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1 of 1

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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#1 Memo w/attach.	DOD Secret To the VP from Nitze <i>open 3-9-09</i> [duplicate of Doc. #2 in (Paris Talks)]	6 p 09/27/61	A
#2 Memo	DOD Secret To Col. Howard Burris from Frederic Miller	1 p 09/27/61	A
#3 Memo	DOD Secret To Col. Howard Burris from Frederic Miller [duplicate of #2]	1 p 09/27/61	A
#4a Chart	DOD Secret re: Turkey	2 p Undated	A
#5a Chart	DOD Secret re: France	3 p 09/26/61	A
#6a Chart	DOD Secret re: Greece	3 p Undated	A
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FILE LOCATION

VP Security File, VP Travel
[Defense Briefing for Paris Discussions]

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Refer to: I-16715/61

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SEP 27 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Briefing Notes for Your Paris Discussions

In accordance with your request to Secretary McNamara, the attached briefing notes have been prepared for your visit to Paris. We understand that you plan to meet with Ambassadors Gavin and Finletter, and Generals Norstad or C. D. Palmer.

As you know, many actions relating to the Berlin crisis are currently in progress at USRO and SHAPE. We believe it would be very useful and informative for you to solicit the views of Ambassador Finletter and Generals Norstad or Palmer, as senior U.S. officials concerned, regarding the adequacy and timeliness of the measures being taken by the U.S., and those taken or announced by our Allies.

Listed below are the topics which in our judgment would be appropriate for your discussions. Briefing notes supporting each item appear at the corresponding tab. These papers have been coordinated with the Department of State.

Effect of the Berlin Crisis on NATO Cohesion (Tab A)
Facilities for Buildup of U.S. Forces in Europe (Tab B)
NATO Country Buildup to Meet Berlin Crisis (Tab C)
Emergency Authority to Stockpile Atomic Weapons in France (Tab D)

Paul H. Nitze

4 Attachments
a/s

DECLASSIFIED
Authority (SD letter 11/8/76 C2)
By cbm/jc, NARA, Date 2-26-09

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PARIS
29-30 September 1961

Effect of Berlin Crisis on NATO Cohesion

Berlin activities by the 4-Powers are testing NATO cohesion. Crises have always before tended to unify NATO, but there have been several adverse NAC and SYG reactions to recent quadripartite steps. Steps now in process to bring the whole Alliance much more fully into Berlin contingency planning will, it is hoped, improve the atmosphere and elicit NATO-wide support for the Berlin program. The Powers with direct responsibility in Berlin cannot afford a small-power veto in the early stages, yet the lesser powers insist on fuller participation in planning that can well determine how and when they go to war. The controversies over the role of nuclear weapons in the Berlin conflict can also affect NATO cohesion. Means of avoiding or reducing disunifying effects are urgently important.

Prepared by: Colonel D. C. Armstrong, III
European Region
OASD/ISA
27 September 1961

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PARIS
29-30 September 1961

Facilities for Buildup of US Forces in Europe

Discussions are proceeding between USCINCEUR and responsible authorities of Germany, France, Italy, U.K. and Belgium concerning the availability of facilities and Line of Communication support which would be required for the deployment of up to six U.S. divisions and 28 tactical air squadrons if required in the light of the Berlin crisis. To date CINCEUR has reported no substantive issues having been raised by host state authorities and excellent progress is being made; however, the availability of land areas in France and Germany is considered by the Department of Defense as a potential problem.

The contingency planning being undertaken by USCINCEUR is based upon the possible deployment of up to six divisions to the Seventh Army area in the FRG, seven tactical air squadrons and one air transport squadron to the FRG, 19 tactical squadrons and one air transport squadron to France and one tactical squadron each to the U.K. and Italy.

Prepared by: W. E. Lang
Foreign Military Rights
Affairs
OASD/ISA
26 September 1961

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PARIS
29-30 September 1961

NATO Country Buildup to Meet Berlin Crisis

In a presentation to the North Atlantic Council on 8 August, Secretary Rusk called upon member nations to increase their posture of military readiness to meet the Berlin threat by measures comparable to those taken by the U.S. On 19 August, SACEUR prepared his "Plan of Action: NATO Europe" (SHAPE 167/61), spelling out recommended country actions in detail. This plan envisioned two phases: measures which would produce positive results prior to 1 January 1962, and those which, under emergency conditions, could produce results during 1962. They included the raising of manning and equipment levels of existing combat units, making available to ACE additional combat units, increasing the number and capability of combat and Service support units, and improving the posture of reserve units.

Country response to date, while uneven, has been encouraging. Fulfillment of commitments stated in the country replies will result in a significantly increased capability of Allied Command Europe forces, particularly in the vital Central Shield area. The existing 21-2/3 divisions in that area will be increased to 24-1/3 by 1 January 1962, and most of these will have a high combat potential. This is in contrast to their capability on 15 September 1961 of "scarcely more than that of 16 fully ready divisions." Country replies also indicate that a strategic reserve of 12-5/3 divisions will be available outside Continental Europe and, depending upon improved transportation and logistic support, can make a substantial contribution. Similarly, the air strength of the Central area will be augmented by the addition of 255 aircraft by 1 January 1962 and of at least 177 more during 1962. In the Northern Region, the responses of Norway and Denmark have been positive, but the financial capability of these nations is so limited that their efforts will necessarily fall short of the desired goals and the defense of this critical area remains uncertain.

NATO country responses to the SACEUR requirements have varied from none in the case of Portugal to good in the case of Canada and the Netherlands. The United Kingdom, French and German responses have been somewhat less than expected of these leading NATO members. Detailed replies and DoD comments are tabulated in separate briefing material. The nature of these responses suggests two issues that deserve early decision:

- (1) How hard should the U.S. press for country compliance with General Norstad's "Plan of Action: NATO Europe" in the face of country unwillingness to increase manning levels or make adequate budgetary provision for its force buildup?

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(2) To what extent should the U.S. be prepared to provide military assistance in support of country actions?

In the case of Greece and Turkey, country compliance will be dependent upon further U.S. aid, both in the form of MAP and supporting assistance. MAP for other NATO countries is presently limited to fulfillment of prior commitments and training. This policy is clearly applicable to the Center countries and Italy, but there is good reason to believe that Norway and Denmark do not possess the financial resources to meet their buildup requirements without some relaxation of present MAP limitations.

The Vice President might solicit comment on the NATO buildup from General C. D. Palmer and Ambassador Finletter.

Prepared by: J. A. Reed, Jr.
P. E. Barringer
European Region
(OASD/ISA)
27 September 1961

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PARIS
29-30 September 1961

Emergency Authority to Stockpile Atomic Weapons in France

France has never permitted the storage of U.S. nuclear weapons on her soil. In mid-1959, due to the impending Berlin crisis, SACEUR directed the redeployment of U.S. nuclear delivery aircraft from French bases to other airbases in Germany and U.K. in order to base delivery vehicles in proximity to nuclear weapons. Subsequently, certain French bases have been largely on a standby basis, whereas our bases in Germany and U.K. have an over-concentration of planes, resulting in increased vulnerability to enemy attack.

