

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>all decisions per NSC law 5/20/77 State law 4/11/77</i>		
	*** TO BE SUBMITTED TO STATE DEPT FOR CONCURRENCE***		
#4 Memo	WH Secret To VP Johnson from Colonel Burris	1 p 04/28/61	A
#4a Memo	WH Secret <i>Sanitized</i> To the President from VP Johnson	9 p <i>open 9-13-83 NLJ 82-288</i> 05/23/61	A
<del>#4b Memo</del>	<del>WH Secret</del> <del>To the President from VP Johnson</del>	<del>9 p <i>open 9-13-83 NLJ 82-288</i></del> <del>05/23/61</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#4c Memo</del>	<del>WH Secret</del> <del>To the President from VP Johnson</del>	<del>9 p <i>open 9-13-83 NLJ 82-288</i></del> <del>05/23/61</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#4d Memo</del>	<del>WH Secret</del> <del>To the President from VP Johnson</del>	<del>9 p <i>open 10-14-87 NLJ 87-149</i></del> <del>05/23/61</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#4e Memo</del>	<del>WH Secret</del> <del>To the President from VP Johnson</del>	<del>9 p <i>open 3-9-09</i></del> <del>05/23/61</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#4f Memo</del>	<del>WH Secret</del> <del>To the President from VP Johnson</del>	<del>9 p <i>open 3-9-09</i></del> <del>05/23/61</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#4g Memo</del>	<del>WH Secret</del> <del>To the President from VP Johnson</del>	<del>9 p <i>open 3-9-09</i></del> <del>05/23/61</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#20 Memo</del>	<del>WH Secret</del> <del>To the President from VP Johnson</del>	<del>9 p <i>open 3-9-09</i></del> <del>05/23/61</del>	<del>A</del>
#5 Memo	WH Conf. <i>Sanitized</i> To Pres. Kennedy from Sen. Mike Mansfield	6 p 05/01/61	A

FILE LOCATION VP Security File, VP Travel  
VP's Visit to SE Asia (I)

RESTRICTION CODES

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#17 Report	<del>DOD</del> Secret <i>ASD ltr 11/16/76, State ltr 12/22/76</i> <del>Supplemental Military Assistance Program 3 p</del>	<del>05/17/61</del>	<del>A</del>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 Letter	State Top Secret <i>Exempt per State</i> To Pres. Kennedy from Diem 7 p	6-30-78 06/09/61	A
#6a Letter	State Conf. <i>Exempt per NSC 10-23-79</i> To VP Johnson from Chiang Kai-shek 4 p	06/09/61	A
<del>#10a Memo</del>	<del>State Secret <i>open 1-29-80 inq</i></del> <del>To VP Johnson from Carl Rowan 1 p</del>	<del>06/02/61</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#10b Report</del>	<del>State Secret <i>open 1-29-80 inq</i></del> <del>Proposed Statement by LBJ before House Foreign Affairs Committee 17 p</del>	<del>06/05/61</del>	<del>A</del>
#11 Letter	State Conf. To VP Johnson from Chiang Kai-shek 4 p [duplicate of Doc #6a]	06/09/61	A
<del>#12a Cable</del>	<del>State Secret <i>open 1-29-80 inq</i></del> <del>Embtel 1820 from Saigon 1 p</del>	<del>05/31/61</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#13b Report</del>	<del>State Secret <i>Exempt per NSC 10-23-79</i></del> <del>VP talks with Diem <i>open 8-22-89 NLS 87-138</i> 6 p</del>	<del></del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#13d Report</del>	<del>State Secret <i>Exempt per NSC 10-23-79</i></del> <del>VP talks with Taiwan officials 4 p</del>	<del><i>open 8-22-89 NLS 87-138</i></del>	<del>A</del>
#13f Report	State Top Secret <del><i>Exempt per NSC 10-23-79</i></del> VP Johnson talks with Thailand officials 4 p <i>sanitized 8-22-89 NLS 87-138</i>		A
<del>#13h Report</del>	<del>State Secret <i>Exempt per NSC 10-23-79</i></del> <del>VP Johnson talks with Indian officials 3 p</del>	<del><i>open 9-13-83 NLS 82-288</i></del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#13j Report</del>	<del>State Secret <i>Exempt per NSC 10-23-79</i></del> <del>VP Johnson talks with Pakistan officials 3 p</del>	<del><i>open 8-22-89 NLS 87-138</i></del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#15 Letter w/attachment</del>	<del>State Secret <i>open 1-29-80 inq</i></del> <del>To VP Johnson from U. Alexis Johnson 4 p</del>	<del>07/11/61</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#15a Letter w/attachment</del>	<del>State Secret <i>open 1-29-80 inq</i></del> <del>To VP Johnson from U. Alexis Johnson 4 p</del> <del>[duplicate of Doc. #15]</del>	<del>07/11/61</del>	<del>A</del>
#16a Letter	State Top Secret To Pres. Kennedy from Diem 7 p [duplicate of doc. #1]	06/09/61	A

FILE LOCATION VP Security File, VP Travel  
VP's Visit to SE Asia (I) 69

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#16b Letter	State Top Secret To Pres. Kennedy from Diem [duplicate of doc. #1]	7 p 06/09/61	A
#16c Letter	State Top Secret To Pres. Kennedy from Diem [duplicate of Doc. #1]	7 p 06/09/61	A
<del>#18 Memo</del>	<del>State Conf. sanitized 1-29-80's Check List for Talks with Nehru</del>	<del>3 p Undated</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#19 Memo</del>	<del>State Secret open 1-29-80's Check List for Talks with Sarit</del>	<del>3 p Undated</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#19a Memo</del>	<del>State Conf. open 3-9-09 Check List for Talks with Nehru [duplicate of #18]</del>	<del>3 p Undated</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#21 Memo</del>	<del>State Secret sanitized 1-29-80's Current Status of Items Discussed Between VP Johnson and Pres. Diem</del>	<del>4 p 08/16/62</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#9 Memo</del> <del>w/attachment</del>	<del>State Secret To Wiley from Battle</del>	<del>5 p Undated</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#14a Letter</del>	<del>State Top Secret Exempt per State To VP Johnson from Ayub Khan Exempt NLS 89-159 Open 3-9-09</del>	<del>1 p 05/29/61</del>	<del>A</del>
#14b Report	State Top Secret Exempt per State Requirement of Pakistan Army Exempt NLS 89-159	4 p Undated	A
#14c Report	State Top Secret Exempt per State Requirements of Pakistan Navy Exempt NLS 89-159	4 p Undated	A
#14d Report	State Top Secret Exempt per State Requirements of Pakistan Air Force Exempt NLS 89-159	2 p Undated	A

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VICE PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON  
SEATO COUNCIL  
BANGKOK  
MAY 16, 1961

THAILAND

(NOT TO BE REPRODUCED OR DISTRIBUTED. STATE ADVISES NO FORMAL SPEECH DESIRED. MEETING WITH 8 COUNCIL MEMBERS. THIS MAY BE USEFUL FOR GUIDELINES.)

I welcome this opportunity to meet with the Representatives to the SEATO Council. Only last month I was privileged to deliver a message from our President to the permanent representatives at NATO in Paris.

Today -- at President Kennedy's request -- I have come to reaffirm to you and to all who may note these proceedings America's determination that our commitments under the SEATO Treaty will be fully honored.

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization is essential to the peace, security and freedom of this area. In turn, this area is essential to the maintenance of peace and freedom throughout the world. The integrity of SEATO as a shield to the sub-continent of Asia must never be compromised.

I realize -- and certainly President Kennedy realizes -- that my visit here now, after my visit last month to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, emphasizes the broad spread and scope of American commitments. It also emphasizes America's faith in strength by alliance.

On both points, we realize there are those who question, first, our capacity to honor our commitments, and, second, question the sophistication of America's trust in alliances as a means of strength. I would like to speak candidly to these questions -- so that friends may better understand the United States and foes may never misunderstand.

The whole history of armed aggression provides these impressive lessons:

1. Aggressors, whether alone or in alliance, inevitably align their forces on two fronts because the aggressor can never trust a peaceful and unfortified boundary.
2. In times of aggression, the aggressor employs the advantage of his initiative and his dispersal to decoy and divert the strength of his intended victims.

3. The objective of such maneuver is to permit the aggressor to achieve -- on one front or the other -- the quick and cheap breakthrough and conquest which deprives the victim of the means to recover or to resist.

The imperative of those who would rule by conquest rather than by free consent is to move quickly, successfully and with minimum loss. The aim of the policy of the United States for more than a decade has been to deny the potential aggressor the certainty of success in such aggression. Without such certainty of cheap and easy conquest, the aggressor embarks upon aggression foredoomed to ultimate exhaustion and retreat.

Since the first threats to the integrity of the Middle East, Turkey and Greece, nearly 15 years ago, the United States has participated in mutual efforts to deny such quick and easy conquests to Communist imperialism -- in Western Europe, in South Korea, and in Southeast Asia. These efforts have succeeded thus far in restraining Communism's imperialistic designs. We believe our joint efforts can continue to succeed.

Holding the first strike advantage that it does, Communist aggression can move anywhere. But against the growing unity of the nations determined to remain free Communism's chances for success grow less and less each year everywhere.

The point is that unity, alertness, and preparedness throughout the world of free men -- especially among the nations which would be aggression's prime first target -- have largely deprived the potential aggressor of any rational hope for worthwhile victory. By achieving unity in advance of aggression, the free world has achieved the strength it has. Traditionally this has been accomplished only after aggression had begun. This achievement may well prove to be far more of a milestone on the road to universal peace than some of us yet appreciate.

Some among our allies and well-wishers raise the question whether, if I may state it candidly, the United States is not "overextended" by its participation in the alliances of this spreading unity. This question is used to foster false doubts among our friends and keep alive false hopes among our enemies.

To reply candidly and soberly, I would make these points:

1. The one American position that would be indefensible -- the one situation where our capacity would be hopelessly overextended -- would be to retreat from the world and attempt to stand as an island in a global sea of Communism. Our capacity to endure is enhanced and extended by the position to which we have committed ourselves. That is a gain not only for the United States but for all free nations.
2. No nation is "overextended" when it is committed to the defense of its own necessary strategic self-interest. When our nation effectively spanned the North American continent to the Pacific the United States acquired a new self-interest without losing or diluting its earliest self-interest in the Atlantic community. As our eastern frontier is oriented to Europe and our Gulf frontier to Latin America, so the future of our growing Western frontier is intertwined with the whole rim of the Pacific. America's interest in the peace, well-being, stability and freedom of Asia is impelling, not impulsive; enduring, not expedient.
3. The third point I wish to make is that the United States position is responsible, plausible and possible because of the alliances we have entered, and has required us to place great trust in the honor among governments of free men. We believe nations extend their strength rather than overextend it by joining together in free associations to meet common dangers and work for common good. Our alliances are not burdens beyond our capacity to support -- they are supports without which we could not stand securely.

Thus, my points are these:

First, the United States holds to a responsible, prudent course by going into the world rather than retreating from it.

Second, the self-interest of the United States both necessitates and justifies commitment to freedom in Asia as well as in Europe -- and as well in Latin America and Africa.

Third, the United States adds to its own strength and endurance by joining its strength with others in free associations and alliance.

The American position is soundly-conceived, strongly-based and will continue to be resolutely-supported.

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization gives to each of our nations new and added strength far beyond the utmost any one nation could mobilize or maintain on its own. The same is true of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The same is true of all such structures of free world association.

I have said these things to make clear to allies and adversaries that the United States is not committed gratuitously or preferentially -- but, rather, we are committed purposefully and realistically. We can and we shall honor the purposes of our commitments.

For all of us, the continuing success of our alliances requires both vigilance and vision now.

Vigilance is required because Communism -- facing frustration of its armed expansion and facing instabilities within -- will predictably seek: 1) to provoke discord and division and doubt in our alliances; 2) to expand outside the areas of the established alliances; 3) to disrupt, paralyze, and even destroy the growing institutions of international cooperation in which it has a voice; and, 4) to distract us militarily to keep us from the social works which express the aims of our society and afford the permanent basis of its strength.

Vision is required of us to add to the scope and purpose of all our alliances -- especially here in Southeast Asia.

