

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>Exempt per RAC 8-16-00</i> TS- 2 p	1/8/66	A
#2 memo	Read to Rostow TS 1 p <i>Sanitized 8-18-03 NWOT/164</i>	5/17/66	A
#3a memo	NSAM 337 <i>sanitized 9-9-93 NL 5-93-65</i> TS 1 p <i>open 6-7-00</i>	8/10/65	A
#3b memo	Duplicate of #3a-		
#5 memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>Exempt per RAC 8-16-00</i> TS- 34 p	7/23/65	A
#6 memo	Rusk to President <i>Exempt per RAC 8-16-00</i> TS- 2 p	7/19/65	A
#7 ltr	Rusk to McNamara <i>Exempt per RAC 10/22/99</i> TS 1 p	8/12/65	A
#7a ltr	Rusk to Raborn <i>Exempt per RAC 10/22/99</i> TS 1 p <i>11 Nov 015-007-31</i>	8/12/65	A
#8a memo	Intelligence Memorandum TS- 3 p	7/23/65	A
#9 memo <i>Exempt 8-18-03 NWOT/201-138</i>	Vance to Bundy TS- 3 p	7/20/65	A
#10 memo	Duplicate of #9-		
#11 memo	Duplicate of #3a- <i>open 6-7-00</i>		
#12a memo	Komer to Bundy <i>open 4-23-01</i> TS- 1 p	8/9/65	A
#12b memo	Duplicate of #3a- <i>open 6-7-00</i>		
#13 memo	Komer to Bundy <i>Exempt per RAC 8-16-00</i> TS- 1 p	8/3/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSAM, NSAM 337

Box 7

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#13a memo	Komer to SecState, SecDef <i>Exempt per RAC 8/16/00</i> S- 1 p	8/2/65	A
#13b memo	Komer to President <i>Exempt per RAC 8/16/00</i> S- 1 p	8/2/65	A
#13c memo	Komer to President S- 2 p <i>Sanitized per NLJ 01-163</i>	7/30/65	A
#14 memo	Komer to Bundy <i>Exempt per RAC 8/16/00</i> TS- 2 p	7/29/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSAM, NSAM 337

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

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May 17, 1966

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: NSAM 337

1. Pursuant to your recent conversation with Mr. Handley, the Department of State has reviewed with representatives of Defense and CIA the October 22, 1965 memorandum for the President from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence. It is the coordinated view of the three agencies that the basic conclusions of the memorandum continue to be valid, i.e., that it remains in the U.S. interest to develop alternatives to U.S. facilities in Pakistan and that measures toward that end are feasible.

2. The passage of time, however, has necessitated certain changes in specific recommendations:

a. Recommendation 1 (e) should be deleted. A shipborne test was conducted with unsatisfactory results. (The Department of State will not explore with other agencies the possibility of developing land-based facilities [REDACTED] which would serve the same purpose. The cost of such facilities should be considerably less than that of a shipborne effort.)

3.4
(b)(1,6)

b. Paragraph 5 is not applicable to the current situation. Negotiations are now underway with the Government of Pakistan for reopening several of the smaller facilities.

3. The agencies concerned propose that we now proceed on the basis of the October 22, 1965 memorandum, revised as indicated above.

John P. Walsh

for

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-164
By iss, NARA, Date 2-4-03

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3/

NSAM 337 -

1 cy given to Chairman, JCS
August 14, 1965

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~VIA COMINT CHANNELS~~

August 10, 1965

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 337

MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: US Intelligence Facilities in Pakistan

In the light of your responses to my memorandum of 6 July on this subject, the President approves your unanimous recommendation that we proceed as a matter of urgency to develop alternate facilities, and requests a firm recommendation on this matter as soon as feasible.

He also approves the Secretary of State's recommendation that no further additions or improvements to the facilities be undertaken at this time.

Finally, he asks that the agencies concerned keep this matter under continuous review and prepare, on a contingency basis, a list of measures they would recommend if it were decided to use this means of convincing Pakistan of our dissatisfaction with its current posture.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

cc: Director of the Budget

~~TOP SECRET/COMINT~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC Memo 11-10-99 E 97-248
By NY NARA, Date 6-7-00

36

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~VIA COMINT CHANNELS~~

August 10, 1965

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 337

MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: US Intelligence Facilities in Pakistan

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McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

cc: Director of the Budget

~~TOP SECRET/COMINT~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC MEMO 11-1049, F97248
By rg NARA, Date 6-7-00

Standard form 63
November 1967
GSA Gen. Reg. No. 27

MEMORANDUM OF CALL

TO: _____

DATE: _____ TIME: _____

YOU WERE CALLED BY: ☐ _____

YOU WERE VISITED BY: ☐ _____

TELEPHONE: _____

NUMBER OF COPIES: _____

REASON FOR CALL: _____

PLEASE CALL ☒ ☐

WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ ☐

RETURNING YOUR CALL ☐ ☐

IS REFERRED TO YOU BY: ☐ ☐

NOTE:

These copies not dist'd.
Awaiting word fm BKS
re classification.

