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| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|------------------|---|--------------------|--------------|
| #1 NSAM | NSAM 333 confidential 1 p <i>open 9-9-93 NLS 93-65</i> | 5/13/65 | A |
| #1a NSAM | duplicate of #1 " | | |
| #6 memo | Thomas Mann for McGeorge Bundy confidential 5 p <i>OPEN 9-24-98 NLS 97-204</i> | 6/17/65 | A |
| #6a report | Summary and Analysis of Draft Legislation confidential 2 p <i>open 3-13-97</i> | 6/4/65 | A |
| #6b bill | draft bill confidential 5 p <i>open 3-13-97</i> | 6/65 | A |
| #8 letter | Robert McNamara for McGeorge Bundy confidential 1 p <i>open 3-13-97</i> | 5/24/65 | A |
| #9 NSAM | NSAM 333 confidential 1 p <i>open 9-9-93 NLS 93-65</i> | 5/13/65 | A |

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, NSAM File, NSAM 333

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May 13, 1965

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 333

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of Commerce

SUBJECT: Follow-up on the Miller Report

The President has directed me to establish a committee consisting of representatives of the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce to recommend to him what actions the government should take in our trade relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe in the light of the recommendations of the Miller Report. May I request that you appoint a senior official of your department to serve with me on such a committee.

All recommendations of the committee will be reviewed with you before they are submitted to the President.

15/
McGeorge Bundy

Information copies to:

Secretary of the Treasury
Secretary of the Interior
Secretary of Agriculture
Secretary of Labor
Director of Central Intelligence
President, Export-Import Bank

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 93-65
By lig, NARA, Date 11-16-92

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 13, 1965

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The Secretary of Defense
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McGeorge Bundy
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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
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By sig, NARA, Date 11-16-92

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 27, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF NSAM NOS. 324 and 333

SUBJECT: Miller Report Follow-up

1. The President wants to get the follow-up process going, and would like Under Secretary Mann to take the lead on the Hill.

2. The Administration is in favor of the Miller Committee recommendations, and, in particular, is in favor of an East-West Trade Act along the lines suggested in the Mann memorandum of June 17.

3. However, the President does not wish to add to the current legislative load, especially of the Senate, and hence will not plan to send up a bill this session.

4. If anyone in the Congress were to introduce a bill of the sort suggested in the Mann memorandum, the Administration would support it.

5. A possible sequence, to be explored with Senator Mansfield and others, would involve hearings on the Miller Report this session, and a bill early in the next.

6. The Miller Report should be given wide circulation both in the Senate and the House.



McGeorge Bundy

Distribution:

Addressees: Sec State
Sec Defense
Sec Commerce

Info cys: Sec Treasury
Sec Interior
Sec Agriculture
Sec Labor
DCI
Ex-Im Bank

Mr. Bator
Mr. Johnson
NSC (NSAM 329 file)
NSC (NSAM 333 file)

Dispatched 7/27/65 - Outside rcpts

Correction fm 329 to 324 made by phone

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, July 1, 1965
8:20 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Follow-up on the Miller Report on East-West Trade

At Tab A is Tom Mann's recommendations for the State Department that we should now follow-up strongly on the East-West trade approach recommended by Irwin Miller and his Committee. At Tab B is a memorandum in which Jack Connor takes a somewhat different position. Both memoranda are important, although the passages on the Export Control Act are out of date now that it has been passed.

State, Commerce, and Defense agree that the Miller approach to bridge building is sound. That it is in our interest to strike trade bargains with individual Bloc countries using trade as a carrot, and trading like good Yankees (or Texans).

It is also agreed that the important new tool that we need is authority to offer most favored nation treatment. Except for Poland and Yugoslavia, Eastern European countries now pay Smoot-Hawley Tariff rates.

It was agreed that the best way to get this bargaining authority is to have a new, separate East-West Trade Act which would spell out the means of using such authority in bilateral bargaining.

