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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#1 memo</del>	<del>NSAM 331</del> <i>open 9-9-93 NLJ 93-65</i> <del>S</del> <del>1 p</del>	4/9/65	<del>A</del>
#2 memo	Duplicate of #1    "		
<del>#3 memo</del>	<del>Duplicate of #1</del> "		
<del>#4 memo</del>	<del>Komer to Bundy</del> <del>S</del> <del>1 p</del> <i>open 5-30-95 NLJ 93-320</i>	<del>4/7/65</del>	<del>A</del>
#5 memo	Harriman to Bundy <i>open 3-7-94 NLJ 93-321</i> <del>S</del> <del>1 p</del>	4/15/65	<del>A</del>
#5a cable	Deptel to All FE, AF, NEA Posts, USUN (draft) <del>C</del> <del>6 p</del> <i>open 3-7-94 NLJ 93-321</i>	4/14/65	A

FILE LOCATION

**NSF, NSAM, NSAM 331--Bandung II Conference**

**Box 6**

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April 9, 1965

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 331

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: The Bandung II Conference

The President wishes to encourage sympathetic nonaligned nations willing to speak up against those who are blindly critical of the US position in Vietnam.

One of the more imminent focal points of this effort should be to prevent the Algiers Chiefs of State Conference in late June from emerging as a platform for anti-US resolutions, especially those attacking our role in Vietnam. We certainly don't want 60-65 countries, including many of our friends, hitting us from the flank this way.

So it would be desirable for the appropriate agencies, under the guidance of the Department of State, to mount a substantial effort to (a) encourage those attendees friendly to us to organize themselves to prevent ostensibly unanimous anti-US resolutions from passing; and (b) ensure that both our purposes and the likely efforts of hostile elements to use the conference to designate them are made widely known to those attending. Thought might be given to whether the President should follow up this effort with personal messages to certain attending chiefs of state asking them to assume leadership to this end.

/s/

McGeorge Bundy

cc: Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
Director, US Information Agency

1 cy ea: R. Komer  
C. Johnson  
NSC Files

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 93-65  
By ing, NARA, Date 11-16-92

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Dispatched 4/13/65 - Rcpts nos. 161-163

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April 9, 1965

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 93-65  
By ijg, NARA, Date 11-16-92

McGB:RWK:tmt 4/9/65

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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April 9, 1965

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*McGeorge Bundy*

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cc: Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
Director, US Information Agency

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**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**  
**NJ 93-65**  
By lip, NARA, Date 11-16-92

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Revised attachment 4

April 7, 1965

Mac -

Given our sensitivity on Vietnam, I'm sure we'd take a dim view of any highly critical resolutions emerging from the 60-65 nation Bandung II Conference in Algiers on 29 June.

Yet this is precisely what's likely to happen, if we let the Chicoms, Indos, Egyptians, Cubans, and Algerians run away with the Conference. At the least we'll get some ringing denunciation of imperialism, neo-colonialism and all that rot, without naming the US but probably mentioning Vietnam, Congo, Cyprus, Cuba, etc., which is about as bad. At worst we'll get a specific resolution condemning warlike escalation and calling for negotiation on a basis we won't like.

So I see merit in generating now a major US counter-effort to match all the intense pre-conference activity of our foes. If we're willing to make the effort we can rally the 20-odd moderates to oppose in bloc the wrong kind of resolutions. But we won't make the effort unless LBJ says "go". Harriman and I try, but run into deafening apathy from the Bureaus. Ergo, how about attached?

OK

RWK

RWK

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 93-320

By cb, NARA, Date 5-22-95

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE  
WASHINGTON

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1 - Komer  
2 - Ret.

April 15, 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

I was very pleased to receive National Security Action Memorandum No. 331 since it ties in directly with the type coordination of U.S. activities we have planned with regard to Bandung II.

Attached is a copy of the basic guidance paper to the field on this subject which has now been approved by the interested offices in the Department, USIA and CIA, after extensive discussion during the past month.

I have called a meeting of persons directly concerned with this subject on Thursday, April 22 at 4:00 pm in my office to discuss the specific action which we should take with the leaders of certain countries to ensure that our mutual interests at the Conference are protected to the fullest extent possible. I am asking Bob Komer to attend in view of his keen interest in this subject.

Attachment:

Basic Guidance Paper.



W. Averell Harriman

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 93-321  
By ijg, NARA, Date 2-1-94

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APR 16 1965

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 93-321  
By isp, NARA, Date 2-1-94

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ALL FE, AF, NEA POSTS and USUN, NEW YORK

INFO: ALL EUR and ARA POSTS  
ALL POLADS

Department of State

Guidance re Second Afro-Asian Conference, Algiers,  
June.  
CA-1212, July 30, 1964

Background:

Second Afro-Asian Conference (Bandung II) now scheduled June 29 in Algiers. Conference on chiefs-of-state level preceded by FonMin meeting June 24. 22-Nation Preparatory Meeting held Djakarta April 1964; official communique attached ref. airgram listed proposed agenda, objectives, and categories of countries (over 60 countries plus national movements) to be invited. Permanent Preparatory Committee consisting of Ambassadors to Algeria of certain Afro-Asian countries announced on Feb. 11 postponed date, decision that FonMin meeting prior conference would resolve question invitation to USSR and Malaysia, and that liberation movements would be invited as observers.

