

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

10/4

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
** TO BE SUBMITTED TO STATE DEPT. FOR CONCURRENCE**			
#1 Memo	WH Conf. <i>NSC ltr 4/19/77 State ltr 11/2/76</i> To the VP from W. Rostow	1 p 08/18/61	A
#1a Memo	WH Conf. <i>NSC ltr 4/19/77 State ltr 11/2/76</i> To Foy Kohler from W. Rostow	1 p 08/18/61	A
#2a Memo	WH Secret <i>NSC ltr 4/19/77, State ltr 11/2/76</i> To the President from the VP	6 p 08/21/61	A
#2b Memo	WH Secret <i>NSC ltr 4/19/77, State ltr 11/2/76</i> To the President from the VP	6 p 08/21/61	A
#3 Report	WH Secret <i>Exempt, NSC ltr 4/19/77</i> VP's report on his visit to Germany	6 p 08/20/61	A <i>agen 2-9-82 via per NSC 11-25-81</i>
#4 Report <i>open 5-27-97</i>	WH Secret <i>Exempt, NSC ltr 4/19/77</i> VP's report on his visit to Germany [duplicate of #3]	6 p 08/20/61	A
#5 Report <i>open 5-27-97</i>	WH Secret <i>Exempt, NSC ltr 4/19/77</i> VP's report on his visit to Germany [duplicate of #3]	6 p 08/20/61	A
#6 MemCon	WH Secret <i>State ltr 11/2/76</i> re: Berlin situation	5 p 08/20/61	A
#6b MemCon	WH Secret <i>Exempt, NSC ltr 4/19/77</i> meeting between VP, Amb. Dowling, Amb. Bohlen, Gen. Clay and Mayor Brandt	6 p 08/20/61	A <i>agen 2-9-82 via per NSC 11-25-81</i>
#7 Report	WH Secret <i>State ltr 11/2/76</i> re: news magazine story	2 p Undated	A
#8 MemCon	WH Secret <i>Exempt, NSC ltr 4/19/77</i> conversation between VP Johnson and Chancellor Adenauer	8 p 08/19/61	A <i>agen 2-9-82 via per NSC 11-25-81</i>
#9 MemCon	WH Secret <i>Exempt, NSC ltr 4/19/77</i> Conversation between VP Johnson and Chancellor Adenauer [duplicate of #8] <i>open 3-9-09</i>	8 p 08/19/61	A
#10 MemCon	WH Secret <i>Exempt, NSC ltr 4/19/77</i> Conversation between VP Johnson and Chancellor Adenauer [duplicate of #8] <i>open 3-9-09</i>	8 p 08/19/61	A

FILE LOCATION

VP Security File, VP Travel
Berlin, Germany, Berlin Papers for the VP

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE		DATE	RESTRICTION
	** TO BE SUBMITTED TO STATE DEPT. FOR CONCURRENCE**			
#11 Letter	WH	Secret <i>NSC ltr 4/19/77, State ltr 11/2/76</i>		
	To VP Johnson	1 p	08/18/61	A
#12 Letter	WH	Secret <i>Exempt, NSC ltr 4/19/77</i>		
	To Willy Brandt	open 1-12-81 is per NSC 12-19-80	3 p	08/18/61
				A
#13 Statement	WH	Conf. <i>NSC ltr 4/19/77, State ltr 11/2/76</i>		
	Arrival statement (Bonn) of the VP	2 p	08/18/61	A
#14 Cable	WH	Conf. <i>Exempt, NSC ltr 4/19/77</i>		
	Embtel 223 from Berlin	5 p	08/17/61	A
				<i>open 2-9-82 is per NSC 11-25-81</i>
#20 Letter	WH	Secret <i>NSC ltr 4/19/77, State ltr 11/2/76</i>		
	To VP Johnson	1 p	08/18/61	A
	[duplicate of #11]			
#22 Statement	WH	Conf. <i>NSC ltr 4/19/77, State ltr 11/2/76</i>		
	Draft arrival statement (Bonn) of the VP	2 p	08/18/61	A
	[duplicate of #13]			
#25 Letter	WH	Secret <i>Exempt, NSC ltr 4/19/77</i>		
	To Mayor Brandt	open 3-9-09	3 p	08/18/61
	[duplicate of #12]			A
#27 Cable	WH	Conf. <i>Exempt, NSC ltr 4/19/77</i>		
	Embtel 223 from Berlin	open 3-9-09	5 p	08/17/61
	[duplicate of #14]			A

FILE LOCATION VP Security File, VP Travel
Berlin, Germany, Berlin Papers for the VP

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<i>all declassified State Co. 2/10/77</i>			
#15 Memo	State Secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 2-9-82 ins</i> To George Reedy from L. D. Battle	1 p 09/07/61	A
#15b Cable	State Secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 2-9-82 ins</i> Embtel 520 from Bonn	1 p 09/06/61	A
#15c MemCon	State Secret <i>Exempt</i> Conversation between Grewe, Schnippenkoetter and Hillenbrand	2 p 09/06/61 <i>open 2-9-82 ins</i>	A
#15d Cable	State Secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 2-9-82 ins</i> Deptel 592 to Bonn	1 p 09/06/61	A
#15e Memo	State Secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 2-9-82 ins</i> To George Reedy from L. D. Battle [duplicate of #15]	1 p 09/07/61	A
#16a Cable	State Conf. <i>Exempt</i> Embtel 223 from Berlin <i>open 3-9-09</i>	3 p 08/16/61	A
#17 Memo	State Secret <i>Sanitized</i> <i>open 2-9-82 ins</i> Briefing Memo on Berlin	1 p Undated	A
#17a Sketch	State Conf. <i>Sanitized</i> Karl Carstens biographical sketch	1 p 05/--/61	A
#17b Sketch	State Conf. <i>Sanitized</i> Ludwig Erhard biographical sketch	1 p 03/--/61	A
#17g Sketch	State Conf. <i>Sanitized</i> Heinrich Von Brentano biographical sketch	1 p 05/--/61	A
#17i Sketch	State Conf. <i>Sanitized</i> <i>open 1-25-01</i> Willy Brandt biographical sketch	2 p 03/--/61	A
#17j Sketch	State Conf. <i>Sanitized</i> Franz Amrehn biographical sketch	1 p 04/--/61	A

FILE LOCATION

VP Security File, VP Travel
 Berlin, Germany, Berlin Papers for the VP

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#17d Memo	CIA Secret <i>CIA ltr. 1/3/77</i> Biographical sketch of Ernst Lemmer 1 p	08/--/61	A
#17f Memo	CIA Conf. <i>Exempt, CIA ltr 1/3/77</i> Biographical sketch of Franz Josef Strauss 1 p <i>exemptly 037-002-2-1</i>	07/--/61	A

FILE LOCATION

VP Security File, VP Travel
Berlin Germany, Berlin Papers for the Vice President

RESTRICTION CODES

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 18, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: W. W. *WR* Rostow

Pierre Salinger sent in to me yesterday all the German correspondents in Washington. When we got to Berlin, I tried out this theme of long-run confidence and unity. I am now convinced it is an important supplement to the more obvious theme that we shall protect access to West Berlin. I know of no one better than yourself to project this sense of confidence.

Best of luck on your mission.

I am sending a copy of this suggestion to Foy Kohler.

ATTACHMENT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 125C Dec 4/14/77, State Dec 11/12/76

By rmg, NARS, Date 5/6/77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 18, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Foy D. Kohler

FROM: W. W. Rostow

The Vice President should not merely reassure the West Berliners that we shall protect access.

He must also say this:

This crisis came about because of the extraordinary success of West Germany and West Berlin as compared to East Germany. This is the historical fact on which we must fasten our eyes. This is the historical fact which Khrushchev understands. He is trying to deal with it via barbed wire, troops, and bullying the men and women of East Germany. Khrushchev can not deal with Western strength and Eastern weakness by these means any more than King Canute could stop the rising tide.

This is a time for confidence and faith among the West Berliners, among the West Germans, and throughout the West. Let the Vopos crow. In their hearts they know that history is not on their side.

Now is the time, too, for the Western allies -- all of us -- to come closer together. The commitment of the U.S. to the freedom of West Berlin is absolute.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 642 4/13/77, State 11/2/76
By smg, NARS, Date 5/6/77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TRANSFERRED TO MUSEUM

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

Mr. Vice President:

A draft of your report to President Kennedy. It has been cleared by Ambassador Bohlen and the State Department staff. Ambassador Bohlen suggests you show it to General Clay.

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MEMORANDUM

August 21, 1961

To: The President
From: The Vice President

Before discussing the questions raised in our mission, I wish to present some general observations as a background to my report.

The significance and accomplishment of our mission to Germany cannot be fully understood unless one gives proper weight to the role of public opinion in West Germany as an important factor in the shaping of German policy. Both in Bonn and in West Berlin the importance of public opinion was evident.

I felt this influence in my quiet discussions with Chancellor Adenauer no less than with Mayor Brandt in Berlin where the unprecedented demonstration of freedom has been said to have no parallel at all, unless it be in the enthusiasm and joy of Europe in the hour of its liberation in 1945, or in Berlin when the blockade was lifted.

In West Berlin I saw signs with the slogan, "Washington is closer than Bonn." Nothing would have been easier, or more destructive, than to have allowed our cause, by one word or action or indiscretion, to become entangled in the election campaign now confusing the German political scene. That risk, I believe, was successfully avoided.

From my opening statement to my message of farewell it was my constant purpose to remove doubts and anxieties about American policy in the face of the new Communist challenge. Immeasurably more important and more reassuring than any words of mine, however, was General Clay's and my presence in Germany at this difficult period as your personal representatives.

Without diminishing in any way the importance of the British and French contribution, I must emphasize that the overwhelming tendency in Germany, both among official leaders and public opinion, was to regard the present crisis as being essentially a confrontation of power between the Soviet Union and the United States.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority WDC ltr 4/19/97 State 4/2/90
By smg, NARS, Date 5/6/97

TRANSFERRED TO MUSEUM

4/18/95

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Page 2

If we failed to rise to the level of these sombre events, all would be lost, for there would be no one who could remove the sense of failure created by our default.

On this supreme issue the only valid and convincing judges must be the German people and leadership themselves. Although the record still is incomplete, the German testimony is already strong enough to justify the conclusion that we have met the present test.

We have the opportunity now, in my judgment, to present the Berlin issue in a way that will profoundly appeal to the American people. In some ways we have advantages now in Berlin that were denied to us in Europe during the war years.

The contrast between freedom and tyranny is so palpable that it is felt almost as a physical presence in the divided city. As I drove through certain streets in Berlin, people whose homes were on the border of East Berlin ran to the rear windows to throw roses on my car. When I visited the reception center for the refugees, an old lady gave me a bouquet and told me she had picked the flowers just before she had fled from East Berlin. As I looked up, I saw the ruins of a building that had been wrecked by our bombers in the war, and here was a German woman kissing my hand in gratitude. I met a little girl, five years old, who had swum to freedom across a canal separating East and West Berlin on the back of a friend, and here she was in the freedom of West Berlin.

While the whole world is watching Berlin we have a greater opportunity than we have ever had to drive home the unforgettable contrast between despotism and a free society. All of the Soviet Union's years of efforts in East Berlin have led to barbed wire and sealed borders, to empty streets and haggard stores, to tanks of oppression and fear of the people, to economic squalor and political servitude.

That is Russia's record. It is a record of shame, of repression; we should never let the Soviet Union, or the world, forget it.

~~SECRET~~

Page 3.

Colonel Johns, the commander of the troops sent by your direction to Berlin, did not know whether the convoy would be challenged at the check points. But he was determined to bring the convoy to Berlin and to do so on time. He did both.

No one who saw the arrival of our troops and the welcome they received, can ever forget the scene. Thousands of Germans cheered and waved flags of greeting; women brought flowers to our soldiers; and the sight of our heavy military equipment brought the greatest cheers of all. There could be no stronger proof that the power of America brings hope and freedom to West Berlin, while the power of the Soviet Union brings fear and oppression to East Berlin.

It is impossible at this stage to predict with certainty how long the strengthened morale of West Berlin will remain high. But at least we are now able to influence the flow of events and to influence them in ways that will cause difficulties for Communist expansion.

Your choice of General Lucius Clay for our mission was an inspired decision. His name and fame have an almost legendary power among the people of Berlin. I believe that his return to a position of responsibility in Berlin would have an immediate and immense influence in stabilizing and strengthening our whole position.

I must acknowledge, with gratitude, the steady and sage counsel of Ambassador Bohlen, and the assistance of the other members of the State Department. I must also acknowledge the numberless courtesies and constant help of Ambassador Dowling and his staff in both Bonn and Berlin. Without the devoted service of all these people, our mission could not have achieved its measure of success.

Here are my personal observations on the facts I observed and the conclusions I drew.

1. The leaders of West Berlin and West Germany are less critical of the United States than press dispatches have indicated they were. Conversations with both Chancellor Adenauer and Mayor Brandt made it clear that there is no basic disagreement on our policies toward Berlin and West Germany.

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Page 4.

2. Nevertheless, these leaders told us that there is great anxiety among the German people because of the obvious success of the Communists in shutting off the flow of refugees from East to West Germany through Berlin. The frustrating inability of the Western powers to counter this move had set off despondency in West Berlin and West Germany which could be explosive.

3. Even the most cursory inspection of the sector border makes it clear that there is no way now known to relieve the plight of those seeking escape from East Germany except by force. Physical barriers of concrete and barbed wire thoroughly policed by armed guards cover every inch of the sector border and have reduced the possibilities of flight to the absolute minimum.

4. The appearance of our group in Berlin was unquestionably successful in bolstering sagging morale and building up the faith of Berliners in the determination of the United States to stand by its commitments. At least a million people turned out voluntarily on short notice on a Saturday afternoon to wave joyously as our caravan traveled through the streets. The faces of the men and women were a study in smiles and tears of relief. There was an unmistakable outpouring of emotion and thankfulness.

5. The entry of our combat group on Sunday was equally effective in raising the morale of the people of Berlin. Our troops were greeted in an exalted mood which at times approached frenzy. The appearance of tank carriers evoked demonstrations of special intensity and consideration might be given to moving more "heavy" equipment into Berlin for its morale effect.

6. Nevertheless, we must frankly face up to the fact that there may be another letdown in spirit as the effects of the division of Berlin continue to operate. Virtually every Berliner with whom we talked has a story about families torn apart and unable to obtain information about the fate of loved ones who may be no more than a few blocks away. We must be prepared with plans for a series of moves to counter these anticipated letdowns -- possibly through further visits by high officials of the Western Alliance or by adding further to the strength of Western forces in Berlin. In addition,

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Page 5.

the problem of the refugees must be kept under continuous and constant review in a search for a workable program that will offer some hope to those who seek an escape from Communist tyranny. We seem to have convinced the people of West Berlin and West Germany that we "will hold the line." But we have not convinced them that there is any future for those who are already caught on the "wrong" side of the line.

7. Attached to this memorandum is a report on our conversations with Chancellor Adenauer and Mayor Brandt. This includes a point-by-point discussion of Mayor Brandt's letter to you and your reply to him which we delivered. These reports speak for themselves.

8. Considering, as we do, that the Communist move in Berlin is an important part of the broader conflict between the free world and the Communist bloc, rather than an isolated local event, I believe that we should continue to deal with the move primarily in the development of our overall policy for meeting the Soviet threat. This would involve principally stepping up the pace of our military preparations and exploiting this new Communist repression in our propaganda. In addition, however, we must continue to recognize the great importance of West Berlin morale, and to take the necessary steps to keep it high. My mission to Berlin and the reinforcement of our garrison in the city were successful efforts in this direction, but it is hard to tell how long this effect will last. We must, therefore, continue giving Berlin morale careful attention.