The difference between Commerce and the rest of us is on timing and on the relation of this issue to Vietnam. The matter of timing is minor -- Jack Connor would like to have further "public education" before we begin Congressional consultation and develop a plan for a bill for the Hill. ^{Others think} The best way to get this education is to make a proposal and follow it up on the Hill.

The Vietnamese issue is more important and presents a basic policy issue. Rusk, Mann, and especially Tommy Thomson all think that it is precisely because of Vietnam that we should be keeping a clear signal of our interest in improved peaceful relations with the Soviet Union and the European Bloc countries. Connor's question is whether we can get

this point across with the Congress and the public at a time when we are having a tough contest in Vietnam.

It is a fair question.

On foreign policy grounds, I believe very strongly indeed that we should make this signal on peaceful trade both to the Russians and to the world. I think it is useful to make it even if the legislative road proves to be slow and tough. But I also think the final judgment on this peculiarly and necessarily Presidential.

On the Congressional front, I am sure that Fulbright would love to receive a bill and begin hearings and manage the timing of the whole exercise, in close consultation with us. Mansfield would be equally favorable. On the basis of preliminary consultation with Irwin Miller, I think Dirksen and Hickenlooper will be reasonable. The matter should not go beyond Senate hearings in this session in any case.

Tom Mann's immediate proposal is that you should discuss this matter briefly with the Leadership on Tuesday and then authorize him to begin intensive Congressional consultations aimed at the early introduction of an East-West trade bill. In spite of Jack Connor's reservations, I think this is the preferred course, but you may wish to hear further argument.

McG.B.

McG.B.

Have O'Brien put this on the
agenda for the next Leadership
Meeting_____

Get Connor and Mann in for a talk
with me_____

Speak to me_____

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 28, 1965 ✓

SUBJECT: Follow-up on Miller Report on East-West Trade

1. We have completed a State-Defense-Commerce-White House follow-up on the Miller Report, and are agreed that:

- (i) The Miller approach to bridge-building is sound -- it is in our interest ~~to try~~ to strike bargains with individual Bloc countries, using trade as a carrot, to promote ~~and reward~~ liberalization and increasing independence.
- (ii) To follow through, you will need to have authority to cut tariffs on imports from individual Bloc countries to most-favored-nation levels. Excepting ^{for} Poland and Yugoslavia, imports from Eastern Europe and Russia are now charged Smoot-Hawley rates. In bargaining with a Communist government, the offer of MFN ~~treatment~~ would be our strongest card.
- (iii) On our view, the best way to get MFN authority would be through a separate East-West Trade Act, which would spell out how you would use such authority to negotiate bilateral agreements designed to serve our interests.

2. There is a difference of opinion between Jack Connor and the rest of us about timing:

- (i) *after* Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Mann and I believe that we should go ahead now -- ~~with~~ a preliminary signal from you to the leadership and Congressional consultations led by Rusk and Mann -- on the premise that we will send up a bill during this session, ask for hearings as soon as practicable, and shoot for enactment either late in this session or early next. By moving ahead now, in the face of Vietnam, you will confirm both here and abroad your commitment to a two-track policy of resisting aggression but trying at the same time to build the peace. An East-West Trade bill is the natural next step, following on the Miller and CED reports, the Chamber of Commerce resolution, the favorable reaction in the Business Council, Congressional soundings concerning the publication of the Miller Report -- and, most importantly, your own statements on bridge-building. In fact, after the above, failure to follow through is bound to bring the entire bridge-building initiative into question.
- (ii) Jack Connor (and his people) want to wait with a bill until after a "substantial, thorough-going and carefully planned educational program", and the testing of the results of such a program.

Jack is not convinced that the business community is sold. (Irwin Miller and his committee all believe that, apart from a crackpot fringe, a large majority of business would fall in solidly behind you, once they got a signal that this is what you thought best for the country.)

