

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	TO BE SUBMITTED TO <u>STATE DEPT.</u> FOR CONCURRENCE**		
#1 Memo	WH Secret <i>nsc ltr 5/13/77, State ltr 1/24/77</i> To VP Johnson from W. J. Crockett	1 p Undated	A
#1a Memo	WH Secret <i>State ltr 1/24/77</i> To VP Johnson from Bob Komer	1 p Undated	A
#2a Memo	WH <i>Open 3-9-69</i> Secret <i>Sanitized, State ltr 1/24/77</i> To VP Johnson from R. W. Komer	1 p 09/05/62	A
#2b Memo	WH Secret <i>State ltr 1/24/77</i> To VP Johnson from R. W. Komer	1 p Undated	A
#4 Memo	WH Conf. <i>nsc ltr 5/13/77, State ltr 1/24/77</i> To VP Johnson from Col. Burris	1 p 05/17/62	A
#4a Memo	WH Conf. <i>nsc ltr 5/13/77, State ltr 1/24/77</i> To VP Johnson from McG. Bundy	2 p 05/16/62	A
#5 Memo	WH Conf. <i>nsc ltr 5/13/77, State ltr 1/24/77</i> To Liz [Carpenter] from R. W. Komer	1 p 10/18/62	A
#11 Memo	WH Secret <i>Sanitized, nsc ltr 5/13/77, State ltr 1/24/77</i> Summary and supplement to report regarding mission to Lebanon, Iran, Turkey, Cyprus, Greece and Italy <i>Open 6/6/00</i>	9 p Undated	A
#13a Memo	WH Secret <i>nsc ltr 5/13/77, State ltr 1/24/77</i> To VP Johnson from R. W. Komer	1 p 09/20/62	A
#14a Memo	WH Conf. <i>nsc ltr 5/13/77, State ltr 1/24/77</i> To VP Johnson from R. W. Komer	1 p 09/20/62	A

FILE LOCATION

VP Security File, VP Travel
VP Johnson's Trip to Middle East

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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2076

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#10a Memo	CIA re: Iran Secret (Gp 1) <i>CIA loc 11/18/76</i>	08/16/62 <i>State loc 3/16/76</i>	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#3a Memo	DOD Conf. <i>OSD ltr 11/12/76</i> To VP Johnson from Gilpatric	2 p 09/26/62	A
#3b Memo	DOD Conf. <i>OSD ltr 11/12/76</i> To VP Johnson from Gilpatric [duplicate of #3a]	2 p 09/26/62	A
#14b Letter	DOD Conf. <i>OSD ltr 11/12/76</i> To Robert Komer from Frank Sloan	2 p 09/20/62	A

FILE LOCATION VP Security File, VP Travel
VP Johnson's Trip to the Middle East

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1b Cable	State Conf. <i>State Ltr. 2-16-77</i> Embte1 508 to Rome 2 p	09/06/62	A
#1c Cable	State Secret <i>State Ltr. 2-16-77</i> Embte1 136 from Tehran 1 p	09/06/62	A
#2d MemCon	State <i>Open 6/6/00</i> Secret <i>Sumpt State Ltr. 2-16-77</i> Conversation between Caramanlis and Komer 1 p	Undated	A
#5b Cable	State Conf. <i>Sumpt State Ltr. 2-16-77</i> Embte1 234 from Nicosia <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 2 p	10/13/62	A
#6 Report	State Secret <i>State Ltr. 2-16-77</i> Iran Briefing Paper 2 p	08/24/62	A
#7 Report	State Secret <i>State Ltr. 2-16-77</i> Turkey Briefing Paper 2 p	08/26/62	A
#8 Report	State Se Conf. <i>State Ltr. 2-16-77</i> Cyprus Briefing Paper 2 p	08/30/62	A
#9 Report	State Secret <i>Sumpt State Ltr. 2-16-77</i> Greece Briefing Paper <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 2 p	08/31/62	A
#12 Report	State Conf. <i>Sumpt State Ltr. 2-16-77</i> Purpose of VP's visit to Greece, Turkey, Iran and Cyprus <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 5 p	Undated	A
#13b Cable	State Conf. <i>State Ltr. 2-16-77</i> Depte1 82 to Athens 1 p	09/14/62	A
#13c Cable	State Conf. <i>Sumpt State Ltr. 2-16-77</i> Embte1 375 from Athens <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 5 p	09/18/62	A
#13d Cable	State Conf. <i>Sumpt State Ltr. 2-16-77</i> Depte1 366 to Athens <i>Open 3-9-09</i> 2 p	09/18/62	A
#14d Cable	State Conf. <i>Sumpt State Ltr. 2-16-77</i> Embte1 435 from Athens <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 1 p	10/04/62	A
#15b Report	State Secret <i>State Ltr. 2-16-77</i> Vice President's Visit to Turkey 5 p	08/03/62	A
#16 Report	State <i>Open 3-9-09</i> Secret <i>Sanitized State Ltr. 2-16-77</i> Vice President's Visit to Iran 12 p	09/06/62	A

FILE LOCATION

VP Security File, VP Travel
VP Johnson's Trip to the Middle East

45
125

RESTRICTION CODES

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#25 Cable	State Conf. <i>State ltr. 2-16-77</i> Embtel 205 from Beirut 2 p	08/23/62	A
#29 Cable	State Conf. <i>State ltr. 2-16-77</i> Embtel 207 from Beirut 2 p	08/23/62	A
#40 Cable	State Conf. <i>State ltr. 2-16-77</i> Embtel 276 from Tehran 3 p	08/25/62	A
#46 Cable	State Secret <i>Exempt State ltr. 2-16-77</i> Embtel 284 from Tehran <i>Open 3-9-09</i> 5 p	08/26/62	A
#48 Cable	State Secret <i>Exempt State ltr. 2-16-77</i> Embtel 285 from Tehran <i>Open 3-9-09</i> 3 p	08/26/62	A
#50 Cable	State Conf. <i>State ltr. 2-16-77</i> Embtel 46 from Tehran 2 p	08/27/62	A
#61 Cable	State Secret <i>State ltr. 2-16-77</i> Embtel 2 from Istanbul 7 p	08/30/62	A
#71 Cable	State Conf. <i>State ltr. 2-16-77</i> Deptel 44 to Ankara 3p	08/30/62	A
#73 Cable	State Conf. <i>State ltr. 4/5/91</i> Embtel 11 from Istanbul 2 p	08/30/62	A
#77 Cable	State Conf. <i>State ltr. 2-16-77</i> Embtel 3 from Istanbul 3 p	08/30/62	A
#84 Cable	State Secret <i>Exempt State ltr. 2-16-77</i> Deptel 308 to Ankara <i>OPEN 6.11.98</i> 5 p	09/03/62	A
#96 Cable	State Secret <i>Exempt State ltr. 2-16-77</i> Deptel 307 to Nicosia <i>OPEN 6.11.98</i> 3 p	09/03/62	A
#98 Cable	State Conf. <i>State ltr. 2-16-77</i> Embtel 13 from Nicosia 6 p	09/05/62	A
#107 Cable	State Secret <i>Exempt State ltr. 2-16-77</i> Embtel 306 from Athens <i>Open 6/6/00</i> 9 p	09/03/62	A
#109 Cable	State Conf. <i>Exempt State ltr. 2-16-77</i> Deptel 313 to Rome 2 p	09/03/62	A

FILE LOCATION VP Security File, VP Travel
VP Johnson's Trip to the Middle East

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#115 Cable	State Secret Chump State etc Embte1 322 from Athens <i>Open 6/6/00</i>	2-16-77 8 p 09/04/62	A
#123 Cable	State Conf. <i>State etc. 2-16-77</i> Embte1 NIACT 2 from Thessaloniki	1 p 09/04/62	A
#140 Cable	State Secret <i>State etc. 2-16-77</i> Embte1 541 from Rome	7 p 09/06/62	A
#162 Cable	State Conf. <i>State etc. 2-16-77</i> Embte1 571 from Rome (Section 1)	3 p 09/09/62	A
#163 Cable	State Conf. <i>State etc. 2-16-77</i> Embte1 571 from Rome (Section 2)	2 p 09/09/62	A
#134 Memo	State Conf. <i>State etc. 2-16-77</i> Conversation between Fanfani and Komer	2 p 09/05/62	A

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VP Security File, VP Travel
VP Johnson's Trip to the Middle East

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~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

56.

1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

Bob Komer and I waited up all night for Washington's reply. I attach the Secretary's personal cable to you. Also attached is one which just came in from Holmes in Tehran, and seems to confirm the Secretary's judgment.

In view of the already tremendous U.S. effort, and the time that has elapsed, Komer and I reluctantly conclude that you will want to call it off. We've asked all those whom we had getting ready to stand down.

We've re-activated the Naples exercise on the old basis for tomorrow.

WJC
W. J. Crockett

A note from Bob Komer is also attached.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC ltr 5/13/77 State ltr 1/24/77
By rmg, NARS, Date 6/15/77

~~SECRET~~

1a

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

In addition to the message from Rusk, MacBundy called me to say that Rusk, and the President had conferred before Rusk sent his message. The President accepted Rusk's judgement that a major exercise at this late date, however, well motivated, might just look contrived and bite back on you.

Mac said to tell you that the experience with Project HOPE (the hospital ship to SE Asia) was an example of how great ideas could be cynically played down as publicity stunts.

Mac said to tell you personally that he was showing the boss all key JODELS and that you were doing a terrific job.

He further urged that, in addition to briefing the press boys enroute home, he hoped you'd consider a special press conference for a high level, selected group on your return. They are clearly quite worried about the aid bill.

Finally, let me say that Bill and I put the proposition positively to Washington. We both thought it a hell of an idea, and our only real reservations (like Washington's) were that we wished we'd thought to suggest it to you three days before.

