

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 list	<del>list of meetings</del> S 1 p. <i>Open 2-10-00 NLT 95-28</i>	<del>9/5/69</del>	<del>A</del>
#2 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 1/6/64 S 1 p. <i>Sanitized 2-10-00 NLT 95-28</i>	1/6/64	A
#3 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 1/7/64 S 4 pp. <i>Sanitized 2-10-00 NLT 95-28</i>	1/8/64	A
#4 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 1/8/64 S 2 pp. <i>Sanitized 2-10-00 NLT 95-28</i> <i>more info released 7-15-05 NW 04-215</i>	1/8/64	A
#4a memo	<del>Memorandum</del> S 2 pp. <i>Open 2-10-00 NLT 95-28</i>	<del>1/8/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#5 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 1/10/64 S 2 pp. <i>Sanitized 2-10-00 NLT 95-28</i>	1/10/64	A
#6 memo	for the Director/Meeting on 1/13/64 S 5 pp. <i>Sanitized 2-10-00 NLT 95-28</i>	1/15/64	A
#7 memo	Memorandum of Meeting/Meeting on 1/14/64 S 2 pp. <i>Sanitized 2-10-00 NLT 95-28</i>	1/14/64	A
#8 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 1/16/64 S 2 pp. <i>Sanitized 2-10-00 NLT 95-28</i> <i>same sanitization 7-15-05 NW 04-215</i>	1/17/64	A
#9 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 2/3/64 S 2 pp. <i>Sanitized 2-10-00 NLT 95-28</i> <i>more info released 7-15-05 NW 04-215</i>	2/3/64	A
#9a memo	Addendum S 3 pp. <i>Sanitized 2-10-00 NLT 95-28</i> <i>more info released 7-15-05 NW 04-215</i>	2/4/64	A
#9b memo	for Discussion with the President S 1 p. <i>Sanitized 2-10-00 NLT 95-28</i> <i>same sanitization per NLT-2001-18 11/21/02</i>	2/3/64	A
#10 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 2/7/64 S 3 pp. <i>Sanitized 2-10-00 NLT 95-28</i>	2/8/64	A
#11 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 2/20/64 S 3 pp. <i>Open 8-5-95 NLT 93-394</i> <i>OPEN 4-20-98 PER JFK BOARD</i>	<del>2/21/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#12 memo <i>(NOT OPEN)</i>	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 2/20/64 S 2 pp. <i>Sanitized 9-25-97 NLT 93-382</i> <i>Sanitized per JFK board 8/6/98</i> <i>same sanitization per NLT-2001-18 11/21/02</i> <i>(same sani 8/26/05 NLT 05-89)</i>	2/20/64	A

FILE LOCATION

John McCone Memoranda, Meetings with the President, "6 January 1964 - 2 April 1964," Box 1

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#13 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 2/26/64 S 4 pp. <i>Sanitized 2-10-00 NLS 95-28</i> <i>Sanitized per NIS/RAC 01-18 &amp; NIS 95-28 11/21/02</i> <i>(A file info released)</i>	2/27/64	A
<del>#14 memo</del>	<del>Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 3/13/64</del> <del>S 2 pp. <i>Open 8-9-95 NLS 93-394</i></del>	<del>3/13/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#15 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 4/1/64 S 3 pp. <i>Sanitized 2-10-00 NLS 95-28</i> <i>same sanitization per NIS-RAC 01-18 11/21/02</i>	4/1/64	A
<del>#16 memo</del>	<del>Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 4/2/64</del> <del>S 2 pp. <i>Sanitized 2-10-00 NLS 95-28</i></del> <i>Open per NIS/RAC 01-18 11/21/02</i>	<del>4/2/64</del>	<del>A</del>

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Sent to Mr. Jorden on 5 Sept.'69

Memoranda for the Record of Meetings between Mr. McCone and the President

47. 6 January 1964. Review of State of the Union message.
48. 7 January 1964. NSC meeting on Indonesia/Malaysia
49. 8 January 1964. Intelligence briefing.
50. 10 January 1964. Meeting on Panama.
51. 13 January 1964. Meeting on Panama.
52. 14 January 1964. Meeting on AG trip to Sukarno.
53. 16 January 1964. Briefing of Congressional members.
54. 3 February 1964. Review of DCI's European trip
55. 7 February 1964. Meeting on Cuba.
56. 20 February 1964. Meeting on Vietnam.
57. 20 February 1964. Review of intelligence items.
58. 26 February 1964. Intelligence items, Ghana.
59. 13 March 1964. Report on trip to Vietnam.
60. 1 April 1964. Meeting on Brazil.
61. 2 April 1964. NSC intelligence briefing.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLI 95-28  
By CB, NARA Date 10-19-99

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6 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting to discuss the President's State of the Union Message

ATTENDANCE: The President, Rusk, Ball, Thompson, Rostow, McNamara, Wilson, Schlesinger, Sorenson, Bundy and McCone

Meeting involved a page-by-page review of the final draft of the State of the Union message. Innumerable changes were introduced, some accepted, some modified, some rejected. Bundy raised the question of South Vietnam and appropriate wording was introduced concerning "crossing borders from men and arms from Hanoi and Havana".

The President questioned McNamara closely as to whether all things possible were being done in South Vietnam. McNamara answered affirmatively and then advocated the Proposed North Vietnam Operations which are to be reviewed on Tuesday.

McCone raised the question of omission of any reference to New Obligation Authority (NOA). After some discussion the President instructed Sorenson to include appropriate references to NOA, indicating the amount of \$102 billion dollars.

McCone raised the question of the absence of any reference to the individual's own responsibility in the instance of poverty. The President felt some wording might be included. There was a resistance to any wording being too specific; however it was agreed that certain modifications should be made.

The President wished to place great emphasis on the overtime clause, indicating that if overtime was eliminated, it might create as many as a million additional jobs. McNamara took strong objection, stating that overtime was a must in certain industries at certain times.

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NLJ 95-28

By cb, NARA Date 10-19-99

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JAM. (tape)

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

18 JAN 1964

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 95-28**  
**By cb, NARA Date 10-11-99**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting - 7 January 1964

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Speaker McCormack  
Attorney-General

White House Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
Mr. Michael Forrestal  
Mr. T.C. Sorensen  
Mr. Pierre Salinger

Treasury Secretary Dillon

Defense General LeMay  
Mr. William Bundy

STATE Secretary of State  
Under Secretary Harriman  
Assistant Secretary Hilsman

AEC Mr. Seaborg

AID Mr. David Bell  
Mr. R. Poats

1. The meeting opened with a briefing by Mr. McCone on the situation in Southeast Asia and Indonesia/Malaysia.

2. Secretary Rusk stated that the principal question for discussion was Indonesia; that the Congressional legislation signed on 16 December 1963 made it desirable that a Presidential determination on continued aid to Indonesia be made. He said that Indonesia was facing a watershed point between a face saving solution, which will permit negotiations and a return to some degree of calm on the one

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hand, or further confrontation which may develop into Indonesian aggression against Malaysia. This might involve the British and even Australia and New Zealand, in which case we would be required to look to our commitments under the ANZUS pact. He stated that he would prefer if we could delay a decision on this question if legally feasible and if the Congressional leaders would permit it. However, if a decision was necessary, it would be preferable to make a limited and reviewable positive determination which would offer the U.S. a chance to work on Sukarno and Indonesia rather than cutting our ties and possibly inspiring a substantial reaction from Sukarno. He referred specifically to a memorandum for the President prepared by the Department prior to the meeting.

3. Mr. Bell stated that AID's legal judgment was that the President had only a reasonable time after 16 December in which to make a determination for on-going aid in the pipeline and that any new obligations must be suspended until the Presidential determination is made.

4. Secretary McNamara commented that he concurred with Secretary of State's position but if a positive determination were made the President should direct him and Mr. Bell to go through the pipeline and weed out items which would have a direct relationship with Sukarno's confrontation capability, without however bringing about the difficulties of a full cessation.