9. In addition, I believe we should discourage United States participation in the Leipzig Fair in September in support of the West German move. We should also agree to the selective ban on the issuance of Temporary Travel Documents to representatives of the Ulbricht regime as proposed by the British and supported by our other NATO allies. It is not that doing these things is terribly important, but not doing them would be, because our allies -- particularly the Germans -- would not understand our failure to take these steps.

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Page 6.

10. In summary, the mission which you sent to Germany succeeded in its primary purpose of clearing the air of misunderstandings and building up the confidence of Germans in the United States and the Western Alliance. We recovered lost ground. But we must not blind ourselves to the fact that there are further problems which cannot be solved by a show of the flag or a show of military strength. So long as the people of Berlin are physically divided, there will be doubts about Western strength and despair about the future. This is a problem which should be submitted to our best minds for careful analysis.

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August 21, 1961

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: THE VICE PRESIDENT

On August 18, you requested me to undertake a mission to Germany and West Berlin.

In this ~~letter~~ ^{memorandum}, I wish to report the successful completion of that mission and to thank you for providing me the opportunity for one of the most moving and satisfying experiences of my life.

Purpose

The main purpose of this mission was to reassure the people of West Berlin, while at the same time talking frankly with Mayor Brandt. The public statements and the letter to Mayor Brandt which we reviewed together provided general guidance for this mission. But, in addition, I was asked to speak frankly with Mayor Brandt in an effort to make it clear to him that in these next months it will be very important to avoid hasty criticism of each other.

I was also asked to observe closely the existing situation in Germany and in West Berlin so that I could advise you, on my return, of any actions which I thought it might be wise for us to take to strengthen the interests of the United States in this area.

Bonn

As you know, I left Washington on this mission on August 18, accompanied by General Clay and Ambassador Bohlen, and we arrived at Bonn on August 19.

After an exchange of greetings with Chancellor Adenauer, I drove with him the 15-20 miles to his office.

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Authority NSC 68 4/19/77, State 68 11/2/76
By mg, NARS, Date 5/6/77

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Although the road passes through only small villages, and although it was a gray, damp day, people -- who had been given very little advance notice -- lined the road all the way to town in large numbers. The cordiality and enthusiasm of their reception was heart-warming. They turned out and cheered and waved and smiled with an intensity that could result only from deep, personal feeling and to a degree that either of us would have been ecstatic over had it happened in the United States last October. Needless to say, I was aware that the acclaim was for the United States rather than for any individual.

I have attached hereto a full record of my meeting with Chancellor Adenauer, but the following are the most important points.

1. The Chancellor was very gratified by our visit.
2. He thinks recent criticism of the United States concerning Berlin is unjustified.
3. The Chancellor depreciated Mayor Brandt's letter to the President, a copy of which he had received from the Mayor. (I left a copy of your reply for Ambassador Dowling to give the Chancellor after delivery of the original to Brandt.)
4. The West Germans are taking certain unofficial measures in the counter measure field, e.g. boycotting the Leipzig Fair and severing sports connections, but they do not plan to use interzonal trade at this time because of its connection with West German access to Berlin.
5. The Chancellor said he agreed fully with all the points General Clay, Ambassador Bohlen, and I made to him.

Berlin

Our reception in Berlin was overwhelming in the full sense of the word. It is what I had in mind in saying that this mission provided one of the most moving and satisfying experiences of my life. From the time we arrived until the

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time we departed crowds estimated at a record-breaking one million lined the streets everywhere we went cheering, waving, smiling, and crying -- frequently all at the same time. And I can report on the best authority that the eyes of the members of our party did not remain wholly dry.

Our Saturday drive from Tempelhof through streets lined with crowds of waving Berliners who had been waiting in ^adrizzle for almost two hours was like a triumphant procession. People greeting the motorcade were shouting words of welcome, many of them weeping with joy. Mayor Brandt and I were mobbed as we stepped out of the car and walked part of the way.

The crowd that was assembled in the city hall square and in the streets leading to it was as large as that for the August 16 rally protesting Communist action and alleged Western inaction. The crowd was notable for the patience with which it awaited the arrival of our motorcade. I am told that several announcements about our progress from the airport to the city hall produced reactions indicating approval that our party was driving to Potsdamer Platz to look at the sector barriers and satisfaction that our progress was delayed by popular greetings. A large number of posters were on display, almost half of which were in English. Several rather chidingly

called for action: "Western Powers, Do Your Duty-Intervene;"

"More Courage for Freedom;" "Don't Put Off Until Tomorrow

What You Should Have Done Yesterday." Others said, "Don't

Let us Down;" "We Trust Our Protecting Powers;" "Washington

Is Nearer Than Bonn;" "Thank You for Coming, Mr. Johnson."

General Clay and I were greeted by the crowd with joyous emotion. My statement on arrival at the City Hall was interrupted by frequent applause. General Clay's remarks were greeted with an ovation.

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My speech in the special session of the House of Representatives also was very favorably received. The crowd outside listening to the speeches dispersed only gradually. When they were told that my departure could be expected only late at night, they took up the chant "to the balcony". When Mayor Brandt and I appeared, we were greeted by enthusiastic applause and cheers. Many people were still on hand to greet Ambassador Dowling and myself after the Rathaus dinner.

The Berliners clearly showed that they are still with us. The endless crowds who waited for hours were the real people, the little people who make up the big city. They waved to their friends, the Americans, represented by the United States Vice President and their great favorite, General Clay. They cheered the announcement of the troop reinforcement as an action beyond the symbolic. They were brought out by the knowledge that their presence would show the visitors that they still trusted the United States. But they also came to show us that we could trust them. The posters occasionally carried or the calls picked up during the cavalcade hinted, however, at an underlying anxiety for the future and dissatisfaction at the impotence of the West to prevent this new crime against their own East Berlin brothers, who like all Berliners, considered themselves among the West's most reliable allies.

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Your promptness in deciding to send our party to Berlin and in ordering reinforcements for the United States garrison provided a tremendous shot in the arm.

All indications are that it was overwhelmingly successful in restoring Berlin's morale and dispelling the mood of despair that was reportedly prevalent earlier in the week.

Mayor Brandt and Foreign Minister von Brentano said the visit will also have tremendous effect in boosting the spirits of the Germans in both West and East Germany.

I have attached hereto a full record of my meeting with Mayor Brandt, but the following are the most important points.

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My main purpose was thus accomplished. The people of West Berlin are reassured for the time being, and I have spoken frankly with Mayor Brandt as directed.

Second Task

The fulfillment of my second task to advise you of any actions it might be wise for us to take to strengthen the interests of the United States in this area is not a simple matter.

~~SECRET~~
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Report by Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson on his visit to Germany, August 19-20, 1961

In submitting my recommendations, I wish to place special emphasis on my confidential discussions with Chancellor Adenauer and Mayor Brandt, for they point to the fundamental facts which must be considered in making future decisions.

Chancellor Adenauer told me that he believes the best economic minds should undertake a thorough review of the possibilities of economic sanctions as a matter of extreme urgency. He himself has felt that we should apply sanctions and more recently has become a strong convert to this idea, but he recognizes that a proposal of this kind must be carefully considered in all its ramifications. I listened without making any commitments beyond the promise that I would place his views candidly and fully before the President.

We then discussed the issues raised by Mayor Brandt's letter to which the President had replied in a letter I was taking to West Berlin. I explained that we took the position that we had already made great sacrifices but we were prepared to make more sacrifices in co-operation with our allies. I added that the United States had acted decisively in the present situation and can be seen from the President's policy of sending the Vice-President and General Clay to Bonn and Berlin, and directing that additional reinforcements, with their equipment, should be sent to West Berlin. Our arrival, and the arrival of the men and machines, would be almost simultaneous.

I emphasized the importance to us all of receiving greater support and assistance from the British, the French and the Germans. I said I realized that in days past the Germans had operated under a good many restrictions -- economic, fiscal, legal and military -- but it was necessary now to consider this whole problem in a new context.

I said there was great wisdom for us in our present predicament in remembering the proverb which tells us that where there is a will, there always is a way. We must

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NSC 11-25-82 Letter re NLS-80-82

~~SECRET~~

By icv

NARS, Date 2-9-82

~~SECRET~~
COPY

No. 2

have the will and we must find the way.

Chancellor Adenauer listened to my statement of this case with the utmost attention. He then told me that he was prepared to extend the period for military conscription in West Germany but the announcement of this new policy would come after the election. ~~He also said he would agree to increase the number of Germans in military service, provided some of the restrictions mentioned by me would be removed.~~ He explained that Defense Minister Strauss had discussed some of these questions in detail with Mr. McNamara.

I replied that the American people would support our commitments with all our national power and all our national resources if only they did not feel that they were being asked to bear an unfair and totally disproportionate burden. They would resent being placed in a position in which there would in effect be a unilateral American commitment when there should be a common determination to carry a shared burden.

Chancellor Adenauer understood this point very clearly. I then explained to Chancellor Adenauer that some of President Kennedy's major problems now arose over the struggle for funds for the mutual security program. An important part of these funds were directly related to Berlin and to the German situation. I added that some of the strongest criticism of the President's program came from the rather sizeable group in this country that were opposed to the American people doing so much more than other nations.

I said that anything more which could be done by Germany, France and Britain should be done; and it should be done quickly. ~~I~~ suggested that one immediate measure which would be helpful would be to increase the number of West German police and to give them additional training.

Chancellor Adenauer said he recognized that Germany could not expect America to carry a bigger burden without herself being ready for greater sacrifices.

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COPY

No. 3

On Saturday, August 19, I addressed the House of Representatives of West Berlin. Immediately following that address I had my most significant private discussion with Mayor Brandt.

He was somewhat apologetic about his letter to the President and regretted that its contents had been given unauthorized publication in the Federal Republic, a disclosure for which he said he was not responsible. I said it did not add lustre to our cause to have our own allies writing critical letters to the President of the United States and putting him to the public question. I then remarked that I had not come to Berlin to debate the past but to reason together with him in quiet co-operation.

Mayor Brandt responded quickly to this approach and I got the clear impression that he was a chastened person, subject to one important exception; he seemed convinced that his letter, with all its faults, had at least moved American policy off dead center.

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

1. Since the United States has committed itself to a course of negotiation to settle the Berlin crisis, the problem arises of determining just what kind of a negotiated settlement would be acceptable.
2. This is not a problem which can be answered by trying to determine Khrushchev's objectives. Reading the communist mind has been one of the great indoor sports in the Western World for the past 40 years. A few people claim some success at it but since so many guesses are made each day, a few of them are bound to be correct just on the law of averages. The only safe assumption about the communist leadership is that it seeks to take over the world and this is not very useful as a guide to conduct in a specific crisis.
3. A safer guide is to determine the vital interests and irrevocable commitments of the United States and the vital interests and irrevocable commitments of the Soviet Union. This is not an absolutely safe guide because either side might make a misjudgment and there is no way of knowing whether Khrushchev might have decided to go beyond safeguarding his vital interests even at the risk of war. But there is no other way of reducing the situation to a point where logical analysis is possible.
4. In terms of Berlin, the United States has already signified what it considers to be its vital interests and its irrevocable commitments. This was made clear when the United States permitted the erection of the wall dividing Berlin but rushed troops to the wall. This was a move of great significance because the easy access of Germans from East Berlin to West Berlin had been a tremendous source of weakness to the communist world. By rushing troops to the wall, the United States said it would fight against being pushed out of a geographical position already held. But by permitting the wall to be put up in the first place, the United States also said that it would NOT fight just to keep in being a source of weakness to the communist world. In short, we have determined that our only vital interest is to stay where we are and our only irrevocable commitment is to defend the people already behind our lines.

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By smg, NARS, Date 4/5/77

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5. This places a limitation upon our negotiating ability. The world knows when and under what circumstances we will fight. Similar knowledge concerning Khrushchev is not available. His only irrevocable commitment thus far is to sign a treaty that will make East Germany a sovereign state (at least in the formal sense.) How far he will go beyond that, we do not know. He knows our boiling point and we don't know his.

6. However, if Khrushchev really wants to settle the Berlin situation, it is a reasonable assumption that he will agree to something just under our boiling point. From his standpoint, the trick of negotiation is to find an area where he gains something substantial without pushing us over the line into war. The history of the past few months suggests that there are two things which he absolutely must have:

- a) The permanent division of Germany with East Germany established as a communist state.
- b) The closing of the escape routes from East to West Germany.

7. These objectives could be accomplished by his merely signing a treaty with East Germany and maintaining the wall through Berlin. In order to keep us below our boiling point, he could guarantee our access routes to Berlin (or even let us have access to Berlin without making a point of it by putting the guarantee in writing.) But actually, this would not be a very satisfactory settlement from his point of view. It would leave Berlin divided and while it is to Khrushchev's interests to have Germany divided, the division of Berlin could be a real source of trouble. It is one thing to divide a nation; another thing altogether to divide a city. A city can be kept divided only by constant police action on a truly colossal scale. Furthermore, a line running through a city is certain to divide thousands of families and cut across close, personal ties. Such a division is bound to create tensions even beyond those considered tolerable in a communist state. Under any circumstances, a city offers a disaffected population innumerable opportunities for sabotage, subversion and acts of individual terrorism. These can be kept under control when the whole city is policed by one force. It is doubtful whether the controls will work when the people in the disaffected part of the city are separated from their kinsmen only by a thin dividing line.

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8. From a dispassionate viewpoint, there would appear to be two ways in which the communists could solve the problem of Berlin -- either by taking it over altogether or by pulling out altogether. Strangely enough, either course would serve their purposes. The importance of Berlin to the communists rests not in its real estate and only secondarily in its symbolism. The real importance of Berlin lies in the fact that it affords an easy escape route to the West which can be cut off under present circumstances only by Herculean efforts. It would be simpler to shut off that escape route by pulling out of Berlin altogether and sealing off the city from East Germany.

9. Khrushchev, of course, has enough prestige at stake that he would not pull out of Berlin without receiving something really important in return. About the only thing the United States could possibly give would be formal recognition of East Germany. In effect, we would trade East Germany for all of Berlin. The situation then would be:

- a) We would have agreed to a permanently divided Germany.
- b) Khrushchev would have agreed to leave Berlin in the Western camp.
- c) We would have brought about one and one-half million people under freedom who do not have it now.
- d) But we would also have agreed to abandon about 16,000,000 Germans to the communists (at least until the next crisis).

10. Under other circumstances, this would be a deal that would be difficult to justify. But the fact remains that we have already announced to the world (by permitting the erection of the wall) that we are not going to fight to liberate the East Germans anyway. The best we can possibly hope for after such an announcement is to preserve the status quo. An agreement along the lines stated above would preserve the status quo. Both we and the communists would be relieved of the problems and tensions arising out of a divided Berlin. At the same time, both sides would have received some important, face-saving concessions.

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11. There is no way of knowing, of course, whether Khrushchev would accede to such an arrangement. Perhaps communist ambitions have gone beyond the status quo and closing the escape routes. If so, there is nothing we can do but prepare to surrender or fight. But if there is a willingness on his part to achieve a degree of stability, the above is a possibility that should be considered. It would be difficult to negotiate such an arrangement. But it is even more difficult to conceive of alternatives.

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Report by Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson on his visit to Germany, August 19-20, 1961

In submitting my recommendations, I wish to place special emphasis on my confidential discussions with Chancellor Adenauer and Mayor Brandt, for they point to the fundamental facts which must be considered in making future decisions.

Chancellor Adenauer told me that he believes the best economic minds should undertake a thorough review of the possibilities of economic sanctions as a matter of extreme urgency. He himself has felt that we should apply sanctions and more recently has become a strong convert to this idea, but he recognizes that a proposal of this kind must be carefully considered in all its ramifications. I listened without making any commitments beyond the promise that I would place his views candidly and fully before the President.

