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#1 memo	Addendum to "Points to be Covered..." Secret 2 p Open NLJ 015-007-1 (8/02)	7/21/65	A
#2 memo	Points to be Covered in Interim Discussion With President Under NSAM 335 Secret 5 p Open NLJ 015-007-1 (8/02)	7/20/65	A
#3 memo	Further recommendations concerning NSAM 335 Secret 2 p Open NLJ 015-007-1 (8/02)	7/7/65	A
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

WASHINGTON

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McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

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1965 JUL 22 AM 10 18

July 21, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of the Paper Entitled, "Points to be Covered in Interim Discussion with the President Under NSAM 335"

SUBJECT: Addendum to the July 20, 1965 Paper entitled, "Points to be Covered in Interim Discussion with the President Under NSAM 335"

In order to bring the subject paper up to date, the first full paragraph on page 2 should be changed to read as follows:

"Because of concern over possible German objections, the question had been raised as to whether we should urge the UK (a) not to table any text at the opening sessions in Geneva, and (b) urge the British when they do table a text to refrain from including the underlined language in their initial presentation until it becomes apparent that its inclusion would materially enhance the prospect of agreement. However, at a cabinet level meeting (but not including the Prime Minister) the U.K. decided against accepting our changes, and have indicated an intention to table the draft in Geneva. They said the revisions we suggested would leave open certain 'options' (presumably give the impression the U.K. might agree to give up their veto in some future evolution of the MLF) which for political reasons they could not leave open. We are urging the British to reconsider the matter and to withhold tabling a text in Geneva until after there has been further NATO consultation. If the British should accept our suggested changes, there would remain the question of how strongly the Presidential message to the Geneva Disarmament Conference should support the objective stated in this language. Should the message, for example,

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GROUP 1
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strongly urge that all nations work together to prevent an increase above the present number of the nations or other entities which independently control nuclear weapons?"

Adrian S. Fisher

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July 20, 1965 2

SUBJECT: Points to be Covered in Interim Discussion With President Under NSAM 335

1. Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

The first question which must be considered is the emphasis which the U.S. should place in the forthcoming NAC discussions and in the ENDC negotiations on the importance of non-proliferation program and the significance of a new negotiating position on a non-proliferation agreement in obtaining this goal.

The second question which must be considered is the language which should be used to describe the prohibition, particularly insofar as it relates to possible MLF/ANF arrangements.

The possible range of decision lies between:

(a) New language which seeks to finesse the question of whether MLF/ANF type arrangements are authorized or prohibited (language which is potentially negotiable but probably upsetting to certain NATO allies, particularly FRG).

(b) Language -- proposed to the Soviets in 1963 after allied discussion -- which prohibits proliferation of nuclear weapons into "national control" of presently non-nuclear States, (language clearly non-negotiable, more satisfactory to FRG, but possibly upsetting to the UK because of implication of "European clause" type MLF in which neither US nor UK would have veto).

The U.S. indicated to the British on Monday that it would support a UK Treaty which used the words "national control" and which also contained a prohibition against any action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other organizations having an independent power to use nuclear weapons. We have indicated to the UK that tactical consideration should be given to the question of whether the underlined language below should be an initial offer to USSR or should be in reaction to meet anticipated USSR objection.

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"Each of the nuclear states party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer any nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear State, either directly, or indirectly through a military alliance; and each undertakes not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons."

Because of concern over possible German objections, the question has been raised as to whether we should urge the UK (a) not to table any text at the opening sessions in Geneva, and (b) urge the British when they do table a text to refrain from including the underlined language in their initial presentation until it becomes apparent that its inclusion would materially enhance the prospect of agreement. If it is decided not to seek strongly to prevent the British from proposing this language, then there will remain the question of how strongly the Presidential message to the Geneva Disarmament Conference should support the objective stated in this language. Should the message, for example, strongly urge that all nations work together to prevent an increase above the present number of the nations or other entities which independently control nuclear weapons?

The third question which is being considered is whether the draft agreement should contain language supporting the application of International Atomic Energy Agency or similar safeguards to peaceful uses of atomic energy. There is considerable agreement within the Government as to the desirability of such safeguards but some question that tying them to the treaty would reduce the negotiability of the treaty with certain potential nuclear powers.

There remains a fourth and a fifth issue which are now being staffed out within the Government.

The fourth is whether, if it is necessary to obtain a non-proliferation treaty, the U.S. would be willing to include

as a part of such a treaty a provision that parties to the treaty undertake to provide or support immediate assistance to any other party that does not possess nuclear weapons and has been the victim of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. Such a provision in a treaty presents issues over and above the UN resolution dealing with the problem which has already been approved within the U.S. Government. While these issues are being considered it is proposed that the Presidential statement to the ENDC be limited to the importance of exploring the question of the security of non-nuclear countries which agree to remain non-nuclear.

The fifth issue is what position the U.S. should take on the proposal which has been made by the Indians that the nuclear powers agree not to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear powers. There is now under consideration within the Government a proposal to include as part of a non-proliferation treaty a provision that each of the parties now possessing nuclear weapons undertakes not to use nuclear weapons against any other party to the treaty that does not possess nuclear weapons, except in defense against an act of aggression in which a state having its own nuclear weapons is engaged. No decision is now requested on this issue until further staff work has been completed.

2. Other steps designed to influence the national decision of countries not to take steps to manufacture nuclear weapons or otherwise acquire control of them.

The actions to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to states not now owning them should not be limited to negotiating a treaty. We should continue taking whatever steps appear to be useful and feasible in discouraging specific countries and areas from acquiring nuclear weapons, including:

(a) India
(b) Japan
(c) Israel
(d) Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East where nuclear free zones may be feasible.

3. Test Ban

Three alternative ACDA proposals are now under study:

1. Treaty banning all tests, including those underground, and providing for inspection if an event is sufficiently suspicious so that United States is considering withdrawal from treaty, but not providing for a fixed annual quota of on-site inspections.

2. Treaty banning all tests, except those underground below a specific threshold level, and not making any provision for on-site inspections.

3. Treaty banning all tests, including those underground, and providing for a fixed but reduced annual quota of inspections (perhaps 2-4), and for somewhat relaxed inspection requirements.

All three proposals would rely to a great extent, but in varying degrees, on unilateral verification. All are now under study.

For the purpose of a Presidential message to the Conference, the question is whether the United States should indicate real interest in negotiations in the test ban area. This might be done, as it was done recently at the UN Disarmament Commission meeting, by a reference to the technical progress made in our research program and to the possibility of somewhat relaxed inspection requirements. ACDA recommends a statement that our research program in the field of detection and identification has resulted in significant progress justifying renewed efforts in the test ban area.

4. Destruction of Several Thousand Nuclear Weapons

For some years the United States has had outstanding a proposal for the verified cut-off in production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons. We have stated

that, if the Soviet Union agreed to such a cut-off, the United States would be prepared to transfer 60,000 kg of U-235 to peaceful uses against a transfer of 40,000 kg by the Soviet Union. In April of this year, the Committee of Principals approved a proposal to take the uranium for this transfer from existing nuclear weapons. In addition, whatever plutonium was also in these weapons would be transferred to peaceful uses.

