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#43g Bio Sketch	CIA Conf. (Cp 1) <i>CIA ltr 11/17/76</i> Albert Wehrer 1 p (duplicate of #37a)	Undated	A
#37a Bio Sketch	CIA Conf. (Cp 1) <i>CIA ltr 11/17/76</i> Albert Wehrer 1 p	Undated	A

FILE LOCATION

VP Security File, VP Travel
VP Visit to the Benelux Countries, 11/4-10/63

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#11 Letter	State Secret <i>State lu 12/21/76</i> to VP Johnson from Douglas MacArthur II 1 p	11/6/63	A
#11a Letter	State Secret <i>State lu 12/21/76</i> To VP Johnson from Douglas MacArthur II 1 p [duplicate of #11]	11/6/63	A
#17 Report	State Conf. (Gp 3) <i>State lu 12/21/76</i> Talking Points Paper 1 p	11/01/63	A
#19 Report	State Conf. (Gp 3) <i>State lu 12/21/76</i> Talking Points Paper 4 p	10/28/63	A
#26 Report	State conf. (Gp 3) <i>State lu 12/21/76</i> Netherlands 1 p	10/29/63	A
#30 Report	State Secret (Gp 3) <i>Sanitized, State lu 12/21/76</i> Background Paper <i>open 3-9-09</i> 6 p	10/28/63	A
#37 Bio Sketch	State Conf. <i>Sanitized, CIA lu 4/21/77, State lu 12/21/76</i> Rinaldo Del Bo <i>Same source NY 037-003-1 (8/02)</i> 2 p	Undated	A
#41 Report	State Conf. (Gp 3) <i>State lu 12/21/76</i> Review of Outstanding World Problems 3 p	10/30/63	A
#43a Bio Sketch	State Conf. <i>CIA lu 4/21/77, State lu 12/21/76</i> King Baudouin I 1 p	Undated	A
#43b Bio Sketch	State Conf. <i>CIA lu 4/21/77, State lu 12/21/76</i> Queen Fabiola 1 p	Undated	A
#43c Bio Sketch	State Conf. <i>CIA lu 4/21/77, State lu 12/21/76</i> Prince Albert of Liege 1 p	Undated	A
#43d Bio Sketch	State Conf. <i>CIA lu 4/21/77, State lu 12/21/76</i> Theodore Lefevre 2 p	Undated	A
#43e Bio Sketch	State Conf. <i>CIA lu 4/21/77, State lu 12/21/76</i> Paul-Henri Spaak 1 p	Undated	A
#43f Bio Sketch	State Conf. <i>Sanitized, CIA lu 4/21/77, State lu 12/21/76</i> Rinaldo Del Bo 2 p [duplicate of #37]	Undated	

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VP Visit to the Benelux Countries

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#43h Bio Sketch	State Conf. <i>Sanitized, CIA, 4/21/77, State 12/21/76</i> Sicco Leendert Mansholt 2 p	Undated	A
#43i Bio Sketch	State Conf. <i>Sanitized, CIA, 4/21/77, State 12/21/76</i> Pierre Chatenet <i>Serial "NY 037-003-1 (8/2/76)"</i> 2 p	Undated	A
#2 Index	State Conf. <i>State 12/21/76</i> Index of Briefing Book 1 p	Undated	A
#43 Biographic Index	State Conf. <i>State 12/21/76</i> Biographic Index of Briefing Book 2 p	Undated	A

FILE LOCATION VP Security File, VP Travel
VP Visit to the Banlux Countries

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**VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT
TO THE
BENELUX COUNTRIES
November 4-10, 1963
THE VICE PRESIDENT**

SECRET

VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE BENELUX COUNTRIES
November 3-10, 1963

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By long, NARS, Date 3/21/77

I. GENERAL

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A

VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE BENELUX COUNTRIES

November 3-10, 1963

SCOPE PAPER

I. OCCASION FOR VISIT.

At the request of Secretary of Agriculture Freeman, the Vice President will open the U.S. Food and Agricultural Exhibition at Amsterdam on November 7. The exhibition will be the largest US agricultural promotion ever staged overseas. It is a cooperative effort of US agriculture and food industries with our Department of Agriculture. During a concurrent symposium of European and U.S. leaders in agriculture, public debates will take place on urgent agricultural policy questions facing the European Community and the U.S.

Rulers of all three Benelux countries have in recent years paid visits to the United States: Queen Juliana of the Netherlands in 1952, Princess Beatrix of the Netherlands in 1959 and in April 1963, King Baudouin of Belgium in 1959, and Grand Duchess Charlotte of Luxembourg in April 1963. In view of the Presidential visit to Italy and Germany last June-July, a visit by a top Government leader to Benelux has become increasingly desirable. Only one U.S. President has ever visited Benelux. Woodrow Wilson went to Belgium in 1919.