We then discussed the issues raised by Mayor Brandt's letter to which the President had replied in a letter I was taking to West Berlin. I explained that we took the position that we had already made great sacrifices but we were prepared to make more sacrifices in cooperation with our allies. I added that the United States had acted decisively in the present situation and can be seen from the President's policy of sending the Vice-President and General Clay to Bonn and Berlin, and directing that additional reinforcements, with their equipment, should be sent to West Berlin. Our arrival, and the arrival of the men and machines, would be almost simultaneous.

I emphasized the importance to us all of receiving greater support and assistance from the British, the French and the Germans. I said I realized that in days past the Germans had operated under a good many restrictions -- economic, fiscal, legal and military -- but it was necessary now to consider this whole problem in a new context.

I said there was great wisdom for us in our present predicament in remembering the proverb which tells us that where there is a will, there always is a way. We must

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Chancellor Adenauer listened to my statement of this case with the utmost attention. He then told me that he was prepared to extend the period for military conscription in West Germany but the announcement of this new policy would come after the election. He ~~also said he would agree to increase the number of Germans in military service, provided some of the restrictions mentioned by me could be removed.~~ He explained that Defense Minister Strauss had discussed some of these questions in detail with Mr. McNamara.

I replied that the American people would support our commitments with all our national power and all our national resources if only they did not feel that they were being asked to bear an unfair and totally disproportionate burden. They would resent being placed in a position in which there would in effect be a unilateral American commitment when there should be a common determination to carry a shared burden.

Chancellor Adenauer understood this point very clearly. I then explained to Chancellor Adenauer that some of President Kennedy's major problems now arose over the struggle for funds for the mutual security program. An important part of these funds were directly related to Berlin and to the German situation. I added that some of the strongest criticism of the President's program came from the rather sizeable group in this country that were opposed to the American people doing so much more than other nations.

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August 20, 1961

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants

Governing Mayor Brandt
Mayor Amrehn
Herr Albertz
Dr. Walter Klein

Ambassador Dowling
Ambassador Bohlen
Mr. Lightner

Subject: Berlin Situation

Place of Meeting: The Mayor's Office in the Rathaus, Berlin

Date of Meeting: August 20, 1961

The Governing Mayor said that the Vice-President had brought with the President's greetings some important comments that he would like to mention. He noted that the increase in the garrison was not only symbolic but itself was a substantive answer to the demands of the other side for us to get out of Berlin. The Mayor said that the question of the Allies' asserting three-power responsibility for West Berlin had been raised. He believed it was important that this should be carried out in a way that did not prejudice our four-power position. The Mayor referred to the success of the Vice-President's visit but said that despite this boost the psychological shock resulting from what had happened last Sunday showed that fear of a weakening of the connections with the West could have a great effect on the morale of the people of West Berlin. Referring to the role and tasks of West Berlin in preparing for the future, the Mayor said that some days or weeks would be required to come up with some ideas. He welcomed the offer of the U.S. government to discuss new problems and their solution. The Mayor also noted that the question of referring to the U.N. the East Zone's violations of human rights in Berlin was also under study.

With respect to a plebiscite, which the President had also mentioned, Brandt said that this had been discussed here with representatives of the Federal Republic several weeks ago and the thought was that a proposal for a plebiscite for all of Germany might be useful at some time; it would of course be answered in the negative by the other side but then this might be followed by having a plebiscite in Berlin. Of course different questions would be asked for a Berlin plebiscite. In this connection Brandt mentioned that there was a draft law on the books

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By mmg, NARS, Date 4/5/77

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in Berlin that authorized a plebiscite and that this law could be passed on very short notice; a plebiscite of this kind should be carefully timed as it could only be used once. Mr. Bohlen commented that the President did not have in mind a plebiscite for a fixed date but was thinking of something that would be useful in negotiations. For example, it might be useful if just before negotiations a plebiscite were held in Berlin in which the Berliners were asked whether they preferred the existing situation to the "Free City" proposed by the Communists.

After noting the strong feeling of confidence in the city aroused by the Vice-President's visit, Brandt said he understood that the President takes the view that no other means will be used to try to change conditions created last Sunday; that other measures were considered unproductive and might only lead to counter-measures by the other side. Mr. Bohlen agreed and said it was felt that other measures would not bring about the unsealing of the city and might indeed lead to a serious reaction by the other side; if economic counter-measures were imposed we would be stuck with them indefinitely. Mr. Bohlen went on to say that in our view this was not the real Berlin crisis; that will come only when the Russians try to interfere with the rights of the Allied powers. Therefore, Mr. Bohlen said, the President concluded that the actions that had been taken, that is, the strengthening of the garrison and the visit of the Vice-President, were sufficient at the present time. They were not only symbolic but expressed our determination to maintain our commitments. Mr. Bohlen then asked the Mayor what actions he anticipated the Soviets might take in the immediate future.

Brandt replied that he was trying to decide which of two conflicting theories was the right one: (1) now that the refugee flow had been stopped, the other side would not be in a hurry to press its demands on Berlin; (2) as a result of its successful action, the East Germans would follow up speedily with new actions. Brandt said he was more inclined to the latter point of view. He referred to the tone and content of Ulbricht's statements during the past week which sounded as though he had conquered the USA and expressed in harsh and jubilant terms his further demands with respect to Berlin. On the other hand, ^{Brandt} ~~he~~ believed it was quite possible that the Russians would not make a direct move before negotiations took place. Ambassador Dowling said he felt we would face further moves to seal off the East-West Berlin sector border but that he doubted that Allied traffic would be touched.

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Mayor Amrehn said that he regretted he had not been present during the conversation with the Vice-President in the morning. He felt that everybody in the city had been encouraged by the Vice-President's visit and by the arrival of the troops but he felt we should keep in mind why the Berliners were so discouraged after the events of August 13. It was not just because the sector border had been closed; there was a real fear that something would soon take place that would affect West Berlin's communications with the West. Mayor Amrehn felt that Mr. Bohlen's remarks failed to take into account that the Russians might soon take further steps. With respect to the question of making a declaration on the three-power status of West Berlin Mayor Amrehn felt this might be very dangerous as it could weaken the continuing, basic ~~and~~ four-power status. Regarding the suggestions for referring matters to the U.N., Mayor Amrehn believed it should be possible to separate the Berlin problem from what has been happening in the Zone. The latter should be brought to the attention of the U.N. On the plebiscite he commented that while it might be possible for the three Allies to get some advantage prior to negotiations out of a Berlin plebiscite he thought that this advantage would be a small one as a result of what had happened last Sunday.

On the subject of counter-measures Mayor Amrehn said it was not clear to him why no other measures were considered possible. We were saving the economic measures for some more serious event but Mayor Amrehn doubted whether such measures would be strong enough if the access route to the West should be closed. What troubled him was that people were now asking: if no counter-measures are possible now, what will be done when the route to West Germany is closed? Mayor Amrehn believed it was possible that the traffic to the West might not be closed down suddenly but gradually, by a series of ever-increasing harrassments and controls that would hamper free traffic but would not be severe enough to result in a closure. He believed it was important to plan carefully just what would be done in the circumstances. He mentioned increasing demands that the East had made in the last week, indicating that we might expect no let up. He referred to the GDR's demand that no Federal Republic flags be flown in West Berlin; that Federal Minister Lemmer must go (which probably foreshadowed a demand that no Federal Minister be permitted to proceed to West Berlin). If things kept on, Mayor Amrehn predicted, there might be renewed uncertainty and uneasiness leading to a serious reduction in orders for Berlin industry and we might face a real problem.

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Mr. Bohlen felt that some of the points that Mayor Amrehn had mentioned involved Allied rights, which he believed the Soviets would not interfere with at this time. The possibility of harassment of civilian traffic on the autobahn was more likely, but the counter-action for such moves seemed to be fairly clearly indicated; the GDR would be clearly guilty of a breach of agreements and it would be logical that the Federal Republic might invoke counter-measures involving the inter-zonal trade agreement (IZT). Mayor Amrehn warned that the opportunities for using the IZT as a weapon were rapidly diminishing; the GDR right now has DM 100 million credit and cannot fulfill deliveries; quotas are already exhausted. In short, the use of this counter-measure could only be as part of a package and not considered as a weapon in itself.

Mr. Bohlen, referring to the U.N., said that it would be unproductive to introduce any aspect of the Berlin problem in the U.N. right now, on the very eve of the Tunisian debate. The neutrals, i.e., Afro-Asians, were very emotional about Bizerta and one could not expect a rational reaction from them; the issue of self-determination for Berlin would get all mixed up. Nevertheless, the U.S. government had this question under continuing consideration. Mr. Bohlen added that an issue involving violation of human rights in the Soviet Zone should preferably be brought up in a broader context, since human rights were also being violated in other bloc countries in Eastern Europe. As far as the three-power status matter was concerned, Mr. Bohlen said that there was no intention of having this such a formal thing that it would undermine the basic four-power status. Mayor Amrehn suggested that three-power status was something that existed in practice but need not be proclaimed.

Mr. Bohlen reassured Mayor Amrehn that the United States would regard the introduction of a Berlin blockade, even by salami tactics, as very serious indeed. Anything that affected the Allied presence, Allied access or the access and economic ties between West Berlin and Western Germany and the free world would be the subject of a strong reaction by us. Nevertheless, Mr. Bohlen continued that it would be hard to say in advance just what we would do in every contingency. With respect to the events of last Sunday, Mr. Bohlen said that Washington expected something of this kind would happen if the refugee flow continued; of course no one was sure just when or how the East would act. We understood why the Berliners felt as they did but frankly we had been surprised that the reaction in Berlin had been so strong. Mr. Bohlen felt that in the coming months we would probably face a further consolidation of the division of the city. However, we should make a distinction between actions that stemmed from the East sector and those that involved our access to the West. Mayor Amrehn

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injected that the trouble was that if we took no counter-measures with respect to what was happening within Berlin the other side might be encouraged to take steps in other directions. In that connection he said he understood that a full trade embargo was contemplated if allied traffic were interfered with. This would take such a long time (three months) to become effective that the other side, said the Mayor, would not be likely to be impressed. Mr. Bohlen assured the Mayor that an embargo was only part of what might be done in those circumstances. In any case it would be possible to mount it in less than three months. He reiterated that it was useless to try to specify exactly in advance what would be done; that one difficulty in taking prompt action was the necessity for consultation with our Allies, but there was nothing that could be done about that. Mr. Bohlen pointed out that the President was determined not to permit any inroads affecting the three essential points referred to above, regarding maintaining Allied presence, Allied access and West Berlin's viability and contact with the West.

EALightnerJr.

Enclosure:

Mayor Brandt's comments on the Four Power status
(translation of paper handed to Ambassador Dowling Aug. 20, 1961)

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Comments on the Four Power Status

- 1.) Excerpt from letter to President Kennedy of Aug. 15, 1961:

"....In this situation I consider it proper that the Western Powers, while demanding reestablishment of Four Power responsibilities, proclaim at the same time a Three Power status for West Berlin. The Three Powers should reiterate the guarantee of their presence in West Berlin until German reunification and, if necessary, have this supported by a plebiscite of the population in West Berlin and the Federal Republic...."

- 2.) Excerpt from the speech before the Schoeneberg City Hall on August 16, 1961:

"It is one matter that the Allies accuse the Soviets of a breach of the Four Power agreements on Berlin and quite rightly demand the retraction of the illegal measures. On the other hand, the Four Power agreements torn up by the Soviets must not be made the yardstick of what is possible and necessary in West Berlin. (Free translation: "It is one thing for the Allies to protest to the Soviets on the breach of Four Power agreements on Berlin. It is another thing, however, for these broken agreements to determine what could and should be done in West Berlin.")

"From now on we should let ourselves be guided by the interests of free Berlin and of the Protecting Powers responsible for our security."

- 3.) Excerpt from the speech before the German Bundestag on Aug. 18, 1961:

"....It must be forcefully pointed out to the Government of the USSR, how dangerous it is to insist on breaching the Four Power agreements. However, the Four Power agreements torn up by the USSR, must not become a self-imposed hindrance to the West when actions are necessary in the interests of Berlin as a part of free Germany. The bonds between the FedRep and West Berlin must not be loosened, rather they must be tightened...."

- 4.) Before the Foreign Press Association in Bonn, August 18, 1961:

"Several unclear points must be eliminated.

"First, there is no doubt that the Western Powers have to demand the reinstatement of the Four Power status. This they have done in their protests.

"Second, we must attempt to prevent the Soviets from making demands on West Berlin through false invocation of the Four Power

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Memorandum of Conversation

August 20, 1961
Ambassador's Residence
Berlin, Germany

Participants

The Vice President
Ambassador Dowling
Ambassador Bohlen
General Clay

Mayor Brandt

The Vice President said that the President had received Mayor Brandt's letter and given it careful consideration, and in consultation with his closest advisers had drawn up a reply which he would now give to Mayor Brandt. He suggested that Mayor Brandt should read it and let him have his reaction either now or later.

Mayor Brandt read the letter carefully and said that he was most grateful for the courtesy of the President in the promptness of his reply. He added that he was most unhappy that his letter had been published through a leak. Ambassador Dowling said that a Frankfurt newspaper had published the text yesterday.

Mayor Brandt said that he had given a copy of his letter to Chancellor Adenauer and it was very regrettable that the letter had been published and the source of the leak was being investigated. He stated that he hoped that the President's answer would be kept confidential. He stated that he had asked in his letter for political action and he still did. He said political action was a broad term and, for example, the decision to strengthen the Berlin garrison was also political action. He said it was important to prevent further steps by the East Zone regime, saying that Ulbricht's speech on Friday had stressed high and dangerous self-confidence.

He said he had found arguments of the French and British representatives and this was a sign of East German weakness, but that this view seemed better abroad than in Berlin. In Berlin it was disadvantageous since the East regime's action was regarded as a demonstration of Communist power.

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Authority NSC 11-25-81 Letter to NSC 80-82
By icv, NARS, Date 2-9-82

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He said that what happened last Sunday was more than the stopping of the refugees, inhuman as that was. He said the Warsaw Pact communique gave an international status to the East German regime even before the peace treaty. The West has no voice in East Germany or in East Berlin. He said it was not enough, as some commentators had remarked, that the action had only internal Communist meaning and represented no change in the West's position. He thought that the 13th of August could play a very great role in future German developments. He did not know yet exactly what they would be. He felt that West Berlin would have to adjust to the new circumstances. Formerly, the "living bridge" had offered hope for the future. Now West Berlin would have to lead an isolated existence but it still could play a role which, however, would take some time to size up and reorient the population. He felt that Berlin should be developed into a model city -- more industry and more schools. He said there was a great deal to be done in order to avoid a loss of confidence in the future of the city. He said it would be necessary to do a number of things quite apart from the mere Allied presence to strengthen the bonds with the Federal Republic; the use of experts in the Federal Republic, tax privileges and similar matters. He mentioned that the cooperation referred to in the President's letter was much appreciated. He added that there was no time to go into details, but that this matter would be discussed with the Western Ambassadors here.

He said we would have to understand the feelings of the people of West Berlin based in some measure on the lack of communication with their friends and relatives across the sector barrier. He said it would be necessary to start from scratch and this was what he had had in mind in his letter in his reference to the three power status. He had a memorandum on this subject which he would give to Ambassador Dowling which would explain what he had in mind. He felt the four power status was now only theoretical and we should not be limited in our action in Berlin by a non-operative status. He mentioned in this connection Khrushchev's reference to the possibility of Soviet troops in West Berlin as a case in point. He went on to say that in West Berlin there had actually been a three power status since 1948, and that West Berlin had been under it since that date. What he had meant in his letter was

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that we should not be limited in our action by a moribund four power status. He repeated that since the split of August 13 West Berlin would only live in the closest connection with West Germany. He wished to emphasize that he was not asking for a constitutional change and that merely in practice we should be guided by the realities.