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~~(iii)~~ Jack is ~~also~~ bothered by the Vietnam context. The rest of us believe that, in terms of a balanced Presidential posture, Vietnam is an argument for going ahead now.

3. If you decide that we should go ahead, we would recommend that:

- (i) As a first step, you explain to the leadership why you are inclined to proceed now, despite Vietnam.
- (ii) You instruct Dean Rusk and Tom Mann to explore in-depth on the Hill. (In our judgment, such exploration should follow a Presidential signal that in your judgment, and on foreign policy grounds, this is a good time to do this.)

Following such exploration we would come back to you for a final decision whether to go ahead with a bill and a message.

McG. B.



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THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MCGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: NSAM 333: Follow-up on the Miller Report

We have reviewed, from the overall standpoint, State's proposed East-West Trade Bill, as well as Tom Mann's memorandum to you of June 17 and his accompanying summary and analysis of the bill.

We agree that the Miller Committee's report is fundamentally sound and offers a practical blueprint for achieving the President's goal of increasing the flow of peaceful trade between Eastern Europe and our country.

On this basis we have no difficulty with State's draft bill, in principle, since it is designed to carry out several of the Miller Committee's important recommendations. I refer particularly to the proposals that the President be given authority to grant MFN treatment to imports from selected East European Communist countries, and that ways and means be found for developing Congressional and public understanding and acceptance of the President's program.

As I see it, there are two sensitive problems which this bill and Tom Mann's memorandum raise at the threshold. They concern the highly important matters of timing and advance preparation.

The decision as to when this bill ought to be presented to Congress will, I presume, need to be attuned to the status of the hostilities in Viet Nam, along with reports on related activities and attitudes of the USSR and other East European Communist countries. Furthermore, since progress and fate of the bill in Congress could hinge on reports from Viet Nam or Eastern Europe which are not now foreseeable, there must be a delicate assessment of the risk that a delay or other setback could have on long-term implementation of this policy.

It is evident that passage of the Export Control Act extension must be accomplished before an East-West Trade Bill is discussed with Congress.

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Authority Commerce Dept. Guidelines, 4-14-73
By 4-11-90, NARA, Date Diff

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The other problem -- that of advance preparation -- brings up what I believe you will agree is one of the Miller Committee's most significant recommendations. This is No. 14, which reads as follows:

"If trade with Communist countries is to be used for these objectives, the U. S. public, the Congress and the executive branch must have a thorough understanding of the problem, the opportunities that trade affords, and U. S. national objectives in this field. The U. S. Government should take every opportunity to make explicit what it intends to do and what it seeks to accomplish. It should act to remove any stigma from trade with Communist countries where such trade is determined to be in the national interest. The foreign policy advantages of such trade to the United States are not widely enough appreciated. With greater public awareness of both facts and objectives, the United States will be in a stronger position to use this trade as it must be used -- for national purposes and to support national policy."

I have noted State's suggestion of the potential usefulness of the bill as a vehicle for developing Congressional and public understanding and acceptance. I believe its key provisions are too important, however, not to precede introduction of the bill by a substantial, thoroughgoing and carefully planned educational program. Indeed, I would like to see this recommendation of the Miller Committee developed, carried out, and its results tested before the bill is submitted to Congress.

If anything were needed to underscore the importance of this Committee recommendation regarding advance preparation, it is, I believe, the unfortunate events that led to Firestone's withdrawal from negotiations with Rumania for the synthetic rubber plant.

We note Mr. Mann's comments that "business is solidly on the side of facilitating East-West trade." While this is true among certain of the larger international corporations in this country, there are wide differences of opinion throughout the business community as a whole. We cannot assume that the entire business community will understand and support the objectives of this proposed legislation.

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I have here limited my comments to what I consider basic matters. In addition, my people have already noticed a number of points of law and policy, which, I am sure you would want them to take up with State and the other interested agencies after the President has decided whether and when to go forward with a bill.