Under our base rights agreement with France, the U.S. retains the right to deploy conventionally armed aircraft to the northern French bases. Under current USAF Tactical Air Command plans, a number of squadrons of aircraft including F-104s and F-100s may be deployed in a conventional configuration to these bases, but all would be capable of nuclear strikes if the need should arise and if nuclear weapons were available.

For this reason, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that France "authorize the U.S. to stockpile atomic weapons in France" and General Norstad has indicated that "consideration should be given . . . to granting authority to stockpile atomic weapons in France on an emergency basis." If the French would approve such a move for the duration of the Berlin crisis, considerable flexibility in the dispersion of in-theater forces would result and units deployed from the U.S. to northern France would have both a conventional and atomic capability if the need should arise. Vulnerability would also be decreased due to greater dispersion.

Recommendation. It is suggested that the possibility of French acquiescence to the emergency storage of nuclear weapons on French soil for the duration of the Berlin crisis be explored with General Palmer and Ambassadors Finletter and Gavin. A clear understanding of their views would be most helpful in reaching a decision here in Washington as to the wisdom of approaching General de Gaulle on this matter.

Prepared by: Colonel B. K. Yount
European Region
OASD/ISA
27 September 1961

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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SEP 27 1961

Refer to: I-16,716/61

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HOWARD BURRIS
Office of the Vice President

SUBJECT: NATO Country Progress Toward Berlin Buildup

The Vice President has been furnished briefing notes on the NATO buildup which indicate the general nature of country responses and their significance for the military posture of Allied Command Europe.

Attached is a more detailed tabulation of NATO country actions recommended by General Norstad and specific steps taken or announced by NATO countries in connection with the buildup to meet the Berlin crisis.

On the basis of the replies to SACEUR's recommendations, our informal evaluation of country statements of intention to date is as follows:

Belgium - Fair	Italy - Fair
Canada - Good	Netherlands - Good
Denmark - Fair	Norway - Poor
France - Fair to Good	Portugal - None
Germany - Fair	Turkey - Poor
Greece - Poor to Fair	United Kingdom - Fair

Attachments
A/S

Frederic H. Miller
Frederic H. Miller
Major General, USAF
Director, European Region

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Authority OSD Ltr. 2/28/77

By rmg, NARS, Date 6/15/77

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SEP 27 1961

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[dup # 2]

Refer to: I-16, 716/61

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HOWARD BERRIS
Office of the Vice President

SUBJECT: NATO Country Progress Toward Berlin Buildup

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France - Fair to Good	Portugal - None
Germany - Fair	Turkey - Poor
Greece - Poor to Fair	United Kingdom - Fair

Attachments
A/S

SIGNED
Frederic M. Miller
Major General, USAF
Director, European Region

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Authority OSD/la 4/28/77
By smg, NARS, Date 4/15/77

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Authority OSD LA 2/28/77

By mmg, NARS, Date 6/5/77

TURKEY

Country Progress Toward Berlin Buildup

SACIEUR Recommendations

Country Action

Comment

General

1. Improve readiness of mobilization.
2. Increase balanced logistic support for all services in phase with force improvement.
3. Intensify joint and combined training activities.

1. Turkish Ground Forces have tightened up mobilization exercise during this period.
2. Turkish Armed Forces do need more up-to-date equipment. Turkey has reiterated need for additional military assistance to accomplish build-up.
3. NATO Exercise CHECKMATE II completed 25 September in THRACE judged an outstanding success.

1. In terms of manpower main lack now in specialist category. Mobilization additional forces would require additional MAP equipment and grant aid. Turkish Ground Forces now mobilized to limit their equipment.
2. Unless we are prepared to expose ourselves to new demands for military aid and provide additional military equipment, Ambassador recommends we not stimulate Turkish activity on military build-up.
3. Efforts to improve Turkish military posture will increase military expenditures and require increased U.S. MAP support and grant aid.

Army

1. Take action to reduce shortages of NCO's and specialists.
2. Remedy deficiencies in TO&E equipment in APC's, small arms, communications, transport vehicles and engineer equip.
3. Increase reserves of ammo and equip. to minimum 30-day requirement.
4. Take action to deploy forces for timely implementation of EDP.
5. Raise levels of M-Day combat formations and support units to at least 90%; insofar as the progress of re-organization permits.

1. None reported.
2. "
3. "
4. "
5. Manning levels first echelon divisions increased from 45% to 81%.

1. These actions are beyond country capabilities and will require increased MAP support and grant aid.
2. "
3. "
4. "
5. Turkish M-Day divisions and supporting units already manned at 98% full war strength.

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TURKEY (Cont'd)

SACEUR Recommendations

Country Action

Comment

Navy

1. Phase forward to Category "A" two destroyers and two submarines.
2. Build up stock levels of POL, 5" ammo, and modern mines.
3. Remedy deficiencies in communication and electronics equipment.

1. None reported.
2. " "
3. " "

1. These actions are beyond country capability and will require increased MAP support and grant aid.
2. "
3. "

Air Force

1. Delay planned inactivation of three squadrons F-84G A/C.
2. Raise manning of Control and Reporting Units to permit 24-hr operations.
3. Remedy equip and supply deficiencies in JP4 fuel, 20mm ammo, 2 75 rockets, droppable fuel tanks.
4. To hasten attainment of a nuclear capability, expedite both construction of special ammo storage sites and activation of IREM Squadrons.

1. Already accomplished.
2. None reported.
3. "
4. "

1. None.
2. Much of existing ACW equipment obsolete. Modernization under current MAP procurement scheduled FY 63. TAF ACW system has never operated on continuous 24-hour basis as only 79 controllers on duty and 216 officer controllers needed. Also there is shortage of maintenance technicians. C and E training inadequate. Correction these deficiencies being taken as high priority task. Will require MAP support and grant aid.
3. These actions are beyond country capability and will require increased MAP support.
4. "

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26 September 1961

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FRANCE

Country Progress Toward Berlin Buildup

SACEUR/SACLANT Recommendations

Country Action

Comment

General

1. By 1 Jan 1961: provide additional units for deployment in Central Area to meet MC-70 requirements of 4 divisions at MC-55/1 standards.

2. During 1962: be ready to deploy one additional division in Central Area on same basis.

1. Draftees will be retained for 27 months and 27 days, thus cancelling reduction to 25 months.

2. Up to 3 additional active divisions may be withdrawn from Algeria by end CY 62.

1. Phase I will be largely met by 31 Dec 61, although there will be some shortage in personnel & equipment.

2. French have indicated that 15th Div. (less one M-day brigade) and 16th, 18th, and 28th Div. available for use by SHAPE "in case of necessity" during 1962. These are 2nd echelon divisions, except for the 15th which is 1/3 M-day and 2/3 1st Echelon.

Army

1. Increase 2 1/3 to 4 divisions and bring up to M-day MC 55/1 standards.

1. Approximately 10,000 troops are being transferred to 1st Army in Germany according to MOD Messmer.

2. Procurement of more modern equipment for the 1959 Divs. (1, 3 and 15th) is underway.

3. 11th Light Inf. and 7th Light Armored Divs. returned from Algeria and assigned to N.W. France. Re-equipping underway.

1. French can bring M-day units to 100% strength in 2 to 3 days by recalling reservists.

2. French report ENTAC and SS-11 missiles and AMX tanks being procured.

3. Both of these units deficient in heavy equip. although some obsolescent M-47 tanks, heavy artillery, wreckers, etc. available in storage. These units not assigned to NATO but available in an emergency.