Mayor Brandt then referred to the question of United Nations action which was referred to both in his letter and the President's reply. He realized that the value of United Nations discussions was doubtful. But he felt that whatever our wishes, the General Assembly, which was to begin on September 19, would at some time or other take up the question of Berlin and Germany. He recalled that the Paris meeting of Foreign Ministers had asked the United Nations Representatives, assisted by the German observer, to make suggestions on this point. He said his idea was for the West powers to be in good position in advance to take the initiative. This should not be left to others. He felt that Western initiative was preferable in order to influence world opinion. He felt that this initiative was going to be valuable before the Belgrade Neutralists Meeting. He said that the Indian representative here had given him the impression that he could count on some Indian support, and that the Swedes, for humanitarian reasons, might be counted on. He repeated that he knew that the United Nations was a difficult problem, but that the subject would come up in any case. He said he thought it was important to pay attention to world opinion in addition to military measures which were being contemplated.

In the diplomatic field, Mayor Brandt felt that the Western delay in their protests had created a very unfavorable opinion. He had told Western Commandants that they should make a quick protest here, to be followed up speedily by one in Moscow. But this had required several days since each Commandant had to refer to his government. The government protests to Moscow had taken even more time. He felt that it would have been better to have taken up the governmental protests with the members of the Warsaw Pact as well.

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The Vice President stated that he found Mayor Brandt's remarks very pertinent. He said the President fully understood how deeply he and the people of West Berlin felt, despite the disadvantage of distance and the fact that they were of different racial origins. He said that this reflected in our decision to send additional troops into Berlin. He pointed out that democracies are always slow and that our policies are not as rapid as we would like to have them. The President considers the Berlin situation most serious and is of the opinion that it will become more serious. The President felt it most important that they all, Mayor Brandt and the authorities of West Germany, and all our allies, understand each other completely and above all, should not permit any differences to become public, but to discuss them privately and confidentially. He said that there were two things the President had done. In the first place, there was the troop reinforcement, and secondly, his trip here meant more than anything that could be said. Mayor Brandt had asked for action and that these were actions. He pointed out that the Administration had only been in power for six months and that there had been new faces in the government and that many actions had already been taken.

He referred to the increase in our military posture, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and that some \$7 billion had been added to defense appropriations.

In regard to the United Nations matter, he had been much interested in Mayor Brandt's views but that the President's views on this subject had been set forth in his reply. He stated that we had not come to Berlin to indulge in any criticism, but to obtain a better picture of the situation. He would wish to emphasize the importance the President attached to keeping our differences to ourselves and to our working together as closely as possible.

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Mayor Brandt asked the Vice President to please tell the President that he had not meant to criticize in his letter, but that the Wednesday meeting had been extremely difficult and that to have gone to this meeting with empty hands would have been impossible for him. He said he had always realized that the Western guarantees still stand, and that he had said so. He expressed regret if his letter had been read as an expression of lack of confidence in the United States.

20. The Vice President stated that the President understood very well the feelings of the people of West Berlin and of their leaders. He pointed out that the President had the continual task of making the American public understand the seriousness of the situation. He said, for example, that many young men were being taken away from their peaceful pursuits in order to join the armed forces, and that where this was being done it was sometimes difficult to explain to the people why there was criticism of the United States from our friends and allies. The President fully understood Mayor Brandt's desire for action rather than words and repeated the importance of our understanding each other and staying close together.

Mayor Brandt said that he would like to make one additional point. He said he understood the problems of the United States and that he had not asked for economic sanctions, but that Chancellor Adenauer had called for these. He said that the Chancellor had taken conflicting positions on the subject of negotiations. He had first said that there should be no negotiations on the threat, and then later had come out for negotiations, which gave the implication that threat was less important than blackmail. On the subject of negotiations, he had thought since the Vienna meeting between President Kennedy and Khrushchev that a larger group, i. e., a peace conference, might clarify the issues and convince a larger number of other countries. It had been said that nothing could come out of this and he felt that a larger conference might be helpful with world opinion.

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He said that for the German people the recent events might mean the end of the unification dream. It was very important to the Western powers, and especially the United States, that this matter should be approached realistically and that clarity was essential. He felt that this aspect of the matter should be kept under careful consideration.

The Vice President said that General Clay had come along at the special request of the President because he was known to be an outstanding American and a friend of Germany. General Clay said that he had little to add to what the Vice President had already said and that he could only state that the United States was with the West Germans.

Mr. Bohlen said that all he had to add was to mention the fact that in regard to taking the Berlin events to the United Nations, he would bear in mind that there was to be a special United Nations General Assembly on the question of Tunis on Monday; and that the sentiments of the Afro-Asian group on this subject would inevitably become mixed up with any consideration of the Berlin question. He recalled the great difficulties in 1948 under conditions of actual blockade and that while the possibility of the utilization of the United Nations was under constant consideration in Washington, it was the general opinion, as indicated in the President's letter, that to try to do it now would inevitably get the question of Berlin mixed up with general anti-colonial feeling because of the Tunis issue.

There was some discussion at this point of the various methods of bringing the question to the United Nations, with Mayor Brandt pointing out that in 1951 the question of Germany was brought up in the Human Rights Committee.

The meeting then broke up in order to permit the Vice President and Mayor Brandt to proceed to the greeting point for the incoming U. S. troops.

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By Amc, NARS, Date 4/5/77

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Eastern-sponsored. "Der Siegel", an influential but destructive news magazine, will carry tomorrow the story of America's alleged betrayal of Berlin. It will state that Mr. McCloy and Khrushchev have agreed to the action of August 13 in advance; and the story will be believed by many readers, because they can not fathom that America would otherwise allow itself to be humiliated by the contemptible East Germans, as has happened. When the illegal GDR forces took over without interference territory under Four-power jurisdiction. Had the Soviets sealed the border, it would have been different, but East Germans - this is humiliation; it must have been agreed upon.

The people I talked to almost all thought that the one action still possible, which could restore the situation, was an American move against the physical obstacles on the sector border. For example, army engineers could remove the barbed wire; troops should cover them and move through the breach and on until encountered by Russians. The chances that the East Germans would fight ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ were considered minimal. They would probably desert in droves. This move could possibly reopen the portals or at least restore faith that the Americans will not let themselves be pushed around. It would also bring the Soviets back into Four-power responsibility restoring the legal and moral situation.

Another move was suggested for possibly opening the barriers: a Four-power conference should be called immediately for the discussion of any of the subjects on the international agenda. The conference should be called in Berlin but, of course, the Soviets must be told that the illegal barbed wire and the walls must come down before the conference could take place.

Another proposal: 1) the Western Allies should send a note to the Soviets demanding return to Four-power status. There would be no international conference until then; 2) in the meantime there would be no temporary travel documents issued by the tripartite Allied travel office in West Berlin nor any visas issued by NATO countries for East German travel (tomorrow, for example, a GDR holiday ship is leaving for England, Italy and Greece); 4) the interzonal trade agreement would be made ineffective by such measures as selective slowdowns or labor unions' refusal to handle GDR goods.

A further suggestion emerged, sparked by General Clay's presence. It was regarded as highly desirable, almost vital, to have a very able and very high-ranking man stationed in West Berlin as top American commander. He would need a direct line ~~with~~ to the White House, and should be sufficiently high in rank as to be able to make on the spot decisions.

Obviously all suggestions had flaws. This was recognized during the conversation but it was emphasized again and again that waiting for the next slice of salami to be removed - which

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again would not offer us a line to stand on - was more dangerous than action now. America must realize that it had been seriously humiliated. It had some chances to recover but every week lessened the possibilities. The last days had strengthened the vile Ulbricht regime immensely and nothing attracts more than success. What sputnik had been for the primitive people, the 13th of August may some day become for the Germans. It has all the makings of becoming just this.

The above report is not an encouraging one but it is an effort to reflect the gist of a number of lengthy and rather emotional statements made during a number of conversations

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NSC 11-25-81 letter

By ics

NARS, Date

2-9-82

Memorandum of Conversation

Bonn Germany
August 19, 1961
12:40 P.M.
Palais Schaumburg

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Participants

American

The Vice President
Secretary Connally
General Gay
Ambassador Bohlen
Ambassador Dowling
Mr. Cash

German

Chancellor Adenauer
Foreign Minister von Brentano
State Secretary Globke
Ambassador von Braun
Ambassador von Etzdorf
Ambassador Duckwitz
Mr. Weber (Interpreter)

The Chancellor began the discussion by saying how grateful he was to have the Vice President and his party in Bonn. He continued by saying that he felt strongly that recent reproaches of the U. S. Administration and especially President Kennedy were completely unjustified. He added that the reproaches were directed against the U.S., U.K., and France, but that they began in the United States. He quoted a New York Herald Tribune article saying that the greatest handicap the Western Allies have is their inability to agree among themselves. The more we are told, the article continued, about the unity of the West, the more disunity grows.

The Chancellor said that the unrest among the German people caused by the shock of the recent acts of the Ulbricht regime had now diminished. The initial impact had been heightened by the fact that the people had not been prepared for these developments. It was vacation time, during which they did not pay much attention to what was in the papers, and thus they have been taken by surprise.

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He said that on the 18th of August he had addressed a crowd of 7,000 in Essen and outlined for them a realistic picture of the world situation. It was a CDU rally, but some SPD supporters were present and heckled him at the start. He had told the crowd that we live in a period of nuclear weapons and had explained the effects such weapons can produce. He had said that we were at the start of a period of very important and serious negotiations, which must take place, but only after military preparations, as the Russians respect only military strength.

He had told the crowd what gratitude Germans owe the U. S. He had added that it was unjust to express doubt that the U. S. would honor its pledges. Instead, the Germans must stand firmly beside the U. S.

The crowd had understood and had applauded him as seldom before.

The Chancellor assured the Vice President that in the month remaining in the current election campaign his party would take the line that the West must negotiate seriously with Khrushchev because the latter does not want a war in which, as he knows, there would be no victors. Khrushchev wants negotiations instead.

He said that the Federal Republic would not flinch in its loyalty to the Atlantic Treaty or in its loyalty to the U. S. He asked the Vice President not to form any firm opinion until he had had a chance to see the present situation in Germany and Berlin for himself.

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In facing a difficult situation such as that we face today, it is especially important to consider emotional and psychological factors, and it was, therefore, exceedingly helpful that President Kennedy had sent to Germany the Vice President and General Clay, who is still so well remembered.

The Chancellor said that the real situation in Germany was reflected in the warm, friendly, enthusiastic greeting the Vice President had received from the hundreds of people who had lined the route all along the long drive from Wahn airport into Bonn. He said he had noted only one critical sign held by an elderly spinster which read "Action, not words." He added with a smile that he had taken a second look at the spinster and decided that he wanted neither words, nor action, with her.

He said he had no doubt that the Vice President would receive in Berlin the same warm, cordial reception from all the people, and inasmuch as Berlin was much larger than Bonn, the welcome would seem even more overwhelming. He had made the same drive from Wahn to Bonn in 1959 with President Eisenhower when there was the same picture of happy people showing great joy, friendship, and real cordiality which was the result of the deep and warm respect they had for the United States.

The Vice President said he appreciated the reception he had received very much. The Chancellor's visit to the U. S. in April was still fresh in the Vice President's mind, and the warm reception given the Chancellor was evidence of high regard for his leadership as well as friendship for the German people.

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In hours of trial, he continued, all nations have some people who get excited and sometimes say and do things that are not wise. However, this is only the initial response, and it comes only from isolated groups and individuals who don't represent the majority.

It is important to realize, he added, that we are not going to solve these difficulties overnight. We must prepare for a series of actions like the recent Berlin developments, which are only an example of what we can expect.

The new U. S. Administration is only six months old, the Vice President continued, and it has had to face many new and old problems. The President has felt that he should call upon Congress and the people to prepare more diligently and effectively -- at great cost to the U. S. taxpayer -- to meet the vast U. S. responsibilities in all parts of the world. The response has been one of faith and encouragement. The President had recently requested the largest preparedness appropriation ever sought except in time of war, and Congress had given him even more than he had asked. There was, therefore, no lack of concern, or preparation, or action on the part of the U. S. Government or any lack of faith in its allies.

The Vice President said the President was very anxious to communicate to the Chancellor and the German people American concern over the unpleasant developments of the last few days. Since he was unable to leave the country at this time, he had asked the Vice President to do so. Knowing the confidence

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reposed in General Clay, the President had requested him to accompany the Vice President. It was felt that there should be no lack of faith when General Clay appeared, as it was well known that he would never advocate retreat.

The Vice President hoped the current visit to Germany would cheer the people and strengthen their morale as well as stimulate the U. S. and Federal Governments to march forward shoulder-to-shoulder. President Kennedy properly felt that this visit would say more than all the words that could be used or any response that could be made by letter, although the Vice President was carrying a letter to Mayor Brandt in response to one he wrote the President.

The President recognizes and appreciates the statesman-like approach the Chancellor takes to our mutual problems. He has great respect for his judgment.

The President sent the Vice President, the Secretary of the Navy, General Clay, and Ambassador Bohlen to make it clear that the U. S. was proceeding expeditiously with a comprehensive program of military and economic assistance to other nations of the world, and that the U. S. has accelerated the call to arms of both men and production and expanded its scientific and space efforts to the extent that the President has requested much more money than President Eisenhower -- or even President Kennedy -- had thought would be necessary. The U. S. has called up men, expanded production, increased its military assistance program, and concentrated on military preparation, all of which can properly be regarded as recognition of necessity for action. We

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want the German people to know what we are doing and to assure them that we are not unaware of developments in Germany and not unconcerned about them. The German people can be sure the U. S. will keep its pledges and honor its commitments, of which the Vice President knew the Chancellor had no doubt.

The U. S. program is supported unanimously by both parties.

The Chancellor said he greatly appreciated the support of the President and Congress.

Regarding the letter from Mayor Brandt, the Chancellor would not have sent such a letter containing some impossible and impractical proposals.

The Federal Government had quite naturally considered using interzonal trade as a way to retaliate against the Communists in the recent actions they had taken in Berlin, but had decided against this because of the link between this trade and access to Berlin.

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One of the main purposes of the current visit was to give evidence of U. S. interest in West Berlin, and the conclusion concerning countermeasures does not indicate any weakening in our determination to defend the freedom of West Berlin, our presence in the city, and access thereto. We hope to convey this in Berlin.

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9

Memorandum of Conversation

Bonn Germany
August 19, 1961
12:40 P.M.
Palais Schaumburg

Participants

American

The Vice President
Secretary Connally
General Clay
Ambassador Bohlen
Ambassador Dowling
Mr. Cash

German

Chancellor Adenauer
Foreign Minister von Brentano
State Secretary Globke
Ambassador von Braun
Ambassador von Etzdorf
Ambassador Duckwitz
Mr. Weber (Interpreter)

The Chancellor began the discussion by saying how grateful he was to have the Vice President and his party in Bonn. He continued by saying that he felt strongly that recent reproaches of the U. S. Administration and especially President Kennedy were completely unjustified. He added that the reproaches were directed against the U.S., U.K., and France, but that they began in the United States. He quoted a New York Herald Tribune article saying that the greatest handicap the Western Allies have is their inability to agree among themselves. The more we are told, the article continued, about the unity of the West, the more disunity grows.

