

13
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

George,

Call him and ask him what
he has on the Greeks and
how is he getting along
etc.

LBJ/mjdr
10/29/82

13a

~~SECRET~~

September 20, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE VICE PRESIDENT

Essentially because of the push you gave, we've taken a big step toward meeting Greek defense budget needs. I've kept the heat on, and I think you as well as Labouisse will be satisfied with the result (see his pleased response in Athens 375 attached).

Note Labouisse thinks he can get Greeks to up their own contribution to \$165 million. The question of European contributions remains up in the air, with the Greeks still trying to get us to take the lead instead of backing their play. Of course, one concern we all have is that the more any of us earmark for Greek defense budget, the less will be left for equally important development account.

I'll have some DOD figures for you on cost of Greek/Turkish soldiers soonest, though I'd be leery of them. Among other things, if a Greek private is only paid \$1.40 or so a month, this is all the more reason why the country itself should pay for them, while we focus on the expensive hardware it can't afford.

My genuine thanks for all your kind words, written and oral. That your trip was a real success is indisputable; that I did, or had to do, much to make it so is overstatement. I enjoyed "talking back", but I know when I've been one-upped too.

R. W. Komer
R. W. KOMER

Attached

AIDTO 82 to Athens
Athens 375 9/18/62
Deptel 366 to Athens 9/18/62

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 75C 605/13/107, State Dec 4/24/77
By AMG, NARS, Date 6/15/07

~~SECRET~~

**OUTGOING
CABLEGRAM**

Department of State

136

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SENT TO - ATHENS / AIDTO PRIORITY 82
PARIS / TORONTO PRIORITY 102

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE
PAGE _____ OF _____
PAGES _____

SUBJECT - PL 480

REFERENCE - Athens 346

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Dtr 2-16-77
By Shur, NARS, Date 3-2-77

JOINT AID/STATE MESSAGE

We are looking for way to ^{find} send \$5 million more support for Greek defense effort. Congressional action on MAP not yet complete, but tight. MAP funds probably will be ~~used~~. Request your comments if PL 480. See ~~PL~~ 104(e) for all or maximum part of \$5 million would do the job. Request Athens and USRO comments on best tactics to get most mileage from this.

RUSK

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OTHER AGENCIES

ARMY

STATE VIZ VISION SECTION

APPROVED BY John H. [Signature], Director	DATE DEC 14 6 11 8	DRAFTED BY Wolf/Kaufmann/Schott	OFFICE GTIC	PHONE NO. 8494	DATE 9/14/62
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AND OTHER CLEARANCES: **VERONA** / **GENERAL** / **CONFIDENTIAL** / **CONFIDENTIAL** / **CONFIDENTIAL**

AND OTHER CLEARANCES

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 14069
Rec'd: September 18, 1962
6:36 p.m.

FROM: Athens

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 375, September 18, 4 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

FILE COPY

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 375, INFORMATION PARIS 29, ROME 43

PARIS FOR USRO, STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE

ROOM FOR ROOD

Re AIDTO 82.

- ~~SMITH-BURTON~~
- ~~DUNGAN~~
- ~~KAYSEN~~
- ~~KILDUFF~~
- ~~PETERSEN~~
- ~~SCHLESINGER~~
- ~~TAYLOR~~
- ~~BELK~~
- ~~FORESTAL~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~KLEIN~~
- ~~KOMER~~
- ~~RASKIN~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~

1. We are very heartened to learn of AID/State decision to find way to fund \$5 million more for support Greek defense effort.
 As indicated previous telegrams, we believe this action will contribute greatly to easing US-Greek tensions over termination supporting assistance and will set stage for continued Greek efforts to meet both defense and development goals on sound basis.

2. In this connection, I had long talk with Minister Coordination Papaligouras on September 15 to explore Greek reactions to cut-come NAC meeting on September 12 and their plans and expectations for immediate future. I said that I was talking on my own without instructions. I referred to our previous conversations and his indications to me that GOG would increase own defense expenditures. I said that, in my opinion, GOG should go at least to \$165 million in 1963 which I believed would be minimum expected of them by NATO allies. He replied that no decision had been taken by government but he said he was sure it could be arranged if NATO allies could also help. He concluded by saying that, for purposes of information to the US, I could take his word as "100 percent assurance" that GOG would contribute \$165 million from

OWN

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DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
 State Dept. Guidelines
 By JW, NARA, Date 5-30-00

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 375, September 18, 4 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO), from:
Athens

own resources in 1963. He then said that, although he would undertake to assure this for 1963, it would be unwise at this time to seek a commitment from Prime Minister for year 1964, that 1963 increase was big enough step for the moment and much depended on what NATO allies would do.

3. Concerning contributions by other NATO allies, I said that I understood Germans and French had made some noises about helping the defense effort. He said this was true, but had nothing definite nor did he have any indication whether they were thinking of grants or loans. He expressed strong opinion, however, that any defense aid should be by grants. He repeated observation Greek Ministers have made in past that it would be difficult internally to justify foreign borrowing for defense in view already disproportionate Greek defense expenditures. If grant assistance were provided, moreover, it would help passify to Greek public increase in level GOG defense expenditures.

4. I asked what would be Greek position if, for example, Germans, French and Italians would undertake defense aid loans in range of \$20 to \$30 million. He agreed this would probably be at expense of loans for development and that it would pose serious problem for GOG. Minister of Defense and some others would disagree with him, but his personal view was that military should have priority only to extent necessary maintain current establishment, thereafter priority should be for economic development. As laymen, we were unable set figure for "maintenance" but I feel satisfied that Papaligouras could obtain government agreement, albeit grudgingly, on something on order of \$180 million for total defense budget, including GOG contribution of \$165 million.

5. We then reviewed US position and the two possibilities of further assistance to defense budget we had discussed in past, i.e., commercial

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-3- 375, September 18, 4 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO), from:
Athens

i.e., commercial economic tables and PL-480 Section 104(C).
I said former was most difficult and, in light pending
appropriations, was very chancey. Although a grant of, say,
\$5 million under PL-480 was not sure thing, I believed it
presented best chance. I emphasized that this would not mean
transfer of additional resources, as it would be simply trans-
fer of attribution from development loan under Section 104(G).
He said he understood situation and, taking all factors into
account, he believed \$5 million grant under 104(C) would go
long way to breaking impasse. It would also be helpful to
GCG efforts to obtain grants instead of loans from other NATO
allies.