II. PURPOSE OF VISIT.

Psychological: There is a large reserve of good will for the United States in the Benelux countries. At the same time, these three relatively small countries feel that the United States often takes them for granted. The visit by the Vice President, as the President's personal representative, will demonstrate our real concern and interest in these countries and will have great symbolic importance for them.

Substantive: The Vice President will be able to (i) reaffirm strongly the concept of Atlantic partnership and its benefits to Europe; (ii) encourage Benelux to insist on a liberal European Community; (iii) restate the US commitment to Europe's defense; (iv) drive home the political necessity for the success of the Kennedy round; (v) set out US policies on agricultural questions and quicken interest in the U.S. Food and Agricultural Exhibition at Amsterdam.

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III. VISIT IN PERSPECTIVE.

The mission begun by the President on his visit to Italy and Germany can be further advanced by the Vice President in a visit now to Benelux. The Benelux countries are of particular importance to us in their collective role in emerging European institutions. They have generally adopted positions in the EEC which have supported U.S. objectives. The Common Market has reached a critical moment in deciding its own agricultural policies on which will depend its common external tariff and the outcome of the Kennedy round negotiations within GATT. Majority opinion in Benelux differs with deGaulle over NATO and the US and British role in Europe, but is anxious to preserve the economic and political gains of European unity. A high level U.S. spokesman of the stature of the Vice President can make a major contribution by setting forth publicly principles the United States stands for in the coming trade negotiations.

IV. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES.

Reaffirmation of Atlantic Partnership: The Vice President can offset doubts which have recently arisen in Europe over rumored withdrawal of U.S. combat troop units. He can emphasize our respect for the role of even the smaller states of the Atlantic Alliance as we move toward a real partnership with Europe, thereby offsetting the Gaullist concept of a Europe independently strong, its ties with the U.S. loosened. In this connection, the Vice President can emphasize the importance the US attaches to close political consultation on major East-West issues.

Encouragement of Liberal EEC: The Vice President will give encouragement to the liberal Atlantic-minded forces not only in Benelux but in other EEC countries as well. He can reduce the tendency of Benelux leaders to bend themselves to the will of the larger EEC powers and urge them to strive for Community policies that conform to European political and economic interests in an Atlantic setting.

Trade and Agricultural Policies: In opening the U.S. Food and Agricultural Exhibition at Amsterdam at the request of the Secretary of Agriculture, the Vice President will underscore the political importance the U.S. attaches to liberal trade

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and agricultural policies. His presence and his statements will help bring Europeans to realize the importance of the agriculture question and to support outward-looking Community trade policies.

Recognition of Helpful Cooperation: Belgian-American relations were seriously affected by the crisis that erupted with the Congo's independence in July 1960. Similarly U.S.-Dutch relations went through difficult moments over Indonesian independence and the West New Guinea problem. Nevertheless, both the Belgian and Dutch governments worked closely with us during both episodes in the face of frequently hostile public opinion. The Vice President's recognition of this cooperation will help erase the few remaining traces of resentment.

Drafted by:	Cleared by:
EUR:WE Mr. Stone	RPE - Mr. Kaplan
Mr. Andrews	WE - Mr. Beigel
Mr. Davis	RPM - Mr. van Hollen
Mr. Tartter	EUR - Mr. Burdett
	WE - Mr. Stone
S/S-S ILFuller, Room 7239, Ext. 7552	

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TENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR VISIT OF VICE PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO BENELUX

November 4 - 10, 1963

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Activity</u>
Sunday November 3	9:30 p.m.	Depart Washington
Monday November 4	11:00 a.m.	Arrive Luxembourg
	11:35 a.m.	Call on Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
	12:05 p.m.	Visit Monument Aux Morts
	1:00 p.m.	Informal luncheon by Grand Duchess
	3:30 p.m.	Call on Acting President, European Coal and Steel Community
	8:00 p.m.	Dinner by Prime Minister (black tie)
Tuesday November 5	9:50 a.m.	Visit American Military Cemetery at Hamm
	10:15 a.m.	Depart Luxembourg
	11:00 a.m.	Arrive The Hague
	11:45 a.m.	Call on Prime Minister
	4:30 p.m.	Call on Burgomaster in Rotterdam
	8:00 p.m.	Netherlands-American Institute banquet at Hilton Hotel (Black tie - speech)
Wednesday November 6	11:00 a.m.	Call on Foreign Minister in The Hague
	12:15 p.m.	Call on Presidents of both Houses of Parliament.
	4:00 p.m.	Call on Burgomaster in Amsterdam
	7 ³⁰ 8:00 p.m.	Dinner by Queen Juliana and Prince Bernhard (black tie)
Thursday November 7	11:00 a.m.	Open U. S. Food and Agriculture Fair. Tour Fair.
	12:45 p.m.	Luncheon at Fair
	4:30 p.m.	Depart Netherlands
	5:00 p.m.	Arrive Brussels

II. TALKING
PAPERS

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Brussels, November 6, 1963.