The Chancellor said that the unrest among the German people caused by the shock of the recent acts of the Ulbricht regime had now diminished. The initial impact had been heightened by the fact that the people had not been prepared for these developments. It was vacation time, during which they did not pay much attention to what was in the papers, and thus they have been taken by surprise.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
Bvch/jc, NARA, Date 8-26-09

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He had told the crowd what gratitude Germans owe the U. S. He had added that it was unjust to express doubt that the U. S. would honor its pledges. Instead, the Germans must stand firmly beside the U. S.

The crowd had understood and had applauded him as seldom before.

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It is important to realize, he added, that we are not going to solve these difficulties overnight. We must prepare for a series of actions like the recent Berlin developments, which are only an example of what we can expect.

The new U. S. Administration is only six months old, the Vice President continued, and it has had to face many new and old problems. The President has felt that he should call upon Congress and the people to prepare more diligently and effectively -- at great cost to the U. S. taxpayer -- to meet the vast U. S. responsibilities in all parts of the world. The response has been one of faith and encouragement. The President had recently requested the largest preparedness appropriation ever sought except in time of war, and Congress had given him even more than he had asked. There was, therefore, no lack of concern, or preparation, or action on the part of the U. S. Government or any lack of faith in its allies.

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The President sent the Vice President, the Secretary of the Navy, General Clay, and Ambassador Bohlen to make it clear that the U. S. was proceeding expeditiously with a comprehensive program of military and economic assistance to other nations of the world, and that the U. S. has accelerated the call to arms of both men and production and expanded its scientific and space efforts to the extent that the President has requested much more money than President Eisenhower -- or even President Kennedy -- had thought would be necessary. The U. S. has called up men, expanded production, increased its military assistance program, and concentrated on military preparation, all of which can properly be regarded as recognition of necessity for action. We

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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August 18, 1961

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 478 Ltr 4/19/77, State Ltr 11/2/77

By 12/17/77, NARS, Date 5/6/77

Dear Mr. Vice President:

I am grateful to you for undertaking on short notice this important mission to Germany and West Berlin.

The main purpose of your mission is to reassure the people of West Berlin, while at the same time talking frankly with Mayor Brandt. The public statements and the letter to Mayor Brandt which we have reviewed together give general guidance for this mission. But, in addition, I hope that you will find an opportunity to speak frankly with Mayor Brandt in an effort to make it clear to him that in these next months it will be very important to avoid hasty criticism of each other.

Finally, I hope that you and your colleagues will take the opportunity of this visit to observe closely the existing situation in Germany and in West Berlin so that you may advise me, on your return, of any actions which you think it might be wise for us to take to strengthen the interests of the United States in this area.

With renewed thanks,

Sincerely,



The Honorable Lyndon Johnson

The Vice President

~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

August 18, 1961

Dear Mayor Brandt:

I have read with great care your personal informal letter of August 16th and I want to thank you for it. In these testing days it is important for us to be in close touch. For this reason I am sending my answer by the hand of Vice President Johnson. He comes with General Clay, who is well known to Berliners; and they have my authority to discuss our problems in full frankness with you.

The measures taken by the Soviet Government and its puppets in East Berlin have caused revulsion here in America. This demonstration of what the Soviet Government means by freedom for a city, and peace for a people, proves the hollowness of Soviet pretensions; and Americans understand that this action necessarily constitutes a special blow to the people of West Berlin, connected as they remain in a myriad of ways to their fellow Berliners in the eastern sector. So I understand entirely the deep concerns and sense of trouble which prompted your letter.

Grave as this matter is, however, there are, as you say, no steps available to us which can force a significant material change in this present situation. Since it represents a resounding confession of failure and of political weakness, this brutal border closing evidently represents a basic Soviet decision which only war could reverse. Neither you nor we, nor any of our Allies, have ever supposed that we should go to war on this point.

Yet the Soviet action is too serious for inadequate responses. My own objection to most of the measures which have been proposed -- even to most of the suggestions in

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority 75C 12-19-80 letter

By inf, NARS, Date 1-12-81

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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- 2 -

your own letter -- is that they are mere trifles compared to what has been done. Some of them, moreover, seem unlikely to be fruitful even in their own terms. This is our present judgment, for example, on the question of an immediate appeal to the United Nations, although we shall continue to keep this possibility under lively review.

On careful consideration I myself have decided that the best immediate response is a significant reinforcement of the Western garrisons. The importance of this reinforcement is symbolic -- but not symbolic only. We know that the Soviet Union continues to emphasize its demand for the removal of Allied protection from West Berlin. We believe that even a modest reinforcement will underline our rejection of this concept.

At the same time, and of even greater basic importance, we shall continue and accelerate the broad buildup of the military strength of the West upon which we are decided, and which we view as the necessary answer to the long-range Soviet threat to Berlin and to us all.

Within Berlin, in the immediate affairs of the city, there may be other specific appropriate steps to take. These we shall review as rapidly and sympathetically as possible, and I hope you will be sure to express your own views on such measures clearly to Vice President Johnson and his party. Actions which effectively demonstrate our continued commitment to freedom in Berlin will have our support.

I have considered with special care your proposal of a three-power status for West Berlin. My judgment is that a formal proclamation of such a status would imply a weakening of the four-power relationship on which our opposition to the border-closing depends. Whatever may be the immediate prospects, I do not believe that we should

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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- 3 -

now take so double-edged a step. I do agree that the guarantees which we have pledged to West Berlin should be continuously affirmed and reaffirmed, and this we are doing. Moreover, I support your proposal of an appropriate plebiscite demonstrating the continuing conviction of West Berlin that its destiny is freedom in connection with the West.

More broadly, let me urge it upon you that we must not be shaken by Soviet actions which in themselves are a confession of weakness. West Berlin today is more important than ever, and its mission to stand for freedom has never been so important as now. The link of West Berlin to the Free World is not a matter of rhetoric. Important as the ties to the East have been, painful as is their violation, the life of the city, as I understand it, runs primarily to the West -- its economic life, its moral basis, and its military security. You may wish to consider and to suggest concrete ways in which these ties might be expanded in a fashion that would make the citizens of West Berlin more actively conscious of their role, not merely as an outpost of freedom, but as a vital part of the Free World and all its enterprises. In this double mission we are partners, and it is my own confidence that we can continue to rely upon each other as firmly in the future as we have in the past.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

The Honorable Willy Brandt
Governing Mayor of Berlin



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13

Draft Arrival Statement (BCNN) of the Vice President

I sincerely appreciate the warm welcome which you have accorded me. I am pleased to have this opportunity to visit the capital of the Federal Republic and to confer with Chancellor Adenauer during these critical days in the history of the free world. I expect to fly to Berlin this afternoon to meet with Mayor Brandt and other key officials.

I have come as the personal representative of President Kennedy to express the ^{deep} sympathetic concern of the President and the American people over the disturbing developments of the past week in the Soviet Sector of Berlin. I have also come to reassure the people of Berlin of our continuing interest in their welfare and to reaffirm the determination of the United States to honor its solemn commitments. As an earnest of this determination the President has authorized an immediate enlargement of the American garrison in West Berlin. ~~This will increase our ability to cope with any emergency which may arise.~~

The developments which have occasioned this visit to Bonn and Berlin need no elaboration. The drastic measures taken in East Germany and East Berlin to ring down the Iron Curtain between two parts of a great city can not be viewed simply in legalistic terms. For while this action, carried out with Soviet approval and support, is a flagrant violation of the special four-power status of Berlin and of free circulation within the city, we must never lose sight of the tragic human implications of these developments.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority YSC ltr 4/19/77, State ltr 11/4/76
By Amg, NARS, Date 5/6/77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Having denied the people of East Germany and East Berlin the personal freedoms enjoyed by their compatriots across the border - to say nothing of the basic right of self-determination - the East German regime is now attempting to deny them even the right to choose a life of freedom in the West. The cruel separation of families, the cutting off of the means of support of over 50,000 East Berliners, and the barring to East Germans of the privilege of an occasional visit to free West Berlin which has made their life in the Soviet Zone of Germany a little more endurable - all of these actions point up the callous disregard of the Communist system for the human values which the free world considers so sacred.

Human history has demonstrated the verity and enduring character of these values. Freedom may be a giant slow to stir but its strength is drawn from every human heart. Believe me, it will prevail.

EUR:GER:HBCox:mne
8/18/61

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

14

7175/JWC

17 AUGUST 1961
DATE

FROM: USMISSION BERLIN

TO : WHITE HOUSE

INFO :

CITE : 223

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

ACTION DEPT NIACT 223 WHITEHOUSE NIACT UNN BONN PRITY 119
INFO LONDON 132 MOSCOW 127 PARIS 138, AUGUST 16, MIDNIGHT FROM
BERLIN SIGNED LIGHTNER.

BONN ALSO PASS INFO POLAD USAREUR 122 FROM BERLIN
PARIS FOR EMB, USRO, STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE.

MAYOR BRANDT HANDED ME TODAY LETTER FOR TRANSMITTAL TO PRESIDENT
KENNEDY. INFORMAL TRANSLATION FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

AFTER DEVELOPMENTS LAST THREE DAYS MY CITY, WISH CONVEY TO YOU

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 14-25-81 Letter re NLJ 80-82
By ies, NARS, Date 2-9-82PAGE 1 OF 5~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN PERSONAL, INFORMAL LETTER SOME OF MY THOUGHTS AND
VIEWPOINTS.

MEASURES OF ULBRICHT REGIME, SUPPORTED BY SOVUNION AND OTHER
EAST BLOC COUNTRIES, HAVE ALMOST FULLY DESTROYED REMNANTS
FOUR-POWER STATUS. WHILE IN PAST ALLIED COMMANDANTS HAVE
EVEN PROTESTED AGAINST PARADES BY SO-CALLED PEOPLES' ARMY,
THIS TIME, AFTER MILITARY OCCUPATION OF EAST SECTOR BY PEOPLES'
ARMY, THEY HAVE LIMITED THEMSELVES TO DELAYED AND NOT VERY VIGOROUS
STEP. ILLEGAL SOVEREIGNTY OF EAST BERLIN GOVERNMENT WAS
ACKNOWLEDGED BY ACQUIESCING IN THE RESTRICTIONS OF THE NUMBER OF
CROSSING POINTS AND OF ENTRY INTO THE EAST SECTOR. I REGARD THIS
ENCROACHMENT AS THE MOST SERIOUS IN THE POSTWAR HISTORY OF THIS
CITY SINCE THE BLOCKADE.

THIS DEVELOPMENT HAS NOT CHANGED WILL TO RESIST OF WEST BERLIN
POPULATION, BUT HAS TENDED TO AROUSE DOUBTS AS TO DETERMINATION OF
THREE POWERS AND THEIR ABILITY TO REACT. IN THIS CONNECTION THE
DECISIVE FACTOR IS THAT THE WEST HAS ALWAYS SPECIFICALLY
INVOKED THE EXISTING FOUR-POWER STATUS.

I AM WELL AWARE THAT EXISTING GUARANTEES FOR FREEDOM OF POP-
ULATION, PRESENCE OF TROOPS AND FREE ACCESS APPLY ONLY WEST BERLIN.
HOWEVER, THIS IS MATTER OF A DEEP WOUND IN LIFE OF GERMAN

PAGE 2 OF 5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PEOPLE AND OF BEING FORCED OUT OF SPHERES OF COMMON RESPONSIBILITY
(BERLIN AND GERMANY AS A WHOLE) AFFECTING WHOLE WESTERN PRESTIGE.

I SEE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL DANGERS IN TWO RESPECTS: (1)
INACTIVITY AND MERE DEFENSIVE POSTURE CAN BRING ABOUT CRISIS OF
CONFIDENCE IN WESTERN POWERS; (2) INACTIVITY AND MERE DEFENSIVE
POSTURE CAN LEAD TO EXAGGERATED SELF-CONFIDENCE ON PART OF
EAST BERLIN REGIME WHOSE NEWSPAPERS ALREADY TODAY BOAST OF SUCCESS
ITS DEMONSTRATION OF MILITARY POWER.

SOVUNION HAS ACHIEVED HALF ITS FREE CITY PROPOSALS THROUGH USE GERMAN
PEOPLES' ARMY. THE SECOND ACT IS A QUESTION OF TIME. AFTER SECOND
ACT BERLIN WOULD BE LIKE A GHETTO, WHICH HAS NOT ONLY LOST ITS
FUNCTION AS REFUGE OF FREEDOM AND SYMBOL OF HOPE FOR REUNIFICATION
BUT WHICH WOULD ALSO BE SEVERED FROM FREE PART GERMANY. INSTEAD
OF FLIGHT TO BERLIN, WE MIGHT THEN EXPERIENCE BEGINNING OF FLIGHT
FROM BERLIN.

IN THIS SITUATION I CONSIDER IT PROPER THAT WESTERN POWERS, WHILE
DEMANDING RE-ESTABLISHMENT FOUR-POWER RESPONSIBILITIES, PROCLAIM
AT SAME TIME A THREE-POWER STATUS FOR WEST BERLIN. THREE POWERS SHOULD
REITERATE GUARANTEE THEIR PRESENCE IN WEST BERLIN UNTIL GERMAN
REUNIFICATION AND, IF NECESSARY, HAVE THIS SUPPORTED BY PLEBISCITE
POPULATION WEST BERLIN AND FEDREP. MUST ALSO BE SAID CLEARLY
PAGE 3 OF 5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THAT GERMAN QUESTION IS IN NO WAY SETTLED FOR WESTERN POWERS BUT THAT THEY MUST INSIST UPON PEACE SETTLEMENT CORRESPONDING TO RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF GERMAN PEOPLE AND SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL CONCERNED. WOULD ALSO CONSIDER ADVISABLE THAT WEST ON OWN INITIATIVE BRING BERLIN QUESTION BEFORE UN, AT LEAST ON BASIS THAT USSR HAS VIOLATED DECLARATION HUMAN RIGHTS IN MOST FLAGRANT MANNER. APPEARS BETTER TO ME PUT USSR IN POSITION OF GUILTY PARTY THAN TO HAVE TO DISCUSS SAME THEME AFTER MOTION BY OTHER STATES.

I EXPECT FROM SUCH STEPS NO SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL CHANGE PRESENT SITUATION AND RECOLLECT NOT WITHOUT BITTERNESS DECLARATIONS REJECTING NEGOTIATIONS WITH USSR ON BASIS ONE SHOULD NOT NEGOTIATE UNDER PRESSURE. WE NOW HAVE STATE OF ACCOMPLISHED EXTORTION, AND ALREADY I HEAR IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TURN DOWN NEGOTIATIONS. IN SUCH SITUATION, WHEN POSSIBILITY OF INITIATIVE FOR ACTION IS ALREADY SO SMALL, IT IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT AT LEAST TO DEMONSTRATE POLITICAL INITIATIVE.

AFTER ACQUIESCENCE IN SOV STEP WHICH IS ILLEGAL, AND HAS BEEN TERMED ILLEGAL, AND IN VIEW MANY TRAGEDIES OCCURRING TODAY EAST BERLIN AND SOVZONE, WE WILL NOT BE SPARED RISKS OF ULTIMATE DECISION. IT WOULD BE WELCOMED IF AMERICAN GARRISON WERE TO BE DEMONSTRATIVELY STRENGTHENED.

I CONSIDER SITUATION SERIOUS ENOUGH, MR. PRESIDENT, TO WRITE

PAGE 4 OF 5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO YOU IN ALL FRANKNESS AS IS POSSIBLE ONLY BETWEEN FRIENDS WHO
TRUST EACH OTHER COMPLETELY.

(SIGNED) YOUR WILLY BRANDT

END TEXT

IN HANDING ME LETTER BRANDT SAID HE WOULD NOT PUBLISH TEXT.
IN SPEECH THIS AFTERNOON BRANDT MENTIONED FACT THAT LETTER WAS SENT.
ORIGINAL LETTER BEING POUCHED.

