

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#16 memo	Rostow to President, 11:40 a.m. <i>open 12-16-99</i> C 1 p	5/20/67	A
#16a memo	Taylor to President " C 2 p	5/17/67	A
#17 memo	Rostow to President, 11:55 a.m. C 1 p <i>open 2/10/92</i>	6/27/67	A
#17a rpt	"I issued in March 1966..." <i>open 12-16-99</i> C 1 p	6/27/67	A
#17b memo	Duplicate of #16 "		
#17c memo	Duplicate of #16a "		
#18b cable	CINCPAC to Bangkok TS 4 p	undated	A
#18c cable	Martin to Sharp TS 3 p	undated	A
#21a memo	Ball to Deputy Under SecState <i>open 12-16-99</i> S 1 p	8/3/66	A
#21b memo	Ball to Foreign Service Institute Dir. " S 2 p	8/3/66	A
#22 memo	Ball to Asst Secretary for Far Eastern Aff. " S 1 p	8/3/66	A
#23 memo	Ball to Dep. Asst. Sec. for Pol Mil Aff " S 1 p	8/3/66	A
#25 rpt	"Point 1--Need for greater emphasis..." S 10 p <i>SANITIZED 2-3-10 NLJ09128</i>	undated	A
#27 rpt	"Point 5--Adequacy of Police programs" S 2 p <i>open per RAC 8/09 12/18/17</i>	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSAM, NSAM 341--Direction, Coordination & Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities
Overseas Box 7

RESTRICTION CODES

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#29 rpt	"Annex A" S 5 p <i>Open per RAC 12/18/17</i>	undated	A
#29a memo	Ball to AID Administrator S 1 p	8/3/66	A
#31 memo	NSAM 119 S 2 p <i>Open per RAC 12/18/17</i>	12/18/61	A
#33 rpt	Duplicate of #29 <i>Open per RAC 12/18/17</i>		
#35 memo	NSAM 162 S 4 p <i>exempt NWT 015007-5</i>	6/19/62	A
#37 memo	NSAM 177 S 1 p <i>Open per RAC 12/18/17</i>	8/7/62	A
#39 rpt	Duplicate of #27 <i>Open per RAC 8/09 12/18/17</i>		
#40 memo	Rostow to Under SecState C 1 p <i>open 12-16-99</i>	3/18/67	A
#40a memo	Rostow to President, 1:10 p.m. "	3/10/67	A
#40b memo	Katzenbach to President "	3/7/67	A
#47 memo	Komer to President C 2 p <i>open 4-17-95 NWT 94-249</i>	3/3/66	A
#49 memo	NSAM 341 C 1 p <i>re (dup. #128, NSF Memos to the President, Bess Koma, Vol. 21) open 12-16-99</i>	3/2/66	A
#50 memo	NSAM 341 C 1 p "	3/2/66	A
#51 memo	Komer to President S 1 p "	3/2/66	A

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#56a rpt	Attachment to #56 C 1 p <i>open 12-16-99</i>	undated	A
#57a memo	"Management Responsibility of the SecState" C 3 p //	undated	A
#58 memo	Duplicate of #57a C 3 p //	8/8/66	A

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
AND THE PROBLEM OF COORDINATION

NEW DUTIES AND PROCEDURES
OF MARCH 4, 1966

PREPARED BY THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
(Pursuant to S. Res. 181, 89th Cong.)
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE



Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations

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FOREWORD

In its review of the conduct of national security policy, the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations has a continuing interest in the role and powers of the Secretary of State and his Department.

On March 4, 1966, it was announced by the White House that President Johnson had assigned formal responsibility to the Secretary of State, as his agent, for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas. In the words of the White House announcement: "Up to now, the Secretary of State, assisted by the regional Assistant Secretaries, has performed a coordinating function in interdepartmental matters abroad. Now he has received formal and specific overall directive authority from the President."

The purpose of this publication is to make available to the subcommittee the texts of the Presidential announcement of March 4 and of related messages and statements.

HENRY M. JACKSON,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on National
Security and International Operations.*

MAY 9, 1966.

CONTENTS

	Page
Foreword.....	iii
White House Announcement of New Procedures for Overseas Interdepartmental Matters, March 4, 1966.....	1
Secretary of State Dean Rusk's Message to his Colleagues in the Department of State and Abroad, March 4, 1966.....	2
Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Circular No. 385, March 4, 1966.....	4
White House Press Briefing with General Maxwell D. Taylor, Special Consultant to the President and U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, March 4, 1966.....	7
"Opportunity and Challenge" by U. Alexis Johnson (from the <i>Foreign Service Journal</i> , April, 1966).....	15
"New System for Coping With Our Overseas Problems," Speech by General Maxwell D. Taylor to the American Foreign Service Association on March 31, 1966.....	17

**WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW PROCEDURES
FOR OVERSEAS INTERDEPARTMENTAL MATTERS, MARCH
4, 1966**

The President today discussed with his Cabinet and other high officials a new procedure, which he has approved, for the purpose of modernizing and streamlining the executive branch of Government in the conduct of foreign affairs.

In order to assist him in discharging his responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, the President has directed the Secretary of State, as his agent, to assume responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas (less exempted military activities). Up to now, the Secretary of State, assisted by the regional Assistant Secretaries, has performed a coordinating function in interdepartmental matters abroad. Now he has received formal and specific overall directive authority from the President. While the term "interdepartmental matters" has not been specifically defined, in the present context it covers those activities abroad involving more than a single department or agency, or which is of such a nature as to affect significantly the overall U.S. overseas program in a country or region.

To assist the Secretary of State in this new role, there will be a permanent interdepartmental committee, called the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), with the Under Secretary of State as its "Executive Chairman." The latter term is used to describe a chairman who has the authority and responsibility to decide all matters coming before his committee, subject to the right of any member to appeal from his decision to higher authority. This is an important provision which makes the difference between the normal committee and an incisive, decision-making body.

The other regular members of the Senior Interdepartmental Group are: the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of AID, the Director of CIA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of USIA, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman will invite representatives of other departments and agencies when they have an interest in the matters under consideration.

The Senior Interdepartmental Group will function as a focal point for decisions and actions on overseas interdepartmental matters which are referred to it by the Secretary of State or by an Assistant Secretary of State, or raised by the action of an individual member. Any department or agency not a member may also raise matters for action by the Group.

Beneath the Secretary of State and the Senior Interdepartmental Group, the regional Assistant Secretaries of State will occupy im-

portant focal positions in the channel of responsibility for overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental matters in the regions of their responsibility. The Assistant Secretaries will serve as Executive Chairmen of Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRG), analogous in membership and responsibilities to the Senior Interdepartmental Group. They will work closely with U.S. Ambassadors and the country teams abroad and will assure the adequacy in their regions of U.S. policy, plans, programs, resources, and performance. It is at this level that the volume of work will be done, leaving for the Senior Interdepartmental Group only the major problems. As in the case of the Senior Group, the new arrangements are for the purpose of expediting decision and action.