BK
Bob Komer

Determined to be an
administrative marking

By MIE On 6/15/77
per State ltr. 1/24/77

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING American Embassy ROME

12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

Control: 133

N I A C T

Recd: Sep 6, 1962
0340

FROM: DEPARTMENT

ACTION: ROME 508, September 5, 9 p.m.

ACTION ROME NIACT 508 TEHRAN NIACT 255

EYES ONLY FOR VICE PRESIDENT AND CROCKETT

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR HOLMES

FROM SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State Hq. 2-14-77
By lhw, NARS, Date 3-7-77

CTION:
ODEI-4

Rptd info: White House by other means

Very deeply appreciate your readiness to return to Iran if that could be of assistance in connection earthquake distress. On first news of earthquake president and I considered very carefully whether we should ask you to interrupt your critically important trip in order to return personally to Iran. We concluded that we should not rpt not do so because of significance your remaining commitments in Greece and Italy and because of way situation has developed in Iran itself.

US response to earthquake disaster was immediate and formidable. Please refer to Tehran's 334. Supplies, mobile field hospital of 100 beds with 200 US personnel, helicopters, food and other necessities were provided as matter highest priority. The US Embassy, aid and other US organizations, both official and private, have pitched in with everything that can be effectively used.

You should know that a most unfortunate hoax was perpetrated as a result of which US Armed Forces Radio in Tehran announced that another earthquake was QUOTE expected UNQUOTE in Tehran itself in a few hours time and that this led to considerable excitement and panic in Tehran which has caused US some difficulty in the propaganda field. This could provide a cynical introduction to your return to Iran and might lead hostile elements to portray your visit as an attempt to capitalize on human distress.

Further, at this point your return would tend to be anti-climatic because both the Shah and the Prime Minister have visited the affected areas and have moved vigorously to mobilize Iran and foreign resources to rid the distress.

Finally, the brilliant success of your visit could be frustrated by deep congressional cuts in our aid program. I would strongly urge that you

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT 508, SEP 5, 9PM

-2-

CONTROL: 133

Complete your visit as planned and reflect in Washington as promptly as possible with key congressional leaders the urgency which your visit has given to the President's aid program. Otherwise, what has been a magnificent gift to American policy in the countries you have visited could produce disillusionment if because of deep congressional cuts the policy you have supported in your visit would be undercut by a refusal of the Congress to provide the necessary means.

Press reaction in this country to your visit has been warm and appreciative. Reporting from our missions on effect in the countries visited has shown a remarkable accomplishment. It seems to me that the highest priority should now be given to driving home in Washington the implications of your visit and that this is the most urgent task in view of the congressional calendar which brings US up to critical decisions in the next week or ten days.

I fully understand and appreciate your human concern for what has happened in Iran but I sincerely believe that the interruption of your schedule to return to Iran would not rpt not be advisable in your or the national interest.

Please let me conclude with deep appreciation for the contribution you have made on what in fact has been a most extraordinary accomplishment in the countries you have visited in the past two weeks.

RUSK

06/0425/jm

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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING

American Embassy ROME

10

This document consists of 1 page
Number of 4 copies, Series A.

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Control: 136

N I A C T

Recd: Sep 6, 1962
0415

FROM: TEHRAN

ACTION: DEPARTMENT

INFO: ROME 13, Sep 6, 5AM

EYES ONLY RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ltr. 2-16-77

By shaw, NARS, Date 3-7-77

ACTION: ROME EYES ONLY CROCKETT
JODEL-4

Reference: Rome's 12 to Tehran, 539 to Department

Understand Vice President's concern and appreciate his willingness to undertake second mission to Iran in spite of his demanding schedule.

I fear, however, that to do so would risk detracting from resounding success of recent visit. Under authority granted by president's instruction we have made a massive contribution to relief of earthquake victims with a speed which has greatly impressed all concerned here. After a jerky start relief operation is just getting underway. As you know most of affect area is remote and visit would require use of at least one of two helicopters which will only be operational for rescue work Thursday. The Prime Minister is personally directing the coordination of operations by Iranian army, Health Ministry and other elements of government with Red Lion and Sun, and the government's administrative resources are strained. Regardless of any plea we might make for simplicity of reception tradition would dictate commitment of such resources to Vice President's arrival and tour of area. There is possibility that a second visit in circumstances might produce adverse comment in press. There is also possibility that purpose of visit might be construed erroneously following unfortunate announcement of second earthquake by USAFR Monday which caused near panic in Tehran.

ACTION COPY

Return to the
Records Unit

Action Taken:

Initials

Date

With regard to paragraph 4 of reftel mobile army hospital which will begin operation Thursday is all supplementary assistance this field required at least for time being.

The first dramatic impact of the disaster has passed and everyone is settling down to the grim job of burying the dead, tending the wounded and looking out for survivors. Bearing this in mind and the great success of Vice President's recent visit, a second one now might turn out to be anti-climatical.

The foregoing represents my considered judgment and is made in spite of my eye-witness knowledge of VP's extraordinary capacity to make friends of strangers.

06/0545/jm

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Classification

HOLMES
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27

2

MEMO FOR THE VP

Wed like a chance to
brief you thoroughly on our
next stop — Washington.
It's a very complicated
political situation, and we
don't want to expose you
to it unprepared.

Bob Komer

~~SECRET~~

2a

September 5, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Vice President (EYES ONLY)

Sir:

Further on Italy's new left-center cabinet. I believe it fair to say that we in the White House, including the President and Mac Bundy, are more enthusiastic about this new reformist government than the cautious types in State and the Embassy.

We see in it the best opportunity, after over a decade of weak center governments, to translate Italy's economic miracle into more for the people through social and economic reform. We also see in it the best way to isolate the extreme left (which got 37 - 39% of the vote in the last national election) by consolidating the split between the Communists and the left Socialists (who now back the government). The Embassy is more concerned than we are lest the left Socialists under Nenni drag Italy in a neutralist direction. We think attractive pull of European unity far outweighs this tendency.

Many Italians still wonder whether the US looks with approval on a government supported by Socialists. So, if at luncheon or dinner, you can inquire about this government, and perhaps indicate our general approval of social and economic reform, it could do much to encourage the most desirable political trend in Italy in years.



R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
Bvabw/jc, NARA, Date 2-26-09

Kami 2A

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

Here are some personal suggestions on: (1) what you might say to the President and Dean Rusk; and (2) a summary of accomplishments in a form which might be used in a press briefing.

They represent my own personal impressions and perhaps prejudices. Having followed events in this area for some time now, it is hard for me to separate past views from on-the-spot reactions. At any rate, I've tried to call them as I see 'em.

My understanding is that you do not want to make a formal written report. Amen to this. But I do think you would want to hit the highlights (and only these) orally with Kennedy and Rusk. Hence the attached.

Press relations are not my business (though I've done quite a bit of informal backgrounding on your behalf.) I think, however, that wrap-up backgrounder from you to our press boys en route would be a natural for the Sunday papers. Mac Bundy also asked that you consider a special session with a select group of Washington correspondents on your return.

Let me just add that in my opinion this trip has been a whole of a success. I know you've felt that I came along initially with a certain scepticism as to this type of exercise. I did. But I hope I'm a big enough guy to tell you that I got a real political education. I intend to tell the President that the morale you make (despite the wear and tear on staff as well as you) is worth its weight in foreign policy gold.

If you can stand me on the next one, sign me up.

Bob Komer

R. W. Komer

Determined to be an
administrative marking

By MIE On 6/15/77
per State Sec. 1/24/77

27

2e

September 5, 1962

Sir:

Since I never quite know whether you are pulling my leg or batting me over the head, I am attaching my Memcon of the only private conversation I had with Caramanlis during the entire Athens trip.

After you'd gotten in the car I went up to him to say goodbye, knowing that we back-door types wouldn't see him at the airport. Our conversation lasted all of twenty seconds and my best recollection immediately thereafter is attached. There may well have been Greek newspapermen standing around; I suspect that, if so, their understanding of Caramanlis' English was as poor as mine. At any rate, I still can't find the press comments to which you referred.


R. W. Komer

2d

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date:

Time:

Place:

Participants: Prime Minister Caramanlis
Mr. R. W. Komer

After the Vice President had left Caramanlis turned to me and asked me to convey his warmest personal greetings to President Kennedy. He said to tell President Kennedy that Greece wanted "more." I asked, smilingly, whether we had not already given them more. He grinned too and said "but Greece still needs more."

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-30-00

~~SECRET~~

27

22

SUBSTANTIVE POINTS TO MAKE TO THE SHAH

1. TO MEET SHAH'S MILITARY CONCERNS

- a. US regards new military aid procedure to be negotiated with Iran shortly as very responsive to his needs. It represents carefully worked out program, as MacNamara pointed out, and has been tailored to Iran's force structure requirements as recommended by General Twitchell's recent mission.
- b. US confident our own military posture, as mentioned by President to Shah, more than adequate to deter Soviets.
- c. We do not see much likelihood of Afgan or Iraqi attack in foreseeable future.

2. TO STEER SHAH ON TO OUR DESIRE HE CONTINUE PRESSING INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM

- a. In our view, Iran's internal problems far more pressing than external threat.
- b. We specifically hopeful that reforms begun in past year will be continued.
- c. We impressed by way Iran Government has managed to balance its current budget; however, with growing social and economic outlays inevitable, important that Iran increase tax revenues in order offset these local currency needs.
- d. In line with new aid policy, US wants to use bulk of its aid money in Iran in support of carefully worked out overall development plans or for the foreign exchange component of adequately documented specific projects in the absence of such plans.
- e. Iranian performance spotty here, for example, 20 Million Dollar Bandar Abbas port project (which President told Shah we would

back) is not in decent project form.