We have a great opportunity to advance our common cause by turning our unity to broader additional purposes of education; economic cooperation and development; building of the social overhead of stable societies such as roads and schools and hospitals and public works; the training of personnel for responsible roles in the essential institutions of a free society; the formulation of progressive agricultural and industrial programs -- all the things required for self-sustaining growth and self-maintaining responsibility.

Such goals as these are no less realistic than the aims of our present alliances.

By putting in place vital and flourishing institutions of freedom, we further deny the aggressor hope of quick, cheap or permanent conquest. Likewise, by putting such institutions in place at the very border of Communism's tragic empire, we challenge their system to a competition only freedom can win.

The United States approaches the era now beginning fully aware of the perils and trials. But we are aware as well of its promise and the triumphs that can be achieved in unity.

There is a great Community of Courage in this world of the free. In that Community are the strong and the rich -- but with them as neighbors live the weak and the poor. We have commitments of the conscience to honor toward them. In our own self interest as well as in the highest interests of our cause we must provide to the weak and the poor not only the means of their freedom's defense but the reasons to continue that defense. This is the highest challenge to free men in Free Asia and the continuing challenge to free men everywhere. Our success will finally be measured by our response to this challenge.

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EXCERPTS FROM VICE PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S STATEMENT ON ARRIVAL AT SEATO

MAY 17, 1961, 9:15 A.M.

I am honored to have you take this time to meet with me. I am very hopeful that this mission that I have undertaken on behalf of the President will be fruitful for him and for me but more important for the free people of the world. This has been an interesting experience. I am pleased beyond compare that I should have an opportunity to meet here with the representatives of some of our oldest, dearest and most dependable friends. I have come to see leaders of free Asia but I have also come to see the people of this section of the world. My President is interested in many things. He has been concerned with many problems in the first 100 days of his administration. There is nothing about which he feels more concern than the future, the prosperity, the peace and protection of liberty and freedom in Southeast Asia.

There comes a time in the life of men when they must cut out the underbrush, consider first things first and live up to their responsibilities. I can speak here, in the atmosphere of this fine organization of which we are a proud member, for the United States of America only. But I can tell you, as my President has said repeatedly in the past, we cherish our liberty, we love our freedom, and we want both of them for everybody. We are not concerned with freedom and liberty just within the boundaries of our individual state or our own nation. It is sometimes difficult to understand how a man -- a nation -- can treasure liberty for himself and be totally unconcerned for it when it involves other people in his own backyard.

America keeps its commitments!

America is aware of its obligations!

America asks the Counsel and advice of all the leaders of the free world not following a course of aggrandizement, nor seeking to subjugate any people anywhere.

United We Stand.

In unity is strength. But it must not be just the strength of a typewriter ribbon, or the empty platitudes of parchment paper. It must be the strength that comes from conviction that all men are created equal. It must be born from the strength and the knowledge that we who have gained so much from the free way of life have a moral, legal and spiritual obligation to see that our fellow man is not enveloped in a sea of atheism and shackled and manacled in a jacket of totalitarianism. These are troublesome days. But look at any period of history that is worth reading about. They were not moments of luxury. Today is another moment of decision where the national will and the national purpose is to be tested.

We have come here to find out the facts; see where we are; determine where we go from here and when; and I trust the mission will be rewarding -- rewarding to men who treasure their liberty and want it for their fellow men regardless of their race, religion or region.

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MEMORANDUM

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**DATE:** 28 April 1961  
**TO:** Mr. Johnson  
**FROM:** Colonel Burris  
**RE:** Certain Implications of the Laotian Crisis

The Laotian crisis is a matter of contention among the major powers and its resolution rests primarily in non-Laotian hands. This has been the basis for negotiations with the Russians for a cease-fire. In the past 48 hours however the Soviets have reneged on their apparent commitment to the extent that they now contend that the issue must be resolved between the contending factions in Laos. This is a familiar Soviet line which is often taken. For example, with regard to Germany the Soviets claim that the issue must be resolved between the two Germanies. The practical result of this position is to permit the Communist effort to continue unabated.

The commission which has been convened in New Delhi is already a victim of Communist tactics and an Indian version of neutralism. Since its very first meeting the group has been bogged down in procedural questions.

There is a grave concern among all the countries in Southeast Asia about the outcome of the crisis. All governments in the area have come to regard the crisis as a symbolic test of the intentions and strengths of the West and the Communist Bloc. The fall of Laos will have a profound effect throughout the area and will inevitably incline these countries toward either neutralism or accommodation to the Communists. Even Thailand, the most important U. S. ally in the area, is expected to establish new and different relationships with the Communists.

If the United States and its allies take immediate action to halt Communist expansion in Viet Nam (assuming that it is no longer possible nor practicable to institute military action in Laos) considerable doubt has already been created in the minds of the Southeast Asians as to whether the United States can long stem Communist advances in the area. Therefore, even with a new and bold effort there remain possibilities and even temptations for the nations of the area to seek at least neutral positions in a new hope for survival.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC Dec. 5/20/77, State Dec. 11/11/77

By RMG, NARS, Date 4/14/77

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May 23, 1961

MEMORANDUM

TO: The President  
FROM: The Vice President  
SUBJECT: Mission to Southeast Asia, India and Pakistan

The mission undertaken May 9, 1961, at your request, was informative and illuminating far beyond my expectations. Unusual candor-- as well as unusual length--marked exchanges in each country. Each leader visited welcomed and sought to take full advantage of my presence as a means of transmitting to you their strongly held personal views on many matters.

The purpose of this memorandum is to convey such of my own impressions and evaluations as seem most pertinent to decisions now under your consideration. It would be unrealistic to assume that such limited visits afford a basis for detailed substantive policy judgments. It would be equally unrealistic not to recognize that the circumstances and timing of this mission elicited a depth and substance of expression not normally present in exchanges through usual channels. My purpose is to offer perspective--not, I wish to emphasize, to propose details of policy.

The Impact of Laos

There is no mistaking the deep--and long lasting--impact of recent developments in Laos.

Country to country, the degree differs but Laos has created doubt and concern about intentions of the United States throughout Southeast Asia. No amount of success at Geneva can, of itself, erase this. The independent Asians do not wish to have their own status resolved in like manner in Geneva.

Leaders

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 82-288

By ics, NARS, Date 9-13-83

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Leaders such as Diem, Chiang, Sarit and Ayub more or less accept that we are making "the best of a bad bargain" at Geneva. Their charity extends no farther.

#### The Impact of the Mission

Beyond question, your judgment about the timing of our mission was correct. Each leader--except Nehru--publicly congratulated you on the "timing" of this mission. Chiang said--and all others privately concurred--that the mission had the effect of "stabilizing" the situation in the Southeast Asian nations.

What happened, I believe, was this: the leaders visited want--as long as they can--to remain as friends or allies of the United States. The public, or, more precisely, the political, reaction to Laos had drastically weakened the ability to maintain any strongly pro-US orientation. Neutralism in Thailand, collapse in Vietnam, anti-American election demagoguery in the Philippines were all developing prior to our visit. The show of strength and sincerity--partly because you had sent the Vice President and partly, to a greater extent than you may believe, because you had sent your sister--gave the friendly leaders something to "hang their hats on" for a while longer.

Our mission arrested the decline of confidence in the United States. It did not--in my judgment--restore any confidence already lost. The leaders were as explicit, as courteous and courtly as men could be in making it clear that deeds must follow words--soon.

We didn't buy time--we were given it.

If these men I saw at your request were bankers, I would know--without bothering to ask--that there would be no further extensions on my note.

The purpose

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The Purpose of Joint Communiques

Starting with President Diem at Saigon, it was my conclusion that the interests of the United States would be served -- and protected -- by the issuance of joint communiques. My purpose was this: to attach the signature and the name of each of the leaders to a joint public statement embodying their acceptance of an agreement with the details of your letters which I delivered in your behalf. Without such statements in writing, it was clear that the United States would be victimized later by self-serving statements that you -- and the Administration -- had offered "nothing" or "too little," etc.

As you recognized, the joint communiques followed item by item the statements in your letters. In most instances, where substantive pledges and policies were involved, the communiques were cleared through Washington before issuance. The extensive, important and almost unprecedented communique with Nehru largely reflects the high regard the Indian Government holds for Ambassador Galbraith.

I should make these two points clear: assurances I gave were those you sent me to convey, and no commitments were asked and none were given beyond those authorized in your letters. In some instances, for various reasons, I did not express all the commitments or proposals authorized in the State position papers.

The Importance of Follow-Through

I cannot stress too strongly the extreme importance of following up this mission with other measures, other actions, and other efforts. At the moment -- because of Laos -- these nations are hypersensitive to the possibility of American hypocrisy toward Asia. Considering the Vienna talks with Khrushchev -- which, to the Asian mind, emphasize Western rather than Asian concerns -- and considering the negative line of various domestic American editorials about this mission, I strongly believe it is of first importance that this trip bear fruit immediately.

Personal Conclusions from the Mission

I took to Southeast Asia some basic convictions about the problems faced there. I have come away from the mission there -- and to India and Pakistan -- with many of those convictions sharpened and deepened by what I saw and learned. I have also reached certain other conclusions which I believe may be of value as guidance for those responsible in formulating policies.

These

These conclusions are as follows:

1. The battle against Communism must be joined in Southeast Asia with strength and determination to achieve success there -- or the United States, inevitably, must surrender the Pacific and take up our defenses on our own shores. Asian Communism is compromised and contained by the maintenance of free nations on the subcontinent. Without this inhibitory influence, the island outposts -- Philippines, Japan, Taiwan -- have no security and the vast Pacific becomes a Red Sea. ✓
2. The struggle is far from lost in Southeast Asia and it is by no means inevitable that it must be lost. In each country it is possible to build a sound structure capable of withstanding and turning the Communist surge. The will to resist -- while now the target of subversive attack -- is there. The key to what is done by Asians in defense of Southeast Asian freedom is confidence in the United States.
3. There is no alternative to United States leadership in Southeast Asia. Leadership in individual countries -- or the regional leadership and cooperation so appealing to Asians -- rests on the knowledge and faith in United States power, will and understanding. ✓
4. SEATO is not now and probably never will be the answer because of British and French unwillingness to support decisive action. Asian distrust of the British and French is outspoken. Success at Geneva would prolong SEATO's role. Failure at Geneva would terminate SEATO's meaningfulness. In the latter event, we must be ready with a new approach to collective security in the area.

We should consider an alliance of all the free nations of the Pacific and Asia who are willing to join forces in defense of their freedom. Such an organization should:

- a) have a clear-cut command authority
  - b) also devote attention to measures and programs of social justice, housing, land reform, etc.
5. Asian leaders -- at this time -- do not want American troops involved in Southeast Asia other than on training missions. American combat troop involvement is not only not required, it is not desirable. Possibly Americans fail to appreciate fully the subtlety that recently-colonial peoples would not look with favor upon governments which invited or accepted the return this soon of Western troops. To the extent that fear

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of ground troop involvement dominates our political responses to Asia in Congress or elsewhere, it seems most desirable to me to allay those paralyzing fears in confidence, on the strength of the individual statements made by leaders consulted on this trip. This does not minimize or disregard the probability that open attack would bring calls for U.S. combat troops. But the present probability of open attack seems scant, and we might gain much needed flexibility in our policies if the spectre of combat troop commitment could be lessened domestically.

6. Any help -- economic as well as military -- we give less developed nations to secure and maintain their freedom must be a part of a mutual effort. These nations cannot be saved by United States help alone. To the extent the Southeast Asian nations are prepared to take the necessary measures to make our aid effective, we can be -- and must be -- unstinting in our assistance. It would be useful to enunciate more clearly than we have -- for the guidance of these young and unsophisticated nations -- what we expect or require of them.
7. In large measure, the greatest danger Southeast Asia offers to nations like the United States is not the momentary threat of Communism itself, rather that danger stems from hunger, ignorance, poverty and disease. We must -- whatever strategies we evolve -- keep these enemies the point of our attack, and make imaginative use of our scientific and technological capability in such enterprises.

8. Vietnam

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8. Vietnam and Thailand are the immediate--and most important--trouble spots, critical to the U.S. These areas require the attention of our very best talents--under the very closest Washington direction--on matters economic, military and political.

