

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1a Memo	DOD Top Secret <i>Exempt, OSD ltr 11/8/76</i> MemCon between VP Johnson, Amb. Gavin, Amb. Finletter and Gen. Norstad 3p	<i>open 2-9-82 ras</i> 09/30/61	A
#2 Memo w/attach.	DOD Secret <i>OSD ltr 11/8/76</i> To the VP from Nitze 6 p	09/27/61	A
#3 Memo	DOD Top Secret <i>Exempt, OSD ltr 11/8/76</i> [duplicate of #1a] <i>open 3-9-09</i> 3 p	09/30/61	A
#4 Memo	DOD Top Secret <i>OSD ltr 11/8/76</i> MemCon between VP Johnson, Amb. Gavin, Amb. Finletter and Gen. Norstad 3 p [draft copy of #1a]	09/30/61	A
#5 Memo	DOD Top Secret <i>OSD ltr 11/8/76</i> VP conversations with NATO leaders 2 p	Undated	A
#6 Memo	DOD Top Secret <i>OSD ltr 11/8/76</i> VP conversations with NATO leaders 2 p (partial duplicate of #5)	Undated	A
#7 Memo	DOD Top Secret <i>OSD ltr 11/8/76</i> VP conversations with NATO leaders 2 p [duplicate of #6]	Undated	A
#8 Memo	DOD Top Secret <i>OSD ltr 11/8/76</i> VP Johnson, Amb. Gavin, Amb. Finletter and Gen Norstad conversation 3 p [duplicate of #4]	09/30/61	A
#9 Memo	DOD Top Secret <i>OSD ltr 11/8/76</i> VP Johnson, Amb. Gavin, Amb. Finletter and Gen. Norstad conversation 3 p [duplicate of #4]	09/30/61	A

FILE LOCATION VP Security File, VP Travel
Paris Talks

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1

Norstad
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

1. Berlin access (Trifant.)
 - air
 - corridors.
2. Steinstrucken
 - Pol. not cleared
3. Status of Clay
4. Decision to send V. P.
 - + battle group to Berlin.
5. Effects on German elections.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

Norstad -

Natl policy making
machinery.

Carvin -

Suggest clarify clay
status. Full pol. auth?
Clarify.

Fintelster -

NATO is building up.
Carvin + Norstad agree.

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1a

M E M O R A N D U M

Memorandum of Conversation between Vice President
Lyndon B. Johnson, Ambassador Gavin, Ambassador
Finletter and General Norstad, at the United States
Embassy, Paris, France, September 30, 1961.

1. General Norstad opened the discussion with an outline of the authority which he has been granted to take countermeasures in the event of Soviet or East German action to deny allied air access to Berlin. He described measures which he has taken to implement his authority and to prepare for immediate action. Specifically, he mentioned the provision of military crews to pilot the civil air liners as the first step. He mentioned that the British had taken similar action, although the French have not made a final decision.

2. General Norstad expressed great concern over the situation in Steinstuecken, a small section in East Berlin under allied control. He said that Steinstuecken acts as a "magnet" attracting refugees from East Berlin. He said he had given approval to a helicopter flight of a group of refugees from Steinstuecken to West Berlin and anticipated another request for similar approval of another helicopter delivery of refugees within a few days. Meanwhile, he continued, the Communists have intensified their guard around Steinstuecken and there was a distinct possibility that patrols would fire at the next helicopter that attempted a rescue. General Norstad said he had rejected a request by General Clay last Sunday for a motor convoy from West Berlin to Steinstuecken as a means of asserting allied access rights. General Norstad said that maintaining allied rights to Steinstuecken and probing Communist intentions in regard to the territory presented very high risks of launching a war. He said that if the United States government decided, as a policy matter, to take such risks he would go along with the decision. But meanwhile, he said, there should be some thinking about the problem and a policy determination.

3. General Norstad said he had been opposed to the sending of the Vice President to Berlin along with a battle group because he thought such steps should have been saved to a later date as part of a calculated "build up" program in the "war of nerves." As the situation now stands, he said, another morale crisis in Berlin could be solved only by sending the President himself because "we have committed our reserves and I believe committed them too early." He said he believed that General Clay should have been sent first and the Vice President sent upon the next

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Authority NSC 11-25-81 letter re NLS-80-85

By ics, NARS, Date 2-9-82

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occasion of a slump in morale. He described the Vice President's mission as a "tremendous success" but thought it should have been saved for a time of greater urgency. He said he had communicated these views to Washington but had received no response.

