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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 Memo	State Secret Current Status of Items Discussed Between VP Johnson and President Diem [duplicate of of Doc. #21 in (I)]	Open 3-9-09 4 p 08/16/62	A
#2 Memo	State Secret Current Status of Items Discussed Between VP Johnson and President Diem [Duplicate of #1]	Open 3-9-09 4 p 08/16/62	A
#3 Report	State Secret <i>Sanitized; some sent NY 037-002-1 (8/62)</i> Status Report on Southeast Asia	14 p 08/08/62	A
#4 Report	State Secret Action Program for Vietnam	9 p 08/14/62	A
#5 Report	State Secret <i>Sanitized; some sent NY 037-002-1 (8/62)</i> Final Report - Task Force Vietnam	17 p 07/01/62	A
#8 Report	State Top Secret <i>Sanitized</i> Presidential Program for Vietnam	Open 3-9-09 5 p 05/23/61	A
#7 Report <i>thru 7aa</i>	State Top Secret The Vice President's Mission to South and Southeast Asia [security classified portions of this booklet listed in VP Visit to SE Asia (I)]	<i>open</i> 48 p 05/09/61	A

FILE LOCATION VP Security File, VP Travel
VP Visit to SE Asia (II)

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~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM

August 16, 1962

SUBJECT: VIET-NAM - Current Status of Items Discussed
Between Vice President Johnson and
President Diem

The following points were discussed (some appeared in the Joint Communique of May 13, 1961). Each is followed by a description of its present status:

1. Agreed to infuse into our actions high sense of urgency and dedication.

Achieved on both sides, as evidenced by the American military build-up, improved Vietnamese morale, exchanges of messages between President Kennedy and President Diem, and the momentum behind the strategic hamlet program in Viet-Nam. President Diem told Ambassador Nolting last month that US-Vietnamese cooperation was excellent. Both sides are agreed on the importance of helping the peasants quickly by means of the strategic hamlet program.

2. Diem pleased U.S. has approved MAP support for 20,000 force increase but pointed to problem of paying local currency costs for this increase.

The present regular armed forces level is now about 200,000, or 50,000 above the level in May 1961. The local currency problem has not been completely solved. However, GVN deficit financing, higher yields on US-financed imports, increased tax collections, combined with US assurances that we will provide resources needed to stem possible inflation, have been sufficient to move ahead with the build-up.

3. Agreed parallel political and economic action has equal importance with military measures but stated political and economic actions must be those appropriate to Viet-Nam as country which is underdeveloped and subject Communist subversion.

There has been political and economic progress since May 1961, although Diem's popular support has probably declined. This is counterbalanced by momentum achieved in the strategic hamlet program already underway, which shows great promise to reverse the trend as villagers get security, more local

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By: [illegible] NARA, Date: 2-26-09

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self government, economic benefits and a greater stake in the outcome of the war.

4. Agreed to increase in MAAG personnel.

A steady increase of U.S. training, advisory and logistic support personnel commenced in May 1961. The number has risen from 700 to 10,000, including those in operational units attached to the new Military Assistance Command/Viet-Nam (MAC/V), of which MAAG is now a component. MAAG advisers in each province are doing a terrific job.

5. Agreed to MAAG support and advice to Self-Defense Corps.

The training and rearming of SDC units is proceeding rapidly and they are giving a good account of themselves.

6. Dien pleased with MAP support for entire Civil Guard force of 68,000.

Training has been speeded up with a target of training and re-arming all CG units by the end of calendar 1962. The strength target for FY 1964 is now 90,000.

7. Dien accepted offer of material support for the Junk Force.

Construction is underway to develop a force of 28 Divisions (20 junks per Division). Four divisions are now operational and performing their mission to harass VC seaborne communications and stop infiltration from outside.

8. Noted that we are prepared to consider the case for further increase in the strength of GVN armed forces.

We have established a force goal of 225,000 (an increase of 50% from May 1961) to be achieved by June 1964.

9. Agreed to further urgent joint study of border control techniques.

Plans and concepts for border control are still under study by RVNAF and US advisors. Intelligence on infiltration is improving, especially as patrols of mountaineers are being rapidly formed. U.S. planes and helicopters and improved radio communication now make it possible to bring Vietnamese troops quickly to any threatened point.

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10. Agreed to consider establishment in Southeast Asia of research and development facilities.

Combat test development centers have been established and are in operation in Viet-Nam and Thailand. Research has led to many improvements, e.g. better arms and armament for helicopters.

11. Agreed to use of US military specialists to assist Vietnamese armed forces in health, welfare and public works activities at village level. Stressed importance of tact of foreign officials in working in this field.

US forces are working in all forty provinces to train the Vietnamese Armed Forces in civic action and civil affairs, as well as mounting their own civic action programs.

12. Agreed to renew border control negotiations with the Cambodian Government.

In spite of repeated efforts by the U.S., joint Vietnamese-Cambodian control has not been effected and incidents are frequent, causing friction and helping the Viet Cong. Cambodia did, however, invite the GVN to send a military commission to visit border areas and determine the extent of Viet Cong activity on the Cambodian side. The GVN has accepted and will dispatch a team shortly. It might develop into a joint operation.

13. Agreed on desirability of using foreign non-American experts in counter-guerrilla field, but stressed it would be up to initiative GVN to request these experts and they would have to work under its control.

The British have sent a highly qualified advisory mission. Many of its recommendations have been accepted. Australia has sent thirty trainers to augment US MAAG activities. Other countries have sent survey missions or are being approached to provide help.

14. Agreed to proposal for sending US economic and fiscal experts to work out financial plan as basis for joint efforts.

A mission under Dr. Eugene Staley worked out a plan with the Vietnamese and completed its work in Viet-Nam in July 1961. The plan was adopted and embodied in National Security Action Memorandum 65, August 11, 1961. As a result the Vietnamese have added import taxes so that aid dollars now generate more piasters.

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15. Agreed we should work together on a longer range economic development program.

The GVN has announced a formal 5-year plan, but it is more in the nature of a catalogue of projects than an integrated plan. The on-going AID program is continuing to contribute to long range development, but conditions in Viet-Nam have required a shift in emphasis to programs with an early pay-off which can help win the war sooner.

16. Diem presented memo to Vice President on need for additional commodity aid and for relaxation of "Buy American" policy on aid to Viet-Nam.

The amount of assistance which could be absorbed by Viet-Nam was a matter of dispute in May 1961. The Staley Mission subsequently established criteria which have proven workable for that portion of commodity aid channeled through the private sector. In addition, commodities and equipment procured directly for the public sector (e.g. materials for strategic hamlet construction), which are not affected by the absorptive capacity of the private sector, have been increased significantly.

FE:WG/VN:CEWood/CRSpurgin/mph
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8/16/62

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STATUS REPORT
ON
SOUTHEAST ASIA

AUGUST 8, 1962

PREPARED BY:

TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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SANITIZED
Authority NLT 037-002-1-2
By SP, NARA, Date 8/9/02

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Current Overall Evaluation

The last two weeks have been devoted, on the U.S. side, to implementing decisions made at Secretary McNamara's Honolulu meeting and to building the resource base from which support for counterinsurgency programs will flow. Two additional U.S. helicopter companies were approved, delivery of armored personnel carriers was accelerated, and Task Force/Saigon prepared and submitted its proposal for an add on \$87.6 million FY1963 aid program which emphasizes direct allocation of materials to the countryside.

There were encouraging reports of improved GVN military performance, including a victory in which 131 VC were killed, but measurable progress in war continued to be slow. The GVN decided to use all means to bring over the Montagnards. Hopefully, a GVN team will soon be in Cambodia to look for evidence of infiltration.

VC Activity

During the period 18-25 July, attacks dropped to 90 from 110 in the previous week, but preliminary figures indicated a rise in the week 25 July - 1 August. During the two week period 679 VC were reported killed against 169 GVN killed. There was no significant increase in VC activity, although sightings indicated a possible build-up. As indicative of GVN thinking on VC intentions, Secretary Thuan told Ambassador Nolting on August 6 that available information from prisoner interrogations and captured documents strongly reinforced his conviction that the VC were concentrating their forces for a large scale offensive in Central Viet-Nam to establish a bridgehead for a puppet government. Thuan was not reassured by Ambassador Nolting's remark that such an attempt might play into our hands in view of GVN superiority in pitched-battle type warfare.

Progress on Action Program

(The following items are keyed to the Viet-Nam draft action program of July 30, 1962)

A. Develop RVNAF Military Capability2. Provision of Assistance to GVN forces.

(a) Helicopters: Two additional helicopter companies have been ordered deployed to Viet-Nam, making a total of six. Some will be armed.

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(d) Crop Destruction and Defoliation: The Department has requested additional information regarding Task Force/Saigon recommendations for support of defoliation operations in delta mangrove swamps and crop destruction in Phu Yen Province (Operation Hai Yen). The GVN is also anxious to destroy crops in the High Plateau area (see B-4 below).

(e) Village Communications: TF/Saigon's proposal for immediate FY1963 AID funding (see D-1 below) includes provision for an additional 8,000 radios (2,000 for civil internal security requirements to tie in with the 2,700-set village/district net, plus 6,000 VHF hamlet radios.) MAP funding is a possibility. There are severe shortages of US and GVN technical personnel for a project of this magnitude. TF/Saigon suggests assignment of additional Signal Corps personnel.

B. Assist the GVN to Create an Environment Hostile to the VC and Favorable to the GVN:

1. Implement a mutually agreed phased plan:

Province Rehabilitation: The Binh Dinh Province plan has been approved in principle by the U.S. Province Rehabilitation Committee and USCM is preparing a 50 million piaster (US\$700,000 project agreement. The plan for Quang Ngai, the most seriously infested province in Viet-Nam, has been revised. It now includes only the two most subverted districts which are separated from each other and in which it is estimated that 80% of the population are VC or VC sympathizers. The plan is still poor and we will not support it in its present form.

2. Strengthen Popular Support: Ngo Dinh Nhu and other senior GVN officials continue to show increasing awareness of the importance of enlisting the cooperation of the people in carrying out the strategic hamlet program. On the negative side, however, torturing of VC prisoners has caused adverse US and foreign press comment. Ambassador Nolting stressed to Secretary Thuan the damaging effect on American and Vietnamese attitudes which can result from mistreatment of prisoners. Thuan said corrective action had been initiated but remarked that soldiers in the heat of battle are difficult to control. There has been no progress in bringing political oppositionists to trial and reliable reports indicate further arrests in recent weeks for alleged anti-regime plotting.

4. Montagnards: The Montagnard refugee problem has been the subject of ministerial-level attention by the GVN and decisions made to encourage by all possible means the exodus of Montagnards from VC-controlled areas. The GVN media output on the subject has increased and a public subscription drive is under study. Secretary Thuan is worried about funds for the program and has asked if counterpart piasters earmarked for other projects could be released for this purpose. He also urged that early action be taken on the GVN request for selective use of chemicals to destroy crops abandoned by the Montagnards.

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D. Provide Resources Required for Counterinsurgency Effort.

1. U. S. Resources:

FY 1963 Aid Program: TF/Saigon has proposed an add on economic aid program with summary cost figures for FY1963 (\$87.6 million) and a firm request for interim funding (\$24.6 million). In contrast to prior year project programs, which were managed through the central government with trickle down benefits, the new program emphasizes direct injection of economic, social and security benefits into the rural sector by means of decentralized machinery. The \$87.6 million "public aid" program, of which \$80.4 million is for equipment and supplies, is exclusive of the \$10 million plaster purchase and of FY1963 projections for plaster-generating commodity aid channeled through the private sector (\$120 million) and PL-480 Title I (\$22.5 million). U.S. resources in the "public aid" category would be applied in roughly the following proportions:

- | | |
|---|-----|
| a. On-going development and technical assistance | 7% |
| b. Counter-insurgency support (essential to backstop sound impact CI programs) | 14% |
| c. Direct CI: hamlet, village and district programs directly altering rural life(excluding hamlet construction) | 25% |
| d. Direct CI: materials for physical establishment of strategic hamlets (possible MAP funding) | 54% |

DOD may finance a large share of this program.

Plaster Purchase: Ambassador Nolting is prepared to exchange letters with the GVN regarding conditions of the \$10 million plaster purchase. Project agreements and fund releases will be approved in Saigon by US and GVN committees concerned with province pacification, but plaster funds will flow directly from a US account to Vietnamese officials responsible for carrying out agreed counterinsurgency programs. The plaster purchase is understood to be short-term emergency measure and not to be construed as a substitute for GVN responsibility for financing the war. The letter would also commit the GVN to intensified tax collection efforts and to greater US-GVN cooperation in GVN budgetary preparation.

