

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 list	list of meetings <i>sanitized 9-14-99 NLS 95-29; same sanit per RAC</i> S 1 p.	10/3/69	8/05 A
#2 memo <i>More info released 10-10-03 NW/RAC 01-19</i>	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 4/3/64 S 4 pp. <i>sanitized 9-14-99 NLS 95-29</i>	4/3/64	A
#3 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 4/7/64 S 5 pp. <i>sanitized 9-14-99 NLS 95-29</i> <i>OPEN 3-4-98 JFK 177-10001-10443</i>	4/7/64	A
#3a note	Dictated by Mr. McCone <i>open per above</i> S 1 p. <i>sanitized 9-14-99 NLS 95-29</i>	4/8/64	A
#4 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 4/19/64 S 3 pp. <i>open 8-9-95 NLS 93-394</i>	4/20/64	A
#5 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 4/22/64 S 2 pp. <i>open 8-9-95 NLS 93-394</i>	4/27/64	A
#6 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 4/29/64 <i>sanitized 9-14-99 NLS 95-29</i> S 3 pp. <i>dup of #6, McCone - 4 Jan - 28 Apr 1965</i>	4/30/64	<i>open 2-11-10</i> A
#7 memo <i>Open 10-10-03 NW/RAC 01-19</i>	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 5/2/64 S 4 pp. <i>sanitized 9-14-99 NLS 95-29</i>	5/4/64	A
#8 memo <i>More info released 10-10-03 NW/RAC 01-19</i>	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 5/2/64 S 2 pp. <i>sanitized 9-14-99 NLS 95-29</i>	5/4/64	A
#9 memo <i>Sanitized 10-10-03 NW/RAC 01-19</i>	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 5/5/64 S 3 pp. <i>sanitized 9-14-99 NLS 95-29</i>	5/5/64	A
#10 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 5/16/64 S 3 pp. <i>open 8-9-95 NLS 93-394</i>	5/16/64	A
#11 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 5/15/64 " S 2 pp.	5/16/64	A
#12 memo	Memorandum for the Record/Meeting on 5/20/64 S 2 pp. <i>dup of #10 - McCone - 4 Jan - 28 Apr 1965</i> <i>sanitized 9-14-99 NLS 95-29</i> <i>more info released 7-15-05 NW 04-216</i>	5/20/64	A

FILE LOCATION

John McCone Memoranda, Meetings with the President, "3 April 1964 - 20 May 1964," Box 1

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

1

Sent to Mr. Jordan on 3 October 1969

Memoranda for the Record of Meetings between Mr. McCone and the President

- 62. 3 April 1964. NSC meeting with House and Senate leadership. Review of world problems.
- 63. 7 April 1964. Meeting with President and others to review covert action program against Cuba.
- 64. 19 April 1964. NSC meeting on Laos.
- 65. 22 April 1964. Breakfast meeting with President, Rusk, McNamara, DCI, House and Senate leaders. Briefing on Vietnam, SEATO meeting, Soviet nuclear cutback.
- 66. 29 April 1964. President and DCI. NSC organization. Role of DCI. U-2's over Cuba. Followed by NSC meeting on Laos.
- 67. 2 May 1964. NSC meeting on Cuban overflights and possible use of A-11.
- 68. 2 May 1964. Meeting on economy in government.
- 69. 5 May 1964. NSC meeting on Cuban overflights and Laos.
- 70. 16 May 1964. President and DCI. Press leaks. Vietnam. Followed by NSC meeting on budget for Vietnam.
- 71. 15 May 1964. NSC meeting with House and Senate leadership. Briefing on NATO, Cyprus, Vietnam, Cuba, and Germany.
- 72. 20 May 1964. President and DCI. Senator Russell's views on Vietnam. Israeli missile program. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] "The Invisible Government" by Ross and Wise. 1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 95-29

By cb, NARA Date 8-26-99

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

3 April 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting. Attended by the President, Rusk, Ball, Harriman, McCone, Bundy and White House Staff, Senate and House leadership of both parties, this date.

1. Secretary Rusk reported in considerable detail on the developments in Brazil, reviewing the earlier leadership with Goulart, the declining economic situation under his presidency, President Kennedy's efforts to have him correct his ways, the Attorney General's trip, and the continual drift toward dictatorship and Communism. He then reviewed in detail the events leading to his overthrow, concluding that the situation was better, the country in sounder hands, but the economic and social problems remain. He emphasized that we did not engineer the overthrow (stating "even CIA did not"). Rusk was questioned by Senators Morse and Dirksen concerning outstanding loans and obligations, with Morse emphasizing ~~the~~ the importance of reaching an understanding on handling of their internal economic and political affairs prior to negotiating further commitments. Senator Fulbright raised the question of the effect on Brazil if the coffee legislation is rejected and both Fulbright and Dirksen forecasted that the legislation had a slim chance of passing. Rusk and Ball emphatically stated that failure to pass the coffee legislation would be most serious to Brazil and a great many other countries.

2. McNamara reviewed South Vietnam, following the outline of his recent report. Senator Saltonstall raised the question as to whether we are still advisors or expanding our role and Senator Morse stated very emphatically that he thought our South Vietnam policy was completely wrong. That we should use SEATO to handle the problem. Dirksen questioned the viability of SEATO. Mansfield supported the McNamara position.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 01-19  
By SJ, NARA, Date 9-25-03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. The President then announced the Panama agreement. The appointment of Robert Anderson as special Ambassador to negotiate outstanding issues and the decision to release a public statement at four o'clock in the presence of the OAS Ambassadors. The statement was reviewed and approved by the NSC. Hickenlooper questioned our position in view of Panama's denunciation of all treaties. Rusk stated that the treaty could not be unilaterally abrogated. Morse and others were highly complimentary of the agreement. All accepted the fact that we had maintained our position and that Panama had come around to our viewpoint.

4. Harriman then reviewed several situations in Africa. The Congo, he stated, was the worse because UN Forces were leaving in June. Efforts were being made by the Belgians, the Italians and the Israelis to train Congo troops to fill the vacuum, and he recommended the U.S. help the mobility of the Congolese Army by supplying jeeps, trucks, aircraft and helicopters. Also maintenance crews to repair existing equipment. He said the State was going good economically. Copper was about 90% of pre-independence, coffee 100%, the government is more efficient, Adoula has the support and confidence of many Congolese and all of the European community. Adoula is under agonizing pressures from (1) malfunctions in Brazzaville and he noted the ChiComs and Soviets were creating Embassies there, and (2) Tshomb e. He noted rumors of ChiCome activity but had no hard information.