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Authority OSD Ltr 2/28/77
By mmg, NARS, Date 6/15/77

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DOD DIR 5200.10

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(France, continued)

SACEUR/SACLANT Recommendations

Country Actions

Comments

4. Maximum effort to strengthen logistical support and equipment.

4. Service battalions will be increased by 1 Jan 62. Shortage of APCs, transport vehicles and communications equipment continues.

5. Possible return of 3 additional divisions from Algeria during 62.

5. Decision to return all three divisions depends on a settlement of the Algerian crisis or a regroupment of the settlers to allow a defensible reduced perimeter. The probable return of the 5th Light Armored Div. during 1961 has been reported but not confirmed.

6. Three Second Echelon Divisions will be placed at SHAPE disposal if necessary.

6. These are the 16th, 18th and 28th divs. - all 2nd Echelon available on M plus 30. Current manning is 16th Div. at 8000 men; 18th & 28th at cadre strength of 400 men.

7. Increased Berlin garrison by 300 men.

7. Reported by MOD Messmer.

8. 501st Tank Regiment moved from Rambouillet to eastern France.

8. Reported by MOD Messmer.

Navy

1. Be prepared to phase forward to Category "A", on request, 1 CV, 2 SS, 6 DD/DEs, and 4 MP a/c earmarked for SACLANT.

1. None reported

1. Withdrawal of French Med. Fleet left no naval units assigned to SACEUR.

2. Be prepared to make available to SACLANT in the later stages of a buildup, one CVS, 2 SS and 3 MP a/c now under national command and not earmarked for NATO.

2. None reported

2. Some units remain assigned to SACLANT and CINCHAN.

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(France, continued)

SACEUR/SACLANT Recommendations

Country Action

Comment

Air Force

1. Bring two Nike Battalions up to full operational status.

1. One Nike battalion operational in temporary sites. Second bn. to be activated 15 October.

1. There will be a delay of more than one year before second bn. is operational.

2. Convert 2/53 F-86K squadrons to 2/24 Mirage III and 2/24 F-86K.

2. 24 Mirage IIICs are being assigned to Dijon area.

2. This will satisfy Gen. Norstad's requirement to replace approximately half of the F-86Ks with Mirage IIIs.

3. AC&W sites should be placed on a 24-hour basis.

3. French report that all AC&W sites will be on a 24-hour basis by 1 Jan 62.

3. This satisfies Gen. Norstad's requirement for 24-hour operation.

4. French will purchase 15 F-100s as a part of the recently approved Trading Arrangement.

4. This will provide necessary attrition aircraft for the 4 LABS-equipped F-100 squadrons recently transferred to Germany. These squadrons can now commence advanced LABS training with Congressional approval of the 144(b) Agreement.

5. Additional pilots will be assigned to F-100 units.

5. Combat crew manning and a/c ready rates have been below MC-55/1 standards.

6. French now report a 20-day supply of 2.75" rockets; 30 days for Sidewinders by 1 Jan 62; 35 days drop tanks by 1 Jan 62.

6. This remedies previously reported major FAF shortages except F-100 spares and fragmentation bombs.

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Authority CSO la 2/28/77

By pmg, NARS, Date 6/15/77

GREECE

Country Progress Toward Berlin Buildup

SACEUR Recommendations

Country Action

Comment

General

- | | | |
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| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Raise the manning level of M-Day units to 90%, and that of 1st echelon units to 50%.2. Insure readiness of mobilization increments.3. Intensify training to achieve combat readiness and to provide an increased number of NCOs and technicians. | <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Efforts being made to raise manning levels of the M-Day Units to 80% by postponing the disbandment of draftees who are due to be released in October 1961. Plans are to retain about 15,000 men for additional 90 days. Also 9,800 reserve officers and men will be called up for training starting in October 1961.2. Greek rapid mobilization system has proved to be very efficient, can offset very speedily present shortfalls in personnel.3. Joint NATO Exercise CHECKMATE II completed September 25th in vicinity of Greek-Turkish border judged an outstanding success. Training of non-organic support units has been intensified. In order improve reserve and mobilization training, 7,700 reservists called up on August 17, 1961 and manned a 1st Echelon Division, which subsequently carried out maneuvers. Another 9,800 reservists will be called up in October 1961. Measures are being taken to improve quality of regular NCO's and technicians. | <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. The Greek decisions to augment their military strength are all contingent on continued U.S. MAP support and increased supporting assistance. The request to the Congress for FY 1962 Greek Supporting Assistance was for only \$10 million, whereas it has averaged \$20 million annually for the past few years. Barring extraordinary developments, it is planned to terminate Supporting Assistance after FY 1962.2. No comment.3. Greeks expect increased Supporting Assistance to cover self-financed cost of these actions. Number of NCO's meets the established requirements. |
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Greece (Cont'd)

SACEUR Recommendations

Army

1. Improve balanced logistical support.
2. Remedy deficiencies in TO&E in tanks, artillery, communications and vehicles.
3. Remedy equipment and ammunition levels to 30-day requirements.

Country Action

1. Greece expediting build-up of one Beach Unloading Unit.
2. None reported.
3. "
4. The frontier units have been reinforced.

Comment

1. Will require U.S. MAP support and increased Supporting Assistance.
2. Shortfalls in TO&E and ammunition can only be remedied and achieved through U.S. MAP support.
3. "
4. Greeks have decided to convert the 31st Military Command into a 1st Echelon Division to strengthen THRACE.

Navy

1. Expedite obtaining and manning of one additional submarine.
2. Advance planned acquisition of 2 DDs and delay scrapping of 2 DE's.
3. Increase the supply levels of ammunition and depth charges.

1. All possible units of R. Navy have been placed under category A. The crew necessary to man the third submarine is ready.
2. Greeks are exerting political pressure to speed up the loan of these ships and have delayed scrapping of 2 DE's.
3. None reported.

1. Acquisition of third submarine and one of two DD's scheduled in FY 1963. Necessary lead time involved will preclude expediting this action to the extent desired by the Greeks. This action will involve U.S. MAP support and increased grant aid.
2. "
3. This is beyond country capabilities and will require MAP support.

Air Force

1. Convert one attack squadron to strike role.
2. Expedite introduction of one G-91 and one F-86D squadron.

1. Conversion completed.
2. Formation of one G-91 squadron and second AWX F-83D squadron will be completed by end of 1961.

1. RHAF ready to proceed to conversion of second attack squadron to strike role by summer 1962.
2. Expect this G-91 Squadron to be operational within first quarter 1962, and AWX F-83D squadron by end of year. These actions will require MAP support and possibly some increase in grant aid. The formation of one RF 104 squadron is programmed for 1962.

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Greece (Cont'd)

SACEUR Recommendations


3. Man Control and Reporting Units for 24-hr. operation.
4. Raise aircraft combat-ready rate to at least 70% and combat crew-ready rate to 100%.

Country Action

3. Manning of Control and Reporting Units have been fulfilled for all units with the exception of that at Corfu.
4. Efforts are being made to increase the present (82%) combat crew-ready rate.