ACDA has recommended that the President's message to the ENDC propose the demonstrated destruction of several thousand nuclear weapons from US and Soviet stockpiles.

5. Destruction of Substantial Numbers of Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles in Connection with a Freeze

On January 21, 1964, the President's message to the Geneva Disarmament Conference proposed exploration of a freeze on the numbers and characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The message said that this could open the door to reductions in armaments.

ACDA has recommended, in connection with the freeze proposal, reductions in strategic delivery vehicles amounting to roughly 30% on both sides. This would constitute about 500 missiles and 200 aircraft.

For the purpose of a message to the Conference next Tuesday, the question is whether the United States can state that it would be prepared to link the freeze with the reduction of a significant number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, including missile launchers and associated missiles -- a reduction to be accomplished over a period of 3 years.

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

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THIS DOC CONSISTS OF __ PAGES. CY NO __ OF __ CYS. SERIES A.

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OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

July 7, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Further recommendations concerning NSAM 335.

My memorandum to you of last Friday set forth a recommended schedule for the formulation of a position under NSAM 335, which has a deadline of August 17 for final Presidential decision on the substance of a program. I believe this is a realistic schedule which will make possible the timely and orderly consideration by the President of the subjects covered by NSAM 335.

This proposed schedule presents one difficulty. Operating under it, a proper respect for security will require all Administration sources to be silent as far as new proposals on the subject of non-proliferation is concerned from now until some time after August 17. This may result in a continuation of the attempt, already started in the Senate, to pre-empt the President's leadership in the field of non-proliferation.

I believe a satisfactory method of asserting the President's leadership in this field would be to extract one item in a non-proliferation program from the recommended schedule and to proceed with it on a more expeditious basis. This item could be the proposed amendment of §§ 91(c) and 144(c) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. These sections, as revised in 1958, in effect, authorize the U. S. Government to provide significant assistance to the nuclear weapons programs of allied countries provided, among other things, that those countries have made "substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons. . ."

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GROUP 3. Downgraded at three year intervals; not automatically declassified.

These provisions appear to say to allied countries, "make progress in your nuclear weapons program on your own and then we will help you". They may well have made sense when they were enacted in the light of the often troubled course of our atomic relations with the United Kingdom. They certainly do not make a great deal of sense as an indication of U. S. policy when the U. S. is trying to implement a program to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Even though the President would not enter any agreement under this authority that was inconsistent with the policy of preventing nuclear spread, repeal of the pertinent provisions of these sections (with appropriate language to save the agreements already entered with the UK) would remove the false impression as to the US policy which these sections of the law may now create.

The President, in the reasonably near future, could send a message to the Congress requesting an amendment of these sections along these lines. In order to put the requested amendment in perspective, he could outline the steps which have already been taken to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He could also indicate the areas in which further steps were under consideration without committing himself to any particular proposals.

Such a message would state a requirement of Congressional action in the non-proliferation field in a way that clearly identified it as part of a Johnson Administration program. The nature of the leadership and the composition of the relevant Congressional Committee (JCAE) is such that the message would retain its identity as part of the Administration program. The nature of the expected opposition is such that, although there would be enough of an argument to make it interesting there would probably be a decisive victory. I realize that the legislative calendar is crowded but much of the purpose of this measure would be accomplished by simply forwarding it to Congress. Legislative action at this Session is not essential.

Adrian S. Fisher
Acting Director

papers for:

Item 2. Disarmament. (NSAM 335, Gilpatric Report)

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PROPOSED DISARMAMENT PROGRAM FOR INCLUSION IN PRESIDENT'S SPEECH

As an introduction to the portion of the President's speech dealing with disarmament and containing his suggestions regarding non-proliferation, the President could make a strong statement about the watershed we have reached on the continuation of the arms race. This could include a brief restatement of the dangers of proliferation as well as the dangers of continuation of competition in the Soviet-American confrontation, but it should be focused on a recognition that none of the future dangers can be avoided unless the nuclear powers are prepared now, whatever the asymmetries in their relative positions might be, to turn the arms race around, begin significant reductions and be prepared to accept some risks in order to avoid the greater risks of the future. The statement should include some de-emphasis on the advantages of nuclear weapons, as a lead-in to our non-proliferation proposals.

The President could then outline five specific proposals dealing with arms control and disarmament:

1. A proposal for agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries which have not chosen to develop them. The President could indicate that the U.S. recognizes the security concerns of such states when they are facing the question of whether they should launch a program of manufacturing nuclear weapons. He could indicate that he stands behind his statements of October 1964. As a further measure to enhance the security of such states he might propose:

(a) an agreement by as many states as possible that they will provide or support immediate assistance to any state which does not have nuclear weapons that is the victim of an act of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used; and

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(b) an agreement by states having nuclear weapons not to initiate the use of such weapons against any state which does not have such weapons.

2. The President could point out that a verified ban on nuclear weapons tests in all environments remains the goal of the United States. He could also point out that while we are seeking that agreement on an urgent basis we should not preclude any opportunity for continued movement forward on a more limited scale and he could therefore propose to move now to extend the present limited test ban treaty to cover those larger underground nuclear weapons tests that can be verified without on-site inspections in the light of significant scientific improvements in detection and verification capabilities. It could be made clear that this does not represent any slackening of U.S. interest in a comprehensive test ban treaty. It could be pointed out that this is a move similar to that taken in August of 1962 when the U.S. submitted the draft of a limited test ban treaty which led to the present limited test ban treaty while at the same time continuing to press for a comprehensive test ban in all environments.

3. The President could reiterate our prior proposal that the Soviet Union and ourselves not only stop all further production of fissionable material for weapons but also transfer very large quantities of these materials from weapons programs to non-weapons use, seeking thereby to reduce the number of weapons in today's arsenals. He could add to it the fact that we would propose to obtain this material by the demonstrated destruction of several thousand nuclear weapons from our stockpiles if the Soviet Union will do likewise. We would include among these weapons thermonuclear warheads and bombs with yields in the megaton range. This would be a major stride forward on the road to disarmament and elimination of the threat of the horrors of nuclear war.

4. On January 21, 1964 the President presented to the Geneva Disarmament Conference a proposal to explore a freeze

on the numbers and characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery systems. Additional details concerning this proposal and the procedures to verify it have been presented by the U.S. representatives at the ENDC. These have been objected to by the Soviet Union as not being real disarmament, since it merely involves holding the present nuclear balance and does not involve any reduction in arms. They have made the familiar argument that "inspection without disarmament is espionage".

Recent announcements of the U.S. decision to curtail its production of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles have deprived us of any leverage to force the Soviets to agree to exercise a similar restraint. In order to restore our bargaining position, the President could indicate that the U.S. is prepared to consider simultaneously with negotiations on a freeze the reduction of a significant number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, missile launchers and associated missiles to be accomplished over a period of three years. The number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to be destroyed would depend upon Soviet interest in such a proposal and its willingness to make commensurate reductions.