ACTION: Harriman specifically requested an intelligence report regarding the ChiCom intentions and capabilities. This should be prepared for discussion with Harriman early next week.

5. With regard to Ghana, Harriman reviewed the Volta project and recommended its continuance. No decision was reached but no objection voiced. He stated Nkrumah was moving to the left, was surrounded by leftists, was disappointed because he was not the greatest man in Africa and was terrified for his life. Nevertheless, he felt it better to stay with the Volta project than to give it up.

6. Nigeria was reported as <sup>a</sup>very encouraging situation and quite satisfactory despite political difficulties in two or three areas.

7. Libya is particularly troublesome, according to Harriman.



UAR propaganda radios are operating continually. There is a great agitation over the Wheelus Base. The oil operation is extremely important as the U. S. companies own more than 50% of them. Harriman stated that Libya is now producing an amount of oil equal to 10% of U. S. production and the reserves are the highest in the world. (NOTE: Check this out as I have the feeling their oil production is far less than this figure, which would mean over a million barrels a day.)

ACTION: The Libya question ties into the problems raised by Secretary Rusk concerning our relationships with Nasser and the UAR.

3.3(b)(1) 8. Harriman then passed a note to me proposing a meeting next week to discuss his observations during his trip. Most particularly with regard to Tshombe's capabilities, Zanzibar, East Africa and Libya. [REDACTED]

9. Mr. Ball then briefly reviewed his discussions with the NATO Council on our Cuban policy. He stated all in attendance except the British expressed sympathy for our position and a desire to cooperate. The President discussed at some length the cooperation he is receiving from Britain and Canada despite their public announcements which are made for political purposes. He cited figures which demonstrated that both countries had very substantially reduced their trade with Cuba.

ACTION: I would like current information on Cuban trade from Britain, West German, Holland, France, Spain and Canada.

NOTE: What I think is that the overall figures cited by the President do not reflect the upward trend we have noted in the last three or four months.

10. Mr. Ball then reviewed the Cyprus situation in some detail, expressing satisfaction and hope over the present arrangements.

11. Ball then briefly reviewed Indonesian policy and the President stated he had not, as yet, made a finding and no new commitments had

been made. to supply aid to Sukarno other than that which has been in the pipeline. The President and Ball spoke of the instability and undependability of Sukarno. Senator Mansfield warned that prior to making a finding we should carefully weigh some of the antagonistic statements toward the United States which have been made publicly by Sukarno.

3.3(b)(1) JAM

Info copy by hand eyes only to DD/I, DD/P and Exec Dir

~~SECRET~~

7 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting at the White House 7 April 1964  
Subject - Review of Covert Program directed  
against Cuba

PRESENT: The President.

State Department: Secretary Rusk,  
Deputy Under Secretary Johnson,  
Assistant Secretary Mann, and  
The Coordinator of Cuban Affairs,  
Mr. Crimmins.

Defense Department: Secretary McNamara and  
Deputy Secretary Vance.

JCS: General Maxwell Taylor.

CIA: The Director, Messrs. Helms and  
FitzGerald.

White House Staff: Messrs. Bundy and Dungan.

1. Mr. Bundy presented to the meeting a memorandum to  
guide discussion concerning the Cuban program against Cuba.  
Seven categories of activities were listed in this memoran-  
dum as follows:


- (1) Collection of intelligence.
- (2) Covert propaganda to encourage low risk  
forms of active and passive resistance.
- (3) Cooperation with other agencies in  
economic denial.
- (4) Attempts to identify and establish contact  
with potential dissident elements inside  
Cuba.

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JFC #177-10001-10443  
By W NARA, Date 3-4-98

~~SECRET~~



- (5) Indirect economic sabotage.
- (6) CIA-controlled sabotage raiding.
- (7) Autonomous operations.

2. Mr. Bundy's paper recommended continuation of the first five items listed and recommended discussion of the last two.

3. There was a brief discussion of item (5) during which various methods of economic sabotage were described. There was no disposition on the part of those present to interfere with this program.

4. With respect to sabotage raiding by CIA-controlled assets, Secretary Rusk said that two things presently militate against a resumption of the program: (a) the pending OAS matter with respect to the Venezuelan arms cache which may be strengthened by discovery of arms in the Argentine as well as in Brazil, and (b) the prospective turnover of the SAM sites by the Russians to the Cubans in April or May. Secretary Rusk said that we would wish to maintain a clean hands posture while the OAS case is pending and that if the Cubans are to misuse the SAMs we would wish the onus to be fully on their backs. Secretary Rusk said that in addition he does not believe that hit-and-run raids are in any event very productive; that they have a high noise level and, furthermore, that he suspects the Cuban exiles who actually conduct the raids of possibly wishing to leave fingerprints pointing to U.S. involvement in order to increase that involvement. Mr. Bundy said that in the past he had been an advocate of sabotage operations, but in view of the history of the program since June, he had come to the conclusion that it is unlikely that an effective sabotage program will be conducted. In explanation he pointed out that the policymakers, each time for good reasons, had turned sabotage operations on and off to such an extent that a program of the type envisioned in the June paper simply does not, in the nature of things, appear feasible.

5. Mr. McCone called attention to the paper dated 8 June 1963 which is the basis of the Agency's current program against Cuba. He quoted from the 8 June paper as follows:

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~



Paragraph 2: "The ultimate objective of this policy would be to encourage dissident elements in the military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the eventual liquidation of the Castro/communist entourage and the elimination of the Soviet presence from Cuba."

With respect to the interdependence of the various courses of action comprising the program, he quoted from paragraph 5 of the paper as follows: "Unless all the components of this program are executed in tandem, the individual courses of action are almost certain to be of marginal value, even in terms of achieving relatively limited policy objectives. This is clearly a case where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts."

With respect to the sabotage program, he quoted from paragraph 6.E. as follows: "It must be recognized that no single act of sabotage by itself can materially affect the economy or stimulate significant resistance. However, it is our opinion that a well-planned series of sabotage efforts, properly executed, would in time produce the effect we seek."

Mr. McCone pointed out that five relatively low-key sabotage operations since June 1963 do not in effect constitute a test of the program and that the statements quoted from the 8 June paper remain valid. He said that there was a surge of anti-Castro sentiment during the fall of 1963, corresponding with the period during which the sabotage raids were conducted, but that resistance sentiment has now fallen into apathy. He said that the five items for which approval is recommended in Mr. Bundy's paper would not have the effect envisioned by the 8 June paper although they might have the effect of slowing down Castro's consolidation of his regime.