Thus, the overall purpose of the changes directed by the President is to formalize relationships and clarify responsibilities in the conduct of our overseas business, operating within the framework of existing law. This action does not affect in any way the statutory responsibilities of any of the key Government officials involved or their relations with Congress. For example, the Public Law 480 (Food for Freedom) program will remain the responsibility of the Department of Agriculture. In establishing the Senior Group and the Regional Groups, it creates a regular meeting place for the key officials involved in overseas activities and assures decisive action by giving unusual authority to the "Executive Chairman." These meetings also assure the departments and agencies primarily involved in overseas affairs a forum in which all views can be expressed in advance of decisions. The departments and agencies with an occasional interest will be invited to attend these meetings when there are matters affecting them on the agenda, or they may propose matters for the agenda. In any case, their representative will have the same rights as the regular members when their business is being considered.

While these procedures are not for the purpose of injecting some kind of automaticity or production-line quality into the handling of overseas affairs, they will, it is hoped, bring greater method into the conduct of foreign affairs, permit a sharper and more rapid focus of the efforts of several departments on complex overseas problems, and assure that no sector of the foreign front is neglected at a time of preoccupation with some overriding problem.

[Department of State Bulletin, March 28, 1966, Vol. LIV, No. 1396]

**SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK'S MESSAGE TO HIS
COLLEAGUES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND
ABROAD, MARCH 4, 1966**

The President has assigned to me and the Department of State additional responsibility for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas. This assignment extends to the limits permitted by law and covers all operations of the United States Government abroad except U.S. military forces under area military command and such other military activities as the President may elect to conduct through military channels. The President's directive also established

a systematic mechanism for considering the views of other agencies involved in our activities abroad, and for reaching decisions promptly. This responsibility will be discharged in Washington primarily through the Under Secretary and the regional Assistant Secretaries of State. They will be assisted by interdepartmental groups of which they will be executive chairmen with full powers of decision on all matters within their purview. Thus the Department, and the regional Assistant Secretaries with respect to their geographic areas, will exercise leadership functions and responsibilities at the seat of Government similar to those delineated for Ambassadors within the countries of their assignment by the President's action of May 1961.

In accepting these expanded duties, I have assured the President that the Department will be organized and manned to perform them effectively and expeditiously. I have also assured my colleagues in the Cabinet that their interests and needs that relate to activities abroad will receive careful and sympathetic consideration.

To enable us to discharge our enlarged responsibilities efficiently, I have today directed certain organizational changes be undertaken systematically within the Department.

The Under Secretary and other designated officers of the Department will proceed immediately to strengthen our capability to meet this new challenge and to establish, through prescribed interdepartmental groups and other means, the interdepartmental working relationships essential to achievement of the President's objectives.

No organizational chart can substitute for the abilities and attitudes of people. Our job requires the exercise of exceptional qualities of leadership and demands that officers working on country and regional matters apply an overview of wisdom and judgment that transcends bureau or departmental interests and focuses on the needs and purposes of the United States Government as a whole in its relationships with other nations. They will be dealing with difficult multiple-agency and Government-wide issues of policy, the planning and control of programs, and the distribution of resources. Their tasks will encompass not only the anticipation and management of crises but the handling of day-to-day operating problems and the orderly promotion of the objectives of our Government with such responsibilities. There can be no room for parochial viewpoints or petty bureaucratic "in fighting." Each of us must recognize that at all times we are, in a real sense, acting for and on behalf of the President, and through him, serving all the people of the United States.

I particularly hope that the new and increased responsibilities given to the geographic Assistant Secretaries and the gradual establishment of the new positions of "Country Directors" will enable us better to serve both the President and our missions abroad. I look to the Country Directors to assume full responsibility, under their Assistant Secretaries, for all activities in the country or countries assigned to them, and to be single focal points in Washington to serve our Ambassadors. In a sense, we are applying the valuable experience that has been gained in the operations of country teams abroad to operations here in Washington.

I wish to assure all the Assistant Secretaries that the formation of the Senior Interdepartmental Group will not reduce their access to me. Indeed, I would hope that the work of the SIG would make

it possible for problems to come to me more systematically than in the past.

I know that all of you will share with me a deep resolve to justify the confidence in the Department which the President has manifested by his directive today. Our job is to serve the interests of the United States. Our paramount concern is always the safety of our nation—in familiar words “to secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” We know that it is no longer possible to find security apart from the rest of the world—that we must work incessantly toward a safe environment, toward a reliable peace in which all men can enjoy a better life. In working toward that goal we serve not only our own deepest interests but those of all other peoples who want freedom, progress, and peace.

[Department of State News Letter, March 1966, No. 59]

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL
CIRCULAR NUMBER 385, MARCH 4, 1966**

**SUBJECT: DIRECTION, COORDINATION AND SUPERVISION OF INTER-
DEPARTMENTAL ACTIVITIES OVERSEAS**

1. Authority and Responsibility of the Secretary of State

To assist the President in carrying out his responsibilities for the conduct of foreign affairs, he has assigned to the Secretary of State authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas.

2. Activities Not Included

Such activities do not include those of United States military forces operating in the field where such forces are under the command of a United States area military commander and such other military activities as the President elects to conduct through military channels.

3. Definition of “Interdepartmental” Activities

Activities which are internal to the execution and administration of the approved programs of a single department or agency and which are not of such a nature as to affect significantly the overall U.S. overseas program in a country or region are not considered to be interdepartmental matters. If disagreement arises at any echelon over whether a matter is interdepartmental or not in the meaning of this circular the dissenting department or agency may appeal to the next higher authority as provided for in the following paragraph.

4. The Concept of Executive Chairmen

The Secretary of State will discharge his authority and responsibility primarily through the Under Secretary of State and the regional Assistant Secretaries of State, who will be assisted by interdepartmental groups of which they will be executive chairmen, i.e., with full powers of decision on all matters within their purview, unless a member who does not concur requests the referral of a matter to the decision of the next higher authority.

5. *The Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG)*

To assist the Secretary of State in discharging his authority and responsibility for interdepartmental matters which cannot be dealt with adequately at lower levels or by present established procedures, including those of the Intelligence Community, the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) is established. The SIG shall consist of the Under Secretary of State, Executive Chairman, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the United States Information Agency, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Representatives of other departments and agencies with responsibility for specific matters to be considered will attend on invitation by the Chairman. Such other departments and agencies may raise matters for consideration of the SIG.

The Chairman of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) may designate the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs or the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs to chair the SIG in the Chairman's absence.

The SIG will assist the Secretary of State by:

- a. ensuring that important foreign policy problems requiring interdepartmental attention receive full, prompt and systematic consideration;
- b. dealing promptly with interdepartmental matters referred by the Assistant Secretaries of State or raised by any of its members, or, if such matters require higher level consideration, reporting them promptly to the Secretary of State for appropriate handling;
- c. assuring a proper selectivity of the areas and issues to which the United States Government applies its resources;
- d. carrying out other duties and responsibilities of the Special Group (counterinsurgency), which has been abolished;
- e. conducting periodic surveys and checks to verify the adequacy and effectiveness of interdepartmental overseas programs and activities.