5. The President asked the Speaker's view, who replied that Sukarno had certainly made a highly supercilious impression in Congress and that he believed it essential that we play very straight with our friends as a general principle; as the British are in trouble at this point we should give them a full sense of solidarity. At the same time he agreed that the problem was a very close one and he could not disagree with the Secretary of State's position, but believed that the matter should be carefully followed with due consideration of the interest of our friends.

6. Secretary Rusk commented that he agreed on both counts with the Speaker, but he pointed out that both the British and Australians are endeavoring to retain some contact with Sukarno in order to

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
3

continue negotiations and the Australians are even continuing aid for this purpose. He therefore believed it not yet time to consider the matter hopeless.

7. The Attorney-General pointed out that we were talking about positive aid and that an announcement of Presidential determination in this positive sense could hardly be anything but a boost to Sukarno and his current policies. He asked whether anything might be done to counter this predictable effect so that it would not be a vote of confidence. He also commented that U.S. public opinion would find such a determination hard to understand. Secretary Rusk recognized these factors but pointed out that a real break in our contact with Indonesia and its 100 million population would be a major setback to U.S. interests, of greater long term importance even than the loss of Vietnam. He reiterated his preference to delay the decision and there was some discussion as to whether this was absolutely necessary.

8. Mr. Bundy expressed his agreement with the Attorney-General's attitude but came to a different conclusion in line with that of Secretary Rusk. He predicted, however, difficulties in the future with Sukarno and commented that while Ambassador Jones had done an outstanding job of accomplishing what had been possible with regard to drawing Sukarno toward us, he was not the man to put across a hard U.S. determination that Sukarno should stop his adventures. He thus suggested that a special tough emissary might be selected to do this and he nominated the Attorney-General. The Attorney-General turned aside the suggestion.

9. Mr. McCone summarized the views of the Board of National Estimates and suggested that it is desirable not to exacerbate the situation. While we cannot offer much real hope of positive developments from the Macapagal/Sukarno meeting he believed it possible that something might come out of this.

 He also agreed with the idea of a special emissary to Sukarno and suggested that if it were necessary the President approve a limited determination.

1.5(c)(d)  
3.4(b)(1)(6)

10. Governor Harriman agreed that the determination should be signed in order to maintain a foot in the door with Sukarno, commenting that our aid is down to a low level already. He pointed out that the situation will not resolve in the near future and we should keep plugging

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at it. He also commented that the Afro Asians in the United Nations were more apt to support Malaysia and the Philippines if the guerrilla operations should go to the United Nations. Secretary Dillon believed it should not be ourselves who force the issue with Sukarno but that any determination should be temporary and not have any fixed period.

11. General LeMay stated that the JCS believed we should keep a foot in the door with Sukarno and the Indonesian military, that we should exclude items of aid which might assist confrontation and that we should await the results from the Manila meeting which might give some indications.

12. The President then stated that he believed that we should speak to the Congressional leaders, describing the delicate and difficult problem before us and the fact that the President had talked about this problem with President Macapagal during his visit here. He believed we should examine the situation carefully, particularly the results of the Manila meeting, that further consideration should be given to dispatching an emissary, that we should consult with the British and other appropriate allies and that we should keep the pipeline going. He commented that he would not want to pull the rug out from under Macapagal who is now working on an effort the President himself asked him to conduct. The President said that he could not in good conscience at this time say that aid to Sukarno is essential to the national interest.

13. Secretary McNamara then suggested that the Attorney-General give a legal decision as to whether a Presidential determination is or is not required for the pipeline, pointing out that the Defense lawyers say that it is not, while AID lawyers say that it is. The Attorney-General stated that he would try to determine how this question should be answered in the national interest prior to his doing the legal homework on it.



William E. Colby  
Chief, Far East Division

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

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8 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President - 5:30 on 8 January 1964

1. Reviewed Estimate 11-14 as outlined in attached memorandum dated 8 January.
2. Reviewed general reconnaissance satellite program, demonstrating two or three photos, particularly the one of Washington. Advised the President we had now identified 234 ICBM launch sites and about 700 IRBM launch sites, about 125 probably in operation. While this was a lesser number of ICBMs than we had, we must always bear in mind that they are very large and carry warheads in the several megaton range and this gives me concern.
3. Advised the President we were going to conduct the inspection of the Dimona reactor in Israel starting January 14th, a good team had been selected from the AEC and I knew they were good because of the background of my personal relationship with them.
4. Gave the President the memorandum on 20 Latin American countries which he retained to read.
5. Reviewed the status of Cuban economic developments, armed shipments and troop training as reported in [redacted] dated 8 January 1964, attached.
6. Discussed briefing of Congressional Committee Chairmen. President advised he planned a dinner for the Chairmen and the senior minority members of principal committees and their wives. After dinner -- the wives upstairs -- he would ask me to give a 10-minute review of the Soviet economics; McNamara 5 minutes on the military posture; and Rusk 5 minutes on the political problems.
7. Advised the President I had completed plans to brief the Heads of State, Europe, as follows:

President Segni and Saragat of Italy when they are here next week.

Following week I would brief de Gaulle and others in Paris and Erhard and others in Bonn.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 04-215 and NLJ 95-28

By us, NARA, Date 2-1-05

E.O. 12958 3.3(b)(1); 6.2(c)

Then I would brief Lord Home and his party  
when they are here in February.

This was agreed.

8. Reviewed briefly President Kennedy's letter to me of  
January 16 and asked for reaffirmation of DCI responsibilities as  
outlined in the letter or any modifications which he desired. The  
President kept the letter and advised he would communicate.

JAM/



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4a  
8 January 1964

MEMORANDUM

The United States Intelligence Board concluded its estimate on Soviet general purpose forces this morning.

They conclude:

1. The Soviets maintain 110 to 140 line divisions of which 60 to 75 are considered as at combat strength (85% or more), the remainder at reduced strength (60% to 70%), or at cadre strength (25% or less).

3.	Command and support	400,000
	Ground forces	1,600,000 - 1,800,000
	Tactical air	150,000
	Naval	400,000
	Total general purpose including command and support	2,550,000 - 2,750,000
	Strategic defense forces	400,000
	Strategic attack forces	300,000
	Total armed services	3,250,000 - 3,450,000

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By cb, NARA Date 10-19-99

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3. The satellite ground forces estimated at 62 divisions at various strengths and effectiveness - about 940,000 men.

4. The Soviets could place 50 to 60 divisions (including 5 to 15 satellite divisions) on line against Western Europe within about 30 days after decision. This includes 22 divisions now in East Germany and Poland.

Total combat and support manpower in these forces would be 910,000 to 1,100,000.

5. Ground force divisions are modern and mobile, but deficient both qualitatively and quantitatively in support and other equipment. They are backed by large mobilization potentation.

6. Divisions equipped with tactical missiles, nuclear and toxic bombs and warheads.

7. Soviets have a deficiency of tactical air, an offensive naval capability, air lift and sea lift.

8. Soviet basic military doctrine anticipates nuclear war from the start or shortly thereafter. Forces are not equipped for warfare in remote areas.

9. We know there are sharp differences among military planners and hence the evolution of Soviet forces seems to be based on compromise.

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**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 95-28**  
**By cb, NARA Date 10-19-99**

10 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: White House Meeting on Panama, 10 January 1964

Present were:	The President
For State:	Messrs. Rusk, Ball, Mann, Martin, and Collins
For Defense:	Messrs. McNamara, Vance, and Ailes
For USIA:	Mr. Wilson
For the White House:	Messrs. Bundy, Dungan, Salinger, and Moyers
For CIA:	Messrs. McCone and Helms

1. The meeting opened at 0930 without the President who joined at 1015. The initial effort was to establish the facts which had caused the riots of the night before in Panama City and the Canal Zone. Mr. Mann briefed on the flag incident and the background of the flag controversy between the United States and Panama. Casualty figures up to that point were cited and agreed on at least as far as Americans were concerned (3 United States soldiers dead, 34 Americans injured). Mr. McCone pointed out that Panamanian Communists had taken advantage of the flag incident to kick off trouble of a kind which we had been predicting ever since last summer would occur the end of December or early in January.