LABOUISSÉ

DMJ

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Action

Control: 14171
Rec'd: September 18, 1962
8:54 p.m.

AID

FROM: Athens

Info

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 375, September 18, 4 P.M. (SECTION II OF II)

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 375, INFORMATION PARIS 29, ROME 43

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PARIS FOR USRO, STOESSEL AND MCGUIRE

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Reference: AIDTO 82

6. I believe Papaligouras realistic view on problem of proper allocation resources between defense and development provides basis for US position which will contribute to highly satisfactory solution this long-standing issue. I recommend our position be along following lines:

A) US will make 104(C) grant of \$5 million, within framework NATO exercise, on understanding Greeks will put up \$165 million of own resources for defense.

B) US will support GOG and Stikker efforts obtain at least \$10 to \$15 million ICF grants from other NATO allies.

C) If efforts under (B) satisfactory, the \$5 million in SA pipeline be attributed to economic development in 1963.

D) Although recognizing validity Project Athena exercise from military viewpoint, we work with Paplaigouras, quietly on side, to discourage any effort increase defense budget for 1963 above \$180/\$185 million as undesirable allocation of limited resources.

E) We

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-2- 375, September 18, 4 P.M. (SECTION II OF II), from Athens

E) We then concentrate our efforts on finding means help economic development through OECD consortium.

7. Above program will have political and psychological advantage of great value here, and, without costing US more money, will enable us to concentrate on economic development. Only fly in ointment would appear to be grants from other NATO allies, but, in view relatively small amounts involved, this should be possible with Stikker help. In latter connection, Papaligouras is satisfied that Stikker trying best to help, and understands one method under consideration is enlargement NATO infrastructure concept as applicable to Greece. If this only way obtain German, French, et cetera, contributions to defense, perhaps our PL 480 grant could be made through that channel.

8. Important protect confidence my conversation with Papaligouras.

LABOUISSÉ

MJA-6

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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ACTION: Amembassy ATHENS 366
PARIS TOPO 358

INFO: Amembassy ROME 622

ROME for ROOD
POLTO 301 repeated Athens POLTO 17

At meeting September 18 with Assistant Secretary Talbot, Greek

Ambassador Matsas upon instruction GCG requested that US undertake initiative to stimulate donations from third country potential donors to Greek defense effort. He stated that Greeks had adequately stated their case in NATO and therefore considered Greek démarches to other countries unnecessary. Greece wants SIG and/or US take up matter in their behalf with allies.

Talbot expressed appreciation Greece's past efforts obtain support for its defense establishment in multilateral context and reiterated that, as Greeks previously informed, we stand ready forcefully to support their initiative with other nations. Talbot stressed fact Secretary had promised that we will approach others only after Greeks have taken initiative. In our considered view this tactic most likely obtain best results. Assistant Secretary expressed concern that Greeks had failed approach others stimulate their contributions and advised Ambassador we believe this effort should be done on urgent basis. After Greeks have made approaches, Greeks and US should

- SMITH-BUNDY
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- KAYSEN
- KILGORE
- PETERSEN
- SCHLESINGER
- TAYLOR
- BEAK
- FORESTAL
- JOHNSON
- [unclear]
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- [unclear]

Created by: NEA:CFI:ERSchott:jaw 9/13/62	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Mr. Talbot
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RPE - Mr. Sheinbaum

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FORM 5-61 DS-322

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By cbu/jc, NARA, Date 2-26-09

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should coordinate our efforts with SYG, keeping one another informed, so that maximum results can be obtained.

Matsas though obviously unhappy agreed transmit our views his government.

Embassy Athens and USRO should stress US position this matter to Greeks drawing on Deptel 181 and TCPOL 231, and Vice President's advice to Greeks during his visit as well as points made above.

RUSH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

14

George

F

In Gree-Turkey thing.

LBJ/mjdr
10/29/62

④ - by

14a

CONFIDENTIAL

Sept. 20, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

Further in response to your phone call, here is the latest on Turkish Air Force spare parts problem. As a result of your cable, an immediate order for critical parts was placed; they are on the way to Turkey.

Also attached is a summary of the cost of maintaining a soldier in various allied countries. As compared to the US figure of \$4014, a Turk costs \$404 and a Greek \$385 annually. This amply proves your point.

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

Att. ltr from Frank K. Sloan
to RWKomer, 9/20/62

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Dec 4/24/77, NSC Dec 5/2/77

By mmg, NARS, Date 6/15/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In reply refer to I-11356/62

20 SEP 1962

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Dear Bob:

This letter, in response to your telephone call of this date, is to provide you with information which may be helpful in considering Greek and Turkish MAP problems.

1. The Vice President's cable concerning the problem of inadequate logistical support for the Turkish Air Force (TAF) (Istanbul 57) has served to focus renewed attention toward making the NATO Maintenance Supply Services System (NMSSS) a successful international logistical organization. The TAF has not received parts mainly because NMSSS, which is directly responsible for supporting it, has failed to do its job well. As an immediate measure to relieve the Turkish spare parts shortage, an order for critical parts was expedited through the NATO Supply Center (NSC), the supply depot of NMSSS, to U.S. Air Force depots. All requested items, except for two, have been turned over to the NSC's commercial freight forwarder for airlift to Turkey. The remaining two items are on expedited procurement. While this direct action on our part has relieved the immediate problem, the basic problem, of making the NMSSS effective, remains. NMSSS is an international logistics system and its operations are unfortunately affected by political considerations; thus unilateral U.S. action is limited. If the U.S. were to transfer grant aid spare parts support of Turkey and Greece from the NSC to direct U.S. support, which unquestionably would provide more effective support, it would signal the demise of the NMSSS. This we may be forced to do. But for the present, our efforts are directed towards making NMSSS effective.

