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National Security File, NSAM File, NSAM 351

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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6-11-66

Thelma--Carole

Mr. Smith asked me to call and
I contacted OSD, ACDA, Mr. Wriggins
and Ed Roberts to mark their copies
EXDIS. ~~Mr. Johnson's office must~~
~~be contacted Monday.~~ *done*

ed

29

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1a

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 9, 1966
6:00 p. m.

Rec'd
6:11 pm

Mr. President:

For your approval.

This National Security Action Memo-
randum instructs the Secretary of
State to produce by July 15 specific
recommendations for your considera-
tion as to how to deal with the Indian
nuclear weapons problem. The
NSAM reflects the discussion in this
morning's Council meeting.

4

W. Rostow

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Authority NLS 87-100
By DCH, NARA, Date 4-12-90

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EXDIS

SECRET

June 10, 1966

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 351

TO: The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem

At the meeting of the National Security Council on June 9, 1966, the President noted the increased urgency of dealing with the Indian nuclear weapons problem following the third Chinese Communist nuclear test. He has directed the Secretary of State, in collaboration with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and heads of other departments and agencies, as appropriate, to study in greater depth the following interrelated issues emerging from the National Security Council review of the Indian nuclear weapons question:

- a. The extent to which it might be in the U.S. interest to use our economic leverage more explicitly to discourage an Indian national nuclear program.
- b. The effect which various arms control agreements might have on Indian nuclear intentions, and what price the U.S. should be prepared to pay for such agreements.
- c. How far it is in the U.S. interest to go in meeting Indian security concerns, what form such action might take, and what the optimum timing might be.
- d. Whether there are other approaches to the problem which need to be pursued.

The study should balance the price of each of these suggested courses of action against the damage resulting from India's choosing the independent nuclear path. For the purpose of this study, no change in our present position on a non-proliferation treaty should be assumed.

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~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

The study should result in specific recommendations to the President as to measures which the U.S., in its own interest, should take to delay or prevent India's choosing that path.

The President requests that the first report of recommendations for his attention be presented to him no later than July 15, 1966.

W W Rostow

W. W. Rostow

Information copies:

Secretary of Defense
Director, ACDA

Wriggins
C.E. *Johnson*
NSC Files
Helms, CIA 7/8/66

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

File

lc

~~SECRET~~

June 9, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Attached is an NSAM for the President's ¹⁵¹signature. ^{approval} The date of completion has been moved to July 15.

The effort has been to make clear that the study called for concerns the Indian problem. The reply to Foster's pitch at the meeting is that he and his committee of principals should continue their work on general recommendations, but that the Indian study will be carried on as provided in the NSAM. In the event that committee of principals reach agreement on recommendations to the President, and the President approves them, his decisions would of course be taken into account in the separate Indian study.

BKS

Bromley Smith

~~SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-252
By *ics*, NARA Date 6-9-98

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Thursday, June 9, 1966

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Mr. President:

For your approval.

This National Security Action Memorandum instructs the Secretary of State to produce by July 15 specific recommendations for your consideration as to how to deal with the Indian nuclear weapons problem. The NSAM reflects the discussion in this morning's Council meeting.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

approve 6/10/66

disapprove

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Authority NLS 87-100

By DCH, NARA, Date 4-12-70

2a

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 351

TO: The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem

At the meeting of the National Security Council on June 9, 1966, the President noted the increased urgency of dealing with the Indian nuclear weapons problem following the third Chinese Communist nuclear test. He has directed the Secretary of State, in collaboration with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and heads of other departments and agencies, as appropriate, to study in greater depth the following interrelated issues emerging from the National Security Council review of the Indian nuclear weapons question:

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By DUS, NARA, Date 4-17-90 ~~SECRET~~

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- 2 -

The study should result in specific recommendations to the President as to measures which the U.S., in its own interest, should take to delay or prevent India's choosing that path.

The President requests that the first report of recommendations for his attention be presented to him no later than July 15, 1966.

W. W. Rostow

Information copies:
Secretary of Defense
Director, ACDA

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~~DRAFT 6/8/66~~

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SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 351

TO: The Secretary of State
~~The Secretary of Defense~~
~~The Director, Arms Control & Disarmament Agency~~

SUBJECT: Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem

At the meeting of the National Security Council on June 9, 1966, the President noted the increased urgency of dealing with the Indian nuclear weapons problem following the third Chinese Communist nuclear test. He has directed the Secretary of State, in collaboration with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Arms Control & Disarmament Agency and heads of other departments and agencies as appropriate, to study in greater depth the following inter-related issues, emerging from the National Security Council review of the Indian nuclear weapons question:

- a. The extent to which it might be in the U. S. interest to use our economic leverage more explicitly to discourage an Indian national nuclear program.
- b. The effect which various arms control agreements might have on Indian nuclear intentions, and what price the U. S. should be prepared to pay for such agreements.
- c. How far it is in the U. S. interest to go in meeting Indian security concerns, what form such action might take, and what the optimum timing might be.

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Authority NLS 87-100

By DA, NARA, Date 4-17-90

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- 2 -

d. Whether there are other approaches to the problem which need to be pursued.

The
Such study should balance the price of each of these suggested courses of action against the damage resulting from India's choosing the independent nuclear path. For the purpose of this study, no change in our present position on a non-proliferation treaty should be assumed.

The *result in*
Such study should ~~thus provide a basis for deciding whether there are~~ specific recommendations ~~that can be made to the President as to measures~~ which the U. S. *in* its own interests ~~in mind~~, should take to delay or prevent India's choosing that path.

The President requests that the first report of recommendations for his attention be presented to him no later than *July* ~~July~~ 15, 1966.

W. W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow

Info *See Ref*
Dir *BCDA*

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