

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 2

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	TO BE SUBMITTED TO STATE DEPT FOR CONCURRENCE**		
#1 Report	WH Secret <i>State Ltr. 11-3-76</i> Visitation to Germany 8 p	08/20/61	A
#1a Report	WH Secret <i>State Ltr. 11-3-76</i> Visitation to Germany 8 p [duplicate of #1]	08/20/61	A
#1b Report	WH Secret <i>State Ltr. 11-3-76</i> Visitation to Germany 8 p [duplicate of #1]	08/20/61	A
#1c Report	WH Secret <i>State Ltr. 11-3-76</i> Visitation to Germany 8 p [duplicate of #1 pages 1-4 and #14 pages 5, 6]	08/20/61	A
#14 Report	WH Secret <i>State Ltr. 11-3-76</i> <del>VP Johnson's Trip to Germany</del> of Dec. #1 pages 5, 6 2 p variation	08/20/61	A

FILE LOCATION

VP Security File, VP Travel  
Report and Related Paper re VP Johnson's Trip to Germany

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#3 Memo	State Conf. <i>State ltr 11/2/76</i> Re negotiation to settle Berlin Crisis 4 p	Undated	A
#3a Memo	State Conf. <i>State ltr 11/2/76</i> Re: negotiation to settle Berlin Crisis 4 p [duplicate of #3]	Undated	A
#4 MemCon	<del>State Secret</del> <i>Exempt, ltr 3/2/77</i> <del>Conversation between VP Johnson, et al and</del> <del>Chancellor Adenauer, et al</del> 8 p	<i>open 3-9-09</i> 08/19/61	A
#9 MemCon	<del>State Secret</del> <i>Exempt, ltr 3/2/77</i> <del>Conversation between VP Johnson, et al and</del> <i>open 3-9-09</i> <del>Mayor Brandt</del> 6 p	08/20/61	A
#10f Cable	State Conf. <i>State ltr 11/2/76</i> Embtel 264 from Berlin 2 p	08/20/61	A
#10g Cable	State conf. <i>State ltr 11/2/76</i> Embtel 264 from Berlin 2 p (duplicate of #10f)	08/20/61	A
#10r Cable	State Secret <i>State ltr 11/2/76</i> Deptel 135 to Berlin 1 p	08/17/61	A
#10s Cable	State Secret <i>State ltr 11/2/76</i> Deptel 135 to Berlin 1 p [duplicate of #10r]	08/17/61	A
#10x Cable	State Secret <i>State ltr 11/2/76</i> Embtel 183 from Paris 2 p	08/19/61	A
#10y Cable	State Secret <i>State ltr 11/2/76</i> Embtel 183 from Paris 2 p [duplicate of #10x]	08/19/61	A

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1

Report

Visitation to Germany

By

Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson

August 19-20, 1961

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority State Dir. 11-3-74  
By Chen, NARS, Date 3-15-77

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Topics in Report

- A. Summary of Confidential Discussion between the Vice President and Chancellor Adenauer, August 19, 1961.
- B. Summary of Discussion between the Vice President and Mayor Brandt, August 19, 1961.
- C. General Observations.
- D. Recommendations.

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A. Summary of Confidential Discussion Between the Vice President and Chancellor Adenauer, August 19, 1961.

The Chancellor recommended, as a matter of great urgency, that economic sanctions should be carefully prepared and then applied. He was assured that this recommendation would be transmitted to the President.

It was impressed upon the Chancellor that the United States had already made substantial sacrifices and was prepared to make even more in cooperation with our Allies. Specific reference was made to the fact that the President had asked for an amount of defense funds never before equalled in peacetime, and that the Congress had appropriated even more than the President had requested. This was cited to illustrate the serious determination of the American people that we should support our commitments with our national power and national resources.

It was further emphasized that our determination would be impaired only by conviction that the United States was being asked to bear a disproportionate burden relative to others, and by criticism from our friends and Allies who were not doing as much as they reasonably should.

It was made clear to the Chancellor that we viewed the Berlin situation as a common cause for free people and that, along with the U.S., additional effort should be made by Germany, France, and the United Kingdom without delay.

There was discussion of the issues raised by Mayor Brandt's letter to the President, a reply to which was being delivered the next day. The Chancellor expressed his disapproval of the Mayor's letter. He was, in turn, informed that the U.S. had reacted decisively to the Berlin situation as evidenced by the President's sending the Vice President and General Clay to Bonn and Berlin, and by his directing that additional equipped troops be sent to Berlin concurrently.

It was again pointed out that our prompt actions following the closing off of East Berlin should be considered with the previously mentioned military buildup as a coordinated action rather than as isolated events.

The Chancellor was told that the President's current difficulties with the Congress, as regards funds for the Mutual Security program,

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stemmed to a considerable degree from the belief that the U.S. was carrying more than its share in the fight against the Communists.

The Chancellor listened most attentively to this exposition of our determination, our actions, and our desire for multilateral participation in meeting the situation created by the USSR. He indicated his understanding of the need for more equal sharing of the burden, and expressed agreement that the Germans must do more to help themselves. In that connection, he stated that he was prepared to extend the period for military conscription in West Germany and that he planned to announce such policy after his election. He further stated that West Germany's Defense Minister Straus had already discussed with Secretary of Defense McNamara various possibilities for increasing West Germany's military strength.

While the Chancellor's determination to do more was clear, it was also clear that we could not expect much additional from the West German people prior to the election.

In response to the Chancellor's reference to various possibilities for increasing West Germany's military strength, it was agreed that the various restrictions placed upon West Germany might well be evaluated anew in light of the present situation. However, no commitment or suggestions as to changes and restrictions were made.

B. Summary of Discussion Between the Vice President and Mayor Brandt, August 19, 1961.

The Mayor was informed of the unfortunate repercussions from his publicized letter to the President. In so doing, it was stressed that the Soviet action in closing off the East Berlin sector had made abundantly clear to the world that life under a Communist regime compared most unfavorably to conditions in the free portion of Berlin. Initially, the propaganda effect of their action had been adverse to the Soviets. It was then pointed out that the Mayor's complaint and the alarm generated thereby among the West Berliners had shifted the propaganda effect so that it now appeared like a show of Western weakness versus Soviet strength.

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The Mayor was advised, however, that all the points in his letter had been carefully considered in Washington, even though it had proved impossible to agree with them. The Mayor was further advised that American policy was set forth clearly and candidly in the President's reply to him.

After this evaluation of the U.S. reaction to his letter, the Mayor was told that the purpose of this visit was not to engage in prolonged re-criminations about something which was now history, but rather was to reason with him in quiet cooperation.

The Mayor reacted most favorably to this candid approach. He expressed regret that the letter had been given unauthorized publication, and denied responsibility for the disclosure of its contents. In fact, he made little effort to justify the letter except to express the conviction that it had helped move American policy off "dead center."

In discussing the recommendations which the Mayor had made, it was emphasized that the U.S. could not accept his proposal to replace the four-power treaty with a three-power arrangement, or to place the Berlin issue before the United Nations at this time. The latter was amplified by pointing out that the General Assembly was currently involved by the Bizerte problem. The Mayor agreed that his recommendations in these respects might well have been ill advised.

He was told that we understood the reaction of the West Berliners to having the city divided by concrete, barbed wire, and armed Communists. It was pointed out, however, that we had responded to the threat with action. The following actions by the President were cited:

- a. request to the Congress for about \$7 billion additional defense money;
- b. calling up of thousands of young Americans to active duty;
- c. extending the period of military service;
- d. sending the Vice President and General Clay to Berlin;
- e. dispatching additional American troops and equipment to Berlin.

This recitation of positive action clearly impressed the Mayor and he agreed that it was necessary for the West Berliners to do more to help themselves. He emphasized this point by stating that the United States should not be expected to carry the load by itself, nor should other countries be asked to increase their contribution unless the people of West Berlin did their part in the joint cause.

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The Mayor was told of our substantial respect for West Berlin's energetic population and economic productivity, as well as for its courage in facing the Communist challenge. It was pointed out to him, however, that this respect would be compromised and support would become more difficult to obtain if West Berliners failed to make a real effort in the defense of their city and their freedom.

The Mayor indicated his agreement with this analysis and stated that he favored a greater contribution on the part of West Berliners. His reaction was friendly and cooperative.

C. Observations.

1. The morale of the West Berliners and Free World confidence in American policy was greatly improved by the visit and by the arrival of American troops.

2. The single most important element in this success was the appearance of American tanks, manned by U.S. soldiers.

3. This restoration of morale, however, cannot be considered permanent, and hence other actions should be planned and should be undertaken before the morale suffers another serious decline.

4. The Soviets have demonstrated that they can seal the border and they will undoubtedly propagandize a picture of the NATO allies being impotent to unseal it.

5. Closing of the escape route for East Berliners will tend to generate a feeling of hopelessness on their part. It would be unwarranted to conclude that this will create significant difficulties for the Soviets as they have had much successful experience in suppressing dissatisfied populations.

6. As an immediate problem, it is more important to attempt to solve the refugee situation than to divert energy toward plans for preventing the Soviets from taking over West Berlin. It is unlikely that Premier Khrushchev has the latter on his present schedule.

7. Those who participated in this recent visit to Germany returned with new pride in America's leadership, but with an accentuated awareness of the responsibility which rests upon this country.

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**D. Recommendations.**

There is no single or simple solution to the Berlin situation. However, the following recommendations are suggested for consideration:

1. Other Allied free nations should be urged to make additional contributions to the total defense strength in Western Europe. This would result in an effective show of unity among the members of the Western alliance.
2. If it is practicable, our most modern weapons should be exchanged for less modern equipment in West Berlin, so that they would be clearly in evidence. The U.S. contributions to this exchange should include small numbers of new M-60 tanks, M-113 armored personnel carriers, and T-235 self-propelled artillery.
3. Careful thought and consideration should be given to plans for placing a single commander in command of the defense of West Berlin in case of an emergency.
4. We should explore the possibilities and advantages of having the West Berlin police force gradually expanded from the current one to one ratio with Allied troops to a two to one ratio. In this connection, consideration should be given to the incorporation of such police force into the defense plans for West Berlin.
5. Consideration should be given to plans for top officials of other major free nations visiting West Berlin at irregular but frequent intervals, upon the pre-arranged invitation from the Federal Republic or West Berlin.
6. A plan should be readied for the imposition of a selective list of economic sanctions. This should be considered for introduction gradually in the form of embargoes on a limited number of key items, and every effort should be made to have all NATO nations cooperate. Withdrawal of such sanctions would comprise a negotiation factor.

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7. Participation in the Leipzig Fair should be informally discouraged; gradually increasing restrictions should be imposed on travel from the East to the West Zone.

8. Key quotations from the President's July 25 address and from formal statements made during the recent trip should be translated into appropriate languages, printed, and widely distributed through the USIA or other organizations.

9. The West Berlin government should announce that it is financing, with token contributions from NATO countries, a large international educational, cultural, or scientific center in the city.

10. Every effort should be made to improve communications between and among the Western powers so as to reduce the time factor required for coordinated reaction to emergencies or changes in the Berlin situation.

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Report

Visitation to Germany

By

Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson

August 19-20, 1961

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By Shu, NARS, Date 3-15-77

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The Chancellor recommended, as a matter of great urgency, that economic sanctions should be carefully prepared and then applied. He was assured that this recommendation would be transmitted to the President.

It was impressed upon the Chancellor that the United States had already made substantial sacrifices and was prepared to make even more in cooperation with our Allies. Specific reference was made to the fact that the President had asked for an amount of defense funds never before equalled in peacetime, and that the Congress had appropriated even more than the President had requested. This was cited to illustrate the serious determination of the American people that we should support our commitments with our national power and national resources.

It was further emphasized that our determination would be impaired only by conviction that the United States was being asked to bear a disproportionate burden relative to others, and by criticism from our friends and Allies who were not doing as much as they reasonably should.

It was made clear to the Chancellor that we viewed the Berlin situation as a common cause for free people and that, along with the U. S., additional effort should be made by Germany, France, and the United Kingdom without delay.

There was discussion of the issues raised by Mayor Brandt's letter to the President, a reply to which was being delivered the next day. The Chancellor expressed his disapproval of the Mayor's letter. He was, in turn, informed that the U. S. had reacted decisively to the Berlin situation as evidenced by the President's sending the Vice President and General Clay to Bonn and Berlin, and by his directing that additional equipped troops be sent to Berlin concurrently.

It was again pointed out that our prompt actions following the closing off of East Berlin should be considered with the previously mentioned military buildup as a coordinated action rather than as isolated events.

The Chancellor was told that the President's current difficulties with the Congress, as regards funds for the Mutual Security program,

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The Chancellor listened most attentively to this exposition of our determination, our actions, and our desire for multilateral participation in meeting the situation created by the USSR. He indicated his understanding of the need for more equal sharing of the burden, and expressed agreement that the Germans must do more to help themselves. In that connection, he stated that he was prepared to extend the period for military conscription in West Germany and that he planned to announce such policy after his election. He further stated that West Germany's Defense Minister Straus had already discussed with Secretary of Defense McNamara various possibilities for increasing West Germany's military strength.

While the Chancellor's determination to do more was clear, it was also clear that we could not expect much additional from the West German people prior to the election.

In response to the Chancellor's reference to various possibilities for increasing West Germany's military strength, it was agreed that the various restrictions placed upon West Germany might well be evaluated anew in light of the present situation. However, no commitment or suggestions as to changes and restrictions were made.

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The Mayor was informed of the unfortunate repercussions from his publicized letter to the President. In so doing, it was stressed that the Soviet action in closing off the East Berlin sector had made abundantly clear to the world that life under a Communist regime compared most unfavorably to conditions in the free portion of Berlin. Initially, the propaganda effect of their action had been adverse to the Soviets. It was then pointed out that the Mayor's complaint and the alarm generated thereby among the West Berliners had shifted the propaganda effect so that it now appeared like a show of Western weakness versus Soviet strength.

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In discussing the recommendations which the Mayor had made, it was emphasized that the U.S. could not accept his proposal to replace the four-power treaty with a three-power arrangement, or to place the Berlin issue before the United Nations at this time. The latter was amplified by pointing out that the General Assembly was currently involved by the Bizerte problem. The Mayor agreed that his recommendations in these respects might well have been ill advised.