According reports from friendly sources, Permanent Preparatory Committee meeting Algiers March 29-30 was notable for Chinese Communist-Indian clash in which Indian role described as "lackey of imperialism." Sources believe Chicoms, while not openly seeking admission to UN, will seek achieve by acclamation resolutions calling for (1) reorganization of United Nations; (2) admission Red China; and (3) variety condemnatory resolutions aimed at US and allies. On questions Rules Committee, election of President, etc., reservations entered by Indians, Iranians, and Turks, attacked by Chicoms and Guineans.

Sources

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S/AH - RHWhite:fjm 4/14/65 S/AH - W. Averell Harriman  
(in draft) S/AL-Amb. Thompson USIA-Mr. Ryan P-Mr. Lisle  
INR-Mr. Thornton ACDA-Mr. DePalma WH-Mr. Komer EUR-Capt. Freeman  
ARA-Mr. Lister FE-Mr. Mendenhall NEA-Mr. Walsh AF-Mrs. Johnston

APR 16 1965

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Sources believe that if sufficient number of reservations and objections received, rules will have to be reconsidered which is what Chicom and supporters wish to avoid.

Public statements Chou En-lai during two-day visit Algiers March 30-31 explicit that CPR expects Bandung II will deal primarily with struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, that it will support all national liberation and independence movements, and that it will support efforts of revolutionary movements to expand their activities for defense of world peace.

In an interview in Cairo on April 2 Chou stated, "It has become very important for the Afro-Asian states to further consolidate their solidarity, and to support each other in their common struggle. This is the basic task of the Second Afro-Asian Conference . . . Afro-Asian solidarity insures victory for the Afro-Asian states and peoples in their common struggle against imperialism, the old form of colonialism, and neo-colonialism . . . It is very clear that despite the existence of separate characteristics which distinguish the efforts of Afro-Asian solidarity, and the genuine policy of non-alignment, the two policies have common aims. Both have appeared as a result of the struggle against imperialism, the old form of colonialism and neo-colonialism, headed by the United States. This can easily be discerned in the basic resolutions adopted by the first Afro-Asian conference, and by the summit conference of non-aligned states."

With regard to United Nations, Chou stated, "The United Nations has become a monopoly of the United States and a few great powers. It has also become an instrument serving imperialism against the states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America . . . The Chinese Government and people firmly support Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations . . . If the United Nations does not act to correct its own mistakes and to reorganize itself comprehensively, then the only course to be followed will be the setting up of another, revolutionary United Nations. Our call to consider the question of setting up another, revolutionary United Nations helps to strengthen the right of Asian and African states to have their full say like other states. It also assists the struggle of these states in exposing the United Nations and in demanding that its mistakes be rectified and that it be reorganized comprehensively."

Of the 67 countries eligible to receive invitation to conference, not counting USSR and Malaysia, US has diplomatic relations with all but the four Asian communist regimes (CPR, North Korea, North Vietnam, and

Mongolia),

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Mongolia), whereas Peiping has relations with less than half (32). Moscow has relations with 50.

U.S. Guidelines:

1. Department recognizes Communist China and Indonesia, the originators and major backers of Bandung II, will try to use conference as extension of their foreign policy. They will endeavor rally support for their position using as nucleus more radical elements Afro-Asian world.

2. Efforts will be made have all Afro-Asian nations subscribe to blanket condemnation of West for "continuing evils of colonialism, neo-colonialism, and imperialism." Chicom activities and statements in particular indicate Peiping's first and foremost objective at conference will be consolidation of Afro-Asian states as bloc, either real or apparent, against U.S. on subject neo-colonialism, using U.S. role in Vietnam as focal point of their attack. Resolution this effect probably already drafted in mind Chicoms with main effort now devoted to tactical measures to ensure its issuance with minimum of watering down. Peiping will undoubtedly try flood Afro-Asian world with this concept during period leading up to conference in hope conference delegations will be conditioned sufficiently to view "neo-colonialist U.S." as uncontested fact of life. Indonesia can be expected to work in close association with Communist China to condemn "neo-colonialists" and "old established forces".

3. As most influential power among chiefs-of-state of some 50-60 Afro-Asian countries, Communist China will have valuable forum available for its diplomatic and political maneuvers. Extent to which Chicoms achieve their objectives will depend on (a) whether they can exclude Soviet participation and/or influence from Conference; (b) whether they can control conference apparatus so that Chicom views and tactics will prevail over those not closely associated with them; (c) whether they can prevent the "moderates" from effectively uniting against them; (d) whether they can prevent countries friendly to West from speaking out and, more important, being heard.