The basic decision in Southeast Asia is here. We must decide whether to help these countries to the best of our ability or throw in the towel in the area and pull back our defenses to San Francisco and a "Fortress America" concept. More important, we would say to the world in this case that we don't live up to treaties and don't stand by our friends. This is not my concept. I recommend that we move forward promptly with a major effort to help these countries defend themselves. I consider the key here is to get our best MAAG people to control, plan, direct and exact results from our military aid program. In Vietnam and Thailand, we must move forward together.

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11. India could well be the subject of an entire report. Nehru, during our visit, was clearly "neutral" in favor of the West. This Administration is highly regarded and well received in India. Only part of this flows out of hope or expectation of aid. Mainly, there is an intellectual affinity, or an affinity of spirit. This, in my judgment, should be exploited not with the hope of drawing India into our sphere--which might be as unnecessary as it would be improbable--but, chiefly, with the hope of cementing under Nehru an India-U.S. friendship which would endure beyond any transition of power in India.

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To recapitulate, these are the main impressions I have brought back from my trip.

The fundamental decision required of the United States -- and time is of the greatest importance -- is whether we are to attempt to meet the challenge of Communist expansion now in Southeast Asia by a major effort in support of the forces of freedom in the area or throw in the towel. This decision must be made in a full realization of the very heavy and continuing costs involved in terms of money, of effort and of United States prestige. It must be made with the knowledge that at some point we may be faced with the further decision of whether we commit major United States forces to the area or cut our losses and withdraw should our other efforts fail. We must remain master of this decision. What we do in Southeast Asia should be part of a rational program to meet the threat we face in the region as a whole. It should include a clear-cut pattern of specific contributions to be expected by each partner according to his ability and resources. I recommend we proceed with a clear-cut and strong program of action.

I believe that the mission -- as you conceived it -- was a success. I am grateful to the many who labored to make it so.

Lyndon B. Johnson

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May 23, 1961

MEMORANDUM

TO: The President  
FROM: The Vice President  
SUBJECT: Mission to Southeast Asia, India and Pakistan

The mission undertaken May 9, 1961, at your request, was informative and illuminating far beyond my expectations. Unusual candor--as well as unusual length--marked exchanges in each country. Each leader visited welcomed and sought to take full advantage of my presence as a means of transmitting to you their strongly held personal views on many matters.

The purpose of this memorandum is to convey such of my own impressions and evaluations as seem most pertinent to decisions now under your consideration. It would be unrealistic to assume that such limited visits afford a basis for detailed substantive policy judgments. It would be equally unrealistic not to recognize that the circumstances and timing of this mission elicited a depth and substance of expression not normally present in exchanges through usual channels. My purpose is to offer perspective--not, I wish to emphasize, to propose details of policy.

The Impact of Laos

There is no mistaking the deep--and long lasting--impact of recent developments in Laos.

Country to country, the degree differs but Laos has created doubt and concern about intentions of the United States throughout Southeast Asia. No amount of success at Geneva can, of itself, erase this. The independent Asians do not wish to have their own status resolved in like manner in Geneva.

Leaders

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 82-288  
By ics, NARS, Date 9-13-83

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Leaders such as Diem, Chiang, Sarit and Ayub more or less accept that we are making "the best of a bad bargain" at Geneva. Their charity extends no farther.

The Impact of the Mission

Beyond question, your judgment about the timing of our mission was correct. Each leader--except Nehru--publicly congratulated you on the "timing" of this mission. Chiang said--and all others privately concurred--that the mission had the effect of "stabilizing" the situation in the Southeast Asian nations.

What happened, I believe, was this: the leaders visited want--as long as they can--to remain as friends or allies of the United States. The public, or, more precisely, the political, reaction to Laos had drastically weakened the ability to maintain any strongly pro-US orientation. Neutralism in Thailand, collapse in Vietnam, anti-American election demagoguery in the Philippines were all developing prior to our visit. The show of strength and sincerity--partly because you had sent the Vice President and partly, to a greater extent than you may believe, because you had sent your sister--gave the friendly leaders something to "hang their hats on" for a while longer.

Our mission arrested the decline of confidence in the United States. It did not--in my judgment--restore any confidence already lost. The leaders were as explicit, as courteous and courtly as men could be in making it clear that deeds must follow words--soon.

We didn't buy time--we were given it.

If these men I saw at your request were bankers, I would know--without bothering to ask--that there would be no further extensions on my note.

The purpose

### The Purpose of Joint Communiques

Starting with President Diem at Saigon, it was my conclusion that the interests of the United States would be served -- and protected -- by the issuance of joint communiques. My purpose was this: to attach the signature and the name of each of the leaders to a joint public statement embodying their acceptance of an agreement with the details of your letters which I delivered in your behalf. Without such statements in writing, it was clear that the United States would be victimized later by self-serving statements that you -- and the Administration -- had offered "nothing" or "too little," etc.

As you recognized, the joint communiques followed item by item the statements in your letters. In most instances, where substantive pledges and policies were involved, the communiques were cleared through Washington before issuance. The extensive, important and almost unprecedented communique with Nehru largely reflects the high regard the Indian Government holds for Ambassador Galbraith.

I should make these two points clear: assurances I gave were those you sent me to convey, and no commitments were asked and none were given beyond those authorized in your letters. In some instances, for various reasons, I did not express all the commitments or proposals authorized in the State position papers.

### The Importance of Follow-Through

I cannot stress too strongly the extreme importance of following up this mission with other measures, other actions, and other efforts. At the moment -- because of Laos -- these nations are hypersensitive to the possibility of American hypocrisy toward Asia. Considering the Vienna talks with Khrushchev -- which, to the Asian mind, emphasize Western rather than Asian concerns -- and considering the negative line of various domestic American editorials about this mission, I strongly believe it is of first importance that this trip bear fruit immediately.

### Personal Conclusions from the Mission

I took to Southeast Asia some basic convictions about the problems faced there. I have come away from the mission there -- and to India and Pakistan -- with many of those convictions sharpened and deepened by what I saw and learned. I have also reached certain other conclusions which I believe may be of value as guidance for those responsible in formulating policies.

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These conclusions are as follows:

1. The battle against Communism must be joined in Southeast Asia with strength and determination to achieve success there -- or the United States, inevitably, must surrender the Pacific and take up our defenses on our own shores. Asian Communism is compromised and contained by the maintenance of free nations on the subcontinent. Without this inhibitory influence, the island outposts -- Philippines, Japan, Taiwan -- have no security and the vast Pacific becomes a Red Sea.
2. The struggle is far from lost in Southeast Asia and it is by no means inevitable that it must be lost. In each country it is possible to build a sound structure capable of withstanding and turning the Communist surge. The will to resist -- while now the target of subversive attack -- is there. The key to what is done by Asians in defense of Southeast Asian freedom is confidence in the United States.
3. There is no alternative to United States leadership in Southeast Asia. Leadership in individual countries -- or the regional leadership and cooperation so appealing to Asians -- rests on the knowledge and faith in United States power, will and understanding.
4. SEATO is not now and probably never will be the answer because of British and French unwillingness to support decisive action. Asian distrust of the British and French is outspoken. Success at Geneva would prolong SEATO's role. Failure at Geneva would terminate SEATO's meaningfulness. In the latter event, we must be ready with a new approach to collective security in the area.

We should consider an alliance of all the free nations of the Pacific and Asia who are willing to join forces in defense of their freedom. Such an organization should:

- a) have a clear-cut command authority
  - b) also devote attention to measures and programs of social justice, housing, land reform, etc.
5. Asian leaders -- at this time -- do not want American troops involved in Southeast Asia other than on training missions. American combat troop involvement is not only not required, it is not desirable. Possibly Americans -- fail to appreciate fully the subtlety that recently-colonial peoples would not look with favor upon governments which invited or accepted the return this soon of Western troops. To the extent that fear

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of ground troop involvement dominates our political responses to Asia in Congress or elsewhere, it seems most desirable to me to allay these paralyzing fears in confidence, on the strength of the individual statements made by leaders consulted on this trip. This does not minimize or disregard the probability that open attack would bring calls for U.S. combat troops. But the present probability of open attack seems scant, and we might gain much needed flexibility in our policies if the spectre of combat troop commitment could be lessened domestically.

6. Any help -- economic as well as military -- we give less developed nations to secure and maintain their freedom must be a part of a mutual effort. These nations cannot be saved by United States help alone. To the extent the Southeast Asian nations are prepared to take the necessary measures to make our aid effective, we can be -- and must be -- unstinting in our assistance. It would be useful to enunciate more clearly than we have -- for the guidance of these young and unsophisticated nations -- what we expect or require of them.
7. In large measure, the greatest danger Southeast Asia offers to nations like the United States is not the momentary threat of Communism itself, rather that danger stems from hunger, ignorance, poverty and disease. We must -- whatever strategies we evolve -- keep these enemies the point of our attack, and make imaginative use of our scientific and technological capability in such enterprises.

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This document consists of 8 pages.  
Number 5 of 8 copies, Series A

May 23, 1961

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TO: The President  
FROM: The Vice President  
SUBJECT: Mission to Southeast Asia, India and Pakistan

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 82-288  
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11. India could well be the subject of an entire report. Nehru, during our visit, was clearly "neutral" in favor of the West. This Administration is highly regarded and well received in India. Only part of this flows out of hope or expectation of aid. Fairly, there is an intellectual affinity, or an affinity of spirit. This, in my judgment, should be exploited not with the hope of drawing India into our sphere—which might be as unnecessary as it would be improbable—but, chiefly, with the hope of cementing under Nehru an India-U.S. friendship which would endure beyond any transition of power in India.

12. President Ayub in Pakistan is the singularly most impressive and, in his way, responsible head of state encountered on the trip. He is seasoned as a leader where others are not; confident, straightforward and I would judge, dependable. He is frank about his belief, offensive as it is to us, that the form of representative government would only open his country to Communist take-over at this time. Nonetheless, Ayub understands -- and is in agreement with -- the aim of eradicating poverty, ignorance and disease. We can have great influence and -- because of his administrative organization -- achieve dramatic success by supporting Pakistan's needs. Our military should see how to improve the effectiveness and achieve modernization of Pakistan's army. Ayub is wisely aware of Pakistan's strategic position, wants to make his forces more modern, and wants to resolve the Kashmir dispute to release Indian and Pakistani troops to deter the Chinese rather than each other. He spells out the fact that U.S. leadership rests on our own self-confidence and confidence we permit Asians to have in us.

To recapitulate, these are the main impressions I have brought back from my trip.

The fundamental decision required of the United States -- and time is of the greatest importance -- is whether we are to attempt to meet the challenge of Communist expansion now in Southeast Asia by a major effort in support of the forces of freedom in the area or throw in the towel. This decision must be made in a full realization of the very heavy and continuing costs involved in terms of money, of effort and of United States prestige. It must be made with the knowledge that at some point we may be faced with the further decision of whether we commit major United States forces to the area or cut our losses and withdraw should our other efforts fail. We must remain master of this decision. What we do in Southeast Asia should be part of a rational program to meet the threat we face in the region as a whole. It should include a clear-cut pattern of specific contributions to be expected by each partner according to his ability and resources. I recommend we proceed with a clear-cut and strong program of action.

I believe that the mission -- as you conceived it -- was a success. I am grateful to the many who labored to make it so.

Lyndon B. Johnson

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May 23, 1961

MEMORANDUM

TO: The President  
FROM: The Vice President  
SUBJECT: Mission to Southeast Asia, India and Pakistan

The mission undertaken May 9, 1961, at your request, was informative and illuminating far beyond my expectations. Unusual candor--as well as unusual length--marked exchanges in each country. Each leader visited welcomed and sought to take full advantage of my presence as a means of transmitting to you their strongly held personal views on many matters.

The purpose of this memorandum is to convey such of my own impressions and evaluations as seem most pertinent to decisions now under your consideration. It would be unrealistic to assume that such limited visits afford a basis for detailed substantive policy judgments. It would be equally unrealistic not to recognize that the circumstances and timing of this mission elicited a depth and substance of expression not normally present in exchanges through usual channels. My purpose is to offer perspective--not, I wish to emphasize, to propose details of policy.

The Impact of Laos

There is no mistaking the deep--and long lasting--impact of recent developments in Laos.