The number could be substantial -- ranging from 500 to 1,000 on each side. Their destruction could be verified by observation.

Acceptance by the Soviet Union of its proposals would constitute a first major step toward halting the nuclear arms competition at present levels, would initiate significant reductions in existing levels of strategic delivery vehicles, and help to create a climate favorable to achieving widespread agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

5. The President could make a clear reaffirmation of previous Presidential statements recognizing that disarmament will increase the possibility of improving the lot of mankind.

This could renew the historical US commitment to use some of the savings resulting from disarmament agreements for economic development.

It could pick up the President's "cooperative effort" theme in the April 8 speech on Vietnam, stressing that the US would like to see disarmament savings used in ways to increase international programs of mutual aid.

. . . . . .

After making these specific proposals, the President could suggest that renewed consideration be given to improving the mechanisms for negotiation of disarmament agreements. He could suggest for this purpose consideration be given to means by which militarily significant states can be associated in appropriate fashion with the negotiations and ways in which the exchange of views in the negotiations can take place in a fashion that reduces the emphasis on formal speeches and increases the emphasis on informal exchanges of views in ways that do not tend to freeze position.

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United States Senate

MEMORANDUM

June 22, 1965

Mr. William C. Foster
U.S. Arms Control &
Disarmament Agency

Dear Mr. Foster:

Senator Kennedy asked me to send the enclosed to you. He plans to deliver it on the floor Wednesday.

Sincerely,

Adam Walinsky

Adam Walinsky
Legislative Assistant
to
Senator Robert F. Kennedy

FOR RELEASE
NOON, WEDNESDAY, JUNE 23

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STATEMENT BY SENATOR ROBERT F. KENNEDY

ON SENATE FLOOR

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 23, 1965

CAUTION: For release 12:00 Noon, Wednesday, June 23, 1965, Not to be quoted from or alluded to in any way prior to that time.

Mr. President:

I rise today to urge action on the most vital issue now facing this nation and the world. This issue is not in the headlines. It is not Vietnam, or the Dominican Republic, or Berlin. It is the question of nuclear proliferation -- of the mounting threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons.

Five nations now have the capacity to explode nuclear bombs. This capacity was developed at great cost, over a period of a generation. But at least a dozen, perhaps a score, of other nations are now in a position to develop nuclear weapons within three years. Two of these nations -- Israel and India -- already possess weapons-grade fissionable material, and could fabricate an atomic device within a few months.

These nations, moreover, can develop nuclear capabilities at a fraction of past costs. Within a very few years, an investment of a few million dollars -- well within the capacity even of private organizations -- will produce nuclear weapons. Once such a capability is in being, weapons will probably be produced for costs in the hundreds of thousands of dollars each. Similarly, delivery systems are far cheaper than they once were. Jet bombers can be purchased from the great powers for a few million dollars. And our own Minuteman missile is far less costly than were our earlier missiles, or even the B-52s that preceded them.

Nuclear capability, then, will soon lie within the grasp of many. And it is all too likely that if events continue on their present course, this technical capability will be used to produce nuclear weapons. Since the explosion of the Chinese bomb, for example, pressure to develop a counterpart has built steadily in India despite Prime Minister Shastri's announced decision to refrain from nuclear armament; his policy may be reversed as a result. If India does acquire nuclear weapons, Pakistan will not be far behind. Finding itself threatened by the Chinese, Australia might work for nuclear capability -- and in turn produce the same fears and desires in Indonesia. The prospect of nuclear weapons in West German hands might result in great pressures on Eastern European nations to acquire or develop a counterweight of their own. Israel and Egypt each have been deeply suspicious of the other for many years, and further Israeli progress would certainly impel the Egyptians to intensify their present efforts. Similar developments are possible all over the world.

Once nuclear war were to start, even between small, remote countries, it would be exceedingly difficult to stop a step-by-step progression of local war into a general conflagration.

Eighty million Americans -- and hundreds of millions of other people -- would die within the first twenty-four hours of a full-scale nuclear exchange. And as Chairman Khrushchev once said, the survivors would envy the dead.

This is not an acceptable future. We owe it to ourselves, to our children, to our forebears and our posterity, to prevent such an holocaust. But the proliferation of nuclear weapons immensely increases the chances that the world might stumble into catastrophe.

President Kennedy saw this clearly. He said, in 1963, "I ask you to stop and think what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament."

There could be no stability anywhere in the world -- when nuclear weapons might be used between Greeks and Turks over Cyprus; between Arabs and Israelis over the Gaza Strip; between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch. But if nuclear weapons spread, it is dangerously likely that they will be so used -- for these are matters of the deepest national interest to the countries involved.

There could be no security -- when a decision to use these weapons might be made by an unstable demagogue, or by the head of one of the innumerable two-month governments that plague so many countries, or by an irresponsible military commander, or even by an individual pilot. But if nuclear weapons spread, they may be thus set off -- for it is far more difficult and expensive to construct an adequate system of control and custody than to develop the weapons themselves.

There could be no effective disarmament -- when each nation would want guarantees, not from one or two or five powers, but from a dozen or a score or even more nations. But if nuclear weapons spread, such guarantees would be necessary.

Think just of the unparalleled opportunities for mischief: a bomb obliterates the capital city of a nation in Latin America, or Africa, or Asia -- or even the Soviet Union, or the United States. How was it delivered -- by plane? by missile? by car or ship? There is no evidence. From where did it come -- a jealous neighbor? an internal dissident? a great power bent on stirring up trouble -- or an anonymous madman? There is only speculation. And what can be the response -- what but a reprisal grounded on suspicion, leading in ever-widening circles to the utter destruction of the world we know.

It is clear, in short, that the United States -- and the entire world -- have the most vital interest in preventing the scattering of nuclear weapons Upon the success of this effort depends the only future our children will have.

The need to halt the spread of nuclear weapons must be a central priority of American policy. Of all our major interests, this now deserves and demands the greatest additional effort. This is a broad statement, for our interests are broad. The need to be strong -- to meet aggression in far-off places -- to work closely with allies all over the world -- all these needs must be met. And the crises of the moment often pose urgent questions, of grave importance for national security. But these immediate problems, and others like them, have been with us constantly for twenty years -- and will be with us far into the future. Should nuclear weapons become generally available to the world, however, each such crisis of the moment might well become the last crisis for all mankind

Thus none of the momentary crises are more than small parts of the larger question of whether our politics can grow up to our technology. The nuclear weapon, as Henry Stimson said, "constitutes merely a first step in a new control by man over the forces of nature too revolutionary and dangerous to fit into the old concepts...it really caps the climax of the race between man's growing technical power for destructiveness and his psychological power of self-control and group control his moral power."

The United States took the initiative and made the maximum effort to secure the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty in 1963 because we knew that our security and the future of the world depended on halting the arms race and exerting every possible effort toward peace. And we hailed the Treaty not principally for its specific benefits -- important and necessary as they were -- but for its value as the first of many necessary actions to secure lasting peace. It was "the first step in a journey of a thousand miles" -- a journey to which President Kennedy was deeply committed, and to which President Johnson is deeply committed.

