

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 list	list of meetings <i>open 9-21-99 NLJ 95-27</i> S 2 pp.	9/29/69	A
#2 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 11/23/63 S 2 pp. <i>open 4-20-94 per E93-0417, CIA 4-1-94/hr.</i>	11/25/63	A
#3 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 11/24/63 S 1 p. <i>OPEN 2-26-98 JFK 177-10001-10471</i>	11/26/63	A
#4 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 11/24/63 S 3 pp. [SANITIZED NLJ 84-36] <i>open 4-20-94 per E93-0417, CIA 4-1-94/hr.</i>	11/25/63	A
#5 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 11/25-26/63 S 2 pp. <i>open 8-9-95 NLJ 93-327</i>	11/26/63	A
#6 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 11/28/63 TS 2 pp. <i>open 6-9-94 NLJ 93-329</i>	11/29/63	A
#7 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 11/28/63 TS 3 pp. <i>Sanitized 6-9-94 NLJ 93-329</i> <b>SANITIZED 4-21-98 JFK BOARD</b> <i>same sanit per RAC 8/02</i>	11/29/63	A
#8 memo <i>more info released 6-6-03 NLJ/RAC 01-17</i>	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 11/29/63 TS 3 pp. <i>Sanitized 9-21-99 NLJ 95-27</i>	11/29/63	A
#9 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 11/30/63 <i>open 2/1/10</i> TS 3 pp. <i>Sanitized 8-9-95 NLJ 93-327</i> <i>Downgraded to "Conf" per NLJ 93-327</i> <b>SANITIZED 4-20-98 JFK BOARD</b>	12/2/63	A
#10 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 11/30/63 TS 2 pp. <i>open 9-21-99 NLJ 95-27</i>	12/2/63	A
#11 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 12/1/63 <i>OPEN</i> TS 1 p. <i>Sanitized 8-9-95 NLJ 93-327 2-26-98</i> <i>Downgraded to "Conf" per NLJ 93-327</i> <b>JFK 177-10001-10474</b>	12/3/63	A
#12 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 12/2/63 TS 3 pp. <i>Sanitized 6-9-94 NLJ 93-329</i> ; <i>same sanit per RAC 5/03</i>	12/3/63	A
#13 memo <i>same sanitization 6-3-03 NLJ/RAC 01-17</i>	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 12/4/63 S 1 p. <i>Sanitized 9-21-99 NLJ 95-27</i> <i>NLJ 045-001-1 (5/02)</i>	12/6/63	A
#14 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 12/6/63 S 3 pp. <i>Sanitized 8-9-95 NLJ 93-327</i> <b>SANITIZED 4-21-98 JFK BOARD</b>	12/6/63	A
#15 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 12/7/63 S 2 pp. <i>OPEN 2-26-98 JFK 177-10001-10476</i>	12/9/63	A

FILE LOCATION

John McCone Memoranda, Meetings with the President, "23 November 1963 - 27 December 1963," Box 1

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#16 memo same sanitization 66-03 NW/RAC 01-17	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 12/9/63 S 2 pp. <del>Sanitized 9-21-99 NLS 95-27</del> open	<del>12/9/63</del> 2/1/10	<del>A</del>
#17 memo same sanitization 66-03 NW/RAC 01-17	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 12/13/63 S 2 pp. <del>Sanitized 9-21-99 NLS 95-27</del>	12/13/63	A
#18 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 12/21/63 S 1 p. open 6-9-94 NLS 93-329	<del>12/22/63</del>	<del>A</del>
#19 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 12/19/63 <del>sanitized 9-25-97 NLS 93-332</del> S 1 p. OPEN 34-98 JFK 177-10001-10477	<del>12/19/63</del>	<del>A</del>
#19a memo more info released 66-03 NW/RAC 01-17	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 12/19/63 S 4 pp. <del>Sanitized 9-25-97 NLS 93-332</del> (-same sani 8/27/05 NLS 05-88)	12/19/63	A
#20 memo more info released 66-03 NW/RAC 01-17	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 12/27/63 TS 9 pp. <del>Sanitized 9-25-97 NLS 93-332</del>	12/29/63	A

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Sent to Mr. Jorden on 29 August '69

Memoranda of Mr. McCone's Meetings with the President

28. 23 November 1963 - Briefing of President Johnson. Introductory, assassination.
29. 24 November 1963 - Briefing of LBJ. Checklist review.
30. 24 November 1963 - Meeting of LBJ, Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Bundy, Lodge, DCI, on Vietnam.
31. 25 & 26 November 1963 - Briefings of LBJ. Checklist review.
32. 28 November 1963 - Discussion. Lodge.
33. 28 November 1963 - Briefing. Check list review.
34. 29 November 1963 - Meeting of LBJ, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy and DCI on A-12 aircraft.
35. 30 November 1963 - Briefing. General review.
36. 30 November 1963 - Discussion. Personnel changes.
37. 1 December 1963 - Briefing. General review.
38. 2 December 1963 - Briefing. Checklist review. Press, McNamara, Vietnam.
39. 4 December 1963 - RFE.
40. 6 December 1963 - Meeting of LBJ, Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, W. Bundy, McBundy on MLF. LBJ, Bundy, DCI on checklist review, COS, Saigon.
41. 7 December 1963 - Discussion on Vietnam, Robert Kennedy, Eisenhower, Alliance for Progress, role of DCI.
42. 9 December 1963 - Briefing.
43. 13 December 1963 - Introduced DDCI, Peer de Silva, reviewed checklist. Discussed Soviet economy, Robert Kennedy.
44. 21 December 1963 - Meeting with LBJ, McNamara, Rusk, Ball, Harriman, Bundy, DCI. Report on trip to South Vietnam, Lodge.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 2.6

REF 95-27

By Cb, NARA Date 8-26-99

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- 45. 19 December 1963 - Meeting of LBJ, DDCI, and many others on Cuba.
- 46. 27 December 1963 - Discussions at LBJ ranch. Role of DCI, Cyprus, Yemen, Vietnam, Communist economies, Cuba, budget, heads of state briefing.

~~SECRET~~



## DECLASSIFIED

Authority E93-0417, CIA 4/V94/1r.By fw, NARA, Date 4-18-94

25 November 1963

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with President Johnson, November 23rd, about 9:15 a.m. The conversation lasted approximately 15 minutes.

1. The President entered Mr. Bundy's office alone and no one was present during the conversation.
2. The President opened the conversation by recalling a long background of association and friendship with me personally, his respect for the Agency, the fact that on a number of issues that had arisen since I took office as DCI he and I had seen eye to eye, he had complete confidence in me and expressed the wish that I continue in the future exactly as I have in the past.
3. I confirmed my confidence in him, my desire to help and support him in every way and my willingness to continue in the future as I have in recent months.
4. The President then asked of any world developments. I reviewed details of the Checklist with him and explained the institution of the "President's Checklist" with which he was not familiar. I stated that we would continue the publication of the Checklist in the future as we had in the past.
5. It was agreed that for the next few days I would brief the President in the morning personally and that senior staff officers would brief the President's staff each morning as I have in the past. The President asked that any matters of urgent importance be brought to his attention at any time, day or night. He designated no intermediary.

6. At 12:30 I went to the President's office in the Executive Office Building to tell him of the information received from Mexico City. In attendance was Mr. Bundy. Following this I had a brief exchange with President Eisenhower who was visiting with President Johnson at the time.

7. This evening I called Secretary Rusk and reviewed with him the information received from Mexico City, most particularly the holding of a Mexican employee of the Cuban Embassy by Mexican officials for interrogation concerning Lee Oswald. I explained to Rusk the information that we had transmitted to the FBI and to the authorities in Dallas. Rusk had not known of these developments prior to my communication with him.

8. I offered the assistance on the part of Mrs. McCone and me personally and also the Agency in connection with the appropriate handling of official visitors arriving from all over the world who might overwhelm the State Department's capacity. Rusk appreciated this offer and said he would call on me. He further said that there may be visitors we would like to meet with and, if so, he would make appropriate arrangements. He indicated that he intended to avoid having all incoming visitors appear as guests of the United States. Each had their own embassy to take care of them, however, he thought there might be some obligations in which I could be helpful. He said that following the Arlington service on Monday afternoon he would hold a reception in the Department which would be in the form of some kind of a buffet and this would be the extent of any planned activities. He thought it was quite probable that the President would meet with several Heads of States at various times on Tuesday and Wednesday.

JAM:mcm  
(tape)



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

26 November 1963

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with President Johnson - Sunday,  
November 24th at 10:00 a. m.

I briefed President Johnson at his residence at 10:00 a. m. Briefing consumed approximately 20 minutes. Reviewed the Checklist and I made the following points:

1. I explained the space event. Soviet ships are in place which would indicate a long range ICBM test. However, the ranges are not up, the area is not cleared and therefore the possibility is that a planned ICBM or Lunar shot has been deferred.
2. I stated I felt the President should, at an early opportunity, receive a briefing on Soviet long range defensive capability, their current air defense capability and the status of the Soviet economy.
3. I referred briefly to our estimate of the Cuban situation, the condition of their economy and our operational plans against Cuba.
4. I stated that we are watching Venezuela and Ecuador with great care. I gave the President a copy of the November 24th Summary of World Reaction to President Kennedy's Assassination.

JAM:mcm

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Authority SFK #177-10001-10471By ju, NARA, Date 2-26-98~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

25 November 1963

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: South Vietnam Situation

ATTENDANCE: The President, Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, Ball,  
Messrs. Bundy and McCone, Ambassador Lodge  
November 24th, 3:00 p.m. - Executive Office Bldg.