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6. As an immediate problem, it is more important to attempt to solve the refugee situation than to divert energy toward plans for preventing the Soviets from taking over West Berlin. It is unlikely that Premier Khrushchev has the latter on his present schedule.

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**D. Recommendations.**

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Report

Visitation to Germany

By

Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson

August 19-20, 1961

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AUG 11 1976  
By chw, NARS, Date 3-15-77

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4. We should explore the possibilities and advantages of having the West Berlin police force gradually expanded from the current one to one ratio with Allied troops to a two to one ratio. In this connection, consideration should be given to the incorporation of such police force into the defense plans for West Berlin.
5. Consideration should be given to plans for top officials of other major free nations visiting West Berlin at irregular but frequent intervals, upon the pre-arranged invitation from the Federal Republic or West Berlin.
6. A plan should be readied for the imposition of a selective list of economic sanctions. This should be considered for introduction gradually in the form of embargoes on a limited number of key items, and every effort should be made to have all NATO nations cooperate. Withdrawal of such sanctions would comprise a negotiation factor.

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7. Participation in the Leipzig Fair should be informally discouraged; gradually increasing restrictions should be imposed on travel from the East to the West Zone.

8. Key quotations from the President's July 25 address and from formal statements made during the recent trip should be translated into appropriate languages, printed, and widely distributed through the USIA or other organizations.

9. The West Berlin government should announce that it is financing, with token contributions from NATO countries, a large international educational, cultural, or scientific center in the city.

10. Every effort should be made to improve communications between and among the Western powers so as to reduce the time factor required for coordinated reaction to emergencies or changes in the Berlin situation.

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Report

Visitation to Germany

By

Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson

August 19-20, 1961

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Authority State ltr. 11-3-76  
By Chu, NARS, Date 3-15-77

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Topics in Report

- A. Summary of Confidential Discussion between the  
Vice President and Chancellor Adenauer, August 19, 1961.
- B. Summary of Discussion between the Vice President and  
Mayor Brandt, August 19, 1961.
- C. General Observations.
- D. Recommendations.

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A. Summary of Confidential Discussion Between the Vice President and Chancellor Adenauer, August 19, 1961.

The Chancellor recommended, as a matter of great urgency, that economic sanctions should be carefully prepared and then applied. He was assured that this recommendation would be transmitted to the President.

It was impressed upon the Chancellor that the United States had already made substantial sacrifices and was prepared to make even more in cooperation with our Allies. Specific reference was made to the fact that the President had asked for an amount of defense funds never before equalled in peacetime, and that the Congress had appropriated even more than the President had requested. This was cited to illustrate the serious determination of the American people that we should support our commitments with our national power and national resources.

It was further emphasized that our determination would be impaired only by conviction that the United States was being asked to bear a disproportionate burden relative to others, and by criticism from our friends and Allies who were not doing as much as they reasonably should.

It was made clear to the Chancellor that we viewed the Berlin situation as a common cause for free people and that, along with the U. S., additional effort should be made by Germany, France, and the United Kingdom without delay.

There was discussion of the issues raised by Mayor Brandt's letter to the President, a reply to which was being delivered the next day. The Chancellor expressed his disapproval of the Mayor's letter. He was, in turn, informed that the U. S. had reacted decisively to the Berlin situation as evidenced by the President's sending the Vice President and General Clay to Bonn and Berlin, and by his directing that additional equipped troops be sent to Berlin concurrently.

It was again pointed out that our prompt actions following the closing off of East Berlin should be considered with the previously mentioned military buildup as a coordinated action rather than as isolated events.

The Chancellor was told that the President's current difficulties with the Congress, as regards funds for the Mutual Security program,

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stemmed to a considerable degree from the belief that the U.S. was carrying more than its share in the fight against the Communists.

The Chancellor listened most attentively to this exposition of our determination, our actions, and our desire for multilateral participation in meeting the situation created by the USSR. He indicated his understanding of the need for more equal sharing of the burden, and expressed agreement that the Germans must do more to help themselves. In that connection, he stated that he was prepared to extend the period for military conscription in West Germany and that he planned to announce such policy after his election. He further stated that West Germany's Defense Minister Straus had already discussed with Secretary of Defense McNamara various possibilities for increasing West Germany's military strength.

While the Chancellor's determination to do more was clear, it was also clear that we could not expect much additional from the West German people prior to the election.

In response to the Chancellor's reference to various possibilities for increasing West Germany's military strength, it was agreed that the various restrictions placed upon West Germany might well be evaluated anew in light of the present situation. However, no commitment or suggestions as to changes and restrictions were made.

B. Summary of Discussion Between the Vice President and Mayor Brandt, August 19, 1961.

The Mayor was informed of the unfortunate repercussions from his publicized letter to the President. In so doing, it was stressed that the Soviet action in closing off the East Berlin sector had made abundantly clear to the world that life under a Communist regime compared most unfavorably to conditions in the free portion of Berlin. Initially, the propaganda effect of their action had been adverse to the Soviets. It was then pointed out that the Mayor's complaint and the alarm generated thereby among the West Berliners had shifted the propaganda effect so that it now appeared like a show of Western weakness versus Soviet strength.

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The Mayor was advised, however, that all the points in his letter had been carefully considered in Washington, even though it had proved impossible to agree with them. The Mayor was further advised that American policy was set forth clearly and candidly in the President's reply to him.

After this evaluation of the U.S. reaction to his letter, the Mayor was told that the purpose of this visit was not to engage in prolonged re-criminations about something which was now history, but rather was to reason with him in quiet cooperation.

The Mayor reacted most favorably to this candid approach. He expressed regret that the letter had been given unauthorized publication, and denied responsibility for the disclosure of its contents. In fact, he made little effort to justify the letter except to express the conviction that it had helped move American policy off "dead center."

In discussing the recommendations which the Mayor had made, it was emphasized that the U.S. could not accept his proposal to replace the four-power treaty with a three-power arrangement, or to place the Berlin issue before the United Nations at this time. The latter was amplified by pointing out that the General Assembly was currently involved by the Bizerte problem. The Mayor agreed that his recommendations in these respects might well have been ill advised.

He was told that we understood the reaction of the West Berliners to having the city divided by concrete, barbed wire, and armed Communists. It was pointed out, however, that we had responded to the threat with action. The following actions by the President were cited:

- a. request to the Congress for about \$7 billion additional defense money;
- b. calling up of thousands of young Americans to active duty;
- c. extending the period of military service;
- d. sending the Vice President and General Clay to Berlin;
- e. dispatching additional American troops and equipment to Berlin.

This recitation of positive action clearly impressed the Mayor and he agreed that it was necessary for the West Berliners to do more to help themselves. He emphasized this point by stating that the United States should not be expected to carry the load by itself, nor should other countries be asked to increase their contribution unless the people of West Berlin did their part in the joint cause.

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The Mayor was told of our substantial respect for West Berlin's energetic population and economic productivity, as well as for its courage in facing the Communist challenge. It was pointed out to him, however, that this respect would be compromised and support would become more difficult to obtain if West Berliners failed to make a real effort in the defense of their city and their freedom.

The Mayor indicated his agreement with this analysis and stated that he favored a greater contribution on the part of West Berliners. His reaction was friendly and cooperative.

C. Observations.

1. The morale of the West Berliners and Free World confidence in American policy was greatly improved by the visit and by the arrival of American troops.

2. The single most important element in this success was the appearance of American tanks, manned by U.S. soldiers.

3. This restoration of morale, however, cannot be considered permanent, and hence other actions should be planned and should be undertaken before the morale suffers another serious decline.

4. The Soviets have demonstrated that they can seal the border and they will undoubtedly propagandize a picture of the NATO allies being impotent to unseal it.

5. Closing of the escape route for East Berliners will tend to generate a feeling of hopelessness on their part. It would be unwarranted to conclude that this will create significant difficulties for the Soviets as they have had much successful experience in suppressing dissatisfied populations.

6. As an immediate problem, it is more important to attempt to solve the refugee situation than to divert energy toward plans for preventing the Soviets from taking over West Berlin. It is unlikely that Premier Khrushchev has the latter on his present schedule.

7. Those who participated in this recent visit to Germany returned with new pride in America's leadership, but with an accentuated awareness of the responsibility which rests upon this country.

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D. Recommendations.

There is no single or simple solution to the Berlin situation. However, the following recommendations are suggested for consideration:

1. All NATO members should be urged to increase their assistance in the defense of West Berlin. The additional strength is needed as an effective show of unity among the members of the Western alliance. This calls for a specific request of each nation and a joint announcement from all nations contributing.
2. A schedule should be established for increases, at frequent but irregular intervals, of military strength in West Berlin. This should be primarily in modern weapons rather than numbers of manpower. As many different NATO countries as possible should supply portions of this equipment, with the origin of each identified clearly to the population. The U.S. should send in small numbers of new M-60 tanks, M-113 armored personnel carriers, and T-235 self-propelled artillery.
3. The West Berlin police force should be gradually expanded from the current one to one ratio with Allied troops to a two to one ratio.
4. Top officials of other major NATO nations should visit West Berlin at irregular but frequent intervals, upon the pre-arranged invitation from the Federal Republic or West Berlin.
5. A plan should be readied for the imposition of a selective list of economic sanctions. This should be considered for introduction gradually in the form of embargoes on a limited number of key items, and every effort should be made to have all NATO nations cooperate. Withdrawal of such sanctions would comprise a negotiation factor.
6. A coordinated NATO plan should be prepared for strategically-timed lifting of some of the non-nuclear restrictions on German military strength.

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7. Participation in the Leipzig Fair should be informally discouraged; gradually increasing restrictions should be imposed on travel from the East to the West zone.

8. Key quotations from the President's July 25 address and from formal statements made during the recent trip should be translated into appropriate languages, printed, and widely distributed through the USIA or other organizations.

9. The West Berlin government should announce that it is financing, with token contributions from NATO countries, a large international educational, cultural, or scientific center in the city.

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## MEMORANDUM

### 1. Background of the trip:

a) Confidential advice from West Germany indicated that morale in West Berlin was sinking to a dangerously low point.

b) The deterioration in morale was accentuated by the heated election campaign between Adenauer and Brandt.

c) The best indication of how bad things had gone was the rather hysterical letter that Brandt had written to the President.

d) There were some who thought that morale had dipped so alarmingly that it was possible for the Communists to take all of Berlin.

e) The President and the Secretary of State decided that a dramatic move was necessary to save the situation.

f) The dramatic move was to send the Vice President into Berlin because, as a nationally elected official of the United States, he would be considered more of a pledge of American intentions than any other person except the President himself.

### 2. The major problems involved in the trip were:

a) To keep the United States absolutely neutral in the election campaign between Adenauer and Brandt.

b) To calm the hysteria of some of the German leaders and to find out where they really stood and to let them know where the United States really stood.

c) To reassure the people of West Berlin that the United States would stand firm in the defense of their freedoms without giving them any false illusions that the United States would encourage any wild adventuristic move to crack the barricades and storm East Berlin.

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3. In order to maintain neutrality in the election campaign, it was decided to have separate visits to Adenauer and Brandt. In the course of these visits, the Vice President held highly private conversations with both leaders. The results of these conversations were very revealing:

a) Adenauer said that he thought the United States had been unfairly criticized and claimed he had tried to soft-pedal some of this criticism. It developed that there were really no differences between the American position and Adenauer's position.

b) In the conversation with Brandt, Brandt appeared to be a somewhat chastened man. He also conceded that he had very few practical suggestions but said the situation was such that something had to be done to counter the Communist moves because otherwise, German morale would deteriorate.

4. The reception accorded to the Vice President in Berlin on Saturday, and to the American troops plus the Vice President on Sunday, was fabulous. It represented a tremendous outpouring of emotion which, according to people who had been in both places, had no parallel except the liberation of Paris. This reception represented an emotional feeling that the Germans did not stand alone and that they had allies in the defense of their freedom. The atmosphere was so super-charged emotionally that people could be seen wiping tears from their eyes and thanking God out loud that America had arrived. Brandt, in effect, said the situation had been saved.

5. It is apparent that the battle over Berlin is a tremendous war of nerves. The Communists won a victory merely by sealing off the borders so effectively that people who are separated by only a few blocks cannot have the faintest knowledge of what has happened to each other. The situation was restored by sending the Vice President and the troops in at the same time. However, we must look ahead for counter measures that can be taken to keep morale high and to keep the Communists off balance. Possible measures would include:

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a) Urging France and England to pour more strength into Berlin. At the present time the combined French and British garrisons are less than 5,000 and even though the British moved some armor in last week, they did it quietly and it was a very small contingent.

b) Urging the Germans themselves to do more. For example, they could extend conscription, increase the Federal police and give them "special" training along the same lines as has been given to the East German "police". There are 12,000 police in West Berlin and if these could be trained and armed with tanks and artillery, it would be a potent stroke.

c) A careful study of the possibilities of removing some of the restrictions that still inhibit the West German military forces. (Such as restrictions on the air force and size of forces).

d) Arranging for further visits by high officials of the Western Alliance to take place at crucial moments when West Berlin needs a "shot in the arm".

e) A re-study of the possibility of economic sanctions (American policy has largely rejected such a step but Adenauer expressed a deep interest in economic sanctions and it would be well to re-study the problem in this light).

f) Imposition of restrictions on passes given to East Germans visiting West Germany and discouragement of participation in the Leipzig Fair (these steps are important only because they have been raised and failure to do them might be interpreted as a sign of weakness).

6. We must face up frankly to the fact that the Communists, by sealing off the border in Berlin, have made a gain. They have lost a propaganda battle because they had to confess their system was so unattractive they could prevent people from fleeing the "Communist paradise" only with rifles, tanks, barbed wire and a cement wall. But on the other hand, no one has come up with a practical suggestion to counter the Communist ability to prevent East Germans from fleeing. In the months that lie ahead, this could lead to greater frustration on the part of the West Germans and the East Germans both and some very careful thought must be given to trying to find an effective counter move.