6. The Secretary of State said that part of our problem has to do with the Soviet Union which is now going through a crisis period, particularly with respect to the Sino-Soviet split. He said that he felt sure that were Ambassador Thompson present at the meeting he would

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

indicate the danger of forcing Khrushchev to take a militant defensive attitude with respect to Cuba. Secretary Rusk said that should the Cubans shoot down a U-2, raid peaceful shipping off the coast or should there be a strong OAS resolution, the question of the conduct of sabotage raids could be reconsidered. (I do not think that I am in error in quoting the Secretary as equating a U-2 shootdown with a good OAS resolution as a basis for resuming raiding operations.)

7. Mr. Mann said that his attitude towards CIA-conducted raiding operations would depend upon getting a clear legal basis for action against Cuba out of the OAS. He said that he doubted that all seven courses of action combined would result in the overthrow of Castro. He said that he leans away from CIA-conducted raids and towards autonomous operations. He said that at the present time, particularly in the light of the Brazilian events, favorable action by the OAS on proposed paragraph two of the resolution looks like a fifty-fifty chance. In reply to Secretary Rusk's query, I said that I believed that CIA-controlled raiding assets could be held together for another two months pending the resolution of the Secretary's two points (OAS and Cuban use of SAMs).

8. I briefed the President on the present status of autonomous operations, including the fact that Arttime is planning to launch his operational program on the 12th of April. There was some discussion of these plans but no one appeared disposed to try to stop Arttime. I said that Manolo Ray's plans were not as well known to us but that he had made it clear that he intended to move by May.

9. The Secretary of Defense said that it was his opinion that the covert program has no present chance of success in terms of upsetting Fidel Castro. He suggested that it might be useful, for reasons which had not been brought out at this meeting, and pointed out that the principal decision to be made was a broader one -- presumably what the overall U.S. attitude should be with respect to Fidel Castro. He said that he felt that the present raiding assets should be held in being pending resolution of Secretary Rusk's two points but that in the meanwhile the fundamental question should be debated. Mr. Vance said that he agrees with the suggestion of continuing these assets in being but that he believes that

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

the program, if permitted to go forward as planned, would at least have the advantage of hindering Castro in the consolidation of his power. He pointed out that the noise level of the raiding operations had not in fact been very high. He would advise resuming raiding operations following the resolution of Secretary Rusk's points. General Taylor said that the Joint Chiefs favor the program in its entirety, that they believe the program has never been given a fair test and that we should move forward with it in the interests of making Castro's life as hard as possible. Mr. Bundy said that the CIA covert program is the only matter to be resolved today, that the matter of our negotiations with the British on the economic program and sugar support would be ready for discussion next week.

10. Secretary Rusk recommended to the President that we keep the raiding assets in being for the next two months and that the question be discussed again following the resolution of OAS events and the Cuban use of the SAM sites.

11. The President accepted this recommendation.



Desmond FitzGerald  
Chief

Western Hemisphere Division

SEE ATTACHED ADDED NOTE BY DCI

~~SECRET~~



3a

8 April 1964

Dictated by Mr. McCone:

McCone went on to say the real issue to be considered at the meeting and by the President was a question of whether we wished to implement the policy as outlined in the 8th June paper and also less specifically in the paper circulated in the meeting by Mr. Bundy, or abandon the basic objective of bringing about the liquidation of the Castro Communist entourage and the elimination of Communist presence in Cuba and thus rely on future events of an undisclosed nature which might accomplish this objective. Specifically McCone said that he could envisage such issues as extreme economic distress caused by sharp drop in sugar prices or other external factors arising which might cause Castro great pain and, ultimately, his downfall. In summing up his position McCone stated that the actions favorably looked upon, that is, intelligence gathering, propaganda, economic denial and surreptitious acts against Cuban ships all would have some effect but definitely would not accomplish the stated objectives.

JAM/mfb

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority JFK #177-10001-10443  
By JW, NARA, Date 3-4-98

20 APR 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting - 19 April 1964

PARTICIPANTS: The President

State: Under Secretary Ball, Deputy Under Secretary  
Johnson, Messrs. Green and BarbisDefense: Secretary McNamara, General Taylor,  
Mr. McNaughton

White House: Mr. McGeorge Bundy and Mr. Forrestal

Ambassador Stevenson and Ambassador Thompson

CIA: Mr. McCone and Mr. Colby

1. Prior to the President's arrival there was a discussion of the traffic from Laos and Mr. Barbis gave a short review of the 1958-1960 series of Lao coups. Secretary Ball identified the basic question as one of determining a U.S. position which would disassociate ourselves from the coup but at the same time not encourage the Pathet Lao and Vietnamese to move against the Lao Government. Mr. Bundy asked what pressures we have on the Right Wing and it was agreed we had considerable power but that our experience had shown it could not be exercised in the short term.

2. The President then entered. Mr. Ball briefed him on the situation and the basic problem of disassociating ourselves without inviting action by the Communists. He pointed out the State Department release of Saturday night deploring the coup and commented that we were in the process of making approaches to other governments involved in the Geneva Agreements to reiterate our non-involvement.


DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-394

By ing, NARA, Date 7-27-95

PRESERVATION COPY



3. The President suggested that Mr. Bundy who is in Saigon be sent to Vientiane for a first hand look prior to his return to Washington. He commented that he agreed with the U.S. support of the Geneva Agreements but that he would not do much urging of action until we see the situation more clearly than we do now. He returned to this point several times during the meeting, indicating some displeasure with the final sentence of State's release. He stated he agreed that some word should be gotten to Hanoi to hold them back from any idea of moving in Laos. Mr. McCone mentioned the possibility of some involvement of General Khanh in the course of the Khanh-Phoumi discussions about two weeks ago.

4. The President also agreed that we take the position with the other Geneva powers that the cease-fire in Laos must be maintained and he agreed that other governments be approached, especially the GVN, along these lines. He then asked that recommendations for action be prepared by Mr. Bundy in conjunction with Ambassador Unger and that meanwhile no other public statements be made.