1. Ambassador Lodge reported that the change in government had been an improvement, that he was hopeful over the outlook, that he expected a speedup of the war, he thought by February or March we would see marked progress. Lodge stated that we were not involved in the coup, though we put pressures on the South Vietnamese government to change its course and those pressures, most particularly on indications of withdrawal by 1965, encouraged the coup. Lodge stated that there were indications that North Vietnam might be interested in arrangements which would be of a nature satisfactory to us. He did not elaborate. He <sup>thought</sup> that that everybody was very happy after the coup and showed some pictures of the crowds in Saigon. He mentioned that Gen. Don would be here and that those talking with him should influence him to put on all the pressure he could. He spoke most highly of the Papal delegate and his intention to see the Pope on Wednesday. He carried with him a letter from the Papal Delegate and also from the Bishop of Saigon, apparently praising the actions in upsetting the Diem government. Lodge said he saw dangers of an anti-Christian move and this was his purpose in seeing the Pope. He made a point that Bishop Thuc had engaged in serious persecutions involving the imprisonment of a great many people, including three Catholic priests. He also made the point that Can, Diem's brother, also engaged in a variety of activities of persecution and the execution of individuals and that Can had, on his own premises, a burial ground for his victims. Lodge said that we were in no way responsible for the death of Diem and Nhu, that had they followed his advice, they would be alive today. He said that he saved Can from assassination and that Bishop Thuc was out of Saigon under orders from the Papal delegate. (Note: I question whether the Papal delegate can order a Bishop out of a country.) The tone of Ambassador Lodge's statements were optimistic, hopeful, and left the President with the impression that we are on the road to victory.

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Authority E93-0417, CIA 4/19/94 (hr)By JW, NARA, Date 4-18-94



At this point McCone stated that our estimate of the situation was somewhat more serious. We had noted a continuing increase in Viet Cong activity since the first of November as evidenced by a larger number of Viet Cong attacks. We also noticed with considerable concern a high level of message volume on the Viet Cong military and political networks and this might quite possibly reflect preparations for further sustained guerrilla pressures. Furthermore I stated that the military were having considerable trouble in completing the political organization of the government and were receiving little if any help from civilian leadership. Indeed it seemed to us that the competent civilians were staying on the sidelines and continuing their traditional role of critics rather than turning in and being helpful. I concluded by stating that we could not at this point or time give a particularly optimistic appraisal of the future.

The President then stated that he approached the situation with some misgivings. He noted that a great many people throughout the country questioned our course of action in supporting the overthrow of the Diem regime. He also noted that strong voices in the Congress felt we should get out of Vietnam. Both of these facts give the President considerable concern. He stated that he was not at all sure that we took the right course in upsetting the Diem regime but this was a decision that he did not have to make as it was a fait accompli. He said now that it was done, we have to see that our objectives were accomplished. (Note: The inferences were that, left to his own devices, he would not have supported the courses of action which led to the coup.)

The President then stated he has never been happy with our operations in Vietnam. He said there had been serious dissension and divisions within the American community and he told the Ambassador that he was in total charge and he wanted the situation cleaned up. He wanted no more divisions of opinion, no more bickering and any person that did not conform to policy should be removed. At this point Mr. Bundy stated that we were searching for a replacement for Truehart and what we wanted was a capable administrator who could run the Country Team. The President again repeated his insistence that the Ambassador was the Number One man and he, the President, was holding the Ambassador personally responsible.

Secretary McNamara stated that he had examined the economic situation and that he felt we must give generously of economic aid and must not ask the South Vietnamese government to do the impossible at this particular time.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President then said that he supported this, but at the same time he wanted to make it abundantly clear that he did not think we had to reform every Asian into our own image. He said that he felt all too often when we engaged in the affairs of a foreign country we wanted to immediately transform that country into our image and this, in his opinion, was a mistake. He was anxious to get along, win the war - he didn't want as much effort placed on so-called social reforms.

Note: I received in this meeting the first "President Johnson tone" for action as contrasted with the "Kennedy tone". Johnson definitely feels that we place too much emphasis on social reforms; he has very little tolerance with our spending so much time being "do-gooders"; and he has no tolerance whatsoever with bickering and quarreling of the type that has gone on in South Vietnam.

The meeting was followed by a statement to the press which was given out by Bundy to the effect that we would pursue the policies agreed to in Honolulu adopted by the late President Kennedy. A picture was taken of the President with Lodge, McNamara, Rusk and Ball.

JAM (tape)/mfb

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-327

By ing, NARA, Date 7-21-95

26 November 1963

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with The President - 25 November and 26 November

1. On Monday, November 25th, there was no briefing of the President, although there was a short visit with him at the State reception on Monday evening. The President then expressed regret that events of the day prevented a briefing and asked if there was any development requiring his attention. I replied there was none and would call him if any developments came to my attention.

2. On Tuesday, the 26th, I briefed the President, reviewing all items on the Check List and the world reaction summary contained in the Bulletin. Briefing and discussion on other matters consumed about 15 or 20 minutes.

3. The President asked if our entire applicable resources had been made available to the FBI in connection with their report, which he had ordered. I replied affirmatively.

NOTE: I should call J. Edgar Hoover concerning this.  
(DCI did this at 11:20 on 11/26/63)

4. The President asked my appraisal of the situation in Vietnam. I replied that I was less optimistic than was the report received from Ambassador Lodge.

5. Mr. Bundy stated the first order of business was to assist State and assign a Deputy Chief of Mission capable of running the Country Team and the American official community. Bundy recommended Mr. Sullivan, Harriman's deputy. The President plans to have a man in position not later than January first.

6. McCone stated that there remained a number of individuals in Saigon who continued to be troublemakers and should be removed. Bundy confirmed this and stated actions were to be taken. No names were mentioned.

NOTE: Apparently the President's appointment secretary will be a Mr. Moyrs. We should get to know him.

1  
Exempt from automatic downgrading and declassification

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

7. The President noted with some considerable contempt the fact that certain people in the Department of Justice had suggested to him on Saturday that an independent investigation of the President's assassination should be conducted by a high level group of attorneys and jurists, probably headed by Governor Dewey. President Johnson rejected this idea, and then heard that the identical plan was to be advanced in a lead editorial in the Washington Post. The President felt this was a deliberate plant and he was exceedingly critical. He personally intervened, but failed with Mr. Al Friendly and finally "killed" the editorial with Mrs. Graham.

JAM/TMLee/mfb

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 93-329

29 November 1963

By           , NARA, Date 5-24-94MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD--  
EYES ONLY--NO DISTRIBUTIONSUBJECT: Discussion with President Johnson, 28 November 1963,  
10:00 a. m.

1. The President was most vehement in his views on Ambassador Lodge. He said in the most emphatic way that he felt the appointment of Lodge was a serious mistake; that he had opposed it; couldn't conceive of the reasons why it was made; that Lodge had made a great blunder in disposing of Diem. He, Johnson, had greatly preferred that we continue the Diem regime, persuade them to straighten out their ways, rather than replace them. He felt this blunder would cost us <sup>our</sup> ~~an~~ opposition in South Vietnam. He could not understand Lodge's running over to see the Pope, and then asked me who would be a good man to run the show in South Vietnam and what was the outlook. In this connection I think that we -- anticipating a probable change there and the fact that Lodge is hanging all of his decisions on the Saturday afternoon cable #243 -- should have compiled a chronology of Lodge's position from August 22nd on.

2. The President then stated that he had the greatest confidence in me personally. He recalled the background for our relationship through the years and also the fact that on several important issues which have come up since my assuming the position of DCI that he had forced me to express myself on policy and noted that he approved of the positions I took on various matters. He said that he felt my work in intelligence was of greatest importance, but he did not wish me to confine myself to this role. He said that he had observed that I had rather carefully avoided expressing myself on policy or suggesting courses of action and he suggested that it might be for interdepartmental reasons that I would wish to continue to do this in meetings (which he felt was a mistake), but nevertheless he invited and would welcome my coming to him from time to time with suggestions of courses of action on policy matters which, in my opinion, were wise even though

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TOP SECRET

they were not consistent with advice he was receiving from responsible people. He said he was not satisfied with the advice he was getting from many quarters and he noted that in issues such as nuclear testing, the disarmament test ban, discussions on Cuba and South Vietnam that he, McCloy and I had always been very close together, with Dillon for the most part conforming to our views, but more often than not these views differed in degree from those of a great many others who are in the Administration. In this context he did not mention Mr. Bundy, however, on other occasions he had expressed confidence in Bundy.

3. I received the definite impression from this discussion that the President would move rather rapidly on the role of advisers and some of his Cabinet members as he is not at all happy with a great many of them. I think the same might be expected of some of his ambassadors.

JAM:mfb/mcm (tape)



29 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting at his residence with President Johnson  
10:00 a.m. - Thursday - November 28th.  
for approximately 30 minutes

1. The President reviewed the Checklist and made the following comments:

[24] a. Are we doing all possible to keep Venezuelan authorities informed? I reviewed briefly our [redacted] and our activities.

b. What is the real future in South Vietnam? The President expressed the desire for an objective appraisal and any recommendations that I might have for modification of policy, changes of personnel and draw up a rough estimate of what is the outlook. The President continues to be concerned over public reaction and Congressional reaction against our activities in South Vietnam. The President is obviously opposed to Lodge (his opposition goes back to conflicts in the Senate). He asked for recommendations as to who would be a good man and who could run the American team.