Secretary of Commerce

cc: Under Secretary of State
for Economic Affairs
Deputy Secretary of Defense

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McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

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IN REPLY REFER TO:

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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2. ref.

June 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MCGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: NSAM 333: Follow-up on the Miller Report

The State Department supports the East-West Trade approach recommended by the Miller Committee. I believe we should now take the following actions:

1. Public and Congressional Presentation

We should sound out the congressional leadership on specific legislative proposals. The President has already pointed to the urgent need for East-West Trade legislation. In his May 7th speech, he stated his intention "to recommend measures to the Congress to increase the flow of peaceful trade between Eastern Europe and the U.S.".

We should take advantage of the momentum created by the Miller Report, the CED Report, the Chamber of Commerce resolution, the favorable reaction in the Business Council, and the Congressional soundings made at the request of the President in connection with the publication of the Miller Report.

We should proceed on the assumption that the administration will introduce a Bill in this session of the Congress, ask for hearings this year and work for prompt enactment at the beginning of the next session. This timetable would be in line with our two-track policy toward

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 57-204

By iso, NARA Date 9-24-98

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communist countries. The act of requesting this legislation would be evidence of our continued interest in working out constructive relations with these countries, even as we pursue the military deterrent part of our strategy. What we propose here would give the President freedom of movement without obligating him to enter into any specific negotiation, now or at any other time.

As to public presentation, business is solidly on the side of facilitating East-West trade. Labor appears to be split; we should seek opportunities for the President and the Secretary of State to explain our foreign policy objectives in this field to George Meany and other labor leaders such as Paul Hall. At this stage we should begin to discuss the issues raised by the Miller Committee publicly, possibly in speeches by the President, the Secretaries of State and Commerce, and other high administration officials.

2. Proposed Legislation

Our main requirement is authority to grant--or withdraw--most-favored nation tariff treatment to individual communist countries in the discretion of the President. This discretionary authority, along with a flexible licensing policy, would provide us with bargaining leverage to use trade as an effective political instrument. Without such authority, it is clear that we cannot move very far toward the approach recommended by the Miller Committee.

We prefer to seek this authority through a separate East-West Trade Act rather than through amendment of section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act. A separate East-West Trade Act would make clear how MFN could be used as part of bilateral trade agreements with communist countries and how this trade could serve our foreign policy objectives.

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A separate East-West Trade Act would provide a vehicle for consideration by the Foreign Affairs as well as the Ways and Means and Finance Committees of the Congress. An East-West Trade Act could also be a means to tidy up the President's authority to authorize Ex-Im Bank credit guarantees to communist countries and to deal with subsidiary issues such as the removal of the present ban on the importation of seven kinds of furs from the Soviet Union.

We have prepared a draft East-West Trade Act designed to implement the Miller Committee recommendations. This draft has not been discussed outside the State Department, and a number of its provisions represent judgments that could go either way without disturbing the essential purpose. We believe, this draft should now be discussed among the interested agencies of the Executive Branch and on the Hill. A draft of the statute and a summary and analysis of its provisions are attached.

3. Flexibility in administration of the Export Control Act

The Miller Committee recommended that the Export Control Act be renewed with "emphasis placed on the possibilities of using trade and export licensing for constructive as well as for restrictive purposes." Secretary Connor has already pointed to the need for flexibility in his testimony before the House Committee on Banking and Currency on the extension of the Export Control Act.

The Act will be coming up before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee sometime this month. It would be desirable for Secretary Rusk to testify on the foreign policy objectives that underlie the administration of export controls. He could do so by way of comment on the policy implications of the Miller Report. Prior consultation with Senator Fulbright would be in order.

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4. A Tentative Action Program

Armed with the proper tools, we should be in a position to use trade negotiations:

-- to encourage the movement toward national independence and internal liberalization in Rumania. We should do what we can to sustain the present momentum for change in that country and to support its policy of moving closer to the West.