- f. We prepared to consider other projects even before 3rd Plan framework finally approved, but early completion 3rd Plan would be most helpful in permitting us to plan our aid, and help get consortium going.

Paul Maris

Wash. & Lib
Howard Burch -
Office Secretary of -

Harry Neal

Supt Georgia State
Personal Advisor for a
year on Rural Reform.

3rd Aid (200)

6 Leo Tolson

Supervisor

~~Germany head Henry Conner~~
Mrs G. W. 2/20
Pally Evans
3408 Rosalie St
Houston 4, Tex

REQUEST ATTACHED DOCUMENT RECEIPT (SD-120) BE SIGNED AND RETURNED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO: OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 3A 948, THE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

RECEIPT FOR CLASSIFIED MATERIAL			
ADDRESSEE The Vice President	PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN TO OSD IMMEDIATELY	NUMBER D- 40738	
ORIGINATOR OR CUSTODIAN 1st Col C. C. Greenhouse	CLASSIFICATION <input type="checkbox"/> TS <input type="checkbox"/> S <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> C	DATE OF TRANSFER SEP 2 1962	
TELEPHONE NUMBER 7700	SUBJECT (Use short title, i.e. short title for Subject "Shipment of Shoes and Process" would be "SOSAD.") (Including date of document). SOSAD SecDel Control No. 6106		
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ORIGINAL 1	CC 1	OTHERS	ENCLOSURES
DATE RECEIVED		RECEIVED BY (Signature)	

SD FORM 120 APR 53 120
white copy - Custodian. Pink copy - Recipient. Post Card - Office of the Secretary of Defense.

REGISTERED DISPATCH RECEIPT				ROTARY LOCK NUMBER	DISPATCH NUMBER		
TO The Vice President United States Senate Washington 25, D.C.		FROM Office of the Secretary of Defense (VIA AFGAS-45B)					
DISPATCHED BY (Name, grade and office symbol) MSGT H. J. Kegg, USAF OCS, OSD		WITNESS	DATE 27 Sept 62	TIME			
RECEIVED BY (Name, grade and office symbol) <i>D. Hunter</i>		WITNESS	DATE	TIME			
ITEM	CONTROL NUMBERS	ITEM	CONTROL NUMBERS	ITEM	CONTROL NUMBERS	ITEM	CONTROL NUMBERS
1	D-40738 (Sealed En)	16		31		46	
2		17		32		47	
3		18		33		48	
4		19		34		49	
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10		25		40		55	
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12		27		42		57	
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15		30		45		60	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3^a
/

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON

SEP 2 1962

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD (m) 11/12/76

By smg, NARS, Date 3/30/77

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Support of the Turkish Air Force

This Memorandum is to provide you with further information regarding the problem, which first came to your attention during your recent visit to Turkey, of inadequate logistical support for the Turkish Air Force (TAF).

At intervals during the last few months, a number of Turkish aircraft have been grounded because of a lack of spare parts. The TAF has not received parts mainly because the NATO Maintenance Supply Services System (NMSSS), which is directly responsible for supporting it, has failed to do its job.

As an immediate measure to relieve the Turkish spare parts shortage the U.S. Air Force sent a team to Turkey during the last week of August to determine the assistance needed. An order for critical parts was expedited through the NATO Supply Center (NSC), the supply depot of NMSSS, to U.S. Air Force depots. More than 97% of the items have been turned over to the NSC's commercial freight forwarder who is now in process of effecting air shipments directly to Turkey, the first of which arrived in Ankara on 29 August. The balance, consisting of two items, is on expedited procurement by the U.S. Air Force.

Additionally, on a project started in July, the U.S. Air Force has reviewed all NSC procurement orders for aircraft spares and has taken priority action to meet those requirements.

The U.S. has been aware for sometime that supply support through the NSC has been inadequate. For example, the NSC has accumulated a tremendous backlog of parts in its receiving section, which it has been unable to process. Yet, the NMSSS Board of Directors (representing 13 NATO nations) has not authorized the hiring of additional help to overcome this backlog. NMSSS is an international logistics system and its operations are unfortunately affected by political considerations; thus unilateral U.S. action is limited. For the past six months the U.S. has had a member on the NMSSS Special Review Committee investigating NMSSS operations. This Review Committee is scheduled to make its recommendations to

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DCD DIR 5200.10

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Serial Control No. 6106

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the NMSSS Board of Directors at its October meeting. In addition, the U.S. General Manager of NMSSS has recently been replaced.

Unquestionably adequate support could be provided from U.S. military depots directly to Turkey. However, if the U.S. were to transfer grant aid spare parts support of Turkey (and Greece) from the NSC to direct U.S. support, it would signal the demise of the NMSSS. This we may be forced to do. But for the present, our efforts are directed towards making the NMSSS a successful international logistical organization.

If further support emergencies arise which cannot be met by the NSC, we shall again take action directly from the U.S.

Russell S. [Signature]

DEPUTY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

SEP 2 1962

36

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

Authority OSD let 11/12/76
By mg, NARS, Date 3/30/70

SUBJECT: Support of the Turkish Air Force

This Memorandum is to provide you with further information regarding the problem, which first came to your attention during your recent visit to Turkey, of inadequate logistical support for the Turkish Air Force (TAF).

At intervals during the last few months, a number of Turkish aircraft have been grounded because of a lack of spare parts. The TAF has not received parts mainly because the NATO Maintenance Supply Services System (NMSSS), which is directly responsible for supporting it, has failed to do its job.

As an immediate measure to relieve the Turkish spare parts shortage the U.S. Air Force sent a team to Turkey during the last week of August to determine the assistance needed. An order for critical parts was expedited through the NATO Supply Center (NSC), the supply depot of NMSSS, to U.S. Air Force depots. More than 97% of the items have been turned over to the NSC's commercial freight forwarder who is now in process of effecting air shipments directly to Turkey, the first of which arrived in Ankara on 29 August. The balance, consisting of two items, is on expedited procurement by the U.S. Air Force.

Additionally, on a project started in July, the U.S. Air Force has reviewed all NSC procurement orders for aircraft spares and has taken priority action to meet those requirements.

The U.S. has been aware for sometime that supply support through the NSC has been inadequate. For example, the NSC has accumulated a tremendous backlog of parts in its receiving section, which it has been unable to process. Yet, the NMSSS Board of Directors (representing 13 NATO nations) has not authorized the hiring of additional help to overcome this backlog. NMSSS is an international logistics system and its operations are unfortunately affected by political considerations; thus unilateral U.S. action is limited. For the past six months the U.S. has had a member on the NMSSS Special Review Committee investigating NMSSS operations. This Review Committee is scheduled to make its recommendations to

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DGD DIR 5200.10

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SecDef Control No. 6106

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the IBESS Board of Directors at its October meeting. In addition, the U.S. General Manager of IBESS has recently been replaced.

Unquestionably adequate support could be provided from U.S. military depots directly to Turkey. However, if the U.S. were to transfer grant aid spare parts support of Turkey (and Greece) from the NSC to direct U.S. support, it would signal the demise of the IBESS. This we may be forced to do. But for the present, our efforts are directed towards making the IBESS a successful international logistical organization.

If further support emergencies arise which cannot be met by the NSC, we shall again take action directly from the U.S.

Signed
ROSWELL L. GILPATRICK
Deputy Secretary of Defense

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

4

DATE: May 17, 1962
TO: The Vice President
FROM: Colonel Burriss
RE: Trips Abroad

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC Dec 5/13/77, State Dec 1/24/77
By rmg, NARS, Date 6/15/77

State draws the same general conclusions as Mr. Bundy concerning the proposed visits to different areas of the world.

With regard to the visit to Italy, Greece and Turkey, it is suggested that this visit be made not later than July since practically all Italian Government officials go on vacation in August. State pointed out that there were international fairs in Greece and Turkey in August and September but these events would not seem to be of appropriate importance for you to attend. It would be appropriate and timely to add Iran to the itinerary following the visit to Turkey.

Since the continent of Africa is in almost complete turmoil, a visit to the area in the late summer or early fall must be worked out very carefully. The current Soviet efforts to penetrate the Sudan and Morocco, particularly in the field of civil aviation, suggests that an effort might possibly be made to counter this Soviet thrust. In order to round out this contingent trip, preparations could possibly be initiated for a visit to Nigeria, which is perhaps the key nation in central Africa because of its size, economic resources and population.

Mr. Harriman feels that a trip to Japan and Korea should not be made unless proposals or responses favorable to either or both of these countries could be made in the course of your trip. Mr. Skiff is looking into some possibilities which would give your trip a broader basis than that of attempting to resolve the long standing feud between Korea and Japan. This trip can be worked out, and a visit to Australia and New Zealand can at any time be added to the delight of the Governments of those two countries.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 16, 1962

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Trips this Summer

After talking to some of the experts and thinking about it some myself -- and after a word with the President -- there are two general scenarios which look very good for this summer. The first is Italy, Greece and Turkey, with Cyprus and the Sudan as possible add-ons. The second is Korea, Japan, Formosa and the Philippines, with Hong Kong, Vietnam and Thailand as possible add-ons. Let me take them in order.

In Italy, the mission would be to demonstrate our support and interest in the new President and the Fanfani government, complete with its opening to the left. Italy is a country of growing importance to us, in the light of General de Gaulle's rather special purposes, and a visit from you at this time would be a very helpful way of signaling our special concern for Italy without arousing jealousy in Germany and France, because of the Mediterranean character of your trip.

In Greece and Turkey we have a constant and important need for reassurance about our support and understanding. Both countries have been staunch on fundamentals, and both would give you a very warm welcome. Cyprus is a new country and you would be coming shortly after Makarios visited us. The timing of this is flexible, but a visit in early July seems sensible if you can manage it.