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7. Finally, there is one point that must be made not just about Berlin, but about the world. After having traveled through Asia, Africa, and Germany, the most important conclusion is the fantastic dependence that the free world places in the United States. No American can possibly travel in foreign lands without being overwhelmed by the feeling that free people are reposing in us faith, confidence, and hope for the future. It is a responsibility that has no parallel in all of history. Every American who has had this experience goes to bed at night with a prayer to God that we can be worthy of this trust.

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By smg, NARS, Date 4/5/77

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

1. Since the United States has committed itself to a course of negotiation to settle the Berlin crisis, the problem arises of determining just what kind of a negotiated settlement would be acceptable.
2. This is not a problem which can be answered by trying to determine Khrushchev's objectives. Reading the communist mind has been one of the great indoor sports in the Western World for the past 40 years. A few people claim some success at it but since so many guesses are made each day, a few of them are bound to be correct just on the law of averages. The only safe assumption about the communist leadership is that it seeks to take over the world and this is not very useful as a guide to conduct in a specific crisis.
3. A safer guide is to determine the vital interests and irrevocable commitments of the United States and the vital interests and irrevocable commitments of the Soviet Union. This is not an absolutely safe guide because either side might make a misjudgment and there is no way of knowing whether Khrushchev might have decided to go beyond safeguarding his vital interests even at the risk of war. But there is no other way of reducing the situation to a point where logical analysis is possible.
4. In terms of Berlin, the United States has already signified what it considers to be its vital interests and its irrevocable commitments. This was made clear when the United States permitted the erection of the wall dividing Berlin but rushed troops to the wall. This was a move of great significance because the easy access of Germans from East Berlin to West Berlin had been a tremendous source of weakness to the communist world. By rushing troops to the wall, the United States said it would fight against being pushed out of a geographical position already held. But by permitting the wall to be put up in the first place, the United States also said that it would NOT fight just to keep in being a source of weakness to the communist world. In short, we have determined that our only vital interest is to stay where we are and our only irrevocable commitment is to defend the people already behind our lines.

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5. This places a limitation upon our negotiating ability. The world knows when and under what circumstances we will fight. Similar knowledge concerning Khrushchev is not available. His only irrevocable commitment thus far is to sign a treaty that will make East Germany a sovereign state (at least in the formal sense.) How far he will go beyond that, we do not know. He knows our boiling point and we don't know his.

6. However, if Khrushchev really wants to settle the Berlin situation, it is a reasonable assumption that he will agree to something just under our boiling point. From his standpoint, the trick of negotiation is to find an area where he gains something substantial without pushing us over the line into war. The history of the past few months suggests that there are two things which he absolutely must have:

a) The permanent division of Germany with East Germany established as a communist state.

b) The closing of the escape routes from East to West Germany.

7. These objectives could be accomplished by his merely signing a treaty with East Germany and maintaining the wall through Berlin. In order to keep us below our boiling point, he could guarantee our access routes to Berlin (or even let us have access to Berlin without making a point of it by putting the guarantee in writing.) But actually, this would not be a very satisfactory settlement from his point of view. It would leave Berlin divided and while it is to Khrushchev's interests to have Germany divided, the division of Berlin could be a real source of trouble. It is one thing to divide a nation; another thing altogether to divide a city. A city can be kept divided only by constant police action on a truly colossal scale. Furthermore, a line running through a city is certain to divide thousands of families and cut across close, personal ties. Such a division is bound to create tensions even beyond those considered tolerable in a communist state. Under any circumstances, a city offers a disaffected population innumerable opportunities for sabotage, subversion and acts of individual terrorism. These can be kept under control when the whole city is policed by one force. It is doubtful whether the controls will work when the people in the disaffected part of the city are separated from their kinsmen only by a thin dividing line.

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8. From a dispassionate viewpoint, there would appear to be two ways in which the communists could solve the problem of Berlin -- either by taking it over altogether or by pulling out altogether. Strangely enough, either course would serve their purposes. The importance of Berlin to the communists rests not in its real estate and only secondarily in its symbolism. The real importance of Berlin lies in the fact that it affords an easy escape route to the West which can be cut off under present circumstances only by Herculean efforts. It would be simpler to shut off that escape route by pulling out of Berlin altogether and sealing off the city from East Germany.

9. Khrushchev, of course, has enough prestige at stake that he would not pull out of Berlin without receiving something really important in return. About the only thing the United States could possibly give would be formal recognition of East Germany. In effect, we would trade East Germany for all of Berlin. The situation then would be:

- a) We would have agreed to a permanently divided Germany.
- b) Khrushchev would have agreed to leave Berlin in the Western camp.
- c) We would have brought about one and one-half million people under freedom who do not have it now.
- d) But we would also have agreed to abandon about 16,000,000 Germans to the communists (at least until the next crisis).

10. Under other circumstances, this would be a deal that would be difficult to justify. But the fact remains that we have already announced to the world (by permitting the erection of the wall) that we are not going to fight to liberate the East Germans anyway. The best we can possibly hope for after such an announcement is to preserve the status quo. An agreement along the lines stated above would preserve the status quo. Both we and the communists would be relieved of the problems and tensions arising out of a divided Berlin. At the same time, both sides would have received some important, face-saving concessions.

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11. There is no way of knowing, of course, whether Khrushchev would accede to such an arrangement. Perhaps communist ambitions have gone beyond the status quo and closing the escape routes. If so, there is nothing we can do but prepare to surrender or fight. But if there is a willingness on his part to achieve a degree of stability, the above is a possibility that should be considered. It would be difficult to negotiate such an arrangement. But it is even more difficult to conceive of alternatives.

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Memorandum of Conversation

Bonn Germany  
August 19, 1961  
12:40 P.M.  
Palais Schaumburg

Participants

American

The Vice President  
Secretary Connally  
General Clay  
Ambassador Bohlen  
Ambassador Dowling  
Mr. Cash

German

Chancellor Adenauer  
Foreign Minister von Brentano  
State Secretary Globke  
Ambassador von Braun  
Ambassador von Etzdorf  
Ambassador Duckwitz  
Mr. Weber (Interpreter)

The Chancellor began the discussion by saying how grateful he was to have the Vice President and his party in Bonn. He continued by saying that he felt strongly that recent reproaches of the U. S. Administration and especially President Kennedy were completely unjustified. He added that the reproaches were directed against the U.S., U.K., and France, but that they began in the United States. He quoted a New York Herald Tribune article saying that the greatest handicap the Western Allies have is their inability to agree among themselves. The more we are told, the article continued, about the unity of the West, the more disunity grows.

The Chancellor said that the unrest among the German people caused by the shock of the recent acts of the Ulbricht regime had now diminished. The initial impact had been heightened by the fact that the people had not been prepared for these developments. It was vacation time, during which they did not pay much attention to what was in the papers, and thus they have been taken by surprise.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By 6020/jc NARA, Date 2-26-09

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He said that on the 18th of August he had addressed a crowd of 7,000 in Essen and outlined for them a realistic picture of the world situation. It was a CDU rally, but some SPD supporters were present and heckled him at the start. He had told the crowd that we live in a period of nuclear weapons and had explained the effects such weapons can produce. He had said that we were at the start of a period of very important and serious negotiations, which must take place, but only after military preparations, as the Russians respect only military strength.

He had told the crowd what gratitude Germans owe the U. S. He had added that it was unjust to express doubt that the U. S. would honor its pledges. Instead, the Germans must stand firmly beside the U. S.

The crowd had understood and had applauded him as seldom before.

The Chancellor assured the Vice President that in the month remaining in the current election campaign his party would take the line that the West must negotiate seriously with Khrushchev because the latter does not want a war in which, as he knows, there would be no victors. Khrushchev wants negotiations instead.

He said that the Federal Republic would not ~~flag~~ in its loyalty to the Atlantic Treaty or in its loyalty to the U. S. He asked the Vice President not to form any firm opinion until he had had a chance to see the present situation in Germany and Berlin for himself.

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In facing a difficult situation such as that we face today, it is especially important to consider emotional and psychological factors, and it was, therefore, exceedingly helpful that President Kennedy had sent to Germany the Vice President and General Clay, who is still so well remembered.

The Chancellor said that the real situation in Germany was reflected in the warm, friendly, enthusiastic greeting the Vice President had received from the hundreds of people who had lined the route all along the long drive from Wahn airport into Bonn. He said he had noted only one critical sign held by an elderly spinster which read "Action, not words." He added with a smile that he had taken a second look at the spinster and decided that he wanted neither words, nor action, with her.

He said he had no doubt that the Vice President would receive in Berlin the same warm, cordial reception from all the people, and inasmuch as Berlin was much larger than Bonn, the welcome would seem even more overwhelming. He had made the same drive from Wahn to Bonn in 1959 with President Eisenhower when there was the same picture of happy people showing great joy, friendship, and real cordiality which was the result of the deep and warm respect they had for the United States.

The Vice President said he appreciated the reception he had received very much. The Chancellor's visit to the U. S. in April was still fresh in the Vice President's mind, and the warm reception given the Chancellor was evidence of high regard for his leadership as well as friendship for the German people.

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In hours of trial, he continued, all nations have some people who get excited and sometimes say and do things that are not wise. However, this is only the initial response, and it comes only from isolated groups and individuals who don't represent the majority.

It is important to realize, he added, that we are not going to solve these difficulties overnight. We must prepare for a series of actions like the recent Berlin developments, which are only an example of what we can expect.

The new U. S. Administration is only six months old, the Vice President continued, and it has had to face many new and old problems. The President has felt that he should call upon Congress and the people to prepare more diligently and effectively -- at great cost to the U. S. taxpayer -- to meet the vast U. S. responsibilities in all parts of the world. The response has been one of faith and encouragement. The President had recently requested the largest preparedness appropriation ever sought except in time of war, and Congress had given him even more than he had asked. There was, therefore, no lack of concern, or preparation, or action on the part of the U. S. Government or any lack of faith in its allies.

The Vice President said the President was very anxious to communicate to the Chancellor and the German people American concern over the unpleasant developments of the last few days. Since he was unable to leave the country at this time, he had asked the Vice President to do so. Knowing the confidence

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reposed in General Clay, the President had requested him to accompany the Vice President. It was felt that there should be no lack of faith when General Clay appeared, as it was well known that he would never advocate retreat.

The Vice President hoped the current visit to Germany would cheer the people and strengthen their morale as well as stimulate the U. S. and Federal Governments to march forward shoulder-to-shoulder. President Kennedy properly felt that this visit would say more than all the words that could be used or any response that could be made by letter, although the Vice President was carrying a letter to Mayor Brandt in response to one he wrote the President.

The President recognizes and appreciates the statesman-like approach the Chancellor takes to our mutual problems. He has great respect for his judgment.

The President sent the Vice President, the Secretary of the Navy, General Clay, and Ambassador Bohlen to make it clear that the U. S. was proceeding expeditiously with a comprehensive program of military and economic assistance to other nations of the world, and that the U. S. has accelerated the call to arms of both men and production and expanded its scientific and space efforts to the extent that the President has requested much more money than President Eisenhower -- or even President Kennedy -- had thought would be necessary. The U. S. has called up men, expanded production, increased its military assistance program, and concentrated on military preparation, all of which can properly be regarded as recognition of necessity for action. We

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want the German people to know what we are doing and to assure them that we are not unaware of developments in Germany and not unconcerned about them. The German people can be sure the U. S. will keep its pledges and honor its commitments, of which the Vice President knew the Chancellor had no doubt.

The U. S. program is supported unanimously by both parties.

The Chancellor said he greatly appreciated the support of the President and Congress.

Regarding the letter from Mayor Brandt, the Chancellor would not have sent such a letter containing some impossible and impractical proposals.

The Federal Government had quite naturally considered using interzonal trade as a way to retaliate against the Communists in the recent actions they had taken in Berlin, but had decided against this because of the link between this trade and access to Berlin.

Certain moves were being made by West Germans such as the developing of an unofficial boycott of the Leipzig Fair. Also sport connections with the Soviet Zone are being severed. There are also the steps the Chancellor discussed with Secretary Rusk a week ago in Cadinabbia.

The Vice President then asked General Clay if he wished to say anything.

The latter said he appreciated the opportunity to return to Germany and see the Chancellor, who knew the General was fully committed to the continued freedom of West Berlin. The Vice President was one of the earliest and strongest

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supporters of this position. In addition, he knew of nothing on which the people of the United States agreed more than on the necessity for firmness on Berlin.

The General felt that we must not waste time on minor counter-measures or pinpricks which would not affect the main issue, on which we must keep our eyes. He was quite confident that the American people were wholly firm on Berlin, but that in addition, they expected negotiations and would not like the introduction of counter-irritants which might interfere with negotiations.

The Vice President then asked Ambassador Bohlen to speak.

The latter said the current feelings of the West Berliners were wholly understandable. The U. S. had considered various counter-measures and concluded that most of them would be counterproductive and would provide a pretext for a renewal of the Berlin blockade.

As the Chancellor knew, Ambassador Bohlen continued, the U. S. had announced that it was reinforcing its Berlin garrison by about 1,500 men. This was the kind of measure the U. S. thought should be taken.

One of the main purposes of the current visit was to give evidence of U. S. interest in West Berlin, and the conclusion concerning countermeasures does not indicate any weakening in our determination to defend the freedom of West Berlin, our presence in the city, and access thereto. We hope to convey this in Berlin.

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Ambassador Bohlen concluded by saying that the U. S. Government agrees with the Chancellor that, though disagreeable, current developments do not represent the real Berlin crisis. Our eyes must be kept on the main issue.

The Chancellor then concluded the meeting by saying that he agreed fully with all that had been said, and that the people of the Federal Republic would be oriented in this direction. This line would be followed in the remainder of the election campaign by the CDU/CSU, which would be successful. He had the previous day made a statement before the special session of the Bundestag, and this statement was in complete harmony with the U. S. position, which was also supported by the CDU/CSU.

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Memorandum of Conversation

August 20, 1961  
Ambassador's Residence  
Berlin, Germany

Participants

The Vice President  
Ambassador Dowling  
Ambassador Bohlen  
General Clay

Mayor Brandt

The Vice President said that the President had received Mayor Brandt's letter and given it careful consideration, and in consultation with his closest advisers had drawn up a reply which he would now give to Mayor Brandt. He suggested that Mayor Brandt should read it and let him have his reaction either now or later.