DTG: 170200Z

PAGE 5 OF 5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

On September 5, 1961, the SPD published the following advertisement
many German daily papers:

"Willy Brandt has America's confidence. Adenauer, in his
helplessness, needs Krushchev as election aid. Yesterday's
flexing of muscles is replaced today by creating of panic
and cries of misery.

Adenauer could not have more clearly revealed the breaking
down of his foreign policy.

Willy Brandt has never created panic and has never rattled
the saber. He has taken hold calmly, thoughtfully, and if
there was a fire, he has stood firm ^{against} ~~xxx~~ Krushchev.

Willy Brandt has called our American friends into position,
as Ernst Reuter had done previously. President Kennedy's
reaction to Willy Brandt's letter proved this. There has
been a sound reason why Vice President Johnson refrained
from having Adenauer accompany him when he brought Kennedy's
reply to Willy Brandt and led 1,500 American soldiers from
Mannheim to Berlin.

What we need today cannot be accomplished by the man of
yesterday, but by the man of tomorrow. Germany needs
Willy Brandt."

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

15
SEP 7 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GEORGE REEDY
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
ROOM T-4, THE CAPITOL

Subject: Attempts to involve Vice President
in West German electoral campaign.

Enclosed are the four key documents relating to
attempts to involve the Vice President in the West
German electoral campaign. They have been sidelined
in red for your ready reference.

We shall keep the Vice President informed of any
further developments by sending copies of messages
relating to this subject to you by this same channel.

WBS
L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. SPD political advertisement
of 9/5.
2. Embassy Bonn telegram No. 520
of 9/6.
3. Memo of conversation between
German Ambassador and Mr.
Hillenbrand 9/6.
4. Telegram No. 592 to Embassy
Bonn 9/7.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-11-81 letter re: NS 8079

~~SECRET~~

By des, NARS, Date 2-9-82

93-31

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 3347

EUR

Rec'd: SEPTEMBER 6, 1961
1:04 PM

Info

FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

139

SS

NO: 520, SEPTEMBER 6, 1 PM

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PRIORITY

MYTEL 519

IN CONVERSATION THIS MORNING, ADENAUER SHOWED HIMSELF EQUALLY PREOCCUPIED RE ELECTION CAMPAIGN, ALTHOUGH HE WAS ANYTHING BUT DEPRESSED. HE IS NATURALLY INTENT ON MAINTAINING HIS ABSOLUTE MAJORITY IN BUNDESTAG, MENTIONING DISARRAY IN GERMAN POLICY WHICH WOULD ENSUE FROM SPD OR FDP ELECTORAL GAINS. I COMMENTED THAT RECENT REPORTS SEEMED TO SHOW HIS PARTY WAS DOING WELL, WHEREUPON GLOBKE, WHO WAS WITH HIM, REPLIED THAT CDU WAS AGAIN MAKING HEADWAY AFTER HAVING LOST SOME GROUND TO SPD AS RESULT OF LATTER'S ATTEMPTS TO CAPITALIZE ON ENTHUSIASM FOR VICE PRESIDENT'S BERLIN VISIT, BUT MUCH DEPENDED ON DEVELOPMENTS OF NEXT TEN DAYS. THIS LED BRENTANO, ALSO PRESENT, TO MENTION SPD SPREAD IN YESTERDAY'S PRESS ASSERTING AMERICAN CONFIDENCE IN BRANDT AS DEMONSTRATED BY VICE PRESIDENT'S REFUSAL TO LET ADENAUER ACCOMPANY HIM TO BERLIN. CHANCELLOR REMARKED HE HOPED VICE PRESIDENT COULD SOMEHOW CORRECT THIS IMPRESSION, AND BRNETANO SAID HE WAS ASKING GREWE TO PUT PROBLEM BEFORE VICE PRESIDENT, WITH SUGGESTION THAT HE MIGHT BE WILLING TO MAKE CLARIFICATION TO PRESS IN BACKGROUND STATEMENT.

DOWLING

RJT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-11-81 letter re: NLS 80-79By ics, NARS, Date 2-9-82~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: September 6, 1961
4:45 P.M.

SUBJECT: CDU Agitation Over SPD Electoral Tactics Involving
Vice President Johnson's Visit to Germany and Berlin

PARTICIPANTS: German Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe
Dr. Swidbert Schnippenkoetter, Counselor, German Embassy
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand, GNR

COPIES TO: S/S - 2
EUR - 2
S/O
GER
American Embassy-Bonn

After the conclusion of today's meeting of the Ambassadorial Group, Ambassador Grewe took Mr. Hillenbrand aside on a matter about which he was apparently somewhat agitated. He had received a telegram from the Foreign Office in Bonn indicating that the SPD had yesterday placed in a large number of West German newspapers an advertisement claiming, in effect, that the visit of Vice President Johnson and the reinforcement of the U.S. garrison in Berlin was a direct result of Brandt's intervention in the form of his letter to President Kennedy. This was contrasted in the advertisement with the inaction of the CDU, and a remark was made about the Vice President's refusal to take Chancellor Adenauer with him in his plane to Berlin.

Ambassador Grewe said that the Chancellor and von Brentano had met with Ambassador Dowling in Bonn today on this subject. Bonn felt that the President and the Vice President should be informed of these developments and of how history was being distorted by the SPD. Von Brentano had expressed to Ambassador Dowling his view that it would be appropriate if the Vice President could make a suitable public comment. One suggestion was that, in a press conference, the Vice President might respond to a planted question in a way calculated to clarify the record. Another suggestion was a background statement by the Vice President.

The German Government was likewise interested in issuing a statement in Bonn giving a historical account of the events immediately following August 13. This statement would particularly point out that the idea of reinforcing the

Berlin

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Authority NSC 8-11-81 letter re: NLS 80-79

By ics, NARS, Date 2-9-82~~SECRET~~
INFORMATION COPY

Berlin garrison had been conveyed to the Ambassadorial Group on August 15 and that on August 18 the Federal Government had already been informed by Ambassador Grese that the Vice President would visit Berlin and that the garrison would be reinforced. The fact that the Federal Government was aware of U.S. intentions in this respect had not been mentioned at the Bundestag meeting, because of the U.S. request for secrecy. In view of the SPD claims as to Brandt's having brought about the Vice President's visit and the reinforcement of the Berlin garrison, the Federal Government wished the approval of the U.S. for the issuance of a statement along the lines indicated.

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

1961 SEP 7 AM 11 01

~~SECRET~~

52

02737

Origin

SENT TO:

Amembassy BONN

PRIORITY

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RMR

FOR AMBASSADOR

Re EMBTEL 536. I have already called German Ambassador to protest unauthorized release details regarding content President's message to Adenauer. You are authorized protest similarly.

I added, re EMBTEL 520 and approach made today by Ambassador Grewe, highly undesirable United States get involved in German political campaign as would be case if Vice President made any statement along lines requested.

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-11-81 letter; re NLS-80-79

By ics, NARS, Date 2-9-82

Drafted by:

EUR:FDKohler:mt

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

9/6/61

S/S - Mr. Manfull

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON



152
SEP 7 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GEORGE REEDY
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
ROOM T-4, THE CAPITOL

Subject: Attempts to involve Vice President
in West German electoral campaign.

Enclosed are the four key documents relating to
attempts to involve the Vice President in the West
German electoral campaign. They have been sidelined
in red for your ready reference.

We shall keep the Vice President informed of any
further developments by sending copies of messages
relating to this subject to you by this same channel.

WB
L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary

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Bonn 9/7.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-11-81 letter re: NLS 80-79

~~SECRET~~

By ms, NARS, Date 2-9-82

Statement by Press Secretary - August 18, 1961

Vice President Lyndon Johnson will leave tonight for Germany as a personal representative of the President. The Vice President expects to see West German Chancellor Conrad Adenaur and West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt. He will deliver to Mayor Brandt a message in answer to the one dispatched by the Mayor to the President. He will be accompanied by General Lucius Clay, who was the U. S. Military Commander in Germany during the 1949 Berlin Airlift. The Vice President and General Clay will travel on the President's plane. ~~His departure~~ The ~~plane~~ departure from Andrews Air Force Base is expected at 9 o'clock tonight.

58-H

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control:

11977

EUR

Rec'd:

AUGUST 16, 1961
9:10 PM

Info

FROM: BERLIN

SS

TO: Secretary of State

7

SP

NO: 223, AUGUST 16, MIDNIGHT

SB

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PX

RMR

ACTION DEPARTMENT 223, BONN PRIORITY 119, INFORMATION LONDON 132,
MOSCOW 127, PARIS 138, POLAD USAREUR 122.

PARIS FOR EMBASSY, USRO, STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE.

MAYOR BRANDT HANDED ME TODAY LETTER FOR TRANSMITTAL TO PRESIDENT
KENNEDY. INFORMAL TRANSLATION FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

AFTER DEVELOPMENTS LAST THREE DAYS MY CITY, WISH CONVEY TO YOU
IN PERSONAL, INFORMAL LETTER SOME OF MY THOUGHTS AND VIEWPOINTS.

MEASURES OF ULBRICHT REGIME, SUPPORTED BY SOVUNION AND OTHER
EAST BLOC COUNTRIES, HAVE ALMOST FULLY DESTROYED REMNANTS
FOUR-POWER STATUS. WHILE IN PAST ALLIED COMMANDANTS HAVE
EVEN PROTESTED AGAINST PARADES BY SO-CALLED PEOPLES' ARMY,
THIS TIME, AFTER MILITARY OCCUPATION OF EAST SECTOR BY PEOPLES'
ARMY, THEY HAVE LIMITED THEMSELVES TO DELAYED AND NOT VERY
VIGOROUS STEP. ILLEGAL SOVEREIGNTY OF EAST BERLIN GOVERNMENT
WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BY ACQUIESCING IN THE RESTRICTIONS OF THE
NUMBER OF CROSSING POINTS AND OF ENTRY INTO THE EAST SECTOR.
I REGARD THIS ENCROACHMENT AS THE MOST SERIOUS IN THE POSTWAR
HISTORY OF THIS CITY SINCE THE BLOCKADE.

THIS DEVELOPMENT HAS NOT CHANGED WILL TO RESIST OF WEST BERLIN
POPULATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

Buckley, NARA, Date 2-26-09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 223, AUGUST 16, MIDNIGHT FROM BERLIN

POPULATION, BUT HAS TENDED TO AROUSE DOUBTS AS TO DETERMINATION OF THREE POWERS AND THEIR ABILITY TO REACT. IN THIS CONNECTION THE DECISIVE FACTOR IS THAT THE WEST HAS ALWAYS SPECIFICALLY INVOKED THE EXISTING FOUR-POWER STATUS.

I AM WELL AWARE THAT EXISTING GUARANTEES FOR FREEDOM OF POPULATION, PRESENCE OF TROOPS AND FREE ACCESS APPLY ONLY WEST BERLIN. HOWEVER, THIS IS MATTER OF A DEEP WOUND IN LIFE OF GERMAN PEOPLE AND OF BEING FORCED OUT OF SPHERES OF COMMON RESPONSIBILITY (BERLIN AND GERMANY AS A WHOLE) AFFECTING WHOLE WESTERN PRESTIGE. SEE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL DANGERS IN TWO RESPECTS: (1) INACTIVITY AND MERE DEFENSIVE POSTURE CAN BRING ABOUT CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN WESTERN POWERS; (2) INACTIVITY AND MERE DEFENSIVE POSTURE CAN LEAD TO EXAGGERATED SELF-CONFIDENCE ON PART OF EAST BERLIN REGIME WHOSE NEWSPAPERS ALREADY TODAY BOAST OF SUCCESS ITS DEMONSTRATION OF MILITARY POWER.

SOVUNION HAS ACHIEVED HALF ITS FREE CITY PROPOSALS THROUGH USE GERMAN PEOPLES' ARMY. THE SECOND ACT IS A QUESTION OF TIME. AFTER SECOND ACT BERLIN WOULD BE LIKE A GHETTO, WHICH HAS NOT ONLY LOST ITS FUNCTION AS REFUGE OF FREEDOM AND SYMBOL OF HOPE FOR RE-UNIFICATION BUT WHICH WOULD ALSO BE SEVERED FROM FREE PART GERMANY. INSTEAD OF FLIGHT TO BERLIN, WE MIGHT THEN EXPERIENCE BEGINNING OF FLIGHT FROM BERLIN.

IN THIS SITUATION I CONSIDER IT PROPER THAT WESTERN POWERS, WHILE DEMANDING RE-ESTABLISHMENT FOUR-POWER RESPONSIBILITIES, PROCLAIM AT SAME TIME A THREE-POWER STATUS FOR WEST BERLIN. THREE POWERS SHOULD REITERATE GUARANTEE THEIR PRESENCE IN WEST BERLIN UNTIL GERMAN REUNIFICATION AND, IF NECESSARY, HAVE THIS SUPPORTED BY PLEBISCITE POPULATION WEST BERLIN AND FEDREP. MUST ALSO BE SAID CLEARLY THAT GERMAN QUESTION IS IN NO WAY SETTLED FOR WESTERN POWERS BUT THAT THEY MUST INSIST UPON PEACE SETTLEMENT CORRESPONDING TO RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF GERMAN PEOPLE AND SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL CONCERNED. WOULD ALSO CONSIDER ADVISABLE

THAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 223, AUGUST 16, MIDNIGHT FROM BERLIN

THAT WEST ON OWN INITIATIVE BRING BERLIN QUESTION BEFORE UN, AT LEAST ON BASIS THAT USSR HAS VIOLATED DECLARATION HUMAN RIGHTS IN MOST FLAGRANT MANNER. APPEARS BETTER TO ME PUT USSR IN POSITION OF GUILTY PARTY THAN TO HAVE TO DISCUSS SAME THEME AFTER MOTION BY OTHER STATES.

I EXPECT FROM SUCH STEPS NO SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL CHANGE PRESENT SITUATION AND RECOLLECT NOT WITHOUT BITTERNESS DECLARATIONS REJECTING NEGOTIATIONS WITH USSR ON BASIS ONE SHOULD NOT NEGOTIATE UNDER PRESSURE. WE NOW HAVE STATE OF ACCOMPLISHED EXTORTION, AND ALREADY I HEAR IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TURN DOWN NEGOTIATIONS. IN SUCH SITUATION, WHEN POSSIBILITY OF INITIATIVE FOR ACTION IS ALREADY SO SMALL, IT IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT AT LEAST TO DEMONSTRATE POLITICAL INITIATIVE.

AFTER ACQUIESCENCE IN SOV STEP WHICH IS ILLEGAL, AND HAS BEEN TERMED ILLEGAL, AND IN VIEW MANY TRAGEDIES OCCURRING TODAY EAST BERLIN AND SOVZONE, WE WILL NOT BE SPARED RISKS OF ULTIMATE DECISION. IT WOULD BE WELCOMED IF AMERICAN GARRISON WERE TO BE DEMONSTRATIVELY STRENGTHENED.

I CONSIDER SITUATION SERIOUS ENOUGH, MR. PRESIDENT, TO WRITE TO YOU IN ALL FRANKNESS AS IS POSSIBLE ONLY BETWEEN FRIENDS WHO TRUST EACH OTHER COMPLETELY.

(SIGNED) YOUR WILLY BRANDT

END TEXT

IN HANDING: ME LETTER BRANDT SAID HE WOULD NOT PUBLISH TEXT. IN SPEECH THIS AFTERNOON BRANDT MENTIONED FACT THAT LETTER WAS SENT.

ORIGINAL LETTER BEING POUCHED.