5. The President then departed and Mr. McNamara requested that the group remain for a general review of the problem. It was pointed out that the balance of forces in Laos generally favored the Pathet Lao with their Viet Minh cadres but General Taylor stated that he did not expect any immediate full scale move which would involve Viet Minh units. The FAR was believed by General Taylor not to be much better then it ever was, despite some reports of improvement we have heard in the past. Kong Le offers more a political than a military force. The chances of substantial support to the non-communists from Thailand or South Vietnam were not considered great. Among the actions considered were the possibility of reinforcing the Thais with a U.S. unit (which it was agreed was complicated as the Thais would exact some assurances on our policy in Laos), and the movement of U.S. naval units off North Vietnam. Ambassador Thompson suggested that we tie our actions in Laos to the public discussion of possible action against North Vietnam, which he believed has a useful effect on the Communists.

PRESERVATION COPY



6. There was then some discussion as to whether it would be possible to restore a neutral government in Laos or whether it would develop into a formal partition. It was agreed that the assistance of the King should be sought but that no great hopes could rest upon him, and that one of the critical figures was Kong Le.

7. Mr. Bundy summarized the actions required as determining:

a. Whether and how we reestablish the neutral solution (i.e. "put Humpty Dumpty together again"). In this context the position of Kong Le is important.

b. The degree of South Vietnamese involvement, encouragement or potential in the Lao situation.


c. How to maintain the cease-fire, getting word to the Communist side and especially Hanoi to do so.

d. The reactions of our Ambassadors in various countries to the prospect of a new Geneva meeting on Laos and whether this would involve Cambodia, Vietnam, etc.

e. The effects of a formal North-South partition on the situation in Vietnam, i.e. whether this would substantially improve the North Vietnamese capabilities of supporting the Viet Cong.

f. Alerting various intelligence activities to any indications of early action by the Communist side. In this context the Department of Defense will ensure a full coverage by high level reconnaissance on South-east Laos and NSA will be alerted to follow the traffic analysis in Laos and Vietnam.

8. After the meeting Mr. McCone and Secretary McNamara discussed the problem informally, Mr. McCone indicating it might be necessary soon to move to Geneva from a real position of strength with the U.S. fleet pointing at Hai Phong. Secretary McNamara indicated he agreed with this position.

  
William E. Colby  
Chief, Far East Division

cc: DDCI

  
PRESERVATION COPY



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-394

By rip, NARA, Date 7-27-95

27 April 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Breakfast Meeting at the White House - 22 April 1964

ATTENDED BY: The President, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Mr. McCone, Mr. Bundy, Senators Mansfield, Humphrey, Dirksen, Kuchel, Speaker McCormack, Boggs, Halleck, Arends, and one or two others

1. The President spoke at some length on the South Vietnamese policies, reading a letter of President Eisenhower to presumably Diem in October, 1954, indicating present policy was identical with that outlined by Eisenhower. There was some criticism on the part of Halleck, Dirksen and several other Senators because of complaints received from their constituents and American guests. The President then spoke of the proposed cutback in the special nuclear materials and turned the meeting over to Rusk who then reported on his trip as follows:

2. Rusk summarized the SEATO meeting, emphasizing unanimity with the exception of France's dissention and the communique which condemned North Vietnam for their aggression. He felt the SEATO meeting had gone very well, that France would not withdraw from SEATO. Rusk then described in detail his impressions of South Vietnam, his confidence in Khanh, his feeling that the tide had turned, and that he was confident that actions taken by Khanh since the McNamara visit are now being felt and we could expect better news in the future. He spoke briefly of the Laotian situation. He did not touch on his talks with Chiang Kai-shek.

3. McNamara then described in detail the cutback in special nuclear materials, referring to the charts which he has used right along, pointing out that even with the cutbacks we still had a very substantial quantity in excess of all requirements, including requirements for weapons yet to be developed or in fact yet to be programmed.

4. I was asked by the President to discuss Khrushchev's announcement of his cutback. I started out by saying that the Soviets' nuclear program was now in the same condition ours was in the first half of the 50's when we were substantially expanding our facilities. I said that facilities under construction, both reactors and U-235 plants, would increase the productive capacity between 60% and 70% and that these facilities would all be operational by mid-1968. When they are operational, the Soviet production of U-235 and plutonium would be about 75% of the maximum U.S. capacity. (I did not mention the present U.S. operating rates).

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~



I then said that we believe the plutonium reactors that Khrushchev is going to stop construction of were being built at Tomsk; we know a good deal about them, and that that would reduce their potential plutonium production so that their maximum capacity would be about 80% or 85% of the capacity expected if the two reactors were completed. Said it was difficult to understand exactly what Khrushchev meant by the cutback of U-235. It would be highly desirable if he would stop construction of some of the new plants or plant expansions; however, this was not indicated. I said that once the plants were built, it was impossible for us to determine except in rare instances whether they are operating at total capacity, partial capacity, or shut down. We can, however, determine the progress of construction. I indicated that if the Soviets completed their plants and operated them at expected capacity their production would be substantially greater than U.S. production under our program of curtailment. There was no comment on my remarks.

After the meeting I explained to Bundy and McNamara the dilemma I was in in attempting to say with any assurance what Khrushchev meant by his April 21st statement. I pointed out from the production schedules where he would be as compared with our program. McNamara dismissed the argument on the basis that our stockpile or inventory would be far greater than the Soviets'; therefore the fact that they were producing more each year than we were was unimportant. I told McNamara and Bundy that while this was all true, and I did not disagree with it, I felt we would face some pretty severe questioning from the Joint Committee. Bundy retorted that the Chairman of the Joint Committee was in agreement and that Anderson had likewise indicated his agreement.

Bundy, McNamara and I then turned to the question of briefing of Presidential candidates, the subject covered in a separate memorandum.

I then told Bundy that I was highly dissatisfied over the fact that President Johnson did not get direct intelligence briefings from me as was the custom with President Kennedy and had been the Eisenhower custom in the prior Administration. Bundy recognized this and thought that I should discuss it directly with the President upon my return and use my report on my discussion with General Eisenhower as an excuse and a good opportunity to bring up the subject.

JAM/mfb (tape)

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~



6

30 April 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with President Johnson - Wednesday afternoon - 29 Apr.  
4:45 in his office

PRESENT: The President and Mr. McCone

1. I reviewed in detail, and item by item, my memorandum of my discussion with General Eisenhower (memorandum dated April 27th).

President Johnson made the following comments:

a. With respect to the organization of the Executive Office, the holding of frequent NSC meetings, the supporting of NSC with an Operations Coordinating Board and Planning Board, President Johnson said he had never heard of the idea before. He said that Eisenhower had never mentioned it to him nor did he recall that I had ever spoken about it. He said he thought the NSC was functioning satisfactorily, that it met when important or critical issues required a meeting, that the staff work was adequate and he was satisfied. He said the only thing that Eisenhower proposed to him was the replacement of McGeorge Bundy with Gordon Gray.