The Far Eastern expedition might then come in August or September -- perhaps better in September. The most important substantive possibility is that you might be able to strike a heavy blow for the reconciliation of Korea and Japan, on which we have been working for so long with only limited progress. There is some reason to think that it may be ripe for real progress by late summer. In addition, we will by then, with luck, be ready to get our relations with the Philippines back on a good strong footing. We will probably be having trouble with Chiang Kai-shek, and you may want to reserve judgment as to a stop in Formosa. Vietnam and Thailand are rather over-visited at the moment, and we have been discouraging lesser VIP's from visits,

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Authority NSC 5413/10, Dec 12/61

By nmj, NARS, Date 6/15/97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

May 16, 1962

but by the end of summer, again, a quick look from you may be very much what is needed.

If these two general patterns seem sensible to you, I will put members of my staff at the disposal of your people for working on details. The real logistic support will have to come from the State Department, but I have a couple of energetic men who would be glad to help with getting both trips just right, because they are enthusiastic about the possibilities.

McG. B.
McG. B.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

27
5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 18, 1962

LIZ -

Please tell the VP that my first reaction was "who, me"? It wasn't.

The most relevant articles State can find are in the NYT and WASHINGTON POST, both date-lined 30 August. This was the very day we arrived (late afternoon). So both obviously resulted from backgrounder Carl Rowan and I laid on previous evening in Istanbul at the VP's request. Doug Heck (our DCM on Cyprus) gave a long and excellent pitch on our problems with Cyprus. I don't recall any of us saying specifically that the VP would press the point grieving Makarios, but it was a natural inference to draw.

Then 1 September NYT has one sentence that "American officials expressed scepticism that Mr. Johnson's visit had changed Archbishop Makarios' tolerant attitude toward the Cypriot Communists." Source could have been any one of a dozen people in Cyprus or Athens.

In any event, tell the VP my sense that this is all to the good. The VP charged Makarios hard on this very issue, and that Makarios remembers it six weeks later is evidence it sank in. My only concern would be if press articles had caused a public stir in Cyprus itself, but State assures me no evidence to date of this.


R. W. KOMER

Attach. Nicosia 234 dtd 10/13/62

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Authority State Ca 1/24/77, NSC Ca 5/13/77
By mmg, NARS, Date 6/15/77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

5a

Bob:

The Vice President wanted you to see this. As you know, he did not talk to the Times about this visit and wonders where he would get this stuff. Best regards...

Liz Carpenter



OCT 17 1962

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Vice President Johnson
(for info)

58

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

53
Action
NEA

Control: 10626
Rec'd: October 13, 1962
9:52 a.m.

Info.

FROM: Nicosia
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 234, October 13, 9 a.m.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FAJ 61-63, n. 1, 4266
By ju, NARA. Date 5-30-00

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 234; INFORMATION ANKARA 52, ATHENS 69,
LONDON UNNUMBERED.

EMBTEL 228; DEPTTEL 798.

MAKARIOS TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT IN ADDITION TO PRESS REPORTS ON MR. BOWLES' MEMORANDUM ON AMERICAN ASSISTANCE, THERE WAS ANOTHER SUBJECT WHICH DISTURBED HIM. HE REFERRED TO NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE OF EARLY SEPTEMBER WHICH REPORTED ON VICE PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S VISIT TO MIDDLE EAST AND HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH MAKARIOS. MAKARIOS READ EXCERPTS TOUCHING ON MAKARIOS' ATTITUDE RE COMMUNISM AND FORMATION OF RIGHT-WING POLITICAL PARTY AND SAID THAT THIS ACCOUNT HARDLY DID JUSTICE TO HIS VIEWS AND TO WHAT HE WAS TRYING TO DO HERE.

MAKARIOS CONTINUED THAT HE HAD BEEN TRYING TO COUNTER INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN CYPRUS AND WAS PREPARING WAY FOR 1965 ELECTIONS IN CYPRUS. GIST OF MAKARIOS' ARGUMENT WAS THAT MANY CYPRIOT COMMUNISTS WERE MERELY PAYING LIP SERVICE TO PARTY AND LEFT-WING LABOR UNION FOR PRESENT BENEFITS AND THAT SINCE THEY WERE SUPPORTING CURRENT GOC POLICIES, IT WAS PREFERABLE TO RETAIN THEIR COOPERATION THAN TO RISK FACTIONS AND POSSIBLY ARMED CLASHES WITHIN GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY. MAKARIOS WAS CONVINCED THAT CYPRIOT COMMUNISTS DID NOT NOW POSE ANY SERIOUS THREAT HERE AND THAT IF DANGER SHOULD SUBSEQUENTLY DEVELOP HE WOULD UTILIZE ANY RPT ANY MEANS TO RESOLVE MATTER.

MAKARIOS SAID: "THERE IS NO DOUBT ABOUT MY ANTICOMMUNIST VIEWS. AT SAME TIME I MUST MAKE USE OF THEM NOW AND CONCENTRATE ON MAKING NEW CYPRIOT GOVERNMENT WORK AND GETTING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM UNDER WAY. I CANNOT RISK DISSENSION WITHIN GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY, BUT I WILL CRUSH COMMUNISTS IF THEY TRY TO TAKE OVER OUR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC." HE SAID, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT FORMER EOKA FIGHTERS CONTINUE HELL-BENT TO ATTACK CYPRIOT COMMUNISTS WITH FORCE, BUT THAT HE HAD WITH DIFFICULTY RESTRAINED THEM IN INTERESTS OF PEACE IN CYPRUS.

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OCT 17 1962

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 234, October 13, 9 a.m., from Nicosia

MAKARIOS COMMENTED RE RIGHTWING POLITICAL PARTY THAT WE IN US HAD WELL-ESTABLISHED DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM WITH EDUCATED ELECTORATE AND ONLY TWO POLITICAL PARTIES: CYPRUS DID NOT HAVE WELL-ESTABLISHED DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM AND MANY OF ITS PEOPLE WERE UNSOPHISTICATED POLITICALLY. IT WAS TRUE COMMUNISTS WERE ORGANIZED; AT SAME TIME IT WAS TOO EARLY SIMILARLY TO ORGANIZE RIGHT WING BECAUSE, AS IN GREECE, EVERY CYPRIOT WANTED TO BE POLITICAL LEADER. MAKARIOS FEARED THAT INSTEAD OF ONE RIGHT-WING POLITICAL PARTY THERE MIGHT BE TWO OR MORE. "WHAT IF ONE OF THEM WERE CALLED 'PARTY FOR UNION WITH GREECE'? COULD I DISAVOW SUCH A PARTY OR SUCH A POLICY?"

MAKARIOS ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR HIM AS PRESIDENT AND AS ARCHBISHOP TO ENGAGE DIRECTLY IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS. FOR TIME BEING IT WAS PREFERABLE TO HANDLE MATTER INDIRECTLY UNTIL CYPRIOT POLITICIANS THEMSELVES WERE CONSCIOUS OF NEED FOR SINGLE ORGANIZATION IN OPPOSITION TO LEFT-WING GROUPING. MAKARIOS THOUGHT THAT THIS DEVELOPMENT WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL EVE OF 1965 ELECTIONS.

I RECALLED THAT, DURING CONVERSATION WITH MAKARIOS LAST JUNE, PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD REFERRED TO MAO'S RELIANCE UPON ORGANIZATION FOR SUCCESSFUL POLITICAL CONTROL AND THAT VICE PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD SAID THAT PREPARATION FOR POLITICAL ELECTIONS COULD NOT BE DELAYED UNTIL LAST MOMENT. I SAID THAT I WOULD MAKE KNOWN TO WASHINGTON HIS ANALYSIS OF LOCAL SITUATION AND HIS JUDGMENT AS TO HOW IT COULD BEST BE HANDLED. MEANWHILE WE COULD CONTINUE TO WATCH SITUATION AND WORK TOGETHER.

WILKINS



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5c

... RIVES ... TALK

Greeks Term Aid Cuts Unfair —Some Cypriotes Cool

By PETER BRANSTUP
Special to The New York Times

ATHENS, Aug. 31 — Vice President Johnson arrived tonight from Cyprus to discuss what Greek leaders have publicly termed an unfair cutback of United States defense aid.

The visit to Greece was viewed by American officials here as the most difficult fence-mending assignment of the Vice President's tour. This has included discussions with leaders of Lebanon, Iran, Turkey and yesterday, with Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus.

Earlier this week Premier Constantinos Caramanlis complained that the end of United States budgetary support, which was \$20,000,000 last year, in effect penalized Greece for her sacrifices on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The American position is that Greece's economy is strong enough to enable her to finance her own operations while United States aid increasingly shifts emphasis to long-term development loans and continued shipment of military equipment.

President Welcomes Johnson

Mr. Johnson was welcomed at the airport by Mr. Caramanlis and other leaders. His motorcade into Athens was interrupted four times as the Mayors of suburban towns and the capital officially welcomed him.

Mr. Caramanlis showed he was no amateur at dealing with crowds. At times the mob was engaged by cheering through waving Greek and United States flags supplied by the United States Information Service, seemed to be a joint official procession.

Mr. Johnson said at the airport. He promised "substantial discussions" would "matter of mutual concern among old allies of common purpose."

Mr. Johnson is scheduled to give brief talks with the President followed by extensive discussions Monday on economic problems Greece is maintaining a 200,000-man defense force for NATO and also is pursuing domestic programs.