The SIG will encourage interdepartmental action and decision-making at the Assistant Secretary level to the greatest extent possible.

The SIG will meet in the Department of State regularly and specially at the call of the Chairman.

The Chairman will be supported by a full-time staff headed by a Staff Director who will also serve as the Special Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department. Staff personnel will be furnished on the Chairman's request by the departments and agencies represented on the SIG. The Chairman may request departments and agencies to designate a point of contact for the Staff Director on matters affecting their interests.

The Staff Directors of the Interdepartmental Regional Groups will assist the Staff Director of the SIG as he requires by providing staff support on regional matters of interest to the SIG.

6. *The Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG)*

To assist the Assistant Secretaries, an Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG) is established for each geographic region corresponding to the jurisdiction of the geographic bureaus in the Department of State. Each IRG shall be composed of the regional Assistant Secre-

tary of State, Executive Chairman, and a designated representative from Defense, AID, CIA, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USIA and the White House or NSC staff. Representatives of other departments and agencies with responsibility for specific matters to be considered will attend on invitation by the Chairman.

The regional Assistant Secretaries, in their capacities as Executive Chairmen of the IRGs, will ensure the adequacy of United States policy for the countries in their region and of the plans, programs, resources and performance for implementing that policy. They will be particularly watchful for indications of developing crises and when such matters require higher level consideration, will recommend appropriate measures to higher authority for dealing with emergent critical situations in their regions.

A regional Assistant Secretary may designate a Deputy Assistant Secretary to chair the IRG in the Chairman's absence. IRG meeting and staff procedures will be patterned on the SIG.

7. Interdepartmental Leadership and Coordination of Country Matters

A new position of Country Director will be established in the regional bureaus to serve as the single focus of responsibility for leadership and coordination of departmental and interdepartmental activities concerning his country or countries of assignment. In particular he will:

- a. provide continuing departmental and interdepartmental leadership in planning, coordination, and implementation of decisions;
- b. raise specific matters for consideration by the IRG, and bring detailed knowledge to IRG discussions when so requested;
- c. serve as the base for crisis task force operations as necessary.

The Country Director will be responsible for seeing that the Ambassador's needs are served both within the Department and government-wide. He will ensure that the mission is fully supported in the full range of its requirements: policy, operations and administration.

Each Country Director will organize and develop such contacts, channels and mechanisms as are appropriate to and necessary for full interdepartmental leadership on country matters, and for full support to the Assistant Secretary.

To assist in providing guidance and direction to the Country Director, the Assistant Secretary will have one or more Deputy Assistant Secretaries whose areas of responsibility will be defined by the Assistant Secretary.

Positions of Office Director and officer-in-charge will be abolished as the transition is made to the establishment of Country Director positions.

[From transcript issued by the White House]

WHITE HOUSE PRESS BRIEFING WITH GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, SPECIAL CONSULTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND U. ALEXIS JOHNSON, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, MARCH 4, 1966

Mr. LAITIN: This streamlining organization has grown out of a survey which the President directed General Taylor to make last fall. General Taylor will sum up for you this modernization and then Under Secretary Johnson will be available, after the summary by General Taylor, to answer any questions for you.

I will turn this over to you, now, General Taylor.

General TAYLOR: Ladies and gentlemen, I think it is fair to say that the survey which was mentioned is a part of the President's program for what he called, in his State of the Union Message, the modernizing and streamlining of the Executive Branch.

The particular task addressed, as you can see, is the coordination and organization of interdepartmental activities overseas. This, of course, has been a problem that we have had in Washington for a long time, a growing problem as our responsibilities and activities have increased overseas, namely, how to get the best aggregate effect out of the contributions of a number of departments in overseas areas.

Among the highlights of the paper which you have in front of you, I would say, the first is the clarification of the responsibility of the Secretary of State. The President has taken a portion of his own Presidential responsibility and given it to the Secretary of State as his agent. This responsibility is described as "overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas (less exempted military activities)."

That elliptical reference, "exempted military activities," describes those military activities which are conducted by the President as Commander in Chief through the command channel to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the overseas commanders.

In addition to fixing the responsibility of the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary in support of the Secretary of State, it requires that this task be discharged through two echelons of interdepartmental committees, which are called "groups".

At the Secretarial level there is the Senior Interdepartmental Group.

Similarly, the Regional Assistant Secretaries, five of them, will also be supported by an interdepartmental group, in this case referred to as the "Interdepartmental Regional Groups".

I would say these are more than normal committees in two important senses. First, the chairman is an Executive Chairman. This is the code name we have developed to describe a chairman who not only presides, but also decides. He is charged with the responsibility of reaching a decision on all issues which come before his committee. If, indeed, there is disagreement, then the individual representative of the department disagreeing has the right of appeal to the next higher authority if he does not accept the decision of the chairman.

The other characteristic which I think is important is that the members representing the departments, the Senior Group, are either the head man or the Number 2 man in each of these very important and powerful divisions of our Government. They must come to meetings prepared to commit their department and they must make attendance a primary duty, always attending in person and not sending some delegate unless they are sick, out of town or something of that sort.

Through those two features, the Executive Chairman, and the permanent nature of the membership and the seniority of membership, we would hope that issues before the SIG and IRG's can be handled expeditiously and delays sometimes inherent in the committee system will be eliminated or at least mitigated.

I think another important point to mention is that these Groups will be very important forums to allow complete participation of everybody who has a legitimate interest in overseas business. I have stressed the point that, although the paper lists the regular members, the head of any department or agency reporting to the President can be an ad hoc member when he has business at stake before the committee or when he himself has raised business before this committee. We would hope that, the SIG and IRG's being a recognized forum, always in business, so to speak, they would allow the voices of all of the legitimate participants to be heard in ample time before decisions are taken.

I might call attention to the fact that, to a large degree, we are paralleling in this organization in Washington the system which exists and has existed for a long time overseas, where the Ambassador is the Number 1 American official in that country, and usually has a Country Team of subordinate heads of agencies and departments represented in his country.

We have never had in the past an organism here in Washington corresponding to the Country Teams, and now we are paralleling that, I say, to a large degree at both the Assistant Secretary level and the Secretary level.

I will close by pointing out again that this action infringes on no statutory authority of any official, and nothing is being taken away from anybody. Instead, a mechanism is being set up which should be quite helpful to virtually everyone who has some mission in the foreign field.

We are trying to expedite business and to codify good practice, and we view this as an important but not a dramatic change in our procedures.

[Q.] General Taylor, this whole statement suggests that up until now the conduct of foreign policy has been either inadequate, sloppy, or delinquent, or whatever this is designed to cure. What is wrong with that view?