4. General Norstad expressed great admiration for General Clay and said he was "the right man" for Berlin. But he said that as he understood the matter, Clay had no authority and his presence in Berlin complicated an already complicated administrative problem. (At this point, General Norstad had to leave in order to keep an appointment.)

5. Ambassador Gavin remarked that he did not see "how Clay can be effective without authority from the President to get things done." He said he thought General Clay should have "political authority" in Berlin but agreed that General Norstad should have authority over NATO military action.

6. In response to a question, Ambassador Finletter said the administrative complications flowing from General Clay's presence in Berlin might be one of the reasons for a forthcoming trip to the United States by General Norstad. He remarked, however, that General Norstad has "diplomatic and political skill" and the ability to resolve complex administrative and personality questions.

7. Vice President Johnson then told Ambassadors Gavin and Finletter that there is a widespread feeling in the United States that America's allies are NOT putting as much into the defenses against communism as they should. He went over a document prepared by the Secretary of Defense which indicated that America's allies had not fulfilled their important commitments completely and asked how public criticisms on this point could be answered. These criticisms, he added, have reached a point where legislation to back vital programs was in grave danger.

8. Ambassador Finletter said that General Norstad was expressing himself "quite optimistically" on the NATO buildup. He listed Greece and Turkey as being financially unable to do more than they are now doing; Portugal as unwilling to act because of the Angola dispute; Norway and Denmark as "the bad ones"; and Germany as doing everything it could "short of mobilizing." However, he conceded that most of the progress is in terms of "commitments" rather than performance. Greece and Turkey he described as "on the flank" of the allied defensive position and he said he was more interested in the "central front" where only

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Denmark and Norway represent a "weakness". He said that Danish and Norwegian memories of the German occupation were still so fresh that it was difficult "to get them worried about Berlin." Furthermore, he said, it is difficult to explain to Europeans the need for a conventional buildup in arms after the United States has stood on the concept of massive nuclear retaliation for so many years. Finally, he said that the concern of most Europeans over the Berlin crisis has diminished somewhat. They feel that the Communists will now apply pressure elsewhere and that the "big headlines" will come next from some other location, such as Iran or Formosa. But he expressed optimism on the European buildup and left with the Vice President a memorandum outlining the steps that have been taken by the European allies to improve their contribution to NATO. He said the best way to handle criticism in the United States was to have General Norstad make some statements on the subject.

9. General Gavin also expressed optimism. But he cautioned that "leadership is a lonely thing" and that it is not surprising that European nations are not putting as much into NATO as the United States. He described France as "probably the strongest ally we have in Europe" and said that General De Gaulle had anticipated the problem of the military buildup and had started to take steps a year ago to meet it. He said that De Gaulle was "trying to get out of Algeria as fast as possible" so France will have more troops to commit to NATO. He stated also that he, personally, favored a "steady, slow buildup" over a fast buildup spurred by a military crisis which might collapse with the collapse of the crisis.

10. Ambassador Finletter said that in his judgment the NATO alliance itself is "more important than the buildup." He said that Khrushchev's major objective in Berlin had been to smash the alliance but this had not been achieved. The European allies, he said, "now think the United States has leadership and they are willing to go along."

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

B-7-16

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Refer to: I-16715/61

SEP 27 1961

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Briefing Notes for Your Paris Discussions

In accordance with your request to Secretary McNamara, the attached briefing notes have been prepared for your visit to Paris. We understand that you plan to meet with Ambassadors Gavin and Finletter, and Generals Norstad or C. D. Palmer.

As you know, many actions relating to the Berlin crisis are currently in progress at USRO and SHAPE. We believe it would be very useful and informative for you to solicit the views of Ambassador Finletter and Generals Norstad or Palmer, as senior U.S. officials concerned, regarding the adequacy and timeliness of the measures being taken by the U.S., and those taken or announced by our Allies.

Listed below are the topics which in our judgment would be appropriate for your discussions. Briefing notes supporting each item appear at the corresponding tab. These papers have been coordinated with the Department of State.

