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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	NSAM 348 <i>sanitized 9-9-93 NLS 93-65</i> TS 1 p <i>open 12-16-97</i>	5/30/66	A
#2 memo	Duplicate of #1		
#3 memo	Read to Rostow TS 1 p <i>sanitized 2-27-04 NW 03-12</i>	5/17/66	A
#4 memo	Rostow to President, 4:30 p.m. TS 2 p	5/27/66	A
#4a memo <i>el. imp 8-21-03</i> <i>NLS 03-15</i>	Intelligence Memorandum TS- 6 p <i>open 2-3-04 NW/PAC 03-8</i>	10/22/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSAM, NSAM 348

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 30, 1966

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
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 348

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Alternatives to US Facilities in Pakistan

I have reviewed your 22 October 1965 Memorandum to me in response to NSAM 337 as updated by the Department of State's 17 May 1966 Memorandum to Mr. Rostow and by my approval on 23 May of the new military sales package for Iran.

I approve your recommendations as updated subject to the usual review by the Bureau of the Budget before expenditures are authorized.



cc: Director, Bureau of the Budget

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By ty NARA, Date 12-16-95

Dispatched 5/30/66 -- Rcpts nos. 171-174

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 30, 1966

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
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

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May 17, 1966

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE


SUBJECT: NSAM 337

1. Pursuant to your recent conversation with Mr. Handley, the Department of State has reviewed with representatives of Defense and CIA the October 22, 1965 memorandum for the President from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence. It is the coordinated view of the three agencies that the basic conclusions of the memorandum continue to be valid, i.e., that it remains in the U.S. interest to develop alternatives to U.S. facilities in Pakistan and that measures toward that end are feasible.

2. The passage of time, however, has necessitated certain changes in specific recommendations:

a. Recommendation 1 (e) should be deleted.

3.3
(b)(1,6)



b. Paragraph 5 is not applicable to the current situation. Negotiations are now underway with the Government of Pakistan for reopening several of the smaller facilities.

3. The agencies concerned propose that we now proceed on the basis of the October 22, 1965 memorandum, revised as indicated above.

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-12
By us, NARA, Date 2-13-04

John P. Walsh
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONFriday, May 27, 1966
4:30 p. m.

Rec'd 6:43 p

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In November you tentatively approved a recommendation from Sect. Rusk, McNamara and Raborn for establishing contingency alternatives for our intelligence facilities in Pakistan. But you felt we ought to hold final decision until after you talked with Ayub. Then we held further until after Tashkent and the Indian visit.

Now State, Defense and CIA have reviewed their October recommendations and (with minor updating) feel we should go ahead. They emphasize that this is not a proposal to relocate most of the present activities from Pakistan or to duplicate them. They propose to develop minimum space and install basic equipment so we can diversify some of these activities and be in a position to move them all on short notice with little intelligence loss if need be.

3.4(b)(1) To refresh your memory, they recommended we: (a) increase existing [redacted] facilities in Embassies Tehran and New Delhi; (b) add one floor to a planned warehouse in the embassy compound in Tehran; (c) acquire land outside Tehran for eventually developing a more satisfactory permanent installation (including dependent quarters) if needed; and (d) explore the possibility of developing facilities in India.

Costs of (a) and (b) would be about \$1.5 million; time about 9 months. Cost of (c) is approximately \$5 million with eventual cost depending on how extensively we develop that site; time about 18 months. Cost of (d) is uncertain until we have a concrete plan but less than the \$8-36 million they projected last fall when they suggested shipborne coverage in the Bay of Bengal (which did not prove out in a later test).

As general guidelines, they recommend (a) no further investment in Pakistan; (b) as new facilities come into being, we transfer some of those now in Pakistan to reduce the leverage any one country holds over us; but (c) unless you decide otherwise or the Paks kick us out, we retain a substantial portion of our present Pak activities.

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5NLJ/RAE 03-8 and FRUS, vol. xxv,
Sp. Asia # 340
By iss, NARA. Date 1-6-04~~TOP SECRET~~
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- 2 -

They also recommended certain sweeteners for Iran to develop the favorable political climate essential to expansion. Your recent approval of the new military sales package has brought those up to date.

The balance of payments impact would be minimal; all equipment would be US-built. One-time real estate and construction costs would be about \$6 million, and annual recurring costs about \$750,000 (much of which would be offset by reduction of Pak facilities).

I believe it makes sense to go ahead with this program now. Since we no longer have the kind of close relationship with Pakistan we had prior to the Chinese attack on India, we would be well to reinsure.

If you still approve, I recommend you sign the attached.

W. W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow

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