Comment

3. It is not deemed necessary to operate C&R Unit at Corfu more than 12 hours per day due to its secondary importance. Will require increased grant aid.
4. Will involve U.S. MAP support and increased grant aid.



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DECLASSIFIED

26 September 1961

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Authority OSD la 2/28/77

PORTUGAL

By mmg, NARS, Date 6/5/77

Country Progress Toward Berlin Buildup

SACEUR/SACLANT Recommendations

Country Action

Comment

Army

If possible, convert 3rd Infantry Division (2nd echelon) into an M-day Brigade Group of the NATO standard Division type.

Portugal states that no new contribution can be made at this time.

Elements of this division have recently been withdrawn for use in Angola. The Portuguese have further advised that this conversion cannot take place because of higher priority requirements in Africa.

Navy

Be prepared to make available to SACLANT during later stages of a buildup 3 DD/DEs and 3 SS now under national command and not earmarked to NATO.

Of the 6 DD/DEs committed to NATO, Portugal recently withdrew 3 for use in overseas territorial waters under national command.

Portugal had one flotilla of 6 DD/DEs committed to SACLANT. Those recently withdrawn will be replaced by 3 new Dealy Class DEs, by 1964.

Air Force

Provide 2 squadrons of ASW maritime patrol aircraft (2/24).

Portugal has one squadron of P2V-5s (12 a/c) committed to SACLANT. Crew training of this unit is apparently continuing despite the crisis in Angola. The remaining squadron of P2V-7 a/c will commence training in calendar 1963.

There is some question that the PAF will be able to man and operate two squadrons of complex P2V a/c when its resources are strained by the Angola situation.

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Authority

OSB/LA 2/28/77

By

smg, NARS, Date

6/15/77

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GERMANY

27 September 1961

8a

Country Progress Toward Berlin BuildupSACEUR RecommendationsCountry ActionComment*General

1. Increase term of service to 18 months.

1. a. Private statements by German officials indicate service tour will be extended to 18 months. This of course must be confirmed by Bonn Government action.

1. a. Most actions, and especially those directly affecting the electorate have been postponed until after the elections. No action can be expected now until the new government has been formed.

- b. The decision has been made to extend for three months 6000 term mil. pers. whose period of service was to end 1 October.

- b. This falls short of the 6-month extension needed for entire draft element. US should continue to press for execution of Strauss' promise that this would be done.

2. Supply critical shortages in pilots, junior officers, electronic and mechanical specialists.

2. a. On 11 August the Federal Government asked the Bundesrat for approval of ordinance implementing conscription of 150 specialist categories outside the ordinary age classes.

2. Indications are that FRG intends to raise army divisions to 90% strength.

- b. Action is being taken to train 65 additional officers as soon as possible in CONUS to fill all existing shortages in FRG NIKE units.

*Germany is capable of meeting from its own resources all SACEUR requirements to meet the Berlin crisis. Germany has indicated that it will not meet certain of the requirements, e.g., the 12th division, as a political rather than a military or economic decision.

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SACEUR Recommendations

Country Action

Comment

General (Cont'd)

- | | | |
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| 3. Accelerate completion of infrastructure commitments, improve supply systems, raise level of stockpiles, and complete equipping those bases already constructed. | 3. All "feasible" measures, including the use of temporary structures, and the use of troop labor are being taken. | 3. a. Pressure should be maintained to ensure that progress on infrastructure and supply systems continues.

b. Measures are in progress to bring equipment up to full TO&E, to increase war reserves to a minimum of 30 days (SHAPE standards). POL reserves for 30 days are on hand. |
| 4. Acquire maneuver areas and provide large unit training (divisional level or higher). | 4. None reported. | |

Army

- | | | |
|--|---|---|
| 1. Phase I: Raise Army M-Day forces to 9 Divisions at MC 55/1 standards. | 1 a. FRG plans an army strength of 9 divisions, including 25 brigades at 90% strength by Dec 31, 1961.

b. Advanced movement to Germany planned for Nike equipment of 5th and 6th FRG battalions to allow for earlier on-site capability.

c. Immediate initiation of Army training tests for FRG Honest John units to improve their training status and insure their capabilities. | 1. This still falls short of Phase I goals by two brigades. |
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SACEUR Recommendations

Country Action

Comment

Army (Cont'd)

1.
 - d. General Foertsch, Chief, FRG Armed Forces, personally requested Chief, MAAG to expedite delivery of 300-400 M113's purchased under MSMS case 1103 to improve Bundeswehr readiness posture, and MAAG has learned from reliable sources in FMD that FRG is considering purchase of approximately 1,000 additional M113 APC's.
 - e. The Chief of Staff, FRG Army has requested Chief, MAAG, to arrange for the earliest possible delivery of 315,000 rounds of cartridges 90MM heat T 300 E56 procured under MSMS case 40121.
2. Phase II: Provide three additional Divisions for a total of 12.
 2. FRG plans to assign to NATO two additional divisions, consisting of two brigades each, in 1962.
 2. FRG states that it is not possible to raise the 12th division in this period. This would leave a shortfall of one division and four brigades.

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SACEUR Recommendations

Country Action

Comment

Navy

- | | | |
|--|---|---|
| 1. Phase forward Category B & C afloat support ships to Category A in the required proportions to support operational units. | 1. All MC 70 Category A requirements with regard to units afloat will be met, with the exception of minelayers. These will not be available for inclusion in Category A until 1962. FRG states the following more important units will be available:

6 Destroyers
35 Forward Patrol Boats | 1. The naval picture is generally good. The position of supply bases remains too far forward but will be compensated for by proper utilization of afloat support units. |
| 2. Procure additional mines and storage facilities. | 2. Mine plans can be met; 2300 additional mines have been procured from the U.S. | 2. None. |
| 3. Build up POL and ammo above current 30-day level. | 3. None reported. | 3. The FRG position on logistics and infrastructure is hedged. It is stated that deficiencies will be corrected with the least possible delay, but then notes the measures needed cannot be realized on short notice. |
| 4. Activate unified Baltic Command. | 4. FRG has stated its readiness to contribute its share to the activation of uniform command in the Baltic Sea area. | 4. None. |

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
SACEUR Recommendations

Country Action

Air Force

- | | | |
|--|--|---|
| 1. FRG to have 22 Squadrons totaling 471 planes by 31 Dec 1961. | 1. FRG states F-104 and G-91 production capacities are in full use. Components are also being brought from the US by air transport. NMSSA has been requested to speed up other spare parts. It is planned to have 16 squadrons of 351 aircraft by 31 Dec 1961. | 1. This will leave a shortfall of 6 squadrons and 120 A/C. |
| 2. Training to be accelerated. | 2. Lack of training facilities will continue to prevent more rapid expansion. | 2. Training facilities must be improved--or else even increased personnel input cannot be fully utilized. Possibility of securing training areas outside FRG should be explored fully. |
| 3. Crew deficiency (now approximately 42% of required) to be remedied. | 3. Crew deficiencies will continue. | 3. Personnel rather than materiel would seem the biggest block. |
| | 4. One hundred twenty three 104-G are scheduled to enter GAF inventory during CY 1962 from European production sources. Spares for above requested on a priority basis. | 4. FRG is moving forward in the procurement field as concerns aircraft parts. |
| | | 5. Sec McNamara has sent a personal cable to Strauss offering to make sidewinder missiles and launchers available to coincide with delivery of F104s to FRG and has ordered accelerated deliveries. |