I said that I did not wish to belabor the point; I thought he had probably forgotten the discussion that Eisenhower told me that he had suggested that Johnson talk with Gordon Gray and General Goodpaster concerning the Eisenhower concept of a proper organization, but did not think that he had advocated placing Gordon Gray in the Executive Office nor had he advocated the removal of McGeorge Bundy. President Johnson said he did not recall any of this and therefore I dropped the matter.

b. I told President Johnson that Eisenhower felt the de Gaulle problem must be solved, and if it is not solved NATO is of very questionable value. However, Eisenhower had no specific suggestions but he did feel that we had to recognize that de Gaulle held himself as a "Grand Charlie" and work around the vanity and not be concerned with it. Specifically, Eisenhower was very positive that if NATO was to be a dependable instrument, de Gaulle's <sup>problem</sup> must be resolved. President Johnson had no particular comment.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSA 045-001.004/1By jc NARA, Date 2-10-10~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY



~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

c. President Johnson resented the Eisenhower criticism of the wheat deal although he said that he had no responsibility for that transaction as it was an accomplished fact prior to his taking office. He defended the nuclear material cut-back stating, as he had before, that there was no deal and that he had no idea that Khrushchev was going to announce a cut-back until he was actually seated at the table at a luncheon in New York and a note was handed to him that the Khrushchev announcement had been made. He said there was no prohibition and no reason why the United States could not resume production at any level at any time if security requirements demanded. He therefore felt that Eisenhower was wrong in his criticism. I recounted the Eisenhower statement of the voluntary test moratorium in which he agreed with Foster Dulles to suspend for 60 days, only to find himself in a straightjacket from which he could never extract himself, and the United States was never able to resume testing until the Soviets had themselves broken the moratorium.

d. I then said that I was concerned that the President was not getting sufficient and adequate intelligence briefings; that I was not seeing very much of him, and this disturbed me. He said he was available any time that I wanted to see him. All I had to do was call up. I said this had not been the case on several "attempts". He mentioned that he had been very busy the last two weeks but he did not think this would be a recurring situation, therefore he invited me to bring to his attention any matters of special and particular interest; however he did not wish to be briefed just for the purpose of being briefed. He said that the Checklist summary was perfectly adequate, that he went over it carefully, and that it gave him a satisfactory feeling of the world situation.

e. I then pointed out the plan to append the list of CIA publications to the Checklist once a week. The President said this would be of interest to them, though his time did not permit extensive reading.

NOTE: I have suggested to Mr. Cline that he personally supervise the particular publications which will be listed in the President's Checklist each week.

2. At the NSC meeting the President opened by stating he had just been given a thorough briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence and turned to me and asked if there were any matters of an intelligence nature which should be brought to the attention of the NSC. It is to be noted that my discussion with President Johnson did not involve an intelligence briefing but merely a review of my discussion with General Eisenhower.

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY



3. I stated that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss Laos, that I had no other current intelligence of interest to report which had not been covered in the daily bulletins of the last several days. (Cline and Colby will develop a memorandum on the NSC discussion, a copy for my files.)

4. I mentioned to President Johnson that I had discussed with Eisenhower the possibility of a Cuban shooting down a U-2. That Eisenhower first responded by indicating that he thought, under such circumstances, the offending SAM sites should be "taken out." However, after considering the problem and reviewing a map, he expressed the opinion that perhaps it would be best to take out all the SAM sites, although Eisenhower did not go so far as to firmly recommend this action. President Johnson then asked my opinion. I stated I most certainly would take out several SAM sites in the vicinity and possibly all of them. President Johnson retorted he agreed and in fact, he favored taking them all out, indicating that the public opinion, UN discussion, etc. would be just as valid on one as on all and therefore we might as well dispose of the problem in its totality.

I then told President Johnson it was unnecessary to have a U-2 shot down, that we would operate the ECM equipment, but this had been steadfastly opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President asked that I discuss this matter with McNamara and General Taylor.

NOTE: Subsequently I reviewed this question with McNamara and Taylor and McNamara was of the opinion that JCS was incorrect for technical reasons and the use of the ECM on the U-2 would not compromise the plan to use the ECM on the B-52.

McNamara stated that the subject was very technical and therefore it was agreed to convene a technical group from Defense (headed by Fubini) and CIA (headed by Wheelon) who could examine all facets of the problem and hence McNamara and I would be in a position to make a firm recommendation to the President and the Executive Committee at a meeting scheduled for 12:00 noon on Saturday, May 2nd.

5. With regard to North Vietnam, President Johnson asked if President Eisenhower supported Nixon's recommendation to go into North Vietnam. I said that Eisenhower did not favor this. He favored the maximum effort in South Vietnam and of course would be in favor of covert and semi-covert harassment against North Vietnam, but was opposed to the Nixon-Goldwater line in this regard.

(tape and dictation)  
JAM:mfb:mcm



4 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion at National Security Council meeting  
Saturday - 2 May 1964

Note: the initial part of the meeting the President did not attend.

PRESENT: The President, Rusk, Ball, Johnson, McNamara, Vance,  
LeMay (representing JCS), Bundy, Dillon, Attorney  
General Robert Kennedy, and Thompson.

Note: Several White House Staff members were present.

1. McCone opened the meeting by discussing pages 1 through 3 of the attached May 1st memorandum reviewing actions taken by USIB on the recommendation of COMOR on the 2nd of April and in the past few days, reaffirming the need for overflights but on a reduced scale and indicating that, except for a most unusual circumstance, two to three flights per week would meet COMOR requirements.
2. Thompson stated that his analysis of recent statements by Khrushchev and Castro indicated that there was a strain between the Soviets and Castro. It appeared to him that Castro is concerned that the relaxed tension between the U.S. and the USSR exposed Cuba to actions by the U.S. which would not be seriously challenged by Khrushchev.
3. Rusk stated that he felt that the threat was not immediate.
4. McCone contributed the SNIE which was read carefully and all agreed with the conclusions.
5. There was some discussion in which there was complete agreement on the obvious necessity for continued overflights. Rusk stated that we cannot negotiate with Castro - this was out of the question. Castro will attempt to bring the issue to the Security Council or the General Assembly. He will receive considerable sympathy but he will not receive an affirmative vote in the Security Council and he could not get the two-thirds majority necessary to place the subject before the General Assembly.
6. Our tactic will be to throw the issue into the OAS, thus keeping it out of the UN and depending upon the October, 1962 resolution which calls for continuing aerial surveillance in the absence of on-site inspection. Rusk did not expect a blessing from the UN or the world at large, but he

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 01-19  
By SJ, NARA, Date 9-25-03

does not expect an adverse vote in any form.