Visitor Tours Nicosia

In Nicosia before he returned to Athens, the Vice President took a walk through the city, which is divided into Greek and Turkish sections, officiated with a "milk-pouring" to celebrate a new American school lunch program with 65,000 Cypriote school children run by CARE Inc., and became the first foreigner to address the fifty-member Cypriote House of Representatives. Mr. Johnson got a good hand from most members of the island Parliament after he told them formally what he had been preaching since he arrived late yesterday. The Republic of Cyprus, he said, must be "constantly vigilant" against the "subversion of its independence," quick to end British-Greek disunity and prompt to launch economic and social programs for the population of 372,000.

The Vice President did not mention Cyprus' growing Communist party or the active Soviet Embassy by name but he did not miss the point, including the three Communist legislators who were present. The Communists, unlike the other members, did not applaud when Mr. Johnson entered the small, modern chamber, nor did they applaud his remarks.

When he stepped down to shake hands with members, the Communists held a hurried conference and shook hands when their turn came, but looked away as they did so. Asked for their reaction to the Johnson speech, they declined comment, saying all questions would have to be submitted in advance in writing.

Sabbath Crowds Out

American officials expressed skepticism that Mr. Johnson's visit had changed Archbishop Makarios' tolerant attitude toward the Cypriote Communists, but it was understood that the Cypriote leader and his guest had agreed on new aid formulas and possible reinforcements for the twenty-two-year Peace Corps contingent due here to teach and work in agriculture and insert.

Mr. Johnson's trip through the city followed a familiar pattern in the Turkish section. The Moslem Sabbath crowds swirled around the open car, dancers performed at Akatiri Square under the broiling midday sun and men chanted "John-son, John-son."

Crossing the square into the Greek section was like sailing into still waters after shooting a rapids. The Greeks were friendly but reserved. The subdued reaction was attributed by local sources to the fact that many workers in the shopping area traversed by the visitor were Communists or Leftists. Moreover, the Government made no special effort to increase the crowds.

The leading Greek-language Communist newspaper, Kharavgi, ignoring Mr. Johnson's pledges that "the United States ask only your friendship" in return for aid, told its 12,000 subscribers that he was really seeking to get Cyprus away from her poiky of nonalignment and into the Western military bloc.

Handwritten scribble

JOHNSON TO WARN CYPRUS ON REDS

Arrives on Way to Greece Also Will Stress U.S. Ties

By PETER BRAUNTRUP
Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES

NICOSIA, Cyprus, Aug. 30—Vice President Johnson arrived in this strategic island republic late today to stress United States friendship and to urge Cypriote leaders to take seriously the threat of Communism here.

Mr. Johnson was greeted at the airport by Vice President Frank B. Rowland and an honor guard in British uniform. Later thousands welcomed his motorcade as it roared through.

While local bands played "The Eyes of Texas Are Upon You," the Vice President spoke again with colonels. He walked the last 200 yards to his hotel.

The Vice President is the highest-ranking foreign dignitary to have visited Cyprus since it became a republic.

Mr. Johnson flew from Istanbul, where he canceled a Republican ball-toss to rest and confer with aides in his Hilton Hotel suite this morning. His schedule coincided with the Turkish Army's "Victory Day" parade celebrating military successes against the Greeks forty years ago. It was the last stop on the Vice President's five-day tour of the Middle East, and western Europe.

American officials cited Cyprus' importance to the West as the site of Britain's chief army and air base in the eastern Mediterranean and a major American relay point. They also pointed to her as a country with an independent but Western-oriented foreign policy.

However, Cyprus has a fifty-year Soviet Embassy. She has the title of the American Embassy staff, and has a growing Communist People's party of Cyprus.

Although it has only 12,000 members, the People's party is led by Moscow-trained professionals and operates successfully through youth and trade union groups. Its candidates received one-third of the votes cast by the island's Greek majority in the last election. Its youth group has grown from nothing to 20,000 members in two years.

American officials have watched the Russians try to reduce the traditional anti-Russian sentiment of the Turkish fifth of the island's population by buying cheap surplus raisins and other unmarketable crops from the struggling farmers, wooing coffee-shop intellectuals and buying the works of starving Turkish artists.

During the visit of the President, Archbishop Makarios to Washington in June President Kennedy tried to convince him of the dangers of Communist infiltration and a possible take-over despite the party's peaceful facade. Now Mr. Johnson is planning to press the point.

The Vice President is also here to urge a speed-up in Cyprus' economic development. Although the republic's 572,000 people have a per capita national income of \$400 a year, higher than that of any other nation in the eastern Mediterranean except Israel, poverty is still widespread among the drought-struck farmers. New industry is needed to supplement copper and iron mining to reduce widespread unemployment.

U. S. Sends Grain

American aid has been highly popular. It comes largely in the form of technical assistance and of surplus grain given to the Government, which sells it and gives the proceeds to local communities for development projects.

A school-lunch program sponsored by CARE, or Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, has been started and a Peace Corps contingent is on the way. Vice President Johnson is expected to assure Archbishop Makarios that the United States soon will join other Western powers in a long-term loan once Cyprus decides what projects it wants to start.

Britain, France, Israel and West Germany also have been active in aiding Cyprus.

American officials believe the Communist threat, and the threat of renewed blood between Greek and Turkish Cypriotes, will subside as the attention of farmers and workers is focused on national projects and programs.

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FROM QUICK COPY

ESC

Johnson Warns Cyprus Against Alien Dictation

By Murrey Marder
Staff Reporter

NICOSIA, Cyprus, Aug. 30 (AP)—Vice President Johnson arrived today in this young island republic where communism feeds on local tensions. He urged Cypriots to beware of "dictation or control from outside."

Johnson told the Cypriots that the United States and other western powers were determined to help them develop "your own institutions and values."

Johnson, the highest ranking foreigner to come to Cyprus since it gained independence two years ago, received a friendly welcome.

The five-mile route from airport into Nicosia was lined with several thousand smiling Cypriots. Branches lined the roadway, and girls in Greek and Turkish costumes tossed jasmine and rose petals in Johnson's path.

Johnson was seen walking with a wife, clasp-

ing hands, picking up a baby girl in his arms, and turning on his most folksy manner.

Raising from a Greek-Cypriot section to a Turkish-Cypriot section was like crossing a national boundary for the differences in language and dialect were immediately evident.

But today as they were united in welcoming their American guest.

The Vice President's party traveled 8 1/2 miles from Istanbul to Nicosia. This is the fourth country visited on Johnson's swing through the Mediterranean area on a commission graceful and reassuring.

Johnson was greeted at the airport by the Vice President of Cyprus, Fikri Kucuk, and this evening he made his first call on the President, Archbishop Makarios. They represent the Greek-Cypriot element, and the hope is that they will bring the two constituent

tion put together in order to give Cyprus independence from Britain in August, 1960, the President is elected by the Greek-Cypriots, who represent 80 per cent of the population, and the Vice President by the Turkish-Cypriots who have 15 per cent of the population.

Big Problem for West

While small in size—about half as big as New Jersey—and with only 570,000 persons, Cyprus nevertheless has been a big problem for the West. Not only does it hold a strategic position at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, but it is also a potential source of major intra-allied trouble because of its population mixture. It also has one of the largest proportions of domestic Communists in the whole Western world.

Some observers on the scene, however, believe the United States is needlessly overexcited about the "Communist menace" here.

The underlying purpose behind Johnson's visit here is to encourage Archbishop Makarios to accord greater attention to what the United States regards to be the latent Communist danger on this island. This is an objective that was pursued by President Kennedy during Archbishop Makarios' visit to Washington in June, when the United States pledged new assistance to Cyprus to bolster its independence by building economic stability.

In the 1956 presidential elections, the Communist-supported candidate received about one of every three votes cast. While this is no real measure of specific Communist strength, what does concern the Western powers is that since then Communist influence has been growing, hidden behind labor unions, front groups, and some lingering hostility toward the United States and Britain from Greek-Cypriot extremists still pushing to put this island under the Greek flag.

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO IRAN
AUGUST 24 - 26, 1962

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State ltr. 2-16-77
By Chu, NARS, Date 3-7-77

Summary Briefing Paper

Iran

Iran is a beleaguered bastion of the West, under strong pressure of every kind, diplomatic and subversive, from the communist bloc. It suffers from grave internal dissension and lack of confidence; it is outside the formal chain of U. S. alliances but still maintains a posture of dignity and defiance vis-a-vis the USSR. Iran cannot continue to resist these pressures indefinitely unless it knows that it has powerful friends, and the visit of the Vice President is vital to buck up the morale of the Iranian people and the Shah. In this sense, the Vice President's visit to Iran is essential in the same sense that his visit to Berlin was essential, even though the Iranian pressure-point is not so heavily publicized as is Berlin.

1. Military Affairs. Uppermost in the Shah's mind is his security posture and what the U. S. intends to do to help strengthen and equip Iran's armed forces. It does not appear likely that the final shape of our 5-year military assistance plan for Iran will be known by the time the Vice President visits Iran. The Vice President should listen ~~to~~ to the Shah's well-rehearsed arguments on this subject, indicate his understanding of the Shah's points of concern and assure the Shah that this matter is receiving the most careful high-level consideration. The Vice President should avoid being drawn into a detailed discussion of technical military matters with the Shah and indicate that Ambassador Holmes will shortly receive instructions on this subject which he can review at length with the Shah.

2. Economic and Financial Affairs. Iran is in the fifth month of its new financial year and has not yet settled its budget. This exceptionally difficult problem was the cause of the resignation of the moderate reformist Prime Minister, Dr. Ali Amini, and some officials have tended to blame the termination of U. S. budgetary support as the

cause

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- 2 -

cause of the GOI's failure to solve the problem. The Vice President may reiterate to the Shah and other officials our feeling that the U. S. cannot go on supporting the Iranian internal operating budget, that the resolution of this matter is within the competence of the GOI, and that the U. S. stands ready and willing to assist Iran with its economic development program as soon as Iran itself has settled its budgetary problem and worked out the details of its investment plans.