E. Generate International Support for Viet-Nam.

2(a) Relations with Cambodia: The GVN border inspection team to Cambodia has been selected and will depart shortly for Cambodia.

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THAILAND

Current Situation Evaluation

The remainder of the U. S. Marines were withdrawn from Thailand during the first week of August. In his discussions with Ambassador Young, Sarit pointedly avoided "agreeing" to the move although he voiced no objection. Sarit and the RTG are seriously concerned over the possibility that the U. S. might wish to remove all its combat forces. We still have in Thailand a 2200-man Army Battle Group, an 800-man Air Force Fighter Squadron, and small logistic support units.

On July 30 the Thai Criminal Court ruled for the second time that it is proper for the police to keep communist suspects under detention indefinitely during investigation and until completion of their trials. Some individuals have been under detention without trial nearly four years. The suspects apparently plan appeal to a higher court.

Interior Minister Praphat announced on July 30 that repatriation of Vietnamese refugees from Thailand is continuing pending negotiation of a new agreement between the Thai and DRV Red Cross organizations. The former agreement, signed in 1959, expired on June 30. The unofficial total of those repatriated now stands at 35,951 out of a total of 70,000. The old agreement provided for repatriation of 1,000 Vietnamese per month. The Thai hope to double this figure in the new accord in order that the remainder may be repatriated within 18 months.

Joint Thai-Malay-British talks were held in Bangkok the last week of July to coordinate efforts against the remaining 500 communist guerrillas operating in the Thai-Malay border region. DS2

Thailand took the line it could not move police from other, higher priority, areas at this time. It was therefore decided to postpone the joint venture until March 1963, by which time Thailand hopes to be able to recruit and train an additional 500 men for the BPP.

Progress on Action Programs

(The following items are keyed to the draft Action Program for Thailand dated July 20, 1962.)

A. To Strengthen Thailand's Ability to Meet the Communist Internal Threat.

1. Improvement of Thai Military Capabilities

At the recent Honolulu Meeting Secretary McNamara requested

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Ambassador Young to prepare an overall assessment of Thailand's military and paramilitary forces. This brief survey should include the role of each organization, the desired strength of each unit (military, police, village defense force, etc.), recommended first steps toward achieving these goals, and allocation of responsibility within the U. S. Government. The Ambassador agreed to provide this information by August 15. Following receipt of this data, interested Washington agencies will decide the best manner of meeting Vice President Johnson's commitment for U. S. assistance in raising the manning level of the Thai armed forces. A decision will also be reached at that time on the funding source for local currency required for military construction and other projects.

(d) Improve Logistic Facilities.

Discussion at Honolulu revealed that the proposed U. S.-built Bangkok-Korat pipeline would be above ground and that it would last only a few years. It was decided that CINCPAC would review this project and submit new recommendations on a better way to meet our needs. This pipeline is part of the logistic facilities (airfields, rolling stock, prepositioning of materiel, etc.) which we have offered the RTG providing the Thai pay for the right of way and possibly in-country transportation. The RTG has accepted the projects in principle but has not yet agreed to the details or to the proposed financial arrangements. Our efforts to secure RTG concurrence are being held in abeyance pending review of the pipeline proposal by CINCPAC.

(f) Military Communications.

The 350-man U. S. Radio Relay Company has arrived in Thailand. This unit will install and initially operate a relay net along the Mekong between Udorn and Ubon. In about a year these facilities will be turned over to the RTG.

(g) Telecommunications Network (SEATELCOM)

Five bids were received on this AID project, only two of which qualified for consideration. Of these, the bid of Collins Radio Company of Dallas, Texas, was low and negotiations are now taking place between the Thai Government and Collins.

This project is still faced with a potentially serious funding problem. AID funds set aside for it fall some \$6 million short of the cost of a four zone communications system (Bangkok, Ubon, Udorn, Chiangmai) and \$11 to 13 million short of the cost of the

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full five zone system (which includes a connection down the southern peninsula). The question of the uncovered cost is now being discussed with the RTG. We have queried CINCPAC for a judgment as to the military necessity for the Chiangmai and peninsular connections.

2. Strengthen Police and Paramilitary Forces.

(a) Provincial Police.

The seven U. S. advisors approved for the 28,000-man Provincial Police have been recruited and are being processed. As a first step in procuring weapons for the Provincial Police, AID, subject to RTG concurrence now being sought, will procure 2800 M-1 carbines and ammunition from MAP stocks subject to later replacement.

(b) Equipment for BPP.

All equipment for the 4500-man Border Patrol Police being procured through military channels was scheduled to have been delivered in Bangkok by July 31. Full information is not yet available from the field, but it appears that this deadline has been substantially, if not completely, met. All items being procured by GSA are delivered or en route with the exception of a small amount of communications equipment. Procurement of this is being expedited. Fifty of the 400 hand-talkies for the BPP were shipped August 4 by air. Another 50 are available waiting word from the field whether to send a partial shipment or wait for the remaining 300 due for delivery in a month.

5. Increase National Cohesion

A total of 243 transceivers (para 5 f) have been approved as part of an eventual program to link villages along the Mekong with the district headquarters. Fifty-one of these sets are available for airshipment this month; 100 will be available in September and the remaining 92 in October.

6. Improve Living Conditions and Transportation Facilities.

AID is now considering a draft study of the work necessary to determine the nature and desirability of agrimetros (para 6 (b)). (These are clusters of villages grouped around common security, health, and other facilities.) On the basis of this study AID expects in the near future to negotiate a contract with a U. S. firm to undertake a feasibility study for three pilot project agrimetros to be located in northeastern Thailand.

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C. To Accelerate the Pace of Economic and Social Growth.

2. Encourage additional Free World support.

The RTG has accepted an invitation from the Development Assistance Committee to discuss Thailand's technical needs for aid. It is likely that a meeting on this subject will be held in Paris during September. Earlier this year Thailand was selected as the first Far Eastern nation for which the U. S. would propose formation of a DAC consultative group. This proposal was approved by the Dutch, French, Japanese, Germans, British, the IBRD, and of course by the U. S.

D. To Strengthen Thailand's Relationship with the U. S. and with its Neighbors.

The Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) consisting of Thailand, Malaya, and the Philippines celebrated its first anniversary on July 31. ASA made modest but encouraging progress during its first year. Its major accomplishments were establishment of through train service between Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur, formation of a telecommunications link between Kuala Lumpur and southern Thailand, and the waiving of visa fees among the three member states.

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LAOS

Current Situation Evaluation

Aug 7

Few decisions have been made by the RLG, either before or since Souvanna's return. Diplomatic relations with divided countries remain in flux. No progress has been made on the integration of the three armed forces.

Progress on Action Program

Political

1. Political Support for Souvanna

U. S., U. K., and French Ambassadors in Vientiane will consult with the aim of drawing up joint recommendations for political actions in support of Souvanna.

2. French Training of FAR

Paris has instructed its embassy in Vientiane to start discussions with Souvanna on the future army and gendarmerie-police.

Economic

1. RLG's intentions re U. S. aid

Souvanna's thinking is very similar to ours on general lines of future U. S. aid, i.e., continue project aid, and substitute commodity aid and other project aid for cash grants.

2. Development of U. S. aid program

Following discussions with Mr. Kaysen, a proposed U. S. aid program for Laos is being redrafted for submission to the White House.

3. Third-Country Aid

The Japanese promised Souvanna \$1.2 million for Vientiane water plant and indicated willingness to give other aid.

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BURMA

Current Overall Evaluation

Ne Win is still in Europe, traveling in a private capacity, and may be away from Burma for about three weeks more. He was reported to have planned to leave Vienna for England on August 6.

The situation in Burma is unchanged and relatively static. Important political activities and government decisions are seemingly being held in abeyance pending Ne Win's return. Preparations are being made for reopening in the near future of colleges and universities which were closed following the student demonstrations of early July.

A number of recent reports indicate that Burma-Thai relations may be deteriorating as a result of Burmese Shan and Karen activities in the border area. Potentially serious is a report that several hundred - and possibly over a thousand - Shan insurgents have crossed into Thailand to rearm (from non-official suppliers) and to prepare for further action in Burma. The Burmese resent non-official Thai assistance received by the insurgents and suspect that the RTG is doing less than it might to control the border. SEATO and the U. S. also are vaguely suspected of somehow encouraging the insurgents.

Further light is shed on the Burmese attitude toward U. S. assistance by a recent report that the Burmese Government will not accept U. S. experts under IAEA for atomic energy technical assistance in Burma.

Progress on Action Program

(The following are keyed to the Burma draft Action Program of July 31, 1962 as revised August 7, 1962.)

A. 1. Allay suspicions of U. S.

(b) Discourage outside assistance for Burmese insurgents

The Department has asked posts in Thailand and Burma to be alert for any evidence that MAP equipment may be getting to Shan insurgents who have reportedly crossed into Thailand to rearm. Embassy Bangkok has also been asked to urge the RTG to take concrete steps to reassure

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the Burmese regarding the Thai attitude toward the insurgents.

A. 2. Increase Burmese understanding of U. S. policies

(a) Use USIA programs

Notwithstanding curtailment of certain USIA activities in Burma, USIA Rangoon reports expanding activities in certain fields since the Ne Win coup. As compared with last year, student registrations at the Bi-National Center have increased; output of material to secondary schools is undiminished and still important; film borrowings have markedly increased; and newspaper placement of USIS materials has also increased to such an extent that it is now reportedly greater than placement of any other foreign agency press output.

(b) Explain important U. S. decisions

At the Department's request, Ambassador Everton on August 1 followed up a previous informal approach to the Burmese Foreign Office in which he expressed the U. S. reaction to a Burmese decision of last June banning overflights of unarmed U. S. Army Caribou aircraft bound for U. S. forces in Thailand. The Foreign Office spokesman explained that the decision was based on Burma's neutral policy, which called for avoidance of any action that might be interpreted as facilitating SEATO activities. The Ambassador had made clear that the U. S. did not regard the decision as truly consistent with neutrality.

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which will be sent to the respective mission with appropriate instructions on taking it up with the governments.

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ACTION PROGRAM FOR VIET-NAM

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GENERAL

Authority State ltr 10/27/77

By mg, NARS, Date 1/10/78

All concerned with winning the fight against Communist domination of Viet-Nam should keep constantly in mind the fundamental fact that massive infusions of external aid and advice will not in themselves win the war. Rather the outcome of this struggle will depend primarily upon the ability of the GVN to enlist the loyalties and organize the efforts of the Vietnamese people in all sectors of their society. It is likely to be a long struggle, and actions, plans, and psychological operations must be related uniformly to the long haul.

The basic U.S. objective of keeping the Republic of Viet-Nam an independent and viable nation requires an integrated plan of action, including political, economic, military, psychological and covert operations in Viet-Nam. These activities, both U.S. and Vietnamese, should be focused on five key problems which must be solved in order to achieve our overall policy objectives.

PROBLEMS AND ACTIONS

A. TO ASSIST THE GVN TO CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT IN THE COUNTRYSIDE HOSTILE TO THE VC AND FAVORABLE TO THE GVN.

1. Implement a mutually agreed phased plan.

All elements of Saigon Task Force will continue to work out a phased strategic plan for bringing Viet Cong subversion under control. This plan will be built on current programs, concepts and local plans, as for example the strategic hamlet concept and the Delta Plan, which the Saigon Task Force considers sound. It should include Vietnamese civic action programs to be supported by American military and civilian officials and programs for the collection of social, political, economic and military intelligence. The plan should be designed a) to win the best possible GVN cooperation so that it will use its resources more effectively and b) as a basis for programming U.S. support.

(a) Develop urgently a plan for the issue of weapons to hamlet defenders.

2. Strengthen popular support.

The GVN should take appropriate measures to build popular support for the war effort, increase confidence in the government, and mobilize all of its manpower resources. It should demonstrate visibly and dramatically its continuing concern for the welfare of

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the Vietnamese people in contrast to the VC. These measures to include the following:

- (a) Appropriate training and indoctrination of provincial, district, village and hamlet officials, with adequate compensation.
- (b) In order to reduce the likelihood of mistreatment of villagers, RVNAF forces and paramilitary forces should be subject to increased discipline and receive adequate support and subsistence. Investigate and if possible carry out an immediate program for supplying food to the families of the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps, through use of PL-480 Title II.
- (c) Develop a detailed program for exhibiting the interest of the GVN in the welfare of the people, including institutionalized means of communication up and down between the national government and the rural population. Measures should be taken to provide a more equitable share in the national income for the agricultural population. (These may include increased emphasis on basic agricultural production, higher GVN prices for agricultural products, assistance to farmers in increasing production by means of low cost fertilizer, and by improving distribution channels.)
- (d) Mobilize all non-Communist elements capable of contributing to the struggle, with particular attention to the labor federations.
- (e) Bring non-Communist prisoners to trial promptly.
- (f) Develop internal publicity showing the value, importance and successes of the Strategic Hamlet program.