He noted Item b. in the Check list and I pointed out the press exaggeration and distortion which appeared in the New York Times. He asked that I personally meet with the head of the Times in New York, pointing out how such distorted reports seriously damage the American interests. I stated that I would do this.

We discussed Item 2.f. having to do with the high level of communications traffic and I stated that this could be considered as an unfavorable indicator.

The President noted without comment report on Israel, USSR, India military aid and Burma.

c. The President asked what the outlook was with Greece. I told him that we expected that Karamanlis would eventually be restored to power. The President stated that he had vigorously opposed our

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Authority JFC#177-10001-10472

By fw, NARA, Date 4-21-98

withdrawal of assistance to Karamanlis, which he felt had a great deal to do with his loss of office.

d. I pointed out to the President that we could expect some trouble in Brazil.

e. The President asked about the future of Prime Minister Inonu of Turkey. I stated that we expected that his government would fall and that he would lose office soon after his return.

f. I repeated to the President briefly my meeting with President Macapagal which is covered in a separate memorandum prepared by Mr. Colby.

[24] g. Also I raised the question of the importance of our taking initiative in the Indonesia matter [redacted] We might bring Indonesia round and also straighten out the Malaysia problem.

2. The President then turned to Cuba. He asked how effective our policy was and what was the future of Cuba. He asked how effective the economic denial program was and how we planned to dispose of Castro. He said he did not wish any repetition of any fiasco of 1961, but he felt that the Cuban situation was one that we could not live with and we had to evolve more aggressive policies. He looks to us for firm recommendations. In this connection we should prepare a briefing and also we should study carefully various courses of action.

3. The President then raised the question of the deal between the Rumanian government and the Ferguson company for the procurement of a steel mill and asked whether I thought this was a good thing. I replied affirmatively, stating that in my opinion economic relations with the satellites would tend to break down the closeness of ties between the satellites in Moscow and this should be a very definite policy effort on our part. I noted that Moscow had discouraged the Rumanian steel mill because it did not fit into their pattern of economic integration of the satellites and the Soviet Union. The President then stated that he agreed that we should attempt to pull the satellites away. He then brought up the question of Tito and asked if I could give him the name of the best man who could serve as Ambassador to Yugoslavia who would be able to "win the girl away from Khrushchev." He said that in his opinion this man should be an experienced, able man, perhaps in his 50's and preferably a Republican, who could carry the confidence of the Republicans and a personality who could win Tito's confidence and allegiance. I responded by stating that I would prepare a list of competent people who I felt could



serve in this capacity and also in others. In this connection, the President stated that he was not satisfied with the Ambassador-elect to Yugoslavia and had therefore held up the appointment. His request for help and the suggestion of names in connection with Yugoslavia and the satellites is along the same line as to who would be a good representative in South Vietnam.

4. The President asked concerning our relationships on the Hill. I said that they were excellent. The only problem was a continual harangue for a Joint Committee on Intelligence. I said that I felt that if Senator Russell would expand his Committee to include Fulbright and Hickenlooper, and Vinson expand his Committee to include two members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, that the issue would be put to rest. The President said he thought this was a good idea and that he would speak to both Fulbright and Russell about it.

5. I then reviewed the brochure on the OXCART by giving the President a broad picture of this development. I explained that surfacing of it was a problem which had been under consideration by Defense and CIA which I had discussed with President Kennedy. I said that McNamara was pressing for a rather early release but that President Kennedy felt that the timing of the surfacing was of very great importance. I said that I felt that the timing was even of greater importance now and I had some reservations about surfacing this vehicle in the first few days of President Johnson's administration. The President seemed to agree and suggested that McNamara, Rusk, Bundy and I meet with him on Friday for a discussion of this problem.

No arrangements were made as to the time of Friday morning's briefing.

JAM/mfb (tape)

DSCI/HK 8

29 November 1963

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. Bundy and DCI

RE : Surfacing the OXCART

3.4(b)(1) I opened the meeting by advising the President that the OXCART program started as a further development of a Mach 3 plus reconnaissance plane which could fly any place in the world with aerial refueling [redacted] [redacted] The original program called for ten A-12 reconnaissance planes, all of which <sup>are</sup> now in being and one lost in a crash.

In addition the Air Force were procuring through CIA 5 reconnaissance versions, 3 long-range interceptors which involved a modification (2-seater versus 1-seater), and a total of 31 reconnaissance bombers.

I stated two of the interceptors were operational, a third would be operational shortly and three of the Air Force reconnaissance planes would be delivered shortly. Then there would be a hiatus of several months because two Air Force reconnaissance planes were modified for a special purpose (details not discussed) and the 31 reconnaissance bomber versions involved substantial modification.

The development and the CIA and Air Force reconnaissance planes (15 in number) would cost about \$700 million, of which about \$400 million have now been spent and I had been advised by Secretary McNamara that the entire program of 49 aircraft would cost about \$2 billion.

I pointed out to the President and radar cross-sections features of the plane through which we hoped to make the plane "invisible" to Soviet radar. This has been successful inasmuch as the radar cross-section was in the order of 1/1000 of normal (such as a B-52), but that we also knew of advances in the Soviet radar capability and therefore felt that this plane could probably be detected but we had not concluded as yet that the Soviet SAMS could actually intercept the plane.

NOTE: In a preliminary discussion prior to meeting with the President, McNamara stated that the A-12 could be

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 01-17  
By cbm, NARA, Date 2-28-03

cc - Dr. Wilson

~~TOP SECRET~~



detected by the ChiCom SAM radars. I questioned whether this was true, stating I had been informed that the early warning Fan Song radar would have to make the initial detection and then alert the SAM site radar so that they could pick up the plane as it approached. I would like to know what is correct in this regard.

I then stated that the question of surfacing was raised for three reasons:

1. Crash of a plane might bring public notice.
2. Visibility of the program as flying increased and the military versions came into being.
3. Concern that technology developed would give Lockheed and Pratt and Whitney a special position on the SST which would be unfair to other contractors.

I recommended that:

1. DoD and CIA agree on a statement that would be valid to cover:
  - a. Leaks
  - b. A crash
  - c. An executive decision to surface
2. That we not surface for the foreseeable future as doing so was not strictly necessary and would expose an intelligence resource and had some political implications.
3. I arranged to brief selected individuals of companies actually active in the SST program so that they will not be in a disadvantageous position.

The President then requested Secretary Rusk's views, who responded that there was no foreign policy problem but that he felt that if we were to surface, advance information of 2 or 3 days should be given to certain foreign countries such as England, Germany, France, Japan, Australia, etc. In balance Rusk thought it better to make an advance release as a direct policy decision rather than be forced to make an announcement because of a crash or a leak.

3.4(b)(1) The President requested McNamara's views, who strongly urged that we surface in the immediate future. He stated he could not see how the reconnaissance capability of CIA would be impaired as we would maintain our fleet of planes and our operations intact [redacted] He noted that increased flying, more planes, a higher rate of expenditure (and he repeated the \$2 billion figure of which about \$400 million is spent), all made it virtually impossible to maintain the same secrecy in the future that we have maintained in the past. Moreover, if he could present the bomber version to Congress, he could eliminate a great deal of criticism, could cut out at least one B-70, saving at least \$75 million, and the technology could be spread among the hundreds of engineers and scientists involved in the SST.

The President then decided and ordered that:

- a. We prepare a surfacing paper.
- b. Get as many planes produced and out at the site as quickly as possible.
- c. Hold up the surfacing as long as possible, perhaps into the Spring.
- d. Review the subject again at the end of January or in early February for further policy consideration, and
- e. He personally will discuss with Halaby.

All agreed with the decisions and Mr. Bundy undertook to reconcile the differing views between CIA and DoD on the surfacing paper. I then gave Mr. Bundy copies of our mark-up of the DoD paper and also a copy of Dr. Wheelon's paper.

NOTE: Bundy has arranged for Dr. Spurgeon Keeny to serve with him on technical matters on a part-time basis and it is Keeny who is working directly with Bundy on this paper

JAM/mfb



2 December 1963

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President, 11:00 a. m., November 30th,  
in attendance Mr. Bundy, meeting lasted approximately  
1 1/2 hours

1. Reviewed the Checklist. The President immediately raised the question of what we were doing about Colonel Chennault. He expects most serious public reaction and has a feeling that we are "drifting" on this situation. I assured him we and the Venezuelan government were doing all that was possible. However, he requested more positive action on a report on the actions being taken.

NOTE: Wish a full report from the station for Sunday morning briefing.

2. No other Checklist items raised any serious questions.

3. The President again raised the question of what we were going to do in Cuba. Bundy advised that a policy meeting was scheduled for Monday, time not set, to discuss Cuban policy. I pointed out to the President the statements of President Kennedy on September 5th, September 13th, and November 20th, 1962 and then I showed the evidence that proved absolutely that arms had been imported into Venezuela from Cuba. I stated that most positive efforts should be made immediately to secure complete OAS agreement on a course of action which would involve a series of steps ranging from economic denial through blockade and even to possible invasion, but that it must be OAS action, otherwise it would involve confrontation with Khrushchev. I stated that if the action was a Hemispheric action I didn't see that the USSR could do much about it. The President agreed but decided to await the policy meeting on Monday.

NOTE: DD/P and WH should prepare full recommendations for positive actions which might be taken unilaterally with the Caribbean states or with the OAS. for my use in the policy meeting.

DECLASSIFIED

Authenticity NWJ.045.001.001/4  
jc, NARA. Date 2-10-10

~~SECRET~~

4. I reviewed the report from Mexico City station, 27 November, advising the number of Soviets in Cuba, indicating that this report which we thought was quite responsible more or less verified our own current estimates.