But we have not yet taken the second step. The world has not moved, beyond the limited Nuclear Test-Ban itself, to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons If we are to leave our children a planet in which to live safely, to fulfill the bright promise of their lives, we must resume the journey toward peace.

And at the outset of this journey, we cannot allow the demands of day-to-day policy to obstruct our efforts to solve the problem of nuclear spread. We cannot wait for peace in Southeast Asia -- which will not come until nuclear weapons have spread beyond recall. We cannot wait for a general European settlement -- which has not existed since 1914. We cannot wait until all nations learn to behave -- for bad behavior armed with nuclear weapons is the danger we must try to prevent.

Rather we must begin to move <u>now</u>, on as many fronts as possible, to meet the problem. With every day that passes, the likelihood increases that another nation will develop the bomb; and every new possessor will lead others to abandon the restraint that alone keeps them from acquiring a nuclear capability now. William Foster, head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has pointed out that as long as the problem involved only the United States and the Soviet Union, a delay of a year or more was not fatal to the conclusion of an agreement. But in the multi-nation problem in which we now find ourselves, "a delay of a year or so, or perhaps even of months...could well mean the difference between failure and success."

I therefore urge immediate action along the following lines.

First, we should initiate at once negotiations with the Soviet Union and other nations with nuclear capability or potential, looking toward a non-proliferation treaty. This treaty would bind the major nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons or weapons capability to nations not now in possession of them. And it would pledge nations without nuclear arms, on their part, not to acquire or develop these weapons.

This pledge would require a third component: the extension to all nations foregoing nuclear weapons a guarantee against nuclear aggression or blackmail. We presently protect our allies against nuclear attack. But our alliance umbrella does not extend to non-aligned nations such as India; and while the President indicated that the United States would help them resist nuclear blackmail, more specific and definite measures are needed. If these nations are to forego nuclear weapons -- especially when their neighbors may possess them -- they must be guaranteed against nuclear aggression.

To be effective, such a guarantee would have to be extended by the United States and the Soviet Union bilaterally -- or better still, by a group of nuclear powers. But I would warn that such an umbrella -- if it is to be effective, and if it is not to lead to great-power confrontations all over the world -- must be divorced from and superior to the other policy aims of the nations involved. We cannot protect only our friends from nuclear attack -- or allow nations with whom we are otherwise friendly to threaten others with nuclear weapons. We must stand against nuclear aggression -- period.

A treaty to prevent nuclear spread, as Mr. Foster has indicated is manifestly in the paramount interest of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is by far the most important step we now can take to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

There have been suggestions that the chief stumbling-block to such a treaty is the war in Vietnam. Buy wholly apart from the strains resulting from that war, I think we have not ourselves done all we can to secure a non-proliferation treaty.

The most prominent example is the question of the Multilateral Force, and the variant Atlantic Nuclear Force. The Soviet Union contends that either plan would give control over nuclear weapons to West Germany; although we disagree with that view, the Soviet Union has absolutely refused to conclude a non-proliferation agreement as long as we go forward with the MLF or the ANF. We have not abandoned the MLF-ANF plans, because West Germany feels that it must have a greater role in nuclear deterence.

But if a non-proliferation treaty can be concluded, it will be in the national interest of every nation. We should therefore continue, with increased concern, our search for a form of nuclear guarantee to West Germany and other countries of Europe which meets their needs without meeting with rejection by the Soviet Union -- such as might evolve from the allied consultation device suggested at the NATO meeting by Defense Secretary McNamara.

Second, we should immediately explore the creation of formal nuclear-free zones of the world. Right now, one of our greatest assets is that there is not one nuclear weapon in all of Latin America or Africa. This situation can be preserved if the nuclear powers pledge not to introduce any nuclear weapons into these areas, the nations of the areas pledge not to acquire them, and appropriate machinery for the verification of these pledges is set up. Some nations -- particularly in Latin America -- have already exchanged informal assurances to this effect. We should encourage them to go further in every possible way. We should extend similar efforts in Africa. And if these efforts are successful, we should call on Israel and the neighboring

states of the Middle East to make the same commitment. I am not, however suggesting that present circumstances permit the creation of nuclear-free zones in the Far East or in Europe

Third, we should complete the partial test-ban agreement of 1963 by extending it to underground as well as above-ground tests Since 1963, we have made considerable scientific progress in detecting underground tests -- in distinguishing many natural tremors from man made explosions. Without jeopardizing our security, we can now extend the test-ban to certain types of underground tests. And as soon as scientific advance makes it possible to extend the test-ban to any other type or size of underground test without jeopardizing security, it should be done. And we should also press all efforts to resolve the deadlock on inspections of those explosions which cannot be firmly identified without inspection. So let us return to the conference table, for the completion of this treaty would be a natural complement to a non-proliferation agreement. It would provide an additional incentive to non-nuclear powers to forego a weapons development program. And it would help to restore the momentum of the test-ban treaty itself.

Fourth, we should act to halt and reverse the growth of the nuclear capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union -- both as to fissionalbe material for military weapons purposes and as to the strategic devices to deliver such material. Freezing these weapons at their present levels -- which, as we all know, are more than adequate to destroy all human life on this earth -- is a prerequisite to lowering those levels in the future.

Moreover, as Secretary McNamara has shown, it would be in the direct self-interest of the United States and the Soviet Union to cut back our nuclear forces. For we each have more than enough to destroy the other nation -- yet can never acquire enough to prevent our own destruction. And even substantial cutbacks would not affect our nuclear superiority over China in the foresseable future. Most of all, it is essential that the two superpowers demonstrate to the world, by concrete example, their determination to turn away from weapons of absolute destruction, toward a world order based on other strengths. Here again, President Johnson has taken the initiative with the slow-d own in production of plutonium and uranium-235, and with the phasing-out of certain bombers. Much more remains to be done.

Fifth, we should move to strengthen and support the International Atomic Energy Agency. This agency is the only truly international vehicle for inspecting peaceful atomic energy plants to assure that they are not used for the production of weapons-grade material The IAEA is the only forum in which the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain have worked without serious friction and without a Soviet veto. Already it inspects many reactors thoughout the world; and its importance was increased last week when Great Britain, following an earlier United States initative, opened its largest reactor to inspection.

But the IAEA has not received the full support it merits -- and demands. The reactor we helped India to build is subject, by prior condition, to IAEA inspection -- and it has remained peaceful. But another reactor, built with Canadian help, is not subject to equivalent conditions -- and in this reactor the Indians may have produced their weapons-grade fissionable material.

We should insist, at a minimum, that all reactors built with the help of other powers be subject to IAEA inspection. Indeed, I think the time has come to insist that all peaceful reactors be subject to inspection. But we ourselves must also stop assisting nations which refuse inspection. In the past, for fear of antagonizing the Europeans, we have sold enriched uranium to Euratom without requiring that its plants be open to IAEA;we have thus aided the construction of reactors in Spain, France, Germany and Holland, all of which are closed to the outside world. Until they are opened, all our assistance to their

creation or functioning should cease. In this connection, I would like to pay tribute to the work of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, and particularly to Senators Anderson and Pastore, who have long insisted on adequate international safeguards on our nuclear-assistance programs.