General TAYLOR: I would say we are simply recognizing that our foreign affairs are becoming more and more complicated, and the procedures which may have been adequate in the past are not good enough for the future. I think those of you who have studied the record recall that in 1961, at the time of the abolition of the Planning Board and the OCB, President Kennedy in a press release indicated he expected the Department of State to take over its coordination functions, but I could find no place in the record where there was

anything more formal than that in assigning responsibility to State. This action clarifies the situation.

[Q.] General, is it possible that this has some relationship to Mr. Bundy's departure, or is this a formalizing of some of the functions that Mr. Bundy has done at the White House?

General TAYLOR: Mr. Bundy's departure had nothing to do with this recommendation. I started work on it long before I ever knew Mr. Bundy was going to leave.

[Q.] General, what relationship does this set-up have with the National Security Council? To what extent does it affect the organization of that?

General TAYLOR: I don't see any effect at all. What has happened is that the Chairman of the National Security Council, the President, has given a part of his responsibility to a member of the National Security Council, the Secretary of State, that is, for this particular overseas function. It is quite apparent, I think, that recommendations bearing on policy and that kind of thing, broad matters which are developed by this machinery we have described here, might well become the subject of consideration by the National Security Council.

[Q.] General, could you clarify your previous answers, sir? Did you mean that this leaves totally unchanged the functions of the White House advisory staff in the field of national security affairs?

General TAYLOR: I see no change effected by this. Quite obviously, it could in time as we gain experience, but what will take place we are not entirely sure. This sets up a procedure, and exactly how it will affect individual activities is a question to be worked out with experience.

[Q.] Mr. Johnson, this seems to add greatly to the burdens of the Secretary of State; is that correct?

Mr. JOHNSON: I think it adds increased responsibilities to the Secretary of State and it sets up a mechanism whereby he discharges this responsibility.

[Q.] By delegating it to the Executive Chairman?

Mr. JOHNSON: To the Executive Chairman, and then the interdepartmental groups as well. It should hopefully somewhat reduce the load on the Secretary of State by providing a more formal mechanism for problems to reach the Secretary.

[Q.] Does this eliminate the need for a task force system of an interdepartmental nature?

Mr. JOHNSON: It may in some cases. I would hope that the organization set up here would be able to take over, as a task force, in a crisis situation, because you already have a group of people working together on the particular problem.

[Q.] What about things like institutions, like the so-called "Tuesday Lunch", which seems to be an informal thing?

Mr. JOHNSON: There is no relation to that at all.

[Q.] Does this give the Secretary of State veto power over the actions of these other agencies, say the CIA?

General TAYLOR: Insofar as an Executive Chairman is concerned, he can decide on a split issue which is before his committee. He can

make a decision, but that can always be appealed. In point of practice, of course, that is true in missions overseas today. I don't really view this as changing relationships but rather simply recognizing relationships and standardizing them.

[Q.] The appeal to the President would always be there.

General TAYLOR: That is the last court of appeal.

[Q.] Do you feel that this will take some burden off the President?

General TAYLOR: I would feel much more relieved if I were the President, with the discharge of my overseas responsibilities, if I felt that I could really put my finger quickly on who is responsible when things go wrong. In that sense, I think it would tend to relieve the burden.

[Q.] General, could we be a little more specific about how it will work out by using Vietnam as an example, and accepting the parenthetical note that this exempts military activities?

Will the Secretary of State now be the man primarily responsible for all of the non-military activities out there? Does that mean that Mr. Lodge reports directly to him in this system?

General TAYLOR: I would not say it would disturb the relationship of Lodge, who reports through the Secretary to the President at the present time. That channel will not be changed. I don't see that it changes anything today in Vietnam. There is enough flexibility of procedure that if any interdepartmental business is unsatisfactory in Vietnam, this machinery can be used to correct it.

[Q.] General, why wasn't the Treasury Department included in this committee?

General TAYLOR: The Treasury Department certainly will have an interest many times, but we feel that an agency pays a price for being on the committee. You have to give your top man or your Number 2 man to this committee, and he has to do a lot of work. I would feel that it is a disservice to any agency to offer it a seat unless it had business before the committee all of the time.

Experience has proved that while the Treasury Department has vast interests in this foreign field, they are not continuing interests. The regular membership on the SIG represents those agencies, the activities of which really require almost continuing coordination. We talked this matter over with the Secretary of the Treasury and he understands thoroughly that he has a right to be there at any time that his interests are involved.

Mr. JOHNSON: I might point out that this covers primarily the agencies who are engaged in activities overseas.

[Q.] Well, the Under Secretary of State will now be relieved of all responsibilities he has had up to now, in order for him to act as an Executive Chairman, or is that roughly what he has been doing?

Mr. JOHNSON: In effect, that is what he has been doing, to a degree, and it is formalizing what is already in existence. I don't see that it changes that at all.

General TAYLOR: In discussing this new arrangement with several senior officials who were concerned as to whether we were creating a time-consuming new procedure, I made the point, which I think is correct, that these officials deal with the matters coming before the

SIG anyway. The existence of the SIG as a forum ought to make it easier for them.

[Q.] Does this mean that more decisions will be made at the level below the President than is the case now?

General TAYLOR: I can't answer that. I would certainly hope that there will be a filtering-out process here at the Assistant Secretary level, and that details and secondary matters will be taken care of at that level, and this would allow, I hope, a greater selectivity in bringing to the President those things which are of top priority.

[Q.] Can you give us specific examples of the sort of problem that this thing might cure?

General TAYLOR: There are just so many of them which might arise. Whenever two agencies have any conflicting interest or merely the need to work together closely, this new arrangement simply will give a greater likelihood of effective treatment of such a matter.

Although this new procedure is not slanted at Vietnam—my experience there bore heavily upon my recommendations, because there you have such large interdepartmental programs, and at least six agencies working all of the time on them.

Take the so-called pacification activities in Vietnam, which includes at least AID, State, Defense, USIA—I guess that is all. You have four agencies working in the same field. It calls for very close cooperation there, and by the same token parallel coordination back here in Washington.

[Q.] General, I have two questions, sir: In this recommendation that you made, did you draw on the studies that were made before the Jackson Subcommittee, and also is this in a sense an alternative to some of the ideas that previously had been put forth for something like a Deputy President?

General TAYLOR: Personally, I have been very much influenced by the work of Senator Jackson's subcommittee. I testified before it and I have read all or most of its documents and re-read them when I was working on this project, so it is certainly fair, insofar as I was concerned, to say I was influenced by the very fine work of the subcommittee.

I did not consider any specific proposals and reject them in favor of this solution. I developed it out of the background of my reading, and personal experience.

[Q.] On the latter part of my question, is this in a sense conceived as an alternative to the idea of a Deputy President?

General TAYLOR: Not as I conceive it. I didn't consider the Deputy President concept at all.

[Q.] How often will this senior group meet?

General TAYLOR: It is hard to tell. I would think at least once a week. As often as necessary.