Mayor Brandt read the letter carefully and said that he was most grateful for the courtesy of the President in the promptness of his reply. He added that he was most unhappy that his letter had been published through a leak. Ambassador Dowling said that a Frankfurt newspaper had published the text yesterday.

Mayor Brandt said that he had given a copy of his letter to Chancellor Adenauer and it was very regrettable that the letter had been published and the source of the leak was being investigated. He stated that he hoped that the President's answer would be kept confidential. He stated that he had asked in his letter for political action and he still did. He said political action was a broad term and, for example, the decision to strengthen the Berlin garrison was also political action. He said it was important to prevent further steps by the East Zone regime, saying that Ulbricht's speech on Friday had stressed high and dangerous self-confidence.

He said he had found arguments of the French and British representatives and this was a sign of East German weakness, but that this view seemed better abroad than in Berlin. In Berlin it was disadvantageous since the East regime's action was regarded as a demonstration of Communist power.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines  
By huf for NARA, Date 2-26-09



Page 2.

He said that what happened last Sunday was more than the stopping of the refugees, inhuman as that was. He said the Warsaw Pact communique gave an international status to the East German regime even before the peace treaty. The West has no voice in East Germany or in East Berlin. He said it was not enough, as some commentators had remarked, that the action had only internal Communist meaning and represented no change in the West's position. He thought that the 13th of August could play a very great role in future German developments. He did not know yet exactly what they would be. He felt that West Berlin would have to adjust to the new circumstances. Formerly, the "living bridge" had offered hope for the future. Now West Berlin would have to lead an isolated existence but it still could play a role which, however, would take some time to size up and reorient the population. He felt that Berlin should be developed into a model city -- more industry and more schools. He said there was a great deal to be done in order to avoid a loss of confidence in the future of the city. He said it would be necessary to do a number of things quite apart from the mere Allied presence to strengthen the bonds with the Federal Republic; the use of experts in the Federal Republic, tax privileges and similar matters. He mentioned that the cooperation referred to in the President's letter was much appreciated. He added that there was no time to go into details, but that this matter would be discussed with the Western Ambassadors here.

He said we would have to understand the feelings of the people of West Berlin based in some measure on the lack of communication with their friends and relatives across the sector barrier. He said it would be necessary to start from scratch and this was what he had had in mind in his letter in his reference to the three power status. He had a memorandum on this subject which he would give to Ambassador Dowling which would explain what he had in mind. He felt the four power status was now only theoretical and we should not be limited in our action in Berlin by a non-operative status. He mentioned in this connection Khrushchev's reference to the possibility of Soviet troops in West Berlin as a case in point. He went on to say that in West Berlin there had actually been a three power status since 1948, and that West Berlin had been under it since that date. What he had meant in his letter was

that we should not be limited in our action by a moribund four power status. He repeated that since the split of August 13 West Berlin would only live in the closest connection with West Germany. He wished to emphasize that he was not asking for a constitutional change and that merely in practice we should be guided by the realities.

Mayor Brandt then referred to the question of United Nations action which was referred to both in his letter and the President's reply. He realized that the value of United Nations discussions was doubtful. But he felt that whatever our wishes, the General Assembly, which was to begin on September 19, would at some time or other take up the question of Berlin and Germany. He recalled that the Paris meeting of Foreign Ministers had asked the United Nations Representatives, assisted by the German observer, to make suggestions on this point. He said his idea was for the West powers to be in good position in advance to take the initiative. This should not be left to others. He felt that Western initiative was preferable in order to influence world opinion. He felt that this initiative was going to be valuable before the Belgrade Neutralists Meeting. He said that the Indian representative here had given him the impression that he could count on some Indian support, and that the Swedes, for humanitarian reasons, might be counted on. He repeated that he knew that the United Nations was a difficult problem, but that the subject would come up in any case. He said he thought it was important to pay attention to world opinion in addition to military measures which were being contemplated.

In the diplomatic field, Mayor Brandt felt that the Western delay in their protests had created a very unfavorable opinion. He had told Western Commandants that they should make a quick protest here, to be followed up speedily by one in Moscow. But this had required several days since each Commandant had to refer to his government. The government protests to Moscow had taken even more time. He felt that it would have been better to have taken up the governmental protests with the members of the Warsaw Pact as well.

Page 4.

The Vice President stated that he found Mayor Brandt's remarks very pertinent. He said the President fully understood how deeply he and the people of West Berlin felt, despite the disadvantage of distance and the fact that they were of different racial origins. He said that this reflected in our decision to send additional troops into Berlin. He pointed out that democracies are always slow and that our policies are not as rapid as we would like to have them. The President considers the Berlin situation most serious and is of the opinion that it will become more serious. The President felt it most important that they all, Mayor Brandt and the authorities of West Germany, and all our allies, understand each other completely and above all, should not permit any differences to become public, but to discuss them privately and confidentially. He said that there were two things the President had done. In the first place, there was the troop reinforcement, and secondly, his trip here meant more than anything that could be said. Mayor Brandt had asked for action and that these were actions. He pointed out that the Administration had only been in power for six months and that there had been new faces in the government and that many actions had already been taken.

He referred to the increase in our military posture, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and that some \$7 billion had been added to defense appropriations.

In regard to the United Nations matter, he had been much interested in Mayor Brandt's views but that the President's views on this subject had been set forth in his reply. He stated that we had not come to Berlin to indulge in any criticism, but to obtain a better picture of the situation. He would wish to emphasize the importance the President attached to keeping our differences to ourselves and to our working together as closely as possible.

Page 5.

Mayor Brandt asked the Vice President to please tell the President that he had not meant to criticize in his letter, but that the Wednesday meeting had been extremely difficult and that to have gone to this meeting with empty hands would have been impossible for him. He said he had always realized that the Western guarantees still stand, and that he had said so. He expressed regret if his letter had been read as an expression of lack of confidence in the United States.

The Vice President stated that the President understood very well the feelings of the people of West Berlin and of their leaders. He pointed out that the President had the continual task of making the American public understand the seriousness of the situation. He said, for example, that many young men were being taken away from their peaceful pursuits in order to join the armed forces, and that where this was being done it was sometimes difficult to explain to the people why there was criticism of the United States from our friends and allies. The President fully understood Mayor Brandt's desire for action rather than words and repeated the importance of our understanding each other and staying close together.

Mayor Brandt said that he would like to make one additional point. He said he understood the problems of the United States and that he had not asked for economic sanctions, but that Chancellor Adenauer had called for these. He said that the Chancellor had taken conflicting positions on the subject of negotiations. He had first said that there should be no negotiations on the threat, and then later had come out for negotiations, which gave the implication that threat was less important than blackmail. On the subject of negotiations, he had thought since the Vienna meeting between President Kennedy and Khrushchev that a larger group, i. e., a peace conference, might clarify the issues and convince a larger number of other countries. It had been said that nothing could come out of this and he felt that a larger conference might be helpful with world opinion.

He said that for the German people the recent events might mean the end of the unification dream. It was very important to the Western powers, and especially the United States, that this matter should be approached realistically and that clarity was essential. He felt that this aspect of the matter should be kept under careful consideration.


The Vice President said that General Clay had come along at the special request of the President because he was known to be an outstanding American and a friend of Germany. General Clay said that he had little to add to what the Vice President had already said and that he could only state that the United States was with the West Germans.

Mr. Bohlen said that all he had to add was to mention the fact that in regard to taking the Berlin events to the United Nations, he would bear in mind that there was to be a special United Nations General Assembly on the question of Tunis on Monday; and that the sentiments of the Afro-Asian group on this subject would inevitably become mixed up with any consideration of the Berlin question. He recalled the great difficulties in 1948 under conditions of actual blockade and that while the possibility of the utilization of the United Nations was under constant consideration in Washington, it was the general opinion, as indicated in the President's letter, that to try to do it now would inevitably get the question of Berlin mixed up with general anti-colonial feeling because of the Tunis issue.

There was some discussion at this point of the various methods of bringing the question to the United Nations, with Mayor Brandt pointing out that in 1951 the question of Germany was brought up in the Human Rights Committee.

The meeting then broke up in order to permit the Vice President and Mayor Brandt to proceed to the greeting point for the incoming U.S. troops.

###



Walter:

With Congress maybe closing Saturday night,  
I started housecleaning the desk today. I'm pessimistic,  
but I think Monday morning will be chaos.

Let me know if you think anything else should be  
done with these.

ashton  
9/22/10:00 am





~~SECRET~~ ENCLOSURE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

10a

August 21, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALTER JENKINS  
EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING

Subject: Telegrams Concerning the Vice President's  
Visit to Berlin

The enclosed selection of telegrams, concerning  
the Vice President's trip to Berlin, may be of  
interest to him and of use for your files.

L. D. Battle  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

Two copies each of:

- |                |                  |                     |
|----------------|------------------|---------------------|
| 1. To Bonn 378 | 5. Berlin 261    | 9. Moscow 579       |
| 2. Berlin 264  | 6. Berlin 259    | 10. Moscow 576      |
| 3. Berlin 262  | 7. Berlin 258    | 11. Paris POLTO 183 |
| 4. To Bonn 375 | 8. To Berlin 135 |                     |

SECRET ENCLOSURE



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

1961 AUG 18 PM 10 50

106

59

10928

Origin

SENT TO: Amembassy BONN 378 PRIORITY

EUR

Info:

USBER Berlin 140 PRIORITY

SS

G

H

SO

P

US IA

Vice President and party departed Andrews Air Force Base 9:15 p.m.  
Washington time.

RMR

RUSK

Drafted by:

EUR:GER:PDav

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Arthur R. Day

Clearances:

Typed in DC/T

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1001 AUG 18 PM 8 03

59-53

ACTION:

Origin ~~SECRET~~ AmEmbassy BONN NIACT 375  
EUR USBER BERLIN NIACT 139  
Info:

10590

SS Following are members Vice Presidential party: Vice President Johnson;  
G General Clay; State Dept., Ambassador Bohlen, Messrs. Cash, Cox and Mautner;  
SP Vice President's office, Colonel Burris, Messrs. Reedy, Boatner, Miss Wiley,  
SA Miss Williams; White House, Mr. Gilbner; Secret Service, Messrs. Knight,  
L Youngblood; Press, Baskin, Dallas News, Bell, AP, McMeanamin, USIA, Scali,  
H ABC, Miss Higgins, Herald Tribune, Miller, Time, Greene, NY Daily News,  
SB Alexander, McNaughton Press, Spivak, UPI, Okamoto, USIA photographer, Staughton,  
SO White House photographer, Max Freedman, Manchester Guardian, Col.  
PR ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~  
P William Jackson, Vice President's Army Aide, Lt. Gen. Fred  
USIA XX  
SY J. Brown, Commanding General Fifth Corps Germany (returning to post)  
INR  
A  
OPR  
RMR

Please arrange accommodations.

RUSK

Drafted by:

EUR: GER: FECash, gw. 8/18/61

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: GER - Frank E. Cash, Jr.

Clearances:

S/S-Mr. Collopy

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SP Vice President's office, Colonel Burris, Messrs. Reedy, Boatner, Miss Wiley,  
SA Miss Williams; White House, Mr. Gilbner; Secret Service, Messrs. Knight,  
L Youngblood; Press, Baskin, Dallas News, Bell, AP, McMeanamin, USIA, Scali,  
H ABC, Miss Higgins, Herald Tribune, Miller, Time, Greene, NY Daily News,  
SB Alexander, McNaughton Press, Spivak, UPI, Okamoto, USIA photographer, Staughton,  
SO White House photographer, Max Freedman, Manchester Guardian, Col.  
PR  
P  
USIA  
SY  
INR  
A  
OPR  
RMR  
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~  
William Jackson, Vice President's Army Aide, Lt. Gen. Fred  
XX  
J. Brown, Commanding General Fifth Corps Germany (returning to post)

Please arrange accommodations.

RUSK

Drafted by:

EUR:GER:FECash,gw. 8/18/61

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: GER - Frank E. Cash, Jr.

Clearances:

S/S-Mr. Collopy

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55-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control: 14696  
Rec'd: AUGUST 20, 1961  
6:46 P M

SS

Info

FROM: BERLIN

G

TO: Secretary of State

SP

SA

NO: 264, AUGUST 20, 9 P M

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NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

RMR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Sec 11/21/76  
By mg, NARS, Date 4/5/77

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 264 INFORMATION BONN 235

FROM DOWLING FOR THE SECRETARY.

PLEASE TELL THE PRESIDENT THAT I CONSIDER VICE PRESIDENT'S BERLIN VISIT TO HAVE BEEN OVERWHELMING SUCCESS IN RESTORING BERLIN MORALE AND DISPELLING MOOD OF DESPAIR PREVALENT IN EARLIER PART OF WEEK. IN BRIEF, IT WAS MOST SIGNIFICANT EVENT IN BERLIN HISTORY SINCE LIFTING OF BLOCKADE.

NUMBER OF PEOPLE AT CITY HALL SQUARE AND IN STREETS YESTERDAY ESTIMATED AT RECORD-BREAKING ONE MILLION. VICE PRESIDENT RECEIVED EVEN HEARTIER WELCOME ON EXTENSIVE CITY TOUR THIS MORNING, FAVORED BY GOOD WEATHER, THAN ON ARRIVAL IN DRIZZLE YESTERDAY. HE WAS WIDELY CHEERED WHEREVER HE WENT AND CRUSHED BY CROWDS WHENEVER HE GO OUT OF CAR. HIS AFFIRMATION OF FREEDOM DREW ROARS OF APPLAUSE DURING EACH OF HIS SPEECHES. TREMENDOUS EMOTIONAL RESPONSE OF POPULATION INDICATIVE OF PEOPLE'S HEARTFELT GRATITUDE FOR IDENTIFICATION OF AMERICA'S GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE, AS REPRESENTED BY VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL CLAY, WITH CAUSE OF FREEDOM IN BERLIN.

PRESENCE OF GENERAL CLAY TO ACCOMPANY VICE PRESIDENT WAS PROFOUNDLY GRATIFYING TO BERLINERS. BOTH MAYOR BRANDT AND FOREIGN MINISTER VON BRENTANO REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED TREMENDOUS IMPACT OF VISIT IN BOOSTING SPIRITS NOT ONLY OF BERLINERS BUT ALSO OF GERMANS IN FEDERAL REPUBLIC

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-, 264, AUGUST 20, 9 P M, FROM BERLIN

AND IN SOVIET ZONE.