A stronger stand in support of IAEA could have a major inhibiting effect on the diversion of peaceful nuclear plants to weapons work -- for example, in such countries as Sweden or Switzerland. In fact, under the Pearson Government, Canada has shown the way by responsibly insisting on guaranteed peaceful use of any uranium it sells. That Canada has lost certain sales thereby proves the value of this policy; clearly, the material might well have gone to weapons. We should also work toward IAEA control of fabricating and reprocessing of all fuel for peaceful reactors.

Sixth, it is vital that we continue present efforts to lessen our own reliance on nuclear weapons. Since 1961, we have worked to build up our non-nuclear forces, and those of our allies -- so that if conflict comes, we need not choose between defeat and mutual annihalation. We have not yet been fully successful; only the United States and West Germany have met their full conventional force commitment to NATO. But we should continue to pursue this course. For our efforts to induce others to forego nuclear forces depend in large part on our ability and willingness to sharply limit the possible use of our own.

As to all these points -- in all our efforts -- we will have to deal with one of the most perplexing and difficult questions affecting American foreign policy: China. It is difficult to negotiate on any question with the intransigent leaders of Communist China. And it is doubly difficult when we are engaged in South Vietnam. China is profoundly suspicious of and hostile to us -- as we are highly suspicious of her. But China is there. China will have nuclear weapons. And without her participation it will be infinitely more difficult, perhaps impossible in the long run, to prevent nuclear proliferation. This was recognized, just last week, by seventy nations at the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations, who urged that China be included in any non-proliferation agreement. It has been recognized by Presient Johnson, who has repeatedly offered to negotiate with any government in the world as to the peace of Southeast Asia. And it has been recognized by the American people, who voted overwhelmingly is a recent poll for negotiations with the Chinese.

At an appropriate time and manner, therefore, we should vigorously pursue negotiations on this subject with China. But if we must ultimately have the cooperation of China, and the Soviet Union, and France, and all other nations with any nuclear capability whatever, it does not follow that we should wait for that cooperation before beginning our efforts. We are stronger -- and therefore have more responsibility -- than any nation on earth; we should make the first effort -- the greatest effort -- and the last effort -- to control nuclear weapons. We can and must begin immediately.

In this connection, I urge that the work of the Gilpatric committee -- which included many distinguished public servants, such as Arthur Dean -- appointed by the President to study the problem of nuclear proliferation, be carried forward by all concerned agencies of the government at once. It is only by study and action by general concern throughout the government, that the problem of nuclear proliferation will remain where it belongs -- in our constant attention, the object of our principal concern. And we can and must continue to reexamine our own attitudes -- to insure that we do not lapse back into the fatalistic and defeatist belief that war is inevitable, or that our course is too fixed to be affected by what we do -- to remember as President Kennedy said, that no government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in virtue" -- and

to remember that "in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.

Above all, we must recognize what is at stake. We must face realities -- however unpleasant the sight, however difficult the challenge they pose us. And we must realize that peace is not inaction, nor the mere absence of war. "Peace," said President Kennedy "is a process -- a way of solving problems." It is only as we devote our every effort to the solution of these problems that we are at peace; it is only if we succeed that there will be peace for our children.

FOR RELEASE
NOON, WEDNESDAY, JUNE 23

STATEMENT BY SENATOR ROBERT F. KENNEDY

ON SENATE FLOOR

4d

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 23, 1965

CAUTION: For release 12:00 Noon, Wednesday, June 23, 1965, Not to be quoted from or alluded to in any way prior to that time.

Mr. President:

I rise today to urge action on the most vital issue now facing this nation and the world. This issue is not in the headlines. It is not Vietnam, or the Dominican Republic, or Berlin. It is the question of nuclear proliferation -- of the mounting threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons

Five nations now have the capacity to explode nuclear bombs. This capacity was developed at great cost, over a period of a generation. But at least a dozen, perhaps a score, of other nations are now in a position to develop nuclear weapons within three years. Two of these nations -- Israel and India -- already possess weapons-grade fissionable material, and could fabricate an atomic device within a few months.

These nations, moreover, can develop nuclear capabilities at a fraction of past costs. Within a very few years, an investment of a few million dollars -- well within the capacity even of private organizations -- will produce nuclear weapons Once such a capability is in being, weapons will probably be produced for costs in the hundreds of thousands of dollars each. Similarly, delivery systems are far cheaper than they once were. Jet bombers can be purchased from the great powers for a few million dollars. And our own Minuteman missile is far less costly than were our earlier missiles, or even the B-52s that preceded them.

Nuclear capability, then, will soon lie within the grasp of many. And it is all too likely that if events continue on their present course, this technical capability will be used to produce nuclear weapons. Since the explosion of the Chinese bomb, for example, pressure to develop a counterpart has built steadily in India despite Prime Minister Shastri's announced decision to refrain from nuclear armament; his policy may be reversed as a result. If India does acquire nuclear weapons, Pakistan will not be far behind. Finding itself threatened by the Chinese, Australia might work for nuclear capability -- and in turn produce the same fears and desires in Indonesia. The prospect of nuclear weapons in West German hands might result in great pressures on Eastern European nations to acquire or develop a counterweight of their own. Israel and Egypt each have been deeply suspicious of the other for many years, and further Israeli progress would certainly impel the Egyptians to intensify their present efforts. Similar developments are possible all over the world.

Once nuclear war were to start, even between small, remote countries, it would be exceedingly difficult to stop a step-by-step progression of local war into a general conflagration.

Eighty million Americans -- and hundreds of millions of other people -- would die within the first twenty-four hours of a full-scale nuclear exchange. And as Chairman Khrushchev once said, the survivors would envy the dead.

This is not an acceptable future. We owe it to ourselves, to our children, to our forebears and our posterity, to prevent such an holocaust. But the proliferation of nuclear weapons immensely increases the chances that the world might stumble into catastrophe.

President Kennedy saw this clearly. He said, in 1963, "I ask you to stop and think what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament."

There could be no stability anywhere in the world -- when nuclear weapons might be used between Greeks and Turks over Cyprus; between Arabs and Israelis over the Gaza Strip; between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch. But if nuclear weapons spread, it is dangerously likely that they will be so used -- for these are matters of the deepest national interest to the countries involved.

There could be no security -- when a decision to use these weapons might be made by an unstable demagogue, or by the head of one of the innumerable two-month governments that plague so many countries, or by an irresponsible military commander, or even by an individual pilot. But if nuclear weapons spread, they may be thus set off -- for it is far more difficult and expensive to construct an adequate system of control and custody than to develop the weapons themselves.

There could be no effective disarmament -- when each nation would want guarantees, not from one or two or five powers, but from a dozen or a score or even more nations. But if nuclear weapons spread, such guarantees would be necessary.