-- to further economic decentralization in Czechoslovakia. The Czechs are now debating how far they should go in liberalizing their economy and exposing it to international competition. The promise of closer economic relations with the United States could encourage them in this direction. We could also use such negotiations to break the long stalemate in our relations caused by our inability to reach a satisfactory settlement of financial and property claims.

What we do in these countries could stimulate pressures for change in Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria and create new opportunities there.

-- The Poles, who are more heavily involved with the West than any Bloc country, have moved very little lately. In some respects they have retrogressed.

-- The Hungarians may now have as much internal freedom as any other people in the Bloc. But the regime has been cautious in developing new relations with the West.

-- The Bulgarians continue to be strongly oriented to Moscow. Nevertheless, they are showing some interest in extending their economic relations with the West.

Our economic relations with the USSR, even more than is the case with East European countries, are closely tied to the general international situation. We should be prepared, however, to use trade negotiations to increase Soviet interest in broader relations with the United States. Such negotiations could also provide a framework for settling lend-lease claims.

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The development of trade relations with the USSR would be an important and logical step in the progression that started with cultural and scientific exchange programs and has been expanded through agreements for cooperation in specific technical projects, the growth of tourism, and the Test Ban Agreement. It is in our long term interest to utilize all possible avenues of entry into the closed Soviet society and to enlarge the kind of relations that could prove useful when tensions mount. Trade could be a highly effective device to such ends.

Thomas C. Mann

Thomas C. Mann
Under Secretary for
Economic Affairs

ATTACHMENT:

Draft Legislation

cc: Secretary of Commerce
Deputy Secretary of Defense

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Summary and Analysis of the Draft Legislation

The attached draft legislation is illustrative of the kind of approach which might be recommended to the Congress to enable the President to regulate trade with communist countries along lines suggested by the Miller Committee. As a companion to existing provisions of law which are instruments of trade denial -- Export Control Act, Battle Act, and restrictive provisions of other laws -- this kind of legislation would equip the President to use trade potential to serve our national objectives.

The major substantive provision would be authority to extend most-favored-nation treatment to individual communist countries when this is determined to be in the national interest. Such authority would be exercised as part of a commercial agreement which could establish conditions beneficial to United States commercial interests and aid in resolving a wide range of bilateral problems with the country concerned. While it is not necessary to tie most-favored-nation authority to a commercial agreement, we believe that both in terms of presenting the proposal to the United States public and in terms of effective bargaining with communist countries the requirement of an agreement is desirable.

These agreements would set the framework for trade - but the trade itself would depend on the decisions of individual firms. The agreements would differ from those typically concluded by communist countries. They would not provide for balancing of trade levels or for bilateral clearing of financial accounts. Lists of commodities might be included in the agreement if this would be helpful to United States business firms, but such lists are not an essential ingredient of an agreement. The primary purpose of these commercial agreements is to afford the United States an opportunity to exercise leverage on individual communist countries in the context of periodic trade negotiations.

The central features of the suggested approach are summarized below.

Declaration of National Policy

A major purpose of the legislation would be the policy declaration, endorsed by the Congress, that the President should use trade with communist countries as a means of advancing the national interests of the United States.

Principal Effect

The principal effect of the proposed Act would be to give the President authority to use most-favored-nation treatment in negotiating commercial agreements with individual communist countries, upon a determination that such an agreement is in the national interest. Each agreement would be for a specified duration not to exceed three years, and subject to termination on six months' notice. The Act would not permit negotiations of individual tariffs.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.1(a)

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BY hwl/gon 3-12-97

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✓ File Miller Report
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Other Features of Commercial Agreement

The legislation would not stipulate the provisions of an agreement and thus would give the President maximum flexibility to take advantage of special opportunities in individual communist countries.