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27 September 1961

90

BELGIUM

Country Progress Toward Berlin Buildup

SACEUR/SACLANT Recommendation

Country Actions

Comment

General

- | | | |
|--|-------------------|--|
| 1. Extend present 12 month (enlisted) and 15 month (officers) conscription terms to 18 mo. | 1. None reported. | 1. Owing to domestic political pressures, Foreign Minister Spaak has stated that Belgium is not contemplating such "drastic" action as extending conscription term at this time. |
|--|-------------------|--|

Army

- | | | |
|---|--|--|
| 1. Raise manning levels of 2 M-Day divisions to 90% (from 82-87%). Reduce shortage of technicians and trained officers. | 1. Belgium reportedly plans to augment units of 1st Corps in Germany by 1000 officers and NCO's by 1 Jan 1962. Drive to recruit NATO technicians will be stepped up. | 1. Personnel increase in 1st Corps is not representative of any real effort since less than half of Belgian army is presently in 1st Corps, and 1962 conscripts begin entering service in October. |
| 2. Intensify training, especially of M-Day forces. | 2. None reported. | 2. None. |
| 3. Expedite reorganization of M-Day divisions and procure more modern equipment. | 3. Accelerated delivery of 181 M75 APC's being procured through MSMS has been urgently requested by Belgium Defense Ministry. | 3. While the request for delivery of these APC's by 31Dec61 is largely a budgetary measure, it will help improve the Belgian military posture. Belgium is capable of a much greater defense effort than is currently being made. However, general Army reorganization and reequipment is beyond Belgian financial capability, which must be supplemented by US grant military assistance if the deficiencies are to be remedied. |

DECLASSIFIED

Authority CSO ltr 2/28/77
By smg, NARS, Date 4/15/77

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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SACEUR/SACLANT Recommendation

Country Actions

Comment

Army (Cont'd)

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|-----------------------------------|--|----------|
| 4. Fill out operational reserves. | 4. Contractual authority in the 1961 extraordinary budget is reported to have been increased by \$10 million for war stocks, tanks, munitions, signal equipment. | 4. None. |
|-----------------------------------|--|----------|

Navy

- | | | |
|--|---|--|
| 1. Add enough active duty personnel to man ships now in reserve. | 1. None reported. | 1. None. |
| 2. Procure mine warfare helicopters and smaller ships. | 2. It is planned to convert 2 MSC's to minehunters by the end of 1963, at a cost of \$1.8 million. | 2. This is too late to be considered a part of the Berlin buildup. |
| 3. Increase operational shipboard and afloat training. | 3. None reported. | 3. None. |
| | 4. To bring Belgian Navy to a condition of readiness, all operational ships are being maintained at 80% full capacity and are being loaded to full capacity for food and 95% of wartime medical supply allowance. Mine warfare ships are being fitted with nonferrous magnetic cable, and full ammunition allowances are being loaded on all operational ships. | 4. None. |

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SACEUR/SACLANT Recommendation

Country Actions

Comment

Air Force

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| 1. Man control and reporting units on a 24-hour basis. | 1. Belgium plans to place control and reporting units on 24-hour basis "as soon as possible." | 1. None. |
| 2. Overcome shortages of pilots, electrical and electronic technicians. | 2. None reported. | 2. None. |
| 3. Procure additional items, particularly 2.75" rockets, to meet MC-55/1 standards. | 3. " " | 3. Belgium has indicated a desire to be furnished these items through grant aid. It certainly has the ability to procure them, however, if sufficient funds are appropriated and if new taxes are levied to support the appropriations -- both difficult steps for the government to take. |

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10



26 September 1961

10a

~~SECRET~~CANADACountry Progress Toward Berlin BuildupSACEUR/SACLANT RecommendationsCountry ActionCommentGeneral

1. Ensure availability sufficient air/sea lift expeditiously to move reserve M-Day brigades to Europe.
2. Provide balanced logistic support for all forces.

1. None reported.

1. None

2. None reported.

2. None

3. a. Authorized strength of Canadian Armed Forces raised from 120,000 to 135,000, Canadian NATO force to be increased from 12,000 to 14,000. Immediate recruitment of 15,000 personnel.
b. Canada will train up to 100,000 men in basic training with emphasis on subjects essential for National survival.

3. These are significant country actions, but are not based on SACEUR recommendations.

Army

1. Expedite modernization of 4th Brigade Group (stationed in Europe).

1. None reported. However, 4th Canadian Brigade Group being augmented by 1100 men. 1500 reinforcements being made available in Canada. Return to Canada of one infantry battalion of 4th Brigade and its replacement by another from Canada being deferred until next year.

1. It has been reported by the U.S. Army attache in Ottawa, but not yet confirmed by the Canadian govt, Canadians plan to have their first Honest John (SSM) Battery in position in Europe with the 4th CIBG by the end of Nov 1961.

2. Ready M-Day brigade groups in Canada, for expeditious movement to Europe.

2. The strength of certain Army formations in Canada earmarked for SACEUR's Strategic Reserve are being increased by 8,950 men.

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Authority OSD Ltr. 2/28/77
By mmg, NARS, Date 6/15/77

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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26 September 1961

CANADA

Country Progress Toward Berlin Buildup

SACEUR/SACLANT Recommendations

Country Action

Comment

Navy

1. Be prepared to phase forward to Category A, on request, 5 DD/E earmarked for SACLANT.
2. Be prepared to make available to SACLANT during the later stages of a buildup 7 DD/DE/DLG/DDG and 1 SS now under National Command and not earmarked for NATO.

1. None reported.
2. None reported.

By an increase of 1749 men, RCN ships' complements being brought up to strength necessary for a prolonged emergency.

Air Force

1. None

1. Increasing strength of RCAF Air Division in Europe by 250 men.
2. Increasing the strength of certain RCAF units in Canada earmarked for SACEUR's Strategic Reserves by 898 men.
3. Training being received in operation and maintenance of F101B aircraft, 66 of which are to be supplied to Canada by U.S. under terms of the "Triangular Deal".

None

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DENMARK

26 September 1961

11a

Country Progress Toward Berlin Buildup

SACEUR/SACLANT Recommendations

Country Action

Comment

General

1. Extend conscript service in all armed forces to a minimum of 18 months; make up shortage of regular NCOs and specialists.

2. Increase balanced logistic support for all services in phase with force improvement.

3. Activate unified command in the Baltic. (BALTAP).

1. Danish military authorities have been instructed by Govt to make preparations for calling up reserves and retaining others on active duty.

2. Danish MOD evidenced considerable activity toward force improvement through supplementary budget requests, totalling \$25 million, for additional capital investment expenditures which include equipment purchases such as weapons, ammo and signal equipment with emphasis on buildup of war reserves.

3. Baltic Command accepted in principle and Danish-SACEUR consultation on implementation have been initiated.

1. Danish Govt has generally implemented SACEUR's recommendations to a marked degree.

2. Sum represents approx. 15% of annual defense budget; notable is earmarking for force improvement and emphasis on war reserve buildup.