2. You are quite correct in stressing that the Greek or Turkish soldier helps defend the United States when he defends his own borders and costs us approximately one-tenth as much. The cost to maintain a soldier (pay, allowances, subsistence and individual clothing) for countries receiving military assistance is shown in the attachment. The significant comparison from this table shows that in CY 1961 the cost to maintain a soldier by the U.S. was \$4,014, by Turkey \$404 and by

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 10-18
By int, NARA, Date 6-4-10

SEP 20 1962

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Greece \$385. This is a valid argument for saving money by employing more Greek and Turkish soldiers to do our fighting. However, in dealing with our NATO allies we must be careful, of course, not to convey the impression that we plan to use the Greeks and Turks as "cannon fodder." The matter of increasing force levels in Greece and Turkey is quite complicated and, as you know, must take into account a number of military and political factors aside from economic considerations. Essentially the country must bear the cost to maintain its own soldiers and finance these costs within its defense budget. In the case of Greece the entire costs must be borne by the GOG since we have terminated supporting assistance. In Turkey we support 18.3% of the defense expenditure in 1962. A cutback in U.S. assistance coupled with the limited budgetary resources available for defense requirements will inevitably restrict the number of personnel employed in the armed forces in Greece and Turkey.

Sincerely,



Frank K. Sloan
Deputy Assistant Secretary

Incl
Ann'l Per Capita
Mil Pers Costs

Mr. Robert W. Komer
National Security Council Staff
The White House

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Annual Per Capita Military Personnel Costs

Cost estimates for countries receiving military assistance shown below are confined to pay, allowances, subsistence and individual clothing. They do not include operation and maintenance expenditures, as no meaningful comparisons could be made due to differing weapons systems and technologies.

For comparative purposes, figures are included for 1959 and 1960. Principal reasons for changes, where available, are indicated. Increases are usually due to pay and allowances raises, and to increased prices. Decreases have been achieved by increasing number of men in lower pay grades. Comparisons between years may be artificial, due to altered exchange rates.

	<u>Costs to Maintain a Soldier</u>				<u>Reason for Change</u>
	<u>CY 1959</u>	<u>CY 1960</u>	<u>CY 1961</u>	<u>Change CY 1960 CY 1961</u>	
U.S.	3,859	3,950	4,014	+ 64	
Belgium	1,430	1,527	1,571	+ 44	
Denmark	1,337	1,429	1,650	+ 221	Increased costs
France	1,622	1,736	1,788	+ 52	
Germany	1,246	1,594	1,689	+ 95	Altered exchange rates
Italy	860	906	960	+ 54	
Luxembourg	1,029	1,486	1,486		
Netherlands	834	825	832	+ 7	
Norway	1,496	1,671	1,706	+ 35	
Portugal	695	668	435	- 233	Increase in forces in lower ranks
Spain	463	416	466	+ 50	
United Kingdom	1,876	2,120	2,332	+ 212	Reduction of numbers in lower ranks
Ethiopia	248	319	375	+ 56	Pay raise
Greece	391	376	385	+ 9	
Iran	421	443	501	+ 58	Increase in allowances and NCO strength
Pakistan	435	435	437	+ 2	Increases in prices
Turkey	352	389	404	+ 15	Pay and allowances raises
Korea	390	176*	219	+ 43	Pay raises, increases in food costs
Cambodia	754	812	829	+ 17	Promotions, longevity
Thailand	270	400	406	+ 6	
Vietnam	915	932	1,049	+ 117	Increases in pay, cost of rice; recall of reserves
Rep. of China	167	163	174	+ 11	
Philippines	1,149	923	742	- 181	Altered exchange rate
Japan	784	784	818	+ 34	
Laos	657	657	488	- 169	Increase in personnel in lower grades

* Korean figure CY 1960 adjusted to reflect altered exchange rate.

Boatman

Staff

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control: 3937
Rec'd: OCTOBER 4, 1962
11:42 P.M.

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FROM: ATHENS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 435, OCTOBER 4, 7 P.M.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 435, INFORMATION BELGRADE 22, SOFIA,
ANKARA UNNUMBERED.

FONOFF DIRECTOR GENERAL PALAMAS SAID TO ME TODAY HE HAD HAD
VERY SATISFACTORY MEETING YESTERDAY WITH YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR
DAPCEVIC WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM TWO MONTHS IN YUGO-
SLAVIA.

PALAMAS STATED THAT BASED ON THIS CONVERSATION YUGOSLAV GOVERN-
MENT APPARENTLY ANXIOUS HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH GREECE AND
THINGS SEEM TO BE MOVING IN RIGHT DIRECTION. HE ADDED
THAT ALTHOUGH FOREIGN SECRETARY POPOVIC HAD NOT GONE
TO NEW YORK THERE HAVE BEEN COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN HIM AND
AVEROFF.

PALAMAS NOTED THAT AS CONCERNS MACEDONIAN ISSUE GOG HAD
WELCOMED VICE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS; HE FELT THESE MAY
HAVE HAD BEARING ON THIS CHANGE IN YUGOSLAV ATTITUDE.

LABOUISSÉ

CTP

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By pw, NARA, Date 5-30-00

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

15

August 13, 1962

~~SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walter Jenkins

The attached draft scope papers may be of use to you, George Reedy and Horace Busby. A somewhat similar paper will appear in the briefing books.

R. W. Skiff

Robert W. Skiff

~~SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

15a

August 13, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

I am leaving today, on the advance party, with considerable reluctance because of the short time before your departure and my desire to be in two places at once.

Briefings are being prepared for you by the specialists and briefing books will be sent to you Wednesday. In the case of France and Italy, Frank Meloy will coordinate the briefing and call your office for an appointment. For the Middle East portion, Deputy Assistant Secretary James Grant, John Bowling and Myles Greene will brief. Bill Crockett may join them. Owing to the serious economic problems in the Middle East, it is now planned that William Gaud, Assistant Administrator, AID, will participate.

Secretary Rusk also wishes to meet with you, perhaps over lunch, if that is convenient. He will call you direct.

Speeches, toasts, arrival and departure statements will be transmitted urgently to Busby and Reedy during the course of this week.

In view of the above, I believe you are in good hands and that I can serve a more useful purpose with the advance party on the scene. I shall endeavor to return no later than August 21st, if this is humanly possible.