The Act would list provisions that might, but need not, be included in the agreements, such as protection for industrial property, provision for settlement of commercial disputes, promotion of trade and tourism, improvement of consular relations and settlement of claims. Agreements authorized by the Act would provide for regular consultations. Such periodic review and confrontation procedures could cover not only commercial matters, but any aspect of relations between the United States and the other country involved.

Ex-Im Guarantees of Credit

The present authority for the Export-Import Bank to issue credit guarantees on exports from the United States to communist countries is subject to a requirement for individual national interest determinations by the President. The Act would eliminate the requirement for a separate determination on credits where the President has already authorized a commercial agreement pursuant to the Act. This authorization is limited to guarantees of private credits on normal commercial terms.

Countries Covered by the Act

The Act would apply with regard to all communist countries except Cuba, Communist China, North Korea and North Viet Nam, and the Soviet Zone of Germany.

Poland and Yugoslavia

The Act would provide that twelve months following its enactment, the limited authority to grant most-favored-nation treatment under present Section 231(b) of the Trade Expansion Act would expire unless there were an agreement for reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment then in effect. Because of the existence of the 1881 Treaty with Yugoslavia, this would not affect most-favored-nation treatment for that country. Poland would have to conclude an agreement with the United States under the Act in order to continue to receive most-favored-nation treatment without interruption.

Relation to Other Laws

The Act (in Sec. 304(c)) would repeal the prohibition on imports of furs from communist countries. It would not disturb the Export Control Act, the Battle Act, or regulations thereunder.

June 4, 1965

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DRAFT
June 1965

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A BILL

To promote the foreign policy and security of the United States by providing authority to negotiate limited commercial agreements with communist countries, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled:

SEC. 101. Short Title

This act may be cited as the East-West Trade Act of 1965.

SEC. 102. Declaration of Policy

The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of the United States to use trade and related contacts with communist countries as a means of advancing the long-range interest of the United States in peace and freedom. The Congress further declares that it is the policy of the United States to encourage constructive relations with individual communist countries and to promote the well-being of their peoples.

SEC. 103. Findings

1) Regular government-to-government negotiations with individual communist countries concerning commercial and other matters of mutual interest can promote constructive relations with such countries, contribute to international stability, and provide a framework helpful to private United States firms conducting business relations with communist state trading agencies;

2) Such negotiations could enable the United States to obtain any or all of the following:

(i) satisfactory arrangements for the protection of industrial rights and processes;

(ii) satisfactory arrangements for the settlement of commercial differences and disputes;

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.1(a)

BY pe/ra ON 3-12-97

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(iii) arrangements for establishment or expansion of United States trade and tourist promotion offices, and for facilitation of entry and travel of commercial representatives as necessary;

(iv) most-favored-nation treatment with respect to duties or other restrictions on the imports of the products of the United States;

(v) other matters affecting relations between the United States and the country concerned, such as the settlement of financial and property claims and the improvement of consular relations;

3) In order to increase peaceful trade and related contacts between the United States and communist countries, and in order to expand foreign market opportunities for products of the United States, there must be competitive market opportunities in the United States for the products of such countries.

SEC. 201. Basic Authority

a) To achieve the purposes of this Act, the President may, when he determines that it is in the national interest, enter into a commercial agreement with a communist country.

b) A commercial agreement entered into pursuant to this Act shall provide for consultations at regular intervals for the purpose of reviewing the operation of the agreement, and reviewing the over-all relations between the United States and the foreign country entering into the agreement.

c) Any commercial agreement entered into pursuant to this Act shall be limited to an initial period specified in the agreement, which shall be no more than three years from the time the agreement becomes effective. Any such agreement may, unless sooner terminated, be renewed for additional periods not to exceed three years.