Effect of the Berlin Crisis on NATO Cohesion (Tab A)
Facilities for Buildup of U.S. Forces in Europe (Tab B)
NATO Country Buildup to Meet Berlin Crisis (Tab C)
Emergency Authority to Stockpile Atomic Weapons in France (Tab D)

Paul H. Nitze
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

4 Attachments
a/s

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Authority OSD Ltr 11/8/76

By rmg, NARS, Date 3/31/77

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PARIS
29-30 September 1961

Effect of Berlin Crisis on NATO Cohesion

Berlin activities by the 4-Powers are testing NATO cohesion. Crises have always before tended to unify NATO, but there have been several adverse NAC and SYG reactions to recent quadripartite steps. Steps now in process to bring the whole Alliance much more fully into Berlin contingency planning will, it is hoped, improve the atmosphere and elicit NATO-wide support for the Berlin program. The Powers with direct responsibility in Berlin cannot afford a small-power veto in the early stages, yet the lesser powers insist on fuller participation in planning that can well determine how and when they go to war. The controversies over the role of nuclear weapons in the Berlin conflict can also affect NATO cohesion. Means of avoiding or reducing disunifying effects are urgently important.

Prepared by: Colonel D. C. Armstrong, III
European Region
OASD/ISA
27 September 1961

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PARIS
29-30 September 1961

Facilities for Buildup of US Forces in Europe

Discussions are proceeding between USCINCEUR and responsible authorities of Germany, France, Italy, U.K. and Belgium concerning the availability of facilities and Line of Communication support which would be required for the deployment of up to six U.S. divisions and 28 tactical air squadrons if required in the light of the Berlin crisis. To date CINCEUR has reported no substantive issues having been raised by host state authorities and excellent progress is being made; however, the availability of land areas in France and Germany is considered by the Department of Defense as a potential problem.

The contingency planning being undertaken by USCINCEUR is based upon the possible deployment of up to six divisions to the Seventh Army area in the FRG, seven tactical air squadrons and one air transport squadron to the FRG, 19 tactical squadrons and one air transport squadron to France and one tactical squadron each to the U.K. and Italy.

Prepared by: W. E. Lang
Foreign Military Rights
Affairs
OASD/ISA
26 September 1961

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PARIS
29-30 September 1961

NATO Country Buildup to Meet Berlin Crisis

In a presentation to the North Atlantic Council on 8 August, Secretary Rusk called upon member nations to increase their posture of military readiness to meet the Berlin threat by measures comparable to those taken by the U.S. On 19 August, SACEUR prepared his "Plan of Action: NATO Europe" (SHAPE 167/61), spelling out recommended country actions in detail. This plan envisioned two phases: measures which would produce positive results prior to 1 January 1962, and those which, under emergency conditions, could produce results during 1962. They included the raising of manning and equipment levels of existing combat units, making available to ACE additional combat units, increasing the number and capability of combat and Service support units, and improving the posture of reserve units.

Country response to date, while uneven, has been encouraging. Fulfillment of commitments stated in the country replies will result in a significantly increased capability of Allied Command Europe forces, particularly in the vital Central Shield area. The existing 21-2/3 divisions in that area will be increased to 24-1/3 by 1 January 1962, and most of these will have a high combat potential. This is in contrast to their capability on 15 September 1961 of "scarcely more than that of 16 fully ready divisions." Country replies also indicate that a strategic reserve of 12-5/3 divisions will be available outside Continental Europe and, depending upon improved transportation and logistic support, can make a substantial contribution. Similarly, the air strength of the Central area will be augmented by the addition of 255 aircraft by 1 January 1962 and of at least 177 more during 1962. In the Northern Region, the responses of Norway and Denmark have been positive, but the financial capability of these nations is so limited that their efforts will necessarily fall short of the desired goals and the defense of this critical area remains uncertain.

NATO country responses to the SACEUR requirements have varied from none in the case of Portugal to good in the case of Canada and the Netherlands. The United Kingdom, French and German responses have been somewhat less than expected of these leading NATO members. Detailed replies and DoD comments are tabulated in separate briefing material. The nature of these responses suggests two issues that deserve early decision:

- (1) How hard should the U.S. press for country compliance with General Norstad's "Plan of Action: NATO Europe" in the face of country unwillingness to increase manning levels or make adequate budgetary provision for its force buildup?

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(2) To what extent should the U.S. be prepared to provide military assistance in support of country actions?