Country to country, the degree differs but Laos has created doubt and concern about intentions of the United States throughout Southeast Asia. No amount of success at Geneva can, of itself, erase this. The independent Asians do not wish to have their own status resolved in like manner in Geneva.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-149

By ing, NARA, Date 10-14-87

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Leaders

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Leaders such as Diem, Chiang, Sarit and Ayub more or less accept that we are making "the best of a bad bargain" at Geneva. Their charity extends no further.

#### The Impact of the Mission

Beyond question, your judgment about the timing of our mission was correct. Each leader--except Nehru--publicly congratulated you on the "timing" of this mission. Chiang said--and all others privately concurred--that the mission had the effect of "stabilizing" the situation in the Southeast Asian nations.

What happened, I believe, was this: the leaders visited want--as long as they can--to remain as friends or allies of the United States. The public, or, more precisely, the political, reaction to Laos had drastically weakened the ability to maintain any strongly pro-US orientation. Neutralism in Thailand, collapse in Vietnam, anti-American election demagoguery in the Philippines were all developing prior to our visit. The show of strength and sincerity--partly because you had sent the Vice President and partly, to a greater extent than you may believe, because you had sent your sister--gave the friendly leaders something to "hang their hats on" for a while longer.

Our mission arrested the decline of confidence in the United States. It did not--in my judgment--restore any confidence already lost. The leaders were as explicit, as courteous and courtly as men could be in making it clear that deeds must follow words--soon.

We didn't buy time--we were given it.

If these men I saw at your request were bankers, I would know--without bothering to ask--that there would be no further extensions on my note.

The purpose

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### The Purpose of Joint Communiques

Starting with President Diem at Saigon, it was my conclusion that the interests of the United States would be served-- and protected--by the issuance of joint communiques. My purpose was this: to attach the signature and the name of each of the leaders to a joint public statement embodying their acceptance of an agreement with the details of your letters which I delivered in your behalf. Without such statements in writing, it was clear that the United States would be victimized later by self-serving statements that you--and the Administration--had offered "nothing" or "too little," etc.

As you recognized, the joint communiques followed item by item the statements in your letters. In most instances, where substantive pledges and policies were involved, the communiques were cleared through Washington before issuance. The extensive, important and almost unprecedented communique with Nehru largely reflects the high regard the Indian Government holds for Ambassador Galbraith.

I should make these two points clear: assurances I gave were those you sent me to convey, and no commitments were asked and none were given beyond those authorized in your letters. In some instances, for various reasons, I did not express all the commitments or proposals authorized in the State position papers.

### The Importance of Follow-Through

I cannot stress too strongly the extreme importance of following up this mission with other measures, other actions, and other efforts. At the moment--because of Laos--these nations are hypersensitive to the possibility of American hypocrisy toward Asia. Considering the Vienna talks with Khrushchev--which, to the Asian mind, emphasize Western rather than Asian concerns--and considering the negative line of various domestic American editorials about this mission, I strongly believe it is of first importance that this trip bear fruit immediately.

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Personal Conclusions from the Mission

I took to Southeast Asia some basic convictions about the problems faced there. I have come away from the mission there--and to India and Pakistan--with many of those convictions sharpened and deepened by what I saw and learned. I have also reached certain other conclusions which I believe may be of value as guidance for those responsible in formulating policies.

These conclusions are as follows:

1. The battle against Communism must be joined in Southeast Asia with strength and determination to achieve success there--or the United States, inevitably, must surrender the Pacific and take up our defenses on our own shores. Asian Communism is compromised and contained by the maintenance of free nations on the subcontinent. Without this inhibitory influence, the island outposts--Philippines, Japan, Taiwan--have no security and the vast Pacific becomes a Red Sea.
2. The struggle is far from lost in Southeast Asia and it is by no means inevitable that it must be lost. In each country it is possible to build a sound structure capable of withstanding and turning the Communist surge. The will to resist--while now the target of subversive attack--is there. The key to what is done by Asians in defense of Southeast Asian freedom is confidence in the United States.
3. There is no alternative to United States leadership in Southeast Asia. Leadership in individual countries--or the regional leadership and cooperation so appealing to Asians--rests on the knowledge and faith in United States power, will and understanding.
4. SEATO is not now and probably never will be the answer because of British and French unwillingness to support decisive action. Asian distrust of the British and French is outspoken. Success at Geneva would prolong SEATO's role. Failure at Geneva would terminate SEATO's meaningfulness. In the latter event, we must be ready with a new approach to collective security in the area.

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We should consider an alliance of all the free nations of the Pacific and Asia who are willing to join forces in defense of their freedom. Such an organization should:

- a) have a clear-cut command authority
  - b) also devote attention to measures and programs of social justice, housing, land reform, etc.
5. Asian leaders--at this time--do not want American troops involved in Southeast Asia other than on training missions. American combat troop involvement is not only not required, it is not desirable. Possibly Americans fail to appreciate fully the subtlety that recently-colonial peoples would not look with favor upon governments which invited or accepted the return this soon of Western troops. To the extent that fear of ground troop involvement dominates our political responses to Asia in Congress or elsewhere, it seems most desirable to me to allay those paralyzing fears in confidence, on the strength of the individual statements made by leaders consulted on this trip. This does not minimize or disregard the probability that open attack would bring calls for U. S. combat troops. But the present probability of open attack seems scant, and we might gain much needed flexibility in our policies if the spectre of combat troop commitment could be lessened domestically.
6. Any help--economic as well as military--we give less developed nations to secure and maintain their freedom must be a part of a mutual effort. These nations cannot be saved by United States help alone. To the extent the Southeast Asian nations are prepared to take the necessary measures to make our aid effective, we can be--and must be--unstinting in our assistance. It would be useful to enunciate more clearly than we have--for the guidance of these young and unsophisticated nations--what we expect or require of them.
7. In large measure, the greatest danger Southeast Asia offers to nations like the United States is not the momentary threat of Communism itself, rather that danger stems from hunger, ignorance, poverty and disease. We must--whatever strategies

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we evolve--keep these enemies the point of our attack, and make imaginative use of our scientific and technological capacity in such enterprises.

8. Vietnam and Thailand are the immediate--and most important--trouble spots, critical to the U. S. These areas require the attention of our very best talents--under the very closest Washington direction--on matters economic, military and political.

The basic decision in Southeast Asia is here. We must decide whether to help these countries to the best of our ability or throw in the towel in the area and pull back our defenses to San Francisco and a "Fortress America" concept. More important, we would say to the world in this case that we don't live up to treaties and don't stand by our friends. This is not my concept. I recommend that we move forward promptly with a major effort to help these countries defend themselves. I consider the key here is to get our best MAAG people to control, plan, direct and exact results from our military aid program. In Vietnam and Thailand, we must move forward together.

a) In Vietnam, Diem is a complex figure beset by many problems. He has admirable qualities, but he is remote from the people, is surrounded by persons less admirable and capable than he. The country can be saved--if we move quickly and wisely. We must decide whether to support Diem--or let Vietnam fall. We must have coordination of purpose in our country team, diplomatic and military. The Saigon Embassy, USIS, MAAG and related operations leave much to be desired. They should be brought up to maximum efficiency. The most important thing is imaginative, creative, American management of our military aid program. The Vietnamese and our MAAG estimate that an additional \$50 million of U. S. military and economic assistance will be needed if we decide to support Vietnam. This is the best information available to us at the present time and if it is confirmed by the best Washington military judgment it should be supported. Since you proposed and Diem agreed to a joint economic mission, it should be appointed and proceed forthwith.

In Thailand

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- b) In Thailand, the Thais and our own MAAG estimate probably as much is needed as in Vietnam--about an additional \$50 million of military and economic assistance. Again, should our best military judgment concur, I believe we should support such a program. Sarit is more strongly and staunchly pro-Western than many of his people. He is and must be deeply concerned at the consequence of his country of a Communist-controlled Laos. If Sarit is to stand firm against neutralism, he must have--soon--concrete evidence to show his people of United States military and economic support. He believes that his armed forces should be increased to 150,000. His Defense Minister is coming to Washington to discuss aid matters.
9. The Republic of China on Taiwan was a pleasant surprise to me. I had been long aware of the criticisms against Chiang Kai-shek and his government and cognizant of the deep emotional American feelings in some quarters against him. I know these feelings influence our U. S. policy.

Whatever the cause, a progressive attitude is emerging there. Our conversations with Chiang and Mme. Chiang were dominated by discussions of measures of social progress, to my unexpected but gratified surprise. As with the Republic of Germany in Western Europe, so I believe we might profitably and wisely encourage the Republic of China in Asia to export talents, skills, and resources to other Asian lands to assist in programs of progress.

10. There is a great reservoir of good feeling toward America among Filipinos, with many of the usual Latin qualifications. Significantly at the time of our visit there were a number of editorial expressions which took a critical, mildly anti-American tone. This undoubtedly reflected feelings regarding Laos but also may have been influenced by the current Presidential election politics in the Philippines. Overall, our mission to the Philippines probably was more important and more necessary than had been indicated and served usefully to strengthen those Philippine leaders who are most unswerving in trust for the United States . It is my judgment

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that we should not take the Philippines for granted but should work closely, sympathetically and realistically in efforts to encourage the strengthening of the unity and the progress of Philippine development.

11. India could well be the subject of an entire report. Nehru, during our visit, was clearly "neutral" in favor of the West. This Administration is highly regarded and well received in India. Only part of this flows out of hope or expectation of aid. Mainly, there is an intellectual affinity, or an affinity of spirit. This, in my judgment, should be exploited not with the hope of drawing India into our sphere-- which might be as unnecessary as it would be improbable-- but, chiefly, with the hope of cementing under Nehru an India-U. S. friendship which would endure beyond any transition of power in India.
  
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May 23, 1961

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Leaders

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
Bvcbul/jc, NARA, Date 2-26-09

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48  
May 23, 1961

MEMORANDUM

**TO: The President**

**FROM: The Vice President**

**SUBJECT: Mission to Southeast Asia, India and Pakistan**

The mission undertaken May 9, 1961, at your request, was informative and illuminating far beyond my expectations. Unusual candor--as well as unusual length--marked exchanges in each country. Each leader visited welcomed and sought to take full advantage of my presence as a means of transmitting to you their strongly held personal views on many matters.

The purpose of this memorandum is to convey such of my own impressions and evaluations as seem most pertinent to decisions now under your consideration. It would be unrealistic to assume that such limited visits afford a basis for detailed substantive policy judgments. It would be equally unrealistic not to recognize that the circumstances and timing of this mission elicited a depth and substance of expression not normally present in exchanges through usual channels. My purpose is to offer perspective--not, I wish to emphasize, to propose details of policy.

The Impact of Laos

There is no mistaking the deep--and long lasting--impact of recent developments in Laos.

Country to country, the degree differs but Laos has created doubt and concern about intentions of the United States throughout Southeast Asia. No amount of success at Geneva can, of itself, erase this. The independent Asians do not wish to have their own status resolved in like manner in Geneva.

Leaders

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
Bvcbm/jc, NARA, Date 2-26-09

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Leaders such as Diem, Chiang, Sarit and Ayub more or less accept that we are making "the best of a bad bargain" at Geneva. Their charity extends no further.

#### The Impact of the Mission

Beyond question, your judgment about the timing of our mission was correct. Each leader--except Nehru--publicly congratulated you on the "timing" of this mission. Chiang said--and all others privately concurred--that the mission had the effect of "stabilizing" the situation in the Southeast Asian nations.

What happened, I believe, was this: the leaders visited want--as long as they can--to remain as friends or allies of the United States. The public, or, more precisely, the political, reaction to Laos had drastically weakened the ability to maintain any strongly pro-US orientation. Neutralism in Thailand, collapse in Vietnam, anti-American election demagoguery in the Philippines were all developing prior to our visit. The show of strength and sincerity--partly because you had sent the Vice President and partly, to a greater extent than you may believe, because you had sent your sister--gave the friendly leaders something to "hang their hats on" for a while longer.

Our mission arrested the decline of confidence in the United States. It did not--in my judgment--restore any confidence already lost. The leaders were as explicit, as courteous and courtly as men could be in making it clear that deeds must follow words--soon.

We didn't buy time--we were given it.

If these men I saw at your request were bankers, I would know--without bothering to ask--that there would be no further extensions on my note.