[Q.] As I understand it, when Mr. Bundy was here, with time he did acquire some kind of judicial function, not necessarily on major policy items, but procedural items that arose out of the known policy when AEC or the Department of Defense had a thing to cooperate on, as to who was going to do it and where, and this kind of judicial function.

Would that now pass to this group, that kind of decision-making, either personnel or interpretation of known policy clashes, and so on?

General TAYLOR: I think Mr. Bundy would say that he did more coordination than decision-making. I will say that always the White House is going to be a focal point of activity and there is going to be a lot of necessary coordination in this building regardless of what takes place outside. I think it would be fair to say if this new system works as I visualize it, that a Mr. Bundy would not be faced so frequently with the need for ad hoc coordination between departments.

Mr. JOHNSON: That is right, and I would hope that it would make the White House special assistant's job easier.

[Q.] But there is still need for a Special Assistant for National Security Affairs?

General TAYLOR: Very much so.

[Q.] How would this affect the operations with Secretary Freeman and Secretary Gardner?

General TAYLOR: I would say not at all, any more than it affects any of the other agencies that are represented in Vietnam. Their activities will have to be brought into proper focus in relation to the overall United States objective, but I don't see that the coordination of their activities presents any special problem. Is that right, Mr. Johnson?

Mr. JOHNSON: I think that that is entirely correct. This will provide a regular forum in which their problems and their ideas can be related to the whole.

[Q.] Would it give the Secretary of State greater jurisdiction over their activities?

Mr. JOHNSON: I wouldn't want to use the term "jurisdiction". I would want to use the term "forum" in which decisions can be reached affecting their activities and their activities affect the activities of others.

[Q.] Was there much opposition to this within the Government?

General TAYLOR: No.

[Q.] Could we say that everyone agreed?

General TAYLOR: A great deal of explanation was given, and one can't suggest any change in the Federal Government without stirring up some apprehension. It was allayed quickly and I was very much encouraged.

[Q.] The original apprehensions were allayed?

General TAYLOR: There are always apprehensions the first time anyone hears a proposition affecting Federal organization. But in talking it through with the principals, as we are talking it through now, when we finished there was agreement.

[Q.] When was this first put to the Cabinet? Is this the first time that they heard about it today?

General TAYLOR: In some cases, but the members primarily concerned had heard about it before. To make one point, it is always important, in my thinking, to remember we are talking about a Presi-

dential function. This is not a State Department function, it is a Presidential function, and the President has simply chosen the Secretary of State to act in his stead.

[Q.] General, would you say this gives the Secretary of State a degree of paramountcy over the Secretary of Defense which he did not have heretofore?

General TAYLOR: He is always *primus inter pares*. I think that he will remain so.

[Q.] Sir, you said that President Kennedy had abolished the OCB and told the Secretary of State to take over in this field. Do you know why that was not done?

General TAYLOR: I would say it was done within the rather limited authority given by the Kennedy statement. I think if you are interested, it would be well to reread that press release, because it is a rather tepid statement of responsibility placed upon the Secretary of State.

[Q.] Would you give an example, sir, of the way in which this new arrangement will speed decisions and action?

General TAYLOR: Well, first let us consider the top group the SIG, because at the Assistant Secretary level the Groups are simply miniatures of the Senior Interdepartmental Group. First, how can an issue get before that Group?

Well, it can be referred to it by the Secretary of State, or, of course, by the President. It can be raised by any member of the Group, or it can be raised by any head of an agency or a department which is not a regular member, or it can come up from the field by way of the channel of the regional Assistant Secretaries.

When the matter gets to the SIG, you have sitting at that table men who control the principal departments of Government, either the head man or the Number 2 man. It should be possible, if they all agree on something, for each man to go back and set his own department in motion at once. By the same token, if there is disagreement, and you have a dynamic Executive Chairman, he will say, "All right, we have a clash now between Department A and Department B, take my decision or we will carry this at once to the Secretary of State, or to the President."

If everyone does his task, I would think that we have real hope for expedited action.

[Q.] You said this group will have responsibility during a crisis situation. Would you expand on that a little bit?

Mr. JOHNSON: I mentioned that. The question was raised with regard to task forces. When we have a crisis situation arise in the Government, it has been a practice to form a task force, however formal or informal it might be. In this case, the nucleus of a task force would already be in existence and you wouldn't have to establish something new in order to deal with a crisis situation. The mechanism that is established here should be able to deal with a crisis situation without the establishing of any new mechanism.

[Q.] Does this run the risk of the problem in the Eisenhower era, or so attributed to that, that the President gets to see only problems long after their formative stages, and too many things are delegated

below him and he doesn't get into the problems until they get out of hand and develop too far?

General TAYLOR: I would point out that both at the Assistant Secretary level and the Senior Group, the White House has a representative, so that the President's eye is looking in on all of these Groups all of the time.

[Q.] Doesn't that make the Senior Group a slightly enlarged National Security Council, without having all of the statutory trimmings of it?

General TAYLOR: I don't think so, because this is merely the Secretary of State performing a specific task for the President, and the National Security Council has a whole broad field of national security.

[Q.] Will the White House representatives on the Assistant Secretary group be people out of the National Security Council staff?

General TAYLOR. I would think so.

[Q.] What would the National Security Council have as its responsibility that this group wouldn't have? This group covers the Defense Department and CIA and the Department of Agriculture.

General TAYLOR: It is more a question of when the President feels the need of the kind of advice available to him from the National Security Council. That body is always available and I feel quite sure that individual matters will emerge from this new arrangement which he would like to put before the Cabinet or the National Security Council.

[Q.] There are other matters, other than those which this group considers, which would still be the province of the National Security Council?

Mr. JOHNSON: There may well be. I would find it hard to answer that. There may well be NSC matters that would not necessarily come to this group. Nothing specific comes to mind offhand.

[Q.] Are there any members of the NSC or any agency involved in NSC which do not have representatives on the Senior Group?

General TAYLOR: Yes, but all of them potentially are on as ad hoc members if they have business appropriate to this.

Mr. JOHNSON: The NSC is formed of the Cabinet officers themselves. This Senior Interdepartmental Group is at the Under Secretary level.

[Q.] Just once removed, however.

Mr. JOHNSON: Yes.

[Q.] General, if you had something like a Cuban missile crisis as a "for instance," would you have the National Security Council meet on it or this Senior Group?

General TAYLOR: That would be a question for the President to decide. You will recall President Kennedy didn't have this group and rarely used the National Security Council.

[Q.] I mean under the current mechanism.

General TAYLOR: This would be available, as would be the National Security Council, also the informal way that President Kennedy

operated. He called in the men whom he really needed in times of crisis.

[Q.] Which would be more likely? Would it be more likely to be the National Security Council?

General TAYLOR: I think it would depend on the President. I don't know how he would do it.

[Q.] If it were in the realm of one of these groups, a crisis of that proportion, who would it be?

General TAYLOR: When you get a major crisis the President is likely to have his own people, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense in person, inside his office for counsel. He wants an eyeball confrontation with them, and he is not thinking in terms of formal organization.