Think just of the unparalleled opportunities for mischief: a bomb obliterates the capital city of a nation in Latin America, or Africa, or Asia -- or even the Soviet Union, or the United States. How was it delivered -- by plane? by missile? by car or ship? There is no evidence. From where did it come -- a jealous neighbor? an internal dissident? a great power bent on stirring up trouble -- or an anonymous madman? There is only speculation. And what can be the response -- what but a reprisal grounded on suspicion, leading in ever-widening circles to the utter destruction of the world we know.

It is clear, in short, that the United States -- and the entire world -- have the most vital interest in preventing the scattering of nuclear weapons. Upon the success of this effort depends the only future our children will have.

The need to halt the spread of nuclear weapons must be a central priority of American policy. Of all our major interests, this now deserves and demands the greatest additional effort. This is a broad statement, for our interests are broad. The need to be strong -- to meet aggression in far-off places -- to work closely with allies all over the world all these needs must be met. And the crises of the moment often pose urgent questions, of grave importance for national security. But these immediate problems, and others like them, have been with us constantly for twenty years -- and will be with us far into the future. Should nuclear weapons become generally available to the world, however, each such crisis of the moment might well become the last crisis for all mankind

Thus none of the momentary crises are more than small parts of the larger question of whether our politics can grow up to our technology. The nuclear weapon, as Henry Stimson said, "constitutes merely a first step in a new control by man over the forces of nature too revolutionary and dangerous to fit into the old concepts...it really caps the climax of the race between man's growing technical power for destructiveness and his psychological power of self-control and group control his moral power."

The United States took the initiative and made the maximum effort to secure the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty in 1963 because we knew that our security and the future of the world depended on halting the arms race and exerting every possible effort toward peace. And we hailed the Treaty not principally for its specific benefits -- important and necessary as they were -- but for its value as the first of many necessary actions to secure lasting peace. It was "the first step in a journey of a thousand miles" -- a journey to which President Kennedy was deeply committed, and to which President Johnson is deeply committed.

But we have not yet taken the second step. The world has not moved, beyond the limited Nuclear Test-Ban itself, to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons If we are to leave our children a planet in which to live safely, to fulfill the bright promise of their lives, we must resume the journey toward peace.

And at the outset of this journey, we cannot allow the demands of day-to-day policy to obstruct our efforts to solve the problem of nuclear spread. We cannot wait for peace in Southeast Asia -- which will not come until nuclear weapons have spread beyond recall. We cannot wait for a general European settlement -- which has not existed since 1914. We cannot wait until all nations learn to behave -- for bad behavior armed with nuclear weapons is the danger we must try to prevent.

Rather we must begin to move <u>now</u>, on as many fronts as possible, to meet the problem With every day that passes, the likelihood increases that another nation will develop the bomb; and every new possessor will lead others to abandon the restraint that alone keeps them from acquiring a nuclear capability now. William Foster, head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has pointed out that as long as the problem involved only the United States and the Soviet Union, a delay of a year or more was not fatal to the conclusion of an agreement. But in the multi-nation problem in which we now find ourselves, "a delay of a year or so, or perhaps even of months...could well mean the difference between failure and success."

I therefore urge immediate action along the following lines.

First, we should initiate at once negotiations with the Soviet Union and other nations with nuclear capability or potential, looking toward a non-proliferation treaty. This treaty would bind the major nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons or weapons capability to nations not now in possession of them. And it would pledge nations without nuclear arms, on their part, not to acquire or develop these weapons.

This pledge would require a third component: the extension to all nations foregoing nuclear weapons a guarantee against nuclear aggression or blackmail. We presently protect our allies against nuclear attack. But our alliance umbrella does not extend to non-aligned nations such as India; and while the President indicated that the United States would help them resist nuclear blackmail, more specific and definite measures are needed. If these nations are to forego nuclear weapons -- especially when their neighbors may possess them -- they must be guaranteed against nuclear aggression.

To be effective, such a guarantee would have to be extended by the United States and the Soviet Union bilaterally -- or better still, by a group of nuclear powers. But I would warn that such an umbrella -- if it is to be effective, and if it is not to lead to great-power confrontations all over the world -- must be divorced from and superior to the other policy aims of the nations involved. We cannot protect only our friends from nuclear attack -- or allow nations with whom we are otherwise friendly to threaten others with nuclear weapons. We must stand against nuclear aggression -- period.

A treaty to prevent nuclear spread, as Mr. Foster has indicated is manifestly in the paramount interest of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is by far the most important step we now can take to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

There have been suggestions that the chief stumbling-block to such a treaty is the war in Vietnam. Buy wholly apart from the strains resulting from that war, I think we have not ourselves done all we can to secure a non-proliferation treaty.

The most prominent example is the question of the Multilateral Force, and the variant Atlantic Nuclear Force. The Soviet Union contends that either plan would give control over nuclear weapons to West Germany; although we disagree with that view, the Soviet Union has absolutely refused to conclude a non-proliferation agreement as long as we go forward with the MLF or the ANF. We have not abandoned the MLF-ANF plans, because West Germany feels that it must have a greater role in nuclear deterence.

But if a non-proliferation treaty can be concluded, it will be in the national interest of every nation. We should therefore continue, with increased concern, our search for a form of nuclear guarantee to West Germany and other countries of Europe which meets their needs without meeting with rejection by the Soviet Union -- such as might evolve from the allied consultation device suggested at the NATO meeting by Defense Secretary McNamara.

Second, we should immediately explore the creation of formal nuclear-free zones of the world. Right now, one of our greatest assets is that there is not one nuclear weapon in all of Latin America or Africa. This situation can be preserved if the nuclear powers pledge not to introduce any nuclear weapons into these areas, the nations of the areas pledge not to acquire them, and appropriate machinery for the verification of these pledges is set up. Some nations -- particularly in Latin America -- have already exchanged informal assurances to this effect. We should encourage them to go further in every possible way. We should extend similar efforts in Africa. And if these efforts are successful, we should call on Israel and the neighboring

states of the Middle East to make the same commitment. I am not, however suggesting that present circumstances permit the creation of nuclear-free zones in the Far East or in Europe

Third, we should complete the partial test-ban agreement of 1963 by extending it to underground as well as above-ground tests Since 1963, we have made considerable scientific progress in detecting underground tests -- in distinguishing many natural tremors from man-made explosions. Without jeopardizing our security, we can now extend the test-ban to certain types of underground tests. And as soon as scientific advance makes it possible to extend the test-ban to any other type or size of underground test without jeopardizing security, it should be done. And we should also press all efforts to resolve the deadlock on inspections of those explosions which cannot be firmly identified without inspection. So let us return to the conference table, for the completion of this treaty would be a natural complement to a non-proliferation agreement. It would provide an additional incentive to non-nuclear powers to forego a weapons development program. And it would help to restore the momentum of the test-ban treaty itself.

Fourth, we should act to halt and reverse the growth of the nuclear capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union -- both as to fissionalbe material for military weapons purposes and as to the strategic devices to deliver such material. Freezing these weapons at their present levels -- which, as we all know, are more than adequate to destroy all human life on this earth -- is a prerequisite to lowering those levels in the future.