In the case of Greece and Turkey, country compliance will be dependent upon further U.S. aid, both in the form of MAP and supporting assistance. MAP for other NATO countries is presently limited to fulfillment of prior commitments and training. This policy is clearly applicable to the Center countries and Italy, but there is good reason to believe that Norway and Denmark do not possess the financial resources to meet their buildup requirements without some relaxation of present MAP limitations.

The Vice President might solicit comment on the NATO buildup from General C. D. Palmer and Ambassador Finletter.

Prepared by: J. A. Reed, Jr.
P. E. Barringer
European Region
(OASD/ISA)
27 September 1961

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PARIS
29-30 September 1961

Emergency Authority to Stockpile Atomic Weapons in France

France has never permitted the storage of U.S. nuclear weapons on her soil. In mid-1959, due to the impending Berlin crisis, SACEUR directed the redeployment of U.S. nuclear delivery aircraft from French bases to other airbases in Germany and U.K. in order to base delivery vehicles in proximity to nuclear weapons. Subsequently, certain French bases have been largely on a standby basis, whereas our bases in Germany and U.K. have an over-concentration of planes, resulting in increased vulnerability to enemy attack.

Under our base rights agreement with France, the U.S. retains the right to deploy conventionally armed aircraft to the northern French bases. Under current USAF Tactical Air Command plans, a number of squadrons of aircraft including F-104s and F-100s may be deployed in a conventional configuration to these bases, but all would be capable of nuclear strikes if the need should arise and if nuclear weapons were available.

For this reason, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that France "authorize the U.S. to stockpile atomic weapons in France" and General Norstad has indicated that "consideration should be given . . . to granting authority to stockpile atomic weapons in France on an emergency basis." If the French would approve such a move for the duration of the Berlin crisis, considerable flexibility in the dispersion of in-theater forces would result and units deployed from the U.S. to northern France would have both a conventional and atomic capability if the need should arise. Vulnerability would also be decreased due to greater dispersion.

Recommendation. It is suggested that the possibility of French acquiescence to the emergency storage of nuclear weapons on French soil for the duration of the Berlin crisis be explored with General Palmer and Ambassadors Finletter and Gavin. A clear understanding of their views would be most helpful in reaching a decision here in Washington as to the wisdom of approaching General de Gaulle on this matter.

Prepared by: Colonel B. K. Yount
European Region
OASD/ISA
27 September 1961

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[Sub of #1a]

M E M O R A N D U M

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

Bvebm/jc, NARA, Date 2-26-09

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Authority OSAL 6a 11/8/76
 By mmg, NARS, Date 3/31/77

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- authority which he has been granted to take*
1. General Norstadt opened the discussion with a description of ~~planned countermeasures~~ in the event the Soviets or the East Germans seek to deny allied air access to Berlin. ~~He said he had an agreement with the British to take such countermeasures on his own initiative. The French, he said, desired to have such steps taken only after the issue was referred back to the respective Allied governments. Nevertheless, General Norstadt said that he intended to act under his agreement with the British should the communists seek to force the issue in the air corridors.~~
 2. General Norstadt then discussed the division of Berlin by the communists. He said he felt that if he were the military commander on the scene, he would have slung a hook across the barbed wire when it was erected, attached the hook by a rope to a jeep and torn down the wire. He also stated that he would have felt justified under the same circumstances in battering down the Berlin wall with a tank. However, he said he did not believe orders to take such action could be delivered by a government to a local commander.
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Authority OSD ltr 11/8/76
By RMG, NARS, Date 3/31/77

M E M O R A N D U M

1. The Vice President's conversations with NATO leaders in Paris brought forth three major problems which must be considered:
 - a) Despite the optimism of high officials, our European allies are still slow and reluctant in building up their strength.
 - b) General Clay's presence in Berlin has ~~caused some administrative and possibly personality difficulties~~ *led to which should be resolved*.
 - c) There is a need for clearcut policy guidance to the NATO military commander as to how he should handle the situation at Steinfuecken.
2. The fact that the European allies are reluctant to engage in the necessary military buildup is apparent from analyzing the discussions of Ambassadors Gavin and Finletter. Both claim the situation is improving and that they are optimistic. But both concede that the "improvement" is in terms of promises, rather than performance. Furthermore, after stating their optimism both discuss at length the reasons for European reluctance to rearm. These reasons may be completely valid. But they sound suspiciously like the classic alibi of the public relations official whose client is caught in an embarrassing situation: "The situation is entirely normal and we are doing everything we can to correct it."
3. The complications involving General Clay are due entirely to the peculiar administrative setup in Berlin. As it now stands, Ambassador Dowling has authority; the military commandant of Berlin has authority and General Norstadt has authority. This leaves unclear the extent, if any, to which General Clay has authority. He has no control over the troops and no control over the civilian population. Apparently, he is primarily a symbol and General Clay is an active, "get-it-done" type of personality who does not react well to being a symbol.