Bob

Robert W. Skiff

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DRAFT

VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO TURKEY
August 27 - September 1, 1962

Scope Paper

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Otl. 2-16-77
By Shu, NARS, Date 3-7-77

Purposes

The purposes of the Vice President's mission to Turkey are:

- (1) by the visit itself to demonstrate to the Turkish public United States support for parliamentary governments and our continued commitment to assist Turkey in its efforts to maintain its independence and to speed economic and social development; (2) in talks with Turkish leaders to explain our views on major international issues and especially to make clear the high value the United States continues to place on Turkish cooperation in collective defense efforts through NATO and in special bilateral relationships with the United States; (3) in an address at the Isdir fair, as well as in official conversations with the Turkish Government, to explain United States trade and aid policies; (4) by reviewing the Victory Day military parade in Ankara ^{Estambul} to provide renewed evidence of high-level United States interest in the efficiency of the Turkish armed forces; (5) by appearances before groups of United States servicemen and other United States citizens in Turkey to encourage them in their task of furthering United States policy objectives in a distant country and often under difficult circumstances.

United States-Turkish Bilateral Relations

Close relations between the United States and Turkey were established by the Truman Doctrine in 1947. Since that time we have supported the territorial integrity, independence, security and economic progress of Turkey with more than \$3.5 billion of assistance, about

\$2 billion/

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\$2 billion of its military aid. We supported Turkey's inclusion in the Marshall Plan and its membership in NATO. For its part, Turkey has maintained a firm and resolute stand against the USSR, supported the US position on all major international issues in the UN and elsewhere, maintained very large armed forces in being committed to NATO, and provided us with valuable real estate for bases and other facilities. During the Korean War the Turks contributed significant and valuable fighting forces and still maintain a contingent there. In general, US-Turkish relations are excellent but there are some exceptions in detail. We are concerned at the political instability and economic stagnation in Turkey. Inevitable incidents arising out of the presence of 17,000 American troops in Turkey create difficulties. The Turks have from time to time been concerned with what they consider the inadequacy of our aid in certain particulars and have upon occasion been reluctant to agree to continued operation of some of our facilities without renewed assurances of US protection against any Soviet retaliatory military moves.

Reassurances

There have been no high-level visits between Turkey and the United States since the advent of the Kennedy Administration, except for a brief trip to Ankara by Secretary Rusk to attend the CENTO conference more than a year ago. The Vice President's trip will therefore be of special significance to the Turkish Government and people.

Turkey remains staunchly pro-West, but the Turks sometimes feel that they are not accepted as true Europeans or full partners in NATO. They

need/

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need frequent reassurances that the United States views Turkey as a full partner in NATO and a very important ally in whom we have the utmost trust and confidence. Turkish leaders have been disturbed by the possibility that, in case of limited attack by the Soviets, they would not receive adequate or immediate support from NATO and, especially, the United States. They should be reassured again that we view attacks of any sort on any NATO country with equal seriousness and that we will act promptly in accordance with our commitments. Furthermore, the NATO Treaty does not differentiate between types of attacks.

Recent Domestic Developments

Turkey has been passing through a very difficult period of economic distress and unusual political instability. Democratic institutions and parliamentary governments are under severe pressure. The Democratic Party (Menderes) Administration was overthrown by a military coup d'etat in May, 1960. Free elections in October, 1961 returned the government to civilian control; however, the military forces have remained as the locus of power. The civilian politicians, now divided into five national political parties, have had difficulties in establishing a stable government. The present government was formed on June 25, 1962.

Turkey has been in an economic recession since the spring of 1960, mainly because of political uncertainty, a poor wheat crop in 1961 and rigorous anti-inflationary measures taken by the government. The electorate in general and the Turkish military in particular have become impatient and dissatisfied with what they consider the slow pace of the government in economic and social fields. The Second Inonu Administration is giving priority consideration to the economic and social problems in an effort to instill public confidence, on which

economic/

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economic growth largely depends. The cabinet is now giving urgent consideration to a Five Year Development Plan, which has been prepared by the State Planning Office and which is to be implemented in March, 1963. An OECD consortium (United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Canada and the United States) was established in July, 1962 to review the Five Year Development Plan and to mobilize large-scale financial assistance from the western powers.

Foreign Affairs

Despite internal difficulties, Turkey has continued staunchly to resist the threats and blandishments of the Soviet Union. Inonu has told the USSR that Turkey is firmly tied to the West and to the United States. At the same time the Turks are prepared to improve their relations with the Soviets insofar as the Soviets display a real intention to act and not just talk.

The Turks regard themselves as a bridge between the West and the Middle East, especially its CENTO allies, Iran and Pakistan. They prefer the maintenance of the status quo in the Middle East, including a continuation of friendly relations with Syria and Iraq, a strong, friendly Israel and a weak, isolated UAR.

Turkey strongly supports the full implementation of the London-Zurich agreements concerning Cyprus and the avoidance of any disturbance in its relations with Greece. Turkey has shown no interest in revitalizing the Balkan Pact, but is content to have it remain on the books.

Turkey has given full support to the United Nations and has

consistently/

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consistently cooperated with the United States and supported American proposals in the United Nations forum. Although the Turkish Government has reduced its forces in Korea, it continues to maintain a contingent there.

Clearances

NEA - Phillips Talbot (in draft) *BT*

AID/NESA - Mr. Kaufman (in draft)

W
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8-3-62

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D R A F T

Vice President's Visit to Iran

September 6 - 9, 1962

Scope Paper

Purposes

The Vice President's visit to Iran provides a timely opportunity to:

(a) Reassure the Shah of United States support and understanding, and encourage him toward responsible and progressive leadership of his country;

(b) Impress upon the Iranian people that in the United States they have a friend willing to protect them from aggression and assist them to modernize themselves which at the same time respects and admires their achievements and culture;

(c) Encourage the Prime Minister and other Iranian officials to devote their best efforts to self-help measures which will lead to national unity and progress.

In order of importance, the Vice President's meetings during this visit will be with the Shah himself, the politically-conscious element of the population of Tehran, and high Iranian officials. There follows a breakdown by general subject of the substantive content of the Vice President's contact with these elements.