3. U.S. should press for early implementation of this decision.

Army.

1. Raise manning levels of M-Day units to at least 90% and insure readiness of remaining mobilization increment.

1. Call up notices for simple alert have been placed in hands of postal authorities for instant distribution on order and active duty personnel have been restricted to a radius of 3 hours' driving time from their duty headquarters.

1. None

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Authority OSD Ltr 2/28/77

By smg, NARS, Date 4/15/77

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DO NOT CLASSIFY AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 10 YEARS.
DOD DIR 0200.10

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Army (Cont'd)

2. Improve adequacy of TO&E equip. Bring up operational reserves for equipment and ammo to SHAPE 30-day interim level.

Navy

1. Phase forward to Category "A" 3 DEs; 4 PCs; 3 SSs and 2 CM (with mines aboard).

2. Procure and store in Denmark additional mines required to meet plans.

3. Improve reserves of spare parts & equipment.

4. All coastal mine layers maintained at D-Day readiness with mines aboard.

5. Acquisition of 2 DEs should be advanced and scrapping of 2 DEs delayed.

Country Action

2. Approx. \$10 million in new appropriation has been released to the Danish Army for emergency procurement of equipment.

1. Danish Govt has stated it is "considering" calling up sufficient personnel for the commissioning of two additional "ships".

2. Danish Govt considers existing mine stocks "sufficient" to cover present plans.

3. Portion of supplementary budget request to be used for spare parts and equipment.

4. RDN's readiness has been increased by loading 1 minelayer and 1 mine planter with full complement of mines. These ships are planned to be kept on station, in close proximity of mine field locations, approx. 50% of the time.

5. Prior to U.S. Congressional passage of shiploan bill 22 Sept., CINC RDN & MOD were considering refusing 2 Fletcher class DDs, to be loaned from U.S., because they felt training requirements would impair Navy's readiness for 15 months.

Comment

2. No indication of efforts to bring ammo to SHAPE 30-day interim level.

1. Danish reply not clear as to how SACEUR recommendations are to be met.

2. Present number of mine stocks are still considered to be insufficient by approx. 600 mines to carry out mining operation called for by NATO planners.

3. Sum considered minimal to satisfy recommendation.

4. Further U.S. attention should be given in view of major importance of Danish role to closing Straits.

5. Though 15 months training would be required, the complete crews for both DDs would only be in training for 4 months due to planned re-scheduling of crew training and ship reconditioning and both DDs could be on active duty by Dec 1962. Long term gain in surface support overrides consideration of short-term decrease in readiness and manning level.

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
<u>Navy (Cont'd)</u>	<u>Country Action</u>	<u>Comment</u>
6. Oilers acquired for effective afloat support.	6. None reported.	6. None.
7. Be prepared to make available to SACLANT during the later stages of a buildup, 1 DD/DE now under national command and not earmarked for NATO.	7. " "	7. "

Air Force

1. Raise combat crew-ready rate (now 33%) to 100% and a/c combat-ready rate (now 55%) to at least 70%.	1. Unknown.	1. Danish response not clear how recommendation is to be met.
2. Man control and reporting units for 24-hour operation.	2. Danish Govt reports manning of C&R units for 24-hr operations has on whole been fulfilled.	2. None.
3. Procure 13 additional F-100 aircraft.	3. Danish Govt has stated "Hunter fighters will be increased" and portion supplementary budget request to be used for a/c procurement.	3. Danish response is not clear how recommendation is to be met.
4. Increase balanced logistic support.	4. Air Materiel Command has decentralized source of a/c spare parts adding speed and flexibility in handling requirements.	4. Increased emphasis has been noted in perfecting logistics and mobility plans.

(Despite increased Governmental appropriations for force improvement, Denmark does not appear to be able to meet requirements for additional equipment completely from own resources and increased MAP for assistance in providing such items as communication equipment and non-combat vehicles for the Army, mines, oilers, ammo and POL for the Navy and ammo, F84G and F100 aircraft for the Air Force is needed.)

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26 September 1961

12a

ITALY

Country Progress Toward Berlin Buildup

SACEUR Recommendations

Country Action

Comment

General

1. Extend enlistments of volunteers and lengthen conscript term of service.

1. None reported.

1. Legislative action probably required and should be initiated forthwith.

Army

1. Raise manning levels in M-day units.

1. 24,000 reservists to be called up on 15 Oct. for 60-day tour. Conscriptees to be required to serve full 18 months tour. Conscriptee contingents to be increased by 50,000 each beginning 1 Nov 61 and extending through 1962.

1. Laudable measures; required now is aggressive follow-through.

2. Increase balanced logistical support.

2. Reports "immediate availability of other (support) units---is assured by disposition already in force."

2. None

3. Eliminate TO&E shortages in M-day units.

3. Reports supply planning underway and industry being asked to accelerate deliveries. Priority items are mines and engineer equipment, munitions, transport vehicles, infantry weapons, ABC materiel and communications equipment.

3. Still unclear as to adequacy and whether additional production is contemplated. Clarification is being sought.

4. Build up operational reserves.

4. Reports that "difficulties of various types exist before levels can be attained---assistance and collaboration of US are necessary."

4. This is clearly an appeal for US assistance. Clarification is being sought.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD Lu 2/28/77
By rmg, NARS, Date 6/15/77

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AT 18 YEARS.
DDI DIR 5260.10

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(Italy, continued)

SACEUR Recommendations

Country Action

Comment

5. Expedite procurement of modern equipment of all types.

5. Reports that for the "provisions of most important materiel --- assistance and collaboration of US are necessary."

5. Inferred reliance on US should be discouraged. Letter has been dispatched to MOD inviting development of lists of items planned for purchase from US sources. Much can be accomplished in this area without US assistance.

6. Reduce shortage of signal personnel.

6. Reports necessary action underway as part of overall personnel measures.

6. None

7. Improve mobilization and reserve training.

7. Reports measures under study.

7. None

8. Improve ammunition delivery methods.

8. None reported

8. Ammo storage dumps too far removed from using units. Delivery of basic loads to combat troops too time-consuming and vulnerable to interruption. Improvements still considered necessary and within Italian capability to achieve.

9. Maintain M-day units at constant strength throughout the year.

9. Reports necessary action underway; see 1. above.

9. See 1. above.

10. Eliminate personnel shortages.

10. Reports personnel requirements will be met.

10. None

Navy

1. Build up operational reserves of ammunition and fuel.

1. Reports "requests for stocks can be in principle satisfied."

1. Can be accomplished from Italian resources.

2. Phase forward 1 DDG and 1 DE.

2. Reports compliance with this recommendation is contingent upon "acquisition of sonar & radar equip. already ordered on MDAP account."

2. Validity of this contention is being investigated; it appears to require action by US in terms of expediting delivery of programmed items.

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(Italy continued)

SACEUR Recommendations

3. Provide additional patrol aircraft.
4. Provide additional helicopters.
5. Accelerate shipbuilding program, including construction of new DD/DEs.
6. Procure additional oilers.

Air Force

1. Man Control and Reporting units for 24-hour operations.
2. Raise aircrew combat ready rate from 69% to 100%.
3. Raise aircraft combat ready rate from 55% to at least 70%.