LIGHTNER

KEA

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 8-16-61 10 PM (CTW)

Advance copy (SS) and (SO) 10 pm 8/16/61 FMH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

17

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM ON BERLIN

Current Situation

On August 13 the East German authorities cut off all travel by East Germans and East Berliners to West Berlin except for persons issued special passes. The more than 50,000 East Berliners who worked in West Berlin were prohibited from continuing this employment. Large and well-armed East German military units were deployed in East Berlin to prevent violent public reaction to these moves, and the Soviets ringed the city with their troops.

These measures had the fundamental and long-range purposes of furthering the separation of East Berlin from West Berlin and the division generally of East Germany from West Germany; advancing thereby the consolidation of the East German "state"; and improving by a fait accompli the bargaining position of the Soviet Union in any negotiations with the West.

Since the taking of the initial measures, the East Germans have restricted the passage of West Berlin motor vehicles into East Berlin and have begun to harass Allied transit into East Berlin.

Western Reaction

The US, UK, and France have protested the Communist action through their Commandants in Berlin (August 14) and in notes directly to the Soviet Government (August 16). There is an intense feeling among the people of West Berlin, however, and to a lesser extent elsewhere in the West, that the Allied reaction has been too weak. In Berlin this feeling is heightened by an apparent growing arrogance and cockiness of the East Germans as their dramatic action met no strong Western response. The morale of West Berliners, which is absolutely vital to the maintenance of our position there, has dropped seriously, and confidence in the Allies seems to have been considerably shaken.

US Policy

We consider that this Communist act is an important move in the broader conflict between the free world and the Communist bloc, rather than an isolated local event. We believe, therefore, that we should deal with the move principally in the development of our overall policy for meeting the Soviet threat. This would involve principally stepping up the pace of our military preparations and exploiting this new Communist repression in our propaganda. In addition, however, we realize the great importance of West Berlin morale, and are taking steps to restore it. The visit of the Vice President to Berlin and the reinforcement of our garrison in the city are the principal measures to this end.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-11-81 letter re. NLS 80-79
By ica, NARS, Date 2-9-82

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SANITIZED

17a

CARSTENS, Karl

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Dr. Karl Carstens, a State Secretary in the Foreign Office since July 1960,

As State Secretary, Carstens supervises the political divisions in the Foreign Office.

Born in Bremen in 1914, Carstens studied law at several German universities and, for brief periods, in England and at Dijon, France. He received a doctor of laws degree in 1937 from the University of Hamburg. In the same year he became a member of the Nazi Party. Before entering the military service in 1939, Carstens practiced law as a junior barrister. After the war Carstens returned to the practice of law in Bremen and served for a while as legal assistant to the Bremen Senator for Justice. Between 1946 and 1948 he attended Yale University as an exchange student. He received a master of laws degree from Yale and was offered a position on the Yale faculty, but he chose to return to Germany. From 1949 to 1954 Carstens served as Plenipotentiary of the Bremen Land government with the Federal government, an office in which he performed representational, liaison, and administrative functions in matters concerning relations between the two governments. He left his position in 1954 to accept the post of Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic to the European Council at Strasbourg. In 1955 he was made Deputy Chief of the Political Division in the Foreign Office. When the Foreign Office was reorganized in 1958, Carstens was appointed Director of the European (West I) Division, and continued in this position until his appointment as State Secretary in July 1960.

Carstens is deeply interested in European integration, and for his ability and judgment in this field he has won great respect from his Foreign Office colleagues and U.S. Embassy officers.

Carstens' wife is a medical doctor. The couple has no children. He neither smokes nor drinks and socially is somewhat reserved, although "correct" and agreeable. He speaks excellent English and French.

SANITIZED

Authority State Sec 2/10/77
By mg, WES, J. 6/15/77

INR:RFB:BI

May 1961

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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OFFICE OF STAFF
 Foreign Relations Division

LEHARD, Ludwig

LEHARD, LUDWIG OF GERMANY

Ludwig Lehard, internationally known and for his role in the "Miracle" of Germany's post-war economic recovery and prosperity, has been Minister for Economics since 1949 and Federal Vice-Chancellor since 1957. Lehard remains one of the political figures most frequently mentioned as a possible successor to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.

Born February 4, 1897 in Würth, Bavaria, Lehard entered the Imperial German Army in 1916 and in 1918 was severely wounded. After recovery he studied economics at the University of Frankfurt, receiving his Ph.D. degree in 1924. He spent the next four years doing research for various business firms and from 1928 to 1942 was employed by the Institute for Economic Observation in Hamburg as assistant, department head and director. Lehard spent the last three years of World War II as director of the Institute for Industrial Research in Hamburg and Pforzheim. Immediately after the German collapse in 1945, he was appointed economic advisor for Upper and Middle Saxony to U.S. Military Government authorities who were seeking economic and anti-Nazi records. In 1945 he was named Bavarian Minister for Economics and the next year became director of the Money and Credit Office of the Personal Economics Administration. Elected to the Bundestag in 1949, Lehard was appointed Minister for Economics in September of that year.

He is a liberal economist who strongly advocates the supreme efficiency of market competition and private enterprise, on the one hand, and consumer sovereignty, on the other, as the determining economic forces in Western society.

Strongly pro-Western in orientation, Lehard is quite friendly to the United States and highly receptive to U.S. advice and influence. A Protestant, Lehard married in 1923. There are no children.

LEHARD, LUDWIG
 SANITIZED

Authority Sara Lee Nelson
 on long 6/15/50

CONFIDENTIAL

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17c

GERSTENMAIER, Dr. Eugen

President of the German Bundestag (Lower House)

On November 16, 1954, the German Bundestag elected Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier to succeed the late Hermann Ehlers as its President. A member of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Dr. Gerstenmaier is a prominent Lutheran clergyman who for the past 20 years has been engaged in church administrative and welfare work.

Gerstenmaier was born in 1906 in Wuerttemberg. He began his career as a commercial employee, but at the age of 25 he decided to study theology and philosophy. In 1937 he received his doctorate of theology from the University of Berlin. Two years earlier, Gerstenmaier had joined the Wuerttemberg Evangelical Church Council and served as its representative on the Reich Church Committee in Berlin. As a member of the German Protestant Churches' Foreign Liaison Office, Gerstenmaier in 1936 visited Switzerland, Scandinavia, and the Balkans. In 1939 he helped found the Evangelical Welfare Organization (Hilfswerk). Strongly opposed to Nazism, he was arrested in 1944 in connection with the July 20, 1944 attempt on Hitler's life and sentenced to seven years of hard labor.

Liberated in 1945, he became Director of the Evangelical Welfare Organization, a position he held until 1951. He visited the U.S. in 1948 and was received by President Truman. In 1949 he was elected to the Bundestag. Since 1950 he has been a delegate to the Common Assembly of the European Coal-Steel Community. At the time of his election to the presidency of the Bundestag, Dr. Gerstenmaier was chairman of that body's Foreign Affairs Committee.

Dr. Gerstenmaier is married. He speaks English.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE
BIOGRAPHIC REGISTER

LEMMER, Ernst

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Sixty-three-year-old Ernst Lemmer was appointed Minister for All-German Affairs in the Cabinet of the Federal Republic of Germany on October 27, 1957. Former Land Chairman of the Berlin organization of the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich-Demokratische Union - CDU), Lemmer first joined the Cabinet as Minister of Posts and Telecommunications in November 1956. A refugee from the Soviet Zone of Germany, Lemmer was one of the postwar founders of the East Zone CDU; he remained in the Soviet Zone until removed from his position as chairman of the East Zone CDU in 1949. Lemmer then moved to West Berlin where he became editor-in-chief of the French-licensed newspaper Der Kurier. Between 1949 and 1956 he rejected many invitations to assume a position in Bonn, preferring to lead the CDU faction in the Berlin House of Representatives, where he was a staunch protagonist of the Berlin coalition. In April 1950 he was elected to the five-man executive council of the West CDU in Berlin and in January 1952 became one of Berlin's CDU representatives in the Bundestag.

Ernst Lemmer has been the subject of much controversy because of his past association with the East Zone. Most observers agree on certain points about Lemmer: that he is prone to opportunism, that he is politically very shrewd, and that he is an able and effective speaker. Some persons describe him as a very readable newspaperman, others say that he has never been an effective reporter. All sources agree again that Lemmer is addicted to good living, and that he can never be expected to take a non-remunerative position. He is unquestionably well-liked; even his bitterest critics admit that they are fond of the cigar-smoking, hearty skat player, whose principal hobbies in life are very obviously good eating and drinking. There has also never been any doubt expressed about Lemmer's basic loyalty to democracy and the West, even at times when he has had to admit contacts with officials of the "German Democratic Republic."

Lemmer is married and has a son and a daughter. He speaks good French and some English.

August 1961

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~
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Authority CIA Ltr 1/3/77
By mg, NARS, Date 3/21/77

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Biographic Information Division

LUEBKE, Heinrich

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

President, Federal Republic of Germany

Heinrich Lübke became the second President of the Federal Republic in 1959, succeeding Theodor Heuss, President since 1949. President Lübke, who served in Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's cabinet from 1953 to 1959 as Minister for Food, Agriculture and Forests, was born into a farm family at Enkhausen, Westphalia, on October 14, 1894. After serving in World War I as an artillery lieutenant and earning the Iron Cross, he studied at the Universities of Bonn, Berlin, and Munster. He then became active in agricultural organizations and was the manager of the German Agricultural Association until its abolition by the Nazis in 1933.

President Lübke served in the Prussian state legislature as a member of the Center (Catholic) Party from 1931 until his dismissal by the Nazis in 1933. He was arrested several times in the next few years and spent a total of 20 months in custody. He passed the war years in Berlin, and in 1945 returned to Westphalia to found a construction company. Reentering politics, Lübke served in the North Rhine-Westphalia legislature as a member of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and was Minister for Food, Agriculture and Forests in that province until his election to the federal parliament (Bundestag) in 1949.

A devout Catholic, President Lübke leads a quiet private life. He speaks very little English, but his wife, the former Wilhelmine Keuthen, has a command of five foreign languages, including English and Russian.

RFB:BI

July 1960

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BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

TOP GERMAN OFFICIALS

BERLIN

1. BRANDT, Willy - Governing Mayor of West Berlin
2. AMREHN, Franz - Deputy Mayor of Berlin
3. HENNEBERG, Willy - President of the Berlin House of Representatives
4. KLEIN, Dr. Guenther - Senator for Federal Affairs

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 1-4-01

BRANDT, Willy

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Willy Brandt, Governing Mayor of West Berlin since October 1957, symbolizes the struggle of the free people of Berlin against Communism. Now only 47 years old, he is one of the most able, colorful and popular politicians in Germany. He has been designated as the Social Democratic Party's official candidate for federal chancellor for the September 1961 parliamentary elections.

Brandt was born December 18, 1913 in Luebeck, and apprenticed to a shipping broker after completing secondary school. He joined the Social Democratic Party in 1930, at the age of 17, and became a reporter for a party newspaper. After the Nazi seizure of power, Brandt fled to Norway. He learned Norwegian, studied history and political science, and joined the Norwegian Labor Party. When the Norwegian Army, to which Brandt was attached, surrendered to the Germans in May 1940, he escaped detection as a German refugee and fled to Sweden. The same year he became a Norwegian citizen, having been deprived of his German nationality by the Nazis. A prolific journalist and writer, he founded a Norwegian-Swedish Press Bureau and wrote three books about Norway during the war years.

Brandt returned to Germany in 1945 as a reporter for Scandinavian newspapers at the Nuremberg War Crime Trials. Early in 1947 he arrived in Berlin as press attache of the Norwegian Military Mission. Regaining his German citizenship in 1948, he rejoined the Social Democratic Party (SPD). During the next ten years he rose rapidly in the SPD hierarchy and in the government of West Berlin. Brandt has been a member of the SPD national executive committee since 1948 and has served as deputy chairman (1954-58) and chairman (since 1958) of the SPD Berlin organization. He was a member of the federal Bundestag at Bonn (1949-1957) and President of the Bundesrat (1957-58), the upper house of the German Federal Parliament. Elected to the Berlin House of Representatives in January 1951, he became President (Speaker) of that body in January 1955 and continued in this position until his election as Governing Mayor of West Berlin in October 1957.

Brandt's record as Mayor of Berlin has been impressive. His deficiencies as an administrator have been more than compensated by his political intuition and his "super salesmanship" for the city. Although he is a first-rate tactician, his ability to make major decisions has remained largely untested. His phenomenal rise in Berlin is due to a number of circumstances: his unquestionable political talent, a keen political sense, a tremendous drive and vigor, and a winning personality which has secured for

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BRANDT, Willy (continued)

him a very favorable press. The most difficult hurdles he has had to overcome in his political career are misgivings about him within the tradition-bound Social Democratic party, his relative youth, his emigration to Scandinavia and activities there during the Nazi era, his outspoken aversion to many of the Marxist trappings of Socialism, and his failure to follow fixed Socialist policy on certain controversial issues.

Brandt is a large-boned, heavy-set and dignified man whose high forehead, strong jaw and irrepressible dimples provide ideal targets for the political cartoonist. An impulsive person, he rarely makes efforts to control his moods except on occasions of state, when he almost invariably exudes seriousness and statesmanship. As a rule, he does not nurse grudges and can take criticism, but dislikes flattery. Never pompous or artificial, he has a modest pride in his achievements as a self-made man. In official conversation with men of rank whom he knows well the chain-smoking Brandt is sincere, convincing, thoughtful-- a leader who can organize and express his thoughts in a most persuasive manner. In private conversation he is warm, outgoing, jovial and fond of levity. But if he fails to make contact, he can become taciturn to the point of embarrassment. He is probably at his best in dealing with or addressing large crowds, and when the occasion is right can cast a charismatic spell over his audience-- the earmark of the great political leader.

Brandt is a good friend of the United States, which he has visited in 1954, 1958 and 1959. He is the co-author of a two volume biography of the late Ernst Reuter, former mayor of Berlin and Brandt's political mentor (Ernst Reuter, A Life for Freedom, 1958), and he recently published his autobiography (My Road to Berlin, 1960). He has been married twice. His present wife, the former Rut Hansen of Oslo, is an attractive, charming ex-journalist. He is a member of the Lutheran Church. In addition to German and Norwegian, Brandt speaks English fluently.

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March 1961

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Biographic Information Division

AMREHN, Franz

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Franz Amrehn, Deputy Mayor of Berlin since January 1955, is the foremost representative of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the Berlin Senat and also serves as a deputy to the Bundesrat (upper house of the West German parliament).

The son of a tailor, Amrehn was born November 23, 1912 in Berlin. He attended local schools and at the age of 20 entered the employ of the Dresdener Bank in Berlin. There are no indications that Amrehn, a member of the pre-1933 Center (Catholic) Party, ever sympathized with the Nazis. He served in the German Army as an enlisted man from 1940 to 1945, eventually attaining the rank of master sergeant, and in 1944 was wounded on the Russian front. Immediately after the war Amrehn joined the CDU and served 1946-48 as a district representative of Berlin-Steglitz and speaker of the Young Union on the executive committee of the CDU's Berlin organization. He was also manager of a home building association and studied law at the University of Berlin from 1946 to 1949. In 1950 he passed the state bar examinations and subsequently, as a practicing attorney, specialized in administrative law. In that same year Amrehn was elected to the Berlin House of Representatives. From 1952 until his election as deputy mayor in 1955, he served as vice president of the House of Representatives. Since 1958 Amrehn has also been deputy chairman of the Berlin CDU organization.

Amrehn spent about two months in 1955 touring the United States under the Exchange of Persons program.

In addition to official visits to several European countries, Amrehn visited Japan in 1956. In April-May 1959 he visited Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, the United Arab Republic and Greece to generate goodwill for West Berlin and to explain the complexities of the Berlin and German situations.