5. Reference the Oswald matter, reviewed with the President CAS Mexico City 7127 reporting on the interrogation of Alvarado. We briefly discussed the composition of the Review Board announced by the President on the 29th. Discussion of the Oswald situation was inconclusive and no action required.

6. The President then brought up the question of Pakistan and I reviewed briefly the intelligence community's feeling of concern and their view that our Pakistan relationship was of the greatest importance. Bundy mentioned the forthcoming December meeting between Ayub and General Taylor. The President made no comment but seemed to feel that Taylor should remain in the United States because of serious Defense budget problems. Bundy reviewed the great number of commitments we have made to Pakistan and that we would come to their defense if India should use our arms to attack Pakistan. The President expressed the greatest of confidence in Ayub and a feeling that we had not been forceful enough with him, had not given him a feeling of confidence in our motives and that he had drifted into the thought that we would abandon him in favor of India. He stated that he wished this corrected in a most positive manner.

7. I reviewed our Cuban overflight program advising the President of the USIB criteria and the extent to which flights were being carried on.

8. Reviewed briefly the TACKLE China overflight and stated these had been stood down since the loss of the last plane but we intended to resume which the President thought was proper.

ACTION: I wish flight plans to meet COMOR priority in targets for at least two flights for submission to the Special Group next Thursday.

9. I advised the President that the ChiCom-India border flights had been completed and that we now planned to brief the Indians, Thailand and very possibly Pakistan. I stated the equipment had been withdrawn from Takhli.



10. I advised the President that the CORONA mission was up and would be brought down on Monday. Also suggested that at an early opportunity I brief him on the CORONA program.

11. Reviewed the Venezuela overflight plan as outlined in memorandum for the Special Group and President approved.

NOTE: I have communicated this approval to General Carter and instructed him to proceed.

JAM:mcm

(tape)

~~TOP SECRET~~

2 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD  
EYES ONLY--NO DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President, 30 November 1963

Throughout the conversation the President mentioned a number of very personal problems and asked my help and also asked that Bundy and I act as a team in trying to help him solve some of his problems.

1. He indicated that there must be some Cabinet changes. By inference he made reference to the Attorney General, but not by direct statement. Apparently he is waiting for the Attorney General to decide what role, if any, he wishes to play in the Johnson Administration.

2. He stated that Secretary Celebrezze is very anxious for a judgeship and that he, Johnson, was extremely favorably impressed with Sargent Shriver and thought he would be an excellent Secretary of H. E. W. This was enthusiastically endorsed by both Bundy and myself.

3. He raised the question of whether Mrs. Kennedy might be a very able ambassador.

4. He was deeply critical of the handling of Ayub. He questioned whether Ball was the proper man to have gone forward to negotiate with Ayub. He felt that we needed a new ambassador and he asked for recommendations, the name of an ambassador who could handle that Embassy, and more particularly handle Ayub. At this point he asked that Bundy and I work together in searching out names of individuals who might be helpful in a number of critical areas. I protested his criticism of Ball, stating that I felt that Ball had done a very good job in his mission to Pakistan. The President expressed the highest regard for Ayub.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 95-27

By Cb, NARA Date 8-26-99



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. He then turned to a discussion of Latin America. Expressed criticism of the Alliance for Progress. Stated that Moscoso was not the man to handle it and he should be replaced and asked who could be his replacement. He also stated that we had not handled the OAS positively enough. He was very critical of our ambassador to the OAS, Acting Ambassador Ward Allen, and asked for recommendations for a replacement.

6. Throughout the conversation it appeared that President Johnson is not going to be satisfied with the organization as it is now composed and that he will make changes, and at the same time he does not intend to make changes just for the sake of change nor does he intend to move in the "hangers-on of the last 20 years." Apparently he has had a vast number of approaches from people who he termed to be political hacks and said he didn't want any part of any of them.

JAM:mcm

(tape)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JFK #177-10001-10474By ju NARA, Date 2-26-98

3 December 1963

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President at his residence on Sunday, Dec. 1 - 10:00 o'clock - about 30 minutes. No one was in attendance.

1. Reviewed a series of reports. There was no Checklist.
2. The President asked about news from Venezuela, particularly concerned about Chenault.
3. Briefly reviewed a clandestine report from Bonn as a means of indicating sources to CIA not available to others.
4. Reported to the President that the UN Commission to Saigon felt a bit critical towards the U.S. presence; however we are in some doubt as to whether they will include such criticism in their public report.
5. Briefly reviewed the final report on the Alvarado case in Mexico City.
6. The President then brought up the question of men in government. Emphasized the need for men, particularly young men. I urged the President to discuss this matter with the Business Council and with the AFL-CIO group. He said that meetings would be arranged this coming week.
7. I advised the President that I was to meet with Halaby to pursue the SST problem.
8. I requested the President to instruct Bundy that Memorandums of Conversation with Heads of State should be distributed to me automatically. Also that the State Department be instructed to send such Memorandums to me. The President agreed.

NOTE: This should be followed up by Mr. Cline. Bundy will apparently discuss this matter later with the President who agreed that such distribution should be automatic except in very special circumstances in which he wished distribution held to his own personal files for reasons of his own choice. I could take no exception to this decision.

9. We should contact Hoover concerning identification of people sending in ads and letters to the Dallas newspapers.

NOTE: I should call Hoover concerning this.

JAM/mfb (tape)



~~TOP SECRET~~

3 December 1963

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with The President, December 2; in attendance, Mr. Bundy

1. Discussed the Venezuelan election. The President immediately brought up the question of Col. Chenault. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)  
S

[REDACTED] The President looked upon this matter with most serious concern; spoke of a range of possible actions, none of which are practical but all indicative of his concern.

ACTION: DDCI [REDACTED] should follow this matter every day and be sure that every resource available is being used. Consideration should be given to possible development of new resources. [REDACTED] State, Defense should discuss additional efforts which might be possible by other departments and what additional effort can be brought on Venezuela authorities to intensify efforts for release of Chenault. Has a reward been offered? This in itself might be considered.

1.3(a)(4)  
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2. I again brought to the President's attention the seriousness of the Yemen problem. I extended the discussion to express my worries over the entire Middle East because of the Yemen conflicts over the northern tier of Africa, the continuing problems with the Israeli border, the Iraq-Syria situation and finally the problems between the oil companies and the producing states which resulted in a planned meeting of the eight producing states in mid-December. This coincided with the determined effort on the part of several countries to renegotiate their concessions. I explained to the President that the producing states are taking the position that the oil companies are in competition, one with the other, had forced the prices down to the advantage of the Western consumers, i.e. Western Europe, Scandinavia, the United States and Japan, and to the disadvantage of the Middle East and Venezuelan producers. I pointed out to the President that Mr. McCloy and Mr. Bunker were well-informed on the Middle East situation, most particularly the Yemen and the problems of Nasser.

1.3(a)(4)  
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SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-329

By JW, NARA, Date 5-24-94

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3. Syria Comments on Syria were included in my discussion on the Middle East; however I ventured that it appeared to me that while the forces ascending in authority in Syria and Iraq were not Nasser satellites, that Nasser's wave of influence was on the upsurge and we could expect further efforts on his part to consolidate his position in these two countries.

4. South Vietnam. No particular comment except reaffirmed in answer to questions by the President that it appeared to us that the Generals had not particularly improved the South Vietnam war effort although there had been a marked drop in Viet Cong attacks in the past week, number totalling about 100 versus an average of about 150 to 175 in the previous weeks. I stated there was some evidence of political turmoil and conflict. The President questioned the withdrawal of 1000 U.S. personnel, stating that he could not see that this was a constructive move in view of the decision to intensify the effort. Bundy defended the action. I made no comment.

5. Explained to the President the trends of the Cuban takeover of the SAM sites and the probable consequences.

6. Advised the President that Prime Minister Inonu of Turkey would undoubtedly resign. I also pointed out to the President that the Congo represented a festering problem and would undoubtedly cause serious concern in the months ahead. Political instability, forces in opposition to Adoula, the continuing efforts of Tshombe to re-establish himself all indicated to me that we can expect trouble in the Congo.

7. The President then referred to the bad press in South Vietnam. I reported the New York Times had tempered its reporting but that Neil Sheehan of the UPI remained there. President asked if I would discuss the problem with Mr. Roy Howard, Scripps Howard paper, or with the President or Chairman of UPI.

8. President referred to news articles concerning differences between himself and McNamara. Expressed the highest regard for McNamara, questioned the accuracy of the articles, felt they were plants, wants them stopped; also referred to a Murphy article. I agreed to have Mr. Charles Murphy come out and review the article with him and urge him to correct any inaccuracies, which I did, and this is the subject of a separate note being prepared by Mr. Elder.



~~SECRET~~

9. The President again requested help on the Alliance for Progress; also help in the securing of an adequate Ambassador to Pakistan.

10. There was an extended discussion of whether Lodge should continue. The President was indecisive. He again spoke in considerable contempt of his feelings concerning Lodge but obviously does not know how to change it. Explored the possibility of reassignments, none of which seemed feasible. The President asked whether our station was strongly manned. I said that it was "comfortably manned". We are leaving [REDACTED] there, placing a very strong man under him; that the station would function satisfactorily; if, however, he changed Ambassadors then we would reconsider the set-up and probably put a new man in charge of the station. I said nothing could be done on this except to carefully observe the functioning of the station, to reinforce it as indicated above and to carefully study the 'independence' of the reporting.