3. Amnesty Policy for VC Defectors.

The GVN should continue to develop and should announce at a psychologically appropriate time a comprehensive amnesty policy for Viet Cong defectors, to include rehabilitation, resettlement if necessary, psychological and military employment of defectors, and a well prepared inducement program. When announced, this plan will be exploited by all GVN and US psychological media, aimed particularly at Communist-held areas, including NVN. Stress will be laid on the rehabilitation of VC prisoners and defectors and the errors of Communism to induce still more defections.

4. Montagnards.

Continue to influence and assist the GVN in preparing coordinated plans and action focussing on the Montagnard problem. This will include the development of a plan for training, organizing and arming an estimated 60,000 tribesmen to operate in the mountain and high plateau country.

B. TO DEVELOP RVNAF MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DEFEAT THE VIET CONG ARMED AGGRESSION.

1. Continue to pursue a military strategy that balances these elements:
 - (a) to extend the area controlled by the Vietnamese Government until it is able to exercise effective sovereignty over its own territory.
 - (b) to seek and destroy Viet Cong forces.
 - (c) to tighten control of Viet Cong infiltration.
2. The U.S. provides the required training, logistical, technical and advisory assistance to the GVN forces, with particular emphasis on increasing RVNAF mobility by land, sea and air, and with concurrent decrease in static assignment. This includes:
 - (a) Airlift for support of operations by the GVN forces, including helicopters, light aviation, and transport aircraft, manned to the extent necessary by U.S. uniformed personnel and under U.S. operational control.
 - (b) Small craft and amphibious equipment along with such United States uniformed advisers and operating personnel as may be necessary for operations in coastal waters and inland waterways.
 - (c) Equipment and U.S. uniformed personnel as may be necessary for air reconnaissance, photography, instruction in and execution of air-ground support techniques, and for intelligence.
 - (d) Continue to develop plans and recommendations for the use of defoliants in both clearing and crop destruction programs. Recommendations for both programs will be submitted to the President as appropriate.
 - (e) Continue to provide materiel and training for village and hamlet communications. This will include procurement of radios and MACV assistance in training of Vietnamese operators and installation of the radios as necessary.
3. The U.S. provides advisory, training, and materiel support for mutually agreed security force levels and for Citizens Irregular Defense Groups.

Strength levels and force composition of military and paramilitary security forces will be reviewed as required to ensure that they meet overall requirements. Shown below are force

levels now authorized for MAP support for FY 62 and FY 63 and the MAP planning force level for FY 64:

	FY 62	FY 63	FY 64
RVNAF	206,800	215,000	225,000
CG	72,000	81,000	90,000
SDC	65,000	80,000	80,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTALS	343,600	376,000	395,000

4. Continue to develop and implement plans for effective border control.

In cooperation with the GVN, the US will seek effective border control measures to cut off infiltration. This will include expansion, training, and support of border forces; continued research and experimentation to apply the full resources of modern technology to the problem; and appropriate diplomatic measures.

5. U.S. will plan for replacement of U.S. personnel.

Develop a long-term program and training schedule for replacement of U.S. personnel, assuming that the effort will be maintained for three years. The program will include language instruction, counter-guerrilla training and other subjects as required to provide replacements for personnel now in Viet-Nam and where possible to tailor our advisory and training effort more closely to the needs of the Vietnamese situation.

6. Plan for Vietnamese takeover of operations now performed by U.S. personnel.

Lay out a long-range program for RVNAF on a three-year basis for Vietnamese to take over jobs now being performed by U.S. personnel. Include projects for necessary equipment, particularly helicopter additions and attrition.

C. TO STRENGTHEN THE OVERALL CAPACITY OF THE GVN TO FUNCTION
EFFECTIVELY

1. Encourage President Diem to delegate more authority to his civil and military advisers.
2. Encourage the GVN to develop government institutions at all levels with the goal of achieving a system responsive to the needs of the Vietnamese people. This need not reflect western political forms.
3. Provide administrators and advisers. The U.S. will continue as opportunity offers to place U.S. adviser-operators with the Vietnamese governmental machinery. The U.S. will continue to develop and strengthen close working relationships with the GVN at all levels, placing particular emphasis on winning and maintaining the confidence of both individual administrators and the GVN as a whole.
4. Improve and strengthen the military-political intelligence system.

In cooperation with U.S. advisory personnel and equipment, the GVN should strengthen its military-political intelligence system, beginning at the hamlet level and extending upward through the government and the armed forces to the Central Intelligence Organization. The U.S. will undertake a review of the total list of intelligence requirements in order to improve the quality of overall intelligence. U.S. personnel will submit periodic reports in the area of general intelligence as related to the strategic situation and the overall progress of our endeavors. In particular, all possible intelligence on Viet Minh and Pathet Lao activities in Laos will be reported to State and Defense.

5. Public information. The GVN with discreet U.S. assistance should accelerate public information programs, particularly in the provinces, to increase understanding of actions taken to combat the Viet Cong and to increase public confidence in the GVN's ability to meet the Viet Cong threat.
 - (a) Expand direct media support for counterinsurgency operations. This should include new additions of Kien Quoc in support of each new clear-and-hold operation, expansion of daily village news bulletins, development of a long-term program to exploit the newly-installed VTVN transmitters (including tribal dialect broadcasts to the high plateau) and establishment of an expanded GVN/USIS exhibits program through USIS field support operations.

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D. TO PROVIDE THE RESOURCES REQUIRED BY VIET-NAM FOR THE COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORT

1. **U. S. Resources.** Within the limits of funds available, the United States will provide the external resources required to supplement the GVN's, to include implementation of mutually agreed counterinsurgency and development plans. Commodity imports will be governed by the criteria of the Staley Report.
 - (a) TF/Saigon will continue to seek limited exceptions for offshore procurement of imports as appropriate, and will investigate the possibilities of paying premiums to encourage the purchase of U.S. goods; these measures will be brought to the attention of the Secretary of Defense as necessary.
 - (b) Continue to assess overall MAP and AID requirements and funding breakdown. The Secretary of Defense will consider MAP/AID transfers to meet counterinsurgency needs.
 - (c) Consider urgently new proposals for FY1963 AID Program for approval and funding, including provisions for simplified procedures.
 - (d) Reach immediate decision on the funding of strategic hamlet requirements. Continue to study strategic hamlet requirements and fund where possible.
2. **GVN Resources.** The GVN should take economic and fiscal measures to mobilize the full resources of the nation in the struggle with the Viet Cong. For example, the following should be considered:
 - (a) Accelerate collection of real estate and direct taxes such as personal income taxes.
 - (b) Additional duties on imports, particularly on items such as automobiles and parts, POL, luxury foods, raw materials for beer and soft drinks.
 - (c) Borrowing from Central Bank.
 - (d) Limitation and selective allocation of credit to business and importers, particularly for non-productive purposes.
3. **U.S. Study.** WG/VN will continue to study how the GVN can best mobilize its domestic resources to avoid curtailing counterinsurgency operations.

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Measures recommended should not be restricted to precedent. TF/Saigon should be provided with a strengthened economic professional staff to assist in discussions and negotiations with the GVN on the issue.

4. U.S. Surplus Agricultural Commodities. Task Force Saigon should report how further use can be made of these commodities, particularly wheat and corn.
5. Undertake Long-range Economic Planning. To the degree possible in the present emergency, long-range economic planning and long-range economic programs should be continued by the GVN. However, care should be taken to avoid competition for scarce resources to the detriment of the counterinsurgency efforts. Planning machinery and personnel should be provided by the GVN for this purpose.

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E. TO GENERATE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR VIET-NAM

1. U.S. Confidence and Support. The U.S. will continue to make clear its support of the Vietnamese people and their government in their conflict with Communism. Our support and confidence must also be made evident to the Free World and to the Bloc, as well as to the Vietnamese.
2. International Support. The U.S. will continue to take measures to gain international support for Viet-Nam and for our Viet-Nam policy. The U.S. will continue to seek third country economic and military aid as well as international political support for Viet-Nam. The U.S. will continue in its information programs to bring developments in Viet-Nam to the attention of the world; this will include an effort to explain and present favorably counter-insurgency programs, particularly the strategic hamlet program. The GVN should take diplomatic and domestic measures to gain maximum international support. These measures should include:
 - (a) Improved relations with Cambodia to achieve border cooperation and reduce mutual public recrimination.
 - (b) Establish a modus vivendi with Laos.
 - (c) In cooperation with the U.S., seek third country economic, and where appropriate, third country military aid. Take measures to coordinate and maximize the effect of this aid.
3. Publicize within Viet-Nam and internationally the facts of DRV aggression and the unfavorable conditions in North Viet-Nam.

Documented facts concerning Communist infiltration and terrorist activities and the measures being taken by the GVN to protect its people from such attacks will be compiled and publicized both domestically and internationally. The publication of information about unfavorable conditions in North Viet-Nam will be increased.

4. Continue to press the GVN to establish adequate facilities for dealing with foreign correspondents. Continue to impress on the GVN the importance of factual and credible information output in gaining international sympathy and support.
5. Cooperate as necessary with ICC/Viet-Nam. Make deliveries of military personnel and materiel as inconspicuous as possible.

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6. Be prepared to deal with a Communist campaign for an international conference on Viet-Nam. This will include a continuing study of Communist intentions and U.S. strategy for blocking Communist efforts to neutralize Viet-Nam. The GVN will be consulted and plans coordinated with them.

August 14, 1962.

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Series BFINAL REPORT - TASK FORCE VIET-NAM

July 1, 1962

A. Presidential Program (Initiated May 23, 1962)

- 1.
- Seek to increase GVN confidence in US by Vice-Presidential visit.

Achieved.

- 2.
- Attempt strengthen Diem's popular support by reappraisal and negotiation.

Continues: Our attempts continue, but Diem's popular support has decreased.

The January 4, 1962, GVN-US Joint Communiqué spelled out a program aimed at providing every Vietnamese with a stake in the outcome of the war. The communiqué resulted from negotiations which began with Vice President Johnson's visit and the Staley Mission. Negotiations aimed at producing action which will increase popular support continue.

The December 4, 1961 Memorandum of Understanding between Diem and Nolting specifically recognized the importance of developing democratic institutions. The GVN has taken a number of actions following from and related to this understanding which are calculated to increase popular support. These include the establishment of Provincial Councils, a National Economic Council, a Constitutional Court, a national flood relief organization (which included oppositionists), a continuing purge of officials charged with various abuses, an organization within the Presidency charged with the responsibility for collecting and acting on popular complaints, the continued toleration of at least a minimum of opposition activity (example: the opposition candidates in the 1961 Presidential elections are at large and have organized a Democratic Bloc; another oppositionist group has been permitted to set up the Front for National Unity which has publicly demanded a forum and legal status for opposition groups).

A more vigorous civilian civic action program has been set in motion, combining the personnel of the

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By. [initials], NARA, Date 8/9/02~~SECRET~~

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former Youth, Information and Civic Action Ministries. U. S. officials have influenced this program through constant contact and assistance to the information program and to the civic action aspects of counterinsurgency plans.

3. Begin negotiations looking toward bilateral arrangement with VN.

Suspended: The December 4 Memorandum of Understanding, plus our on-going joint programs constitute an adequate bilateral "arrangement" for realizing our objectives in VN. A bilateral treaty would probably bring us into conflict with the provisions of the Geneva Accords, commit us irrevocably, and Diem has shown little interest in such a treaty since General Taylor's visit, and the increased American assistance which resulted.

4. Negotiation to improve VN's relationship with other countries, especially Cambodia, and its standing in world opinion.

Continues: Vietnamese-Cambodian relations continue to be bad. In spite of many US efforts to bring the two parties together, little progress has been registered. VN's standing in world opinion has probably improved as a result of clearer international understanding of the nature of the hostilities there.

In contacts with other governments, the U. S. has consistently sought to present the facts of the Vietnam situation. In December 1961, the US published the evidence linking the DRV with the VC and documenting DRV aggression against SVN in our report "A Threat to the Peace".

President Diem on March 31, 1962, sent a letter to all heads of Government and Chiefs of State outlining the facts of the DRV attack on his country. The June 2 ICC Report charging the DRV with a deliberate campaign aimed at the violent overthrow of the GVN has been used by our diplomatic Missions to focus world attention on the DRV attack.