Military Affairs

The Shah

The Shah of Iran has long believed that the United States has displayed a lack of understanding of his security problems in drawing up its

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By ctm/jc, NARA, Date 2-26-09

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its military assistance programs for Iran. He believes that the military equipment given to Iran, along with the fixed military installations constructed by the United States, have been inadequate in terms of both quantity and quality. He feels that even though the United States may, through its nuclear deterrent, be successful in protecting him from direct Soviet attack, it has not taken into account the possibility of indirect communist aggression from Soviet-armed Iraq and/or Afghanistan. The United States, on the other hand, believes that the Shah's armed forces are too big, and somewhat inefficient. The growing demand on available resources which they represent have been counterproductive in terms of the requirements for social and economic progress in Iran. In talks with the Secretary of Defense in the course of his visit to the United States last spring, the Shah was informed that the United States was planning a multi-year program of military assistance which would facilitate an increase in the efficiency of his armed forces and thereby allow a reduction in manpower levels. A Joint Chiefs of Staff study team was sent to Iran, and, after consultations with Iranian military officers, has worked out detailed recommendations as to a concept for defense with a reduced force level and as to the nature of our proposed multi-year program.

As of the first week of August, the team report had been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its approval recommended to the Secretary of Defense. It is possible that by the time of the Vice President's visit to Tehran, details of the program may have been completed and approved to the point where our Ambassador will be able to present it to the Shah. Whether or not our Ambassador will have so presented it before the time of the Vice President's visit, it is probable that the Shah will present to the Vice President many well-rehearsed arguments for more and better military equipment for Iran. Experience has shown that it is unproductive

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for high United States officials to attempt to argue technical military matters with the Shah. The Vice President can be of great value to the solution of this thorny problem, however, if he listens politely to the Shah's arguments, indicates that he understands and appreciates the Shah's points of concern and that the shape of a multi-year military assistance program to Iran is or has received the most careful high-level consideration. The Vice President can note that the military requirements of many countries, including the United States, often exceed available financial and physical resources and cannot therefore be met as fully as may be militarily desirable. The Vice President may wish to emphasize United States confidence in the superiority of the United States nuclear capability as against that of the USSR. He may also wish to note that a civic action program along the lines presently being contemplated by the GOI could contribute to public understanding and appreciation of the Iranian armed forces.

The Iranian Public

The military forces of Iran do not enjoy marked respect or confidence on the part of the civilian public. It is therefore not advisable for the Vice President to make public reference to military matters, although a reference to Iranian courage and valor through the centuries in defending the homeland against scores of major invasions would be helpful.

High Iranian Officials

Neither the Prime Minister nor the Minister of War has much influence on Iranian military affairs, which are in the hands of the Shah. It would therefore not be profitable to discuss military matters with high Iranian officials. In view of a tendency among Iranian civilians to measure national technological capabilities in terms of accomplishments in the

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exploration of space, however, it would be useful should the opportunity arise for the Vice President to draw on his detailed knowledge of the United States space effort to impress upon his hosts elements of relative superiority in the United States space effort as against the Soviet effort, and to note the appreciation of the United States for the contributions made by the Smithsonian-Tehran University Satellite Tracking Station.

Economic and Financial Affairs

The Shah

The Shah as well as his officials are quite disturbed over the current budgetary problem in Iran, which has been the immediate cause of the resignation of a moderate reformist Prime Minister, Dr. Amini. At the time of his resignation, Dr. Amini alluded to the inadequacies of United States assistance as a cause of his inability to solve the budget problem. He subsequently modified his statement but it is possible that there remains some belief in official and unofficial circles that Dr. Amini's original comment was true. The new Cabinet is currently struggling with the fiscal problems Dr. Amini was unable to resolve.

Iran has been plagued for the past several years with recurrent budgetary crises. The basic causes of these difficulties are failure of the Iranian government to modernize its budgetary and fiscal administrative structures. Tax collections have not been pursued vigorously and/have not kept pace with the ever growing governmental expenditure for new public services and capital investment stemming from development and modernization efforts. Substantial oil revenues and, to a lesser degree, the availability of United States aid for budgetary support have tended to obscure from the Iranian government the need for fundamental reforms in its fiscal structure. The immediate crisis has been aggravated by the following

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factors: (a) a failure of tax revenues to rise due to the result of a business recession which followed largely from a successful stabilization program, (b) a commitment to pay higher salaries to teachers and to other categories of government employees, (c) the necessity of repaying foreign and domestic overdue debts, (d) the high cost of the land reform program, assuming it proceeds as rapidly as now appears probable, (e) relatively heavy and inflexible military expenses, and (f) the necessity for maintaining the momentum of the economic development expenditures during the transitional year when the Second Plan is being completed and the Third Plan being inaugurated. Both the old and the new Cabinets have appealed for United States budgetary assistance to meet the problem; the United States has consistently indicated its willingness to assist in economic development activities if the Iranian Government will solve its own internal operating budget problems.

The Vice President may wish to reiterate to the Shah our feeling that we cannot go on supporting the Iranian internal operating budget, and explain, on the basis of the Vice President's personal experience, the internal political factors in the United States which make it imperative that United States assistance be for meaningful economic development rather than for such budget subsidies. He should reassure the Shah as to the willingness of the United States to assist Iran in its economic development program, and point out that such assistance can be most effective when it can be extended in close coordination with aid from other friendly nations and within the framework of an overall development plan. The Shah may attempt to obtain the approval of the Vice President for specific measures or approaches to the solution of Iran's internal budget problem. The Vice President would do well to express interest in such measures, but to avoid giving any hint of United States blessing for any particular

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approach to what is essentially an internal Iranian problem involving many delicate political factors. The Vice President's refusal to endorse specific measures would be an essential element in our efforts to persuade the Iranians to face up to their own problems and to take the responsibility for the failure and success of their own actions.

The Iranian Public

There will be considerable public expectation that the Vice President brings with him emergency United States financial assistance to Iran. The Vice President might wish to make it clear at the first opportunity that his visit to Iran is not connected with specific economic or military assistance programs. The Vice President should also be alert to counter popular beliefs, encouraged by communist propaganda, to the effect that neutralist countries receive more United States assistance than do countries committed to the West. The Vice President could utilize the fact that the United States has provided more than a billion dollars in all forms of assistance to Iran, a nation of 20 million which receives large amounts of oil revenue.