1.3(a)(4)  
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JAM/mfb (tape)

~~SECRET~~

6 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President, 4 December 1963

1. On Wednesday, the 4th of December, I met briefly with the President prior to his meeting with the Business Council. I urged that he support the Radio Free Europe program, endorse the position taken by President Kennedy, assure Mr. Crawford Greenewalt of his personal support, and subsequently write a letter to Greenewalt expressing his position.

2. When the Business Council was in the Cabinet Room (following the meeting when the Press was present) the President met the above request. I personally introduced Mr. Greenewalt to the President and I felt the President was very gracious.

ACTION: [REDACTED] should prepare an appropriate letter from the President to Mr. Greenewalt and I will get him to send it.

STATINTL

3. No other matters were discussed with the President.

JAM:mcm

SANTIZED  
Authority NLT 045-0011-7  
By Q NARA, Date 4-17-02



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6 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with The President - 9:45 - 6 December 1963

The first part of the meeting involved a discussion with Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, William Bundy and McGeorge Bundy concerning the procedures on MLF.

Rusk requested, and received, approval to brief General Eisenhower and will arrange to have Amb. Merchant, Admiral Ricketts and General Goodpastor present at the briefing. Rusk reported that a group of "young Republicans" opposed the MLF.

Rusk also received approval to brief certain Congressional leaders in small groups, but to intimate that no government, including the United States Government, is committed to the MLF program.

Rusk gave an optimistic report on progress and stated the most important objectives of the MLF was to give the Germans a sense of participation in nuclear weapons planning and operations under a scheme providing adequate control by other Allied nations, including the United States.

McNamara stated that Mr. von Hassel had advised him that the MLF was a "must" or else the Germans would undoubtedly pursue an independent course in developing their own national nuclear weapons resources. Rusk indicated that failure to proceed with the MLF might force a German-French arrangement on nuclear weapons. McNamara stated there was no military requirement for the MLF but the force will have a military (?) utility and will permit a reduction in planned United States national capabilities and hence the cost, which is considerable, is not really an additional U.S. military cost.

The President then suggested a briefing of Congressional leaders, both Democratic and Republican, Senate and House, substantially along the lines of the NSC briefing of yesterday afternoon. I brought up the question of security and pointed out the dangers. The President asked that I develop a 10 or 15 minute briefing on Soviet strategic capabilities, Soviet defense and Soviet economy, going just as far as I possibly could without endangering sources and methods.

ACTION: Discuss with Cline, et al.

SANITIZED

Authority JFK #177-10001-10475

By JW, NARA, Date 4-21-98

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

The meeting then continued with the President, McGeorge Bundy and McCone. I discussed the foreign aid figures as included in the 6 December memorandum and the special report on Soviet Foreign Economics Programs of 25 October, and stated that I would prepare for the President some special graphics which would show Soviet foreign, economic and military aid, both extensions and draw-downs, to non-Communist countries and Cuba.

NOTE: Mr. Rostow raised the question earlier as to the validity of comparing our aid figures with USSR's aid figures because the latter did not include aid to satellites. His position is that since we include aid to NATO countries, particularly Turkey, Greece, South Korea, etc., we should examine USSR aid to their satellites in addition to Cuba. This should be examined. I do not know whether the figures are available.

The President reviewed the Checklist and I made the following comments:

1. I expect the USSR to expand the test ban agreement to cover underground tests and it was quite possible they would soon make claims for vast improvements in seismology. I mentioned the recent information on the LASER beam.

2. I pointed out the seriousness of the Cambodian situation stating the fact that the Khmer Serei clandestine radio had been located in Southeast Thailand and that my information was that the Thais were not inclined to put it out of business because the Cambodians were broadcasting unfavorably against them.

3. I noted the additional indicators of possible conflict over Malaysia.

[247] I then explained to the President the source of our information that the Soviet Intelligence Service, on orders from Moscow, was attempting to stimulate communications from India to him, Chief Justice Warren and the Attorney General, urging a full probe into the assassination of the President. I stated that this report comes from [ ] and we evaluate it quite highly.

We then discussed the assignment of Peer de Silva to Saigon. I stated that the staff had made such recommendation to me, but that I felt it was only a good move if he was to remove Ambassador Lodge. He felt that to do this would have political repercussions.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ONLY

[03] tantamount to a vote of no confidence in the military junta, that it would indicate President Johnson's support of Diem rather than the present authorities. Therefore he stated he could not move to remove Lodge but hoped that Lodge would remove himself and become a candidate for the Republican nomination for the Presidency and would be the nominee. (Note: I told the President he wanted things too easy). I told the President that Lodge would destroy de Silva if he opposed his assignment or did not like him, or wished to get rid of him. The President said he would communicate most emphatically with Lodge in this regard and asked Bundy to write an appropriate communication. I told the President this would do no good, that Lodge was absolutely unconscionable in matters of this kind and he had resorted to trickery time and time again during the Eisenhower administration and that he never failed to use the newspapers in order to expose an individual or block an action. I therefore could only conclude that if he was going to keep Lodge on that it would be better to stay with [redacted] as Chief of Station, who is a most competent officer but young and not fully experienced, but this proposal did not meet his request that the best and most experienced man we can find be placed on the job. The President said he would exercise the full power of his office to keep Lodge in line and felt our responsibilities in South Vietnam are so great that CIA should have a "four-star man" on the job and that is what he wanted.

JAM/mcm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JFK #177-10001-10476

By fw NARA. Date 2-26-98

9 December 1963

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President on Saturday,  
December 7th, 12:00 for about one half hour

1. The President confirmed that he thought I should go to Saigon to meet McNamara, that he wished our new Chief of Station to be in place by that time, that he wished to meet the Chief of Station personally before he went to Saigon and again expressed apprehension over the situation in South Vietnam.
2. Reviewed with the President, modified, and apparently approved draft of a cable to Ambassador Lodge on the above subject.
3. I reviewed briefly my discussion with Robert Kennedy on Saturday morning, details of which are covered in another memorandum.
4. Reviewed my practice of briefing General Eisenhower. The President asked that I continue and he expressed the greatest of confidence in and friendship for General Eisenhower.
5. Discussed the organizational plan for the Alliance for Progress which was submitted in a memorandum last week. The President said that Robert Anderson flatly refused the President's personal appeal. He said he was turning towards placing Ambassador Thomas Mann as an Undersecretary of State for Latin American affairs, responsible not only for the Alliance for Progress but for all Latin American activities.
6. I told the President that I was dissatisfied with the "image" of the DCI. It has been created because Allen Dulles



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

and also a number of men in the Administration had built up the operational side of the Agency and had not emphasized the activities of CIA and DCI which were first and carefully outlined in the law and were most important. I said the result of this had been that the DCI was now considered strictly a "cloak and dagger" operator and that this image had developed to a point that my contribution to him and to the Department was impaired, travel is difficult, visiting foreign countries is practically an impossibility all to the end neither the DCI nor the Agency were serving the President as effectively as they could in view of the vast resources of talent existing in CIA. In saying this I did not diminish the very great importance of the operational side as well as the technical side but indicated that our real contribution was to take all intelligence, including clandestine and technical intelligence, and meld it into a proper and thoughtful analysis estimate of any given situation. The President agreed and asked that I prepare a memorandum of a few paragraphs which he could use from time to time in talking with the press or in press conferences or even in speeches.

JAM:mcm

(tape)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President - 10:15 - 9 December 1963

The meeting was very brief as the President was behind schedule. Involved were a quick review of the Checklist and a brief discussion of the Bolivian problem and I advised the President that this was an extremely dangerous situation because the miners in this area were notorious, vicious men who ruled with guns and placed a very low value on life.

NOTE: I wish the situation watched hourly by the WH Division and our experts on Bolivia.

The President asked that I brief the Congressional leadership on Tuesday morning, covering the subject of 11-8, 11-4 and the Soviet economy. He allowed me 20 minutes and wants to give all possible information with a minimum of deletions for security. He wanted to handle the foreign aid approach carefully so it wouldn't kick back on his foreign aid program. I will be followed by Rusk for 5 minutes and by McNamara for 5 minutes. The meeting will be in the Cabinet Room.

ACTION: Briefing papers and charts should be prepared for review late this afternoon or this evening.

Prior to seeing the President I talked to Bundy briefly about a number of matters. He raised the Washington Post article on SAMOS, asked whether any damage assessment was being made. I replied affirmatively.

ACTION: Wheelon and Bannerman should go into this. I feel that in all probability the article is a clever piece of putting together of everything that's been published, in an interesting and conclusive way. However the extent to which the word "SAMOS" is used leads me to believe the article was inspired and probably given substantial help by the Air Force.

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Authenticity NLS 045 001.001/9  
in file NARA Date 2-10-10



~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

Bundy stated that the President wished to talk to me about travelling personally and desired to work out arrangements so that my doing so would not be resisted by Ambassadors. He advised Bundy it would be virtually impossible for him to travel but he would like me to plan to travel and to report to him on my observations. The President did not raise this question.

JAM/mfb

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

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13 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President, 13 December - 9:30 a. m.

1. Introduced General Carter but was unable to explain his responsibilities.
2. Introduced Peer de Silva. The President spoke briefly of what he expects of the Station and the representatives of the Government in the Saigon community.
3. Reviewed the Checklist. I emphasized (a) the dangers of the hostages in Bolivia, stating however that while 21 lives are extremely important, nevertheless, we must avoid a policy decision the consequence of which might mean the lives of an undertermined thousands of people in the future. In fact I was saying we must not give the Communists the upper hand in this argument. I explained the critical location of the prisoners, and (b) I called the President's attention to the international oil situation and the deadlock between OPEC and the international oil companies and the opening that this is affording the Italians and possibly the French.