FIRST UNIT OF AMERICAN BATTLE GROUP ORDERED INTO BERLIN WAS MET BY VICE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNING MAYOR AT WEST BERLIN BORDERS WITH HUGE, CHEERING CROWDS IN ATTENDANCE. ARRIVAL OF BATTLE GROUP AND SWIFTNESS OF THEIR MOVE TO BERLIN CONTRIBUTED FURTHER TO MAKING THIS MOST EVENTFUL DAY. BATTLE GROUP COMMANDER SAID ONLY COMPARABLE WELCOME "WAS WHEN WE LIBERATED FRANCE."

LIGHTNER

MGG

**Note: Advance copies to SS and SO, 8:30 p. m., 8-20-61. CWO-M.**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

55-M

Action

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Control: 14696  
Rec'd: AUGUST 20, 1961  
6:46 P M

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Info

FROM: BERLIN

G

TO: Secretary of State

SP

SA

NO: 264, AUGUST 20, 9 P M

L

H

SB

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USIA

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NSA

OSD

ARMY

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AIR

RMR

PRIORITY

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Sec 11/2/76  
By mg NARS, Date 4/5/77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Note: Advance copies to SS and SO, 8:30 p. m., 8-20-61. CWO-M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



55-M

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Action

Control: 14685  
Rec'd: AUGUST 20, 1961  
2:44 P M

EUR

Info

FROM: BERLIN

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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SP

NO: 262, AUGUST 20, 6 P M (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

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NSC

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CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

RMR

ACTION DEPARTMENT 262, BONN 233, INFORMATION LONDON 167,  
PARIS 171, MOSCOW 160, POLAD USAREUR 152

PARIS FOR EMB, USRO, STOESSEL, AND MCGUIRE.

VICE PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S BERLIN VISIT DOMINATED ALL WEST  
BERLIN PAPERS, WITH TAGESPIEGEL (INDEP) GIVING MOST OF  
FIRST FOUR PAGES TO STORY. HEADLINES FEATURED FIRMNESS  
AND DECIVENESS OF VP'S STATEMENTS AND ROYAL WELCOME GIVEN  
HIM BY POPULACE. ALL PAPERS RAN EITHER ENTIRE TEXT OR  
EXTENSIVE EXCERPTS FROM VP'S ADDRESS TO BERLIN  
HOUSE OF REPS. BONN AND BERLIN ARRIVAL STATEMENTS WERE  
ALSO CARRIED, AS WERE EXCERPTS FROM BRANDT GREETING  
SPEECH AND GOVERNING-MAYOR'S AND FONMIN VON BRENTANO'S  
SPEECHES IN HOUSE. PRESS CARRIED LENGTHY DESCRIPTIONS  
OF VP'S TRIUMPHAL MOTORCADE FROM AIRPORT TO RATHAUS,  
EMPHASIZING STORMY GREETING GIVEN BY HUGE AND ENTHUSTIATIC  
CROWDS. GENERAL CLAY'S NAME FIGURED PROMINENTLY IN ALL  
STORIES, AND SEVERAL PAPERS RAN SPECULATIVE DPA STORY  
FROM BERLIN REPORTING THAT CLAY MIGHT TAKE OVER MILITARY  
ASSIGNMENT IN BERLIN.

HIGHLIGHTED WERE VICE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS THAT COMMUNIST  
MOVES HAD UNITED WESTERN ALLIES MORE FIRMLY THAN EVER,  
THAT AMERICA'S GUARANTEES OF WEST BERLIN FREEDOM AND  
WESTERN ACCESS RIGHTS TO BERLIN WERE FIRM, AND THAT COMMUNISTS  
WERE CONGRATULATING SELVES TOO SOON. VICE PRESIDENT'S  
WORDS OF SYMPATHY FOR BERLINERS' "BROTHERS IN THE EAST"  
WERE WELL PLAYED, AS WAS HIS STATEMENT, "TYRANNY'S DAYS  
ARE NUMBERED."

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-2-, 262, AUGUST 20, 6 P M, (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM BERLIN

TELEGRAF (PRO SPD) CARRIED DPA/AP STORY FROM BONN TO EFFECT THAT AMERICAN SIDE HAD "POLITELY BUT FIRMLY" TURNED DOWN REQUEST BY CHANCELLOR ADENAUER TO ACCOMPANY PARTY TO BERLIN ON GROUND OF DESIRE TO AVOID INJECTION OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGN INTO VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. DER TAG (PRO CDU) CARRIED SEVERAL COLUMNS OF BIOGRAPHY OF VICE PRESIDENT.

EDITORIALLY, ALL WEST BERLIN PAPERS EXPRESSED DEEP SATISFACTION WITH VP'S VISIT, WHICH ALONG WITH ANNOUNCEMENT OF IMPENDING ARRIVAL US TROOP REINFORCEMENTS, WAS SEEN AS EVIDENCE AMERICANS WOULD STAND FAST IN WEST BERLIN. WITH REGARD PRESENT BERLIN SITUATION, COOLER HEADS WERE BEGINNING PREVAIL AS COMMENTATORS POINTED OUT LONG-TERM PROBLEMS REQUIRE PATIENT, LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS AND THAT NO DRASTIC, AGGRESSIVE ACTION BY WEST WAS INDICATED/ TELEGRAF CHIEF EDITOR SCHOLZ SAID "JOHNSON WAS A GOOD AMBASSADOR OF HIS PEOPLE AND PRESIDENT. HIS WORDS WERE SIMPLE, UNPATHETIC AND FOR THAT VERY REASON HAD A BELIEVABLE RING. BERLINERS UNDERSTOOD HIM AND WENT BACK TO THEIR HOMES IN GOOD SPIRITS AND WILL GO BACK TO WORK ON MONDAY WITH NEW STRENGTH... IN BERLIN THERE HAS BEEN SHOWN AGAIN IN THESE DAYS WHAT WAS HEARD IN MANY SPEECHES; BERLINERS DO NOT WANT TO LET THEMSELVES BE DIVIDED AND THEY WOULD WELCOME ANY STEP CALCULATED TO TEAR DOWN THE WALLS THAT STAND TODAY AT POTSDAMER PLATZ AND THE BRANDENBURG GATE. THEY ARE CLEAR THAT AN OPEN CONFLICT OFFERS NO CHANCE BUT RATHER DESTROYS EVERYTHING AGAIN, INCLUDING THE GIGANTIC RECONSTRUCTION JOB THAT BERLINERS THEMSELVES HAVE ACHIEVED."

DER TAG BRIEFLY REVIEWED LAST WEEK'S CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN BERLIN, WHICH PAPER SAW OVERCOME BY VP'S VISIT. VISIT HAD FOCUSED WORLD ATTENTION ON FACT THAT "UNITED STATES, AS LEADING POWER OF BELEAGURED WEST, FULLY ACCEPTS ITS RESPONSIBILITIES." PAPER CRITICIZED THAT "IN SUCH AN HOUR OF CONFUSION THERE SHOULD BE A CALL TO CONVERT FOUR-POWER STATUS OF BERLIN INTO THREE-POWER STATUS."

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-3-, 262, AUGUST 20, 6 P M, (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM BERLIN

IT SAW AS PREMATURE ANY MOVE TO RAISE BERLIN ISSUE IN "COMMUNITY OF NATIONS, WHICH IS BURDENED WITH SO MANY ELEMENTS OF UNCERTAINTY." PAPER CONCLUDED THAT PEOPLE APPEALING TO FRIENDS TO DO SOMETHING MUST ALSO BE READY MAKE SACRIFICES THEMSELVES. "AMERICANS ABOVE ALL, AS THEY ARE DEMONSTRATING, ARE NOT MERELY PREPARED MAKE SACRIFICES FOR OUR CAUSE. THEY ARE ALREADY DOING SO."

LIGHTNER

MGG

**Note: Mr. Valliere (EUR) notified 5:10 PM, advance copies to SS and SO, 8/20, CWO-M.**

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Action

Control: 14685

Rec'd: AUGUST 20, 1961

2:44 P M

EUR

Info

FROM: BERLIN

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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US IA

NSC

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ARMY

NAVY

AIR

RMR

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OF VP'S TRIUMPHAL MOTORCADE FROM AIRPORT TO RATHAUS,  
EMPHASIZING STORMY GREETING GIVEN BY HUGE AND ENTHUSIASTIC  
CROWDS. GENERAL CLAY'S NAME FIGURED PROMINENTLY IN ALL  
STORIES, AND SEVERAL PAPERS RAN SPECULATIVE DPA STORY  
FROM BERLIN REPORTING THAT CLAY MIGHT TAKE OVER MILITARY  
ASSIGNMENT IN BERLIN.

HIGHLIGHTED WERE VICE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS THAT COMMUNIST  
MOVES HAD UNITED WESTERN ALLIES MORE FIRMLY THAN EVER,  
THAT AMERICA'S GUARANTEES OF WEST BERLIN FREEDOM AND  
WESTERN ACCESS RIGHTS TO BERLIN WERE FIRM, AND THAT COMMUNISTS  
WERE CONGRATULATING SELVES TOO SOON. VICE PRESIDENT'S  
WORDS OF SYMPATHY FOR BERLINERS' "BROTHERS IN THE EAST"  
WERE WELL PLAYED, AS WAS HIS STATEMENT, "TYRANNY'S DAYS  
ARE NUMBERED."

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OFFICIAL USE ONLY

-2-, 262, AUGUST 20, 6 P M, (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM BERLIN

TELEGRAF (PRO SPD) CARRIED DPA/AP STORY FROM BONN TO EFFECT THAT AMERICAN SIDE HAD "POLITELY BUT FIRMLY" TURNED DOWN REQUEST BY CHANCELLOR ADENAUER TO ACCOMPANY PARTY TO BERLIN ON GROUND OF DESIRE TO AVOID INJECTION OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGN INTO VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. DER TAG (PRO CDU) CARRIED SEVERAL COLUMNS OF BIOGRAPHY OF VICE PRESIDENT.

EDITORIALLY, ALL WEST BERLIN PAPERS EXPRESSED DEEP SATISFACTION WITH VP'S VISIT, WHICH ALONG WITH ANNOUNCEMENT OF IMPENDING ARRIVAL US TROOP REINFORCEMENTS, WAS SEEN AS EVIDENCE AMERICANS WOULD STAND FAST IN WEST BERLIN. WITH REGARD PRESENT BERLIN SITUATION, COOLER HEADS WERE BEGINNING PREVAIL AS COMMENTATORS POINTED OUT LONG-TERM PROBLEMS REQUIRE PATIENT, LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS AND THAT NO DRASTIC, AGGRESSIVE ACTION BY WEST WAS INDICATED/ TELEGRAF CHIEF EDITOR SCHOLZ SAID "JOHNSON WAS A GOOD AMBASSADOR OF HIS PEOPLE AND PRESIDENT. HIS WORDS WERE SIMPLE, UNPATHETIC AND FOR THAT VERY REASON HAD A BELIEVABLE RING. BERLINERS UNDERSTOOD HIM AND WENT BACK TO THEIR HOMES IN GOOD SPIRITS AND WILL GO BACK TO WORK ON MONDAY WITH NEW STRENGTH... IN BERLIN THERE HAS BEEN SHOWN AGAIN IN THESE DAYS WHAT WAS HEARD IN MANY SPEECHES; BERLINERS DO NOT WANT TO LET THEMSELVES BE DIVIDED AND THEY WOULD WELCOME ANY STEP CALCULATED TO TEAR DOWN THE WALLS THAT STAND TODAY AT POTSDAMER PLATZ AND THE BRANDENBURG GATE. THEY ARE CLEAR THAT AN OPEN CONFLICT OFFERS NO CHANCE BUT RATHER DESTROYS EVERYTHING AGAIN, INCLUDING THE GIGANTIC RECONSTRUCTION JOB THAT BERLINERS THEMSELVES HAVE ACHIEVED."

DER TAG BRIEFLY REVIEWED LAST WEEK'S CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN BERLIN, WHICH PAPER SAW OVERCOME BY VP'S VISIT. VISIT HAD FOCUSED WORLD ATTENTION ON FACT THAT "UNITED STATES, AS LEADING POWER OF BELEAGURED WEST, FULLY ACCEPTS ITS RESPONSIBILITIES." PAPER CRITICIZED THAT "IN SUCH AN HOUR OF CONFUSION THERE SHOULD BE A CALL TO CONVERT FOUR-POWER STATUS OF BERLIN INTO THREE-POWER STATUS."

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-3-, 262, AUGUST 20, 6 P M, (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM BERLIN

IT SAW AS PREMATURE ANY MOVE TO RAISE BERLIN ISSUE IN "COMMUNITY OF NATIONS, WHICH IS BURDENED WITH SO MANY ELEMENTS OF UNCERTAINTY." PAPER CONCLUDED THAT PEOPLE APPEALING TO FRIENDS TO DO SOMETHING MUST ALSO BE READY MAKE SACRIFICES THEMSELVES. "AMERICANS ABOVE ALL, AS THEY ARE DEMONSTRATING, ARE NOT MERELY PREPARED MAKE SACRIFICES FOR OUR CAUSE. THEY ARE ALREADY DOING SO."