[Q.] Is Under Secretary Ball the man who is going to be in charge of this?

Mr. JOHNSON: Yes.

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OPPORTUNITY AND CHALLENGE

By U. Alexis Johnson

(Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; President, American Foreign Service Association)

One of the most important events in the recent history of the Department and the Foreign Service was the announcement by the President on March 4 of the assignment of additional responsibilities to the Secretary of State and the Department of State for the over-all direction, coordination and supervision of United States Government activities overseas. Secretary Rusk's message of the same date to the Department and the field clearly set forth his concept of what is required of the Department and the field to carry out this task and the organizational changes gradually and systematically to be effected better to enable the Department to meet these new demands.

The President's instruction did not represent any hasty decision on reorganization for reorganization's sake, but rather was the result of many months of careful consideration and discussion within the executive branch under the leadership of General Maxwell Taylor. Similarly, the organizational changes in the Department were given long and careful consideration by the senior officers of the Department.

The recommendations approved by the President in a very real sense grew out of the experience abroad with the "country team" concept. It is an attempt to transfer that concept, insofar as it is applicable, to the management in Washington of our Government's overseas activities. While, as noted in the White House announcement, the term "interdepartmental matter" has not been specifically defined, in the present context it covers those activities abroad involving more than a single Department or agency, or which are of such a nature as to affect significantly the over-all US overseas program in a country or region. The concept here is that the Department of State should not and does not want to get into the purely internal problems of other agencies but, where foreign policy interests are significantly involved,

and the Department finds a real need for its own involvement, it can raise the matter. If the agency affected does not concur, the appeal procedure set forth in the President's instruction is open to it.

It will be noted that the new term appearing in the President's instruction is that of "direction" and "decision" by the Under Secretary of State as Executive Chairman of the Senior Interdepartmental Group and by the geographic Assistant Secretaries as Executive Chairmen of the Interdepartmental Regional Groups. This is, as noted in the announcement, subject to "the full extent permitted by law." This does not mean that the Department of State can override or usurp the functions and responsibilities given by law to other Departments or agencies. However, it does mean that the impasses, particularly at lower levels, which in the past have all too often prevented *any* decision being made should now in large degree be eliminated. Someone has to make a decision and that "someone" is in the Department of State. If the agency directly concerned does not concur with that decision, a procedure is provided for prompt appeal and action on that appeal, up to the Secretary of State and then to the President if necessary. This new procedure is far different than "government by committee" for it is not expected that these groups will act on any majority voting procedure. As set forth in the White House announcement, it is simply creating a regular meeting place for key officials involved in overseas activities and provides the mechanism for assuring decisive action with respect to these activities. It also assures that the Departments and agencies primarily involved in overseas activities can have a forum in which their views can be expressed in advance of decisions.

As Secretary Rusk pointed out in his message, these new responsibilities will require the exercise of exceptional qualities of leadership at a truly national level, with no room for parochial viewpoints or bureaucratic "in-fighting." Each member of the Department and the Foreign Service is going to be required to recognize that at all times he is in a real sense acting for and on behalf of the President. More than ever, the Foreign Service is called upon to recognize that it is not the Foreign Service of any particular Department or agency, but in a real sense "The Foreign Service of the United States." If this system is going to work as desired by the President, and if we are going to gain the respect and confidence of the other Departments and agencies essential to make it work that way, we are going to be required at all times to take a truly national point of view. Other Departments and agencies must be satisfied that their interests and needs have received careful and sympathetic consideration, and the President must be satisfied that all the points of view and considerations which need to be weighed have been taken into full account.

This is not a system for smothering or keeping from the President or the senior officers of the Department differences of view. Rather, it should be a system for assuring that various points of view and various considerations are brought to their attention in a concise and orderly manner, and that decisions reached at lower levels truly reflect a proper weighing of *all* the considerations.

The term "Director" in the new position of "Country Director" has been used to impart the sense that these officers will be expected to be truly "Directors" of all U.S. Government activities involving the country for which they are responsible. As stated by Secretary

Rusk, he will look to the Country Directors to be single focal points in Washington to serve our Ambassadors abroad. The concept is that these positions will be occupied by senior officers, to the maximum extent possible qualified to be, or having been DCM's or Ambassadors abroad. They will have whatever staff assistance they need best to do their jobs, including full or part-time assistance from the administrative section of the Bureau. It is expected that, depending on the country and the range of its problems, they will, with appropriate representatives from other Departments and agencies, constitute, under the Assistant Secretary and the Interdepartmental Regional Group, "country teams" at the Washington level. They will report directly to the Assistant Secretary, thus cutting out the "Office" level now interposed between the "country desk" and the Assistant Secretary.

The concept also is that the Deputy Assistant Secretary or Secretaries will not constitute a "layer" between Country Directors and the Assistant Secretary but rather act as *alter egos* for the Assistant Secretary within their assigned field of responsibility.

In the case of smaller countries with similar or minimal U.S. Government activities, a single officer might be the Country Director for several countries. These questions will have to be systematically worked out by each Bureau in accordance with its own particular needs.

The working out of this concept will of course require more rather than fewer qualified senior officers and thus presents additional opportunities for the Foreign Service. In fact; the whole complex of the President's instruction and the organizational changes in the Department presents new challenges and new opportunities for all members of the Foreign Service. I have told Secretary Rusk of my confidence that the Foreign Service can meet its part of the challenge. I am sure that each member of the Foreign Service will see and redeem this strong reaffirmation of the role of the Department of State in foreign affairs and the opportunity it offers all of us to be of greater service.

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NEW SYSTEM FOR COPING WITH OUR OVERSEAS PROBLEMS*

By General Maxwell D. Taylor

(Special Consultant to the President)

President [Alexis] Johnson, ladies and gentlemen of the Association: Alex's very kind introduction to me, unnecessarily considerate, was most appreciated. I am so glad to read in the paper that he is going to be around Washington for a long time; perhaps he will introduce me at some other occasion. With regard to my address today, his suggestion was that I take this opportunity to give a sort of autobiographical account of NSAM-341 and its background. I am very happy to do it if you will excuse the occasional use of the first person

*Speech to the American Foreign Service Association, March 31, 1966

pronoun, because what I propose to do is simply to tell you how this project developed as I saw it.

I am sorry to sound an inauspicious note when I say that insofar as I am concerned NSAM-341 really had its origin in the "Bay of Pigs" experience. You may recall that following the collapse of the beachhead, April 17, 1961, several of us were asked by President Kennedy to appraise the operation and tell him what had gone wrong. This group included his brother, Bob Kennedy, Allen Dulles, Arleigh Burke and myself. In our final report to President Kennedy, we pointed to a number of shortcomings, among them, the organizational deficiencies in Washington which made it difficult for the President to control a complex, interdepartmental operation such as the "Bay of Pigs." We indicated the kind of organization which would be necessary if we were ever tempted to engage again in so involved an operation.