Moreover, as Secretary McNamara has shown, it would be in the direct self-interest of the United States and the Soviet Union to cut back our nuclear forces. For we each have more than enough to destroy the other nation -- yet can never acquire enough to prevent our own destruction. And even substantial cutbacks would not affect our nuclear superiority over China in the foreseeable future. Most of all, it is essential that the two superpowers demonstrate to the world, by concrete example, their determination to turn away from weapons of absolute destruction, toward a world order based on other strengths. Here again, President Johnson has taken the initiative with the slow-d own in production of plutonium and uranium-235, and with the phasing-out of certain bombers. Much more remains to be done.

Fifth, we should move to strengthen and support the International Atomic Energy Agency. This agency is the only truly international vehicle for inspecting peaceful atomic energy plants to assure that they are not used for the production of weapons-grade material. The IAEA is the only forum in which the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain have worked without serious friction and without a Soviet veto. Already it inspects many reactors thoughout the world; and its importance was increased last week when Great Britain, following an earlier United States initative, opened its largest reactor to inspection.

But the IAEA has not received the full support it merits -- and demands. The reactor we helped India to build is subject, by prior condition, to IAEA inspection -- and it has remained peaceful. But another reactor, built with Canadian help, is not subject to equivalent conditions -- and in this reactor the Indians may have produced their weapons-grade fissionable material.

We should insist, at a minimum, that all reactors built with the help of other powers be subject to IAEA inspection. Indeed, I think the time has come to insist that all peaceful reactors be subject to inspection. But we ourselves must also stop assisting nations which refuse inspection. In the past, for fear of antagonizing the Europeans, we have sold enriched uranium to Euratom without requiring that its plants be open to IAEA;we have thus aided the construction of reactors in Spain, France, Germany and Holland, all of which are closed to the outside world. Until they are opened, all our assistance to their

creation or functioning should cease. In this connection, I would like to pay tribute to the work of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, and particularly to Senators Anderson and Pastore, who have long insisted on adequate international safeguards on our nuclear-assistance programs.

A stronger stand in support of IAEA could have a major inhibiting effect on the diversion of peaceful nuclear plants to weapons work -- for example, in such countries as Sweden or Switzerland. In fact, under the Pearson Government, Canada has shown the way by responsibly insisting on guaranteed peaceful use of any uranium it sells. That Canada has lost certain sales thereby proves the value of this policy; clearly, the material might well have gone to weapons. We should also work toward IAEA control of fabricating and reprocessing of all fuel for peaceful reactors.

Sixth, it is vital that we continue present efforts to lessen our own reliance on nuclear weapons. Since 1961, we have worked to build up our non-nuclear forces, and those of our allies -- so that if conflict comes, we need not choose between defeat and mutual annihalation. We have not yet been fully successful; only the United States and West Germany have met their full conventional force commitment to NATO. But we should continue to pursue this course. For our efforts to induce others to forego nuclear forces depend in large part on our ability and willingness to sharply limit the possible use of our own.

As to all these points -- in all our efforts -- we will have to deal with one of the most perplexing and difficult questions affecting American foreign policy: China. It is difficult to negotiate on any question with the intransigent leaders of Communist China. And it is doubly difficult when we are engaged in South Vietnam. China is profoundly suspicious of and hostile to us -- as we are highly suspicious of her. But China is there. China will have nuclear weapons. And without her participation it will be infinitely more difficult, perhaps impossible in the long run, to prevent nuclear proliferation. This was recognized, just last week, by seventy nations at the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations, who urged that China be included in any non-proliferation agreement. It has been recognized by Presient Johnson, who has repeatedly offered to negotiate with any government in the world as to the peace of Southeast Asia. And it has been recognized by the American people, who voted overwhelmingly is a recent poll for negotiations with the Chinese.

At an appropriate time and manner, therefore, we should vigorously pursue negotiations on this subject with China. But if we must ultimately have the cooperation of China, and the Soviet Union, and France, and all other nations with any nuclear capability whatever, it does not follow that we should wait for that cooperation before beginning our efforts. We are stronger -- and therefore have more responsibility -- than any nation on earth; we should make the first effort -- the greatest effort -- and the last effort -- to control nuclear weapons. We can and must begin immediately.

In this connection, I urge that the work of the Gilpatric committee -- which included many distinguished public servants, such as Arthur Dean -- appointed by the President to study the problem of nuclear proliferation, be carried forward by all concerned agencies of the government at once. It is only by study and action by general concern throughout the government, that the problem of nuclear proliferation will remain where it belongs -- in our constant attention, the object of our principal concern. And we can and must continue to reexamine our own attitudes -- to insure that we do not lapse back into the fatalistic and defeatist belief that war is inevitable, or that our course is too fixed to be affected by what we do -- to remember as President Kennedy said, that "no government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in virtue" -- and

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5

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ June 28, 1965

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 335

TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Director of Central Intelligence
Director, United States Information Agency
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Agency
Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Preparation of Arms Control Program

In his speech at the Twentieth Anniversary of the United Nations, President Johnson stated:

> "We of the United States would hope that others will join with us in coming to our next negotiations with proposals for effective attack upon these deadly dangers to mankind."

The President has directed the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to prepare for submission to him a proposed new program of arms control and disarmament, including a proposed program for preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. The initiative in preparing this program should be with the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Its proposals should be presented to the President together with preliminary comments from other interested agencies of government. The purpose of this procedure is to assure that the issues and the points of view of the interested agencies of the Government are brought to the attention of the President in a timely and orderly manner in order to permit a decision by him at the appropriate time.

The timing of this procedure will be determined by this office, in consultation with the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in the light of the prospects for international negotiations.

McGeorge Bundy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dispatched 6/29/65 - Outside rcpts

1 cy ea: Mr. Keeny
Mr. Rowen, BoB
C. Johnson
NSC Files

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WASHINGTON

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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7

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/s/
McGeorge Bundy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

8/

June 25, 1965

MEMO FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Per our telephone
conversation of this morning.

Adrian S. Fisher

encl: ~~Confidential~~ Draft NSAM.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In his speech at the Twentieth Anniversary of the United Nations, President Johnson stated,

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE JUNE 25, 1965

Office of the White House Press Secretary
(San Francisco, California)

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT

AT THE

UNITED NATIONS TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY COMMEMORATIVE SESSION,
SAN FRANCISCO OPERA HOUSE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

(AS ACTUALLY DELIVERED AT 11:30 AM PDT)

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, your Excellencies, distinguished representatives, Governor Brown, ladies and gentlemen:

On my journey across the continent, I stopped in the state of Missouri, and there I met with the man who made the first such pilgrimage here twenty years ago as the thirty-third President of the United States -- Harry S. Truman.

Mr. Truman sent to this Assembly his greetings and good wishes on this anniversary commemoration. He asked that I express to you for him --as for myself and for my countrymen-- the faith which we of the United States hold firmly in the United Nations and in the ultimate success of its mission among men.

On this historic and happy occasion we have met to celebrate twenty years of achievement and to look together at the work that we face in future meetings. I come to this anniversary not to speak of futility or failure nor of doubt and despair-- I come to raise a voice of confidence in both the future of these United Nations and the fate of the human race.