[REDACTED]

(Mr. McCone repeated this briefing later when the President had joined the meeting.) The undersigned spoke of the Panamanian student-organized demonstration which was scheduled to begin at 1100 today, also of the problems which might arise depending upon where it was decided to bury the students killed in the rioting the night before. There then followed a general discussion of the tactics to be used in dealing with these problems in the OAS, the United Nations Security Council, with President Chiari, etc. Attention was given to the handling of the Senate and House leadership in connection with the problem.

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

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- 2 -

2. After the President took over the meeting, he was brought up to date on the situation in Panama and on the actions which the Secretary of State was proposing. After considerable discussion of these proposals, the following were decided upon:

A) The President would speak on the telephone with President Chiari, provided that Mr. Salinger was able to ascertain through President Chiari's Press Secretary that President Chiari would receive the telephone call.

B) Mr. Mann would head a delegation representing President Johnson to leave for Panama immediately, this group to include Messrs. Vance, Martin, and Dungan. [REDACTED]

C) The OAS Peace Committee would be encouraged to make an immediate investigation of the situation on the ground.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

D) Mr. Ball would get in immediate touch with the congressional leadership to brief them on developments.

E) The White House would issue a statement to the press announcing the Mann mission and appealing for an end to violence in Panama.

3. There was considerable attention paid to the history of difficulties with Panama over the Canal Zone. Touched on were the legal problems, financial considerations, and the traditional attitudes of the "Zonies" who have always had strong support from certain congressional committees.

[REDACTED]  
Richard Helms  
Deputy Director for Plans

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

Distribution:

Original - The Director ✓  
1 - Chief, WH  
1 - DD/P

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15 January 1964

6

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: White House Meeting on Panamanian Crisis - 13 January 1964.

1. Meeting was held in the Cabinet Room from approximately 2200, 13 January, to 0030, 14 January 1964.

Among those present were:

The President  
Secretary Rusk  
Secretary McNamara  
Under Secretary Bell  
Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
Secretary Vance  
Assistant Secretary Mann  
Assistant Secretary Manning  
Mr. Dungan, White House  
Mr. Lansing Collins, State  
Mr. McCone  
Colonel King

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**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLI 95-28**  
**By CB, NARA Date 10-19-99**

2. Subsequent to the departure from Panama of the Special Commission headed by Mr. Mann, a call had been received from Mr. Ed Martin, who remained in Panama, asking for instructions if a move to unseat Chiari by forces unfriendly to the United States, such as an Arnulfo Arias - Communist alliance (reported in PACY 1943) should occur. In reply to a question of the President as to what should we do in these circumstances, Mr. Mann recommended intervention with U.S. forces in Panamanian territory if so requested by President Chiari. Even if not requested, the U.S. should intervene anyway if necessary to prevent the taking over of the Government of Panama by a group consisting of Arnulfo-ista followers in joint action with the Communist Party. Mr. Rusk said there was an alternative to direct intervention without request by Chiari. This would be to persuade the Commandant of the National Guard to assume responsibility for the Republic of Panama and ask for help. In order to prepare for this eventuality, General O'Meara should inform Colonel Vallarino, Chief of the National Guard.

3. Mr. Mann agreed that Mr. Martin should tell President Chiari and General O'Meara to tell Vallarino that they can count on us and we will not tolerate a Commie takeover in Panama.

4. Mr. Rusk said he wished to recapitulate the various actions to be taken, which were:

a. Martin's approach to Chiari.

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- b. The military to get word to Vallarino to say that he can count on us in case of a Commie attempt.
- c. Also, leak or get word directly to Arnulfo Arias of U.S. decisions in order to forestall an action by him which could only end in disaster. Mr. Mann recommended Arias be told that we have reports about his plans which we do not believe, but just in case there might be some truth in them, word is being passed on not to engage in action doomed to failure.

5. The President, with the support of Mr. Rusk, said that if General O'Meara receives a request for assistance or if a situation develops which calls for intervention without request for assistance from any Panamanian authority, General O'Meara should call Secretary McNamara for approval first. Mr. McNamara will call Mr. Rusk, who will call the President.

6. Mr. Rusk commented that the Panamanian National Guard in the past, when faced with unsatisfactory political situations, has intervened and changed presidents. If this were possible now, it would be to the U.S. advantage to leave such an action to them. Mr. Rusk said he did not wish to give Chiari a blank check against a coup. Therefore, we should be explicit with Vallarino but not Chiari in promising support.

7. Mr. Bundy said that in the first report of Foreign Minister Solis's press conference, held this evening (13 January) there apparently was no denunciation of the Treaty. At this point, Mr. Mann commented how dejected Solis appeared at the second meeting with Chiari, in contrast with his relaxed and apparently happy demeanor at a meeting with the Commission earlier in the day. This could indicate a disagreement between Chiari and Solis as to the proper course of action. We should therefore play our hand carefully until sure that internal pressures will not change the present impasse. Mr. Mann then referred to the probable anti-American influence exerted on Chiari by Eloy Benedetti, who is legal advisor of the Foreign Ministry of Panama, and who was present at some of the meetings with the Commission. Benedetti was identified by a Cuban intelligence agent of undetermined reliability as a strong secret supporter of the revolutionary movement, and is known to have served as a lawyer for the Communist Party.

8. Mr. Mann proposed as a long-term solution to the Canal problem that negotiations be initiated with Colombia for a sea-level canal, with Nicaragua as a second option. When agreement is reached then talk with the Panamanians. Mr. Rusk replied that we cannot get

the kind of Treaty we want with Colombia and Nicaragua. Mr. Mann said he understood that such a canal would cost \$300,000,000. Mr. Ball dissented, and said it would cost two billion. Mr. Mann urged careful consideration, because the construction of another canal would resolve the perpetuity clause in the present controversial U.S. - Panama Treaty. Once it was known that another canal would be opened at a certain date, even though ten years away, we could then re-negotiate with the Panamanians on a time schedule granting certain of their demands which would coincide with the new canal. Mr. Mann said he was impressed by the size of the U.S. presence in the Canal Zone and Panama, and felt that with such a large number of Americans there our political problems would mount. A sea-level canal would require a relatively small number of American employees to man it.

9. Mr. Rusk asked what would happen on the supposition that Panama proceeds on the basis that present treaties are abrogated. Mr. Dungan said it would be tough if the large number of Panamanian workers now employed by the Canal were no longer available, but we could continue to operate the Canal.

10. Mr. McNamara, who had stepped outside the room to converse with General O'Meara by phone, reported that the possibility of the Arnulfista-Commie coup had been passed to Chiari.

11. In response to a question of the President, as to the involvement of Castro [REDACTED] Mr. McCone recalled a report [REDACTED] which had warned of a move in December 1963 - January 1964. The President requested that such reports be brought to his special attention. He did not wish to be caught in the position where we found ourselves at the time of Pearl Harbor, when certain reports apparently had not been properly highlighted.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

12. The President then asked Mr. Mann to give him a brief summary of events from his time of arrival in Panama. Mr. Mann began with his Chiari meeting the night of 10 January, up to the final meeting at 1500 on 13 January. The American position remained firm and consistent throughout, that we would not negotiate under duress, and that the first order of business was to restore peace. It was at the personal request of the Foreign Minister on the 11th that the Commission remained over Sunday, January 12. Mr. Vance said the flag issue was mentioned and a solution in accordance with previous treaty agreements promised, but that the Foreign Minister thought this did not mean much because it was merely compliance with an action already



agreed upon.

13. Mr. Rusk asked if the OAS Peace Committee possibly could help in restoration of relations, to which Mr. Dungan and Mr. Mann replied in the affirmative. Mr. Dungan then said that even the most moderate government of Panama will have to follow the nationalist line and be tough with the United States, because of the explosive temper of the populace. Mr. Mann agreed that we will have growing trouble.