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High Iranian Officials

Iranian Cabinet Ministers may be more strident and persistent than the Shah in making a case for United States budgetary assistance. The Vice President would do well to express sympathy but, as outlined above, indicate that the budgetary problem is one for Iran, not for the United States to solve. One or more Iranian officials might in desperation hint to the Vice President that Iran might be forced to put pressure on United States oil companies operating in Iran as a part of the Oil Consortium in order to obtain more revenue. The Vice President might in this case pretend to ignore the implications of the remark, praise the Iranians for their cooperative relationship with the Oil Consortium, and bring up the fact that Iran, according to the best figures available, collects in taxes from its people only about 8% of the Gross National Product, a figure well below that of most comparable nations, and probably too low to support a modern government. The Vice President should indicate to high Iranian officials if the opportunity presents itself that higher tax revenues are an indispensable element in any long-term solution of Iran's budgetary problems.

Iranian Domestic Politics

The Shah

Following the overthrow of the increasingly demagogic and anti-Western regime of Mosadeq in 1953, the Shah of Iran, backed by the armed forces, which are personally loyal to him, assumed control of the country. The Shah and the Army were, until a little more than a year ago, in a loose and uneasy alliance with the traditional elite of landlords, religious leaders, and big business leaders, while
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opposition from the political heirs of Mosadeq and their followers among urban educated and semi-educated elements gradually increased. With the selection of Amini as Prime Minister in early 1961, the Shah broke this pattern, in that he delegated considerable authority and responsibility to a Prime Minister who embarked on an important if spotty reform program, alienated the traditional elite (which, subsequently cooperated from time to time in loose alliance with the Mosadeqists), and developed long-range policies aimed at enlisting the political confidence and enthusiasm of the hitherto apathetic peasantry and urban proletariat. He was able to attract little popular support for this program, and was kept in office by the power and prestige of the Shah and the armed forces. His successor is a weaker man, but initial indications are that he intends to continue the general line of the Amini program, although he may well prove to be much less independent of the Shah than was Amini.

Both Traditionalist and Mosadeqist opposition groups have demanded early elections of a new Parliament; the old one was dissolved by Amini. Rigged elections might precipitate a new internal security crisis; relatively free elections would probably result in a Parliament divided between reactionaries from the rural areas and neutralist demagogues from the cities. Although Iran's government is essentially autocratic, it is not totalitarian, and the standard of political freedom is relatively high by Afro-Asian standards.

The Vice President might wish to assure the Shah of United States approbation for his courageous program of internal moderate reforms aimed at the improvement of the lot of the masses, and against the inevitable opposition of greedy and ambitious vested interests of both Right and Left. Since the Shah has perennial fears that the United States

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may abandon him in favor of his pro-Mosadeq opponents, the Vice President might wish to find an opportunity to mention United States comprehension of the demagogic and sterile nature of this portion of the opposition. However, to help the Shah avoid a tendency to dismiss this very significant and in many ways justified opposition as unimportant, the Vice President might wish to indicate that we clearly differentiate between it and a much smaller communist element which is attempting to infiltrate it, despite the fact that it is being encouraged and supported by massive communist propaganda efforts. Should the question of elections to the national parliament be brought up by the Shah, the Vice President would do well to avoid expressing any opinion, other than to state that the problem is complicated and that the Shah and his Cabinet will doubtless arrive at a satisfactory solution.

The Iranian Public

It would be wise for the Vice President to avoid all discussion of internal Iranian politics in public, stating that as a foreigner he is unwilling and unable to comment on such matters. If pressed further, he might indicate his hope that all Iranians, despite any difference in approach they may have to specific problems, doubtless agree that their internal political course is something to be set by Iranians for Iranian reasons, and that foreign suggestions and propaganda, official or unofficial, from any source, should rightfully be ignored by a proud and independent people. (This attitude would serve both to disarm the prevalent public myth that Iranian internal politics are dominated by the United States, and to reinforce Iranian reluctance to be influenced by the barrage of Soviet subversive propaganda to which the public is subjected.)

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High Iranian Officials

The attention of high Iranian officials will doubtless be taken up primarily with financial problems. Nevertheless, the Vice President could perform a great service by indicating clearly to the new Prime Minister that the United States hopes he will discharge the duties of his office with vigor and authority and carry on the program of reform which was begun by Dr. Amini under the direction of the Shah.

Foreign Affairs

The Shah

The Shah needs constant reassurance that he is needed and admired by the West, and more particularly by the United States; he must constantly be disabused of the idea that critical items in the American press reflect official American distrust and hostility toward him. He is vain, moody, and suspicious, as well as being intelligent and courageous. Anything the Vice President can do to impress upon the Shah that the great mass of the American people, as well as the American government, appreciate his importance, his bravery, and his devotion to the cause of the Free World will be of concrete value to the success of our foreign policy.

The Shah has recently gone to great trouble and has in some ways risked his prestige in an effort to bring Afghanistan and Pakistan together to find a solution to their border transit problems. The final results of this effort may still not be known by the time of the Vice President's visit, but whether it was successful or not, the Shah deserves an expression of American thanks and appreciation for his statesmanlike efforts to bring about a peaceful solution and thus strengthen the fabric of the Free World. His initiative and his concern should entitle him to

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such gratitude.

The Shah may wish to discuss with the Vice President the current state of his relations with the USSR, and to describe Soviet efforts to bribe him or overthrow him in an effort to take Iran out of the ranks of committed pro-Western nations. The Vice President might wish to note in choosing his remarks on this subject that as a matter of policy we have always attempted to avoid being put in a position where it appears that the United States is interested in the maintenance of abnormal tensions and bad relations between Iran and its northern neighbor. There should be no difficulty on this point, since the Shah usually indicates that he wants good relations with the USSR and that bad relations are due to the efforts of the USSR to interfere in Iran's internal affairs. The Shah may also attempt to "sell" the Vice President on the prevalence of Soviet influence in the United Arab Republic, and to a lesser extent in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Vice President could in reply point out that the United States shares his concern, but that the Shah will doubtless agree that the United States should continue to do what it can to maintain what influence it can in these nations. The Shah detests Nasser.

The Shah personally brought Iran into CENTO, and since that time CENTO has become an unpopular internal political issue in Iran. The Shah feels that Iranian adherence to CENTO has brought with it risks not compensated by special Western economic and military assistance. The Vice President can do little on this score other than to indicate that the U. S. attaches great importance to CENTO as an integral part of the Free World security system.