The movement of history is glacial. On two decades of experience, none can presume to speak with certainty of the direction or the destiny of man's affairs. But this we do know and this we do believe.

Futility and failure are not the truth of this Organization brought into being here twenty years ago.

Where, historically, man has moved fitfully from war toward war, in these last two decades man has moved steadily away from war as either an instrument of national policy or a means of international decision.

Many factors have contributed to this change. But no one single factor has contributed more than the existence and the enterprise of the United Nations itself.

For there can be no doubt that the United Nations has taken root in human need and has established a shape, and a purpose, and a meaning of its own.

By providing a forum for the opinions of the world, the United Nations has given them a force and an influence that they have never had before. By shining the light of inquiry and discussion upon very dark and isolated conflicts, it has pressed the nations of the world to conform their courses to the requirements of the United Nations Charter.

And let all remember --and none forget-- that now more than fifty times in these twenty years the United Nations has acted to keep the peace.

By persuading nations to justify their own conduct before all countries, it has helped, at many times and in many places, to soften the harshness of man to his fellow man.

By confronting the rich with the misery of the poor and the privileged with the despair of the oppressed, it has removed the excuse of ignorance -- unmasked the evil of indifference, and has placed an insistent, even though still unfulfilled, responsibility upon the more fortunate of the earth.

By insisting upon the political dignity of man, it has welcomed 63 nations to take their places alongside the 51 original members -- a historical development of dramatic import, achieved mainly through peaceful means.

And by binding countries together in the great declarations of the Charter, it has given those principles a strengthened vitality in the conduct of the affairs of man.

Today, then --at this time of anniversary-- let us not occupy ourselves with parochial doubts or with passing despair. The United Nations --after twenty years-- does not draw its life from the assembly halls or the committee rooms. It lives in the conscience and the reason of mankind.

The most urgent problem we face is the keeping of the peace.

Today, as I speak, clear and present dangers in Southeast Asia cast their shadow across the path of all mankind.

The United Nations must be concerned.

The most elementary principle of the United Nations is that neighbors must not attack their neighbors -- and that principle today is under challenge.

The processes of peaceful settlement today are blocked by willful aggressors contemptuous of the opinion and the will of mankind.

Bilateral diplomacy has yielded no result.

The machinery of the Geneva Conference has been paralyzed.

Resort to the Security Council has been rejected.

The efforts of the distinguished Secretary General have been rebuffed.

An appeal for unconditional discussion was met with contempt.

A pause in bombing operations was called an insult.

The concern for peace of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers has received little and very disappointing results.

Therefore, today I put to this World Assembly the facts of aggression, the right of a people to be free from attack, the interest of every member in safety against molestation, the duty of this Organization to reduce the dangers to peace, and the unhesitating readiness of the United States of America to find a peaceful solution.

I now call upon this gathering of the nations of the world to use all their influence, individually and collectively, to bring to the tables those who seem determined to make war. We will support your efforts, as we will support effective action by any agent or agency of these United Nations.

But the agenda of peace is not a single item.

Around the world, there are many disputes that are filled with dangers --many tensions that are taut with peril; many arms races that are fraught with folly among small nations as well as large.

And the first purpose of the United Nations is peace-keeping. The first work of all members now, then, just must be peace-making. For this organization exists to resolve quarrels outside the confines of its headquarters --and not to prolong quarrels within.

Where there are disputes, let us try to find the means to resolve them -- through whatever machinery is available or is possible.

Where the United Nations requires readily available peace forces in hours and days --and not in weeks or months-- let all pledge to provide those forces. And my country is ready.

On another front of our common endeavors, I think nothing is more urgent than the effort to diminish danger by bringing the armaments of the world under increasing control. Nations rich and poor are burdened down by excessive and competitive and frightening arms. So let us all urgently commit ourselves to the rational reduction of those arms burdens. We of the United States would hope that others will join with us in coming to our next negotiations with proposals for effective attack upon these deadly dangers to mankind.

And after peace, high on the agenda of man is devotion to the dignity and to the worth of the human person --and the promotions of better standards of life in larger freedom for all of the human race.

We in this country are committing ourselves to great tasks in our own great society. We are committed to narrow the gap between promise and performance, between equality in law and equality in fact, between opportunity for the numerous well-to-do and the still too numerous poor, between education for the successful and education for all of the people.

It is no longer a community or a nation or a continent but a whole generation of mankind for whom our promises must be kept -- and kept within the next two decades.

If those promises are not kept, it will be less and less possible to keep them for any.

And that is why --on this anniversary-- I would call upon all member nations to rededicate themselves to wage together an international war on poverty.

So let us then together: raise the goal for technical aid and investment through the United Nations; increase our food, and health, and education programs to make a serious and a successful attack upon hunger, and disease, and ignorance -- the ancient enemies of all mankind.

Let us in all our lands --including this land-- face forthrightly the multiplying problems of our multiplying populations and seek the answers to this most profound challenge to the future of all the world. Let us act on the fact that less than five dollars invested in population control is worth a hundred dollars invested in economic growth.

For our wars together on the poverty and privation, the hunger and sickness, the despair and the futility of mankind, let us mark this International Cooperation Year by joining together in an Alliance for Man.

The promise of the future lies in what science, the ever more productive industrial machine, the ever more productive fertile and usable land, the computer, the miracle drug, and the man in space all spread before us. The promise of the future lies in what the religions and the philosophies, the cultures, and the wisdoms of five thousand years of civilization have finally distilled and confided to us -- the promise of the abundant life and the brotherhood of man.

The heritage that we share together is a fragile heritage.

A world war would certainly destroy it. Pride and arrogance could destroy it. Neglect and indifference could destroy it. It could be destroyed by narrow nationalism or ideological intolerance -- or rabid extremism of either the left or the right.

So we must find the way as a community of nations, as a United Nations, to keep the peace among and between all of us. We must restrain by joint and effective action any who place their ambitions or their dogmas or their prestige above the peace of all the world. And we just must find a way to do that. It is the most profound and the most urgent imperative of the time in which we live.

So I say to you as my personal belief, and the belief I think of the great American majority, that the world must finish once and for all the myth of inequality of races and peoples, with the scandal of discrimination, with the shocking violation of human rights and the cynical violation of political rights. We must stop preaching hatred, we must stop bringing up entire new generations to preserve and to carry out the lethal fantasies of the old generation, stop believing that the gun or the bomb can solve all problems or that a revolution is of any value if it closes doors and limits choices instead of opening both as wide as possible.

As far back as we can look --until the light of history fades into the dusk of legend--such aspirations of man have been submerged and swallowed by the violence and the weakness of man at his worst.

Generations have come and gone, and generations have tried and failed.

Will we succeed?

I do not know.

But I dare to be hopeful and confident.

And I do know this: whether we look for the judgment to God, or to history or to mankind, this is the age, and we are the men, and this is the place to give reality to our commitments under the United Nations Charter. For what was for other generations just a hope it is for this generation a simple necessity.

Thank you very much.

E N D