14. Mr. Rusk listed four basic points affecting the situation:

- a. Our physical presence.
- b. Our presence is fundamental to the economic prosperity of Panama.
- c. The Peace Committee is not hostile to the U.S.
- d. Other Latin American countries have a big stake in our maintenance of the Canal. He added that against this is a feeling among the press corps that we have not dealt reasonably with Panama over the years, and believe that all segments of Panamanian life want revision of the Treaty. Mr. Mann commented that many of the permanent American civilian employees of the Canal are not adjusted nor friendly with the Panamanians and this contributes to our difficulties. Mr. Vance said that the ultimate issue is Panamanian sovereignty of the Canal. Mr. Rusk said that in his opinion (and he wished that his opinion be kept within the confines of the room) in the long run, the Canal would be placed under OAS supervision, but that this would not take place in the foreseeable future or while any of those around the table were actively in government.

15. Mr. Mann requested of the President permission to work up a plan starting from the premise that we cannot give up our present virtual sovereignty, but must look for other solutions. Mr. Ball said that one positive step would be the appointment of a new Board of Directors of Pan Canal, consisting of men with broader vision and experience than those at present.

16. Mr. Rusk asked what is the position of the Peace Commission, to which Mr. Mann replied that he believed eventually we should negotiate with the Panamanians, but that there should be no fixed requirements levied upon us before sitting down to discuss demands.

17. The President asked if there was impulsive military action on the part of the U.S. which may have led to some of the casualties. Mr. Vance replied categorically that there was none, and that our

troops showed great restraint under severe provocation from snipers' fire which they were not allowed to return. The President said we should tell our side of the story, that it had not been getting out to the world. It was agreed there should be an on-the-record account by Mr. Vance.

18. The President said we must be firm but not inflammatory. We are not telling our story properly because we are unjustifiably accused of impulsive military action. We have done nothing to be ashamed of and it is time to state some facts, since the Panamanians went after our kids and soldiers. In public statements we do not want to give any impression we are willing to consider revision of the Treaty.

19. Throughout most of the meeting there were interruptions to consider a press release. Numerous drafts and changes were submitted.

  
Chief

Western Hemisphere Division

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

CC: DDCI

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
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SANITIZED

14 January 1964

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

SUBJECT: To discuss Attorney General's trip to visit Sukarno

IN ATTENDANCE: The President, Secretary McNamara, Gov. Harriman,  
Mr. Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Sorenson

Arrangements have been completed for a meeting on Saturday, January 18th, in Tokyo with Sukarno and Subandrio and in all probability, Nasution.

It was decided that no Presidential finding as required under the Gruening amendment would be made prior to the meeting.

AG's terms of reference were reviewed and modified to meet the wishes of the President and to incorporate some suggestions made.

Messages [REDACTED] were noted. Harriman pointedly stated that reports were excellent, he was deeply appreciative, [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

The AG and Bundy and Forrestal all concurred.

[REDACTED]  
Itinerary not definitely scheduled but tentatively leave late night January 14th, spend several hours in Honolulu, then proceed non-stop to Tokyo.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

Following actions are required:

1. [REDACTED] prepare concise memorandum of exactly what the AG can reveal to Sukarno, et al, concerning our knowledge of their guerrilla and military preparations and plans. (NOTE: Care must be taken [REDACTED] but statement must be made as comprehensive as possible.)

1.5(c)(d)  
3.4(b)(1)(6)

2. [REDACTED] have full file including classified information for review by AG and Forrestal when and as required.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 95-28  
By cb, NARA Date 10-19-99

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

3.

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)(d)  
3.4(b)(1)(G)

4.

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)(d)  
3.4(b)(1)(G)

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)(d)  
3.4(b)(1)(G)

JAM [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

# 2  
8

~~SECRET~~

17 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting at the White House - at Dinner - Evening of January 16th

1. The President gave a dinner for the senior minority members of all principal committees of the Senate. In addition there were several other Senators; in all there were about 40 members of the Senate.
2. Prior to the dinner the President called me on the telephone, asked the subject of my briefing and the time. I responded that it would be short - perhaps 7 or 8 minutes - and that it would cover the Soviet military posture and the Soviet economy.
3. After the guests had assembled, all the men went down to a theater conference room in the basement.
4. The President introduced me in complimentary terms, referring to background of various assignments in Government and giving the nod to the work of the CIA and the intelligence community.
5. I presented the briefing, using the cards attached - no graphics.
6. I was followed by Kermit Gordon who spoke of the budget, explaining the reductions that had been accomplished and emphasizing that even though the rate of spending for '65 was less than '64, reductions in specific areas, most particularly the military and space (rate of spending), gave room to finance the various measures mentioned in the President's State of the Union address.
7. Then Secretary McNamara spoke (without reference to notes which were in his pocket) and reviewed the military posture of the United States. McNamara gave comparative figures on aircraft, missiles, submarines, concluding that we were 2-1/2 to 3 times as well off as the Soviets and that they would never catch us. He made no reference to the fact that they were equipped with larger missiles and larger warheads than we are. Made no reference to the IRBM/MRBM's that face Western Europe. He displayed two charts showing the production and the requirements for U-235 and plutonium, indicating that even with the recently-announced cutback, our inventory would exceed our requirements by an appreciable amount through 1972.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 04-215  
By iss, NARA, Date 2-1-05

E.O. 12958  
3.3 (b) (1) and 6.2 (c)

8. Secretary Rusk reviewed briefly the Panamanian situation, indicating that there would be continuing discussions aimed at resolving all differences between Panama and the United States. He then turned briefly to relationship with Russia, emphasizing that there is "no detente", that serious problems continue and that we cannot afford to be lulled by the apparent pause in the belligerent attitude of the Soviets.

9. Following the briefings, we joined the ladies at dinner.

10. My briefing was favorably commented upon, especially by 10 or 12 of the Senators.

JAM [REDACTED] (tape)



~~SECRET~~9

3 February 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President, 3 February, 12:00 noon.  
No one else present.

1. Reviewed the subjects discussed on my trip as outlined in memoranda dated 2/3 and 2/1 attached.
2. President reviewed the names of individuals contacted by me per attachment.
3. President asked what Latin American country would go next. Replied probably Honduras and read report in 2/3 PICL. The President suggested I talk over course of action with Rusk.
4. President asked for a briefing on 2/4 on Africa.
5. Discussed the French situation in considerable detail, advising the President there is no communication between the United States and the French on policy matters in areas of common concern. I observed that this had been true ever since the early days of de Gaulle's assumption of office. Eisenhower had three times visited de Gaulle in one year but had never discussed substantive matters with him. Bohlen had no means of communicating on substantive matters. As a result I could see nothing but continuing increasing disunity among the Western allies during a period when maximum unification was clearly indicated. I reviewed my discussion [redacted] concerning de Gaulle's visit to the United States and the reasons why President Johnson could not visit de Gaulle at Martinique. Recalled [redacted] comments concerning "protocol" and the necessity for having an emissary. Stated that I felt that General Eisenhower was the only man who might be able to talk seriously with de Gaulle, but I felt this impractical because of the forthcoming election. The President seemed to agree but made no specific comment.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 04-215 enr NLJ 95-28

By ju, NARA, Date 2-1-05

E.O. 12958

3.3 (b)(1)(6)

~~SECRET~~

6. I elaborated in considerable detail on the effect that the easing of tensions in such agreements as the Test Ban was having on the indigenous parties in France, Italy and elsewhere. I recalled [REDACTED] comments concerning the increased strength of the Communist Party in France and Italy because of the Test Ban Agreement. I noted that this was not confirmed in Italy by anyone with whom I spoke, but that President Segni, while not attributing any problem to the Test Ban Agreement, did confirm rapprochements with the Soviets is strengthening the Communist Party in Italy. Therefore, he urged we seek and reach agreement only on matters of real importance and substance and that we avoid reaching agreements merely to be making agreements.