LIGHTNER

MGG

**Note: Mr. Valliere (EUR) notified 5:10 PM, advance copies to SS and SO, 8/20, CWO-M.**

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55-M

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Action

Control: 14686

Rec'd: AUGUST 20, 1961  
3:27 P M

EUR

Info

FROM: BERLIN

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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SP

NO: 262, AUGUST 20, 6 P M (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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AIR

RMR

ACTION DEPARTMENT 262, BONN 233, INFORMATION LONDON 167,  
MOSCOW 160, POLAD USAREUR 152

PARIS FOR EMB, USRO, STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE

CHIEF EDITOR SILEX, IN TAGESPIEGEL, SAW IN VP'S VISIT THE REACTION THAT HAD BEEN MISSING AND WHOSE ABSENCE HAD INEVITABLY CREATED WAVE OF DISAPPOINTMENT. SILEX COMPLIMENTED BRANDT FOR HAVING TAKEN INITIATIVE IN WRITING LETTER TO KENNEDY AND CRITICIZED FEDGOV FOR ITS LASSITUDE. REST OF EDITORIAL WAS DEVOTED TO DISCUSSION OF "RIGHTS". SILEX REGRETTED WEST'S TENDENCY TO CONCENTRATE ON TECHNICAL LEGALITIES IN FACE OF AGGRESSIVE MOVES BY OTHER SIDE. SILEX SAID UNDER SECRETARY BOWLES, IN DISCUSSIONS OF BERLIN DURING RECENT AFRICA-ASIA TRIP, HAD FOUND LACK OF RESPONSE TO EXPLANATIONS OF LEGAL RIGHTS BUT HAD GAINED SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING WHEN HE RESTED CASE ON AMERICAN ROLE AS PROTECTOR OF FREEDOM, SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE. THIS WAS SEEN AS FAVORABLE SIGN FOR FORTHCOMING BELGRADE CONFERENCE OF NEUTRALS. WITH REGARD TO WHAT SILEX SAW AS A SHRINKAGE OF WESTERN RESPONSIBILITY SINCE NOV 1958 FROM ALL BERLIN TO WEST BERLIN, HE SAID THIS HAD GOAL OF PREPARING POPULATION IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES MORE EFFECTIVELY BY SETTING MOST SPECIFIC BOUNDARIES ON COMMUNIST AGGRESSION. SILEX REGRETTED THAT WESTERN PROTEST NOTES OVER EVENTS OF AUGUST 13 WERE SENT ONLY TO MOSCOW, BELIEVED PROTEST SHOULD HAVE GONE TO ALL WARSAW PACT STATES, SINCE ALL PARTICIPATED IN UNLEASHING CRISIS.

EAST BERLIN NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, AUG 20 CARRIED FOUR SHORT

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OFFICIAL USE ONLY

-2-, 262, AUGUST 20, 6 P M, (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM BERLIN

SATIRIC ITEMS RE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT IN BERLIN. TONE OF ARTICLES WAS SET BY EDITORIAL, ENTITLED "CORSET SUPPORT" (KORSETTSTUETZE), WHICH ACCOMPANIED CARTOON SHOWING US TANK ARRIVING IN BERLIN WITH LARGE IRON CORSET HANGING FROM CANNON. TWO CIVILIAN BERLINERS, WITH SARDONIC EXPRESSIONS ON FACES, COMMENT THAT "AMIS HAVE BROUGHT BRANDT CORSET SO THAT HE DOESN'T FALL COMPLETELY APART". EDITORIAL ACCOMPANYING CARTOON SAID: "AS REPORTED, BRANDT ASKED AMERICAN PRESIDENT BY LETTER FOR CORSET SUPPORT. SINCE HE GUARANTEED AT SAME TIME TO PAY FOR IT FROM TAXES OF WEST BELINERS, CORSET SUPPORT, 'MADE IN USA', ARRIVED PROMPTLY. IT IS MISTER VICE PRESIDENT JOHNSON WITH MILITARY ESCORT.

"ON ARRIVING, MR JOHNSON SAID: 'NOW I CAN EXAMINE WITH OWN EYES CONSEQUENCES THIS TRAGIC SITUATION...'

"DO EXACTLY THAT, MISTER, SINCE YOU HAVE GREAT EXPERIENCE WITH TRAGIC SITUATIONS. FIRST LAOS, THEN CUBA. WAS IT NOT YOU WHO VISITED ALSO MR DIEM IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND MR CHANG KAI SHEK IN TAIWAN? IN THIS CASE, IT WAS QUITE APPROPRIATE THAT PRECISELY YOU SHOULD COME TO MR BRANDT. AS COLLECTOR OF FORLORN US CREATURES, DONT FLY NEXT TO HELGOLAND, BUT RATHER TO COMMANDER OF BIZERTE.

"DID YOU SAY THAT 'BORDER OF FREEDOM NOW RUNS THROUGH BERLIN'? WHOSE FREEDOM DID YOU MEAN? THAT OF THE MILLIONS OR THAT OF MILLIONAIRES, SUPPORTERS OF PEACE OR AGENTS OF NATO? LIBERTY OF PEOPLE RULES IN CAPITAL CITY OF GDR.

"BY THE WAY, WOULD YOU NOT LIKE TO TAKE YOUR MILITARY ESCORT WITH YOU RIGHT AWAY? THEN LATER, MISTER, AT TIME OF PEACE TREATY. YOU ARE EXPERIENCED IN SUCH THINGS..."

ADN EAST GERMAN NEWS AGENCY IN REPLY TO SFB AND RIAS REPORTS RE RUMORS OF CHANGE IN CURRENCY CARRIED ITEM STATING FINANCE MINISTRY KNOW OF NO SUCH PLANS

LIGHTNER

**Note: Advance copies to SS and SO, 5:30 PM, 8/20, CWO-M**

MGG

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Action

Control: 14686

Rec'd: AUGUST 20, 1961

3:27 P M

EUR

Info

FROM: BERLIN

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SP

NO: 262, AUGUST 20, 6 P M (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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RMR

ACTION DEPARTMENT 262, BONN 233, INFORMATION LONDON 167,  
MOSCOW 160, POLAD USAREUR 152

PARIS FOR EMB, USRO, STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE

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OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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LIGHTNER

**Note: Advance copies to SS and SO, 5:30 PM, 8/20, CWO-M**  
MGG

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Action  
EURControl: 14674  
Rec'd: AUGUST 20, 1961  
12:57 PMInfo  
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RMR

FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 261, AUGUST 20, 3 PM

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 261, BONN 232, INFORMATION LONDON 116, PARIS 170, MOSCOW 159, POLAD USAREUR 151.

PARIS FOR EMB, USRO, STOESSEL, AND MCGUIRE.

VICE PRESIDENT'S DRIVE THROUGH STREETS LINED WITH CROWDS OF WAVING BERLINERS WHO HAD BEEN WAITING IN DRIZZLE FOR ALMOST TWO HOURS WAS TRIUMPH. PEOPLE GREETING MOTORCADE WERE SHOUTING WORDS OF WELCOME, MANY OF THEM WEEPING WITH JOY. VP AND BRANDT WERE MOBBED AS THEY STEPPED OUT OF CAR AND WALKED PART OF WAY.

CROWD THAT WAS ASSEMBLED IN CITY HALL SQUARE AND STREETS LEADING TO IT AS LARGE AS FOR AUG 16 PROTEST RALLY (BERLIN'S 197 BONN, 224 SECSTATE). CROWD NOTABLE FOR PATIENCE WITH WHICH IT AWAITED ARRIVAL OF MOTORCADE. SEVERAL ANNOUNCEMENTS ABOUT PROGRESS OF VISITORS FROM AIRPORT TO CITY HALL PRODUCED RIPPLES OF REACTION, APPARENT APPROVAL THAT PARTY WAS DRIVING TO POTSDAMER PLATZ TO LOOK AT SECTOR BARRIERS, AND SATISFACTION THAT PROGRESS OF CARS DELAYED BY POPULAR GREETINGS. LARGE NUMBER OF POSTERS ON DISPLAY, ALMOST HALF OF WHICH IN ENGLISH. SEVERAL RATHER CHIDINGLY CALLED FOR ACTION: "WESTERN POWERS, DO YOUR DUTY- INTERVENE;" "MORE COURAGE FOR FREEDOM;" "DONT PUT OFF UNTIL TOMORROW WHAT YOU SHOULD HAVE DONE YESTERDAY." OTHERS SAID, "DONT LET US DOWN;" "WE TRUST OUR PROTECTING POWERS" "WASHINGTON IS NEARER THAN BONN;" "THANK YOU FOR COMING, MR JOHNSON."

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-2- 261, AUGUST 20, 3 PM, FROM BERLIN

VP AND GEN CLAY GREETED BY CROWD WITH JOYOUS EMOTION. VP'S STATEMENT ON ARRIVAL AT CITY HALL (AFTER SHORT INTRODUCTION BY BRANDT) INTERRUPTED BY FREQUENT APPLAUSE. PEOPLE GREETED BRIEF REMARKS BY CLAY WITH OVATION.

VICE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH IN SPECIAL SESSION HOUSE OF REPS ALSO VERY FAVORABLY RECEIVED. CROWD OUTSIDE LISTENING TO SPEECHES DISPERSED ONLY GRADUALLY. WHEN IT WAS TOLD VP'S DEPARTURE COULD BE EXPECTED ONLY LATE AT NIGHT, CROWD TOOK UP CHANT "TO THE BALCONY"; WHEN VP AND BRANDT APPEARED THEY WERE GREETED BY ENTHUSIASTIC APPLAUSE AND CHEERS. MANY PEOPLE STILL ON HAND TO GREET VP AND AMB DOWLING AFTER RATHAUS DINNER.

PROMPTNESS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECISION SENDING VP AND ORDERING REINFORCEMENTS OF AMERICAN GARRISONS HAS PROVIDED TREMENDOUS SHOT IN ARM TO BERLIN MORALE.

LIGHTNER

BP

**Note: Relayed WH, OSD, JCS, A, N. A, 2:30 p.m.  
Advance copies S/S & S-O 2:30 p.m., 8/20/CWO-JRL**

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## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

10m

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE37-L  
Action  
EURControl: 14674  
Rec'd: AUGUST 20, 1961  
12:57 PM

Info

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CIA

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RMR

FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 261, AUGUST 20, 3 PM

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 261, BONN 232, INFORMATION LONDON 116, PARIS 170, MOSCOW 159, POLAD USAREUR 151.

PARIS FOR EMB, USRO, STOESSEL, AND MCGUIRE.

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-2- 261, AUGUST 20, 3 PM, FROM BERLIN

VP AND GEN CLAY GREETED BY CROWD WITH JOYOUS EMOTION. VP'S STATEMENT ON ARRIVAL AT CITY HALL (AFTER SHORT INTRODUCTION BY BRANDT) INTERRUPTED BY FREQUENT APPLAUSE. PEOPLE GREETED BRIEF REMARKS BY CLAY WITH OVATION.

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LIGHTNER

BP

Note: Relayed WH, OSD, JCS, A, N. A, 2:30 p.m.  
Advance copies S/S & S-O 2:30 p.m., 8/20/CWO-JRL

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

*Department of State*

107

54-M

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Action

Control: 14519

Rec'd: August 19, 1961

12:44 p.m.

EUR

Info

FROM: Berlin

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SO

NO: 259, August 19

P

USIA

PRIORITY

RMR

Vice President Johnson arrived 5:05 p.m.

LIGHTNER

MLB

Note: Mr. Bieling (EUR) Informed 3:30 p.m. 8-19-61 CWO ML

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

*Department of State*

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## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

109

37 L

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Action

Control: 14454

Rec'd: AUGUST 19, 1961  
11:45 AM

EUR

Info

FROM: BERLIN

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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SP

NO: 258, AUGUST 19, 3 PM

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CIA

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ARMY

NAVY

AIR

RMR

ACTION DEPARTMENT 258, BONN 230, INFORMATION LONDON 164,  
PARIS 168, MOSCOW 157, POLAD USAREUR 149.

PARIS FOR EMBASSY, USRO, STOESSEL, AND MCGUIRE.

ALL WEST BERLIN MORNING PAPERS AUG 19 HEADLINE TODAY'S VISIT  
VICE PRES, EMPHASIZE HE BRINGS PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRES-  
IDENT AND IS ACCOMPANIED BY GEN CLAY. VISIT HAS PUSHED  
BUNDESTAG BERLIN DEBATE INTO SECOND PLACE (EXCEPT IN DIE WELT),  
BUT PAPERS CARRY LENGTHY REPORTS LATTER AND ALL EDITORIALS  
COMMENT ON DEBATE.

TAGESSPIEGEL (IND) EDITORIAL SAID STATEMENTS ADENAUER  
AND BRANDT CHARACTERIZED BY "STATESMANLIKE RESPONSIBILITY"  
IMPORTANT RESULT WAS THAT BOTH HAD SAME INTERPRETATION,  
SHOWED SAME WILL. EDITORIAL ENDORSED CHANCELLOR'S  
DECLARATION THAT CUTTING OFF EAST BERLIN FIRST STEP IN  
ATTACH ON FREE WESTERN PART CITY, AND NOTED THAT EVEN IF  
BRANDT EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT (I.E., WITH LACK OF  
WESTERN COUNTERACTION) MORE CLEARLY THAN ADENAUER, THIS  
MIGHT STRENGTHEN GOVERNMENT POSITION IN TALKS WITH "OUR  
FRIENDS." MORGENPOST (IND) COMMENTED MOST REGRETTABLE THAT  
NO DEMONSTRATION UNITY BY ALL PARTIES, ATTRIBUTED THIS TO  
SUSPICIOUS AROUSED ELECTION CAMPAIGN; PAPER ALSO SAID  
NOTHING COULD BE WORSE THAN IRRESPONSIBLE CRITICISM OF  
POWERS WHO ENSURE WEST BERLIN'S FREEDOM.

DER TAG (PRO-CDU) ENDORSED STATEMENT BY CDU LEADER  
KRONE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT FEDREP WOULD CONTINUE POLICY  
CLOSEST ALLIANCE WITH WEST, CRITICIZED BRANDT FOR BITTERLY

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-2- 258, AUGUST 19, 3 PM, FROM BERLIN

DEMANDING COUNTERMEASURES BY WEST. DIE WELT (IND) ATTACHED SPD PROPOSAL REFER BERLIN QUESTION TO UN, SAID THIS WOULD UNDERMINE FOUR-POWER RESPONSIBILITY, AND ADDED BRANDT SUGGESTION GIVE UP FOUR-POWER STATUS BERLIN DANGEROUS.

TELEGRAF (SPD) EDITOR SCHOLZ REGRETTED NO COMMENT DECLARATION MADE END OF SESSION, BLAMED THIS ON GOVTS ELECTION STRATEGY.

LIGHTNER

BP

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## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

1098

37 L

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Action

Control: 14454

Rec'd: AUGUST 19, 1961  
11:45 AM

EUR

Info

FROM: BERLIN

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 258, AUGUST 19, 3 PM

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NAVY

AIR

RMR

ACTION DEPARTMENT 258, BONN 230, INFORMATION LONDON 164,  
PARIS 168, MOSCOW 157, POLAD USAREUR 149.