Country Action

3. Reports compliance with this recommendation is contingent upon acquisition of aircraft from US, presumably under MAP.
4. Reports compliance with this recommendation is contingent upon acquisition of aircraft from US, presumably under MAP.
5. None reported
6. Reports "steps will be taken for their requisition and equipping them previously for supply at sea."

Comment

3. Delivery already completed on all programmed aircraft. None have been recommended for programming by USCINCEUR to meet Berlin buildup requirements.
4. Aircraft are programmed but delivery schedule not yet determined.
5. Still desirable; should be pursued. Initiative on this is with the Italians.
6. None
1. Reported actions are wholly inadequate; should be reconsidered and positive measures adopted. Excuses may be partially justified; now being investigated.
2. Adequacy cannot be determined. Clarification is being sought.
3. Excuses may be partially justified; now being investigated. Spare parts problem is basically one for Italy to solve thru NMSSA. NMSSA may require increased capitalization to raise stock levels.

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(Italy continued)

SACEUR Recommendations

4. Increase operational stocks of droppable fuel tanks and bombs.

5. Accelerate inspection and repair of F-84F aircraft.

Country Action

4. Reports "stocks of bombs --- will be largely satisfied" but that "additional reservoirs of stocks cannot be satisfied either because it involved too heavy expenses or because a secondary priority has been given".

5. Reports "slowness of IRAN program is in reality due in part to lack of spare parts which are to come from MDAP". "Crisis created by cessation of MDAP assistance" is being met through use of national funds.

Comment

4. Action wholly inadequate; should be reconsidered and positive measures adopted. Initiative is with the Italians but US assistance in allocation of resources may be required.

5. Validity of allegation now being investigated. Overall solution to spare parts problem is basically an Italian responsibility requiring urgent action (see 2. above). US procurement or allocation action may be required in arranging for increased stock levels.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority

CDD 66 2/28/77

By

mmg, NARS, Date 6/5/77

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NETHERLANDS

27 September 1961

132

Country Progress Toward Berlin BuildupSACEUR/SACLANT RecommendationsCountry ActionCommentArmy

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|--|---|--|
| 1. Move 1 Brigade group to Germany. | 1. Will temporarily station one light brigade in FRG for 3 mo. period. Troops in tents so will extend only if absolutely necessary. | 1. Netherlands has indicated it will act on all SACEUR's Phase I Recommendations short of mobilization, and on latter if all NATO acts. |
| 2. By 1 January, raise manning of M-Day units from present 81% to 90%; ensure readiness of remaining mobilization reserve. | 2. Will meet 90% level by Nov 1961, by extension of conscription terms, announced 15 Sept, from 18 mo. (enlisted) and 21 mo. (officers and specialists) to 21 and 22 mo. Will recall if necessary on 24-hour notice one of two drafts on short leave. | 2. This meets SACEUR Recommendations ahead of schedule. |
| 3. By 1 Jan 1962, provide Tank Bn., FA Bn. and Armored Brigade to complete I Corps units. | 3. The Dutch reply does not comment on this recommendation. | 3. Presumably, the Dutch will endeavor to meet the recommendation. |
| 4. Take steps to conduct brigade and divisional exercises, improve reserve and mobilization training. | 4. None reported. | 4. This action would measurably improve force effectiveness. |
| 5. Procure modern equipment to replace present obsolescent materiel and support the NATO Standard Division organization; fill deficiencies in SHAPE 30-day interim requirements. | 5. (See Comment) | 5. Dutch already taking some steps toward this end (i.e., procuring tanks and APCs from France, machine guns from Israel). More procurement is required, however to meet objectives. |

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
 DECLASSIFIED AT 12 YEARS.
 DOD DIR 5200.10

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SACEUR/SACLANT Recommendations

Country Action

Comment

Navy

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|---|-------------------|--|
| 1. Raise personnel ceilings and increase manning. | 1. None reported. | 1. The extension of the conscription terms will have little effect on the Navy. What is needed is the lifting of the present personnel ceiling and allowing increased enlistments. |
| 2. Increase ASW training, and participate in joint Naval maneuvers. | 2. " " | 2. Dutch presumably awaiting SACLANT and CINCHAN recommendations. |
| 3. Be prepared on request to phase forward to Category A 1 SS and 1 DD/DE earmarked to SACLANT. | 3. " " | 3. Favorable Dutch response expected. |
| 4. Be prepared to make available to SACLANT during later stages of a buildup 1 CL, 2 DD R/DE and 3 SS now under national command and not earmarked to NATO. | 4. " " | 4. Favorable Dutch response expected. |

Air Force

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|--|--|----------|
| 1. Increase manning of control and reporting units to support a 24-hour operation. | 1. The Dutch will consider, in consultation with their Allies, raising AC&W manning levels as recommended. | 1. None. |
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SACEUR/SACIANT Recommendations

Country Action

Comment

Air Force (Cont'd)

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| 2. Increase combat-ready rate of aircraft to at least 80%, and of crews to 100%. | 2. The Dutch will consider, in consultation with their Allies, increasing the combat-ready rates of aircraft and air crews. | 2. Dutch may have difficulty increasing trained manpower, but the draft extension should help. |
| 3. Maintain the 4/96 Hunter aircraft during 1962. | 3. Dutch will maintain these aircraft until 1 April 1962. | 3. This meets SACEUR recommendations. |
| 4. Augment 3/48 F-86K AWK squadrons by adding 1 sq. of 16 F104 A/C by end 1962 and build up reserves. | 4. None reported (see comment). | 4. Equipment procurement still under study. |

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DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~Authority 01866 2/28/77
By rmg, NARS, Date 6/5/77

NORWAY

27 September 1961 14aCountry Progress Toward Berlin BuildupSACEUR RecommendationsCountry ActionCommentGeneral

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|---|--|---|
| <p>1. Extend present conscript services of 18 mts. in all armed forces; make up shortage of regular NCOs and specialists.</p> | <p>1. "Some" reservists being called up, but govt, unwilling to take further measures to meet manning requirements as these would require partial mobilization. Problem of sufficient NCOs under "active consideration".</p> | <p>1. In the 11 Sept. National elections, the Norwegian Labor Party won only 74 seats in the 150 member Parliament, thereby losing its slim majority, though Govt's pro-West foreign policy is not expected to change. Composition of a new govt, will be decided at opening of Parliament on 2 Oct. when results of Govt study of SACEUR recommendations can be expected to be implemented. No appreciable buildup of forces as a result of the Berlin situation is evident.</p> |
| <p>2. Increase balanced logistic support for all services in phase with force improvement.</p> | <p>2. Appropriation of \$3 million for procurement of equipment and supplies.</p> | <p>2. Major benefits will accrue to Air Force and Navy. While further national expenditures are called for, Norway is unable to satisfy requirements completely from own resources and U.S. grant assistance will be needed.</p> |

Army

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|---|---|--|
| <p>1. Raise manning levels of M-Day units to at least 90%; insure readiness of remaining mobilization increments.</p> | <p>1. Refresher training of Army units will be maintained at least to end of 61, initiation of refresher training for some units advanced from December to Sept. 61, and additional signal personnel are being called up. This will in-</p> | <p>1. Units concerned are primarily support type units located in North Norway and involves only a relatively small number of men. Refresher training enhances mobilization capability and causes slight</p> |
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DO NOT CLASSIFY AT 12 MONTH INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFY AT 12 YEARS.
DOD 5010.10

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Army (Contd)

Country Action

Comment

2. Increase strength in FINNMARK and make up deficiencies of Brigade North.

- crease manning level of M-day units to 74% and 1st echelon units to 23% which will be increased to 25% by end of 62. \$10,000 has been allocated to improve radio link system in North Norway. Due to lack of equip., it will not be possible to activate one medium tank sqd and 1 anti-tank company before 63.

increase in active Army but does not contribute materially toward increasing combat effectiveness of M-Day units. Additional efforts needed to minimize weakness of military posture in North. Norwegian Army had developed long-range plan for overall modernization, especially for Brigade North. Equipment needs of tank sqd and anti-tank company appear to lie beyond Norwegian resources and should be funded under MAP.