7. The question arose as to reopening the UN offer for on-site inspection. McCone stated that much would depend on how this inspection was carried out. UN inspection has not been very satisfactory and that probably (though not assuredly) aerial photography would be necessary to complement on-site inspection.

8. Rusk said that their attorneys felt that if the issue was brought to the World Court, our case would not be good, however they could confuse it by concurrently putting forth a great many counter claims against Cuba such as ceding property, etc., etc.

9. I then turned to a discussion of the alternatives as covered in pages 4 through 7. I added a point made at USIB that a shootdown of a drone would not create an incident exactly paralleling the shootdown of a U-2 and also put forward the idea of drones. Also in the discussion I noted State Department's reservations, but not their dissent at USIB, on the question of the intensity of the overflight program.

10. My final recommendation was that the U-2 flights should be continued, the use of ECM's should be carefully considered and in the final analysis the compromise of ECM equipment was up to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. Alternate means of aerial photography were not satisfactory; alternate intelligence assets would not suffice our needs; we could expect a continuing flow of human resource information concerning "missiles in Cuba", which must be checked out.

11. There was no disagreement with these recommendations.

12. The President then joined the meeting.

13. Rusk reviewed the discussions accurately, except in interpreting the SNIE he indicated to the President the Board was not concerned about the immediacy of an incident. I stated the Board could not be sure about this.

14. After some discussion, and inviting any dissents, the President decided that:

a. We should continue the U-2's overflights on the basis of two to three a week as determined by USIB;

b. He favored use of the ECM; he instructed McNamara and the Chiefs to review the subject on Monday; he felt the JCS' arguments were probably not valid and he wished them studied in the light of the morning discussion.



c. He called a meeting for 12:00 o'clock noon Tuesday to make a final decision on the use of ECM equipment.

15. During the meeting there was considerable discussion of the use of the OXCART. I stated that it was my opinion (though I had not checked it out with our operators) that it could be used in a matter of weeks at about 2.2 Mach, 75,000 feet and several months later at 3.2 Mach and 85,000 or 90,000 feet, that its presence would be known because it would appear on the radar and the sonic boom would be audible, it would be more disturbing to people in Cuba than U-2's because they could not see the U-2 but they would hear the OXCART, that because of the absence of the TALL KING search radar I felt the SAMS with their FAN SONG would not be effective on the U-2 because of their short reaction time. I pointed out the use of the OXCART would compromise it as a reconnaissance vehicle. No decision was reached.

16. McNamara stated that if ECM equipment was used, he felt there would be a 95% or more possibility that the first U-2 that was attacked would survive and come home. He pointed and, and I confirmed, that this would create a new situation as it would demonstrate Castro's true intentions which were now only a matter of conjecture. McNamara asked that the Contingency Plan be amended to discuss courses of action under such a situation.

17. McNamara then stated that while he does not agree with the Joint Chiefs on the seriousness of the compromise of ECM equipment, he is against using it now, suggests it be kept in readiness, and the question be reviewed from week to week.

18. The actions are as follows:

- a. Study the operational capabilities of the OXCART.
- b. Study the vulnerability of the OXCART.

NOTE: Both of the above to be discussed with JCS Monday afternoon in preparation for Tuesday's meeting.



~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

c. Develop in detail the Agency position on ECM which varies from the SAC-JCS position.

d. Prepare to supply CIA planes equipped with ECM on short notice until the SAC planes are fully modified.

NOTE: In the discussion McNamara stated that ECM equipment similar to Systems 13-15 was aboard the Powers' plane and therefore known to the Soviets.

ACTION: I would like this explored because this question did not arise in the Powers' Hearings. I was very much surprised to hear that Powers had ECM equipment aboard and raised the question in my mind as to why he did not turn it on when he had received the warning. Also I raised the question as to why this matter, if true, was not brought out in the very extensive Hearings with Powers upon his return.

8

4 May 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

**SUBJECT: Cabinet Meeting and Heads of Independent Agencies  
on Saturday, May 2nd, 11:30 a. m.**

1. The President read a statement giving instructions to all Department Heads concerning economy.

**ACTION:** A copy of this statement should be secured from BoB to be used as guidelines for instructions by the DDCI to Department Heads.

2. Secretaries Dillon, Hodges, Gronouski and Small Business Administrator Foley reviewed actions taken in their departments on cost reduction. The statements made were very impressive and evidenced some considerable effort and progress in the direction of efficiency and economy.

3. Budget Director Gordon spoke briefly of the plan for the 1966 budget. He said they are now in the process of a spring review and called on 25 agencies to forecast the 1966 needs and also for longer range plans. These will be reviewed in May, discussed with the President in June and the objectives and planning figures for the 1966 budgets will be established by the President in early July. Gordon urged all Department Heads to concern themselves with the BoB request, stating that he wished to place principal emphasis on policies and programs. He urged all Departments to cut out low priority programs and exercise economies in order to make room for new programs.

4/ Gordon then spoke<sup>ed</sup> the BoB's manpower review efforts. Apparently a system has been established where the BoB and the Civil Service join with an agency in reviewing its manpower usages and establishing ground rules for the future use of manpower and developing all possible economies. Gordon said that this is a most effective and useful exercise and is being carried on in a most expert way and that agencies or sections of agencies are being reviewed in 1964.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/PAC 01-19  
By SJ, NARA, Date 9-25-03



**ACTION:** I was most impressed with the seriousness of this discussion and I wish to review the subject in considerable detail with our senior executives.

5. More particularly, I believe we should:

1) Secure the President's statement and implement the points made.

2) Review with Gordon the manpower review procedures. It would not be practical from a security point of view to bring this tripartite group into CIA. However, we could follow exactly the same pattern internally. Therefore, I recommend that a special manpower review committee of a few specialists be established under General Carter on a continuing and permanent basis and that they methodically and carefully review manpower usage in each and every department and sub-department of CIA.

3) I wish an examination made of all controllable expenses.

4) We should keep under constant review the gold outflow problem, which is going to be just as important a point in our budget review as the actual amount of our budget in 1966 and in the future years.