7. |

8. In all of the above the President had no particular comment to make. He listened intently, but seemed preoccupied with other matters.

JAM: [REDACTED]



9a

4 February 1964

ADDENDUM:

Following additional items on memorandum of discussion with the President, 3 February 1964:

1. With respect to Panama I told the President that there was complete misunderstanding throughout Europe of the U. S. - Panama issue. The popular impression which I ran into in a great many places was that the United States actually committed acts of aggression against Panama. To hear some people talk you would think that our Marines had entered Panama City, shooting up buildings, killing people, etc. The facts simply are not known and neither the press nor the radio seem to be correcting this impression (no mention was made of any USIA broadcasts). I therefore told the President the first thing we had to do was to get the facts out into the open and I would favor an exhaustive public debate on the question of "U. S. aggression in Panama" either in the Council of OAS or in the United Nations, or both. I thought the unwillingness to state the facts, including the Castro-Communist activity in Panama, was entirely wrong and placed the United States in a very bad light. The President made no comment. He then asked me what I thought we should do and I said we have to stand firm until the situation had cooled off. That it would be a mistake to offer concessions in the view of threats by Panamanian political leaders and agitators. We must operate the Canal and protect it and we may have to engage in a protracted "cooling off period."

2. With respect to France's attitude in Southeast Asia, I told the President that my talks [REDACTED] evidenced that the French were convinced that we simply could not win in Southeast Asia by trying to train the South Vietnamese to fight off guerrilla operations. They expressed the opinion that the guerrilla operations could be mounted indefinitely by the North Vietnamese with very little effort and that the monumental effort by the United States to support the South Vietnamese resistance would soon erode away. Feeling as

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By ins, NARA, Date 2-1-05

E.O. 12958

3.3(b)(1)



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

they did they thought the consequences of our policy and action would be the ultimate loss of all Southeast Asia since they were sincerely convinced our procedure would fail, they felt the only alternative was one of negotiation and for that reason de Gaulle decided to recognize Communist China. They furthermore emphasized that North Vietnam and China were traditional enemies and the French knew this from a great many years of experience with these people. They felt that our position that North Vietnamese, Vietnam and Communist China were one and the same was entirely wrong. Their policy would lead to an independent North Vietnam which would be neutral and free of the domination of Communist China and that a similar situation would develop in South Vietnam. They urged that we not take it for granted that they favor unification of North and South Vietnam. This they had not advocated officially but rather looked to the neutralization of the entire area. They disclaimed any desires to extend influence in South Vietnam, however, it is obvious to me that they wish to reestablish French influence in Southeast Asia, just as they desire to reestablish French influence in all areas of the world where France has been traditionally influential as a dominant power.

3. In discussing the trip of the Attorney General, I advised the President that [REDACTED] all seemed to be totally uninformed concerning the purpose of the Attorney General's trip. I emphasized [REDACTED] and in great detail, the reason why the trip was necessary in the interest of Indonesia-United States relation and the fact the President was obliged by law to make a "finding of fact" before aid to Indonesia could proceed. I further stated the Attorney General's involvement in the past, his discussions with Sukarno in Tokyo were by understanding prior to the AG's departure from Washington, to be the result of his discussions with Sukarno. These discussions led to the conclusion that he should see Macapagal and/or the Tunko which would engage in extensive discussions on the Malaysia-Indonesia-Philippine issue and then it was his intention to proceed. On the other hand, his discussions with Sukarno which involved only Indonesia-U. S. relations were final and he would not pursue the border issue.

No one with whom I talked understood these instructions. They had been informed but it had not registered or they had been disabused of such intention by others. There was obviously a great deal

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

of bitterness in the feeling that the United States had taken a unilateral action without informing them. I do not feel that my talks were necessarily convincing, however, I do feel that probably to some extent they eased the reactions upon the Attorney General's arrival in Britain after his visits in Indonesia and elsewhere.

(tape)

JAM: [REDACTED]

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98  
3 February 1964

For discussion with the President:

General conclusions from the trip.

- EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs  
(C)
1. No substantial disagreements on the estimates of Soviet military posture and economic conditions [redacted]
- EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs  
(C)
2. Violent criticism of French recognition of Communist China and other French actions [redacted]
- EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs  
(C)
3. No meaningful communication [redacted] on formulation of policies of mutual interest.
- EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs  
(C)
4. Explanation [redacted] of Southeast Asia situation.
- EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs  
(C)
5. Views on the strength of Communist parties [redacted]
- EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs  
(C)
6. [redacted] views on credits to Soviet Union [redacted]
- EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs  
(C)
7. Attorney General's trip to Indonesia and the Yemen.
- EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs  
(C)
8. Complete lack of correct appreciation of the Panama problem and events. Lack of appreciation [redacted] of the Castro threat. No particular inclination to support an economic denial program.
- EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs  
(C)
9. Yugoslavia's improved relations with Moscow [redacted]
- EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs  
(C)
10. MLF supported [redacted] but support withheld because of internal political problems; no evidence of support [redacted]
- EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs  
(C)
11. [redacted]

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By us, NARA, Date 10-31-02



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10  
SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 95-28  
By CG, NARA Date 10-19-99

8 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting at the White House 7 February 1964

1. At 5 p.m. the same group plus Secretary Rusk, Mr. Ball, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Donald Wilson, USIA, and Mr. Theodore Sorensen met with the President. Mr. McCone commenced with a briefing of the facts which had been established as follows: First, Cuban public statements, press releases and broadcasts have in the last ten days featured the Guantanamo issue. Second, the Cuban ships were fishing in our territorial waters on February 2nd and there were fish aboard of the type caught in these waters. Third, there was no absolute evidence that the ships were dispatched or directed to national waters as against having been directed into traditional United States fishing grounds. Fourth, Cuban authorities were advised that the ships were in U.S. national waters at the time they were seized. Fifth, it should be noted that Castro's actions regarding the Guantanamo water supply took place four days after the ships were apprehended which raises some question as to whether Guantanamo was a part of the original plan.

2. Mac Bundy stated that the easiest part of the decision to be reached concerned the Florida legal problem. After hearing Meeker's briefing, the President agreed that the matter should be handled by the Florida courts as being in the nature of a first offense; that the crews would be released under temporary custody of Immigration and not fined; that the captains should be fined and that there should be no forfeiture of the vessels.

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3. On the question of Guantanamo and measures to be taken in response to Castro's act, Mr. Bundy said that the choices had narrowed down to alternatives one and two as set forth in the proposed releases. The argument centered around the question of the Base employees and the lines were quite clearly drawn. The Secretary of Defense strongly favored the dismissal of employees on the ground that only by this act could the Base be made "secure." General Taylor on balance supported the Secretary of Defense. Mr. Nitze on close balance favored not dismissing the employees but did not re-state his position in the later stage of the argument. Secretary Rusk suggested a compromise which would put special emphasis on the dollar contribution to Castro made by the Base wages.

4. The Attorney General repeated his very strong objection to the dismissal of the Base employees on the grounds that (a) it was an over-reaction to Castro's move and (b) it hurt the wrong Cubans who by and large had been loyal Base employees, some for more than a generation. Mr. McCone also opposed the dismissal on these grounds plus the fact that other countries in which we have bases might fear a similar action in the event of a disagreement with them. He also pointed out that our annual rental for Guantanamo is \$3,000. Without the economic benefits of the Base salaries, this rental figure will stand out and weaken our Guantanamo position. Mac Bundy stated that from the point of view of domestic reaction (which he said would be bad) there was little to choose between the two alternatives and that he favored alternative two.

5. The President clearly showed that he leaned toward alternative one, mainly on the ground of Base security. The argument went around again with Wilson voting for alternative two and the Secretary of State for alternative one with certain word changes. Mac Bundy at this point made a heated defense of alternative two.

6. Mr. Sorensen said that the course of the argument had indicated to him that neither alternative was adequate under the circumstances.