The Shah is well-informed on global political problems, and would appreciate discussing such subjects as the disarmament talks, the Laos

problem

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problem, Viet-Nam, the Arab-Israeli dispute, NATO problems, and the Berlin crisis with the Vice President. We have found the Shah to be worthy of confidence, and the Vice President might wish to be quite frank with him in exchanging information and ideas on these and other topics of the day.

The Public

In remarks to the press and public, the Vice President might repeat expressions of Free World appreciation for the Shah's constructive statesmanship in attempting to solve the Afghan-Pakistan transit problem. He can emphasize the friendly feelings of the American people toward the government and people of Iran. He might wish to characterize Iran in its behavior over the past several decades as an archetype and model for all small nations threatened with totalitarian subversion and aggression, and to praise the Iranian people's devotion to their proud tradition of independence and national sovereignty.

High Iranian Officials

The Shah maintains control over important foreign policy questions in Iran. Even so, the new Prime Minister, who has long been very friendly toward the West, probably deserves some words of encouragement for Iranian resistance to Soviet threats, blandishments, and subversive propaganda. Apprehensions over the possible spill-over into Iran of the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq may be voiced by some high officials. The Vice President might wish to counsel restraint as to any possible Iranian intervention in an internal affair of Iraq, and to point out the best antidote to disunifying threats is a meaningful program of social and economic progress and reform.

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VICE PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S TRIP
TO THE MIDDLE EAST
August - September, 1962

SUBJECT

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Tentative Schedule

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LEBANON

Text of the Vice President's statement at Beirut Airport,
Thursday, August 23, 1962 (2)

Vice President's call on President Chehab at 6:30 pm on
August 23, 1962 (3)

Vice President's call on Prime Minister Karame at 7:30 pm
on August 23, 1962 (4)

Beirut's 207 reporting on the Vice President's activities
on August 23, 1962 (5)

Beirut's 215 summarizing the Vice President's visit to
Lebanon (6)

Text of the Vice President's departure statement issued at
Beirut Airport on the morning of August 24, 1962 (7)

IRAN

Arrival statement of the Vice President on August 24, 1962
at Tehran, Iran (8)

Text of the Vice President's toast at the Shah's dinner on
August 24, 1962 (9)

Tehran's 276 reporting on the Shah's dinner for the Vice
President (10)

Text of the Vice President's remarks at the Iran-American
Society on August 25, 1962 (11)

Vice President's toast at the Prime Minister of Iran's
dinner on August 25, 1962 (12)

SUBJECT

TAB

IRAN Continued

Vice President's conversation with the Shah of Iran (13)

Vice President's conversation with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Iran (14)

Tehran's 46 reporting on the Vice President's visit to Iran (15)

Text of the Vice President's departure statement on August 26, 1962 from Tehran, Iran (16)

TURKEY

Reaction of people to Vice President's arrival in Ankara on August 26, 1962 (17)

Text of the Vice President's toast at President Gursel's luncheon on August 27, 1962 (18)

Ankara's 77 reporting on Vice President's visit to Ankara (19)

Record of conversation between the Vice President and President Gursel in the Presidential Palace on August 27, 1962 (20)

Vice President's visit to Izmir on August 28, 1962 (21)

Text of the Vice President's arrival statement to Izmir delivered in the Governor's office (22)

Reaction of people in Izmir to Vice President's visit (23)

Vice President's arrival statement (in written form to the press due to the late arrival hour) in Istanbul, August 29, 1962 (24)

Report of Vice President's trip in Istanbul (25)

Vice President's departure statement from Istanbul on August 30 (26)

Text of the Vice President's departure statement from Istanbul on August 30 (27)

Istanbul's 3 concerning daily reports by Ankara, Izmir and Istanbul regarding the Vice President's visit (28)

SUBJECT

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CYPRUS

Vice President's arrival statement in Nicosia, August 30	(29)
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Vice President's statement inaugurating Expanded School Lunch Program, August 31	(35)
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Conversation between the Vice President and Turk Cypriot community leaders in the Vice President Kutchuk's Office	(37)
Text of a memo given EIP by Cypriot Vice President Kutchuk embodying views, anxieties and recommendations of Turkish community in Cyprus, August 31	(38)

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Summary record conversation between the Vice President and Prime Minister Karamanlis at the Prime Ministry, September 1	(42)
Report of Vice President's visit to Corfu, September 2	(43)

SUBJECT

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GREECE Continued

- Vice President's toast at the luncheon of King Paul and Queen Frederika in Corfu, September 2 (44)
- Text of the Vice President's toast at the Prime Minister's dinner, September 2 (45)
- Summary record conversation between the Vice President and Prime Minister Caramanlis at the Prime Minister's Office, September 3 (46)
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- Thessaloniki's 48 describing arrival of the Vice President, September 3, in Thessaloniki (48)
- Text of the Vice President's speech at the Thessaloniki's Trade Fair, September 3 (49)
- Thessaloniki's 49 describing success of Vice President's trip to Northern Greece (50)
- Vice President's statement made prior to his departure for Rome from Athens, September 4 (51)

ITALY

- Vice President's arrival statement on arriving in Rome, September 4 (52)
- Description of Vice President's arrival in Rome (53)
- Transcript of remarks by the Vice President at a luncheon given by President Segni at Quirinale Palace, September 5 (54)
- Memcon between Prime Minister Fanfani and R.W. Komer at Quirinale Palace, September 5, regarding Greek Defense Budget (55)
- Toast delivered by the Vice President at a dinner given by Prime Minister Fanfani, September 5 (56)

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- Series of meeting between the Vice President and Italian Government leaders which included Prime Minister Fanfani at Chigi Palace; Foreign Minister Piccioni at Farnesina; and President Segni at Quirinale - September 6 (58)
- Text of Vice President's statement upon arrival in Naples, September 6 (59)
- Transcript of remarks by the Vice President at Naples shinyard, September 6 (60)
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- Transcript of remarks by the Vice President at NATO Headquarters - introduction of Lady Bird, Linda Bird, Ambassador Reinhardt and Mrs. Reinhardt (62)
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- Text of Vice President's remarks to a group of prospective immigrants at the American Consulate General, Naples, September 6 (64)
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TENTATIVE SCHEDULE

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VICE PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S TRIP
TO
MIDDLE EAST

AUGUST - SEPTEMBER
1962

Tentative Schedule

August 22 1600 Depart Andrews Air Force Base
August 23 1130 Arrive Beirut

Vice President

1. Airport statement on arrival.
2. Lunch in suite and afternoon at hotel.
3. 1030 call on President Chehab.
4. 1915 call on Prime Minister Karame.
5. Quiet dinner and evening at hotel.

