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Vice-Presidential Security File, Vice-Presidential Travel VP's Trip to Senegal

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# DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON



March 28 1961

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Authority State etr 12/20/76

By mg , NARS, Date 3/21/77

Dear Mr. Perry:

I understand that the Vice President has agreed to head the President's delegation to the independence ceremonies of the Republic of Senegal at Dakar on April 3 and 4.

In this connection, I enclose for the Vice President's information a confidential briefing memorandum on Senegal, together with the unclassified "country paper" which gives general background information and statistics. I have also included biographic sketches of President Senghor, Prime Minister Dia, Foreign Minister Thiam and the President of the National Assembly, Mr. Lamine Gueye.

We believe it would be appropriate for the Vice President to make a brief statement on arrival in Dakar, and he will be expected to make a few remarks when he is presented to President Senghor. Suggested texts are enclosed. The Vice President will probably wish to take advantage of the latter occasion to present to President Senghor the personal gift from the President which is customary at events of this kind. The gift will be a large Steuben vase, appropriately mounted, which the Department will arrange to deliver to the Vice President's plane before departure from Washington.

Sincerely yours,

Assistant Secretary

## Enclosures:

- Confidential briefing memorandum.
- 2. Unclassified country paper.
- Biographic sketches.
- 4. Suggested arrival statement.
- 5. Suggested statement on presentation of gift.

Mr. Arthur Perry,
Office of the Vice President.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

March 28 1961

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Authority Attack 12/20/96

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Sincerely yours,

Brooks Hays Assistant Secretary

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- 1. Confidential briefing memorandum.
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Mr. Arthur Perry, Office of the Vice President.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE Biographic Information Division

# SENGHOR, Léopold-Sedar

SENEGAL

Moderate in his views, Senghor has expressed concern over the Communist influence in the Mali Republic and feels that it poses a greater threat than in Guinea. He has supported the UN intervention in the Belgian Congo. A French official who knows Senghor well has said that although he is a good and intelligent man, he does not have a strong character.

# DIA. Mamadou

Mamadou Dia, who was long considered a protege of Leopold Senghor; has developed into a strong politician in his own right, and is considered one of the outstanding leaders of former French West Africa. Able, intelligent, and hardworking, he has concentrated on the political, economic and social development of Senegal.

## LAMINE-GULYE, Amadou

Although the prestige of Lamine-Gueye has declined in the past few years, he has continued to play an important role in Senegal. Described as amenable to flattery, he was reportedly acceptable to the Soudanese for the post of President of the Mali Federation, for the reason that they felt he would be more easily manipulated than Leopold Senghor, the Senegalese candidate.

## THIAM, Doudou

Thiam is described as intelligent and able. Soft-spoken and moderate in outlook, he is considered to be well-disposed toward the West.

INR/RFB/BI

# BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT CONCERNING THE REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL

(Should be read in conjunction with the unclassified country paper transmitted under same cover).

## General

Senegal was the oldest French West African dependency and had long experience of electoral politics while still a colony. Its Government is therefore more tolerant of political dissent than most African regimes. There is a relatively large educated population, and President Senghor himself is a distinguished poet and man of letters. Senegal's development plans are sober and realistic; they concentrate en education, especially vocational training, and on improvements in agricultural productivity, not on economically wasteful prestige projects.

## International Relations

The Senegalese Government is basically pro-Western, within the framework of a formal posture of non-alignment. Senegal remains within the Community, and its relations with France are very close. Over three-quarters of its fereign trade is with France, and the French enjoy military base rights in Senegal.

In African politics, Senegal's basic problem is to break out of the isolation in which it found itself after the dissolution of the former Mali Federation (composed of Senegal and the present Mali Republic). A trade boycott imposed by Mali has deprived Senegal of its natural economic hinterland. Guinea, Senegal's southern neighbor, is not overtly hostile, but the leftist Guinean regime has close links with Mali and considers the moderate Senegalese Government to be a puppet of France.