(7. 

1.3(c)  
3.4(b)(1)


~~SECRET~~

3



1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

8. The President chose alternative one.



1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

Desmond FitzGerald  
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

~~SECRET~~





21 FEB 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting on Vietnam, 20 February 1964

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
Mr. Forrestal

Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Mr. Sullivan

Deputy Secretary Vance, Assistant Secretary Bundy,  
General Taylor, General Anthis

Mr. Poats - Mr. Stoneman, AID

Mr. McCone - Mr. Colby

1. The meeting was called to present the members of the Sullivan Committee on Vietnam and to brief the President on the current situation. The meeting opened with a short CIA briefing on the overall situation, including a reference to the recent SNIE on the subject. Invited to comment on this, General Taylor indicated that he did not share the pessimism of the SNIE and that he believed that it would be possible to return to the situation of last October, at which time we were winning in the countryside despite the difficulties in the cities. Asked by the President to say what would be needed to accomplish this, General Taylor said that we should do our utmost to stabilize this government, vigorously press the National Pacification Plan, and place pressure on Ho Chi Minh. The present Phase I of the North Vietnam Plan, he said, needs to be augmented possibly by air bombardment of some key places. The Director commented that the present first phase of the North Vietnam Plan does little more than continue the earlier CIA operations. It was agreed that the plan would be reviewed by the Sullivan Committee in conjunction with an overall review of pressures on North Vietnam.

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By pn, NARA, Date 4-20-98

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2. The President was briefed on Mr. Cooper's job of determining what reporting is really needed and his forthcoming visit to Vietnam to implement a better reporting system.

3. The President was advised that we had little hard information on French activities but that the effect of their policies is obvious. Mr. Sullivan raised the danger of French instigation of a coup. In answer to the President's question, the Director said that we had no firm information to confirm General Khanh's allegations of French and neutralist plotting by the Generals he upset. Secretary Rusk stated that he believed that the French role in Vietnam is essentially passive and that he was dubious that they were engaged in any active conspiracies. Mr. Ball commented that there might be some individual Frenchmen doing some generalized talking which was misconstrued by the Vietnamese as more active official plotting.

4. The President reviewed the proposed reply to Ambassador Lodge's telegram in which he stated that the only additional assistance he might need would be additional funds. The President made it clear that he wished the reply to Lodge's telegram to indicate that we are very anxious to take prompt action to carry out any recommendations made by Lodge and that we merely request him to make more specific the economic aspects of his recommendations for more funds so that they can be implemented by the appropriate economic advisors. The President specifically did not wish Lodge to receive a bureaucratic reply and then complain that his recommendations had been handled in less than a vigorous fashion in Washington.

5. With respect to dependents, the President expressed his opinion that dependents were exposed to unnecessary risks and would be better off here, permitting the sponsors to work full time at their job. Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Vance raised the psychological effect and Mr. Vance recommended that the matter be held in abeyance until Mr. McNamara's forthcoming visit to Vietnam. The President accepted this recommendation, but hoped that Mr. McNamara could go soon and that the dependents could be brought out soon. General Taylor mentioned the problems this would cause in respect to short

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tours of military personnel. The President agreed that this matter should be reviewed, but he hoped there would be a rapid answer. The psychological aspect he believed could be posed in the sense of a rolling up of our sleeves, not of a pull out of Vietnam. Pending Mr. McNamara's trip, it was agreed that voluntary departures would be authorized.

McCone stated that in his opinion pulling out of dependents from Vietnam would have a good psychological effect rather than a poor one. He said it would indicate a more aggressive attitude on the part of the U.S. and a less relaxed posture on the part of both U.S. military and civilian personnel. The President agreed completely with McCone's viewpoint. McCone then raised the question of removing dependents voluntarily. It was agreed this could be done by each department or agency unilaterally. McCone stated that CIA personnel usually volunteered to do what CIA wanted them to do and hence he felt that a voluntary program would be effective with CIA dependents. The President commented he understood that CIA personnel were so disciplined.

6. Secretary Rusk briefed the President on Sikanghouk's recent offer, to which the President indicated his full approval of pursuing vigorously this opening. Secretary Rusk also briefed the President that some interagency proposals are under consideration with respect to Laos and that specific proposals would be forthcoming in the near future, especially having to do with the possibility of SEATO support and a reconvening of the Geneva Conference to demand adherence to its agreements by the Communists.

7. Again re North Vietnam, the President was advised that some overall planning is in process and he recommended that this be accelerated. He believed it essential to carry the fight to the enemy and that this be beyond pin-pricking, as the criticism of our passive position in the face of the deterioration of the situation is growing and can lead to a defeatist approach. The President also was briefed on the radio and propaganda measures taken against North Vietnam both by the VOA and by the Vietnamese with American support. The President expressed the hope that all concerned would vigorously approach the question of what else we can do to win the war. In this connection he suggested that Secretary Rusk arrange for an adequate briefing of Senator Mansfield to try to turn off some of his negativism. Secretary Rusk stated that the most useful thing we could have in the near future would be some substantial military victories.

Prepared by Mr. Colby except for insert dictated by Mr. McCone as second part of paragraph 5. above.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

12

20 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President - 20 February 1964 - Alone

1. I advised the President of my willingness to go with him and to meet early in the day with General Eisenhower if he thought this would be constructive. He said he felt General Eisenhower might feel he was being high-pressured and that he intended merely to advise him of the plan to surface the OXCART and exchange formalities. He would then tell him he was ordering me to go out and brief him in the next week or two and I should make my own arrangements.

2. I told the President we had a very sensitive effective operation working in Mexico City [redacted] which involved telephone surveillance and was being done in a most careful manner [redacted]

[redacted] Ambassador Mann knew of this from Scott, as did certain selected people in State Department. [redacted] did not know of Mann's knowledge of the operation and looked upon the operation as an [redacted] arrangement between [redacted] and the CIA station. [redacted] I said the President should not mention this but I wanted him to know about it [redacted]

3. I told President Johnson that we continued our interrogation of Nosenko; our counterintelligence people were inclined to feel he was a plant but had not made up their minds. President said he thought he was probably legitimate and would give us some good information. I said I hoped this was true - that we certainly were taking advantage of everything that he did give us; that we were working closely with the FBI, however we could only conclude at the moment that the Soviet's performance and action were so different from any other defector case that our suspicions had been aroused. The President asked to be kept informed.

4. The President then raised the question of Spain, suggesting I might return to Spain to talk again to Franco. He said he was in a very difficult situation because of announcement of the cut-off of aid to Britain, France and Yugoslavia which he did not know about until he read it in the paper, and that he was beside himself because he wanted to give aid of \$31 million to Spain but had the greatest difficulty in the justification.

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~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

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By ies, NARA, Date 10-31-02

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

I told the President it was my impression from information gained from clandestine sources that Franco had made some moves to curtail trade with Cuba after my visit with him but that the Spanish companies were endeavoring to circumvent his orders by various surreptitious methods. The President asked that I study the matter carefully and speak to him about it next week.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

ACTION: I have asked Mr. O'Ryan to contact  and I am asking Mr. Ball to contact Ambassador Woodward to determine whether the Spanish had taken any actions which they have announced or might communicate to us which would indicate an intention on their part to curtail or restrict shipping or trade with Cuba.

5. The President then said he wanted to do everything possible to get me out of the cloak and dagger business. That he was tired of a situation that had been built up that every time my name or CIA's name was mentioned, it was associated with a dirty trick. He asked if our economic studies had stood up and I said yes, they had, and that they were reconfirmed and supported by an exhaustive article in TIME Magazine. The President seemed pleased at this, expressed satisfaction in CIA's operations but was most emphatic in his feelings that we should get away from the cloak and dagger image and expressed a determination to bring this about by statements he would make from time to time.