RECEIVED BY: _____

53-106

Mr. ~~Smith~~:

7/23 8/

I think this is the paper Mr. Komer inquired about yesterday - he asked for CIA counterpart to Vance/Bundy memo on subject, rec'd Wednesday.

rb

Ask Komer's office to pick up
picked up - 16¹⁵
7/23

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~VIA COMINT CHANNELS~~

August 10, 1965

11

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 337

MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: US Intelligence Facilities in Pakistan

In the light of your responses to my memorandum of 6 July on this subject, the President approves your unanimous recommendation that we proceed as a matter of urgency to develop alternate facilities, and requests a firm recommendation on this matter as soon as feasible.

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151
McGeorge Bundy

cc: Director of the Budget

~~TOP SECRET/COMINT~~

1 cy ea: Komer
Johnson
NSC Files

gearup

ltd
OK
Dispatched 8/11/65 - Rcpts. nos. 319-322
[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NSC memo 11-1044, F92248*
By *14* NARA, Date *6-7-00*

8/10/65

12

To: Mr. Komer

From: McGeorge Bundy

You are right -- but it's not our best plot
either.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~COMINT~~

August 9, 1965

Mac -

I think attached modification will do the trick. Note the extras I threw in.

I must say that your 303 colleagues did not impress me by the clarity of their logic. Apparently we're supposed to bring Ayub around with mirrors.

*You are right
~but it's not an
here ~~you~~ plot either map*

RWK
RWK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority PLJ.141.019.023/6
By jc, NARA, Date 4-12-01

12b

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~VIA COMINT CHANNELS~~

August 10, 1965

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 337

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: US Intelligence Facilities in Pakistan

In the light of your responses to my memorandum of 6 July on this subject, the President approves your unanimous recommendation that we proceed as a matter of urgency to develop alternate facilities, and requests a firm recommendation on this matter as soon as feasible.

He also approves the Secretary of State's recommendation that no further additions or improvements to the facilities be undertaken at this time.

Finally, he asks that the agencies concerned keep this matter under continuous review and prepare, on a contingency basis, a list of measures they would recommend if it were decided to use this means of convincing Pakistan of our dissatisfaction with its current posture.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

cc: Director of the Budget

~~TOP SECRET/COMINT~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC Memo 11-10-49, F 97-248
By 14 NARA, Date 6-7-00

Held for meeting
Tuesday 7/30
for

Let in Rusk
in Sit Room
7/30 - 7:30

July 30, 1965

13c

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Where to on Pakistan? In choosing to create a public issue over the consortium postponement, Ayub has apparently decided on a tit-for-tat response: (1) alleging that we are using political pressure; (2) portraying Pakistan as the "aggrieved party"; and (3) therefore asking us to come to him. He hopes to get the other consortium donors to pledge (thus isolating us), and then wait us out in the expectation we'll come through on 23 September.

Though Ayub has put himself out on a limb by this foolhardy course, he's also created a dilemma for us. Our stance is that the delay is for quite legitimate Congressional reasons. Now that Ayub has publicly challenged us, however, how do we play our hand? Everyone knows you don't want to continue paying such large Pak bills unless we get more in return. Everyone also knows that you are determined not to pledge until after Congress acts. But there is honest confusion as to what you'd favor doing when the aid bill is passed and the 23 September pledging session rolls around. Would we (1) go ahead and pledge, even if the Paks haven't moved our way; (2) make a much smaller pledge; or (3) just let the situation ride?

Rusk and Mann apparently interpret your position as being to sit tight and see if the Paks will get smart and start coming to us. If they don't, they can stew in their own juice right past 23 September. If they want to pull out of CENTO and SEATO, let them. So the only actions State proposes are to ask Gene Black to go through Pakistan and tell Ayub he'd better come here himself if he's wise. Also Fulbright will scare the Pak Ambassador about the Hill situation.

The risk in this relaxed approach is that if the Paks don't get the word and start coming to us we'll face a tough decision on 23 September. If we then make the pledge they want, it will look as though we've capitulated to Pak counterpressures. If we don't make a pledge, it will trigger a real crisis with the Paks. Since we'll no longer be able to use the Congressional argument, it will be a straight political pressure play. The Paks might then feel compelled to put the squeeze on Peshawar, for example.

The alternative is to step up our effort to make Ayub come to us before 23 September. Instead of sitting back and waiting, we could take a series

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 01-163 and RAC
By id, NARA, Date 1-2-09

~~SECRET~~

Page Two

of steps designed to shake him loose (and thus minimize the risk of a much deeper crisis). It wouldn't involve chasing after him, but rather making a lot clearer to him that he's skating on awfully thin ice. We could :

(1) Pass the word via direct and indirect means that by making a public stink over our request for consortium postponement, he had changed the game and made it a test of confidence. Therefore, until the Paks changed their tune, we might not be able to make any pledge at all.

(3) Then pass word that we won't run after the Paks and ask them to let us give them aid. So if Ayub values US support, he'd be wise to pick up your standing invitation and suggest he visit here soon.

If the purpose of the exercise is to bring the Paks around rather than cast them adrift, your staff here would tend to favor this second alternative. We see merit in actively managing this crisis rather than depending on the Paks to see the light on their own, and inviting a major showdown in September if they don't.

If you favor sitting tight, we'll subside. If you'd like to hear argument, we'd suggest a meeting this week.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~