3. The Kurdish Question. Iran has recently become preoccupied with the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq and its possible impact on the Kurds in northern Iran. The Vice President may wish to encourage Iran in its plans to focus on improving the political and economic status of the Kurds in Iran and counsel against Iranian intervention in Iraq.

4. Iran-Soviet Relations. Iran has been the object of an unremitting Soviet campaign of threats, blandishments and hostile radio propaganda for well over four years. It has courageously resisted these intense pressures, held firm to its pro-Western posture, and tried to work toward a reduction of tensions in spite of severe provocation on the part of the Bloc. The Shah has recently offered to make a unilateral statement, with appropriate qualifications, to the effect that Iran would not allow foreign missile bases on its territory. The Soviets have tried to expand such a statement into a bilateral agreement affecting Iran's ties with the West, but Iran has resisted this. The Vice President might congratulate Iran on its firm stand, show understanding and sympathy for Iran's difficult position, and remark that it is clear to the world that existing Iran-Soviet tensions are not the fault of Iran.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority State ltr. 2-16-77
By shw, NARS, Date 3-7-77

VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO TURKEY
August 26 - August 30, 1962

Summary Briefing Paper

Turkey is America's most solid and trustworthy friend in the area. Its doughty resistance to communism has served as an example to the whole world. Turkey needs recognition; its people and government need to know that Turkey's exposed position on the firing line of the Cold War is appreciated by the United States. Turkey has been afflicted by purely internal political difficulties which have made it difficult for her leaders to come to the United States to visit the President; the Vice President's visit is the only way in which we can give this trusted and courageous ally the gesture of friendship it deserves.

1. Turkish-American Bilateral Relations

The Truman Doctrine of 1947 strengthened historic bonds of friendship between the United States and Turkey. Since its enunciation we have supported the territorial integrity, independence, security and economic progress of Turkey with about 3.8 billion dollars of assistance, about 2 billion dollars of which was military aid. Turkey, for its part, has maintained a resolute stand against the USSR, supported the U.S. position on all major international issues in the United Nations and elsewhere, maintained very large armed forces in being committed to NATO and provided us with valuable real estate for bases and other facilities. In general, United States-Turkish relations are excellent but there are some exceptions in detail. The Vice President may wish to confirm that the Kennedy Administration intends to strengthen and improve Turkish-American relations.

2. Reassurances - NATO

Turkey remains staunchly pro-West, but the Turks sometimes feel that they are not always accepted as true Europeans or full partners in NATO. Turkish leaders have been disturbed by the fact that, in case of limited attack by the Soviets, they would not receive adequate or immediate support from NATO and the United States. The Vice President will wish to reassure the Turks that we view attacks of any sort on any NATO country with equal seriousness and that we will act promptly in accordance with our commitments. Furthermore, the NATO Treaty does not differentiate between types of attacks. He may also

wish

wish to remark upon Turkey's helpful role in the NATO alliance and to express our appreciation thereof.

3. Domestic Developments

Turkey has been passing through a very difficult period of economic distress and unusual political instability. Democratic institutions and parliamentary government are under severe pressure. The electorate in general and the Turkish military in particular have become impatient and dissatisfied with what they consider the slow pace of the Government, especially in the economic and social fields. The result of political uncertainty, aggravated by a poor wheat crop in 1961 and intensified by rigorous anti-inflationary government measures since 1960, has been widespread economic stagnation. The Vice President may wish to congratulate Turkish leaders on the free elections of October 1961 and the return to civilian political rule. He may also wish to state our hope that this government will enjoy the general support of the Turkish people, that it will show it can take necessary vigorous decisions, and that Turkey will continue its progress in responsible democratic government. We were pleased to note that Turkey's leaders adhered to civilian rule during the recent uncertain period. The Vice President may wish to remark favorably on the priority consideration which the Government is now giving to economic and social problems and to voice our hope that the intense efforts now being given to the Five Year Development Plan will not be lessened. The Vice President may also wish to assure Turkish leaders that the United States will continue to assist Turkey in all appropriate ways.

4. Foreign Relations

Despite internal difficulties, Turkey has continued staunchly to resist the threats and blandishments of the Soviet Union. Inonu has told the USSR that Turkey is firmly tied to the West and to the United States and that any effort to "improve" Soviet-Turkish relations must be within the framework of Turkey's present commitments. The Vice President may wish to congratulate the Turkish leaders on their resolute stand against the USSR and to encourage them to pursue this same course in the future.

Turkey has taken an active role in CENTO and the UN and has generally supported American views. The Vice President may wish to express gratification for the constructive and helpful role Turkey has played in CENTO and in UN affairs.

8

VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CYPRUS
August 30 - August 31, 1962

Summary Briefing Paper

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Authority State ltr. 2-16-77
By ehw, NARS, Date 3-7-77

Cyprus, a small and technically neutralist nation, is a vital piece of real estate and permits the U.S. to utilize its soil for various technical facilities without attempting, as some other nations do, to extract a huge financial price for their use. We must encourage this attitude of friendship on the part of the Cypriot Government. The Vice President may also be able to play a vital role in persuading the mutually hostile Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus to subordinate their differences in building a new nation, developing their economic resources, and meeting the threat of a communist movement which thrives on communal rivalry.

1. Communal Relations

Cyprus is divided between a majority Greek Cypriot community and a minority of Turkish Cypriots. Relations between the two communities are balanced between smouldering hostility on the one hand and increasing cooperation and understanding on the other. It is to our national interest that the communities concentrate on the real problems of Cyprus, such as the water resources, agricultural improvement, and other measures of economic development. The Vice President can possibly be a decisive element in this situation by emphasizing privately to the leaders of both communities our hope that moderation, restraint, and good sense will prevail, and that communal harmony will be achieved within the framework of the London-Zurich Agreements.

The Vice President should pay separate calls on Vice President Kuchuk and, perhaps, other Turk-Cypriot leaders. This will tend to some extent to compensate for the feeling among Turk-Cypriots that they have not been given the opportunity to play the constitutional role entitled them.

2. Communism

It still appears that the Archbishop has neither a full appreciation of the real nature of communism nor an adequate awareness of the dangers of communism to Cyprus. He feels that when

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and if the communists ever present a real problem in Cyprus, he, as the leader of the Greek Orthodox Church and the Greek-Cypriot community, will be able to eliminate the problem. The Vice President can be very helpful in reiterating to Makarios our concern at communist strength on the island. The approach should be in a fairly low key since other U.S. Government officials, notably President Kennedy, have made more or less forceful presentations of this point recently.

3. Voice of America

As yet the Government of Cyprus has not agreed to our VOA station proposal, and is not scheduled to make a statement on the matter until about the middle of September. If the proposal is accepted before the Vice President's trip, it would be appropriate for him to convey our appreciation. If not, it would be helpful for the Vice President to urge favorable Cyprus action.

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO GREECE
August 31 - September 4, 1962

Summary Briefing Paper

Greece, with the memories of its epic fight against Communist guerrillas still fresh, and with Communist neighbors all along a northern border scarred by minority problems, is understandably nervous and needs the kind of reassurance the Vice President's visit can provide. More urgent at the moment is the necessity of convincing Greece that our policy of terminating support for the Greek defense effort and moving toward multi-national support of the entire Greek economy through economic development is firm and does not represent a loss of American interest in the military defense of Greece and of its role in NATO.

1. United States - Greek Relations

Caramanlis has recently expressed worry and dissatisfaction about the present status of Greek-United States relations. He continues to interpret the termination of grant economic aid as evidence of slackening United States interest in Greece. Caramanlis' problem is compounded by what he considers a lack of United States appreciation of the threats Greece faces from the three Communist states on its northern borders, his inability to make a settlement of the pre-war debt with the American bondholders, and violent attacks on his government by the opposition.

2. Our Aid "Turn Around" Philosophy in Greece

The United States has contributed over \$3 billion in military-economic aid to Greece since World War II.

In light of our general policy objective to terminate grant aid on a world-wide basis, it was announced that such aid to Greece would be terminated at the close of FY-1962. \$20 million of supporting assistance in FY-1962 was given Greece as a transitional grant. Contributing factors to this decision were: (1) the improved economic situation in Greece; (2) increases in Greek foreign exchange reserves; and (3) the favorable Greek balance of payments situation.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-30-00

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The Greek Government has been most reluctant to accept our policy and has interpreted this action as our "abandonment" of Greece. In order to minimize the political effect of the change in the form of aid and concomitantly accelerate Greek momentum toward economic development and maintain the Greek defense effort at the acceptable level, we have informed the Greeks that we will continue our military and PL-480 programs, provide long-term, low-interest loans, and support their efforts to obtain external assistance in the consortium established for Greece.

The ease with which the Greeks adjust to these types of United States aid, accelerate progress and maintain their defenses will depend not only on their--and our--efforts, but on the assistance and encouragement which it receives from the Free World. As a result of the Greek acceptance of the NATO defense study group report and the formation of a consortium, we are hopeful that the Greeks will recognize the fact that we are not diminishing our support, but only changing its form in one sector. The visit of the Vice President and his reassurance of our continuing interest in Greece will substantially contribute to making this point, particularly as the Vice President will be able to restate United States policy with an authority the Greeks will recognize.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT 10

Here is a brief piece by John McCone's people which gives as good a thumbnail sketch of the Iranian outlook as I've seen. Worth five minutes of your time.