4.

3.4(b)(1)

NOTE: Carter and de Silva left the room at this time.

5. I told the President that subject to Rusk's approval, I intended to issue a series of articles on the weakness of the Soviet economy, drainage on their gold supply, over-commitments on foreign aid, etc. for the political figures who are wavering between leaning on the

Soviets or the West, such as Sukarno and certain South American countries, so that they will understand they are not leaning on very much when they lean on the Soviets.

6. Explained that I had given a complete briefing to General Eisenhower and conveyed to the President General Eisenhower's expression of friendship and support.

7. Discussed briefly my talk with Robert Kennedy and urged the President to send a message to Kennedy but not to see him until after the first of the year. I asked for the President's approval to invite Kennedy to accompany me to Saigon.

NOTE: This invitation has been extended but Kennedy felt it was untimely because of personal family commitments, responsibilities to Jackie, concern on the part of his wife, Mrs. Kennedy, and for other reasons.

8. Mr. Bundy joined in part of these discussions. The President asked what the Attorney General intended to do, that is, stay on or leave. I told the President the Attorney General intended to stay on as Attorney General, but it was not clear to what extent the President wished him to become involved in the activities outside the area of the Office of the Attorney General, such as, intelligence work, NSC problems, counter insurgency matters, etc. I explained to the President that I had told Bobby he could not bring back the intimacy of relationship with the President which he had had with his brother because that was a blood relationship, not an official relationship. A type of relationship which is seldom found between brothers and never found between officials, either in business or government.

9. I gave the President a copy of the memorandum on Soviet Foreign Aid.

JAM:mem



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-329

By W, NARA, Date 5-24-94

December 22, 1963

Discussion with the President, Saturday, December 21, 1963

1. On Saturday morning, Secretary McNamara and I reported to the President on our trip to South Viet Nam. In attendance were Secretary Rusk, Ball, Harriman, and Mr. Bundy.

The substance of the discussion was covered in Secretary McNamara's memorandum (attached) and my memorandum of December 20, (also attached.)

I gave McNamara a copy of Mr. Kent's memorandum on the "Probable North Vietnamese Reaction to Certain Clandestine Operations, 20 December."

Following the meeting, I gave Bundy a copy of my memorandum of December 20, "Highlights of Discussions in Saigon - 18 - 20 December 1963". Bundy retained the original for transmission to the President.

The President requested my comments on the McNamara memorandum be prepared prior to my departure.

2. U-2 overflights over the Laos-Cambodian borders were approved.

NOTE: On Sunday, Secretary Alexis Johnson, as a member of the 5412, approved such overflight. Also, it is my intention to secure Gilpatric's approval on Sunday evening.

3. Following the discussion, Rusk, McNamara, and I talked privately with the President concerning Lodge's future. The subject was again raised by Rusk on Sunday morning. I stated that it was my impression that Lodge would stay with his job, would not enter a GOP primary; would stake his chances on the Republican nomination at the Convention. I reported that Lodge had told me privately that he would stay with his job and he was embarrassed over the publicity surrounding his availability as a candidate.

At the meeting Saturday, and again Sunday, I stated I could not guarantee Lodge's position because he was devious and therefore, I received any remarks he made with some considerable suspicion.

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21 December 1963

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HIGHLIGHTS OF DISCUSSIONS IN SAIGON 18 - 20 December 1963

1. There is no organized government in South Vietnam at this time. The Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) is in control, but strong leadership and administrative procedures are lacking. Reports were received that province and district chiefs do not act because of the lack of direction and orders. Nevertheless, the MRC are confident. They feel they are winning the support of the people. They recognize there is a big job ahead but feel it is not insurmountable, and they feel their plan of organization will lead to success. They claim complete understanding among all members, however there is evidence of tension which, if it grows, could lead to serious political difficulties.

2. The Military Revolutionary Committee, MRC, has replaced about 70 percent of the 43 province chiefs and a substantial number of the 253 district chiefs. This replacement program is continuing. Many appointments are reported to be good, some not so good. The MRC feel that practically all must be replaced.

3. The MRC feel they have reached an understanding with the Hoa Hao and on 27 December will reach agreement with the Cao Dai. These arrangements could substantially improve the security of the Cambodian border, relieve CVN troops in Hoa Hao and Cao Dai provinces, provide important information on VC concentrations and activities, and have a significant psychological impact on the population. The success of the detente arrangements will bear significantly on the future of the GVN.

4. It is abundantly clear that statistics received over the past year or more from the GVN officials and reported by the US mission on which we gauged the trend of the war were grossly in error. Conditions in the Delta and in the areas immediately north of Saigon are more serious now than expected and were probably never as good as reported. The Viet Cong control larger percentages of the population, greater amounts of territory, and have destroyed or occupied more strategic hamlets than expected. Admittedly, this area of South Vietnam has been recognized as the most serious. Revelation of factual data evidences a far greater problem for the GVN in arresting the unfavorable trend and recovering the situation than was thought.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, 1964-63 IV, 736-38  
By OCB, NARA, Date 4-17-93

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5. Starting in about July, indices on progress of the war turned unfavorable for the GVN. The number of Viet Cong attacks and the losses of strategic hamlets to the Viet Cong increased. VC casualties vs GVN casualties, weapons lost vs weapons captured, etc., all turned in favor of the VC and against the GVN. The trend lines were gradual until 1 November, the date of the coup, and then moved very sharply against the GVN because of a great increase in number and intensity of VC attacks in the weeks immediately following the coup.

6. The tempo of VC activities has slowed down. Incidents were fewer during the last week in November and have continued at a lower rate so far in December. Concurrently, the tempo of GVN activities has increased. Hence, the trend lines of all indices have turned in favor of the GVN in recent weeks, although in no instance has the situation which existed in June or July, 1963, been recovered.

7. There is continuing evidence of infiltration of cadres and small arms from North Vietnam through Laos and across the Laotian border. GVN intelligence reports indicate 1550 men with substantial but not precisely known quantities of arms have entered South Vietnam from North Vietnam through Laos this year.

8. Large machine weapons, such as recoilless rifles, mortars, and anti-aircraft guns, and men trained in their use, have appeared in the delta in recent months. It is not known whether they came through Laos and Cambodia and across the border, down the rivers, or by sea. Large weapons have not appeared in the northern sectors of South Vietnam.

9. The MRC recognizes the seriousness of the problems in the delta and have taken a number of actions which they feel will produce results. However, there is evidence of serious deficiencies in the Self-Defense Corps, which must be corrected. Also, there is an urgent need for substantially more organized GVN units in the delta and the provinces around Saigon.

10. The strategic hamlet has encountered resistance in the delta because relocation removed families from their fields and locations occupied for generations. Many defections of entire villages were reported as due to the above reason. The villages built along the banks of rivers and canals could not be rearranged into defensible compounds without hardships the villagers considered unacceptable.



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## CONCLUSION

It is my conclusion that the coup came when there was a downward trend which was more serious than was reported and, therefore, more serious than realized.

The military government may be an improvement over the Diem-Nhu regime, but this is not as yet established and the future of the war remains in doubt.

The Viet Cong are receiving substantial support from North Vietnam and possibly elsewhere, and this support can be increased. Stopping this by sealing the borders, the extensive waterways, and the long coast line is difficult, if not impossible.

The VC appeal to the people of South Vietnam on political grounds has been effective, gained recruits for their armed forces, and neutralized resistance.

The ability of the GVN to reverse this trend remains to be proven. Much depends on the ability of the MRC to deploy their forces and pursue the conflict in a manner which will ensure the security of the people and provide them desired freedom, privileges, and some tangible benefits.

The lack of an outstanding individual to lead and absence of administrative experience within the MRC are ominous indicators.

The political stability of the new government under the MRC is subject to serious doubt. Conflicts of ambition, jealousy, differences of opinion over policy matters are all possible, could develop serious schisms, precipitate further dissensions and coup attempts all of which will affect the war effort against the VC.

Overcoming the VC movement by the GVN is formidable and difficult, but not impossible. The problems can be intensified by continuing increased support from NVN and political failures by the MRC. Hence, in my judgment, there are more reasons to doubt the future of the effort under present programs and moderate extensions to existing programs; (i. e., harassing sabotage against NVN, border crossings, etc.;) than there are reasons to be optimistic about the future of our cause in South Vietnam.

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EYES ONLY

19 December 1963

*Noted by Dcl.  
Welder*


## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President on Cuba at 1100 on  
19 December 1963

1. Included in the meeting were Acting Secretary of State Ball, Acting Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, Secretary Cyrus Vance, Secretary Douglas Dillon, Ambassador Thompson, General Wheeler, Mr. Donald Wilson, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Bromley Smith, Mr. Edwin Martin, Mr. Ted Sorensen, Mr. John Crimins, Mr. Gordon Chase, Mr. George Ready, Mr. Bill Moyers, General Carter, Mr. Helms, and Mr. FitzGerald.

2. The President, after full discussion, postponed any sizable operations by FitzGerald, primarily to avoid any possible embarrassment to our OAS negotiations on the Venezuelan arms cache. We are authorized to continue to put forward proposals for operations and also to continue preparations for air ops. The main thrust was to greatly increase political action with Canada, Britain, Spain, Italy, and others in an effort to promote greater economic blockade.

3. Mr. Bundy later stated that his analysis of the meeting was that the President would continue to approve smaller FitzGerald-type operations even though they would be relatively unrewarding if they would assist in keeping up the morale of the troops on shore, of our agents, and otherwise help in keeping the ball rolling.



Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Acting Director

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JFK #177-10001-10477By pw NARA. Date 3-4-98~~SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

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19 DEC 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting at the White House 19 December 1963

PRESENT: The President

The State Department: Under Secretary George W. Ball, Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson, Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Edwin Martin, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs John H. Crimmins.

The Defense Department: Deputy Secretary Roswell Gilpatric, Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance.

Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Wheeler.

USIA: Deputy Director Donald M. Wilson.


The Treasury Department: Secretary Douglas Dillon.

The White House Staff: Executive Assistant to the President McGeorge Bundy, Messrs. George Reedy and Williams Moyers, and Gordon Chase.

CIA: General Marshall S. Carter, Messrs. Richard Helms and Desmond FitzGerald.

1. The President arrived at the meeting approximately five minutes early -- prior to the arrival of several members of the group including Mr. Bundy. Without a formal introduction I commenced the scheduled briefing on the Agency Cuban program at the urging of the President and despite the activities of the Presidential photographer.

2. The President appeared interested in the number of agents inside Cuba but made no particular comment concerning the program until the subject of economic denial was introduced. He asked to be told what additional measures could be taken to step up the denial program. I said that the



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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 01-17

By cbm, NARA, Date 2-28-03

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principal soft spots among free world countries appeared at the present time to be Canada, the U.K. and Spain. The President requested a memorandum setting forth specifics concerning leaks of economically strategic items from these three countries together with recommendations as to what could be done to stop these leaks. He requested Under Secretary Ball to prepare to make demarches to the governments of these three countries as well as any others engaged in the Cuba trade contrary to our interests. He appeared particularly interested in the subject of economic denial and returned to it several times.

3. After hearing a brief description of our progress in connection with promoting disaffection among the Cuban military, the President said that it did not seem to him that we had gone very far along this line and that one day those concerned in Cuba matters, including himself, would have to face the "grand jury" (of domestic public opinion) to account for our progress in our attempts to find a solution to the Cuban situation. I pointed out that the program being presented was, with the exception of the economic denial item, entirely a covert program and, if run at full capacity, would tax the capabilities of the clandestine services -- in other words, that if new and broader measures against Cuba were to be undertaken, they would have to be within the overt field.

4. After a brief description of the sabotage and harassment program the subject of the proposed Matanzas raid was discussed. After hearing the pros and cons the President stated that he did not feel that the present time was a good one to conduct an operation of this magnitude which carried a less than 50 percent chance of success. He said that he felt that such an operation, if pinned directly on the U.S., might cause the Soviets to move in the wrong direction with respect to Cuba, i.e., increase their economic aid or their military presence. Recognizing that a cessation of raids would have a bad morale effect within Cuba, he agreed that low risk operations, with admittedly lower economic and psychological impact, should be conducted. He further stated that planning for such operations as Matanzas should be continued. General Wheeler raised the possibility of air strikes against major targets by autonomous groups. This was discussed and it was agreed that in view of the fact that preparations would take at least three months, these preparations should proceed and the question re-examined at the time that capabilities have been perfected.

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5. On the question of autonomous groups the President asked the cost of these operations (five million dollars). He also asked the cost of Cuban operations for the current year (21 or 2 million dollars) and the total Agency budget.

6. The intelligence summary concerning Cuba prepared by General Carter for the meeting was examined.

7. Mr. Bundy then reviewed current U.S. policy vis-a-vis Cuba. He then went down a check list of possible new courses of action taken from the Department of State paper prepared for the December 13 Standing Group meeting. Unilateral actions presented were:

- (1) Air attacks by our autonomous groups. No further discussion.
- (2) Selective relaxation of U.S. controls against exile groups in Florida. No comment on Mr. Bundy's generally unfavorable presentation.
- (3) Military feints. No comment on generally unfavorable presentation.
- (4) Low-level reconnaissance flights. Comment by Assistant Secretary Martin concerning the value of keeping open the franchise for low-level flights. Acknowledgement of certain value to the intelligence community. No decision requested.
- (5) Extension of efforts to eliminate free world shipping from the Cuba trade. No decision requested.
- (6) Presidential declaration concerning U.S. policy on Cuba designed to stimulate anti-Castro dissidence in the armed forces. Mr. Bundy's comments indicated that there was room for a stronger statement than that made by President Kennedy in Miami.
- (7) Talks with the Soviets and the Cubans. Not elaborated and no comment.
- (8) Other forms of covert actions. Not specified or elaborated.

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8. In connection with bilateral and multilateral actions involving the cooperation of the OAS and nations of the Caribbean, Mr. Bundy stated that the nature and import of the recently discovered arms cache in Venezuela constitutes a point of departure for such actions as search and seizure on the high seas or an OAS-sponsored quarantine against arms shipments.

3.4(b)(1)

Mr. Martin then briefed concerning OAS action with regard to the arms cache. He said that the committee appointed by the OAS to investigate had called for additional evidence from the Venezuelan government which would take two to three weeks to assemble. He said that he felt that the OAS report would be out in mid-January although the question of Cuban defense against the Venezuelan charges had not yet been resolved. Mr. Bundy referred to the efforts being made to increase the effectiveness of surveillance of arms smugglers in Central America and referred to the possibility of an OAS-sponsored search and seizure on the high seas.

9. Under Secretary Ball stated that the Department of Justice has warned that a number of students, some of more respectable stripe than the last group which visited Cuba, were planning to try to visit Cuba during the Christmas vacation and that there is evidence of larger numbers planning to do the same thing during the summer. He said that the Attorney General was bothered by this and had suggested the relaxation of present rules concerning travel to Cuba. Mr. Ball said that the Department of State is tentatively opposed to such relaxation particularly because of its effect on Latin American countries. The President strongly concurred with the Department of State position. He said that he did not propose to change or relax present regulations.

  
Desmond Fitzgerald  
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

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29 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussions with President Johnson at the Johnson Ranch  
on Friday, December 27th

1. I arrived at the ranch by Jet Star from Seattle, arriving at midnight on Thursday, December 26th. I stayed in a guest room at President Johnson's residence. President Johnson and I ate breakfast alone the following morning and then with Pierre Salinger took a long walk. Following the discussion two memoranda were prepared by me for the President's subsequent use. Memorandum marked #1 was to be used by him in discussing our meeting later in the day when he met with a large number of the press. Memorandum #2 was for discussion with Secretary Rusk and others and for subsequent release to the press.

2. At breakfast the President immediately brought up his desire to "change the image of the DCI" from a cloak and dagger role to the role of an adviser to the President on world situations derived from intelligence sources which were of importance to the President in reaching policy decisions. For this reason he intended to call upon me for a great many activities which would be different from those of the past. As an example, he wished me to return to California to meet with President Eisenhower to discuss with him certain aspects of the world situation and also the particular actions which President Johnson had taken in the interest of government economy.

3. I responded that this was very much in line with my thinking. I was willing to do anything that he desired. I then produced the Truman article and the Starnes article and explained to him that a statement of this type by President Truman would do great damage, that it would be used by many columnists who enjoyed criticizing CIA,

3.4(b)(1)

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NLI/RAC 01-17

By ebm, NARA, Date 2-28-03

that the Truman article and later editorials such as the Starnes article would undoubtedly be introduced into the Congressional Record by such critics of CIA as Senator Eugene McCarthy and would be used in an attempt to bring about legislation creating a joint committee on intelligence (Watchdog Committee). The President said that he had read the Truman article, that he thought it was a mistake and that he would do all that he could to arrest any such impressions concerning CIA's activities.

4. The specific items which we discussed are covered in attached memorandum #1.

NOTE: The ink changes were made by DCI and a clean draft prepared for the President. The pencil changes were made by Secretary Rusk, who read the memorandum immediately prior to my departure from Johnson City.

5. Reference item #1, the President expressed concern over the safety of Americans in Cyprus. I indicated that we felt that the British military which totalled about 11,000 with 500 reinforcements being moved in at the present time ensured safety of Americans and that the situation appeared to be reasonably in hand, although the future was by no means clear.

6. The President asked for a detailed briefing on the Yemen and how the situation evolved. I explained the background of the establishment of the Yemen Republic under Sallal and our recognition of that Republic at the urging of Nasser. I indicated that the British had not recognized the Yemen Republic and were critical of us for doing so. I told the President that the Yemen for a long period of time -- hundreds of years -- had been governed by a chief chosen on an understanding among tribal leaders and sheiks, the most recent being Badr. This government was overthrown by revolution and the new government was immediately supported by Nasser. However, when Nasser moved in troops in substantial numbers, military officers who overthrew the Iman became discouraged. A great many of them defected and returned to their old tribal leaders; others became neutral. As a result, Nasser was required to send in increasing numbers of troops and his forces now totalled 30,000 to 32,000. This is about one-third of his total armed forces. The costs to Nasser of the Yemeni

operation are very high. They are estimated at about \$50 to \$75 million dollars. The situation now was difficult because the only military forces sustaining the Yemen Republic Government were the Nasser forces and the Egyptians were really running the country with the Yemen political authorities acting in a subservient position and with little authority. As a result, dissension was growing among the Yemen Government officials who resented the control and authority exercised by the UAR present.