XGDS 2

5. Strengthen

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5. Strengthen border control arrangements with Cambodia.

Continues: In spite of repeated efforts by the US, joint VN-Cambodian control has not been effected and incidents are frequent. This continuing friction and the absence of effective joint border controls has helped the VC.

7. Examine diplomatic setting for commitment of U.S. forces to VN.

Suspended: Accomplished by the Taylor Mission. The present level of U.S. assistance, i.e. training and logistic support plus some limited operational forces, appears to be the most effective "mix" at this time.

8. Assess

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8. Assess political implications of increasing GVN forces from 170,000 to 200,000.

Achieved: The current strength level is over 197,000.

9. Request recommendations from Nolting to accomplish actions 1 and 2.

Achieved.

10. Install radar to obtain warning of Communist overflights for intelligence or air supply.

Achieved: Temporary installations were set up and operational at Danang in October 1961. Permanent installations are under construction with a target date of early Spring 1963.

11. Military Assistance Program for 20,000-man increase in ARVN is approved.

Achieved.

12. Increase MAAG as necessary for 20,000-man ARVN increase.

Achieved.

13. Consider case for increase ARVN strength above 170,000.

Achieved: Current ARVN strength is 197,000. Target for the end of Fiscal Year 1964 is 225,000.

14. Provide MAP support for Civil Guard Force of 68,000.

Achieved.

15. Expand

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15. Expand MAAG responsibilities to include support and advice to Self-Defense Corps.

Achieved.

16. Provide MAP support for Vietnamese Junk Force, including training of junk crews.

Continues: See Action 54.

17. Accelerated Special Forces Training.

Continues: Eleven Special Forces teams are engaged in training programs in Viet-Nam.

18. Collaborate with GVN in use of military, health, welfare and public works specialists for activities in villages.

Continues: With U.S. assistance, ARVN's Civic Action Program has improved steadily. However, this program still requires a great deal of effort to realize its full potential.

19. Study jointly with GVN border control techniques.

Continues: The use of defoliants, dogs, portable radar, invisible chemical markings and other devices and techniques are undergoing study and tests at the combat development test center in VN. See also Action 65.

20. Consider establishment in SEA of testing facilities for new techniques against Communist aggression.

Achieved: Combat test development centers have been established and are in operation in VN and Thailand.

21. Full

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21. Full examination of size and composition forces required in case of commitment U.S. forces VN.

Continues: Contingency planning is under continual review.

22. Dispatch to VN economic and fiscal experts to work out with GVN a joint financial plan.

Achieved: The Staley Mission completed its work in ^{July} June of 1961. Its plan was adopted as the Joint Action Plan (SEE Actions 34 through 44 below).

23. ICA (AID) is authorized to undertake rural development - civic action programs.

Continues: The January 4, 1962 Joint Communique outlined these programs. USOM/Saigon has mounted an impact crop protection program, including rat destruction and eradication of rice destroying insects, which will directly benefit 50,000 families. A program for Montagnard relief and resettlement is under way. The International Voluntary Service under contract to AID has been expanded to 69 people.

Civic action in connection with the two clear-and hold operations, plus the country-wide strategic hamlet program, is being planned and supported jointly. This civic action effort includes agricultural credit and extension, schools, and rural medical programs from village dispensaries to provincial surgical facilities.

24. Undertake long-range economic development program as a means of demonstrating U.S. confidence in the future of VN.

Continues: The GVN has announced a formal 5-year plan. The on-going U.S. AID program has contributed and will continue to contribute significantly to the long-range development of the economic infrastructure, including both agricultural development and

industrialization

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industrialization. U.S. aid continues to make important contributions to education, medicine, and other social services.

25. Assess economic implications of an ARVN force increase of 170,000 to 200,000.

Achieved.

26. Assist GVN public information programs to build public understanding of actions required to combat VC and increase public confidence in GVN.

Continues: USIS has worked closely with the GVN to develop its information program. Accomplishments include the establishment of a radio net serving the entire nation, production and distribution of films, and the development of rural newspapers. We are currently negotiating for the establishment of joint branch USIS-VIS posts throughout the country.

27. Country Team in coordination with GVN should compile documented facts of Communist infiltration and terrorism for dissemination in VN and throughout the world.

Continues: The US publication "A Threat to the Peace" and Under Secretary Ball's speech on Viet-Nam, published by the Department in June, brought the evidence of Communist aggression to the attention of an international audience. USIS in Saigon works with the Vietnamese authorities on a continuing basis to collect and cross-file such information for use in media throughout the world.

28. In coordination with CIA and GVN, USIS will publicize unfavorable conditions in NVN.

Continues: Information which can be declassified is not plentiful, but USIS continues to cross-file stories on unfavorable conditions whenever available.

29. Development

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29. Development Agricultural Pilot Projects throughout the country.

Suspended: Security conditions make this type of project difficult. A US-financed center near My Tho is in operation, however, with IVS personnel (who have been fired on by the VC). Ten pilot agricultural stations are conducting tests and demonstration work in crop and livestock development.

30. Exploit rehabilitation of VC prisoners and broadcast their stories to Communist areas.

Continues: The GVN does not have a well-defined rehabilitation program for VC prisoners. (See Action 68). It has been reluctant to make prisoners available for interviews. Interviews with refugees from Communist NVN have been made and broadcast, however.

31. Provide funds for US participation in Saigon trade fair.

Cancelled: The fair was called off.

32. Covert action to be carried forward and coordinated at appropriate levels.

Continues.

33. President reserves judgment on levels of funding proposed.

No Task Force action required.

B. Joint Action Program (Staley Report)

34. Provide equipment and assistance in training for an increase in armed forces from 170,000 to 200,000. To increase effectiveness of increase,
mutually

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mutually agreed geographically phased plan, understanding on training and use of 30,000 additional men, and regulation of rate of increase for most efficient absorption should be accomplished.

Continues: The force level now stands at 197,000. We have encountered difficulties in setting up and implementing a geographically phased plan. The Delta plan meets this requirement, but we are not sure that it will be completely implemented.

35. Decision regarding increase above 200,000 will be postponed until next year (1962). Meanwhile, training and equipment for Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps should be expedited.

Achieved: Force levels now stand at 197,000. The ultimate target is 225,000 by the end of FY 64. On the Self-Defense Corps and the Civil Guard see Action 55.

36. Within limits of available funds U.S. will provide resources required to implement action program, including commodity imports.

Continues: The commodity import target for FY 62 was set at \$135 million. The Vietnamese economy has been able to absorb only \$110 million. Other external resources, i.e. equipment for economic and military projects, have been provided as needed.

37. VN should be strongly urged to undertake generation of piasters by the means spelled out in Joint Action Program.

Continues: The GVN instituted fiscal reforms, including what amounted to a devaluation, in January 1962. These reforms are a direct result of U.S. urgings.

Internal tax receipts have increased over 1961. Piaster revenue remains inadequate, however, to cover counterinsurgency needs. The GVN has been unwilling to use deficit financing to meet this shortfall and has requested a cash grant from US. The problem is under negotiation.

38. Strongly

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38. Strongly urge GVN undertake tax reform and adopt principle of single and realistic rate of exchange.

Continues: Although the January 1962 fiscal reforms represent considerable progress, the GVN still has a multiple exchange rate which is set too high. Tax collections should also be improved.

39. Ambassador should make clear to Diem that we attach great importance to agreed criteria governing imports, we consider raising effective piaster rate indispensable, and increased piaster realization per dollar will not be used as reason for reducing U.S. aid.

Continues: GVN has abided by the agreed criteria for imports in spite of shortfalls in the commodity import program. The January reforms raised the effective piaster rate but at the appropriate time it should be raised further.

40. President directed ICA to conduct thorough review of new proposals for emergency social action and of programs already under way.

Achieved: Review continues.

41. Encourage long-range planning and urge Vietnamese create more effective planning machinery to develop a long-range plan.

Continues: The GVN has recently announced a five-year plan, but this plan is more in the nature of a catalogue of projects than an integrated economic plan. Manpower planning is still very haphazard. One step forward: doctors are subject to the draft and medical talent will presumably be allocated to the most urgent needs.

42. Make clear to Diem that we hope one consequence new joint efforts will be effective projection our confidence in future of Viet-Nam.

Continues: Our joint effort has markedly improved Vietnamese

morale.

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morale. Dien has been understandably concerned that the extent of U.S. assistance may make the GVN appear to be the creature of the U.S.

43. Parallel committees should be given maximum delegation of authority.

Suspended: Parallel committees have been discarded in favor of direct contact and negotiation between the action people on both sides at each level.

44. President shall be informed of matters arising in implementation of joint program requiring his attention.

Continues: TF/VN provided the White House with regular Status Reports, the NSC has provided an observer on TF/VN, and the Director of the Task Force appears bi-weekly at meetings of the Special Group (Counterinsurgency).

C. Actions under NSAM 104

45. Make preparations for publication white paper on DRV aggression against SVN.

Achieved: "A Threat to the Peace" was published in December 1961.

46. Develop plans for action in ICC based on white paper.

Achieved: The ICC report of June 2, 1962 confirms the U.S. position, i.e. the hostilities in VN are caused, directed, planned and led by the DRV.

47. Develop plans for presentation of VN case in UN.

Suspended: After studying matter several times it was concluded that in present circumstances presentation to UN would result in more complications than gains.

48. Introduce

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48. Introduce Jungle Jim squadron into VN for training purposes.

Achieved. See Action 53.

49. Initiate guerrilla ground action against Communist aerial supply missions in Tchepone area.

Suspended: Due to possible effects on Lao negotiations.

50. General Taylor should undertake mission to Saigon.

Achieved: General Taylor went to Viet-Nam in October 1961.

51. President agrees that certain other actions developed by TF/VN which do not require specific presidential approval should be undertaken on an urgent basis.

Continues.

D. actions under NSAM 111

52. Provide increased airlift to GVN forces.

Continues: The U.S.-provided airlift has sharply increased ARVN mobility and reduced reaction time. Perhaps more than other factors, it has enabled the GVN to take the offensive and upset the VC timetable. There are now 80 U.S.-manned helicopters, 20 other (U-1A), and 21 C-123's in Viet-Nam. In addition, 32 C-123's based at Clark are available for operations in Viet-Nam.

53. Provide equipment and personnel for air reconnaissance, photography, instruction in and execution of air-ground support techniques, and for special intelligence.

Continues: Operation Farmgate (including 8 T-28's, four C-47's and four B-26's) now provides instruction in and

execution of air-ground support. Results have been good, with evidence that many VC attacks and bases have been disrupted by air action. Equipment and personnel have also been provided for air reconnaissance and photography and for special intelligence.

54. Provide small craft, including advisers and operating personnel, for control of coastal waters and inland waterways.

Continues: A joint Junk Patrol has been organized with the Vietnamese Navy and elements of the Seventh Fleet to cut infiltration from North Viet-Nam. Construction is underway to develop a Junk Force of 28 Divisions (20 junks per Division). Four Junk Divisions are now operational. Three Junk Force training centers are operating, and recruitment of Vietnamese fishermen is satisfactory.

The U. S. has provided the GVN with 713 craft in all. These include 693 boats for inland waterway patrol and to increase ARVN mobility in the delta, 9 harbor support and logistics type vessels, and 11 vessels with off-shore and major river capability.

55. Train and equip CG and SDC with objective relieving ARVN of static missions.

Continues: Training of the Civil Guard by MAAG began January 1961 at a single training center. At MAAG's urging, the training was speeded up by establishing four other centers and reducing the training period from 24 to 12 weeks. By mid-June, 128 companies were trained, 51 were in training at the centers, and 21 additional were in training on-the-spot under MAAG contact training teams. The target for FY 62 is 372 trained companies. By the end of FY 64, total strength will be 90,000. Current strength, trained and untrained, is 75,000. FY 63 strength is set for 78,950 and FY 64, 80,000.

YGD 2

57. Provide new terms reference, reorganization and additional personnel as required by increased responsibilities of U. S. military.

Continues: A military assistance command under General Harkins was established in February 1962 to direct our increased operational and training activities in Viet-Nam. U.S. military personnel in Viet-Nam have been increased to 9,069 to carry out our increased responsibilities.