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SEC. 202. Application of Most-Favored-Nation Rates to Imports into
the United States

a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may by proclamation extend to the products of any foreign country entering into a commercial agreement pursuant to this Act the benefits of any reduction, elimination or continuance of any existing duty or other import restriction or the continuance of any existing duty-free or excise treatment proclaimed in carrying out any trade agreement under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. §1801, or under Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §1351; provided that the application of the reduction, elimination or continuance of any existing duty or other import restriction or the continuance of any existing duty-free or excise treatment shall be limited to the period of effectiveness of any such commercial agreement.

b) Nothing herein shall be deemed to authorize the President to proclaim the modification, reduction or elimination of any existing duty or other import restriction to a rate less than that contained in the column numbered 1 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States.

c) The President may at any time terminate any proclamation made pursuant to this Act.

SEC. 301. Export Guarantees

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Export-Import Bank of Washington is authorized to guarantee the payment of any obligation hereafter incurred in connection with the purchase

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of products of the United States by any communist country (or any agency or national thereof) entering into a commercial agreement pursuant to this Act; provided that any such guarantee of payment shall be on terms commonly encountered in commercial transactions.

SEC. 302. Transmission of Agreements to Congress

The President shall transmit promptly to each House of Congress a copy of each commercial agreement entered into or renewed under this Act, together with a statement of his reasons for entering into or renewing such agreement.

SEC. 303. Limitation on Authority

The authority conferred by this Act shall not extend to areas dominated or controlled by the communist regimes of China, North Viet Nam, North Korea, Cuba, or the Soviet Zone of Germany.

SEC. 304. Relation to other Laws

a) The authority to extend the benefits of trade agreement concessions to any communist country in accordance with section 231(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. §1861(b), shall expire twelve months from the date of enactment of this Act, unless at such time there is in effect an agreement between the United States and such country, pursuant to this Act or other authority, providing for reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment with respect to duties or other restrictions on the imports of the products of the United States and such other country.

b) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to modify or amend the Export Control Act of 1949, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. §2021 et seq.) or the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, as amended (22 U.S.C. §1611 et seq.) and regulations issued thereunder.

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c) Headnote 4 for schedule 1, part 5, subpart B of the
Tariff Schedules of the United States (77A Stat. 32; 19 U.S.C.
§1202) is hereby repealed.

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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

May 25 1965

*See
Copies sent to
Rat
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MEMORANDUM

To: McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President
From: Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture
Subject: Follow-up on Miller Report

A handwritten signature in blue ink, likely of Orville L. Freeman, is written over the "From:" line and extends into the "Subject:" line.

This is to acknowledge receipt of an information copy of National Security Action Memorandum No. 333 establishing a committee consisting of representatives of the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce to recommend actions relating to trade relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe.

Insofar as trade in agricultural commodities or agricultural technology are concerned we look forward to being informed with regard to prospective recommendations.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

~~T. Prator~~
Let BKS
24 MAR 1965 8

Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

Dear Mac:

In reply to your request of May 13, 1965 (NSAM No. 333), I appoint Mr. Alvin Friedman, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Security Affairs, as the Defense Department representative on the committee the President has directed you to establish to study and recommend what actions the government should take in our trade relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe in the light of the recommendations of the Miller Report.

Sincerely,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-20-00 BY 1043

BY fw/rq ON 3-12-97

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X - 2808

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 13, 1965

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 333

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of Commerce

SUBJECT: Follow-up on the Miller Report

The President has directed me to establish a committee consisting of representatives of the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce to recommend to him what actions the government should take in our trade relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe in the light of the recommendations of the Miller Report. May I request that you appoint a senior official of your department to serve with me on such a committee.

All recommendations of the committee will be reviewed with you before they are submitted to the President.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

Information copies to:

Secretary of the Treasury
Secretary of the Interior
Secretary of Agriculture
Secretary of Labor
Director of Central Intelligence
President, Export-Import Bank

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 93-65
By sig, NARA, Date 11-16-92

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Distribution: 1 cy ea: F. Bator
 C. Johnson
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Dispatched 5/17 - Outside rcpts