PARIS FOR EMBASSY, USRO, STOESSEL, AND MCGUIRE.

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MIGHT STRENGTHEN GOVERNMENT POSITION IN TALKS WITH "OUR  
FRIENDS." MORGENPOST (IND) COMMENTED MOST REGRETTABLE THAT  
NO DEMONSTRATION UNITY BY ALL PARTIES, ATTRIBUTED THIS TO  
SUSPICIOUS AROUSED ELECTION CAMPAIGN; PAPER ALSO SAID  
NOTHING COULD BE WORSE THAN IRRESPONSIBLE CRITICISM OF  
POWERS WHO ENSURE WEST BERLIN'S FREEDOM.

DER TAG (PRO-CDU) ENDORSED STATEMENT BY CDU LEADER  
KRONE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT FEDREP WOULD CONTINUE POLICY  
CLOSEST ALLIANCE WITH WEST, CRITICIZED BRANDT FOR BITTERLY

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-2- 258, AUGUST 19, 3 PM, FROM BERLIN

DEMANDING COUNTERMEASURES BY WEST. DIE WELT (IND) ATTACHED SPD PROPOSAL REFER BERLIN QUESTION TO UN, SAID THIS WOULD UNDERMINE FOUR-POWER RESPONSIBILITY, AND ADDED BRANDT SUGGESTION GIVE UP FOUR-POWER STATUS BERLIN DANGEROUS.

TELEGRAF (SPD) EDITOR SCHOLZ REGRETTED NO COMMENT DECLARATION MADE END OF SESSION, BLAMED THIS ON GOVTS ELECTION STRATEGY.

LIGHTNER

BP

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

DOT

102

100123 17 PM 9 57

58

Origin

EUR

Info:

SS

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INR

RMR

ACTION: USBER BERLIN PRIORITY 135

10088

INFO: Amembassy BONN PRIORITY 370  
Amembassy Moscow PRIORITY 462  
Amembassy LONDON PRIORITY 818  
Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY 938

038

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: State Sec 11/2/76

By mmg, NARS, Date 4/5/77

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

PARIS FOR USRO AND STOESSEL

President has sent personal messages to de Gaulle and Macmillan proposing earliest possible (hope for Saturday at latest) declaration by the three containing solemn warning determination maintain and preserve at whatever cost rights in Berlin and obligations to <sup>West</sup> Berliners.

President has also decided reinforce Berlin garrison by one battle group moved up autobahn and urged others take comparable action.

Germans here informed.

Lightner should inform Brandt of this in strictest repeat strictest confidence and that President plans send answer his letter soonest by high level messenger.

Drafted by: EUR:GER:FECash:mt  
8/17/61

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

Foy D. Kohler

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Collopy

RUSK

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By lmq, NARS, Date 4/5/77

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Action

Control: 14694

Rec'd: August 20, 1961  
6:32 p. m.

EUR

Info

FROM: Moscow

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SP

NO: 579, August 20, 5 p. m.

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PRIORITY

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 579 INFORMATION BONN 86, LONDON 108,  
PARIS 137, BERLIN 61

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USIA

IZVESTIYA (August 19) published full texts US protest  
note of August 17 and Soviet reply thereto. PRAVDA (August  
20) published only Soviet reply.

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

PRAVDA also publishes full page summary excerpts of  
Ulbricht August 18 radio-TV address with major emphasis  
on western violations of June, 1949, agreements.

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

NIC

In continuing coverage Berlin developments, PRAVDA  
concentrates on denouncing American reaction to GDR/Soviet  
action. Previous daily reportage of East German support  
and western calls for negotiation absent.

RMR

New York PRAVDA report cites US propaganda build-up against GDR  
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under caption "fighting with fire".Vice President's Bonn visit ridiculed as propaganda show  
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Vice President and General Clay in Berlin, according PRAVDA,  
heavily exploited by Brandt and his cold-war troubadours in  
effort bolster West Berlin revanchists.LIMITED OFFICIAL USEREPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
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-2-, 579, August 20, 5 p. m., From Moscow

PRAVDA also notes UK decision add 18 armored personnel carriers and 16 armored cars to Berlin garrison.

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MGG

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## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

10m

55-M

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Rec'd: August 20, 1961  
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PARIS 137, BERLIN 61

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## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

10w

47

Action

LIMITED OFFICIAL USEControl: 14594  
Rec'd: AUGUST 19, 1961  
7:42 P.M.

EUR

Info

FROM: MOSCOW

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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SP

NO: 576, AUGUST 19, 3 P.M.

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 576, INFORMATION BONN 85, LONDON 107,  
PARIS 136, BERLIN 60

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RMR

PRAYDA AUGUST 19 FRONT-PAGES SALINGER ANNOUNCEMENT VICE  
PRESIDENT JOHNSON FLYING TO WEST BERLIN AND BONN AS PERSONAL  
REPRESENTATIVE OF PRESIDENT TO MEET WITH ADENAUER AND BRANDT  
AND DEMONSTRATE US INTEREST BERLIN. ONLY REFERENCE TO  
INCREASING WESTERN BERLIN GARRISONS APPEARS IN MOSKOVSKAYA  
PRAYDA WHICH FRONT-PAGES REPORT WHITE HOUSE REFUSED COMMENT  
ON PRESS STORIES INCREASE IMMINENT.

IN GENERAL, SOVIET PRESS COVERAGE CONTINUES EFFORT PORTRAY  
EAST BERLIN AS QUIET IN CONTRAST WEST BERLIN AND BONN WHERE  
BRANDT AND ADENAUER STRIVING PROMOTE CRISIS ATMOSPHERE.  
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DESCRIBING CONTINUED NORMAL FUNCTIONING CITY LIFE AND  
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CROSSERS PROBLEM INSISTING EAST BERLIN BORDER-CROSSERS  
ALREADY HAPPILY RESETTLED IN LOCAL FACTORIES. PRAYDA REPORTS  
UK AMBASSADOR STEEL IN INTERVIEW WITH DAILY EXPRESS  
FOLLOWING 25-MINUTE TOUR EAST BERLIN STATED "I RECEIVED  
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SOVIET PRESS, IN CONTINUED CONDEMNATION "HYSTERICAL  
REACTION WESTERN GOVERNMENTS", DENOUNCES SPECIAL BUNDESTAG  
SESSION AT WHICH ONLY DUF DEPUTY BERISH REFUSED JOIN IN  
"COLD-WAR ANTICS". ALSO REPORTS EFFORTS BY BRANDT AND DGB  
LEADER RICHTER TO MOBILIZE WESTERN WORKERS AGAINST THEIR

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-2- 576, AUGUST 19, 3 P.M. FROM MOSCOW

COMRADES IN GDR. RED STAR PRINTS TASS STORY ON US NAVY INCREASES INCLUDING STATEMENT 42 ADDITIONAL SHIPS TO BE ACTIVATED RAISING USN TOTAL TO 861 SHIPS.

EFFORTS ALSO CONTINUE TO GIVE IMPRESSION REASONABLE VOICES IN WEST ARE CRITICIZING WESTERN MILITARY PREPARATIONS AND INSISTING ON NEED FOR IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS. IZVESTIYA CITES UK LABOR MP DENNIS HEALY AS DENOUNCING WESTERN RESISTANCE TO NEGOTIATIONS AND INSISTING ENTIRE WORLD WILL REJECT WESTERN POSITION UNLESS NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN.

IZVESTIYA ALSO REPORTS SPECIAL CAMPAIGN LAUNCHED BY US PROPAGANDA MACHINE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO STEP-UP COLD WAR AROUND WORLD, WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO UP-COMING BELGRADE "NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE".

SOVIET AUGUST 18 NOTE IN RESPONSE WESTERN NOTE OF AUGUST 17 NOT PUBLISHED AT TIME WRITING (2:00 P.M. MOSCOW TIME).

MCSWEENEY

SMD:OKY

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USEControl: 14594  
Rec'd: AUGUST 19, 1961  
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Info

FROM: MOSCOW

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 576, AUGUST 19, 3 P.M.

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 576, INFORMATION BONN 85, LONDON 107,  
PARIS 136, BERLIN 60

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action  
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062

Control: 14538  
Rec'd: AUGUST 19, 1961  
3:15 PM

Info

FROM: PARIS

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 183, AUGUST 19, 6 PM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Br 11/2/76

By my, NARS, Date 4/5/77

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT POLTO 183; INFORMATION BONN POLTO 39, BERLIN  
POLTO 21, MOSCOW POLTO 38, LONDON POLTO 39

POUCHED OTHER NATO CAPITALS POLTO UNN.

PER DEPTTEL 972 US INFORMED NAC THIS AFTERNOON OF REINFORCEMENT  
BERLIN GARRISON. US EXPLAINED NEED TO SHOW EARNEST OF WEST,  
PARTICULARLY US, TO LIVE UP TO COMMITMENT IN LIGHT ANXIETY  
OF PEOPLE OF BERLIN, AND TRIP OF VICE PRESIDENT AND CLAY  
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PURPOSES.

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SECRET

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~~—SECRET—~~

-2- POLTO 183, AUGUST 19, 6 PM, FROM: PARIS

IN WASHINGTON MUST HAVE CONSIDERED FURTHER CONSEQUENCES AND GENTLY INDICATED WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ANY INFORMATION AVAILABLE. HE INCLUDED IN HIS COMMENTS RESTRAINED BUT CLEAR INDICATION THAT MEMBERS WOULD HAVE WANTED TO HAVE KNOWN OF DECISION AND DISCUSSED IT BEFORE HAND.

TURKEY PRESSED POINT AS TO WHETHER THIS MIGHT NOT BE A PROBE OR RESULT IN SAME ACTION AS A PROBE AND INQUIRED WHETHER FOUR POWERS READY TO APPLY EMERGENCY PLANS IF THERE WAS TROUBLE. GERMANS STRESSED IT WAS NOT A PROBE, BUT RELATED TO NERVOUSNESS BERLIN POPULATION. VON WALTHER PERSONALLY SAID HE THOUGHT THAT IF THERE ARE ANY DIFFICULTIES, TROOPS WOULD NOT MARCH ON.

IN RESPONSE ITALY QUESTION, GERMANS AND UK SAID SIMILAR MOVEMENTS ON AUTOBAHN NOT UNUSUAL AND UK POINTED OUT NO LIMITATION IN INCREASING GARRISONS. UK THOUGHT WASHINGTON GROUP HAD ANTICIPATED THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTIES, BUT IF CONTRARY OCCURRED WOULD BE SERIOUS. UK THOUGHT WE SHOULD DISTINGUISH MILITARY BUILD-UP PROPOSED BY RUSK FROM ACTION TO REASSURE BERLIN POPULATION. SAID UK SENDING 18 ONE TON ARMORED VEHICLES AND 16 FERRETS, AND HAD NO WORD MOVEMENT BLOCKED. FRENCH AGREED AS TO PURPOSE OF REINFORCEMENT AND SAID FRENCH GOVERNMENT TODAY CONSIDERING REINFORCEMENT OF GARRISON, PERHAPS BY THREE COMPANIES OF PARATROOPERS, AND ABOUT 1,000 MEN. HOPED TO BE ABLE TO CONFIRM MONDAY.

US REITERATED THIS WAS IN NO SENSE A PROBE, POINTED OUT MOVEMENT NOT BEING RUSHED NOR WAS IT A TREMENDOUS FORCE.

US THEN CONVEYED SUMMARY OF SOVIET NOTE PER MOSCOWS 573 TO DEPARTMENT AND UK SAID THEY HAD RECEIVED NOTE WHICH SOUNDED IDENTICAL.

ELP/22

DURBROW

~~Note: Advance copies to Mr. Magill (RA) and SO 6:30 p.m. 8-19-61~~

~~SECRET~~

CWO-M



## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

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Control: 14538

Rec'd: AUGUST 19, 1961  
3:15 PM

1163

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 183, AUGUST 19, 6 PM

PRIORITY

Authority

L. L. B. 11/2/76  
By pmg, NARS, Date 4/5/77ACTION DEPARTMENT POLTO 183; INFORMATION BONN POLTO 39, BERLIN  
POLTO 21, MOSCOW POLTO 38, LONDON POLTO 39

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DURBROW

~~Note: Advance copies to Mr. Magill (RA) and SO 6:30 p.m. 8-19-61~~

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CWO-M



~~SECRET~~-ENCLOSURE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

102

AUG 21 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALTER JENKINS  
EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING

Subject: Telegrams Concerning the Vice President's  
Visit to Berlin

The enclosed selection of telegrams, concerning  
the Vice President's trip to Berlin, may be of  
interest to him and of use for your files.

/s/ Melvin L. Mantell

L. D. Battle  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

Two copies each of:

- |                |                  |                     |
|----------------|------------------|---------------------|
| 1. To Bonn 378 | 5. Berlin 261    | 9. Moscow 579       |
| 2. Berlin 264  | 6. Berlin 259    | 10. Moscow 576      |
| 3. Berlin 262  | 7. Berlin 258    | 11. Paris POLTO 183 |
| 4. To Bonn 375 | 8. To Berlin 135 |                     |

~~SECRET~~ ENCLOSURE

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

11  
/

August 9, 1961

Mr. Vice President:

A few thoughts that might be helpful  
in your individual conversations.

GER



## MEMORANDUM

1. Many Americans have become discouraged over the Berlin situation because they assume that Khrushchev sits down at the table with a hand full of aces and therefore there is nothing to do but surrender or fight. Actually, there are some weaknesses in Khrushchev's hand which may not be fatal to his plans, but which might afford some bargaining room.
2. The Khrushchev position, as presented to the world, is a simple one. He is merely proposing to sign a peace treaty with East Germany and turn it loose as an independent nation. This would then leave the fate of Berlin up to East Germany -- a country with which the United States has no treaties, which the United States does not recognize, and which the United States, for compelling reasons, does not want to recognize.
3. At first glance, the Khrushchev position seems to be one of overwhelming power. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to stand before the bar of world opinion and protest against turning a conquered nation loose 16 years after the war is over. It is equally difficult to insist that a sovereign nation does NOT have the right to seal off its borders and it is impossible to reach Berlin without crossing the borders of East Germany.
4. But a closer inspection raises some interesting questions as to how far Khrushchev is really willing to go in setting East Germany "free". Obviously, he is willing to give East Germany a facade of freedom. Obviously, he is willing to pull out some -- if not all -- of his troops. But is he really willing to pull out completely and turn over day to day administration of East Germany to the East German communist leaders? If so, he is less astute than generally believed.
5. By any standard -- even communist standards -- the East German communist leaders cannot be considered men of stature. Ulbricht and his followers have not succeeded in 16 years in establishing real control over East Germany. They are even incapable of sealing off the escape routes into West Germany -- something that should be a matter of simple police action. They are obviously routine bureaucrats -- brought to power by Soviet arms, maintained in power by Soviet arms, and quite likely to become panicky if Soviet arms are removed.