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

JAM/mfb



27 February 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President at 1:00 o'clock, February 26th;  
No one was present

1. Briefly discussed the trip to South Vietnam. President indicated he expected that I would be with the McNamara/Taylor group. He did not specifically ask that I go nor did I ask him whether I should. It seemed a foregone conclusion in his mind that I was going and he was looking forward to an objective and independent judgment of the situation in South Vietnam from me.

2. He expects me to brief Eisenhower in the near future. He had so told Eisenhower. He did not wish me to make a special trip for this purpose but suggested that I meet with Eisenhower as soon as convenient. I explained that if McNamara's trip was timed, as I expected it would be, I could leave on Wednesday, March 4th, see Eisenhower for about one day, proceed commercially by plane to Honolulu and join the McNamara party there. The President thought this was a good plan. Otherwise he thought I should brief Eisenhower at the earliest convenient time.

3. I told the President we had completed an extended CORONA coverage of the Soviet Union involving the photographing of [REDACTED] Soviet landmass. [REDACTED]

3.4 (b)(1) [REDACTED] This gave me an opportunity to discuss the CORONA J development. I said that the photography had not been completely studied but the evidences were that the Soviets were slowing up or stopping construction of soft ICBM sites and were emphasizing the construction of hard sites. [REDACTED]

3.4 (b)(1) [REDACTED] Khrushchev knew that through satellite photography we were learning the exact location of missile sites. He was not relocating them - what he was doing, he was hardening them, and this was costing them an enormous amount of money. The President expressed great interest in the subject of satellite photography and I asked for an hour's time to go over the program, the pictures and other details. He agreed. I suggested perhaps when he was flying some place I go with him and we could spend an hour or so together on this one subject. This he felt might be a good idea.

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NLJ/RAC 08-18 and NL 995-28  
By us, NARA, Date 10-31-02



ACTION: Remind me to follow this up and to make arrangements on a Presidential trip in the near future.

4. I then discussed the surfacing of the OXCART and advised him that Chairman Vinson and Senator Russell felt that their Committees should be fully informed by them and they wished to do this in advance of the announcement and also stated that Mr. Cannon wished me to meet with his Subcommittee prior to the announcement and that George Mahon wished to inform his committee prior to the announcement. I recommended that this be done but it be timed so the Committees would be advised practically concurrently with the announcement so that the press would not get the news before the President announced it. I said that if, for instance, he was to make the announcement Saturday morning (which he did not confirm as the time), then all of the Congressional actions should be taken Saturday morning. Thus the Congressmen would know in advance but not so much in advance that the press would get hold of the story. The President was very much against this. He felt that if the announcement was made on Saturday, we could inform the Committees on Monday. I stated that this would cause the Committee Chairmen and the Committees a great deal of trouble. With this Johnson picked up the phone to call Senator Russell; however the call was not returned and I did not get a final decision.

ACTION: Later I mentioned the question to Bundy and he said that he would have to get to the President and get a decision. Until this decision is forthcoming we should take absolutely no action with respect to the Hill. Bundy and I discussed the problem several times during the day, including a brief discussion at Mrs. J. F. Kennedy's residence when the President was there. However, Bundy did not think it appropriate to discuss it with the President on the particular occasion at Mrs. Kennedy's residence. This should be followed up with Bundy today.

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)>25Yrs  
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5. I then referred to the [redacted]

[redacted] This item refers to the withdrawal of the Soviets from Cuba and the turning over of the SAM sites to them. I said there was a high probability that the SAM sites would be placed in the hands of the Cubans who would have absolute control over them. I said that other evidence convinced us there would be a continuing withdrawal of Soviets from Cuba, but not a total withdrawal; however we could not gauge the exact numbers. I said that this, in my opinion, represented probably the next important crisis that we would face because Castro in his rather amicable but long press conference had raised the question of our penetrating illegally Cuban air space. I therefore recommended that this subject be discussed with Secretaries of State and Defense; that they be ordered to prepare contingency plans for such a situation, otherwise we would be confronted with an emergency.

all the lights in town would be on, and our course of action would have to evolve under an atmosphere of emergency. I pressed this point hard. The President asked if I had discussed it with McNamara and Rusk and I told him I had, on many occasions, but they seemed wholly preoccupied with the problem at hand and had never come to grips with this particular hypothetical but possible situation. The President gave me no satisfactory answer as to any action he would take. In fact, he seemed more preoccupied with the withdrawal of Soviets and the "numbers remaining" than he did with the issue I was confronting him with.

6. We were then joined by Secretary Rusk, Harriman, Edgar Kaiser and Mr. Calhoun and engaged in a long discussion on Ghana. Kaiser reported on his conversations with Nkrumah and his absolute and positive insistence that Nkrumah stop the anti-American actions in his country or else he, Kaiser, could not proceed with the work. Furthermore, under the climate that Nkrumah had developed Kaiser could not raise a single cent toward additional investments in Ghana. Nkrumah seemed to agree and said he was writing President Johnson.

The President asked Kaiser what he wished to do. Kaiser stated that he had a contract that had not been broken by Ghana despite the exasperating situation and that he intended to fulfill his contract. He reviewed the situation about as follows: Volta Dam will cost about \$200 million of which Ghana is putting up half and the other half is being put up by AID, the World Bank, the British, and the Export-Import Bank in varying amounts and for differing components or parts of the project. The aluminum plant will cost about \$150 million, about \$100 million has been put up by the Export-Import Bank and about \$50 million by the Kaiser-Reynolds Syndicate (Kaiser, 90% - Reynolds, 10%) but all of this is guaranteed by the United States Government. The entire \$350 million in the form of loans, there are no grants made. The power that Kaiser will take, representing half of the power generated at the dam, will pay for the entire project in 30 years. Kaiser stated that he could not forecast the permanence of his position in the project. It was entirely possible that Nkrumah would take it over. This was a risk and represented a very serious problem to him because he was proceeding with manufacturing outlets in Europe to utilize the raw aluminum produced. Despite this risk he was going forward. The President was noncommittal.


7. Later Governor Harriman stated he wanted to get together with me to reach a conclusion on our policy concerning the Volta Project. He was in favor of proceeding -- there were many who wished to cut and run. He sensed that I would favor staying with the project. What he was seeking was a partner to support his position.

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8.



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JAM/tape



13 March 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President, attended by Secretaries Rusk, and McNamara, Mr. Bundy and Mr. McCone -- To discuss South Vietnam report.

1. McNamara reviewed his report orally going over it page by page and ending up with the several recommendations, and explaining reasons why he had concluded against cross border operations, retaliatory operations or operations of a military nature to bring pressure on North Vietnam.

2. At McNamara's suggestion I stated my agreement with all that he proposed, but that I felt it was "too little too late" and then reviewed my reasoning and the additional proposals outlined in the foot-notes to the report.

3. General Taylor endorsed McNamara's proposals and expressed disapproval of mine, most particularly the use of Chinese Nationalist Divisions in the Delta and stated if this matter was put to the Chiefs they would unanimously oppose it.

4. McNamara then pointed out that the retaliatory and cross border operations were in effect proposed by him on the basis of taking all preparatory steps so that execution could be accomplished within 72 hours but he was not asking approval at this time. He said under no circumstances would he recommend the use of ChiNat Divisions.

5. The President asked that I prepare a very brief statement of my position and such recommendations as were additive to those of the McNamara report.

6. There was considerable discussion of Lodge's views and ideas of an approach to de Gaulle as contained in recent telegrams and it was left that McNamara and Rusk would discuss this matter with Ambassador Bohlen and agree upon a course of action.

7. The President then expressed the hope that McNamara and I would get together and settle our differences so we could have a common policy in which we all were in agreement. McNamara stated this was

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 93-394

By inp, NARA, Date 7-27-95

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impossible because he could not agree with the courses of action proposed by me which were in addition to those contained in his paper. The President deplored the fact that if such a split came before an NSC meeting with 30 or 40 people present, it would immediately become known to the press that the Government was divided between "hawks and doves" and there would be great press speculation and many other disadvantages. I then stated that as far as I was concerned, I would not advance my views at an NSC meeting unless specifically requested by the President for the simple reason that such matters as military and foreign policy were beyond my competence as Director of Central Intelligence; my views had been set forth in the McNamara paper because McNamara requested them, and I was expressing my views to the President because he had requested them. However, I had a statutory responsibility to advise the NSC on intelligence matters and unless specifically requested by the President, I would not go past my statutory prerogatives. Doing so, I said, would impair the value of my intelligence analyses and presentation.