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states should take this into consideration.

4. The Steinbruecken-East Berlin situation is a parallel--in miniature--of the West Berlin-East Germany situation. It represents an opportunity for refugees to escape from East Berlin but then presents the problem of how to get them to West Berlin across 2,000 meters of communist-held territory. Furthermore, the refugees must be evacuated by helicopter--a far more tempting target to the communists than faster moving forms of air transport. Obviously, if we continue to evacuate refugees we must test communist intentions at the risk of war. We are already running that risk in Berlin itself but at this point we have thought it through and calculated the risks. We apparently have not done so in regard to Steinbruecken as the NATO commander does not regard himself as having clear policy directives and is "playing the situation by feel."

5. Recommendations:

- a) That some of the highest and most persuasive officials of the administration be sent to countries such as Norway and Denmark for personal "heart-to-heart" talks with the chiefs of government as to their contribution to NATO.
- b) That thought be given to clarifying General Clay's position.
- c) That a policy decision be made as to whether and under what circumstances the United States will continue or cease to evacuate refugees from Steinbruecken. Obviously, this situation could be "solved" only by "solving" the Berlin situation itself. But the NATO commander should have guidance at least as thorough as that he has on West Berlin and the access routes.

In principle, we must determine in advance what we wish to achieve and what will be the result of our various actions. Our present moves will then have the strength of deliberation rather than the weaknesses of afterthought.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD ltr 11/8/76
By img, NARS, Date 3/31/77

M E M O R A N D U M

1. The Vice President's conversations with NATO leaders in Paris brought forth three major problems which must be considered:
 - a) Despite the optimism of high officials, our European allies are still slow and reluctant in building up their strength.
 - b) General Clay's presence in Berlin has caused some administrative—and possibly personality—difficulties.
 - c) There is a need for clearcut policy guidance to the NATO military commander as to how he should handle the situation at Steinbruecken.
2. The fact that the European allies are reluctant to engage in the necessary military buildup is apparent from analyzing the discussions of Ambassadors Gavin and Finletter. Both claim the situation is improving and that they are optimistic. But both concede that the "improvement" is in terms of promises, rather than performance. Furthermore, after stating their optimism both discuss at length the reasons for European reluctance to rearm. These reasons may be completely valid. But they sound suspiciously like the classic alibi of the public relations official whose client is caught in an embarrassing situation: "The situation is entirely normal and we are doing everything we can to correct it."
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Authority OSD Ltr 11/8/76
By rmg, NARS, Date 3/31/77

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Authority osd ltr 11/8/76
By rmq, NARS, Date 3/31/77

M E M O R A N D U M

Memorandum of conversation between Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, Ambassador Gavin, Ambassador Finletter and General Norstadt at the United States Embassy, Paris, France, Sept. 30, 1961.

1. General Norstadt opened the discussion with a description of planned countermeasures in the event the Soviets or the East Germans seek to deny allied air access to Berlin. He said he had an agreement with the British to take such countermeasures on his own initiative. The French, he said, desired to have such steps taken only after the issue was referred back to the respective Allied governments. Nevertheless, General Norstadt said that he intended to act under his agreement with the British should the communists seek to force the issue in the air corridors.
2. General Norstadt then discussed the division of Berlin by the communists. He said he felt that if he were the military commander on the scene, he would have slung a hook across the barbed wire when it was erected, attached the hook by a rope to a jeep and torn down the wire. He also stated that he would have felt justified under the same circumstances in battering down the Berlin wall with a tank. However, he said he did not believe orders to take such action could be delivered by a government to a local commander.
3. General Norstadt expressed great concern over the situation in Steinstuecken, a small section in East Berlin under allied control. He said that Steinstuecken acts as a "magnet" attracting refugees from East Berlin. He said he had given approval to a helicopter flight of a group of refugees from Steinstuecken to West Berlin and anticipated another request for similar approval of another helicopter delivery of refugees within a few days. Meanwhile, he continued, the communists have intensified their guard around Steinstuecken and there was a distinct possibility that patrols would fire at the next helicopter that attempted a rescue. General Norstadt said he had rejected a request by General Clay last Sunday for a motor convoy from West Berlin to Steinstuecken as a means of asserting allied access rights. General Norstadt said that maintaining allied rights to Steinstuecken and probing communist ~~intentions~~ intentions in regard to the territory presented very high risks of launching a war. He said that if the United States government decided, as a policy matter, to take such risks he would go along with
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the decision. But meanwhile, he said, there should be some thinking about the problem and a policy determination.