The purpose

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### The Purpose of Joint Communiques

Starting with President Diem at Saigon, it was my conclusion that the interests of the United States would be served-- and protected--by the issuance of joint communiques. My purpose was this: to attach the signature and the name of each of the leaders to a joint public statement embodying their acceptance of an agreement with the details of your letters which I delivered in your behalf. Without such statements in writing, it was clear that the United States would be victimized later by self-serving statements that you--and the Administration-- had offered "nothing" or "too little," etc.

As you recognized, the joint communiques followed item by item the statements in your letters. In most instances, where substantive pledges and policies were involved, the communiques were cleared through Washington before issuance. The extensive, important and almost unprecedented communique with Nehru largely reflects the high regard the Indian Government holds for Ambassador Galbraith.

I should make these two points clear: assurances I gave were those you sent me to convey, and no commitments were asked and none were given beyond those authorized in your letters. In some instances, for various reasons, I did not express all the commitments or proposals authorized in the State position papers.

### The Importance of Follow-Through

I cannot stress too strongly the extreme importance of following up this mission with other measures, other actions, and other efforts. At the moment--because of Laos--these nations are hypersensitive to the possibility of American hypocrisy toward Asia. Considering the Vienna talks with Khrushchev--which, to the Asian mind, emphasize Western rather than Asian concerns--and considering the negative line of various domestic American editorials about this mission, I strongly believe it is of first importance that this trip bear fruit immediately.

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Personal Conclusions from the Mission

I took to Southeast Asia some basic convictions about the problems faced there. I have come away from the mission there--and to India and Pakistan--with many of those convictions sharpened and deepened by what I saw and learned. I have also reached certain other conclusions which I believe may be of value as guidance for those responsible in formulating policies.

These conclusions are as follows:

1. The battle against Communism must be joined in Southeast Asia with strength and determination to achieve success there--or the United States, inevitably, must surrender the Pacific and take up our defenses on our own shores. Asian Communism is compromised and contained by the maintenance of free nations on the subcontinent. Without this inhibitory influence, the island outposts--Philippines, Japan, Taiwan--have no security and the vast Pacific becomes a Red Sea.
2. The struggle is far from lost in Southeast Asia and it is by no means inevitable that it must be lost. In each country it is possible to build a sound structure capable of withstanding and turning the Communist surge. The will to resist--while now the target of subversive attack--is there. The key to what is done by Asians in defense of Southeast Asian freedom is confidence in the United States.
3. There is no alternative to United States leadership in Southeast Asia. Leadership in individual countries--or the regional leadership and cooperation so appealing to Asians--rests on the knowledge and faith in United States power, will and understanding.
4. SEATO is not now and probably never will be the answer because of British and French unwillingness to support decisive action. Asian distrust of the British and French is outspoken. Success at Geneva would prolong SEATO's role. Failure at Geneva would terminate SEATO's meaningfulness. In the latter event, we must be ready with a new approach to collective security in the area.

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We should consider an alliance of all the free nations of the Pacific and Asia who are willing to join forces in defense of their freedom. Such an organization should:

- a) have a clear-cut command authority
  - b) also devote attention to measures and programs of social justice, housing, land reform, etc.
5. Asian leaders--at this time--do not want American troops involved in Southeast Asia other than on training missions. American combat troop involvement is not only not required, it is not desirable. Possibly Americans fail to appreciate fully the subtlety that recently-colonial peoples would not look with favor upon governments which invited or accepted the return this soon of Western troops. To the extent that fear of ground troop involvement dominates our political responses to Asia in Congress or elsewhere, it seems most desirable to me to allay those paralyzing fears in confidence, on the strength of the individual statements made by leaders consulted on this trip. This does not minimize or disregard the probability that open attack would bring calls for U. S. combat troops. But the present probability of open attack seems scant, and we might gain much needed flexibility in our policies if the spectre of combat troop commitment could be lessened domestically.
6. Any help--economic as well as military--we give less developed nations to secure and maintain their freedom must be a part of a mutual effort. These nations cannot be saved by United States help alone. To the extent the Southeast Asian nations are prepared to take the necessary measures to make our aid effective, we can be--and must be--unstinting in our assistance. It would be useful to enunciate more clearly than we have--for the guidance of these young and unsophisticated nations--what we expect or require of them.
7. In large measure, the greatest danger Southeast Asia offers to nations like the United States is not the momentary threat of Communism itself, rather that danger stems from hunger, ignorance, poverty and disease. We must--whatever strategies

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we evolve--keep these enemies the point of our attack, and make imaginative use of our scientific and technological capacity in such enterprises.

8. Vietnam and Thailand are the immediate--and most important--trouble spots, critical to the U. S. These areas require the attention of our very best talents--under the very closest Washington direction--on matters economic, military and political.

The basic decision in Southeast Asia is here. We must decide whether to help these countries to the best of our ability or throw in the towel in the area and pull back our defenses to San Francisco and a "Fortress America" concept. More important, we would say to the world in this case that we don't live up to treaties and don't stand by our friends. This is not my concept. I recommend that we move forward promptly with a major effort to help these countries defend themselves. I consider the key here is to get our best MAAG people to control, plan, direct and exact results from our military aid program. In Vietnam and Thailand, we must move forward together.

a) In Vietnam, Diem is a complex figure beset by many problems. He has admirable qualities, but he is remote from the people, is surrounded by persons less admirable and capable than he. The country can be saved--if we move quickly and wisely. We must decide whether to support Diem--or let Vietnam fall. We must have coordination of purpose in our country team, diplomatic and military. The Saigon Embassy, USIS, MAAG and related operations leave much to be desired. They should be brought up to maximum efficiency. The most important thing is imaginative, creative, American management of our military aid program. The Vietnamese and our MAAG estimate that an additional \$50 million of U. S. military and economic assistance will be needed if we decide to support Vietnam. This is the best information available to us at the present time and if it is confirmed by the best Washington military judgment it should be supported. Since you proposed and Diem agreed to a joint economic mission, it should be appointed and proceed forthwith.

In Thailand

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- b) In Thailand, the Thais and our own MAAG estimate probably as much is needed as in Vietnam--about an additional \$50 million of military and economic assistance. Again, should our best military judgment concur, I believe we should support such a program. Sarit is more strongly and staunchly pro-Western than many of his people. He is and must be deeply concerned at the consequence of his country of a Communist-controlled Laos. If Sarit is to stand firm against neutralism, he must have--soon--concrete evidence to show his people of United States military and economic support. He believes that his armed forces should be increased to 150,000. His Defense Minister is coming to Washington to discuss aid matters.
9. The Republic of China on Taiwan was a pleasant surprise to me. I had been long aware of the criticisms against Chiang Kai-shek and his government and cognizant of the deep emotional American feelings in some quarters against him. I know these feelings influence our U. S. policy.

Whatever the cause, a progressive attitude is emerging there. Our conversations with Chiang and Mme. Chiang were dominated by discussions of measures of social progress, to my unexpected but gratified surprise. As with the Republic of Germany in Western Europe, so I believe we might profitably and wisely encourage the Republic of China in Asia to export talents, skills, and resources to other Asian lands to assist in programs of progress.

10. There is a great reservoir of good feeling toward America among Filipinos, with many of the usual Latin qualifications. Significantly at the time of our visit there were a number of editorial expressions which took a critical, mildly anti-American tone. This undoubtedly reflected feelings regarding Laos but also may have been influenced by the current Presidential election politics in the Philippines. Overall, our mission to the Philippines probably was more important and more necessary than had been indicated and served usefully to strengthen those Philippine leaders who are most unswerving in trust for the United States. It is my judgment

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that we should not take the Philippines for granted but should work closely, sympathetically and realistically in efforts to encourage the strengthening of the unity and the progress of Philippine development.

11. India could well be the subject of an entire report. Nehru, during our visit, was clearly "neutral" in favor of the West. This Administration is highly regarded and well received in India. Only part of this flows out of hope or expectation of aid. Mainly, there is an intellectual affinity, or an affinity of spirit. This, in my judgment, should be exploited not with the hope of drawing India into our sphere-- which might be as unnecessary as it would be improbable-- but, chiefly, with the hope of cementing under Nehru an India-U. S. friendship which would endure beyond any transition of power in India.
  
12. President Ayub in Pakistan is the singularly most impressive and, in his way, responsible head of state encountered on the trip. He is seasoned as a leader where others are not; confident, straightforward and I would judge, dependable. He is frank about his belief, offensive as it is to us, that the forms of representative government would only open his country to Communist take-over at this time. Nonetheless, Ayub understands--and is in agreement with--the aims of eradicating poverty, ignorance and disease. We can have great influence and--because of his administrative organization-- achieve dramatic success by supporting Pakistan's needs. Our military should see how to improve the effectiveness and achieve modernization of Pakistan's army. Ayub is wisely aware of Pakistan's strategic position, wants to make his forces more modern, and wants to resolve the Kashmir dispute to release Indian and Pakistani troops to deter the Chinese rather than each other. He spells out the fact that U. S. leadership rests on our own self-confidence and confidence we permit Asians to have in us.

To recapitulate, these are the main impressions I have brought back from my trip.

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The fundamental decision required of the United States-- and time is of the greatest importance--is whether we are to attempt to meet the challenge of Communist expansion now in Southeast Asia by a major effort in support of the forces of freedom in the area or throw in the towel. This decision must be made in a full realization of the very heavy and continuing costs involved in terms of money, of effort and of United States prestige. It must be made with the knowledge that at some point we may be faced with the further decision of whether we commit major United States forces to the area or cut our losses and withdraw should our other efforts fail. We must remain master of this decision. What we do in Southeast Asia should be part of a rational program to meet the threat we face in the region as a whole. It should include a clear-cut pattern of specific contributions to be expected by each partner according to his ability and resources. I recommend we proceed with a clear-cut and strong program of action.

I believe that the mission--as you conceived it--was a success. I am grateful to the many who labored to make it so.

Lyndon B. Johnson

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May 23, 1961

MEMORANDUM

TO: The President  
FROM: The Vice President  
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Lyndon B. Johnson

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May 1, 1961

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TO : The Honorable  
John F. Kennedy  
President of the United States of America

**COPY**

FROM : Senator Mike Mansfield

SUBJECT: The Laotian Situation.

A. Short of actual armed intervention, the following courses of action are still open:

1. Address a Presidential communication to the other 13 nations scheduled to participate in the Conference on Laos. Request that all 14 nations urge publicly--individually or collectively--that all factions in Laos cease-fire and stand fast in present positions.
2. Address a note to India, as chairman of the cease-fire commission to the effect that the commission call immediately for the temporary sealing of the Laotian borders to land, sea or air passage pending the convening of the 14 nation conference--this sealing to be subject to verification by the cease-fire commission.
3. Request that India, as chairman, speed up the dispatch of the cease-fire group to Laos.
4. The U.N. should be held in abeyance on this question until it is clear that the present approach is not going to work. Nehru might be felt out in confidence on this question. If he is persuaded that the present approach is doomed, then India, as chairman of the cease-fire group, might be pressed to raise the question in the U.N.

Another alternative would be to hint to Britain and the Soviet Union as co-chairman of the 14-nation group that if the present approach for which they are responsible cannot work, they have a joint responsibility to bring the matter to the U.N.

- B. The whole point of the above suggestions is to get us out of the center of this thing and into a position more commensurate with our limited interests, our practical capabilities, and our political realities at home. If these suggestions added to what has already transpired do not work, we are confronted then and only then with the question to intervene or not to intervene. These are some factors which we should bear in mind at that point:

SANITIZED

Authority State Sec. 4/11/77, NSC 685/20/00

By smg, NARS, Date 6/14/77

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1. If there were a reasonable expectation that an intervention in Laos would be of the type which took place in Lebanon, it might not be so bad. But is that the probability? The circumstances are greatly different. In Lebanon, in effect, we had a situation where naval power could be highly effective. We were dealing essentially with Egypt, a weak country. The Lebanese will to independence was not entirely absent and the armed Lebanese dissidents were relatively small in number. Communist power could not be brought to bear on the situation, as necessary, in a hierarchical pattern. It was either Soviet Russian intervention or nothing and the Russians chose not to intervene. In Laos, however, those in armed opposition--from Souvanna Phouma and Kong Le leftward--appear to have much the greater strength and popular appeal. Moreover, the Communists are in a position to control the feed-in of support from outside for these forces. They can draw, first, on Hanoi. If that is not enough, Peking can channel in such measures as are necessary to hold us in check as we add to our commitment. All this and the Russians can still stand aside from actual physical involvement and plead for peace.