4. Countries friendly to West which plan to attend Conference should be well aware of difficulties and embarrassments hostile elements may place in their path. Main purpose of both Communists and radical nationalists aimed at removing all vestiges Western influence from Afro-Asian world to be replaced by attitudes their respective liking.

5. In

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5. In short (four-day) crowded (over fifty delegations) meeting, Communists and radical nationalists are expected attempt prevent Western-style parliamentary debate or voting procedures, and to extent possible railroad their resolutions by using control techniques similar to those effective in Second Non-Aligned Conference in Cairo last October. Reservations by several delegations to this Conference's resolutions have never been made public.

6. At meetings of this type, resolutions or final communique, especially when dealing specifically with Western (primarily U.S.) action regarding Vietnam, Congo, Cyprus, Israel, and southern Africa are usually prepared and presented by Communists and radical nationalists in such manner that anyone who objects will be labelled de facto supporter of colonialism, stooge, etc.

7. On other hand, moderate countries if they participate vigorously and effectively may be able to prevent domination of the Conference by Communists and radical nationalists. For example, at recent Afro-Asian Islamic Conference in Indonesia, moderates who were not even sophisticated delegates of governments succeeded in substantially watering down hostile resolutions promoted by governmental representatives from Indonesia and Communist China.

#### U.S. Position re Participation Friendly Countries:

1. Although conceived in Peiping and Djakarta and geared to Chicom and Indonesian tactics, Bandung II presents opportunities as well as problems for those who do not wish to see the Afro-Asian world completely misrepresented by subterfuge and deception. To capitalize, however, on these opportunities will require effective planning and coordination.

2. Included among countries expected to attend Bandung II in addition to radical and extreme elements are: India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Iran, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Nepal, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Turkey, South Vietnam, South Korea, as well as many moderates African states - Ethiopia, Morocco, Tunisia, Nigeria, Liberia and some members of OCAM.

3. Following general lines of discussion regarding host government participating in Conference are suggested. Posts, at their discretion,

may

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may adjust or modify these suggestions to fit particular situations.

a. We recognize final decision attend Bandung II, of course, remains responsibility country involved. However, unless there are strong overriding reasons that a country should not attend, U.S. officials should urge friendly countries eligible to attend not only to participate but be prepared to send strongest possible delegation equipped to combat communist-type aims and tactics cited above.

b. With regard African countries that display disenchantment with such meetings, we should neither encourage nor discourage their attendance. If question attendance raised by such governments, Embassy should say that presence governments willing and able play vigorous role would clearly help cause of moderates. (Specific instructions to certain African posts follow.)

c. Countries which plan to attend should be urged to prepare for Bandung II well in advance. Important in pre-conference period that strong steps be taken to ensure that "rules of procedure" for conference allow right to dissent. In this connection "decision by concensus" concept should be closely protected at Permanent Preparatory Meetings in Algiers in May, and at same time not used as argument to exclude participation of countries such as Malaysia.

d. To be effective, forces of moderation will require leadership by some of the larger and more influential countries as well as full support of those who think accordingly. (At Cairo Conference in October many delegates were in disagreement with certain of the proceedings and resolutions but were unable to take remedial action because of "rules of procedure" or for lack of effective leadership.) In event conference is found to be "completely rigged," most effective counter move on part of moderates would be mass walk-out accompanied by vocal denunciation of control tactics involved.

e. Pre-Conference activities on large scale may, of course, not be possible for many countries concerned, but they should be urged, whenever feasible, to consult with like-minded neighbors, and partners in regional groupings through whatever channels are available to them.

f. Suggest

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f. Suggest no formal reply should be made to an invitation from host government (Algeria) until arrangements for conference are firm and final. This will allow flexibility in case it later becomes desirable for a country not to attend and in event conference is further postponed.

g. Where there is some question that a country eligible to attend conference will not receive invitation, country concerned should work through friendly countries on Permanent Preparatory Committee in Algiers to insure that it receives an invitation.

**ACTION:** FYI Primary purpose of this circular is to acquaint posts in FE, AF, and NEA with objectives and tactics of Communist China and its supporters to use Conference as a platform for anti-U.S. resolutions, especially those attacking our role in Vietnam. USG concerned that many of the 60-65 countries represented with which we have friendly and mutually-beneficial relations will be maneuvered into supporting anti-U.S. resolutions that do not represent their true feelings and even represent ideas and concepts to which they are in fact opposed.

Department wishes (a) encourage those attendees friendly to U.S. to organize themselves to prevent ostensibly unanimous anti-U.S. resolutions from passing, and (b) ensure that both our purposes and the likely efforts of hostile elements are made widely known to those attending.

This circular is world-wide and accordingly cannot cover all possible problems of various countries. Department interested in receiving full reporting on attitude and specific planning host governments toward conference. Subsequent guidance will be furnished to cover special situations in certain countries.

U.S. position on agenda items, particularly re Chicom-Indonesian attempts scuttle U.N., will be furnished when more details available on possible agenda revisions and likely nature "rules of procedure".

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