August 24 0745 Depart Beirut
August 24 1200 Arrive Tehran

Vice President

1. To be met by Prime Minister, Minister of Court, Foreign Minister, Mayor. (Guard of Honor)
2. 1300 arrive Marble Palace (Sign Shah's guest book)
3. 1330 private luncheon at Embassy.
4. (After lunch) Free time
5. 1800 reception at Foreign Ministry
6. 2030 dinner with Shah

August 25

Vice President

1. 0930 discussion with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.
2. Audience with Shah,
3. 1330 official luncheon at Embassy
4. 1600 drive to Key (lay wreath on tomb Reza Shah).

Mrs. Johnson

Afternoon free for possible sight-seeing and shopping.

Mrs. Johnson

Same as for Vice President

Same as for Vice President

Same as for Vice President

Same as for Vice President

Same as for Vice President

Mrs. Johnson

(Morning) Visit Archeological Museum.

Possible visit University Tehran.

1200 calls on Queen.

1330 official luncheon at Embassy.

Same as for Vice President.

August 25 (Cont'd)

<u>Vice President</u>	<u>Mrs. Johnson</u>
5. (After 1600 ceremony) drive through city, bazaar and Mosque, etc.	Same as for Vice President
6. 1730 reception at Iran American Society	Same as for Vice President
7. 2030 dinner with Prime Minister	Same as for Vice President

August 26

<u>Vice President</u>	<u>Mrs. Johnson</u>
1. Morning - possibly view Crown Jewels at Back Malli or drive into countryside	Same as for Vice President
2. 1130 address official American community	Same as for Vice President
3. 1200 private luncheon with Ambassador	Same as for Vice President
4. Early afternoon - depart Tehran	Same as for Vice President

August 26 Mid-afternoon arrive Ankara

<u>Vice President</u>	<u>Mrs. Johnson</u>
1. Arrival ceremony (Honor Guard)	Same as for Vice President
2. Lay wreath Ataturk Tomb	Same as for Vice President
3. Sign Presidential guest book	Same as for Vice President
4. Private dinner with Ambassador	Same as for Vice President

August 27

<u>Vice President</u>	<u>Mrs. Johnson</u>
1. Morning - discussions with President	Morning - visit Hittite Museum
2. Discussions with Prime Minister Inom	
3. Lunch with President Garsel	Luncheon with Turkish Career Women (Turkish American Women's Cultural Society)
4. Afternoon - tour Ankara	Same as for Vice President
5. Dinner - hosted by Prime Minister Inom	Same as for Vice President

August 28

<u>Vice President</u>	<u>Mrs. Johnson</u>
1. Morning - speaks to official American community	Same as for Vice President
2. Visit to CIBU Headquarters	Visit to new children's hospital
3. Noon - departure for Izmir	Same as for Vice President
4. Visit to two NATO Headquarters, Izmir	Now Open
5. Call on Governor	Now Open
6. Attend American Day ceremonies at Fair (Will make address)	Same as for Vice President
7. Tour Fair	Same as for Vice President

August 28 (Cont'd)

Vice President
8. Depart Izmir for Istanbul
9. Dinner on board plane
10. Arrive Istanbul

Mrs. Johnson
Same as for Vice President
Same as for Vice President
Same as for Vice President

August 29

Vice President
1. Call on Governor of Istanbul
2. Free time - shopping and sightseeing

Mrs. Johnson
Free time - possible shopping and sightseeing

August 30

Vice President
1. Trip on Bosphorus - visit islands and possibly Roberts College
2. (Early afternoon) - Depart Istanbul
Mid-afternoon - arrive Nicosia
3. Arrival ceremonies
4. Call on President
5. Attend President's reception
6. Dinner in hotel

Mrs. Johnson
Same as for Vice President
Same as for Vice President
Same as for Vice President
Free time
Same as for Vice President
Same as for Vice President

August 31

Vice President
1. Inaugurate CARE lunch program
2. Address Cypriot Parliament
3. Call on Cypriot Vice President
4. Lunch with President Makarios
5. 1515 departure for Athens
Late afternoon - arrive Athens
6. Arrival ceremonies
7. Dinner in hotel

Mrs. Johnson
Same as for Vice President
Possibly attend or visit Nicosia Museum
Same as for Vice President
Same as for Vice President
Same as for Vice President
Same as for Vice President
Same as for Vice President

September 1

Vice President
1. Morning - visit with Ambassador
2. Luncheon hosted by Prime Minister
3. Meets with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.
4. (Afternoon) Tour city
5. Private dinner

Mrs. Johnson
Possible visit to nearby village or visit to one of Queen's projects
Same as for Vice President
Same as for Vice President
Same as for Vice President

September 2 (Sunday)

VICE PRESIDENT

1. Morning - depart for Corfu
2. Luncheon at Summer Palace hosted by King and Queen
3. Late afternoon - return to Athens
4. Dinner hosted by Prime Minister

MRS. JOHNSON

- Same as for Vice President
Same as for Vice President
Same as for Vice President
Same as for Vice President

September 3

VICE PRESIDENT

1. Morning - departure for Thessaloniki
2. Tour American Farm School
3. Luncheon given by Minister for Northern Greece
4. Visit Anatolia College
5. Attend America Day Ceremonies at Trade Fair (will make address)
6. Tour of Fair
7. Return to Athens

MRS. JOHNSON

- Same as for Vice President
Same as for Vice President
Same as for Vice President
Same as for Vice President
Same as for Vice President
Same as for Vice President
Same as for Vice President

September 4

VICE PRESIDENT

1. Morning - possibly additional talks with Prime Minister
2. Address official American community
3. Private luncheon
4. Depart for Rome

MRS. JOHNSON

- Late morning reception organized by Eleni Viachov (owner-publisher of Kathimerini)
Same as for Vice President