The organizational concept which we suggested called for a permanent committee with the title Strategic Resources Group, reporting to the President, capable of directing the use overseas of the resources of several departments. Whatever its intrinsic merits, the suggestion was not received with any great enthusiasm, primarily because it seemed to suggest the United States might want to undertake another Bay of Pigs type of operation, and that was not an appealing thought in 1961. However, the concept of having a permanent steering group of very senior officials who controlled all the resources of the principal departments engaged in overseas activities remained alive and reappeared in January, 1962, when President Kennedy approved the constitution of the so-called Special Group for Counter-Insurgency. This was really the Strategic Resources Group under a different name, with a slightly different membership and with a more restricted objective.

Now for those of you who are not familiar with the Special Group, I will review its mission and composition. It was established to assure the unity of effort and use of all resources required to prevent and resist subversive insurgency. That was the overall purpose. More specifically, it was to assure recognition throughout the entire Federal Government that subversive insurgency or the "War of Liberation" is a major form of political-military conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare; and to verify that all Departments give appropriate attention to counter-insurgency in their training programs in order to form the leadership necessary to carry forward in this field. A third objective of the Group was to verify the adequacy of departmental resources to cope with "Wars of Liberation" in the future. Finally, the Group was directed to keep an eye on certain selected countries—countries designated by the President and to verify the adequacy of the interdepartmental programs in these countries which were given this special attention because they were either under subversive attack or seemed exposed to that threat.

The original membership of the Special Group consisted of the Military Representative of the President as Chairman, the Attorney General, the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of CIA, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Administrator of AID.

This Group has been meeting regularly since early 1962 with only slightly changed membership. I would say that its record has been

a very honorable one. Many things were started under its direction. The impact on the education programs which it initiated throughout the government has been very great. It created a new realization of the problem of coordinating overseas efforts in the US Missions. It has been responsible for the development of Internal Defense Plans in certain sensitive countries. But as time went on, I think that most of the members of the Group found that it was much harder to follow up on these programs than it had been to initiate them. Hence, the general feeling grew that the mission of the Special Group should be reviewed and perhaps revised.

I returned from Saigon in August of this last year, at which time the President asked me to review all of the activities of our Government in the Counter-Insurgency field, both at home and abroad, and to make appropriate recommendations. I received authority from the White House to ask for the constitution of four interdepartmental committees: One, to examine matters of organization, doctrine and programing headed by Ambassador Bonsal; a second committee to examine training; a third committee to evaluate resources, their availability and use; and the fourth to look into the broad questions of intelligence bearing upon Counter-Insurgency. These committees worked very hard and very effectively for two months and gave me their reports on the first of December, after which I prepared my recommendations to the President.

What I am going to comment on today is only that part of my recommendations which bear upon NSAM-341—the direction, supervision and coordination of interdepartmental affairs overseas.

Having been asked to look into governmental effectiveness in the field of counter-insurgency, those of us involved soon felt that our directive was too restricted; since counter-insurgency literally means resistance to an insurgent movement, and obviously the last thing that we should want is to find ourselves in that kind of defensive situation. It seemed to us that we should give priority to the prevention of subversive insurgency and emphasize what should be done to improve preventive measures including the early detection of symptoms.

The next question is, where do you look for the symptoms of subversive insurgency? The answer is that they are found in virtually every emerging country in the world. Subversive insurgency is encouraged and fomented by conditions of poverty, of backwardness, of poor government, of lack of education, all of which are conditions one finds in most of the 90 odd emerging countries. Hence, one concludes that any organization adequate to meet the requirements of anticipating subversive insurgency must observe and evaluate continuously the conditions in some 90 countries of the world. At this point, one begins to question the wisdom of setting up a special organization study of two-thirds of the population of the world and of ignoring the remainder. Should we not recognize that the basic organizational requirement is really crisis anticipation and crisis management wherever found? This was the line of reasoning which I felt impelled to follow and it was in that spirit that I made the recommendation which later resulted in Presidential approval of NSAM-341. In case you do not identify the document by that designation, its text was published in the Foreign Affairs Manual as Circular No. 385, dated March 4, 1966.

I was surprised when I started inquiring into the overseas authority of the Secretary of State to find how little specific authority he had for the management of interdepartmental business. In contrast, an Ambassador with authority derived from the letters of three successive Presidents (the last being President Kennedy's of 1961) is very clearly the number one man in his country. He has overall coordination and supervisory responsibility for all US programs. However, I have found no assignment of directive responsibility to him. That word, "directive," apparently was deliberately omitted from the Presidential letters. Nonetheless, I think as a practical matter as you experienced Foreign Service officers know better than I, that a strong Ambassador with his present authority clearly runs his Country Team and directs the overall US program.

But here in Washington, we have never had a single focal point of authority comparable to the Ambassador and his Country Team. The National Security Council was organized with the intention of doing something like this in supporting the President in his discharge of responsibilities in the field of security. But the record shows, I believe, that the National Security Council has not adequately fulfilled the original intent.

In deciding how best to fill this void, I talked to many senior officials about refurbishing the National Security Council. I found virtually no enthusiasm for such a facelifting effort. The general feeling was that the National Security Council had the inherent weakness of being too big and that no President was likely to sit down in such a large group and use it as a forum for deciding major overseas matters. So, in the absence of any desire on the part of our senior officials to overhaul the organization of the National Security Council, it appeared necessary to look elsewhere for organizational support for the President in the discharge of his responsibilities for overseas affairs.

Reviewing the record, I found that the only special authority that the Secretary of State had in this field had been given by President Kennedy rather casually in the public relations release made at the time of the abolition of the OCB and the Planning Board in January, 1961. The language I cannot quote exactly, but it said in effect that the President would look to the Department of State to assume the coordination function which presumably had been done by the OCB. That being the case, it was logical to consider whether we should not give more specific authority to the Secretary of State and the means to carry out this authority or alternatively whether we should set up some new organization, stemming from the President himself, for the conduct of interdepartmental affairs overseas. Personally, I had no difficulty in choosing between these two alternatives. The creation of some new organization under the White House reaching out into all the countries where we have missions abroad did not appeal as being either desirable or practical. The simple way, hence the preferred way, would be to use the structure of the Department of State for the discharge of this additional Presidential function. Thus, it came out in the end, expressed in the following language: "To assist the President in carrying out his responsibility in the conduct of Foreign Affairs, he has assigned to the Secretary of State authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government

overseas." That is the first time the words "overall direction" have ever appeared in defining the responsibility of the Secretary of State overseas and, indeed, goes somewhat beyond the present language of the authority of our Ambassadors.

I would like to repeat again that I view this decision as the act of the President in making the Secretary of State his agent in directing interdepartmental matters overseas. This is not inherently or organically a State Department function. It is something additional. By the same token those other officials of the State Department under the Secretary who are involved, the Assistant Secretaries of State whose role I will mention later, and the Ambassadors overseas all are really wearing a second hat—a Presidential hat—in fulfilling this function.