(more)



6. Khrushchev's strategy rests upon the extent to which he turns East Germany loose. But the extent to which he turns East Germany loose is a measure of the extent to which he commits the future of the communist world to men like Ulbricht. If the East German communist leaders do anything silly or infantile, the Soviet Union will have to bail them out. It is entirely possible that East Germany could maneuver the Soviet Union into "the wrong war, in the wrong place at the wrong time". Khrushchev, by his own lights, is a responsible leader. Is he really going to stake his own prestige on the likes of Ulbricht?

7. This consideration, of course, will not cause Khrushchev to back down from his position. But it is certain that he is NOT going to permit East Germany to be "free" -- in the sense that Yugoslavia is "free" or even Poland is "free". This gives the United States a basis for some sharp questioning as to what "liberation" of East Germany really means. This would not prevent Khrushchev from signing a peace treaty. But the U.S. position is definitely strengthened by the extent to which it can be demonstrated that freedom for East Germany is phony. Khrushchev is playing with fire when he plays with "freedom" for East Germany and he should not be allowed to forget it.

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# COPY

## MEMORANDUM

1. Many Americans have become discouraged over the Berlin situation because they assume that Khrushchev sits down at the table with a hand full of aces and therefore there is nothing to do but surrender or fight. Actually, there are some weaknesses in Khrushchev's hand which may not be fatal to his plans, but which might afford some bargaining room.
2. The Khrushchev position, as presented to the world, is a simple one. He is merely proposing to sign a peace treaty with East Germany and turn it loose as an independent nation. This would then leave the fate of Berlin up to East Germany -- a country with which the United States has no treaties, which the United States does not recognize, and which the United States, for compelling reasons, does not want to recognize.
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(more)

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**THE WHITE HOUSE**  
**OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

12

7331/CLF

24 AUGUST 1961  
DATE**OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE**

FROM: USMISSION BERLIN

TO : WHITE HOUSE

INFO :

CITE : DEPT 296

ACTION DEPT PRITY 296 BONN 262 AUGUST 23, 9 PM SIGNED LIGHTNER

FOLLOWING IS ORIGINAL ENGLISH TEXT OF LETTER TO VICE

PRESIDENT JOHNSON FROM GOVMAYOR BRANDT HANDED US THIS

AFTERNOON.

BEGIN QUOTE.

DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT,

WE HEARD THAT YOU LANDED SAFELY YESTERDAY IN WASHINGTON

AFTER AN UNEXPECTED INTERMEDIATE LANDING. THE NEWSPAPERS

HAVE GIVEN FULL ACCOUNTS OF YOUR REPORTS TO THE PRESIDENT

AND THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES.

PLEASE ALLOW ME TO CONVEY ONCE MORE TO YOU, AS VICE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MY GRATEFUL

THANKS FOR ALL THE TROUBLE WHICH YOU TOOK IN MAKING

YOUR TRIP TO BERLIN. I HAVE WRITTEN TO EXPRESS MY

PAGE 1 OF 3**OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

## OFFICIAL USE ONLY

THANKS TO YOUR PRESIDENT IN THE NAME OF ALL BERLINERS.  
I WOULD BE VERY GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD BE SO KIND AS TO  
CONVEY OUR THANKS ALSO TO GENERAL CLAY AND TO AMBASSADOR  
BOHLEN.

THE FACT THAT YOU MADE THIS VISIT TO BERLIN, AND THE SENDING  
OF A MILITARY REINFORCEMENT TO THE AMERICAN GARRISON,  
WERE THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE WAYS OF REITERATING THE  
PLEDGES WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS GIVEN FOR THE FREEDOM  
OF WEST BERLIN AND FOR FREE ACCESS TO THIS CITY. I HOPE  
THAT THIS HAS ALSO BEEN CORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD IN MOSCOW;  
YOU WILL HAVE REALIZED HOW MUCH TRUST AND HOPE MY FELLOW-  
CITIZENS HAVE PLACED IN YOU. YOUR NAME STANDS NOT ONLY  
IN THE GOLDEN BOOK OF BERLIN, IT IS ALSO INDELIBLY IN-  
SCRIBED IN THE HEARTS OF THE BERLINERS. WE SHALL NEVER  
FORGET YOUR FRANKNESS AND THE MANY PROOFS THAT YOU GAVE  
OF YOUR FRIENDLY FEELINGS.

I SHALL REMAIN IN CONTACT WITH AMBASSADOR DOWLING AND HIS  
LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES WITH REGARD TO THE POINTS DISCUSSED  
BETWEEN US AND THE MEMBERS OF YOUR PARTY. IT IS TO OUR  
MUTUAL INTEREST THAT WEST BERLIN SHOULD CONTINUE ITS  
DEVELOPMENT AS A FLOURISHING COMMUNITY. WE ARE ALSO

PAGE 2 OF 3

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OF ONE MIND THAT THE GERMAN QUESTION SHOULD NOT BE DROPPED FROM THE AGENDA OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS BUT THAT THIS IS THE TIME ABOVE ALL FOR DEMANDING THE RIGHT OF SELF DETERMINATION FOR THE GERMAN PEOPLE.

I HOPE THAT THE SAMPLES FROM THE BERLIN PROCELAIN FACTORY WILL REACH YOU IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. YOU ASKED ME TO SEND YOU A TAPE RECORDING IN GERMAN FOR A SHORT RADIO PROGRAM. THE TAPE WILL BE SENT OFF TODAY OR TOMORROW. I AM ALSO SENDING BY SEPARATE MAIL THE PHOTOGRAPH YOU ASKED FOR. THE LITTLE GIRL WHO GAVE YOU THE FLOWERS IN THE REFUGEE CAMP IS CALLED PETRA. WE WOULD RATHER NOT GIVE HER SURNAME BECAUSE HER GRANDPARENTS ARE STILL LIVING IN THE EAST AND COULD SUFFER IF THE NAME WERE TO BE MADE KNOWN.

WITH RENEWED GRATEFUL THANKS FOR THE MAGNIFICENT MISSION WHICH YOU CARRIED OUT FOR THE FREEDOM OF WEST BERLIN AND OUR COMMON CAUSE, AND WITH BEST WISHES, ALSO IN THE NAME OF MY WIFE AND MAYOR AMREHN, I REMAIN,

SINCERELY,  
WILLY BRANDT.

DTG: 240147Z

PAGE 3 OF 3

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Washington-- It now is possible to outline in some detail the thinking of the Kennedy Administration on the problem of negotiations over Berlin.

At present there is no allied agreement on the schedule for negotiation. Nor is there any disagreement. Events have not yet forced the various governments to this point of decision. It should be added that the problem is free from the uncertainty of negotiat<sup>ing</sup>~~ion~~ from strength or from weakness. Mr. Khrushchev thoroughly understands the strength of the west in raw terms. There is no need to put on special displays or to make special declarations in order to impress him. Nor is there any reason to think that Mr. Khrushchev would regard specific western proposals for negotiation as signs of weakness in the Western position. After all he has seen the recent military build-ups in various parts of the world and he knows that the massive military power of the United States has recently been given an even larger military budget .



It must be remembered that there will soon be a growing problem of leading people in the United States and the Western alliance to believe that the problem of Berlin has not been cast primarily in military terms. Young Americans have been called up for extended military service, ~~many~~ an enlarged defence program has been authorized, and the American people have been warned of still greater sacrifices. In such circumstances, it is inevitable that people will begin to pay serious attention to protecting our vital interests by putting diplomacy to work. One can expect a growing restlessness if this is not done.

The work of diplomacy may be done either through normal channels or through a special meeting if one is deemed useful. A variety of forms can be used and no satisfactory way of achieving progress is now foreclosed. In view of this general background there is no point in trying to identify or emphasize particular points of disagreement among the allies. There has been no disagreement as yet on any ultimate ~~xxx~~ decisions, because we have not yet reached that stage, though it should not be far off, and most of the differences



concern the timing and method of the negotiations rather than the deeper question of whether negotiations should take place at all. That is true even of France despite the inflated reports of French objections.

There is also the separate and important question of how much public knowledge there should be about the matters that will be brought under negotiation. On this point the United States is <sup>ed</sup> committed to a policy of calculated secrecy. It is trying to break with the tradition under which the fall-back positions of the United States were spread over the front page before the American delegation even entered the conference room.

But one can state the central issues which cannot be negotiated because they touch what is regarded here as vital interests. These include the presence of allied garrisons in Berlin with no mixture of Soviet troops, the right of access for the whole free world, and the right of Berlin to live in freedom. There will be no yielding on these points. All the allies are in agreement on these basic issues.



There are other political issues which will be kept open as political objectives but they will not be matters that can be regarded as shooting issues. It should be understood that the United States has recently spoken of self-determination for Germany without underlining or emphasizing the demand for german reunification. This has been deliberately done. Just as the unity of Korea remains a political objective, so will the unity of Germany. Nothing will be abandoned in the traditional western position nor will this particular point be pressed as a decisive issue.

Thus far there has been no overriding desire on the part of any Germans to start shooting. There was a danger that the German people might place events beyond the control of even the great powers if there had been large rioting in East Germany and East Berlin but that peril seems to have passed. So it is hardly correct to say that German emotionalism is in charge of events. It must be added with the greatest emphasis that no unlimited guarantees have been given or implied to West Berlin and West Germany. Instead, the German people are being urged to make greater contributions to the shared



defence plans of the allies.

Hope has not yet been abandoned here that Mr. Khrushchev will realize that it has never been the policy of the United States or the western allies to encourage the flow of refugees from East Germany. It is plainly against Western interests to de-germanize East Germany, thus allowing Russia to face a smaller challenge from dissident and brave Germans and allowing Russia to fill up the waste spaces with people sent into the country from Eastern Europe. Once the refugees have arrived in West Berlin or West Germany, they have been given help as a matter of humanitarian treatment and in observance of basic human rights. But the West has never wanted to keep up the massive flow of refugees as a deliberate goad upon Russia.

✓ The judgment here is that Mr. Khrushchev created the Berlin crisis not so much because he wanted to challenge the West as because he felt the necessity of consolidating Russia's position in East Germany. ~~There is open and unqualified contempt here for the Ullbricht regime. Ullbricht himself is described as a gangster. Had~~



conditions in ~~the~~ East Germany been more satisfactory, it might have been possible for Mr. Khrushchev to model East Germany after Poland but the utter failure of the Ullbricht regime made that attempt completely impossible.

The West cannot reasonably be expected to make its overtures for negotiation before the German elections on September 17. It is a matter of opinion how Mr. Khrushchev's own timetable will affect his actions. He may wish to ~~xxxx~~ ~~xx~~ solve the present crisis before the communist party congress meets in October or he may prefer to ~~xxxxxxxx~~ have no major argument with the west while that congress is in session. The preferred interpretation here is that Mr. Khrushchev will try to snatch no sudden triumph at the risk of a major explosion. The expectation is that there will be weeks of suspense and anxiety with the situation remaining very confused and on occasion even dangerous.

The strategic situation has changed since the Berlin blockade of 1949. At that time the United States had an atomic monopoly. Now both Russia and America have nuclear weapons and delivery systems



for them. Both sides are looking down the cannon's mouth. They are no longer playing games. They have begun to talk of their vital interests. To flourish the nuclear deterrent may no longer suffice. One must begin to think of the possible circumstances in which ultimate power must be used in defence of these interests when challenged and invaded beyond doubt. There must of course be no panic and no miscalculation.

This means in summary that there must be both calmness and determination dash calmness to avoid surrender that may be worse than war ,and determination to give diplomacy backed by power every chance to save the peace. All depends on the unbroken unity of the allies. Max Freedman

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Oth. 11-3-76

By Chw, NARS, Date 3-15-77

D. Recommendations.

There is no single or simple solution to the Berlin situation. However, the following recommendations are suggested for consideration:

1. All NATO members should be urged to increase their assistance in the defense of West Berlin. The additional strength is needed as an effective show of unity among the members of the Western alliance. This calls for a specific request of each nation and a joint announcement from all nations contributing. L
2. A schedule should be established for increases, at frequent but irregular intervals, of military strength in West Berlin. This should be primarily in modern weapons rather than numbers of manpower. As many different NATO countries as possible should supply portions of this equipment, with the origin of each identified clearly to the population. The U.S. should send in small numbers of new M-60 tanks, M-113 armored personnel carriers, and T-235 self-propelled artillery. L
3. The West Berlin police force should be gradually expanded from the current one to one ratio with Allied troops to a two to one ratio.
4. Top officials of other major NATO nations should visit West Berlin at irregular but frequent intervals, upon the pre-arranged invitation from the Federal Republic or West Berlin.
5. A plan should be readied for the imposition of a selective list of economic sanctions. This should be considered for introduction gradually in the form of embargoes on a limited number of key items, and every effort should be made to have all NATO nations cooperate. Withdrawal of such sanctions would comprise a negotiation factor.
6. A coordinated NATO plan should be prepared for strategically-timed lifting of some of the non-nuclear restrictions on German military strength. L

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7. Participation in the Leipzig Fair should be informally discouraged; gradually increasing restrictions should be imposed on travel from the East to the West zone.

8. Key quotations from the President's July 25 address and from formal statements made during the recent trip should be translated into appropriate languages, printed, and widely distributed through the USIA or other organizations.

9. The West Berlin government should announce that it is financing, with token contributions from NATO countries, a large international educational, cultural, or scientific center in the city.

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