R. W. KOMER

18 August 1962
(DATE)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Authority CIA ltr 11/18/76, State ltr 3/16/77
By pmg, NARS, Date 6/15/77

16 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Iran



SUMMARY

With the resignation of Prime Minister Amini, the Shah is once more the single focal point of the Iranian political scene. Before long he will almost certainly again become the direct target of political pressures and general discontent. While none of the Shah's opponents are likely for some time to summon up the will or develop the capability to overthrow him, they will be alert to take advantage of any fortuitous crises which may occur, e.g., a popular outburst in Tehran, a Kurdish insurrection, etc. As long as the Shah retains control of the army and the security forces, the chances are that he will be able to ride out such crises, but each time one occurs, the possibility of his overthrow or even his voluntary abdication will be present.

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GROUP 1
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1. For some years our estimates have been pessimistic about the prospects for political stability in Iran. In NIE 34-61, "Prospects for Iran," dated 28 February 1961, we went so far as to estimate that profound political and social change was virtually inevitable and that it would most likely be revolutionary in nature. In SNIE 34-2-61, "Short-Term Outlook for Iran," dated 23 May 1961, soon after the advent of Prime Minister Ali Amini, we said that the chances of an evolutionary change would be enhanced should Amini be able to develop a position independent of the Shah and implement a major reform program. However, we also said that, if the Shah forced Amini into a puppet's role or replaced him with a politician subservient to the throne, unrest would be likely to break out again.

2. Ali Amini resigned as Prime Minister on 17 July 1962. In his place, the Shah appointed Asadollah Alam, a longtime personal retainer, and indicated that he himself intended to reassume direct responsibility for governing Iran. Under the circumstances it is expedient for us to take another look at "The Prospects for Iran."

3. While Amini was in office, the Shah gave him a free hand in most fields other than the military, but there is little

reason to believe that His Imperial Majesty was ever optimistic over his experiment with an independent Prime Minister. He began it in May 1961 when the sudden outbreak of serious disturbances in Tehran left him with the choice of direct repression of public unrest by military forces which he probably did not entirely trust, or conciliation by some clearcut manifestation of political liberalization. He continued it, in part at least, because of the obvious favor with which it was regarded by his Western allies, especially the US. He allowed it to end unspectacularly when Amini, reduced to the verge of physical and mental collapse by the difficulties he encountered during 14 months of trying to implement a moderate reform program, chose to resign rather than be overruled in his efforts to cut the defense budget, as he was cutting the budgets of other departments.

4. In reasserting his own exclusive dominance, the Shah has acted in accordance with his longstanding belief that Iran is far from ready for a true parliamentary government and that the country can be ruled effectively only by his own strong but benevolent hand. (He has several times indicated that should he find it impossible to direct affairs in the manner he believes necessary, he would leave Iran.) The Shah's conviction is not

without some foundation. The wealthy conservative elements, who for generations have constituted the established elite, have proven themselves virtually incapable of modernization and reform. The nationalist opposition is disunited and irresponsible. The military has shown little talent for leadership. Apart from Amini, there are no known political "independents" of any stature. Even Amini's modest achievements while in office were dependent almost entirely on the backing he received from the Shah.

5. The net effect of Amini's departure from the government is to return Iran to a situation very like that which existed before he came to office. The Shah is again the single focal point of the Iranian political scene. He must not only cope with the budgetary problems which defeated Amini but must try to raise the substantial foreign aid which will be required to support Iran's new development plan which begins this year. He must also deal with what most Iranians (not excluding himself) feel is the less than satisfactory state of their country's relations with both the USSR and the West. Above all, he must once again bear directly the burden of unrest in the country: the disgruntlement of the upper classes who would undo Amini's modest reforms; the disillusionment of the professional groups and the bureaucrats

whose hopes of modernization and reform have been set back; the frustration of the nationalists who, although they refused any kind of cooperation with Amini, are already beginning to look upon him as a martyr to the Shah's authoritarianism.

The Outlook

6. The Shah's behavior in this situation is not difficult to predict. Although he might once again turn to Amini, it is more likely that he will press ahead by himself, sincerely trying to implement anticorruption and land reform measures, but without either the will or the ability to deny special treatment to those whom he trusts or to whom he is bound by personal ties. His preoccupation with military matters and his neglect of administrative and fiscal improvement will almost certainly persist. He will avoid elections, or, if this proves inexpedient, will try to rig them to his own purpose, refusing to compromise with the nationalists or share power with anyone. He will continue twisting and turning to relieve or deflect Soviet pressure. While going to great lengths to maintain his alliance with the West, he will press for greater military and political support from the US.

7. What all of this means in terms of future political stability in Iran is less easy to estimate. The nationalists' distrust of the Shah is as implacable as is his of them. However, their small numbers and scant organization makes it unlikely that they will for some time to come at least be able to initiate and sustain a serious challenge to his authority. Eventually, the Tudeh, the Iranian Communist Party, may succeed in infiltrating the nationalist movement and welding it into a more formidable opposition. At the moment, however, the Tudeh suffers to an even greater degree from the same disabilities as the nationalists.

8. While the wealthy conservatives will continue to try to frustrate almost any kind of reform, they are likely to move directly against the Shah only if such a move promised to be the only way of preventing a nationalist takeover. Most of the top military officers share the same inhibitions as their counterparts in the civilian "establishments," although there will probably continue to be a few of them, like the currently exiled General Timur Bakhtiar, former head of SAVAK (the Iranian Intelligence and Security organization), who have a yen for power on their own and may fancy themselves destined for the role of the "man on a white horse." Perhaps the most dangerous

possibility of all is that of a move against the Shah by nationalist-minded junior or middle level military officers along the lines of the Nasser and Qassim coups in Egypt and Iraq. The most that can be said about such a possibility is that it probably exists; it is impossible, on the basis of existing information, to assess its likelihood.

9. The large and fairly effective security apparatus which the Shah has developed -- SAVAK, the national police, the gendarmerie, and the military intelligence arms -- has in the past enabled him to detect and deal with potential challenges by both military and civilian elements. In general he probably can continue to count on the loyalty of the security forces and the support of the bulk of the military to counter most clandestine plotting and organization. The military and security forces will also probably remain capable of dealing with more direct challenges to central authority. Much of the top leadership of the military and security forces, however, is clique-ridden and few officers appear to have any outstanding devotion to the Shah. The possibility will remain that some of these officers might fail the

Shah in the face of a critical challenge or might even themselves become involved in plotting.*

10. For some months, most political elements will probably be busy assessing the new situation and charting their own attitudes toward it. Before very long, however, the political pressure will almost certainly begin to build up once more. The nationalists will not be satisfied with anything the Shah does and will almost certainly agitate for elections -- always likely times for crisis in Iran. If the Shah continues to press Amini's land reform and anticorruption measures, many conservatives will seek to undermine his authority; and in a more fluid situation, the ambitions of individual military officers are likely to be sharpened again.

11. For some time to come, none of these groups is likely on their own to develop both the will and the capability to overthrow the Shah. Neither are they likely to be able to effect a coalition among themselves. However, all will be alert to challenge the Shah's control given a favorable occasion, e.g., a popular outburst in Tehran, a Kurdish insurrection, a particularly

* Annex A contains a more detailed assessment of the Iranian security forces.

juicy scandal in the royal court, or a resounding failure in foreign policy. As long as he retains control of the army, the chances are that the Shah will be able to ride out such crises, but each time one occurs, the possibility of his overthrow or his voluntary abdication of responsibility for his troublesome country will be present.

12. Under these circumstances, we reiterate our earlier estimate that profound political and social change appears virtually inevitable in Iran. While the prospects of Amini's providing an evolutionary vehicle for such change may frequently have been exaggerated, there was some hope as long as he was in office. There may be hope again if the Shah chooses to recall Amini or even more unlikely, if he manages to find some other leader with similar characteristics. At present, however, Amini is out; the Shah must face his problems alone; and there has been no apparent significant change in either his personal character and philosophy or in the nature of the Iranian political scene. Once again then, storm warnings appear to be in order.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES



ABBOT E. SMITH
Acting Chairman

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This memorandum is to summarize and supplement my personal report to you regarding the mission to Lebanon, Iran, Turkey, Cyprus, Greece and Italy, August 22-September 7.

As recognized from the inception of the mission, we were in the position of visiting relatively new governments -- new in terms of their leadership or, as in Italy, in terms of political alignments -- in the area of our own oldest Cold War commitments, at a time when these governments are concerned with the implications of our own new policies on assistance. As also is recognized fully, these countries remain the key to the Free World's containment policy, presenting as they do the indispensable bastion against Soviet encirclement of Europe.

Our personal discussions were timely and beneficial in terms of helping the leaders concerned better understand personally our policies and intentions. Their basic fear is that our program shifts foretell our withdrawal or major slackening of interest in the area. It would be unrealistic to assume that this fear has been erased by a single effort. Continued attention will be required to prevent misunderstanding.

More seriously, it is evident that changes in our policies will -- after our long active role in the area -- be subject to distortion and exploitation by the oppositions to the governments which we support. The people are pro-American; so, also, are the opposition leaders. Changes in United States policy are subject to construction as evidence of our lack of confidence in the very governments in which our own confidence is highest. We must so handle our program changes as to avoid undermining the leadership we regard as most reliable. It is imperative in this regard that our decisions be cognizant of regional feelings -- e.g., Greece and Turkey -- so that our continued support of one neighbor does not precipitate intolerable political conditions for friendly governments of another neighbor.

American aid has been a great success in the areas visited. We cannot yet assume, however, that the success is so durable that we can minimize our vigilance in this area. The veneer of success there is encouraging and hopeful -- but it remains, as yet, still a veneer.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-30-00

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Greece, Turkey, and Iran

These rimland states stand a lonely and exposed guard against communist expansion to the oil of the Middle East, to contiguity with the chaotic Arab World, and to the Balkans and the Mediterranean. They remain vigilant and faithful, despite communist threats and abuse. Their heads are still high, but there are disquieting indications that the governments and peoples of these countries are beginning to feel the strain of their exposed position, and to question what is in our hearts toward them - what our real intentions are. It is important that in our justified pre-occupation over Berlin, Cuba, and the Congo, we not forget these states, the reminder of our first great and successful effort to stem the communist tide.