Senegal has reacted to this situation by cultivating close ties with the pro-Western "Brazzaville Group" of twelve former French tropical African dependencies - besides Senegal, the Conseil de l'Entente states (Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey, and Niger), Cameroun, Madagascar, Mauritania, and the former French Equatorial African colonies (Gabon, Congo Republic, Central African Republic,

and Chad).

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and Chad). President Senghor has also paid visits recently to Liberia, Nigeria, and Ghana, and he is trying to effect a rapprochement with Guinea.

Senegal recently made several gestures toward the Soviet Bloc. It has recognized Communist China and North Vietnam and has invited delegations from both regimes to its independence ceremonies. We expect the Soviets to open an Embassy in Dakar soon. These moves represent less a real change in Senegal's orientation than an effort to demonstrate its Cold War nonalignment and thereby refute the charge, made by Guinea, Ghana and Mali, that the Senegalese are "imperialist stooges". (We have asked our Ambassador to register concern at Senegal's recognition of Communist China and North Vietnam in the hope of preventing further troublesome Senegalese gestures toward the Communist bloc.)

## Relations with U.S.

U.S. relations with Senegal are good, and there are no serious contentious questions at issue between the two Governments. Both Prime Minister Dia and Foreign Minister Thiam have attended UN sessions in New York; Dia took the occasion to pay a call on President Eisenhower here in December, and Thiam saw Secretary Rusk on March 17. We have maintained a consular post in Dakar off and on since 1883.

For a while, the Senegalese showed some pique when we did not recognize their Government immediately after it seceded from the Mali Federation. (We waited until the present Republic of Mali formally accepted the new situation before recognizing Senegal). This irritation seems to have worn off. The Senegalese have also expressed displeasure that we began an aid program for Mali (\$2.3 million for FY 1961) before assisting the more pro-Western Senegalese. (We felt obliged to move quickly in Mali, after the dissolution of the Federation, to prevent the radical Malian government from sliding into heavy dependence on the Soviet Bloc, as Guinea had done earlier).

Actually, we tried to discuss an aid program for Senegal even before its secession from the Federation, but the Senegalese asked that talks be postponed for several months until their development plan was ready. Just recently, they requested U.S. financing for a number of vocational and other school construction projects. We have offered a \$600,000 commodity aid program (rice), the local proceeds of sale to be used to finance one of the projects proposed.

We hope to

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We hope to increase this to \$1.4 million for FY 1961, if additional funds become available, and expect the FY 1962 program to be about \$3 million. (The French aid program runs at about \$20 million annually, that of the European Economic Community at about \$9 million).

Our direct interests in Senegal are not great. Only about 100 Americans live in the country. Texaco and the French subsidiaries of Mobil Oil and Esso have distribution or bunkering facilities there, and Continental Oil and Cities Service, in association with French interests, hold exploration permits in Senegal. International Minerals and Chemical Corporation is considering a substantial participation in a phosphate mining venture.

## Internal Politics

Although virtually a one party state, the Senegalese regime is not rigidly totalitarian in approach and permits a considerable free play of opinion inside and outside of the ruling party, the Union Progressiste Senegalaise (UPS). A noisy leftist opposition seems to have little real strength.

There are, however, significant tensions within the UPS. President Senghor and Prime Minister Dia reportedly disagree on the division of executive authority between their respective offices. Valdiodio N'Diaye, the ambitious Minister of the Interior, is pressing for more power. Lamine Gueye, Mayor of Dakar and President of the National Assembly, whose following merged with the Senghor-Dia group in 1958 to form a single party, has never entirely reconciled himself to a secondary role in the UPS.

Prospects for future stability are fairly good. The most likely threat to internal peace lies in a struggle for power by contending factions within the UPS, not in its overthrow by the leftist opposition. However, if the UPS should fall apart, the leftists and the few Senegalese Communists could easily gain influence out of propertion to their numbers by making common cause with one or another of the resulting splinter groups.