other groups. Expansion of these contacts will be considered and coordination of existing contacts improved. Action on this item is considered to be completed.

36. Assign hand-picked US officers to work directly and exclusively with GVN in the Prime Minister's office, key ministries such as Interior, Information, and Chieu Hoi, and on key programs such as land reform and the New Rural Life Hamlet. Ideally, these should be provided from within Mission resources. Their presence in the GVN Ministries should prove valuable, inter alia, in bringing US and GVN concepts closer together.

Comment: The Mission indicated that its personnel already have close, primarily unofficial, contacts with officials in key ministries and other offices, in order to report their attitudes and influence them as instructed by the Embassy. The Mission also questioned as to whether it would be advisable for the US to propose close official advisory relationships at top political levels and whether the GVN would accept the institutionalizing of such relationships. Action on this item is considered to have been completed.

37. To provide common guidance and fuller US coordination of pacification operations, the establishment of a US interagency action group directed by a senior Mission officer who reports directly to the Ambassador should be studied.

Comment: The Mission indicated that this question has been studied in the past and is under continuing review. In effect the US Mission Council, under the direction of the Ambassador guides and coordinates the United States role in pacification. The Mission doubted that there would be any value in organizing another separate administrative layer.

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Juanita,

Copy for the President's information.

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Apr 14 1965
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 10, 1965

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MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense

The President has directed me to emphasize again his continuing concern for more careful control of military information on operations in Vietnam. The President continues to believe that it is very unhelpful to have detailed accounts of the size and strength of air operations against North Vietnam, and does not understand why it is not possible to avoid giving out accurate information on numbers of aircraft and the weight of bombs dropped.

The President is also dissatisfied with the rapidity of release of information respecting further troop reinforcements to ~~North~~ Vietnam and does not understand why there should have been an announcement on this subject from Saigon. This announcement seems to him inconsistent with the decisions reached on April 1 and reported in paragraph 11 of National Security Action Memorandum No. 328 dated April 6.

The President requests that the Department of State and the Department of Defense take further energetic action to improve our performance in these respects.

McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State 4-19-78; NSC 6-21-78
By DCU/LP, NARA, Date 3-6-90

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 6, 1965

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 328

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

On Thursday, April 1, The President made the following decisions with respect to Vietnam:

1. Subject to modifications in the light of experience, and to coordination and direction both in Saigon and in Washington, the President approved the 41-point program of non-military actions submitted by Ambassador Taylor in a memorandum dated March 31, 1965.

2. The President gave general approval to the recommendations submitted by Mr. Rowan in his report dated March 16, with the exception that the President withheld approval of any request for supplemental funds at this time -- it is his decision that this program is to be energetically supported by all agencies and departments and by the reprogramming of available funds as necessary within USIA.

3. The President approved the urgent exploration of the 12 suggestions for covert and other actions submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence under date of March 31.

4. The President repeated his earlier approval of the 21-point program of military actions submitted by General Harold K. Johnson under date of March 14 and re-emphasized his desire that aircraft and helicopter reinforcements under this program be accelerated.

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Authority NSC memo 5/23/78
By MTT NARS, Date 6/6/78

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5. The President approved an 18-20,000 man increase in U. S. military support forces to fill out existing units and supply needed logistic personnel.

6. The President approved the deployment of two additional Marine Battalions and one Marine Air Squadron and associated headquarters and support elements.

7. The President approved a change of mission for all Marine Battalions deployed to Vietnam to permit their more active use under conditions to be established and approved by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State.

8. The President approved the urgent exploration, with the Korean, Australian, and New Zealand Governments, of the possibility of rapid deployment of significant combat elements from their armed forces in parallel with the additional Marine deployment approved in paragraph 6.

9. Subject to continuing review, the President approved the following general framework of continuing action against North Vietnam and Laos:

We should continue roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of ROLLING THUNDER operations, being prepared to add strikes in response to a higher rate of VC operations, or conceivably to slow the pace in the unlikely event VC slacked off sharply for what appeared to be more than a temporary operational lull.

The target systems should continue to avoid the effective GCI range of MIGs. We should continue to vary the types of targets, stepping up attacks on lines of communication in the near future, and possibly moving in a few weeks to attacks on the rail lines north and northeast of Hanoi.