The only activities excluded from this allocation of responsibility were those which are military and which the President as Commander-in-Chief directs through the channel of command reaching from the President through the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to our overseas commanders.

There had been considerable debate as to what should be understood by the term "interdepartmental activities." The following language was put into the NSAM which I believe expresses quite clearly what is intended: "Those activities which are internal to the execution and administration of approved programs of a single department or agency, and which are not of such a nature as to effect significantly the overall US overseas programs in a country or region, are not considered to be interdepartmental matters." The question arises as to who is going to make the determination of whether an activity is "interdepartmental." The answer is that it will be made by the so-called "executive chairman" about whom I am going to talk in a moment.

In order to assist the Secretary of State in discharging his responsibility, he has been given certain organisms to support him. The thought was to create in Washington at both the Assistant Secretary and at the Under Secretary level something analogous to the Ambassador and his Country Team so that each regional Assistant Secretary of State would have an interdepartmental committee called the Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG) and the Under Secretary of State would have the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) as interdepartmental agencies to assist these officials in discharging their interdepartmental responsibilities.

Now I shall talk only about the Senior Interdepartmental Group because the Interdepartmental Regional Groups are merely duplicates of the senior group. The language in setting up the so-called SIG, if we may use abbreviations, reads as follows: "To assist the Secretary of State in discharging his authority and responsibilities for the interdepartmental matters which cannot be dealt with adequately at lower levels or by presently established procedures, including those of the Intelligence Community, the Senior Interdepartmental Group is established." The membership of the SIG is identical with that of the old Standing Group which I have described above, with the exception that the "executive chairman" is the Under Secretary of State. Otherwise, we have as permanent members the same representation from State, Defense, JCS, AID, CIA, USIA. There was considerable debate during the circulation of the draft as to whether this permanent membership was adequate. Obviously other depart-

ments have very important overseas business which is often interdepartmental in nature. Take Treasury, for example, or Agriculture. But it was agreed after discussion that these departments do not have regular business and the assignment of a senior official as a permanent member of the SIG is hardly justified. However, the understanding was reached, and it is clear in the NSAM, that the Chairman of the SIG must look after the potential interests of other departments and invite them to provide membership when business affecting them is on the agenda. Furthermore, the head of any agency or department can ask for an item to be put on the agenda and, when that is the case, send a representative who has full rights of membership. Furthermore, the Senior Interdepartmental Group was made the successor to the Special Group for Counter-Insurgency which is now abolished and all the responsibilities established by NSAM-124 now pass to the jurisdiction of the SIG.

Now let me talk about the "Executive Chairman" role at the SIG and IRG levels. I would certainly not be particularly happy if the end product of the work I have been describing had simply been the creation of six additional Washington committees. Nothing could be more unpromising. But I harbor the hope that the curse of the committee system has been somewhat attenuated by several features which have been built into this new structure. First, as to the membership of the Groups, you can see by the composition of the SIG we have the top man or the number two man of all the major agencies of government regularly involved in overseas business. They must come to the conference table prepared to take a position on all items on the agenda and to commit their department or agency. Moreover, the membership is permanent and each one of these officials is expected to be present for meetings unless he is sick or out of town. Additionally, the Chairman is an "executive chairman." That title is defined as a chairman who has not only the authority but also the responsibility for settling any issue on the agenda of his committee. It means that, in the extreme case, he can have every member of his committee against him but he can say "Boys, this is the way it is going to be unless you utilize your right of appeal." In the latter case, any member can appeal the issue to the next higher authority. In the case of an appeal from the SIG, it would presumably be to the Secretary of State with the right to go beyond him to the President. In a case of an appeal from the Assistant Secretary level, it would be to the SIG. So we have an echelonment of tribunals to which an appeal can be carried. I sincerely believe that with chairmen with that kind of authority many of the delays and compromises which frequently creep into committee business can be avoided.

Let me sum up now what the advantages appear to be in this new arrangement. I feel that, for the first time, we have fixed responsibility for overall managerial guidance and direction of our business overseas. The Secretary of State is responsible, acting for the President. Next I feel that there has been a clarification of relationships. There is no doubt now who is in charge, whence the direction comes and who must be consulted. A very important advantage, I would think, is that we now have several recognized forums in Washington where we should be able to get interdepartmental decisions rapidly. Virtually any senior official can utilize the mechanism either at the Assistant Secretary level or at the Under Secretary level to get his business considered and decided. One of my problems as a military official used to be, and I am sure the problem is common in every

other department in Washington, to get the military voice heard in conference early enough to be effective. Now we have these forums in regular session where it should be easy to inject the views of each of the interested agencies in the early phases of discussion before decisions have been reached. I would think that this would be a great advantage to all participants in interdepartmental business overseas.

I might say, at this time, that in clearing this proposal about town I had anticipated considerable difficulty in obtaining concurrences. To my surprise, I found almost no difficulty. I found that almost every senior official in Washington was most happy to have the Secretary of State given this clear authority. Hence, I am convinced that, at the top level, State will get nothing but cooperation in discharging this added responsibility. As I made my rounds, there was, of course, a very close examination of the fine print in the language of the NSAM. But insofar as the principle was concerned, no opposition whatsoever was raised.

I think this is good news because as we all know organizational changes in themselves have minimal value. I have often said that good organization simply allows good men to do their work better. If, indeed, this is a sound organization, it still will not contribute significantly unless it is accepted happily by the participating agencies—which I believe is the case at this moment. Next, it is essential that all agencies put in first class players to fill the key slots. This organization will never be any better than the quality of the men who are given the key assignments.

A final advantage which I think I see in this arrangement is the possibility of coping better with the problems of what has been called the growing multipolarity of power. In recent years many of us would say, I believe, that our bi-polar confrontation with the Sino-Soviet Bloc has ceased to be our sole important preoccupation in international affairs. Instead, we have a diversity of problems in many quarters. There are many troublemakers creating for us many trouble spots around the world. We need built into our executive organization a system which will assure us of watchful eyes looking constantly in all directions and giving warning before we are surprised. Uncle Sam can no longer afford to be a one-eyed Cyclops able to focus attention in only one direction but must have an Argus-eyed capacity to survey the entire international scene. I believe that this organization we have discussed will contribute to that capability for vigilance.

Before I sit down, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to record my feeling this decision of the President recorded in NSAM-341 is a tremendous challenge to the Foreign Service and to the Department of State. As a complete outsider, I obviously had personal bias in this matter but felt that it was the obvious solution which should be given a thorough trial. But it means that State has to perform up to the challenge. You will have to put your best players into the key slots for, in due course, I am sure there will be a review made of what has been accomplished under this system. If, as I hope, performance justifies the concentration of responsibility and authority in State, we are on the right track and a longstanding deficiency in our Federal system has been corrected. If not, the only answer will be to review the decision and find another solution. I have all confidence in my mind that I have before me here many of the men and women who are going to make this system work.



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