7. I then said that Ambassador Bunker had completed a rather effective negotiation last summer under which Faisal would cease supplying arms to the royalists, who had retired to the north into the hills, providing the UAR withdrew its troops. Nasser had agreed to withdraw 5,000 troops; however, to date he had withdrawn only 1,000 to 1,200. The initial withdrawals were to have taken place prior to November 4th, at which time the authority of the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) would come to a halt. After some considerable negotiations the UNYOM was extended until January 4th. The problem now was whether Faisal and Nasser would agree to further extension. If they did not it was highly probable that Faisal would again start to supply arms to the royalists, and that Nasser would escalate military activities against the royalists and into Saudi Arabia. I pointed out that this was an extremely critical matter, not because of the importance of Yemen, but because of our entire relationship with the Saudi Arabian Government and the importance of Saudi oil reserves to our national interest. The President asked what should be done and I said that every effort should be made to extend the January 4th date in the hopes that with the passage of time the Yemen resentment to UAR occupation would increase to a point where the UAR would be forced to withdraw increasing numbers of troops and the threat to Faisal would thus be relieved.

8. With respect to the situation in South Vietnam, I stated there was nothing to add to the report that McNamara and I gave when we returned a week ago. However, I felt that President Macapagal's offer to use his good offices in the Cambodian dispute was constructive and we should try to encourage Macapagal to influence not only Sihanouk, but also Sukarno and others in the Far East. I expressed confidence in Macapagal and urged that we develop a close understanding and relationship with him.



9. We discussed briefly the economic situation in the Soviet Union, Communist China and the satellites. The President requested a briefing for the Congressional Committee Chairmen, details of which will be discussed later in this memorandum. The President asked if Khrushchev had taken any action or said anything of importance recently and I said no, that I felt that Khrushchev was pretty well consumed with his internal problems and the Sino-Soviet relationship and that he had been remarkably quiet with respect to the West. I did point out however that Castro had made some statements concerning President Johnson that were not unlike those which he had made from time to time about President Kennedy.

3.4(b)(1)

I reviewed briefly the most recent summary (the CIA-DIA assessment of 20 December) of the situation in Cuba, advising the President that there had been no additions to the Soviet forces but no appreciable withdrawal. There had been a substantial turnover in recent months and the probability was that a few hundred -- and not more than a few hundred -- Soviets had departed. This was about the extent of the net reduction. I said that it appeared that the Soviet activities were entirely of a training nature, that the Cuban SAM trainees had been deployed at SAM sites and that there was a possibility that autonomous Cuban control of the SAM sites would present us with a very difficult situation in the immediate future. The President then asked what could be done if the Cubans decided to use the SAMs against our U-2's. I stated that we could not go without continuing aerial surveillance. We had two choices: either use our "new development," which I opposed because of its importance for other purposes, or tentatively to actually "take out" the SAM sites. The President remarked that this would then mean war and I responded that certainly the destruction of the SAM sites would mean war, that the degree of escalation could not be determined in advance. I stated that this was the most ominous situation that confronted us in Cuba in the immediate future. The President made no comment.

10. The President then asked that I return to California, arrange to see President Eisenhower and brief him in detail on world conditions and also on the actions taken by President Johnson to promote economy in government, to reduce government employment, and to take such

actions as are possible to reduce the 1965 budget. It is obvious that the President feels the need of substantial Republican support in his tax legislation and wishes the Republican side of the House to know that actions he has taken will reduce the 1965 budget substantially below the Kennedy level. However, he does not hope for anything that would approach a balanced budget. He mentioned a forecasted income of \$91 or \$92 billion dollars from taxes and other receipts under the new tax legislation. He explained that the Federal budget would be in the order of \$102 or \$103 billion. He started with the FY '64 budget of \$99 billion. To this must be added \$1.7 billion for pay increases which had been voted and increased costs which were uncontrollable. Another \$1.7 or \$1.8 billion must be added to finance programs which had become law to prior legislative action. This included educational funds, welfare expenditures, public works, etc. None of these could be removed, and therefore, the total additions were thus about \$3.5 billion. Moreover, additions requested by each and every department had to be considered. However, he had succeeded in reducing more than one billion Defense appropriations previously requested and approved by President Kennedy. At a recent Cabinet meeting had cut off at least \$700 million from various departments. In addition, he had issued stern orders concerning reductions in personnel and other economy measures. What he wanted me to do was to get all of his orders and messages, go over them in detail with President Eisenhower, and get Eisenhower's reactions. This I agreed to.

ACTION: The White House is to deliver to General Carter copies of the President's orders. If they do not do so, it is very important to receive a copy of a memorandum dictated by Eisenhower for Johnson on Sunday, November 24th. If this document is not included in the papers delivered to us by the White House, then we should get in touch with Mr. Moyers or Mr. Valenti and arrange for the President to release this specific document. In addition I would like as much in the way of definitive figures as General Carter can get from the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. What I must have are some specific actions to show Eisenhower just what is being done, otherwise, I am sure that he will feel that he is being used if he hears only statements of generalities.

11. Now turning to memorandum #2, I told the President that we were making a study in depth of the Soviet and Chinese Communist

economies and that I felt that the Heads of State and two or three other officials in Britain, Germany, France and Italy, and possibly Japan, and perhaps one or two other countries, should be briefed for the reasons explained in the memorandum. I asked his authority to go to Europe the latter part of January for this purpose. The President agreed and suggested that he might make such an announcement. I urged that this not be done until after he had had a thorough discussion with Secretary Rusk and perhaps until we had had an opportunity for a little more staff work and maybe some advance notice to the Heads of the States involved. The President agreed to discuss this with Rusk upon his arrival at the ranch on the 27th. He did not state definitely whether he would announce the plan today or not. I emphasized the very great importance of having the fragile nature of the Soviet economy thoroughly understood by Sukarno and this might best be conveyed to him through Macapagal. The President agreed to discuss with Rusk.

12. NOTE: We should continue work on briefing and get particulars on to graphics as they represent probably the best way that information of this kind can be presented convincingly and briefly to foreign Heads of State.

13. The President then said he thought he should call together the heads of all committees of the Senate and House and that I should give them a 15-minute briefing on Soviet military capabilities, sanitizing to the extent necessary and that I should follow this with a briefing on the Soviet and ChiCom economies. He thought I should then be followed by Rusk commenting on world conditions and McNamara covering United States military posture. The President would also make some remarks to sum up. Work should be started on the briefing papers immediately. The President desired that the briefing run 15 minutes, although I do not think he would object seriously to a 20-minute briefing.

3.4(b)(1)

14. [REDACTED]

The President took a reservation on the suggestion by Secretary Rusk. I said that I had some serious reservations as did the senior people in CIA. I urged that the President discuss the subject with Rusk which he agreed to do and then we could have a further talk prior to taking any action. I would like the pros and cons of this considered by the staff for review with me upon my return.



15. Items 3, 4 and 5 of memorandum #2 require no further expansion. With respect to item #5, the President desired to have the entire Business Council for luncheon. I felt it would be more effective to have a small group, but he felt it would be impossible to discriminate between members of the Council and therefore intends to ask all of them. He does not feel that business was actually behind Kennedy's fiscal program or his tax reduction and reform program, even though some groups of businessmen supported the latter. He is genuinely interested in seeking the advice and counsel of businessmen and does not wish them to be under the impression that he is "using them."

There are a number of items which I had intended to discuss with the President, but time ran out. They were:

1. The general scope of activity of CIA, most particularly in the areas of DDP. However, I am satisfied, after discussing the Truman article with the President, that he is in complete accord with our covert operations, including political action and paramilitary activities. However, he wishes to emphasize the correlating, estimating and reporting functions (i. e., DDI) in order to minimize the "cloak and dagger" aspects of CIA and the DCI.

2. I intended to suggest to the President that CIA be represented in his inter-departmental organization to examine foreign aid, or alternatively that we have an adviser or consultant sit with the committee. I would like the staff to give some consideration to this idea and give me their views upon my return.

3.4(b)(1)

However, there is some question as to whether we should become involved, either by direct participation or as consultants in this field.

3. The political action in Chile was not discussed. I would like more information upon my return on Item 4a and 4b.

3.4(b)(1)

3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

I am told that with three parties running for election in Chile that the Parliament or Congress has the final right to select one of the two candidates who receives the highest number of votes for the presidency. It is not necessary to select the one with the highest number. The number two man can be selected and legitimately established. Competent observers of the outlook of Chile politics have advised me that they feel that under no circumstances would the Socialist-Communist Popular Front candidate be chosen by the Parliament and furthermore, if by any chance he were, the military would not permit him to take office and a situation similar to that which developed in Peru a year ago would result.

[REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

3.4(b)(1)

4. [REDACTED]

5. I did review briefly the items which could be covered at an NSC meeting. There was no agreement to call an NSC meeting for the specific purpose of reviewing the estimates on Communist China economy and armed forces and the Sino-Soviet dispute, although I believe this would be useful and should be arranged at an early date.

6. I did not bring up the question of the reorganization of USIB because it has not been cleared by the Joint Chiefs. In a later telephone conversation with General Carter I asked that he advise Gilpatric to postpone the effective date of the reorganization until I have had a chance to discuss the subject with the JCS.

16. I told the President that we had just completed a successful CORONA shot and had recovered the capsule. It was a [ ] mission and we would expect a considerable amount of useful photography, probably covering as much as [ ] of Soviet and ChiCom territory. [ ]

3.4(b)(1)

[ ] I explained to him again the value of CORONA photography and stated that we would have frequent flights in the future. I reviewed briefly some of the photography which was sent to me, pointing out particularly such items [ ]

3.4(b)(1)

[ ] as examples of very useful intelligence gained through satellite photography. I did not go into details concerning [ ] because of the shortness of time. This item might be placed on an agenda for a more extensive briefing in January.