58. Provide increased economic aid for flood relief and to support the counterinsurgency program.

Continues: Emergency food relief assistance from the U.S. included medicaments and PL 480 foodstuffs. Major items in our increased economic aid in support of counterinsurgency to date include: funds and equipment for two clear-and-hold operations now in progress (Hai Yen and Binh Minh or Sunrise), funds and equipment for Montagnard refugee relief and resettlement; the establishment of a special stockpile of supplies and equipment for fast servicing of rural counterinsurgency programs (particularly the strategic hamlet program); funds and equipment for 25 new surgical suites (which will treat battle casualties) to be set up in provincial hospitals; new strategic road construction and repair of bridges and roads sabotaged by the VC; and the rapid development of communications systems, in particular a broadcasting net and the village radio program which now has installed 670 of a projected 2500 two-way radios.

59. Encourage GVN to request international or multilateral assistance for flood relief.

Suspended: Assistance was received from Malaya and Australia.

60. Provide

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60. Provide administrators and advisors for the GVN as agreed by two governments.

Continues: The GVN has not yet formally requested advisors. MAAG advisors are operating in all provinces.

61. Provide personnel for joint provincial surveys.

Continues: Three joint provincial surveys were completed by a formal joint US-GVN team. Joint intelligence surveys of all provinces were made by CIA. Formal joint surveys have been abandoned, since it is found that the information can best be obtained by continuing local contacts. All agencies continue to collect the required information in cooperation with the GVN.

62. GVN action to place nation on war footing, including measures to tap full potential all non-Communist elements.

Continues: See Action 2. In addition to the measures noted under Action 2, the GVN has reactivated its National Internal Security Council, which Diem promised he would use as a war cabinet, created an Inter-Ministerial Strategic Hamlet Committee under Ngo dinh Nhu, provided military training for civil servants and women, and in Central Viet-Nam organized a promising political-military irregular force to operate in the hamlets. Little or no genuine effort has been made to get the support of opposition cliques or to realize the potential of the religious sects, the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao.

A great deal of effort has gone into programs designed to give the rural population a stake in the war. The war will be won or lost in the provinces.

63. Vitalization of appropriate governmental wartime agencies.

Continues: An acute shortage of skilled administrators plus the temperamental reluctance of Diem to delegate authority (a reluctance understandably reinforced by the real dangers of subversion or another coup attempt) have made progress on this action slow. The National Internal Security Council has apparently met only

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five times since its inception in January and the Strategic Hamlet Committee is little more than an extension of Nhu. Progress has been registered in cutting red tape and increasing efficiency. Best results will probably be achieved by ad hoc arrangements and continued steady but patient pressure from the U.S. rather than by insistence on dramatic structural changes in the GVN.

64. Overhaul of the military establishment and command structure.

Continues: Considerable progress registered on this item. With U.S. assistance, ARVN has cut its reaction time and markedly improved its mobility. A Field Command, a Joint US-GVN Operations Center, a Joint General Staff and a Tactical Air Command, have been organized and are operating. U.S. advisors have been accepted and are operating effectively with all units, with the Province Chiefs, and in the intelligence organizations. The GVN has increased pay and benefits for the Civil Guard and the lower ranks of ARVN. The weakest link in the GVN military is still its citizen defense forces, the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps, but as noted in Action 55, this problem is being rapidly solved.

E. December 4 Diem-Nolting Memorandum of Agreement.

In addition to the Actions above, the following specific actions should be added from the Diem-Nolting agreement.

65. Border Ranger Force.

Continues: Ten companies of ARVN Rangers and 14 companies of Montagnard Rangers were made available for the Border Ranger Force on March 20. However, the old MAAG border control plan has not been implemented because high ARVN officers feel it is unrealistic. Plans and concepts for border control are under study by both RVNAF and their U.S. advisors. The forces presently engaged in border control total about 7,000 in 88 posts.

66. Develop

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66. Develop more contacts between GVN officials and people.

Continues: Increased activity by Civic Action cadre plus frequent trips to rural areas by the President, National Assembly Deputies, and Cabinet Ministers have helped. The President has been unwilling to undertake regular "fireside chats." The basic problem is a change in attitude by District and Provincial officials. This is well understood at the top, but changing attitudes is slow work.

67. Bring non-Communist prisoners promptly to trial.

Continues: No non-Communist prisoners of note have been brought to trial. The principal civilian leaders of the November 1960 coup are still being held without trial in spite of reports that Diem intends to release them.

68. Develop and announce an amnesty policy for VC defectors.

Continues: The GVN has developed a nationwide plan approved by Thuan and General Ty, but it has not yet been coordinated with all Ministries. Surrender leaflets and rewards have been used locally in a number of areas with varying success. Although it seems to have great promise, the GVN has not yet really given this tactic a trial.

6

S VN Only

Recruited 5,336
Jan-June

Cas
VC 500/wk vs. 250 VC 19,000/21,000
weapons +

- Decrease size of attacks > Co < batts

220,000

Size reg. forces on sked

Thes - rising fast.

"Harkins - troops on training site"

Comm. improved - reaction time less

Training skeds ahead

Intell. better.

Few intense attacks

- 9200 mag - McNam "plan 3 yrs
plans down"

U.S. ships withdrawn (now S VN)

Border crossing about same

VC Comm. effective

Mr. Wood 5218

Taylor (add)

Air logistic

Improve communications

" intelligence

Econ - Staley

Political -

Dien weaker

- camp

- uncommunicative

- less tolerable

+ strength at lower level

✓ for VN govt [X for Dien]

- less emphasis on helping Saigon
but more on province

Social

- Agricul. credit
- Infirmary
- Info Center
- Education

- ① Desire for security
- ③ Health
- ② Money

- * Check PHS
for doctors for
VN (team at.
for only 90 days)

Military

Mc - 'Must make ^{strong} rapidly in
misunderstood.
and " too little, too late " change

- Downward tendency halted in Nov.
- about even now

Statistics - 3

VC - No large formations
- Food -

77-64-225,000

Reg. 200,000

Amibled 70,000

7464-90,000

Self Def 65,000

7760 80,000

- 3 yr effort
- McN - Harkins

- Compare to Korea

Kao-type settlement? X

Government

Court

Army
Reparts } strength

TOP SECRET

1

The Vice President's Mission to South and Southeast Asia

May 9-24, 1961



TOP SECRET

The Far East

M O N G O L I A

C H I N A

KOREA

T i b e t

New Delhi
May 18

Karachi
I N
May 2

Hong Kong
May 15

T'ai-pei May 14

Manila May 13

Bangkok
May 16

Sa
Saigon

11 BR. BORN

PHILIPPINES

O C E A N

INDIAN
OCEAN

A U S T R A L I A

Scale at Equator 1:48,000,000

Boundaries are not necessarily those recognized by the U.S. Government.

Sakhalin south of 50 degrees latitude and the Kuriles are under U.S.S.R. administration.

12695 5-53

7a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Mission to South and Southeast Asia.

Pursuant to your request, there is appended a country-by-country check list of the status of the various undertakings which, as authorized by the President, you made during your talks with the leaders of the countries which you visited during your mission to South and Southeast Asia. The communiques issued in each country have been attached as Tab A.

This report is also being transmitted to the President, in accordance with his request of May 27 that he be provided a status report upon his return from Europe.

Attachments:

Classified Country Annexes.

For the Acting Secretary
M. Alexis Johnson

7c

PHILIPPINES

THE PHILIPPINES

The Vice President made no formal promises or commitments to the Philippines during his visit to Manila.

1. The Vice President discussed the Philippine desire for an increase in their permanent sugar export quota to restore their prewar share in the U.S. market.

STATUS: (Unclassified) The Philippine sugar delegation is in the U.S. awaiting hearings before the Congress. The date of the hearings has not yet been announced.

2. The Vice President discussed legislation pending in the Philippine Congress on easing restrictions on imports of U.S. leaf tobacco.

STATUS: (Unclassified) The Philippine Congress adjourned May 18 without taking action on this legislation. A special session may be called later in June and action is possible then.

3. The Vice President discussed steps which could be taken together to develop vigorous science programs for the Philippines and U.S.

STATUS: (Official Use Only) This proposal is under consideration within the administration, but no specific project has as yet been approved.

4. The Vice President discussed possible Peace Corps projects.

STATUS:

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

STATUS: (Official Use Only) These were discussed later in the week of May 16 between President Garcia and Mr. Shriver. Projects proposed have been approved, and we have a draft Circular 175 Agreement ready to be signed with the Philippines at an early date.

5. The Vice President discussed possible U.S. legislation reenacting the pre-war coconut oil tax refund.

STATUS: (Unclassified) The Philippine Government was informed in a note dated August 4, 1959 that the 3 cent coconut oil processing tax was considered an internal tax and not an ordinary customs duty. The request for the restoration of the refund was therefore rejected. There is no present intention to review the question.

6. The Vice President discussed the Additional War Damage Claims Bill (H.R. 1129, providing for the appropriation of \$73 million) now pending in the U.S. Congress.

STATUS: (Unclassified) A Department of State spokesman (Assistant Secretary Edwin M. Martin) on June 1, 1961 presented the Executive Branch position in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee in support of H.R. 1129 with an amendment providing for payment to all claimants in dollars.

7. The Vice President discussed a more vigorous development program for Mindanao. President Garcia promised to present a memorandum to Vice President Johnson on the subject, but the memorandum has not yet been received. The Department of State and ICA will presumably have action.

STATUS:

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

STATUS: (Official Use Only) Sympathetic consideration of the general idea is assured, since ICA has been developing its own plans for this important area.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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COMMUNIQUE - MANILA - May 14, 1961

President Carlos P. Garcia of the Republic of the Philippines and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United States of America met at Malacanang Palace at 7:35 a.m. today and informally discussed matters of interest to their two countries and the Free World.

The meeting was cordial and friendly. The discussion was thorough, frank and specific. There was complete agreement on the seriousness of the situation in Southeast Asia. There was also complete agreement on the determination of the two nations to maintain effective strength against Communist encroachments in Asia. On this principle there is complete accord between the two nations.

Vice President Johnson stressed that he came at the request of President Kennedy to seek counsel and judgment and the views of President Garcia on the world situation.

Vice President Johnson presented to President Garcia a letter from President Kennedy.

The Vice President said he gained a greater understanding of the conditions in this part of the world and that when he returned he would present the viewpoints of President Garcia to President Kennedy. The Vice President told President Garcia that he had been deeply thrilled and moved by the enthusiastic welcome of the Philippine people.

He also expressed his admiration over the success of the Philippine reconstruction which he regarded as a tribute to the character and capacity of the Filipino people.

President Garcia congratulated Vice President Johnson for a very timely and heartwarming address before the joint session of Congress. The two leaders talked about problems which confront the Governments of their two peoples. Among other things, they discussed sugar legislation in the United States; the additional war damage claims bill now pending in the United States Congress; the steps which could be taken together to develop vigorous science programs for the Philippines and United States; the possible Peace Corps projects which will be discussed later in the week with Mr. Shriver; possible legislation re-enacting the pre-war coconut oil tax refund; and legislation pending in the Philippine Congress on easing tobacco import restrictions. President Garcia is going to present to Vice President Johnson a memorandum on the possibilities of a more vigorous development program for Mindanao.

Vice President Johnson assured President Garcia of the United States desire to approach all these matters in a spirit of constructive understanding and that he will report fully through appropriate channels upon his return to Washington.

79

VIET-NAM

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VIET NAM

1. The Vice President agreed to infuse into our actions a high sense of urgency and dedication.

STATUS: (~~Confidential~~) A Task Force for Viet Nam in Washington has been established and is in operation. A Counterpart Task Force in Saigon is also in operation. All Task Force traffic will receive priority action at both ends.

2. The Vice President approved MAP support for a 20,000 force increase and noted Diem's statement that there was a problem of paying local currency costs for this increase.

STATUS: (Unclassified) MAP funds have been made available for a force increase of 20,000. /(~~Secret~~) The GVN has called up 6,000 so far./ U.S. financial experts are scheduled to depart for Viet Nam on June 16th to draw up an agreement on financing the increase. The mission consists of:

Dr. Eugene Staley,
Research Director,
International Industrial
Development Center,
Standard Research Institute;

Colonel E. F. Black,
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense;

Mr. Herman Kleine,
Assistant Deputy Director of
Operations, ICA;

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Authority NSA 87-138 (=136)
By ipjc NARA, Date 6-15-06

Mr. Paul Geren

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Mr. Paul Geren,
State, Deputy Director Office
of International Financial &
Dev. Affairs;

Dr. William N. Diehl,
Chief, Far East Division,
Office of International Finance,
Treasury; and

Mr. Warren A. Silver,
Operations Center,
Department of State.

3. The Vice President obtained Diem's agreement that parallel political and economic action have equal importance with military measures but took note of Diem's view that political and economic actions must be those appropriate to Viet Nam as a country which is underdeveloped and subject to Communist subversion.