8. McNamara then decided to transmit his report to the Chiefs without my footnotes.

9. The President then asked that I present my views to him in a brief paper so that he could give consideration to them in addition to the recommendations of McNamara.

The meeting adjourned after an hour and a half and after press and TV pictures of the group were taken.

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1 April 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting at the White House 1 April 1964  
Subject - Brazil

PRESENT: The President

State Department: Secretary Rusk,  
Under Secretary Ball, Deputy Under  
Secretary Johnson, and Mr. Ralph Burton

Defense Department: Secretary McNamara,  
Deputy Secretary Vance, General Taylor  
and General O'Meara

White House Staff: Messrs. Bundy, Dungan,  
Moyers, and Reedy

CIA: The Director, Colonel King and  
Mr. FitzGerald

1. The meeting commenced with a briefing on the latest intelligence reports by Colonel King including items from the 10 o'clock telecon between State and Ambassador Gordon. Matters seemed to be more favorable to the insurgents than they had been the previous evening, particularly in view of indications that General Kruehl is moving Second Army troops to the Sao Paulo border.

2. Secretary Rusk said that Ambassador Gordon was not advocating U.S. support at this time. Only the Paulistas had requested such aid and this without definition. Ambassador Gordon, with whom the Secretary agreed, believes that it would be wrong at this stage to give Goulart an anti-Yankee banner.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC D-18  
By ms, NARA, Date 10-31-02

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3. Secretary Rusk referred to a "leak" the evening before regarding the movement of a Naval task force to the area of southern Brazil. (General Taylor said that there was not actually a leak but that it appeared to be a deduction by newsmen based on knowledge that a special meeting of the Joint Chiefs took place.) It was agreed that newspaper queries concerning the Naval movement would be treated routinely and that it would not be shown as a contingency move having to do with Brazil.

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4. [REDACTED]

5. There was an aside on Panama concerning the latest OAS language concerning U.S. discussions with the government of Panama. The President gave as his opinion that this language, which appeared to please the Panamanians, did not to him appear to differ from that which we had previously used.

6. In another interjection, the President asked what the effect of Senator Fulbright's speech had been abroad. Mr. Ball referred to his recent trip to Europe during which he addressed the NATO council (prior to the Fulbright speech). He said that the NATO people had agreed that the U.S. had not clearly stated its position vis-a-vis Cuba. Mr. Ball believes that the Fulbright speech may give ammunition to those who do not favor our Cuba policy in the first place. He also added that the Che Guevara speech in Geneva had been much too long and had therefore probably laid an egg. He said that he did not think that, as far as economic denial against Cuba is concerned, the Fulbright speech would have very much effect in Latin America as there was very little trade anyway. The President inquired whether we are endeavoring to explain the basis of our present policy to Fulbright. Secretary Rusk said that this had been and is being done. The President observed that Senator Fulbright probably is enjoying the halo set on his brow by the New York Times and the Washington Post and will probably wish to retain the headgear. Mr. Ball said

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that he had identified the soft underbelly of the British position in the Cuban denial matter. Apparently British governmental credits can be granted on two grounds: (1) that it is a good credit risk, and (2) though not a good credit risk, the risk is in the national interests. The British apparently admit that the Leyland Bus deal falls in the second category. As a consequence, he believes that we may well be able to stop future British government-backed credits to Cuba.

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[REDACTED]

The President said that he wants to be very sure that the British fully understand our position with respect to Cuban economic denial.

7. Secretary McNamara reported on the status of the task force. It sailed this morning and would be in the vicinity of Santos by the 11th of April. The arms and ammunition are now being assembled for airlift in New Jersey and the airlift would take 16 hours from the time of decision. As to POL, the earliest Navy tanker, diverted from the Aruba area, would be in place on the 10th or 11th of April. There is, however, a Norwegian tanker chartered by Esso in the South Atlantic loaded with the necessary motor and aviation gasoline. It is headed for Buenos Aires and should arrive there on the 5th or 6th of April.

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[REDACTED]

(Messrs. Bundy and Dungan, following the meeting, said that they had taken exception to the Navy's order to its task force which had placed the movement clearly within the contingency plan for Brazil. They felt that this was an unnecessary security hazard.)

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[REDACTED]

Desmond Fitzgerald  
Deputy Chief, WH (Special Affairs)

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2 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting

1. I briefed the NSC on the following items as per the attached briefing notes:

- a. Soviet Space and Missile Developments
- b. Sino-Soviet Dispute
- c. South Vietnam
- d. Brazil

2. I then asked Col. King to brief in further detail on developments in Brazil which he did, utilizing the teleconference report of 1500Z, April 2nd, between Secretary Ball and Ambassador Gordon. A copy of this telecon is in the file.

3. With respect to the Soviet VENUS shot, I called the President's particular attention to the security breach which appeared on March 31st in the NEW YORK TIMES' Finney article entitled "Soviet Fails in Two VENUS Probes", and a parallel article using practically the same text which appeared in the Washington Post. I stated that USIB were considering recommendations on an investigation and I would present such recommendations to the President. The President responded that I should go forward with any investigations I felt appropriate and he would approve any actions I desired to take.

NOTE: In a later conversation with Bundy and Alexis Johnson, they explained that both of them, together with Spurgeon Keeny, had considered releasing the substance of the Finney article but after talking with Dr. Wheelon had decided against doing so. All three were very much surprised that the article appeared in the paper and disclaimed any responsibility.

ACTION: Depending upon USIB's decision, I should instigate a USIB investigation or an FBI investigation. In the event of the latter, the subject should be discussed with the President. Also I agreed informally to review the USIB decision with Mr. Bundy prior to proceeding.

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NLJ/RAC 01-18  
By ics, NARA, Date 10-30-02

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4. Secretary Rusk stated that Amb. Bohlen was meeting with de Gaulle today to discuss South Vietnam.

ACTION: We should be on the alert for Bohlen's report.

5. Rusk stated that it was his and the Department's opinion that CIA was in no way overstating the depth of the Sino-Soviet split, indicating that the Department was studying carefully any evidence of actions by one party of the controversy against the other. He said no physical actions were discernible as yet but Rusk raised the question of the possibility of the abrogation of the Soviet-ChiCom Mutual Defense Treaty.

ACTION: We should continue to study this problem in depth and confer from time to time with State. I should be kept informed for personal discussions with Rusk.

6. Rusk then brought up the question of the UAR relationship. He said that the Department believed that no benefits had as yet been derived from our attempts to reach an understanding with Nasser. Nasser had failed in his commitments in the Yemen; there were now more troops in the Yemen than ever before and furthermore he had taken overt action against the Aden. Furthermore Nasser had stimulated Libya's efforts against the U.S. and British bases and was continuing to agitate this issue. Additionally Nasser had been uncooperative in our numerous efforts to bring the Middle East arms race under control. Rusk said he raised this question with, and informed the Consul, that U.S. policies towards the UAR and Nasser were under penetrating study by the Department.

ACTION: DDI should give this matter continuing consideration and should discuss the subject with appropriate people in the Department and also with me.

7. Rusk then reported on Panama, stating that status quo remained, that there was a possibility that today or tomorrow there would be a break which would permit us to move to the conference table. There was no change in our position.

NOTE: In a previous conversation with the President and others, it appeared that the Panamanians were moving away from their intransigent position and they themselves were creating a more favorable climate. In this conversation, which took place on April 1st, the President asked me personally if I thought we were acting correctly on this Panama issue. I replied that I felt his position was defensible and would not recommend any changes.

JAM/mfb