If the military struggle expands in Laos and our military involvement in it deepens, without actual Soviet Russian intervention, the Russians will be in a position to call all the shots. They can reassert heavy dominance over Peking. The Chinese pressures will be off them in Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia. They can still pose as the peaceful one before the world while they condemn us for the bloodshed in Laos.

We may start an intervention with only Pakistani, Thai and Filipino forces on the ground and, perhaps, ourselves in the air and on the sea. But can we end it that way? Even if we do the net result will be a deeper involvement on our part at a still greater cost in aid of all kinds in Laos for years to come just to hold the situation from deteriorating again.

We had better also face now the possibility that a highly limited involvement on our part may not work in Laos as it did in Lebanon. That means that we had better be prepared abroad to face the following ramifications:

- a. That we may have to intervene ourselves on the ground in Laos.
- b. That we may have to act to meet stepped up covert attacks in South Viet Nam and, perhaps, open invasion from the north.

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LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY

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- c. That we may have to cope with a renewal of bombardments of the off-shore islands and an invasion of those islands, if not of Formosa itself.
- d. That we may have to face, at least, border difficulties in Korea and perhaps serious uprisings in the south if not an actual re-invasion.
- e. That we may have to deal with a resumption of, at least, serious trouble-making in Berlin, short of *causa belli* with the Soviet Union.

possibly

If we intervene, we can/anticipate an initial reaction of public approval for your "standing firm." If the intervention succeeds in the Lebanese pattern, there will be some sustained approval but it is not likely to drown out the complaints about the increased costs of aid which will follow. If the intervention involves U.S. forces, the initial approval, such as it is, will start to disappear as soon as the first significant casualty lists are published. And it will not be long before the approval of "stand-firm" gives way to the disapproval of "Kennedy's war" and "what are we doing in Laos?"

## 2. If we do not intervene:

As of this moment, it appears that Souvanna Phouma and Kong Le will probably emerge as the leaders of the next government of Laos. Souvanna Phouma is a nationalist. Such information as is available suggests that Kong Le is also a nationalist.



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In any event, if Souvanna Phouma does emerge our response to him should be diplomatically correct. We should discontinue military aid in all forms. We should discontinue defense support. We should be open to but not eager for aid-requests for food and for specific projects of economic development or for Point 4 type projects. All is not necessarily lost if Souvanna Phouma comes to power. We will at least be in a position to cut our losses with some measure of dignity and we will be relieved of an enormous over-commitment.

As for the rest of Southeast Asia, it does not automatically follow, that Souvanna Phouma will provide a wide-open gate into Thailand and South Viet Nam. Given the nature of the terrain and communications in that region, the gate has already been just about as wide-open as it can be for infiltration. If our own diplomacy is astute enough to give Souvanna Phouma some room for manoeuvre, he is not likely just to carry out Communist orders and lay out the carpet for their armed forces to pass over into Thailand and Viet Nam even if that is the next move on their list.

If Souvanna Phouma, leaning heavily on the Communists, comes to power in Laos, there will be some adverse reaction at home but it will be mild compared with the reaction to Boun Oum kept in power with American blood and treasure. Souvanna Phouma will also cause some consternation in government circles in Bangkok and Saigon, because of his heavy dependency on the communists. This consternation is likely to lead to some groping on the part of the [undependable] Thais for better contacts with the Russians, the Japanese, and perhaps, with the Chinese.

In Viet Nam, the consequences of the developments in Laos may also be felt in an increasing uncertainty among the peasants and, hence, a greater acquiescence on their part in underground activities of the Viet Minh.

If it makes these two countries feel any securer, perhaps we might see to it that an aircraft carrier is present from time to time on goodwill visits in the harbors at Bangkok and Saigon. This should not be done, however, except at the express request of the principal civilian authority in each country and they ought not to be pressured into making the request. In my opinion, to station a regular contingent of our ground forces in Viet Nam and Thailand at this time would probably cost more in adverse propaganda among the peoples of these countries than it would be worth in terms of reassuring the governments.

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If we cut our aid to Laos, some of these funds might be diverted to Dien in order to stiffen resistance to meet an anticipated increase in sabotage and terror. The problem here is to adjust the flow of military aid at a level which is high enough to act against Viet Minh sabotage but not so high that it atrophies the will of the Viet Namese government to do what it must do to strengthen its ties among the Vietnamese people. It will take great astuteness to make this adjustment and we ought to assign to Viet Nam an exceptional diplomatic mission and an aid team in a dedicated effort to foster rapid economic development of the country and the improvement of its political institutions. Viet Nam, in my opinion, has the greatest potential in leadership, human capacities and resources for a stable freedom in the region.

As for Malaya and Indonesia, I see no point in becoming more deeply involved in either through the extension of military aid. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to see the purpose or justification for much more than Point 4 projects for these countries, coupled with highly selective development loans.

The whole substance of these suggestions for Southeast Asia is in line with those offered on Laos. We are, in my opinion, too far out on too many costly and shaky limbs in that region and our basic problem is how to get down from them so that our commitments will be reasonably commensurate with our interests--to get down from them in a dignified and responsible fashion before communist intrigue compels us either to descend in embarrassment and disorder or to climb still further out.

As I see it, the only way to do this is:

- (1) To concentrate our principal efforts in a place like Viet Nam where there is some hope for the future;
- (2) To eschew the costly search for cold-war "allies," most of whom can be "allies" only in a heavily dependent sense, and to concentrate, instead, on developing honestly mutual and friendly relations with countries like Cambodia, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and Thailand;
- (3) To encourage a much more active role for India in Southeast Asian affairs, as well as for other non-communist countries while at the same time limiting our own.



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To be sure, there are risks in this course of limiting and reducing our commitments. Something which passes for communism or "communist-oriented" may emerge in any of these countries. But the fact is that the realities of these countries will not readily change and it is not likely to be any easier for Moscow or Peking to play a dominant role in them than it is for us. In any event, if there are risks in this course, what of the risks in the other, the course of involvement? What are we to say of these latter risks after the experience in Laos, where the sky was the limit as far as commitment on our part was concerned and yet, we still wind up with the alternative of a "communist-oriented" government taking over or the military involvement of this nation?

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# United States Senate

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## MEMORANDUM

Here are the two copies of the letter  
from Chiang Kai-shek which you asked the  
Chinese Ambassador to send.

Liz

L). There is a great reservoir of good feeling toward America among Filipinos, with many of the usual Latin qualifications. Significantly at the time of our visit there were a number of editorial expressions which took a critical, mildly anti-American tone. This undoubtedly reflected feelings regarding Laos but also may have been influenced by the current Presidential election politics in the Philippines. Overall, our mission to the Philippines probably was more important and more necessary than had been indicated and served usefully ~~to~~ to strengthen those Philippine leaders who are most unswerving in trust for the United States. It is my judgment that we should not take the Philippines for granted but should work closely, sympathetically and realistically in efforts to encourage the strengthening of the unity and the progress of Philippine development.

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MEMORANDUM FOR MISS MARY MARGARET WILEY  
THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

Subject: Addition To Document Entitled Presidential Program  
For Viet-Nam.

1. Please add the attached document to the Presidential Program for Viet-Nam.
2. The Task Force Status Reports, now issued twice monthly, will henceforth include these additional actions.

*David Koum*  
L. D. Battle  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Joint Program of Action  
with the Government of  
Viet-Nam (Staley Report).

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority State 6-30-78, 715C 10-23-79  
By inf, NARS, Date 1-29-80

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- 5 -

Joint Program of Action  
With the Government of  
Vietnam (Staley Report)

August 4, 1961

The President agrees with the three basic tenets on which the recommendations contained in the Joint Action Program are based, namely:

- a. Security requirements must, for the present, be given first priority.
- b. Military operations will not achieve lasting results unless economic and social programs are continued and accelerated.
- c. It is in our joint interest to accelerate measures to achieve a self-sustaining economy and a free and peaceful society in Viet-Nam.

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34. The United States will provide equipment and assistance in training for an increase in the armed forces of Viet-Nam from 170,000 to 200,000 men. In order to make this increase as effective as possible, the United States and Viet-Nam should satisfy themselves, before the time when the level of 170,000 is reached, on the following points:

- a. That there then exists a mutually agreed upon geographically phased strategic plan for bringing Viet-Cong subversion in the Republic of Viet-Nam under control.
- b. That on the basis of such a plan there exists an understanding on the training and use of these 30,000 additional men.
- c. That the rate of increase from 170,000 to 200,000 will be regulated to permit the most efficient absorption and utilization of additional personnel and material in the Vietnamese armed forces with due regard to Viet-Nam's resources.

35. In view of the fact that the force level of 200,000 will probably not be reached until late in 1962, a decision regarding the further increase above 200,000 will be postponed until next year when the question can be re-examined on the basis of the situation at that time. Meanwhile, the build-up in equipment and training of the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps within already agreed levels should be expedited.

36. Within the limits of available funds, the United States will provide the external resources required to implement the Joint Action Program, including commodity imports which can be justified and absorbed under the seven criteria of the Joint Action Program (pp. 20-21). The Parallel Committees of the United States and Viet-Nam will immediately cooperate in working out target estimates for an import program that will give the United States Government a basis for planning.

37. In order to direct the resources of Viet-Nam to the highest priority requirements, Viet-Nam should be strongly urged to undertake to generate piasters through the several means spelled out on pp. 22-23 of the Joint Action Program.

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- 7 -

38. Strongly urge early implementation by the Vietnamese of the recommendation regarding tax reform and the principle of a single and realistic rate of exchange.

39. The Ambassador should make clear to President Diem that if this is to be a truly joint effective effort, action by each country must be related to that by the other. In particular, the U.S. attaches great importance to the reasonable implementation of the agreed criteria governing imports; we also consider the raising of the effective piaster rate applicable to U.S. commodity aid, to which it is understood President Diem has already agreed, to be an indispensable part of our effort. Action by Viet-Nam on both of these matters will be very closely related to the U.S. contribution to the over-all effort. The Ambassador is authorized to assure President Diem that increased piaster realization per dollars worth of imports will not be used as a reason for reducing the U.S. share of our joint efforts.

40. The President directs the Director of International Cooperation Administration to conduct through USOM Viet-Nam and in cooperation with appropriate Vietnamese experts, a thorough and expeditious review of the new proposals for emergency social action outlined in Section B of the Joint Program and of programs already underway which these proposals are intended to supplement.

41. In order to derive long-range benefits from our joint efforts to win in the present emergency, Viet-Nam needs long-range planning. Accordingly, urge the Vietnamese to create more effective planning machinery to develop a long-range plan and urge them to expedite the training of staff to carry on planning activities.\* The Parallel Committees should develop specific development projects in line with the general recommendations in the Joint Action Program.

42. Make clear to Diem that we hope that one consequence of our new joint efforts will be an effective projection to the nation, its friends and its enemies, of our confidence in a long-range future for an independent Viet-Nam. In this connection, the Ambassador

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\* Such planning activities should, inter alia, cover such particulars as the use of medical manpower and teachers, for which Viet-Nam has competing civilian-military requirements.

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- 8 -

should seek discreetly to impress upon President Diem that he should use the total U.S. program for the greatest political effect in his achievement of maximum appreciation of his government by the people of Viet-Nam and the people of the world. (It is hoped that the Ambassador will continue his efforts to persuade President Diem to engage more fully in his civic action program non-Communist elements now in political opposition.)

43. The Parallel Committees should be given a maximum delegation of authority to assure follow-up action, approve modifications of the program and "recommend measures to improve and adapt the Special Action Program as the situation changes." In this connection, the President has emphasized that the chief responsibility for the planning and execution of the U.S. share of the program will, more than ever, rest with the Ambassador and, under his direction, with MAAG and USOM.

44. The President shall be informed of matters arising in the implementation of this Joint Program requiring his attention so that they may receive his immediate consideration.