STATUS: (Unclassified) President Diem has issued a series of decrees reorganizing his government.

4. The Vice President agreed to an increase in MAAG personnel.

STATUS: (~~Secret~~)

Previous authorized MAAG strength	685
U.S. military personnel assigned	
Embassy	51
Army Communications personnel	
(arrived Saigon 14 May 1961)	83
Immediate augmentation as follows:	
First increments to train:	
(a) 20,000 increase	20
(b) Self Defense Corps and	
Civil Guard	50

(c) Junk

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(c) Junk Fleet	12
(d) Logistics and Supply	18

(~~Secret~~) Of this group, the Department of the Army will provide 56 officers and 32 enlisted men on PCS status during June and July.

5. The Vice President agreed to MAAG support of and advice to the Self Defense Corps.

STATUS: (~~Secret~~) The Self Defense Corps is now being equipped by the ARVN from stocks recovered from the Civil Guard. Chief, MAAG cautions there is practically no leadership in the SDC, and not much more in the Civil Guard. Arrangements must be worked out with the GVN for the provision of a direct role for the advisors/instructors.

6. The Vice President pledged MAP support for the entire Civil Guard force of 68,000.

STATUS: (Unclassified) MAP support has been authorized for selected units of the Civil Guard increase from resources available in FY 61. MAP funds are programmed for the entire Civil Guard of 68,000 for FY 62. MAAG advisors and trainers have been assigned to Civil Guard units. /(~~Secret~~) Selected leaders of Civil Guard units are now undergoing counter-guerrilla training under the supervision of U.S. Special Force trainers in three training areas.]

7. The Vice President pledged material support for the Junk Force.

STATUS: (~~Secret~~) MAAG plans training advisory teams for three Junk Bases. The GVN

will provide

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will provide junks and engines. MAP will provide weapons and radios. CINCPAC will assist in the development of standard operating procedures for GVN coastal patrols.

8. The Vice President noted that the U.S. was prepared to consider the case for a further increase in the strength of the GVN armed forces.

STATUS: (~~Secret~~) The JCS has requested CINCPAC and MAAG recommendations. Fiscal and budget considerations have been received from Task Force Saigon.

9. The Vice President obtained Diem's agreement to further urgent joint study of border control techniques.

STATUS: (~~Secret~~) The JCS, military departments, CINCPAC, and Chief, MAAG are all studying the problem. No recommendations have yet been received.

10. The Vice President obtained Diem's agreement to consider the establishment in Southeast Asia of a research and development facility.

STATUS: (~~Secret~~) A team of six DOD officers will depart June 4 for Saigon to help the GVN set up a research and development facility.

11. The Vice President obtained Diem's agreement to the use of U.S. military specialists to assist Vietnamese armed forces in health, welfare and public works activities at the village level. The Vice President took note, however, of Diem's insistence on tact on the part of foreign officials working in this field.

STATUS:

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STATUS: (Unclassified) Chief, MAAG requested the Department of the Army to assign a military civic action mobile training team for a period of 180 days, to arrive Viet Nam at the earliest practical date. The team is to be composed of one public administrator, one engineer, one public health officer, and one administrative assistant.

12. The Vice President obtained Diem's agreement to renew border control negotiations with the Cambodian Government.

STATUS: (~~Secret~~) The JCS, military Departments, CINCPAC, and Chief, MAAG are all studying the problem. J-5 of the JCS has action.

13. Obtained Diem's agreement on the desirability of using foreign non-American experts in counter-guerrilla field and took note of Diem's insistence that it would be up to the initiative of the GVN to request these experts and that they would have to work under its control.

STATUS: (~~Secret~~) The British have offered to pay for the services of three guerrilla experts to be offered by Malaya. Task Force Saigon is now discussing their appropriate role with the British and the GVN in Saigon.

14. The Vice President obtained Diem's agreement to the U.S. proposal for sending a team of U.S. economic and fiscal experts to work out a financial plan as basis for joint U.S.-Viet Nam efforts.

STATUS:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

STATUS: (Unclassified) A team of experts headed by Dr. Eugene Staley, Standard Research Institute, departs June 16.

15. The Vice President obtained Diem's agreement to work together on a longer range economic development program for Viet Nam.

STATUS: (Unclassified) The above team will also explore with the GVN a long range economic development program.

16. The Vice President received a memorandum from Diem requesting additional defense support aid and recommending that the Buy American policy should not be applied to the aid program for Viet Nam.

STATUS: (Unclassified) The team will also examine defense support aid and the Buy American policy.

Fi

A

Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice President of the United States, has just completed a visit to the Republic of Viet Nam, on behalf of President Kennedy and on invitation of President Ngo Dinh Diem.

The enthusiastic welcome he received in Viet Nam reflected a deep sense of common cause in the fight for freedom in Southeast Asia and around the world.

This recognition of mutual objectives resulted in concrete understandings between the Republic of Viet Nam and the United States.

It is clear to the Government and the people of Viet Nam and to the United States that the independence and territorial integrity of Viet Nam are being brutally and systematically violated by Communist agents and forces from the north.

It is also clear to both Governments that action must be strengthened and accelerated to protect the legitimate rights and aspirations of the people of Free Viet Nam to choose their own way of life.

The two Governments agreed that this is the basic principle upon which their understandings rest.

The United States, for its part, is conscious of the determination, energy and sacrifices which the Vietnamese people, under the dedicated leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem, have brought to the defense of freedom in their land.

The United States is also conscious of its responsibility and duty, in its own self-interest as well as in the interest of other free peoples, to assist a brave country in the defense of its liberties against unprovoked subversion and Communist terror. It has no other motive than the defense of freedom.

The U. S. recognizes that the President of the Republic of Viet Nam Ngo Dinh Diem, who was recently re-elected to office by an overwhelming majority of his countrymen despite bitter Communist opposition, is in the vanguard of those leaders who stand for freedom on the periphery of the Communist empire in Asia.

Free Viet Nam cannot alone withstand the pressure which this Communist empire is exerting against it. Under these circumstances--the need of Free Viet Nam for increased and accelerated emergency assistance and the will and determination of the U. S. to provide such assistance to those willing to fight for their liberties--it is natural that a large measure of agreement on the means to accomplish the joint purpose was found in high-level conversations between the two Governments.

Both

Both Governments recognize that under the circumstances of guerrilla warfare now existing in Free Viet Nam, it is necessary to give high priority to the restoration of a sense of security to the people of Free Viet Nam. This priority, however, in no way diminishes the necessity, in policies and programs of both Governments, to pursue vigorously appropriate measures in other fields to achieve a prosperous and happy society.

The following measures, agreed in principle and subject to prompt finalization and implementation, represent an increase and acceleration of U. S. assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam. These may be followed by more far-reaching measures if the situation, in the opinion of both Governments, warrants.

First, it was agreed by the two Governments to extend and build upon existing programs of military and economic aid and to infuse into their joint actions a high sense of urgency and dedication.

Second, it was agreed that regular armed forces of the Republic of Viet Nam should be increased, and that the United States would extend its military assistance programs to include support for an additional number of regular Vietnamese armed forces.

Third, it was agreed that the United States would provide military assistance program support for the entire Vietnamese Civil Guard Force.

Fourth, it was agreed that two Governments should collaborate in the use of military specialists to assist and work with Vietnamese armed forces in health, welfare and public works activities in the villages of Free Viet Nam.

Fifth, it was agreed that the assistance of other free governments to the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam in its trouble against Communist guerrilla forces would be welcome.

Sixth, it was agreed that, to achieve the best possible use of available resources, the Vietnamese and the United States, in prosecution of their joint effort against communist attacks in Viet Nam, a group of highly qualified economic and fiscal experts would meet in Viet Nam to work out a financial plan on which joint efforts should be based.

Seventh, it was agreed that the United States and the Republic of Viet Nam would discuss new economic and social measures to be undertaken in rural areas, to accompany the anti-guerrilla effort, in order that the people of Viet Nam should benefit promptly from the restoration of law and order in their villages and provinces.

Eighth, it was agreed that, in addition to measures to deal with the immediate Viet Nam guerrilla problem, the two Governments would work together toward a longer range economic development program, including further progress in the fields of agriculture, health, education,

fisheries

fisheries, highways, public administration and industrial development.

These longer range plans and programs would be developed in detail after further consideration and discussion.

Their goal would be a Viet Nam capable of a self-sustained economic growth.

President Ngo Dinh Diem and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, on behalf of President Kennedy, established a sense of mutual confidence and respect which both believe essential to fulfillment of their objectives.

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TAIWAN

TAIWAN

1. The Vice President stated that the U.S. would stand by its allies in the Asian area. Nothing was said by the Vice President to make this commitment more specific; however, it will undoubtedly be construed by the GRC as meaning (insofar as the GRC alone is concerned) that the U.S. will fulfill its obligations under the terms of the US-GRC Mutual Defense Treaty of December 1954.

STATUS: (~~Secret~~) Top leaders of the Administration have on several occasions since January 20 made it plain that the U.S. will act in accordance with the US-GRC Mutual Defense Treaty to assist in the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores. An extensive Military Assistance Program is being maintained by the U.S. to improve the GRC's own capacity to defend these territories, and joint US-GRC military defensive planning is being conducted through the US-Taiwan Defense Command.

2. The Vice President stated that the U.S. would continue to oppose the seating of the Chinese Communists in the UN and to support the position of the GRC in that body. This commitment can be derived from the language of the wording of the Joint Communique of May 14, which states that: "The United States opposes the seating of the Peiping regime at the United Nations and regards it as important that the position of the Republic of China in the United Nations should be maintained."

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By idp. NARA, Date 6/15/06

STATUS:

STATUS: (~~Confidential~~) Again, leading Administration officials have stated on several occasions since January 20 that U.S. policy is to preserve the GRC's membership in the UN and under present circumstances to exclude Communist China from membership. In conjunction with representatives of the GRC we are conducting discussions on what tactics should be used to this end in place of the moratorium procedure, which we believe can no longer be made to work. We are also consulting with key allies along the same lines.

3. The Vice President stated that the U.S. would not recognize Communist China. This commitment is explicitly stated in the Joint Communiqué.

STATUS: (Unclassified) No specific action has been taken, but we have repeatedly made it clear in public statements that there can be no question of recognizing Communist China so long as Peiping demands Taiwan as the basis for such recognition and persists in a policy of bitter hostility toward the U.S.

4. The Vice President stated that the U.S. would continue to work with the GRC in support of the latter's accelerated economic growth program. This is also explicitly stated in the Joint Communiqué.

STATUS: (Unclassified) Provision for continuing economic assistance to the GRC has been made in the current foreign aid budget which is now being presented to Congress. It is envisaged that this aid will be administered as before through our Mutual Security Mission to China.

5. The

5. The Vice President stated that the U.S. would consider giving executive direction to the anti-Communist nations of Asia in a NATO-like coalition to which each participant would be required to contribute according to its abilities. In his after-dinner conversations with President Chiang on May 13 the Vice President spoke in these terms, and presumably included the GRC in the category of anti-Communist Asian nations which he had in mind. The Joint Communiqué also noted that "new measures of cooperation among the free nations of Asia as well as with the United States and other countries are necessary and desirable."

STATUS: (~~Secret~~) No formal commitment was made by the Vice President on this topic, and U.S. involvement should be viewed more in terms of the Vice President's recommendation for a broad Asian-Pacific Alliance of free nations than as a specific understanding with respect to the GRC.

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The President of the Republic of China and the Vice President of the United States of America met Sunday at the President's Residence and held extended discussions regarding the threat of Communist aggression against the free nations of Asia. The discussions were held in an atmosphere of friendly accord.

The President expressed his pleasure at the visit of the Vice President and the latter noted with deep gratitude the warmth of the welcome he received.

The Vice President wished to note particularly the opportunity he was afforded to greet, meet, and shake hands in friendship with so many Chinese people on the streets of Taipei and Taoyuan.

In the discussions, there was complete agreement on the common purpose of the Republic of China and the United States of America to maintain the integrity of Free Asia.

There was candid exploration and consideration of the strategies required to assure effective action.

Both the President and the Vice President affirmed, as a matter of principle, that all people who desire freedom and are working for freedom should have freedom. Freedom, they agreed, is not for ourselves alone but must be preserved and extended to all who desire it.

The Vice President, on behalf of President Kennedy assured President Chiang that:

The U. S. means to stand with her allies in the Asian area; the U. S. has no intention of recognizing the Peiping regime.

The U. S. opposes seating the Peiping regime at the United Nations and regards it as important that the position of the Republic of China in the U.N. should be maintained.