Leaflet operations should be expanded to obtain maximum practicable psychological effect on the North Vietnamese population.

Blockade or aerial mining of North Vietnamese ports need further study and should be considered for future operations. It would have major political complications, especially in relation to the Soviets and other third countries, but also offers many advantages.

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- 3 -

Air operation in Laos, particularly route blocking operations in the Panhandle area, should be stepped up to the maximum remunerative rate.

10. Ambassador Taylor will promptly seek the reactions of the South Vietnamese Government to appropriate sections of this program and their approval as necessary, and in the event of disapproval or difficulty at that end, these decisions will be appropriately reconsidered. In any event, no action into Vietnam under paragraphs 6 and 7 above should take place without GVN approval or further Presidential authorization.

11. The President desires that with respect to the actions in paragraphs 5 through 7, premature publicity be avoided by all possible precautions. The actions themselves should be taken as rapidly as practicable, but in ways that should minimize any appearance of sudden changes in policy, and official statements on these troop movements will be made only with the direct approval of the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State. The President's desire is that these movements and changes should be understood as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy.

McGeorge Bundy

McGeorge Bundy

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April 6, 1965

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 328

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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3. The President approved the urgent exploration of the 12 suggestions for covert and other actions submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence under date of March 31.
4. The President repeated his earlier approval of the 21-point program of military actions submitted by General Harold K. Johnson under date of March 14 and re-emphasized his desire that aircraft and helicopter reinforcements under this program be accelerated.

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Authority NSC memo 5/23/78
By ME, NARS, Date 6/6/78

5. The President approved an 18-20,000 man increase in U. S. military support forces to fill out existing units and supply needed logistic personnel.

6. The President approved the deployment of two additional Marine Battalions and one Marine Air Squadron and associated headquarters and support elements.

7. The President approved a change of mission for all Marine Battalions deployed to Vietnam to permit their more active use under conditions to be established and approved by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State.

8. The President approved the urgent exploration, with the Korean, Australian, and New Zealand Governments, of the possibility of rapid deployment of significant combat elements from their armed forces in parallel with the additional Marine deployment approved in paragraph 6.

9. Subject to continuing review, the President approved the following general framework of continuing action against North Vietnam and Laos:

We should continue roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of ROLLING THUNDER operations, being prepared to add strikes in response to a higher rate of VC operations, or conceivably to slow the pace in the unlikely event VC slacked off sharply for what appeared to be more than a temporary operational lull.

The target systems should continue to avoid the effective GCI range of MIGs. We should continue to vary the types of targets, stepping up attacks on lines of communication in the near future, and possibly moving in a few weeks to attacks on the rail lines north and northeast of Hanoi.

Leaflet operations should be expanded to obtain maximum practicable psychological effect on the North Vietnamese population.

Blockade or aerial mining of North Vietnamese ports need further study and should be considered for future operations. It would have major political complications, especially in relation to the Soviets and other third countries, but also offers many advantages.

Air operation in Laos, particularly route blocking operations in the Panhandle area, should be stepped up to the maximum remunerative rate.

10. Ambassador Taylor will promptly seek the reactions of the South Vietnamese Government to appropriate sections of this program and their approval as necessary, and in the event of disapproval or difficulty at that end, these decisions will be appropriately reconsidered. In any event, no action into Vietnam under paragraphs 6 and 7 above should take place without GVN approval or further Presidential authorization.

11. The President desires that with respect to the actions in paragraphs 5 through 7, premature publicity be avoided by all possible precautions. The actions themselves should be taken as rapidly as practicable, but in ways that should minimize any appearance of sudden changes in policy, and official statements on these troop movements will be made only with the direct approval of the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State. The President's desire is that these movements and changes should be understood as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy.

McGeorge Bundy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 6, 1965

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 328

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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3. The President approved the urgent exploration of the 12 suggestions for covert and other actions submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence under date of March 31.

4. The President repeated his earlier approval of the 21-point program of military actions submitted by General Harold K. Johnson under date of March 14 and re-emphasized his desire that aircraft and helicopter reinforcements under this program be accelerated.

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Authority

NSC memo 5/23/78

By

MJE

NARS, Date

6/6/78

5. The President approved an 18-20,000 man increase in U. S. military support forces to fill out existing units and supply needed logistic personnel.