CENTO, whose birth we midwifed,
floats embarrassingly, only half-alive, over the
area. We can't let it die, and we can't make
it into a little NATO. Nevertheless, we could
help it to a greater acceptability and vigor by
channelling more economic aid into CENTO
projects, even at the cost of marginal reductions in
our contributions to national economic development programs.

In Iran, and to a lesser degree in Turkey
and Greece, there are relatively inefficient bureaucracies,
without the blessings of a colonial background, which
are not capable of ^{the kind of} sound program and project
planning for economic development which we
would like. A quasi-official program, perhaps
under some foundation, to help with this work would
be one of ~~the most~~ a most valuable adjunct to
our aid program and to our national interests.

The Peace Corps has a great potential for useful service in all these countries, particularly in serving as a catalytic point for the execution of plans for social reform and economic development. In Iran, it could be particularly valuable in sparking a successful launching of the Shah's "labor battalion" scheme.

We must give careful study to the problems which would be posed by all-out Soviet support for the Kurdish independence movement, should the Soviets take such risky action.

In Iran, we must accept the Shah, with his shortcomings, as a valuable asset. We must cooperate with him and influence him as best we can, since we have no ^{acceptable} alternative. We should continue to prod him in the direction of social

reform to prevent his losing the affections of the masses of his people. He has accepted the termination of defense support, and we must remain firm against any demands for its resumption.

We should carefully determine the real military potential, present and future, of the State's military forces and allocate MAP to them in a context of global U.S. security interests, without regard to alliance membership.

In Turkey, we should do what we can to help Prime Minister Inönü, a tough devotee of parliamentary democracy who is attempting to raise his country economically against the loadings of a clumsy coalition government. It is most important that the phase-out of defense support in Turkey be gradual, over a

period of at least three years. The official American community in Turkey has grown by 50% over a three-year period, and has been involved in serious frictions with the Turks - a careful high-level survey of the size and behavior of the official American community would be useful.

In Greece, we cannot allow ~~our~~ Prime Minister Caramanlis to fall before an irresponsible opposition because of our termination of defense support. He has accepted the end of this form of aid, but to tide him through the next year and to save the Greek defense and development programs we need to: (a) provide \$10 million in special help (\$5 million ^{extra} in commercial consumables under MAF and \$5 million counterpart now in the pipeline); (b) require Greece to provide

roughly another \$10 million for defense, to partially
compensate for the loss of defense support; (c)
shift our PL 480 to a defense grand basis; (d)
implement the \$10 million program loan; and (e)
give prompt and sympathetic consideration to
Greek development loan applications.

Lebanon and Cyprus

Lebanon and Cyprus are delicately balanced
and continued entities which are a long way
from a true national spirit. Nevertheless, it is
in the U.S. interest to maintain them as independent
states. Accordingly, it is in our interest for them
to remain "non-aligned" and thus protected from the
internal repercussions of rigorous foreign policies.
We would do well to assist in whatever quiet
ways we can the Lebanese to cross the hurdle
of their next Presidential elections. As for

Cyprus, we should: (a) support the economic development program as long as it is fair to both communities on the island (b) offer generous inducement toward the establishment of a national university, (c) stimulate ^{President} negotiations, and recognizing the internal communist threat, and (d) stay out of constitutional disputes.

Italy

In Italy, the "turn to the left" is an immensely important development, with great possibilities for both good and evil. The U.S. would do well to avoid involvement in it unless future events indicate that the U.S. national security is clearly at stake. Through continued close liaison, the Pope could be of considerable value to the U.S. in coordinating global attacks on disease, poverty, and injustice.

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Such committed states as Greece, Turkey, and Iran should be given some form of special consideration in the distribution of U.S. economic aid, to help make up for what they spend to maintain their armed forces along the underbelly of the Bloc.

Such special consideration could take the form of easy-term program economic loans, the provision of local-currency defense grants under the PL 480 program, or an increase in the supply of commercial consumables under our MAP programs.

The value of such special consideration would be to a large extent psychological, ensuring the recipients that their sacrifices are recognized, and that they are nearer our hearts than are the neutralist states they fear we are moving at the expense of our friends.

Purpose of the VPs visit to Greece, Turkey,
Iran and Cyprus

A. General

I. Reassure Greece, Turkey and Iran of continued U.S. commitment to assist them against Soviet bloc pressures and of maintenance of U.S. interest in their economic welfare and progress.

These countries need renewed reassurances because:

- a) They border directly on the Soviet bloc
- b) They provide U.S. with valuable real estate for military bases, communications facilities, and electronic warfare and support US on all major international issues, thus exposing themselves to Soviet hostility.
- c) They are remote from centers of western military power.
- d) They fear US interest in them has declined following Soviet success in by passing northern tier and establishing power and influence in states to south, e.g. UAR, Iraq, and following development of Soviet nuclear and missile strength.
- e) Greece and Turkey feel they are second class members of the NATO alliance, Iran that it is a member of a second-class alliance (Cente).
- f) Shift in US aid from grants to loans, increased US insistence on self-help, social reform and sound economic development along with massive US aid to neutrals have created major problems in all three countries and raised doubts of maintenance of high degree of US interest in its allies in that part of the world.
- g) There are specific individual problems in US relations with each of these countries that require attention. (see section B. below).

*Protect US
Investment
\$9 billion, mainly
in Greece, Turkey & Iran
about \$8 B. Iran,
3.5 Greece, 3.9 Turkey.*

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- b) Cyprus presents less major problems but a show of continued US interest desirable in maintaining our valuable communication facilities there and in helping to prevent the island becoming source of trouble in eastern Mediterranean either by increased growth of communist strength or by exacerbation of troubles between Greeks and Turks.

Means of accomplishment

- a) Mere presence of the VP will be a signal demonstration to the people and the governments of Greece, Turkey and Iran of continued US interest.
- b) Through conversations with leading officials of OTI and in press conversations, VP will have opportunity convey US policies and attitudes and correct misapprehensions.

II. Explain US trade policies

Reason - These countries like rest of the world are concerned by impact on them of Common Market and US trade and aid policies.

Means - Major speeches at international trade ^{airs} ~~airs~~ at Salonika (Greece) and Izmir (Turkey). These will have impact not only in the area but far beyond. They can be supplemented by talks with government officials and by press conferences.

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B. Specific missions

I. Greece

- a) Explain why US has terminated Supporting Assistance.
- b) Demonstrate to Greek leaders that US and other western assistance to Greece through OECD consortium will not only directly assist economic development but indirectly assist Greece's defence burdens. Assure Greeks of US support in securing aid from other western countries.
- c) Explain US policy toward Yugoslavia and our views on the Macedonian question.
- d) Point up US views on the current aspect of the communist threat to the area.
- e) Emphasize central nature of NATO Alliance in US policy and US view that Greece is an equal partner in that alliance.
- f) ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Explain US views on major international questions such as Berlin, disarmament, Sino-Soviet aims.

II. Turkey

- a. Encourage the Turks to continue their strenuous efforts to develop plans for rational, feasible and rapid economic development.
- b) Assure the Turks of strong US support for securing aid from other western countries through OECD consortium.
- c) Explain US policies toward neutrals, particularly UAR.
- d, e, and f - same as for Greece.
- g) Demonstrate US interest in Turkey's resolute stand against the USSR by visiting Turkish troops ~~and~~ on Soviet-Turkish frontier.
- h) Show high level US interest in NATO and in the welfare of thousands of US troops in Turkey by a visit to headquarters in Ismir.

Probably not a good idea

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As allies of the United States, Greece, Turkey and Iran have helped to bar the expansion of Soviet power and influence in the Middle East. They have also supported the US position on all major international issues and have provided US with extremely valuable real estate for bases, communications facilities and electronic warfare installations. In so doing they have exposed themselves to increased Soviet hostility, menaces and possible reprisals.

The United States has a huge investment in the security and progress of these countries. Since World War II we have provided nearly \$10 billion aid to these countries: Greece 3.46, Turkey ~~4.9~~ 3.9, Iran 1.2. We have no comparable stakes in newly-independent Cyprus which has chosen to follow a non-aligned foreign policy. A modest aid program is just getting under way intended in part to insure the maintenance of our critical communications facilities on the island and by helping counter further Communist growth and checking ~~aggravation~~ exacerbation of communal strife prevent Cyprus from again becoming a focal point for trouble in the eastern Mediterranean and NATO dissension.

In the past week there have been serious crises in US relations with Iran and Greece. The reformist Prime Minister of Iran resigned attributing his failure in part to inadequate US aid. The Prime Minister of Greece seems to be reaching a comparable point of explosion. Basically, the trouble is the same. The shift in US aid from grants to loans, increased US insistence on self-help measures from aid recipient countries, on social reform and on sound economic development coupled with massive US aid to neutrals and what Greek and Iranian leaders fear is a US downgrading of their geographical and military importance,

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have presented these leaders with tough problems and decisions and they are inclined to take the easier way out of blaming the US. They need reassurances of our continued interest in their security and economic progress and high level explorations of our aid policy.

So far we have had no such crisis with Turkey, and we can help to avert one by a high-level visit, especially since the Turkish leaders have had no contact with the leaders of the Kennedy administration

Cyprus presents no immediate problems but the Vice President's visit will help to push Cypriot acceptance of our request for a VOA installation there, safeguard our communications facilities, and promote our other objectives on the island.

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