3.3(b)(1)

JAM:(tape)

~~SECRET~~ 1000 1000

~~SECRET~~

5 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion at NSC Meeting - 5 May 1964

IN ATTENDANCE: Rusk, Ball, Johnson, Thompson, McNamara,  
Vance, Taylor, Bundy, Dillon, Mann, Attorney  
General and McCone

1. McNamara reviewed the use of ECM equipment on the U-2's, stating that doing so would not compromise SIOP; would give some protection initially but not over the long range; the Soviets know the principals of our ECM; ECM would not provide great protection to the U-2 but the degree of protection was open to question as it was obvious that ECM would not permit continued use of U-2's to meet intelligence requirements. JCS objects for a variety of reasons and General Taylor discussed this.

3.3(b)(1)

2. General Taylor stated that the JCS agree that the use would not compromise SIOP; pointed out 14 countries have SAMS and therefore compromise might be serious at some future time. Vulnerability was uncertain and was dependent upon the warhead, noting there were [ ] warheads and that DIA had indicated [ ] warheads were on the Cuban SAMS. (McCone said we had no intelligence on this.) Therefore JCS recommended against the use of ECM.

3. Rusk raised the question of whether a new pattern of flights crossing the island, rather than flying the axis of the island, would reduce exposure. McNamara said this could be done by increasing the number of flights and therefore the danger.

4. McNamara then advanced the idea of drones, stating they were awkward to use, of questionable reliability, limited in quantity, but raised an alternative intelligence means. ECM would make them less vulnerable but would compromise ECM.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/PAC 01-19  
By SJ NARA, Date 9-25-03



5. I then stated that drones were limited in number, were only six of two types operational and three in the works; altitudes were 54,000' to 59,000' versus 64,000' to 72,000' for the U-2's; photography resolution equivalent to U-2 but area limited to 18-mile swath and 255 miles of linear coverage; that drones were vulnerable to MIG-21's; that they could be identified by contrails and therefore I had reservations concerning their effectiveness. McNamara agreed and after some discussion the drone question was pretty well dismissed. The same is true of balloons as it was felt they represented more serious operational problems than drones. The Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, expressed himself very positively against changing to drones as it would represent an unacceptable retreat.

6. We then turned to a discussion of the OXCART. I stated that it was coming along well, giving the figures on the number of flights and the speeds but that all of our operational people, without exception, felt that we must not attempt to use it until it is completely debugged and this would take several months. Furthermore I said that at 2.2 Mach the OXCART would possibly be vulnerable to SAMS though this was uncertain.

7. Secretary Dillon then asked what the ultimate value of the OXCART was. I stated that when fully operational it probably would be quite invulnerable except under miraculous circumstances.

8. Thompson spoke the political situation, feeling that Khrushchev and Castro would be restrained during this year, recognizing our internal political situation.

9. The President entered and Rusk and McNamara reviewed the conversations. The President commented that we were right back where we started.

10. Rusk raised the question of UN on-site inspection. I agreed that properly planned and executed on-site inspection would be somewhat more dependable than in October 1962 because of our knowledge of the island gained through extensive photography.

11. McNamara then recommended that we operate for a week with U-2's at the rate of 2 to 3 flights a week on the assumption that Castro will not take offensive action. In the meantime we create ECM capability but not use it; finally we expedite our drone capability to give us an option but that we emphatically deny any intent to use them. McNamara noted some leaks about drones out of the Pentagon which disturbed him.

~~SECRET~~ <sup>2</sup> ~~SECRET~~ ONLY

~~SECRET~~

12. The President inquired about expediting the OXCART. I took the position we would do all we could to push the development and debug the vehicle but said that we were working against unexplored frontiers of aviation; that many felt unexpected problems were arising - some of which we can answer rapidly, but many have to be answered by methods of "cut and try"; and that the problem in hand would not lend itself to a "crash" program.

13. There was no discussion of the Contingency Plan.

14. The meeting then turned to a discussion of Laos with Mann leaving and Bundy, Harriman and Forrestal entering.

15. No intelligence report was called for and therefore our 02993/64 was not used. Bundy outlined in detail the problems of cross border operations, low level photography and the use of HARDNOSE teams in Laos. It was agreed that all actions with respect to cross border and HARDNOSE operations had previously been authorized. Bundy noted that he had gone out for a more full disclosure of MACV's plans which he felt we did not understand.

16. At Ambassador Unger's insistence, we will not for the time being conduct low level flights.

17. Mr. Colby's memorandum on this portion of the meeting is attached.

3.3(b)(1) JAM ☐



~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

16 May 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: National Security Council meeting - 16 May 1964

IN ATTENDANCE: the President, Secty Rusk, William Bundy,  
Mr. Sullivan, Secty McNamara, Gen. Taylor,  
Mr. McNaughton, Mr. McGeorge Bundy,  
Mr. Bell, Mr. Gordon, Mr. McCone,  
Mr. Colby and AID man (Coats?)

NOTE: Prior to the meeting I saw the President privately and alone  
for about 10 minutes and covered the following points:

1. I told the President that I gathered from discussions with Hedley Donovan, publisher of TIME-LIFE, and some of his associates that it was obvious from questions asked they were completely informed on all of the substance of Lodge's communications to Washington including the extreme and rather hysterical position taken by Khanh at that unusual morning meeting of May 4th. I expressed distress over this situation. The President made no comment.

2. I stated that CIA experienced analysts on Southeast Asian matters, at my direction, had carefully appraised the situation on the basis of all current intelligence and produced a report on "The Viability of South Vietnam", dated 15 May 1964, a copy of which I handed him and which he read. I noted that our position was more pessimistic than that reported by McNamara either at the NSC meeting Thursday or the meeting with the Leadership on Friday.

3. I told the President that I did not agree with General Taylor's response to his question concerning possible North Vietnamese, ChiCom or USSR reaction to bombing raids on North Vietnam. I pointed out that while it is true there are no known combat aircraft in NVN, several airfields have been improved during the last year and their runways can accept jet fighters and bombers. Also that a squadron of about 12 IL-28's were recently deployed into Hainan Island and, while we do not know if they are there at the moment (as they rotate in and out frequently), they could move in on short notice and could mount an attack on Saigon from this point. Furthermore, substantial ChiCom air force units, including MIG fighters, etc., are now deployed on to fields in southern China close to the North Vietnam border.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 93-394

By ing, NARA, Date 7-27-95

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

Hence if any action is taken against North Vietnam we must prepare for "the worst" in the way of retaliation and prudence therefore indicates that adequate air defense units be deployed into South Vietnam in advance of such operations irrespective of the scale on which they are carried out.

Furthermore I said I felt that Lodge's concept of denying SVN or U.S. participation in the raids was naive.