6. The President approved the deployment of two additional Marine Battalions and one Marine Air Squadron and associated headquarters and support elements.

7. The President approved a change of mission for all Marine Battalions deployed to Vietnam to permit their more active use under conditions to be established and approved by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State.

8. The President approved the urgent exploration, with the Korean, Australian, and New Zealand Governments, of the possibility of rapid deployment of significant combat elements from their armed forces in parallel with the additional Marine deployment approved in paragraph 6.

9. Subject to continuing review, the President approved the following general framework of continuing action against North Vietnam and Laos:

We should continue roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of ROLLING THUNDER operations, being prepared to add strikes in response to a higher rate of VC operations, or conceivably to slow the pace in the unlikely event VC slacked off sharply for what appeared to be more than a temporary operational lull.

The target systems should continue to avoid the effective GCI range of MIGs. We should continue to vary the types of targets, stepping up attacks on lines of communication in the near future, and possibly moving in a few weeks to attacks on the rail lines north and northeast of Hanoi.

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10. Ambassador Taylor will promptly seek the reactions of the South Vietnamese Government to appropriate sections of this program and their approval as necessary, and in the event of disapproval or difficulty at that end, these decisions will be appropriately reconsidered. In any event, no action into Vietnam under paragraphs 6 and 7 above should take place without GVN approval or further Presidential authorization.

11. The President desires that with respect to the actions in paragraphs 5 through 7, premature publicity be avoided by all possible precautions. The actions themselves should be taken as rapidly as practicable, but in ways that should minimize any appearance of sudden changes in policy, and official statements on these troop movements will be made only with the direct approval of the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State. The President's desire is that these movements and changes should be understood as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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April 6, 1965

Mr. Cooper:

Copy of draft NSAM as requested.

Dolores

*DD comments
(McNught)*

April 5, 1965

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SECRETARY OF STATE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Authority NSC memo 5/23/78
By act/mif, NARA, Date 3-6-80

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March 14 and re-emphasized his desire that aircraft and helicopter reinforcements under this program be accelerated.

5. The President approved an 18-20,000 man increase in US military support forces to fill out existing units and supply needed logistic personnel.

6. The President approved the deployment of two additional Marine Battalions and one Marine Air Squadron, *2nd associated headquarters*
2nd support elements

7. The President approved a change of mission for all Marine Battalions deployed to Vietnam to permit their more active use under conditions to be established and approved by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State.

8. The President approved the urgent exploration, with the Korean, Australian, and New Zealand Governments, of the possibility of rapid deployment of significant combat elements from their armed forces in parallel with the additional Marine deployment approved in paragraph 6.

9. Subject to continuing review, the President approved the following general framework of continuing action against North Vietnam and Laos;

We should continue roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of Rolling Thunder operations, being prepared to add strikes in response to a higher rate of VC operations, or conceivably to slow the pace in the unlikely event VC slacked off sharply for what appeared to be more than a temporary operational lull.

The target systems should continue to avoid the effective GCI range of MIGs. We should continue to vary the types of targets, stepping up attacks on lines of communication in the near future, and possibly moving in a few weeks to attacks on the rail lines north and northeast of Hanoi.

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The actions themselves should be taken ^{as rapidly as practicable, but} in ways that should minimize any

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April 5, 1965

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SECRETARY OF STATE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE McNamara (4/5/65) m

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

On Thursday, April 1, the President made the following decisions with respect to Vietnam:

1. Subject to modifications in the light of experience, and to coordination and direction both in Saigon and in Washington, the President approved the 41-point program of non-military actions submitted by Ambassador Taylor in a memorandum dated March 31, 1965.
2. The President gave general approval to the recommendations submitted by Mr. Rowan in his report dated March 16, with the exception that the President withheld approval of any request for supplemental funds at this time--it is his decision that this program is to be energetically supported by all agencies and departments and by the reprogramming of available funds as necessary within USIA.
3. The President approved the urgent exploration of the 12 suggestions for covert and other actions submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence under date of March 31.
4. The President repeated his earlier approval of the 21-point program of military actions submitted by General Harold K. Johnson under date of

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Authority NSC memo 5/23/78
By OC4/MIC, NARA, Date 3-6-90

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March 14 and re-emphasized his desire that aircraft and helicopter reinforcements under this program be accelerated.