Amrehn was married in 1947 to the former Else Trettin. The couple has no children. A Roman Catholic by faith, Amrehn has been a leading member of the Catholic community of Greater Berlin since 1949. He speaks some English and French.

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April 1961

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Authority State Sec 2/10/77

By MM9 DATE 1/15/77

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OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE
BIOGRAPHIC REGISTER

HENNEBERG, Willy

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Willy Henneberg, President of the Berlin House of Representatives since 1958, is a member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands - SPD) and a strong supporter of Mayor Willy Brandt. Although Henneberg is not without ambitions, he fills his position well and does not attempt to overshadow the Mayor. During the past year he has been forced to give up his activities in the House due to ill health. He was expected to return to his duties before the fall term.

Henneberg is a definite asset to the SPD because he himself is a master electrician and thus is one of the few true representatives of the crafts in the House of Representatives. He also owns an electrical appliances shop which is managed by his wife. Henneberg first joined the SPD in 1922 and has been successively elected to the House of Representatives since 1948.

Born in Berlin in 1898, Henneberg learned the electrician's trade and by 1937 had his own shop. He served in the Wehrmacht in Poland but was discharged in 1940. His own firm was completely destroyed in the war but he has since rebuilt it.

Henneberg has been described as a dignified, decent, and pleasant man. He does not speak English.

August 1961

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Biographic Information Division

BRANDT, Willy

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

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Authority State Dept 2/10/57

By rmg

DATE 6/10/57

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BRANDT, Willy (continued)

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Brandt is a large-boned, heavy-set and dignified man whose high forehead, strong jaw and inexpressible dimples are wide ideal targets for the political cartoonist.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

August 18, 1961

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC la 4/19/77, State la 11/2/76
By WMA, NARS, Date 5/6/77

Dear Mr. Vice President:

I am grateful to you for undertaking on short notice this important mission to Germany and West Berlin.

The main purpose of your mission is to reassure the people of West Berlin, while at the same time talking frankly with Mayor Brandt. The public statements and the letter to Mayor Brandt which we have reviewed together give general guidance for this mission. But, in addition, I hope that you will find an opportunity to speak frankly with Mayor Brandt in an effort to make it clear to him that in these next months it will be very important to avoid hasty criticism of each other.

Finally, I hope that you and your colleagues will take the opportunity of this visit to observe closely the existing situation in Germany and in West Berlin so that you may advise me, on your return, of any actions which you think it might be wise for us to take to strengthen the interests of the United States in this area.

With renewed thanks,

Sincerely,

The Honorable Lyndon Johnson

The Vice President



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Draft Arrival Statement (BONN) of the Vice President

I sincerely appreciate the warm welcome which you have accorded me. I am pleased to have this opportunity to visit the capital of the Federal Republic and to confer with Chancellor Adenauer during these critical days in the history of the free world. I expect to fly to Berlin this afternoon to meet with Mayor Brandt and other key officials.

I have come as the personal representative of President Kennedy to express the ^{deep} sympathetic concern of the President and the American people over the disturbing developments of the past week in the Soviet Sector of Berlin. I have also come to reassure the people of Berlin of our continuing interest in their welfare and to reaffirm the determination of the United States to honor its solemn commitments. As an earnest of this determination the President has authorized an immediate enlargement of the American garrison in West Berlin. ~~This will increase our ability to cope with any emergency which may arise.~~

The developments which have occasioned this visit to Bonn and Berlin need no elaboration. The drastic measures taken in East Germany and East Berlin to ring down the Iron Curtain between two parts of a great city can not be viewed simply in legalistic terms. For while this action, carried out with Soviet approval and support, is a flagrant violation of the special four-power status of Berlin and of free circulation within the city, we must never lose sight of the tragic human implications of these developments.

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Authority

11/2/76
SC la 4/19/77 State Sec

By

mg

NARS, Date

5/6/77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Having denied the people of East Germany and East Berlin the personal freedoms enjoyed by their compatriots across the border - to say nothing of the basic right of self-determination - the East German regime is now attempting to deny them even the right to choose a life of freedom in the West. The cruel separation of families, the cutting off of the means of support of over 50,000 East Berliners, and the barring to East Germans of the privilege of an occasional visit to free West Berlin which has made their life in the Soviet Zone of Germany a little more endurable - all of these actions point up the callous disregard of the Communist system for the human values which the free world considers so sacred.

Human history has demonstrated the verity and enduring character of these values. Freedom may be a giant slow to stir but its strength is drawn from every human heart. Believe me, it will prevail.

EUR:GER:HBCox:mne
8/18/61

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

August 18, 1961

Dear Mayor Brandt:

I have read with great care your personal informal letter of August 16th and I want to thank you for it. In these testing days it is important for us to be in close touch. For this reason I am sending my answer by the hand of Vice President Johnson. He comes with General Clay, who is well known to Berliners; and they have my authority to discuss our problems in full frankness with you.

The measures taken by the Soviet Government and its puppets in East Berlin have caused revulsion here in America. This demonstration of what the Soviet Government means by freedom for a city, and peace for a people, proves the hollowness of Soviet pretensions; and Americans understand that this action necessarily constitutes a special blow to the people of West Berlin, connected as they remain in a myriad of ways to their fellow Berliners in the eastern sector. So I understand entirely the deep concerns and sense of trouble which prompted your letter.

Grave as this matter is, however, there are, as you say, no steps available to us which can force a significant material change in this present situation. Since it represents a resounding confession of failure and of political weakness, this brutal border closing evidently represents a basic Soviet decision which only war could reverse. Neither you nor we, nor any of our Allies, have ever supposed that we should go to war on this point.

Yet the Soviet action is too serious for inadequate responses. My own objection to most of the measures which have been proposed -- even to most of the suggestions in

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
Bvckm/jc, NARA, Date 8-26-09

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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- 2 -

your own letter -- is that they are mere trifles compared to what has been done. Some of them, moreover, seem unlikely to be fruitful even in their own terms. This is our present judgment, for example, on the question of an immediate appeal to the United Nations, although we shall continue to keep this possibility under lively review.

On careful consideration I myself have decided that the best immediate response is a significant reinforcement of the Western garrisons. The importance of this reinforcement is symbolic -- but not symbolic only. We know that the Soviet Union continues to emphasize its demand for the removal of Allied protection from West Berlin. We believe that even a modest reinforcement will underline our rejection of this concept.

At the same time, and of even greater basic importance, we shall continue and accelerate the broad buildup of the military strength of the West upon which we are decided, and which we view as the necessary answer to the long-range Soviet threat to Berlin and to us all.

Within Berlin, in the immediate affairs of the city, there may be other specific appropriate steps to take. These we shall review as rapidly and sympathetically as possible, and I hope you will be sure to express your own views on such measures clearly to Vice President Johnson and his party. Actions which effectively demonstrate our continued commitment to freedom in Berlin will have our support.

I have considered with special care your proposal of a three-power status for West Berlin. My judgment is that a formal proclamation of such a status would imply a weakening of the four-power relationship on which our opposition to the border-closing depends. Whatever may be the immediate prospects, I do not believe that we should

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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now take so double-edged a step. I do agree that the guarantees which we have pledged to West Berlin should be continuously affirmed and reaffirmed, and this we are doing. Moreover, I support your proposal of an appropriate plebiscite demonstrating the continuing conviction of West Berlin that its destiny is freedom in connection with the West.

More broadly, let me urge it upon you that we must not be shaken by Soviet actions which in themselves are a confession of weakness. West Berlin today is more important than ever, and its mission to stand for freedom has never been so important as now. The link of West Berlin to the Free World is not a matter of rhetoric. Important as the ties to the East have been, painful as is their violation, the life of the city, as I understand it, runs primarily to the West -- its economic life, its moral basis, and its military security. You may wish to consider and to suggest concrete ways in which these ties might be expanded in a fashion that would make the citizens of West Berlin more actively conscious of their role, not merely as an outpost of freedom, but as a vital part of the Free World and all its enterprises. In this double mission we are partners, and it is my own confidence that we can continue to rely upon each other as firmly in the future as we have in the past.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

The Honorable Willy Brandt
Governing Mayor of Berlin



~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



7175/JWC

17 AUGUST 1961
DATE

27

FROM: USMISSION BERLIN

TO : WHITE HOUSE

INFO :

CITE : 223

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

ACTION DEPT NIACT 223 WHITEHOUSE NIACT UNN BONN PRITY 119
INFO LONDON 132 MOSCOW 127 PARIS 138, AUGUST 16, MIDNIGHT FROM
BERLIN SIGNED LIGHTNER.

BONN ALSO PASS INFO POLAD USAREUR 122 FROM BERLIN
PARIS FOR EMB, USRO, STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE.

MAYOR BRANDT HANDED ME TODAY LETTER FOR TRANSMITTAL TO PRESIDENT
KENNEDY. INFORMAL TRANSLATION FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

AFTER DEVELOPMENTS LAST THREE DAYS MY CITY, WISH CONVEY TO YOU

PAGE 1 OF 5

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By abm/jc, NARA, Date 2-26-07

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN PERSONAL, INFORMAL LETTER SOME OF MY THOUGHTS AND
VIEWPOINTS.

MEASURES OF ULBRICHT REGIME, SUPPORTED BY SOVUNION AND OTHER
EAST BLOC COUNTRIES, HAVE ALMOST FULLY DESTROYED REMNANTS
FOUR-POWER STATUS. WHILE IN PAST ALLIED COMMANDANTS HAVE
EVEN PROTESTED AGAINST PARADES BY SO-CALLED PEOPLES' ARMY,
THIS TIME, AFTER MILITARY OCCUPATION OF EAST SECTOR BY PEOPLES'
ARMY, THEY HAVE LIMITED THEMSELVES TO DELAYED AND NOT VERY VIGOROUS
STEP. ILLEGAL SOVEREIGNTY OF EAST BERLIN GOVERNMENT WAS
ACKNOWLEDGED BY ACQUIESCING IN THE RESTRICTIONS OF THE NUMBER OF
CROSSING POINTS AND OF ENTRY INTO THE EAST SECTOR. I REGARD THIS
ENCROACHMENT AS THE MOST SERIOUS IN THE POSTWAR HISTORY OF THIS
CITY SINCE THE BLOCKADE.

THIS DEVELOPMENT HAS NOT CHANGED WILL TO RESIST OF WEST BERLIN
POPULATION, BUT HAS TENDED TO AROUSE DOUBTS AS TO DETERMINATION OF
THREE POWERS AND THEIR ABILITY TO REACT. IN THIS CONNECTION THE
DECISIVE FACTOR IS THAT THE WEST HAS ALWAYS SPECIFICALLY
INVOKED THE EXISTING FOUR-POWER STATUS.

I AM WELL AWARE THAT EXISTING GUARANTEES FOR FREEDOM OF POP-
ULATION, PRESENCE OF TROOPS AND FREE ACCESS APPLY ONLY WEST BERLIN.
HOWEVER, THIS IS MATTER OF A DEEP WOUND IN LIFE OF GERMAN

PAGE 2 OF 5

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PEOPLE AND OF BEING FORCED OUT OF SPHERES OF COMMON RESPONSIBILITY
(BERLIN AND GERMANY AS A WHOLE) AFFECTING WHOLE WESTERN PRESTIGE.

I SEE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL DANGERS IN TWO RESPECTS: (1)
INACTIVITY AND MERE DEFENSIVE POSTURE CAN BRING ABOUT CRISIS OF
CONFIDENCE IN WESTERN POWERS; (2) INACTIVITY AND MERE DEFENSIVE
POSTURE CAN LEAD TO EXAGGERATED SELF-CONFIDENCE ON PART OF
EAST BERLIN REGIME WHOSE NEWSPAPERS ALREADY TODAY BOAST OF SUCCESS
ITS DEMONSTRATION OF MILITARY POWER.

SOVUNION HAS ACHIEVED HALF ITS FREE CITY PROPOSALS THROUGH USE GERMAN
PEOPLES' ARMY. THE SECOND ACT IS A QUESTION OF TIME. AFTER SECOND
ACT BERLIN WOULD BE LIKE A GHETTO, WHICH HAS NOT ONLY LOST ITS
FUNCTION AS REFUGE OF FREEDOM AND SYMBOL OF HOPE FOR REUNIFICATION
BUT WHICH WOULD ALSO BE SEVERED FROM FREE PART GERMANY. INSTEAD
OF FLIGHT TO BERLIN, WE MIGHT THEN EXPERIENCE BEGINNING OF FLIGHT
FROM BERLIN.

IN THIS SITUATION I CONSIDER IT PROPER THAT WESTERN POWERS, WHILE
DEMANDING RE-ESTABLISHMENT FOUR-POWER RESPONSIBILITIES, PROCLAIM
AT SAME TIME A THREE-POWER STATUS FOR WEST BERLIN. THREE POWERS SHOULD
REITERATE GUARANTEE THEIR PRESENCE IN WEST BERLIN UNTIL GERMAN
REUNIFICATION AND, IF NECESSARY, HAVE THIS SUPPORTED BY PLEBISCITE
POPULATION WEST BERLIN AND FEDREP. MUST ALSO BE SAID CLEARLY

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THAT GERMAN QUESTION IS IN NO WAY SETTLED FOR WESTERN POWERS BUT THAT THEY MUST INSIST UPON PEACE SETTLEMENT CORRESPONDING TO RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF GERMAN PEOPLE AND SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL CONCERNED. WOULD ALSO CONSIDER ADVISABLE THAT WEST ON OWN INITIATIVE BRING BERLIN QUESTION BEFORE UN, AT LEAST ON BASIS THAT USSR HAS VIOLATED DECLARATION HUMAN RIGHTS IN MOST FLAGRANT MANNER. APPEARS BETTER TO ME PUT USSR IN POSITION OF GUILTY PARTY THAN TO HAVE TO DISCUSS SAME THEME AFTER MOTION BY OTHER STATES.

I EXPECT FROM SUCH STEPS NO SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL CHANGE PRESENT SITUATION AND RECOLLECT NOT WITHOUT BITTERNESS DECLARATIONS REJECTING NEGOTIATIONS WITH USSR ON BASIS ONE SHOULD NOT NEGOTIATE UNDER PRESSURE. WE NOW HAVE STATE OF ACCOMPLISHED EXTORTION, AND ALREADY I HEAR IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TURN DOWN NEGOTIATIONS. IN SUCH SITUATION, WHEN POSSIBILITY OF INITIATIVE FOR ACTION IS ALREADY SO SMALL, IT IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT AT LEAST TO DEMONSTRATE POLITICAL INITIATIVE.

AFTER ACQUIESCENCE IN SOV STEP WHICH IS ILLEGAL, AND HAS BEEN TERMED ILLEGAL, AND IN VIEW MANY TRAGEDIES OCCURRING TODAY EAST BERLIN AND SOVZONE, WE WILL NOT BE SPARED RISKS OF ULTIMATE DECISION. IT WOULD BE WELCOMED IF AMERICAN GARRISON WERE TO BE DEMONSTRATIVELY STRENGTHENED.

I CONSIDER SITUATION SERIOUS ENOUGH, MR. PRESIDENT, TO WRITE

PAGE 4 OF 5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO YOU IN ALL FRANKNESS AS IS POSSIBLE ONLY BETWEEN FRIENDS WHO
TRUST EACH OTHER COMPLETELY.

(SIGNED) YOUR WILLY BRANDT

END TEXT

IN HANDING ME LETTER BRANDT SAID HE WOULD NOT PUBLISH TEXT.

IN SPEECH THIS AFTERNOON BRANDT MENTIONED FACT THAT LETTER WAS SENT.

ORIGINAL LETTER BEING POUCHED.

DTG: 170203Z

PAGE 5 OF 5

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