3. Improve adequacy of TO&E equipment. Operational reserves for equip. and ammo brought up to 30-day SHAPE interim requirement level, especially in North Norway.

3. Portion of \$3 million appropriation to be used for ammo, spare parts, pioneer equip. hard mines, expediting ammo renovation, additional communications equip and procurement of 300 new quarter ton vehicles in 61 and 400 in 62, especially for deployment in North Norway.

Even with additional Govt. appropriations, Norway would still be unable to purchase all of the needed communications and engineering equipment, transport vehicles and ammo and additional MAP will be needed.

Navy

1. Phase forward to Category "A" 3 destroyers; delay scrapping of 1 destroyer.

1. Norwegian Govt. considering postponing scrapping of "certain" naval vessels but unable to phase forward to Category "A" the 3 destroyers.
2. The number of FPBs will be increased from 12 to 14 during 1962.

1. Present govt. efforts not sufficient to improve Navy overall effectiveness.

2. Shipbuilding program and acquisition of FPB should be expedited.

2. U.S. should consider exerting pressure to phase forward joint US-Norwegian shipbuilding program. Still short 8 FPBs of SACEUR's recommendations, which will not be provided unless there is extension of MAP.

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Country Action

Comment


Navy (Contd)

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| 3. Ships undergoing overhaul, repair or routine maintenance should be out of service for minimum period. | 3. Funds re-allocated to Navy will be used to improve and maintenance of Category "A" ships and to procure spare FPB engines. | 3. None |
| 4. Phase forward 3 requisitioned oilers in Category "B" to Category "A". | 4. None reported. | 4. Critical need for afloat support in Norwegian Navy. |
| 5. Expedite acquisition of 1 SS. | 5. None reported. | 5. None |

Air Force

- | | | |
|---|--|--|
| 1. Remedy UE deficiencies in a/c; procure 9 F-86F a/c. | 1. Country reply states UE deficiencies can only be corrected by allocation of reserve a/c through MAP. | 1. 4 F-86Fs are already in proposed FY 62 program. 5 additional a/c have been recommended by USCINCEUR for programming & expedited delivery under MAP. |
| 2. Raise combat ready rate of a/c (now 60%) to at least 70% and combat crew rate (now 76%) to 100%. | 2. Norwegian AF considering forward deployment of "some" F-86 a/c. Country reply states that combat ready rate can only be raised by accelerated deliveries of spare parts through NMSSA. Unable to raise combat crew ready rate for time being. | 2. Difficulty appears to be that NMSSA carries insufficient stocks, requiring excessive lead-time. |

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DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~Authority OSD Ltr 2/28/77
By mmg, NARS, Date 6/15/77

UNITED KINGDOM

27 September 1961 15aCountry Progress Toward Berlin BuildupSACEUR/SACLANT/CINCHAN RecommendationsCountry ActionCommentGeneral

1. Establish war reserve stocks at 90-day operational level.

2. Assume heightened state of readiness and accelerate combat readiness training of active units.

3. Prepare during the first phase to bring second phase units rapidly to full combat readiness.

4. Increase balanced logistic support for all services in phase with force improvement.

1. U.K. reported that 30-day level of reserve stocks will be maintained on the Continent.

2. None reported.

3. Plans announced to create a strategic reserve division in U.K.

4. U.K. reports that this is being reviewed.

1. Beyond U.K. capability within time frame.

2. Part of U.K. strategic reserves (19th Brigade Group) received training in Kuwait affair. U.K. is capable of increased efforts here.

3. Unlikely that UK will do more than add mission of reinforcing BAOR to present UK Strategic Reserves.

4. U.K. is capable. This will be an untested factor in BAOR which relies on 46,000 German civilians for logistics labor support.

Army

1. Raise manning level of 7 brigades now in Germany to at least 90% and insure readiness of the remaining mobilization increment.

1. 1 SAM regiment and 2 light AA regiment being added to BAOR in Sept 61. 18 armored personnel carriers and 16 scout cars have been sent to UK Berlin garrison.

1. UK has reported inability to do this within the time required, but that preparations are being made to permit for rapid mobilization of reserve units. U.K. has capability for this.

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AT 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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Country Action

Comment

Army (Contd)

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|---|--|---|
| 2. Form in the U.K. a division as part of SACEUR's strategic reserve. | 2. U.K. has announced intentions to do this. | 2. Same as for Comment 3 above. |
| 3. Be prepared to have deployed in the Central Area 3 combat-ready divisions. | 3. U.K. reported that re-examination of problem is being made. | 3. 1 additional armored brigade and 1 mechanized brigade required to augment 7 brigades already deployed. Action during Phase I unlikely. U.K. has capability if political decision is made for conscriptive service. |

Navy

- | | | |
|---|--|---|
| 1. Earmark for AF MED sufficient additional naval vessels to meet MC 70 requirements. | 1. None reported. | 1. 7 DD/DE and 1 SS shortfall could be met by phasing forward these vessels from Categories "B" and "C" to Category "A". U.K. is capable. |
| 2. Be prepared to phase forward to Category "A", on request, 3 CVs, 2 CA/CL, 24 DD/DE and 6 SS earmarked to SACLANT. | 2. HMS Centaur, attack aircraft carrier, returned from Middle East to Home Fleet and SACLANT area. | 2. U.K. is capable of meeting this requirement. |
| 3. Be prepared to make available to SACLANT, in the later stages of a buildup, 1 CV, 2 CL, 5 DD/DE, 7 SS and 12 MP a/c now under national command and not earmarked for NATO. | 3. None reported. | 3. U.K. is capable, but could not maintain all of the above measures over an indefinite period of time. |

Air Force

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Provide full complement of a/c for Canberra 1. and Hunter sqds now in Germany. | 1. U.K. has brought recon sqd to full strength and reported that strike sqd will be at full strength by end Sept. 61. | 1. In addition, 3 Javelin sqds due for withdrawal by end of 61 have been brought up to full strength and will be retained in Germany. |
| 2. Raise aircraft combat-ready rate (now 53%) to at least 70%. | 2. U.K. announced plans to provide additional air & ground crews for non-operational units. | 2. Low rate in operational units due mainly to shortage of a/c rather than low state of individual training. Will be accomplished. |
| 3. Earmark an additional Canberra recon sqd in the U.K. for support of SACEUR. | 3. U.K. intention to do so has been announced. | 3. No action taken as yet, but accomplishment is expected. |