5. The President approved an 18-20,000 man increase in US military support forces to fill out existing units and supply needed logistic personnel.

6. The President approved the deployment of two additional Marine Battalions and one Marine Air Squadron.

7. The President approved a change of mission for all Marine Battalions deployed to Vietnam to permit their more active use under conditions to be established and approved by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State.

8. The President approved the urgent exploration, with the Korean, Australian, and New Zealand Governments, of the possibility of rapid deployment of significant combat elements from their armed forces in parallel with the additional Marine deployment approved in paragraph 6.

9. Subject to continuing review, the President approved the following general framework of continuing action against North Vietnam and Laos:

We should continue roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of Rolling Thunder operations, being prepared to add strikes in response to a higher rate of VC operations, or conceivably to slow the pace in the unlikely event VC/slacked off sharply for what appeared to be more than a temporary operational lull.

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The target systems should continue to avoid the effective GCI range of MIGs. We should continue to vary the types of targets, stepping up attacks on lines of communication in the near future, and possibly moving in a few weeks to attacks on the rail lines north and northeast of Hanoi.

Leaflet operations should be expanded to obtain maximum practicable psychological effect on the North Vietnamese population.

Blockade or aerial mining of North Vietnamese ports need further study and should be considered for future operations. It would have major political complications, especially in relation to the Soviets and other third countries, but also offers many advantages.

Air operation in Laos, particularly route blocking operations in the Panhandle area, should be stepped up to the maximum remunerative rate.

10. Ambassador Taylor will promptly seek the reactions of the South Vietnamese Government to appropriate sections of this program and their approval as necessary, and in the event of disapproval or difficulty at that end, these decisions will be appropriately reconsidered. In any event, no action into Vietnam under paragraphs 6 and 7 above should take place without GVN approval or further Presidential authorization.

11. The President desires that with respect to the actions in paragraphs 5 through 7, premature publicity be avoided by all possible precautions. The actions themselves should be taken in ways that should minimize any

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appearance of sudden changes in policy, and official statements on these troop movements will be made only with the direct approval of the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State.

The President's desire is that these movements and changes should be understood as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy.

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DRAFT NSAM

April 3, 1965

SECRETARY OF STATE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

On Thursday, April 1, the President made the following decisions with ^{include to} ~~actual action~~ respect to Vietnam:

1. Subject to modifications in the light of experience, and to coordination and ^{non-} ~~program~~ of military actions submitted by Ambassador Taylor in a memorandum dated 31 March 1965.
2. The President gave general approval to the recommendations submitted by Mr. Rowan in his report dated March 16, with the exception that the President withheld approval of any request for supplemental funds at this time--it is his decision that this program is to be energetically supported by all agencies and departments and by the reprogramming of available funds as necessary within USIA.
3. The President approved the urgent exploration of the 12 suggestions for covert and other actions submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence under date of March 31.
4. The President repeated his earlier approval of the 21-point program of military actions submitted by General Harold K. Johnson under date of March 14 and reemphasized his desire that aircraft and helicopter reinforcements under this program be accelerated.

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Authority NSC Memo 5-23-78
By DAH/mic, NARA, Date 3-6-90.

5. The President approved an 18-20,000 man increase in US military support forces to fill out existing units and supply needed logistic personnel.
6. The President approved the deployment of two additional Marine Battalions and one Marine Air Squadron.
7. The President approved a change of mission for all Marine Battalions deployed to Vietnam to permit their use on appropriate offensive combat missions under conditions to be established and approved by the Secretary of Defense.
8. The President approved the urgent exploration, with the Korean, Australian, and New Zealand Governments, of the possibility of rapid deployment of significant combat elements from their armed forces in parallel with additional Marine deployment approved in paragraph 6.
9. Subject to continuing weekly review, the President approved the following general framework of continuing action against North Vietnam and Laos:

We should continue roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of Rolling Thunder operations, being prepared to add strikes in response to a higher rate of VC operations, or conceivably to slow the pace in the unlikely event VC action slacked off sharply for what appeared to be more than a temporary operational lull.