The United States will continue to work with the Republic of China in support of its accelerated growth program.

Discussions encompassed a far-ranging consideration of the international situation in Asia, with reference to the serious situation in Southeast Asia and particularly with regard to the Vice President's visit to Viet Nam.

The joint communique issued at Saigon by President Ngo Dinh Diem and Vice President Johnson was noted with satisfaction.

The President and Vice President agreed that new measures of cooperation among the free nations of Asia, as well as with the United States and other countries, are necessary and desirable.

The President and the Vice President joined in expressing their common concern with the conditions of famine on the Mainland of China and

the mass

the mass suffering under Communist rule.

In the course of discussions, the President and Vice President agreed that the political, social, agricultural and economic progress in Taiwan, which is the result of the combination of conditions of peace on the Island, Chinese skills and industry and American aid, is an achievement worthy of note throughout all Asia and the world.

In conclusion, the President of the Republic of China and the Vice President of the United States expressed the high mutual regard and mutual respect in which the peoples of their two countries hold each other.

70

THAILAND

THAILAND

1. The Vice President reaffirmed U.S. determination to honor its treaty commitments to support Thailand in its defense against subversion and aggression. He asked how many troops Thailand was ready to move into Laos if the Conference breaks down or the cease fire were violated. He also asked whether the Thai Government wished U.S. forces sent into Thailand.

The Thai Government stated its readiness to send one regimental combat team into Laos if the U.S. were also ready to move, or any number required if the U.S. and SEATO were prepared to move. The Prime Minister indicated that at present he did not desire the despatch of U.S. troops into Thailand.

STATUS: (~~Top Secret~~) Current U.S. military planning is taking into account these attitudes of the Thai Government.

2. The Vice President indicated sympathy for Thai defense assistance, and asked what additional matching contributions the Thai Government would be prepared to make over and above its present budgetary outlays for military purposes.

The Prime Minister indicated that Thailand would be prepared to contribute 10% of any new U.S. contributions

to the

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Authority FRS. 61-63, 101, 23, #408

By pc. NARA, Date 6-15-06

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

to the Thai military assistance program.

STATUS: (~~Top Secret~~) Military aid planning is proceeding on the assumption that any new U.S. contributions to the Thai military aid program will be matched by a Thai contribution equal to 10% thereof.

3. The Vice President suggested the possibility of a Pacific NATO covering the entire area from San Francisco westward.

The Prime Minister replied that this sounded like a good idea but inquired whether this would put SEATO into a deep freeze. The Vice President explained he was merely exploring a new concept since SEATO leaves many areas uncovered and excludes several firm allies.

STATUS: (~~Top Secret~~) U.S. planning agencies are re-examining U.S. treaty commitments in the Far East, including the status of SEATO.

4. The Vice President reaffirmed U.S. interest in joint economic projects designed to assist Thailand in mobilizing its resources for development. He referred to the scheduled arrival in Bangkok on May 19 of an ICA study team, whose mission it would be to review the entire U.S. economic aid program and to make recommendations for joint action in the field of economic and social development. It was noted that the Thai Government attaches particular importance

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importance to the irrigation projects in the Northeast.

STATUS: (Confidential) (a) The departure of the ICA study team for Bangkok was delayed at the specific request of Ambassador Young, who is returning to Washington on consultation on June 7. Following discussions here between the Ambassador, members of the team and interested State and ICA officials, it is expected that the team will arrange to leave for Bangkok at approximately the date of the Ambassador's return to his post on June 17. The team is headed by Sherwood Fine of ICA and includes the following members and associates: Nelson Peach, chairman of the Department of Economics of Oklahoma University; Henry Billingsley, former consultant to the House Foreign Affairs Committee; John Blumgart, Ford Foundation; Howard Bowen, President of Grinnell College; Glenn Johnson, Professor of Agricultural Economy, Michigan State; and Seymour Taubenblatt, DLF. (b) The Thai Government has been informed that the U.S. Government is favorably disposed to the irrigation projects and, on receipt of further engineering data requested from the Thai authorities, is prepared to give urgent consideration to the Thai application.

5. The Vice President and the Prime Minister discussed the planning and setting up of projects under the Peace Corps program.

STATUS: (Official Use Only) Mr. Shriver and a group of his staff recently visited Thailand and discussed a number of suggestions for Peace Corps volunteers to participate in the fields of health,

education

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education and agriculture. Particular emphasis has been placed in this preliminary planning on English language instruction and malaria eradication.

6. The Vice President and the Prime Minister agreed that Ambassador Young and Deputy Prime Minister Thanom would be jointly responsible for the preparation of a memorandum setting forth the requirements for the Thai armed forces and other related points covered in the talks which took place during the Vice President's visit to Thailand.

STATUS: (~~Confidential~~) Ambassador Young is expected to return to Washington on June 7 with detailed recommendations following up the specific points raised by the Vice President in Bangkok.

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The Vice President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Thailand have completed a series of meetings during the Vice President's visit to Thailand over the past two days. Their discussions covered many subjects of common interest, and reflected mutual objectives and undertakings of both Governments.

The Vice President stressed that the President of the United States had sent him on this mission to inform the Prime Minister personally and directly of the United States Government's complete understanding of Thailand's concern over the threats to peace and security in Southeast Asia, and conveyed the President's intense interest in the preservation of the independence and political integrity of Thailand and the other free countries of Southeast Asia.

Vice President Johnson also stressed that he had come at the personal request of President Kennedy to obtain the counsel of Prime Minister Sarit on what should be done in the immediate future to meet our common problems. Further, he stressed that he would report the views of the Prime Minister to President Kennedy.

The Vice President expressed his great appreciation for the amount of time, as well as the serious attention, which the Prime Minister and his colleagues devoted to these discussions. He also expressed gratitude for the warmth of the reception of the people of Thailand.

The Vice President noted that Thailand has made great social and economic progress. He cited the advances of Thailand in the fields of education, health, finance and economic development.

The Vice President expressed his interest in the challenge of the development of northeast Thailand where opportunities for development are being sought under the leadership of the Prime Minister.

At the conclusion of their talks, the Prime Minister and the Vice President agreed to the release of a joint communique covering the following points:

1. Both Governments found mutual understanding regarding the serious situation existing in parts of Southeast Asia. They reached full accord on Thai-United States objectives of peace and independence, and agreed that both Governments should work for these objectives.

2. Both Governments recognize that the foundation of freedom rests on the adequate education of the young, the health of the people. Both Governments pledged their diligent efforts to the advance of education, health, communications, and other fields of modern progress in Thailand.

3. The United States Government expressed its determination to honor its treaty commitments to support Thailand--its ally and historic friend--in defense against subversion and Communist aggression.

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4. Both Governments recognize the utmost importance of preserving the integrity and independence of Thailand.

5. Both Governments reiterated their determination to fulfill their SEATO commitments and to go forward in steadfast partnership.

6. Both Governments examined possible ways to strengthen Thai defense capabilities, agreed to explore ways in which this might be achieved through greater joint efforts and mutual sacrifices and the military assistance program involving the armed forces.

7. Both Governments expressed approval of specific joint economic projects such as irrigation projects in the northeast and the new thermal power plant, which are being developed in Thailand, as well as the planning, the setting up of projects under the Peace Corps program.

The Vice President and the Prime Minister rededicated themselves to work for an honorable peace in Southeast Asia, and to intensify the efforts of their countries for the defense and progress of the free nations of this region.

Finally, they agreed on the desirability of regular consultation with as much frequency as may be practicable.

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INDIA

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INDIA

No specific undertakings were made in the case of India.

1. The Vice President discussed our programs for the peaceful exploration of outer space and mentioned the U.S. desire for international participation, particularly with regard to communication and weather satellites. Mr. Nehru expressed an interest on behalf of India. There is therefore an implied commitment to invite India to participate in the scientific exploration of space.

STATUS: (Official Use Only) No new invitation to scientific collaboration has been made. However, U.S. and Indian scientists are already collaborating in a joint high-altitude balloon project which was negotiated between the two governments Oct.-Dec. 1960, in addition to a number of other research projects unrelated to outer space.

2. The Vice President and the Prime Minister discussed at length the need for economic progress in South and Southeast Asia, progress from which the mass of people would benefit. Emphasis was laid on education, industrialization, and rural progress and reform (specifically: land reform, farming cooperatives, irrigation and rural electrification). Mr. Nehru explained India's unemployment problem, and the need for foreign exchange to carry out India's Third Five-Year Plan. The Vice

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President explained that no specific commitment of U.S. aid was possible, as only Congress has authority to make the necessary appropriations.

STATUS: (Unclassified) The IBRD Consortium on Aid to India held a resumed meeting May 31-June 2 in Washington. (Official Use Only: The leading role was played by the U.S. at the two meetings this spring.) At this most recent meeting it was agreed that the IBRD, the IDA, and six individual countries (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and United States) would, subject to necessary legislative authorizations, provide the following amounts of aid to India:

\$1,295 million in 1961-62, of which the U.S. share is \$545 million.

\$2,286 million in 1961-66 as an initial commitment to the Third Plan, of which the U.S. is providing large amounts of PL-480 surplus agricultural commodities (\$1,276 million in 1960-64).

This and other external aid to India will include projects in industry, education, power development, and rural improvement with particular emphasis on increased food production. Allocation of aid to specific projects will be made in the coming months upon receipt of requests from the Government of India.

3. The Vice President and the Prime Minister discussed the Peace Corps. Mr. Nehru expressed satisfaction over his talks with Mr. Shriver.

STATUS: (Unclassified) Negotiations for specific Peace Corps projects are proceeding satisfactorily.

4. The need for stability and progress in Southeast Asia was discussed and agreed upon. Mr. Nehru was urged to give
counsel

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counsel and leadership to insure economic advance and social reform in the area. Mr. Nehru demurred. Thus no commitment was made by either side except in general terms to support the goal of a neutral and independent Laos as set forth in the Communique.

STATUS: (~~Secret~~) The U.S. and Indian Governments are continuing to consult on the means of reaching this goal.

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The Vice President and the Prime Minister have had full and highly useful discussions covering a wide range of subjects of interest and concern to the two countries. At the outset, Vice President Johnson conveyed to Prime Minister Nehru the warm greetings of President Kennedy and told him of the President's admiration for the way in which India is waging its great battle against privation and poverty. He told of the President's interest in the Third Five Year Plan.

1. The Vice President said that while American assistance is dependent on the decisions of the Congress and also on parallel efforts by the other developed countries, it is the President's hope that American aid to the new Plan will be both substantial in amount and effective in form. The Prime Minister expressed his satisfaction at the President's interest in India's development plans.

2. The two leaders agreed that the common enemies of mankind, on which a major attack must now be mounted are ignorance, poverty and disease. The conquest of these everywhere is the first step to the assurance of peace and freedom.

3. The new American Administration agrees with the Prime Minister that the benefits of economic advance must accrue to those who need help the most. The Prime Minister stressed the importance of effective land reform in many underdeveloped countries as a vital step toward greater social and economic equality. The Vice President agreed on the importance of such reform and noted that the United States was a strong believer in home ownership and in the distribution of the ownership of land, particularly by those who work it.

4. The Prime Minister mentioned to the Vice President the Indian program for establishing universal free and compulsory education in the Third Five Year Plan. Both leaders agreed on the fundamental importance of education in economic development.

5. The Vice President told of President Kennedy's concern for assuring an effective cessation of hostilities in Laos and for getting a truly neutral and independent government which would be neither dominated nor threatened from any quarter. He expressed satisfaction and thanks for India's past assistance in obtaining a cease-fire. The Prime Minister expressed his full approval of the goal of a neutral and independent Laos and assured his continuing assistance and support in achieving this end.

6. The Vice President, who has long been associated closely with developments in exploration and research in space in the United States, stressed American concern for peaceful and concerted effort by all nations in the great adventure into outer space. He told of the imminent prospects for the development of a communications satellite with its promise of a possible break-through in the field of mass education. He outlined also the prospects for, and potential value of, the weather satellite. These developments will be of benefit not alone to Americans but to all mankind. They will

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belong to all mankind. The expense of development has so far been a barrier to participation by the scientists and engineers of the less developed countries. The United States would like now to find ways to broaden interest and participation in these epoch-making activities. The Prime Minister expressed much interest on behalf of India and promised the matter his close attention.

7. There was discussion of the Peace Corps. The Prime Minister stressed the importance of voluntary workers being men and women of good training who are also otherwise well prepared for their new life and tasks. He expressed satisfaction with his talks with the Director of the Peace Corps.