#### NSC MEETING

1. The meeting concerned itself with the budget problems attendant to furnishing additional economic and military aid to South Vietnam.

2. Mr. Bell presented a very strong argument favoring limiting the economic aid to \$40 million. McNamara insisted on the \$75 million requested by Khanh and Oanh. In his appeal he read the summary of the CIA May 15th Memorandum using that as an indication of the critical situation faced in SVN. (McNamara took no exception to the pessimistic tone of this Memorandum.)

3. I stated that I was not able to comment on the amount of economic aid which should be given but emphasized the seriousness of the situation, that deterioration was continuing and has not bottomed out and, in the opinion of CIA, the situation was worse than the pessimistic report that McNamara gave on Friday.

4. Bundy seemed to support the Oanh request of \$75 million and called on Colby who criticized the USOM-AID administration on the basis of nit-picking at the lower bureaucratic levels in Washington and Saigon. McNamara strongly supported Colby's position as did Bundy who stated that it was his impression that the South Vietnamese felt, in dealing with the AID bureaucracy, they were dealing with a "Mr. Passman". McNamara then urged \$75 million for economic aid and \$50 million for military aid. After some discussion it was decided to give \$70 million for economic aid and \$55 million for military aid.

5. There then followed a brief discussion of the Lodge cable (Bell and Gordon left the room). Rusk stated that Lodge had not been as precise in his talks with him as the May 15th cable #2212 indicated.

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~



~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

Rusk asked for time to study the problem and determine a course of action. He indicated he had talked to the Canadian Foreign Minister and had presented the question of Canadian approach to Ho Chi Minh. He questioned whether the threat should be as positively stated as Lodge's cable indicated. The basic difference between Rusk and Lodge is one of timing. Rusk opposes conducting air raids prior to the Canadian-NVN discussion as recommended by Lodge. No decision was reached in this matter.

6. Bundy suggested that the next communications pass between Rusk and Lodge rather than the President and Lodge.

JAM/mfb

16 May 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on Friday, 15 May at noon

ATTENDED BY: All members and the Bipartisan Leadership of  
both the House and the Senate

1. Rusk opened the meeting at the invitation of the President by reviewing the NATO discussions insofar as they related to the intentions of France towards NATO, the NATO Council urging de Gaulle to come forward with plans for reorganization of NATO, the problems de Gaulle has with his military who have been abroad so long, i.e. in South Vietnam, Algeria and elsewhere, that they no longer feel an allegiance to France itself. Also discussed were Cyprus, Vietnam, Cuba and the question of unification of Germany.

2. McNamara then reviewed in considerable detail the situation in South Vietnam following the substance of his report to the NSC meeting of the day before except that in reciting the facts he, for the benefit of the Congressional leadership, placed a more optimistic slant on the situation than indicated in the Colby Memorandum of the 14th of May meeting. Nevertheless the facts were essentially the same. He expressed Khanh's views were to consider a strike against the north after the end of the year as it would take until then to solidify the situation in South Vietnam so that any retaliatory moves by the North Vietnamese could be handled. He also said that Khanh believed decision to strike the north was to be a U.S. decision even though carried out by SVN. The President then asked if Khanh really was not asking for a U.S. guarantee of the integrity of the country, to which McNamara answered that since Khanh believes the decision must be one of the U.S., he obviously is looking to us to guarantee the success of the South Vietnam effort.

The President then asked General Taylor the probable responses of the NVN. Taylor stated (much to my surprise) that he feels there would be very little response unless the strike was quite large. If the strike was small, such as in bombing of isolated locations - Haiphong Harbor, oil refineries, etc., he would expect the response to be in some increased sabotage activities in SVN or some plastic bombing in Saigon. He pointed out that the NVN have no air force and no capability for an air strike and he questioned ChiCom's participation.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4

NLI 93-394

By lip, NARA, Date 7-27-95~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~



~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

3. After a series of questions by Senators Dirksen and Saltonstall and Congressman Jensen, the President asked my views.

I responded that I was more pessimistic concerning the situation than indicated by the expressions I had heard. I based my position on the increased VC military activity, the obvious VC political action which is meeting some success, the VC gain of control of more people and more real estate than heretofore, political unrest within Saigon and the very great importance of the threatening religious conflict within the Buddhists and the Catholics as well. The President questioned me on this latter point, pointedly asking me if I feel the threat of religious conflict was really serious, to which I responded "yes". (It seems to me that the religious issue could very readily be "used" as an excuse or a reason for a change of policy one way or another or a defense of failure if we meet failure).

4. The President wound up the meeting by stating that a supplemental budget would be presented to the Congress on Monday.

NOTE: The Colby memorandum of May 14th meeting can be considered as a part of this report.

JAM/mfb

12

20 May 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President, 20 May, 1:15 p. m.  
for about 20 minutes

1. I reviewed in detail my meeting with Senator Russell and his Committee concerning South Vietnam. Advised the President that:

a. Russell had no suggestions or alternative courses of action

b. Saltonstall had expressed objection of the [REDACTED] supplemental. Russell had indicated that he felt that it would be voted, but that it would have to come out of the overall foreign economic and military aid appropriations. In other words, there would be no increase in the total to take care of South Vietnam.

c. Russell did not see how we could go forward or withdraw (I mentioned the cow-on-the-fence example used by Russell.)

NOTE: Advised the President that in attendance were Russell, Hayden, Saltonstall, Young and Stennis.

2. Reviewed in considerable detail the status [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I drew the President's particular attention to the last paragraph of the memorandum.

3. Reviewed in detail the technical penetration of the American Embassy in Moscow, advising the President that the lead-in to the discovery of these penetrations [REDACTED]

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 04-216 and NLJ 95-29

By ins, NARA, Date 2-1-05

E.O. 12958  
3.3 (b)(1)



---

4. I informed the President of the damage that I expected would result from the Wise-Ross book, "The Invisible Government." Stated it would be damaging to CIA, State, Defense, NSA and others for a variety of reasons which were discussed in some detail. I told the President of the actions I had taken in meeting with the authors on 15 May, contacts with Random House, contact with J. H. Whitney and discussing the book with Mr. Cowles of Look Magazine. I said that I felt all of this would come to naught, that I did not feel that the book would be modified, and that when published considerable harm would result. I suggested to the President that a statement could be made by him at a press conference, which at least would establish the fact that, in his opinion, CIA's actions were carefully coordinated. The President expressed regret that the book was published, discouragement over the license of government officials with the press, but didn't seem to know what to do about it.

JAM: [REDACTED]

---