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SIGNIFICANT FACTS FOUND

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Over-all

1. Free nations will stand or fall primarily on the basis of winning the war against ignorance, poverty, disease.
2. The principal challenge to free governments of the region is to enlist their own people in the struggle for freedom and progress and peace.
3. Military strength is important in preserving the independence of the nations of the region but military strength alone will not be decisive.
4. United States aid can be effective in assisting free nations to improve the living standards of its people; it is not now as effective as it might be.
5. United States aid can be effective in aiding these nations to defend themselves; it is not now as effective as it might be.
6. Our approach to this region has been piece-meal when it should have been regional. Our aid would be much more effective with more regional coordination.
7. Our policies and their administration have not been as closely attuned as is desirable to the needs of the people of the region.
8. The role of SEATO in the future of Southeast Asia needs redefinition. Not only the British and French but we and our other allies needs to assess more accurately both our expectations and the extent of our willingness to contribute to making SEATO effective.
9. The developments in Laos have disturbed the neighboring nations from India to the Philippines and it is imperative for their security and peace of the region that a just solution on the basis of reliable neutralization be found by the conference in Geneva.
10. The situation in Viet-Nam is serious but can still be solved in a fashion which assures the independence and integrity of that nation. Time is short and it will take a great and concentrated effort on the part of the Vietnamese government and people, ourselves and other free nations.
11. There has been a remarkable economic and social advance in Taiwan due to the peace which it has enjoyed, the labor and industry of the people on the island and the impact of American aid. So long as peace is preserved this advance may continue.

12. There is a great reservoir of affection for the United States among the Filipino people which can be tapped for many joint efforts for the peace and progress of the islands and the region.

13. India is moving forward in freedom with its internal development but the problems are immense and without aid from the outside, for many years to come may prove overwhelming. The needs are so great that they can be met only by the joint efforts of free nations.

14. Pakistan's problems of internal development are of a similar order of magnitude to India's and will require assistance of a similar concept and kind. The housing and resettlement programs of Pakistan show evidence of important progress in the right direction.

15. Education is a key to the peace and progress of Southeast Asia. Great strides have been made in the battle against illiteracy. It can be conquered within the next decade with assistance from ourselves and other nations.

16. We should increase and improve the quality of our technical assistance program. While economic assistance in large amounts is also indispensable, the key to rapid economic and social progress lies in the development of the human resources and institutions of these countries.

17. Because of its critical contribution to economic and social progress, a study in depth of technical assistance should be immediately instituted. This study should be under several of the best economists and sociologists who can be recruited, supported by personnel from ICA and other outside consultants. This study should draw upon past experience in conducting technical assistance programs.

18. Much as we might wish to concentrate our aid exclusively on economic and social development, conditions in much of this area are such that military assistance in large amounts is essential. Actual or threatened Communist aggression and subversion cannot be ignored. Economic and social development cannot occur in the absence of law and order; nor can nations retain their independence without responding to military and para-military efforts to destroy this independence.

19. Our aid, no matter how massive, will not be effective in producing economic and social progress unless it is accompanied by profound internal changes in the societies which we are assisting. These changes are often difficult for local governments to accomplish and we must do everything possible to help them to make these changes.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON This document consists of  
one page.

~~SECRET~~

Copy 1 of 3 Copies, Series A

June 2, 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

Here is a suggested opening statement for your appearance before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. It may be a bit longer than you expected, but I felt that you would want to cover all the points that I have included. It can be shortened as you desire, of course.

I should like very much to have the Committee agree, after your appearance, to declassify the material after certain portions have been edited out in order that we might produce it as a State Department pamphlet and thus make it available to the American people. I should like to get your views on this at your earliest convenience, in order that we might move speedily to produce such a pamphlet.

*Carl T. Rowan*  
Carl T. Rowan

Enclosure:

Suggested statement (SECRET)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 6-30-78; 715C 10-23-79

By ing, NARS, Date 1-29-80

~~SECRET~~

DATE SENT: 6/2/61

CLASSIFIED MATERIAL  
RETURN RECEIPT TO SENDER

**S 506418**

TO: Rowan

**P**

**6821 NS/E**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

FROM: **The Vice President**

DATE

RECEIVED: \_\_\_\_\_

(Signature of Addressee)

IDENTIFICATION: **Suggested opening statement**

**before the House Foreign Affairs Committee**

ADDRESSEE SIGN AFTER CHECKING AND RETURN TO SENDER

~~"SECRET"~~

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PROPOSED STATEMENT BY VICE PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON  
BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

June 5, 1961

I think some of you already know that I undertook this mission with reluctance. I was unfamiliar with the area, and I certainly made no pretenses at being an expert on the problems of that part of the world. Beyond this, I felt that my mission might accomplish little or nothing; I feared that I was going into a world of pessimism and defeat, where I would find masses of people willingly surrendering their freedom. But the President insisted that I go, both to carry messages from him to the heads of state in these key nations and to listen and learn as much as I could about the feelings, the attitudes, the hopes and aspirations of the leaders and peoples of these countries.

I am happy to tell you that the trip was much more rewarding than I anticipated. It was for me personally a real education, and I have come home not only with some new insights that I shall share with you today but with a new sense of urgency that I also hope to transmit to you.

I want to preface everything I say with the observation that Communism is not riding a tide of inevitable triumph in Asia. In the countries we visited, Asians expressed both the will to resist tyranny and the determination to make whatever sacrifices are called for to preserve human liberty. Throughout both South and Southeast Asia I found the backbones of the people a lot stronger, the strength of the countries a lot greater and the determination to remain free a lot more vibrant than I ever dreamed would be the case. So I want to emphasize

before

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Authority State 6-30-78; 71SC 10-23-77  
By ijf, NARS, Date 1-29-80

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before you today my feeling that freedom is not lost in this part of the world. We may have lost a skirmish in Laos — and this is not yet a certainty — but the war of free men against tyranny is far from over.

Having expressed this general note of optimism, I must go on and place before you gentlemen the stark realities of Southeast Asia today.

1. We cannot afford to ignore the fact that United States prestige has been damaged seriously by developments in Laos. Any further deterioration of our prestige in this area is going to open wide the floodgates of Communist domination. I noticed in press conferences that the newsmen had scores of ways of asking their questions, but they all added up to this: "When is the United States going to fight?"

The diplomats were much more subtle, but they too expressed the feeling that in Laos the Communists had pushed the United States to the brink and the United States had said "uncle" in the face of the big bluff.

This attitude was particularly obvious in the Philippines where both President Garcia and Foreign Minister Serrano asserted that to retain leadership and maintain freedom in the area the United States would have to "do something" immediately to back up her strong words of assurance. Since my visit, Garcia has expressed in unusually strong language the same attitude in an interview with three members of the Associated Press Bureau in Manila.

An editorial in a Philippines newspaper asserted the belief that it was foolish ever to expect the United States to risk a fight for the freedom of Asians, and that the United States would never show any real backbone until United States land and people become directly involved.

There

There was even less confidence in SEATO than in the United States, these doubts arising largely from the Asian peoples distrust of Britain and France. I saw a general feeling that neither Britain nor France is at all willing to become involved in anything close to war to keep the Communists from overrunning these small Asian nations. This means that the United States now stands as the primary power factor deterring the Chinese Communists from enveloping the area. You can see, then, that for the freedom-loving peoples of the area it becomes a matter of grave concern and frustration when the United States appears to back away in the face of Communist pressure.

2. We are going to have additional opportunities to make good on the assurances that we have given the people of the area. Guerrilla attacks on South Vietnam constitute a serious problem for that government. During the three months ending April 30 the Communist Viet-Cong group killed more than 700 Vietnamese officials and military men. Since the insurrection began these Communist insurgents have destroyed the schools of more than 25,000 children. These vandals, who attack villages in the night and slay the innocent in the most wanton manner, are striving to prevent the Diem regime from achieving the educational, economic and social progress that the peoples of the country want so desperately.

There is reason to fear that the Communists are going to step up these activities, particularly if and when they get Laos securely in their grasp.

The situation in Thailand is not nearly so grave, but there is real fear of a Communist-led insurrection in the Northeast.

President

President Kennedy has said — and I renewed his assurances — that this nation will make any sacrifice and risk any danger to see that liberty is not extinguished by aggression in these areas where men want to be free. All of us had just as well face the fact that the Communists are going to challenge these words. Southeast Asia is going to have the opportunity to see whether we shall make any sacrifices and risk any real dangers.

The Communists seem determined to overwhelm the region through subversion, terrorism, intimidation and trumped up insurrection. Our struggle to preserve freedom is going to be long, costly, and in many instances dangerous.

3. Undoubtedly many of you are wondering whether to fulfill our obligations to freedom and to the people of the area we must ship American troops into the countries under assault. At this point the answer is no — but let me caution against any of us inviting the Communists to miscalculate by giving the impression that American troops never would be used in the area. The fact as of now, though, is that no Asian leader expressed any desire to have American troops in his country except as part of a training mission. People like Sarit of Thailand and Diem of South Vietnam emphasized that they have the manpower, but that what they need from us is guidance and material.

There is a subtlety here that we must understand and appreciate. Anti-colonial feeling is still so strong in the area that none of these leaders want Western troops in, or want it to appear that they have made their nations and peoples complete puppets of the United States and her western allies.

4. Does this mean, then, that my mission turned out to be primarily a big round of sessions in which I opened Uncle Sam's moneybag and made outlandish promises

promises of new military assistance. I am happy to say that this was no "giveaway" mission. The fact is that these Asian leaders did not ask for everything that I was empowered to give, and for special reasons I decided not to offer these things voluntarily. More important, Thailand expressed willingness to spend more of its own money to develop its capability of repulsing the Communist threat. South Vietnam agreed to have United States fiscal experts come in to give the economy a hard look so as to determine whether and how more of South Vietnam's resources might be employed more effectively in the campaign to deal with the Communist insurgents and protect that nation's integrity.

It was obvious to me that in these two nations where the people are so willing to defend themselves we ought to show no reluctance to help them. It is my feeling that either we proceed on the assumption that we are going to go all the way with them, or we ought to throw in the towel now before we dribble away any more of our wealth and resources. But if we throw in the towel we must pull back our defenses to our own shores and rely on a "fortress America" concept.

I don't think I need tell you which road I would take. I am for standing with South Vietnam and Thailand, for I have seen as a boy and a man that when you start running from a bully he keeps you running, and if he doesn't respect the line you draw out in the pasture he isn't going to respect the line that you draw at your front yard. He is going to wind up chasing you right out of your own house.

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This means that we have got to get into South Vietnam and Thailand the best people available. Our Embassy, USIS, MAAG and related operations leave a lot to be desired. We aren't going to beat Khrushchev and his gang with our second team, so we have got to bring our operations up to maximum efficiency.

Of utmost importance is imaginative, creative management of our military aid program. We need to get into these areas bright young military men capable of dealing with this new kind of assault which never involves direct attack, but whose stock gambit is treachery by night.

Our MAAG people in Saigon say that Diem needs more forces and greater mobility if he is to wipe out the insurgents. I might just say here that his forces have been doing a good job. In the three months prior to April 30, when, as I said earlier, some 700 Vietnamese officials and soldiers were killed, about 1000 Viet-Cong Communists were wiped out. Our MAAG people say that, barring direct attack by the North Vietnamese or the Chinese Communists, South Vietnam would be in a position to protect itself adequately if an additional 50 million dollars were devoted to military and conomic assistance programs this year. The President has asked that this additional assistance be made available. I think you know also that on the 17th of this month the joint economic mission will be going into South Vietnam for a thorough study.

In Thailand, Sarit believes - and our experts concur - that his armed forces should be increased to 150,000. His Defense Minister has come to Washington to discuss these plans.

Here, too, it has been estimated that up to 50 million dollars in additional military and economic assistance is needed this year. The President also has requested this.

I hope nobody will rush to the mistaken conclusion, though, that the

allocation

allocation of another 100 million dollars to these two countries will insure the survival of freedom. This probably will be just one installment in what I have said will be a very costly struggle.

5. Let me emphasize that while new military strength and techniques appear to be essential if the peoples of Asia are to beat back these immediate assaults upon their independence and integrity, we must not deceive ourselves into believing that military steps alone provide any permanent solution to the problems of Asia. Such military strength as we help provide can be only a shield behind which free governments provide the economic and social progress that the masses of people are demanding passionately. Either these economic and social reforms are pushed or we shall find that our military men have built iron fortresses on foundations of quicksand.