8. Early in their conversations the Prime Minister and the Vice President found a strong common interest in the field of electric power development. The Vice President was one of the pioneers in rural electrification in the United States, having at President Roosevelt's request, participated in the establishment of the largest rural electrification project in the United States. The Prime Minister told of his longstanding conviction that electric light, and all that went with it, were the greatest gift of modern industrial society. Because of the high capital costs and the heavy demands for foreign exchange that are involved, the development of power generating capacity has been an especially important area of American aid. The Prime Minister noted with satisfaction the accomplishments which could be attributed to this aid in the Second Five Year Plan and the two leaders reviewed the large demands for power to be met in the Third Five Year Plan. The Vice President expressed his hope that during the Third Five Year Plan there would be particular success in getting electricity to rural villages.

In concluding their talks, the Vice President and the Prime Minister returned again to hunger, illiteracy and disease which are basic problems of the peoples of the underdeveloped countries. The battle against them will not easily be won; but neither can it be longer delayed. The Vice President stated that India's experience in dealing with these basic problems is of great value to the United States which wishes to use its resources for aiding the peoples of the underdeveloped countries. The Vice President and the Prime Minister expressed a desire for close and continuing consultation on these problems. The Prime Minister expressed his warm appreciation of Vice President Johnson's mission and the opportunity the visit gave for frank and friendly exchange of views and ideas.

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PAKISTAN

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PAKISTAN

1. The Vice President reaffirmed the U.S. interest in supporting the implementation of the Second Five-Year Plan.

STATUS: (Unclassified) The U.S. is participating in a Consortium sponsored by the IBRD to discuss a commitment to implement assistance to Pakistan's Second Five-Year Plan. In addition, the appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government are in the process of testifying before Congressional Committees in support of the President's requests for foreign aid programs. In the meantime, these agencies are also studying the various technical assistance and economic aid proposals of the Second Five-Year Plan and related activities.

2. The Vice President expressed interest in the water-logging and salinity control project of West Pakistan and said that he thought every consideration should be given to the assistance the U.S. might provide.

STATUS: (Official Use Only) The recently released report on this subject has been received and the contribution which the U.S. might make is under active consideration by appropriate U.S. agencies, with, among others, Finance Minister Shoaib, at present in Washington. Our existing reclamation program has been developed in response to requests from the GOP.

3. In his conversation with President Ayub, the Vice President suggested taking "20 to 30 of the best Pakistan primary teachers to the U.S. to train them in teaching by television alongside about the same number of American technicians who

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Authority NWJ 87-138 (*13j)
By mr/jk NARA, Date 6-15-06

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would return with them to Pakistan to help install the system". He suggested the building of a television tower on the tallest local hill or building and arranging with U.S. television manufacturers to supply TV sets, about 400 to begin with, to be placed in market places or other convenient places in Karachi and nearby towns where they could provide first-grade education to large numbers of school teachers.

STATUS: (Official Use Only) ICA is prepared to study with Pakistani authorities the feasibility of low-cost educational television in Pakistan on request from the GOP. ICA has had considerable experience in educational television in developing countries and has invited representatives of industry to come to Washington on July 9 to discuss aid to education including the use of low-cost television. USIA in recent months has demonstrated closed-circuit television in Karachi, Lahore and Dacca in connection with the Pakistan industrial exhibits.

4. The Vice President suggested the U.S. should continue to help with the housing program.

STATUS: (Unclassified) The U.S. has under active review the contribution it might make bilaterally or multilaterally to improved housing.

5. The Vice President suggested the U.S. should continue its assistance to Pakistan in its health program.

STATUS: (Unclassified) The U.S. has under active review the contribution it might make bilaterally or multilaterally to improved health facilities.

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6. The Vice President suggested that the U.S. would provide Peace Corps volunteers to work in such fields as health, education and agriculture.

STATUS: (Official Use Only) A survey group representing the Peace Corps has recently returned from Pakistan with a number of suggestions for Peace Corps volunteers to participate in the fields of health, education and agriculture. Efforts are being made to find appropriate types of volunteers to fill these requirements as well as preparing the administrative organization needed to implement a Peace Corps operation in Pakistan.

7. The Vice President expressed an interest in maintaining and increasing Pakistan a mobile defense force capable of making a substantial contribution to free world security.

STATUS: (~~Secret~~) In the FY 62 presentation, provision has been made for limited modernization including tanks, tank carriers and trucks. The U.S. is in the process of delivering one squadron of F-104's and has recently undertaken a study of Pakistan's need for a more modern air transport squadron.

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The President of Pakistan and the Vice President of the United States of America met Saturday, May 20, 1961 at the President's House for talks, which were conducted in a frank and friendly atmosphere reflecting the continuing close cooperation of Pakistan and the United States in pursuit of common objectives.

The Vice President expressed the friendly greetings and warm good wishes of President Kennedy and the American people for the President and the people of Pakistan. The Vice President noted that the United States anticipated with pleasure President Ayub's visit in November. In this connection, Vice President Johnson extended a personal invitation for President Ayub to visit the Vice President's ranch home in Texas during the stay in the United States. President Ayub recalled that he had previously visited Texas which reminded him of Pakistan and expressed pleasure in accepting the Vice President's invitation.

Vice President Johnson explained that he had come at the request of President Kennedy and presented to President Ayub a personal letter from the President of the United States. The Vice President said that President Kennedy wanted him to discuss with the leaders of Pakistan and other countries of South and Southeast Asia what might be done further to strengthen peace and freedom and to enhance the general welfare of the people. Vice President Johnson said the exchange in Karachi would be of great value toward a closer understanding of Pakistan and the views of Pakistan's leaders toward regional and world problems.

In the course of the conversations, President Ayub and Vice President Johnson noted with satisfaction the many common objectives and specific programs of cooperation that link the two countries. They welcomed continued cooperation in regional collective security arrangements, such as CENTO and SEATO, and the growing economic and social cooperation among the regional members of these alliances. They discussed measures to strengthen these alliances.

President Ayub and Vice President Johnson agreed that the long-term security of the free world must be built on a foundation of progress assuring greater opportunity and a better life for the people.

Specifically:

1. President Ayub reviewed the objectives of Pakistan's Second Five Year Plan and progress in its implementation. The Vice President reaffirmed the United States' firm interest in supporting Pakistan's implementation of this far-sighted program.
2. The two leaders discussed the great problems arising from the loss of agricultural lands in Pakistan due to water-logging and salinization. The President outlined the energetic program planned to cope with this problem, and the Vice President received documentation for use in considering further means by which the United States might assist.

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3. The importance of education was emphasized. President Ayub described the substantial educational programs of his country to which both government and private assistance is being extended from the United States. Means of further cooperation in this field were considered.
4. It was recognized that the provision of adequate housing is an essential primary need of any community or nation. In this context, assistance being extended by the United States to supplement Pakistan's housing programs was reviewed.
5. The provision of greater health facilities was discussed at length.
6. Plans for the assignment to Pakistan of members of the American Peace Corps were discussed, and President Ayub expressed particular interest in the assignment of Peace Corps members to work on projects in such fields as health, education and agriculture.
7. President Ayub discussed Pakistan's land reform programs in which millions of acres have been re-distributed, giving new ownership to hundreds of thousands of people who work the lands.
8. Vice President Johnson said that the United States has high expectations that international cooperation in scientific developments will be of great benefit to countries on every continent. He mentioned in particular possibilities from weather, communication, navigational and mapping uses of space vehicles.
9. The President and Vice President discussed the possible advantages of a meeting to be held in the near future of heads of nations of Asia and the Pacific area to review their common aspirations, objectives and problems and to seek means of greater cooperation among themselves.

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*Presidential
Program
for
Viet-Nam*

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By cbw/jc, NARA, Date 2-26-09

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PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAM FOR VIET-NAM

OBJECTIVE

To prevent Communist domination of Viet-Nam by initiating, on an accelerated basis, a series of mutually supporting actions of a political, military, economic, psychological, and covert character, designed to create in that country a viable and increasingly democratic society and to keep Viet-Nam free.

PROGRAM

Political:

1. Seek to increase the confidence of President Diem and his Government in the United States by a series of actions and messages relating to the trip of Vice President Johnson.
2. Attempt to strengthen President Diem's popular support within Viet-Nam by reappraisal and negotiation, under the direction of Ambassador Nolting.
3. Begin negotiations looking toward a new bilateral arrangement with Viet-Nam, but make no firm commitment to such an arrangement without further review by the President.
4. Negotiate in appropriate ways to improve Viet-Nam's relationship with other countries, especially Cambodia, and its standing in world opinion.
5. Strengthen border-control arrangements, particularly with Cambodia; encourage Diem to authorize the renewal of negotiations on this subject with the Cambodian Government. If he concurs, we will use our best efforts with the Cambodians to facilitate these discussions.
6. Cooperate with the GVN in planning the most effective use of assistance offered by other governments to assist Viet-Nam in its actions against the Viet Cong, including the provision of certain expert personnel with long experience, e. g., in Malaya.

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7. Examine the diplomatic setting within which a possible commitment of U.S. forces to Viet-Nam might be undertaken.

8. Assess the political implications of increasing GVN forces from 170,000 to 200,000.

9. Ambassador Nolting is requested to recommend any necessary reorganization of the Country Team to accomplish 1 and 2 above.

Military:

10. Install as a matter of priority a radar surveillance capability which will enable the GVN to obtain warning of Communist overflights being conducted for intelligence or clandestine air supply purposes.

11. Military Assistance Program support of 20,000-man increase in ARVN is approved.

12. Increase the MAAG as necessary to insure the effective implementation of the military portion of the program including the training of the additional 20,000 men.

13. Consider together with the GVN, if developments should warrant, the case for a further increase in ARVN strength beyond the 170,000 limit now contemplated.

14. Provide MAP support for the entire Civil Guard force of 68,000.

15. Expand MAAG responsibilities to include authority to provide support and advice to the Self-Defense Corps with a strength of approximately 40,000.

16. Provide MAP support for the Vietnamese Junk Force as a means of preventing Viet Cong clandestine supply and infiltration into Viet-Nam by water, to include training of junk crews in Viet-Nam or at U.S. bases.

17. Give Special Forces training to assist the GVN in accelerating the training of its Special Forces.

18. Collaborate with the GVN in the use of certain military specialists to assist and work with the ARVN in health, welfare, and public-works activities in the villages.

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19. Study jointly with the GVN the problem of Viet-Nam's borders to develop techniques whereby crossing of those borders by unfriendly elements can be more effectively controlled.

20. Consider jointly the establishment in Southeast Asia of a facility to develop and test, using the tools of modern technology, new techniques to help the U.S. and GVN in their joint campaign against the Communists.

21. A full examination will be made of the size and composition of forces which would be desirable in the case of a possible commitment of U.S. forces to Viet-Nam.

Economic:

22. Despatch to Viet-Nam a group of highly qualified economic and fiscal experts who would meet with GVN experts and work out a financial plan on which joint U.S.-GVN efforts can be based.

23. ICA is authorized to move into a rural development-civic action program, to include short-range, simple, impact projects which would be undertaken by teams working in cooperation with local communities.

24. Undertake the development of a long-range economic development program as a means of demonstrating U.S. confidence in the economic and political future of the country by authorizing Ambassador Nolting to inform the GVN that the U.S. is prepared to discuss a long-range joint five-year development program which would involve contributions and undertakings by both parties.

25. Assess the fiscal and other economic implications of a further ARVN force increase from 170,000 to 200,000.

Psychological:

26. Assist the GVN to accelerate its public-information program to help develop a broad public understanding of the actions required to combat the Communist insurgents and to build public confidence in the GVN's determination and ability to deal with the Communist threat.

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27. The U.S. Country Team, in coordination with the GVN Ministry of Defense, should compile and declassify for use of media representatives in Viet-Nam and throughout the world documented facts concerning Communist infiltration and terrorist activities and the measures being taken by the GVN to counter such attacks.

28. In coordination with CIA and the appropriate GVN Ministry, USIS will increase the flow of information about unfavorable conditions in North Viet-Nam to media representatives.

29. Develop agricultural pilot-projects throughout the country, with a view toward exploiting their beneficial psychological effects.

30. Exploit as part of a planned psychological campaign the rehabilitation of Communist Viet Cong prisoners, stressing the errors of Communism, and broadcast this material to Communist-held areas, including North Viet-Nam, to induce defections.

31. Provide adequate funds for an impressive U.S. participation in the Saigon Trade Fair of 1962.

Covert:

32. Program to be carried forward and coordinated at appropriate levels.

Fiscal:

33. The President reserves judgement on the levels of funding proposed in the Task Force Report and in the funding annex.

Task Force on Viet-Nam,
Department of State,
May 23, 1961.

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