4. General Norstadt said he had been opposed to the sending of the Vice President to Berlin along with a battle group because he thought such steps should be saved to a later date as part of a calculated "build up" program in the "war of nerves". As the situation now stands, he said, another morale crisis in Berlin could be solved only by sending the President himself because "we have committed our reserves and I believe committed them too early." He said he believed that General Clay should have been sent first and the Vice President sent upon the next occasion of a slump in morale. He described the Vice President's mission as a "tremendous success" but thought it should have been saved for a time of greater urgency. He said he had communicated these views to Washington but had received no response.
5. General Norstadt expressed great admiration for General Clay and said he was "the right man" for Berlin. But he said that as he understood the matter, Clay had no authority and his presence in Berlin complicated an already complicated administrative problem. (At this point, General Norstadt had to leave in order to keep an appointment.)
6. ~~XXXXXX~~ Ambassador Gavin remarked that he did not see "how Clay can be effective without authority from the President to get things done." He said he thought General Clay should have "political authority" in Berlin but agreed that General Norstadt should have authority over NATO military action.
7. In response to a question, Ambassador Finletter said the administrative complications flowing from General Clay's presence in Berlin might be one of the reasons for a forthcoming trip to the United States by General Norstadt. He remarked, however, that General Norstadt has "diplomatic and political skill" and the ability to resolve complex administrative and personality questions.
8. Vice President Johnson then told Ambassadors Gavin and Finletter that there is a widespread feeling in the United States that America's allies are NOT putting as much into the defenses against communism as they should. He went over a document prepared by the Secretary of Defense which indicated that America's allies had not fulfilled any of their important commitments completely and asked how public criticisms on this point could be answered. These criticisms, he added, have reached a point where legislation to back vital programs was in grave danger.

9. Ambassador Finletter said that General Norstadt was expressing himself "quite optimistically" on the NATO buildup. He listed Greece and Turkey as being financially unable to do more than they are now doing; Portugal as unwilling to act because of the Angola dispute; Norway and Denmark as "the bad ones"; and Germany as doing everything it could "short of mobilizing." However, he conceded that most of the progress is in terms of "commitments" rather than performance. Greece and Turkey he described as "on the flank" of the allied defensive position and he said he was more interested in the "central front" where only Denmark and Norway represents a "weakness". He said that Danish and Norwegian memories of the German occupation was still so fresh that it was difficult "to get them worried about Berlin." Furthermore, he said, it is difficult to explain to Europeans the need for a conventional buildup in arms after the United States has stood on the concept of massive nuclear retaliation for so many years. Finally, he said that most Europeans do not believe that Berlin is the main crisis and expect the "big headlines" to come next year in the Formosa straits or some other location. But he expressed optimism on the European buildup and left with the Vice President a memorandum outlining the steps he thinks have been taken by the European allies to improve their contribution to NATO. He said the best way to handle criticism in the United States was to have General Norstadt make some statements on the subject.
10. General Gavin also expressed optimism. But he cautioned that "leadership is a lonely thing" and that it is not surprising that European Nations are not putting as much into NATO as the United States. He described France as "probably the strongest ally we have in Europe" and said that General De Gaulle had anticipated the problem of the military buildup and ~~st~~ had started to take steps a year ago to meet it. He said that De Gaulle was "trying to get out of Algeria as fast as possible" so France will have more troops to commit to NATO. He stated also that he, personally, favored a "steady, slow buildup" over a fast buildup spurred by a military crisis which might collapse with the collapse of the crisis.
11. Ambassador Finletter said that in his judgment the NATO alliance itself is more important "than the buildup". He said that Khrushchev's major objective in Berlin had been to smash the alliance but this crisis had been met and solved. The European allies, he said, "now think the United States has leadership and they are willing to go along."

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

OSD 4/8/76

By

rmg, NARS, Date 3/31/77

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