Perhaps nothing impressed me more on this trip than the magnitude of squalor and human misery. I have known poverty as a boy, and even in recent years I have seen a great deal of it in my own state and in the rest of our nation. I had read a great deal about the role that poverty, illness and illiteracy are playing in the revolutions that shake our world today, but not until this trip was I so acutely aware of the fact that they are Communism's best allies. Thus, gentlemen, I regard it as imperative — certainly no less important than the military measures that we are taking — that we convince our fellow Americans and the citizens of wealthier friendly nations that it is of the utmost importance, in terms of the preservation not only of freedom but world peace, that we move boldly to help struggling peoples to achieve the happiness, material well-being and dignity that they deserve.

This

This journey convinced me that it has never been more important that Congress and the American public really extend themselves to support the efforts of Free Asians to banish the curse of squalor and human want. I am convinced that given something for which to fight, the peoples of Asia will man the ramparts of freedom with valor. But we Americans have got to face this hard fact of life: People do not fight in the steaming jungles to preserve hunger or misery or political oppression.

The leaders to whom I talked now understand that any economic assistance that this Administration provides must be clearly matched in terms of the efforts and sacrifices of the recipient people. I tried to make it clear that social and governmental reforms must be part of any effective anti-Communist program and that our aid grants would be conditioned on agreements to push for such reforms. I emphasized also that we want assurances that the benefits of economic development will go directly to the masses rather than to dictators and aristocrats.

In this connection, let me say that it is high time the representatives of this country got out of their air-conditioned offices and limousines and went out to meet the people -- I mean the masses who are going to determine the fate of these countries. They warned me in advance that I should not mingle with the people in Saigon -- that it was too dangerous. There were other pessimists who speculated that I might face hostile demonstrations here and there. Well, I walked the streets of Saigon and mingled among the people in the post-midnight darkness; and I walked into the huts of villagers who did not expect me. I was surrounded by throngs in every land we visited, and I never saw a hostile hand or heard a hostile voice.

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I am convinced that friendship for America is still there, but we have got to make it possible for the average man in these countries to get to know something about Americans, to have the opportunity to personalize this latent friendship for America.

You know that some American newspapers criticized my policy of stopping processions so I could get out on the streets to meet and talk with the people. One of the most ironic moments of the whole trip occurred in Karachi when I picked up The Sunday Morning News. On page 1 was a big bold headline saying: "JOHNSON HERE ON 'MISSION OF PURPOSE' Handshakes his Way into People's Heart." But on page 3 of the same newspaper was a news story about a New York Times editorial which asserted that my activities of mingling with the masses were "in questionable taste".

The editorial went on to explain: "Some Asians are extroverts and many even enjoy the folksy manner. Others are not and prefer dignity and reserve in public personalities."

Well, I am not prepared to psychoanalyze Asians en masse, for I am afraid that much of our trouble in Asia arises from the fact that too many Americans for too long were applying their homespun psychoanalysis to Asians. For years all Asians were supposed to be "inscrutable"; then we outgrew that nonsense. Now they are supposed to be so dignified and reserved that it is bad to shake hands with them.

The only generalization that I am going to accept is that these Asians are just like you and I are, and that they share the same hopes and dreams. They are struggling and crying and fighting today for a bigger bowl of rice and  
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better homes in which to live, and good schools for their children, and freedom from malaria and dysentery and for a place of dignity under the sun. Either we convince them that ~~we convince them that~~ these things are quickly attainable through the institutions of freedom, or they are going to reject all that we stand for. I am convinced that we are not going to convince them of these things if our representatives fly over in an air-conditioned plane, jump into an air-conditioned limousine, ride to an air-conditioned palace to talk to an air-conditioned prince and then flit home pretending to have conquered the world.

So I repeat, that our Ambassadors and other representatives have got to run the risk of getting some Homburgs dusty. They have got to walk the streets and the dusty footpaths in a personal effort to ensure that the image of America as a dynamic land dedicated to change, to the achievement of social justice, is not dead. The reactions of the common people that I saw convinced me that they will rally to the cause of freedom if we can get Americans to assert and emphasize the vitality of our way of life.

Now, before I close, gentlemen, I should like to give you a country-by-country summary and appraisal:

Our first stop was South Vietnam, which I regard as the most critical point along the tour. I have told you earlier of the Communist assault on that country and of the necessity for us to find new ways of meeting that assault. It is my feeling that South Vietnam is going to be the first real test of our ability to provide what President Kennedy called for in his speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors -- that is, some new techniques with which to meet a wily and very unscrupulous foe.

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Naturally the people of South Vietnam are concerned about Laos because it gives the Communists a chance to pressure them not only across the 17th parallel but now along the border of Laos.

South Vietnam's leader, President Diem, is a complicating factor because he is a complex figure who is beset by many problems. He has some admirable qualities, but some of the people around him are far less admirable and certainly less capable. Diem is still much too aloof from the people, despite our constant appeals over the last six or so years that he really try to build a reservoir of loyalty and support among the people.

Despite Diem's shortcomings, in terms of the interest of freedom he is the most reliable <sup>man</sup> thing on the scene. Our new Ambassador in Saigon, Mr. Nolting, has said in a recent telegram that he feels that much of the criticism of Diem is unjustified and that a great deal of Diem's difficulty in South Vietnam arises from criticism of him in the press in the United States.

The situation in South Vietnam is critical, and this certainly is no time for nit-picking where Diem is concerned -- either by the press, Congressmen or anyone else. We either decide that we are going to support him and support him zealously or that we are going to let South Vietnam fall.

Our next stop was the Philippines, where I found a great reservoir of good feeling toward the United States. Nevertheless, there were editorials which were critical of United States policy and mildly anti-American in tone.

Part of the criticism can be attributed to the self-interest that exist in every land -- the desire for a big and permanent sugar quota, the demand that

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we settle Filipino war claims, etc. I have no doubt, also, that the fact that a Presidential election is coming up there was partly responsible for criticism by some Filipino leaders and politicians.

However, there was significant evidence that Filipino unhappiness exists largely as a result of their disappointment with our policies in Laos. As you know, the Filipinos argued fervently for sending SEATO troops in. There was widespread feeling in Manila that our "backing away" in Laos was a sign that Asian reliance on the U.S. is quite risky.

These expressions of doubt as to United States intentions were perhaps more vocal in the Philippines than in any other country. This raises the question of whether we ought not allow for the possibility that the doubts are equally strong throughout free Asia, but that only the Filipinos felt close enough to us to tell us what they really thought.

Taipei and the Republic of China were for me a very pleasant surprise, primarily because the things I saw there were completely out of keeping with what I had expected as a result of the many criticisms leveled against Chiang Kai-shek and his government. I saw on Taiwan the social and agricultural reforms and the educational progress that we are crying for in other parts of Asia, and quite frankly I left Taiwan with the feeling that where Chiang is concerned a lot of American critics have adopted the attitude: "My mind is made up, so don't confuse me with the facts."

We found that the Republic of China has the highest caloric intake of any country in Asia. About 99% of the children of Taiwan are attending school, something I wish I could say about my home state of Texas. I saw some excellent public housing, and the land reform program must be one of the best anywhere in  
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the world. I can say in all honesty that the vast thousands of school children who lined the streets, smiling and shouting as we rode in from the airport, appeared to be the healthiest and the happiest of all those we saw on our tour.

I say all this because it appears to me that we are so preoccupied with criticizing Chiang that we are ignoring the opportunity to point to Taiwan as an example of the progress and human happiness that can be achieved under the kind of system that we propose, as contrasted with the Mainland of China where widespread hunger and political oppression and repression are still the order of the day.

Just to emphasize again what is happening to our prestige in the area, however, I must point out that there were critical editorials in the Republic of China. Let me quote one: The following is from the United Daily News:

"Has the American Vice President brought with him on his Far East visit any new U.S. policy or any plan for future movements?"

"The American Government and U. S. public opinion have apparently forgotten the tragic lessons of history and are repeating political errors recorded in history. They don't have any positive policy to back up their protestations or any resolute actions to support their denunciations. The Korean War has never been fought to a finish. Assistance given by the U.S. to its allies is invariably subject to restrictions. Even the American policy of containment has now back-fired when applied on the situation in Laos and Vietnam. There is now open debate among the Americans whether former Secretary of State Stimson's policy of non-recognition should be applicable to the Outer Mongolian regime. We just wonder whether, even forgetting the events of history, the successful subversion of Cuba by Soviet Russia and Communist China

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has not been a shocking enough event like the attack on Pearl Harbor to rouse the American public from their dream of peace and prosperity."

I rather suspect that when the Communists put the pressure on us in other parts of Asia they are going to act on the assumption that we have grown fat and soft, concerned only with our prosperity.

I found Prime Minister Sarit and the leaders of Thailand no less concerned about Communist encroachment than the other peoples in the area. Sarit received with enthusiasm our suggestions about economic reform and other activities designed to thwart Communist plans for insurrection in the Northeast area.

It has been a long time since an American visited another country and convinced the leaders of that country to spend some money, but this I accomplished in Thailand. Sarit indicated that his government would come up with some more money to bolster that country's defense.

While we were in the area there were newspaper stories speculating that doubts about complete reliance on the United States has convinced Thailand's leaders to shift to the neutral position of other countries in the area like Burma. I saw no signs of any such shift. The Sarit I saw was strongly and staunchly pro-Western, and more than willing to fight the Communists or anybody else to preserve his country's independence and integrity.

I could talk at great length about India. I shall not, of course, but I do want to emphasize these points:

India definitely has become more pro-Western in the last half dozen years. For example, I was not asked a single embarrassing question about the Cuban episode. Those who know India say that in 1954 and 1955 Indians would have  
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delighted in rubbing in our faces taunts about that unhappy affair.

My talks with Nehru were far more pleasant than I had anticipated. He seemed especially delighted at my interest in economic and social development in Asia. He feels strongly, as I do, that the Communists can be effectively thwarted only if we meet the demands of the masses for a better life.

I got the feeling that there is an intellectual affinity, or call it an affinity of spirit or a fundamental inclination to democracy, that makes India particularly valuable to us although she may never "come into our camp" in a military way. We can make good use of this affinity, but we must resist the occasional temptation to ridicule India because she does not agree to every proposal we make.

If the Communists are to be stopped short of war, world opinion, or world moral force, will have to be a powerful factor. India can be extremely important in the formation of world opinion. It was for that reason that I asked Mr. Nehru to take a more vigorous and vital interest in preserving the freedom of choice of all the peoples of Asia. He made no direct commitment, but he did express a desire to be helpful.

Let me say that we must, by all means, grant every feasible assistance to India as she proceeds with her third Five-Year Plan for the country's development.

Our last official stop was Pakistan whose President Ayub I found to be a tremendously able and likeable man.

Pakistan has been firmly anti-Communist and remains so.

I believe that Ayub is as outspoken as anyone in Asia in urging the United States to exert her power boldly. He feels that we cannot afford to give the impression of being pushed around, else all of Asia is going to move

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with what they think is the ruler of the future — that is, the Communist bloc.

There is one unhappy situation with regard to Pakistan and our friendship with that country and that is the constant Pakistani complaint that we are helping India more although Pakistan is delivering much more to the free world alliance.

There has been a wave of editorial criticism in Pakistan because I mentioned publicly that I had asked Nehru to assert more leadership. You would think that I had suggested that he become Prime Minister of Pakistan. The Pakistani reaction, of course, is part of the emotionalism that lingers over the question of Kashmir. I expressed on my trip there, and this country's leaders ought to express wherever appropriate, the desire that India and Pakistan come closer together. Freedom will have a much better chance of survival in Asia if these two great nations pool their efforts and resources in the interest of freedom rather than spend them in activities made necessary by these constant rumblings of hostility toward each other.

That, gentlemen, is my report. It is much longer than I intended it to be, but I did not want to run any risk of failing to pass along to you these facts and opinions that go to the heart of the survival of a free Asia.

May I conclude by reiterating that I have come home with a new sense of urgency with regard to the need to preserve freedom in Asia. I could put it on the selfish basis of our own survival and say that the great numbers of people and the vast resources of Asia must not fall under Communist domination. we girdled the globe impressed  
I can go further and say that the mere speed with which our freedoms and those  
upon me the extent to which our freedoms and those  
of Asians are linked together. But having rubbed shoulders with and looked into the eyes of the peoples of Asia, I know that it is not just a matter of our own security.

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security. These people are caught up in the same hopes and dreams that long have motivated Americans. These are human beings who deserve freedom and the opportunity to fashion their own societies and governments, to determine their own destiny. We Americans simply cannot turn our backs on them.

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