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Dear Mr. Vice President:

While I realize you are very fully briefed on our relations with Belgium, I am enclosing three short papers we have prepared as of possible use in your conversations with Foreign Minister Spaak and other officials. Rather than trying to cover the waterfront, we have emphasized the major items of interest in United States-Belgian relations and have included a brief review of the Belgian political scene plus a statement of United States policy objectives toward Belgium.

We are looking forward eagerly to your arrival tomorrow. With every good wish and warm personal regards,

Sincerely yours,



Douglas MacArthur II

Enclosures:

1. Notes for lunch with Spaak and Dequae.
2. Belgian Political Situation.
3. United States Objectives in Belgium.

The Vice President
of the United States of America.

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By mmg, N. R., J. 3/21/97

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Brussels, November 6, 1963.

~~SECRET~~

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The Vice President
of the United States of America.

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE BENELUX COUNTRIES
November 3-10, 1963

TALKING POINTS PAPER

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES - ALBERT WEHRER High Authority,
European Coal and Steel Community

Topics the Vice President Should Raise:

1. European Integration and Atlantic Partnership.

The U.S. continues to support an increasingly united Europe and Atlantic Partnership. We hope that the European integration movement will assume a liberal outward-looking character.

2. Our Atlantic Objectives.

Essential to the close cooperation of the European nations and the U.S. are the following elements of U.S. foreign policy: NATO, the bedrock of our Atlantic defenses; the Multi-Lateral Force, as the most effective force for those defenses; the OECD, which provides the means for consultation among governments on economic problems; and the forthcoming Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations for reducing barriers to greater international trade.

3. Proposed Steel Tariff Increases.

The U.S. opposes any increase in steel tariffs by the Community because (a) tariff increases would not solve the problem, (b) the problem is world-wide, not only European, (c) there would be an adverse effect on the Kennedy Round, and (d) it would encourage other protectionist tendencies in the U.S. and elsewhere.

Drafted by:

EUR/RPE - Mr. Sheimbaum

Cleared by:

EUR/RPM - Mr. VanHollen

E/TA - Mr. Lande

S/S-S:Mr. I. L. Fuller, Room 7239, Ext. 7552


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By smg, NARS, Date 3/21/77

VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE BENELUX COUNTRIES
November 3-10, 1963

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES -- SICCO MANSHOLT -- VICE PRESIDENT
EEC COMMISSION

(Equally applicable for discussions with Benelux leaders)

Topics the Vice President Should Raise:

L. Atlantic Partnership and European Integration

Recommended U.S. Position

We continue to support an increasingly united Europe as a bulwark of the evolving Atlantic Partnership of which the President spoke in Frankfurt on June 25. This Partnership continues, however, to need new sources of strength and a sense of vitality and timely purpose. We are gratified that the vast majority of Europeans recognize the necessity to resume movement toward closer unification as a basic requisite of the Partnership. We hope that the European integration movement will assume a liberal, outward-looking character.

Anticipated Mansholt Position

Vice-Pres Mansholt is a strong supporter of the Atlantic Partnership. He will doubtless reiterate his understanding and support of our position and will probably be optimistic that the Communities are finally regaining lost momentum. He will express relief that the "poultry war" has been reduced to manageable dimensions, thereby moving a potentially large irritant in U.S.-Community relations. He will indicate that the EEC program for the fall and winter calls for increased activity across a broad spectrum, including adoption by the EEC of its strategy for the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations next spring.

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2. Kennedy Round

Recommended U.S. Position

The EEC and the U.S. must produce together the leadership and political awareness of the factors involved to assure success in this major undertaking. A substantial reduction in trade barriers for industrial and agricultural products will stimulate both European and the U.S. economic growth and do much to solidify the Atlantic Partnership.

Anticipated Mansholt Position

The EEC will be ready to negotiate on this basis. The French may seek to limit the final results. But the negotiations are in their interest as well as in the interest of the rest of the Community, and they can be expected to come around to the eventual position of the Community. It would be unrealistic to assume, however, that the negotiations will be completely smooth.

3. Agriculture in the Kennedy Round

Recommended U.S. Position

It is essential, in resolving the issues of the moment in European agriculture -- the grain price level for the 1964-65 market and regulations on beef, rice and dairy products -- that the Community recognizes the possible serious consequences to third countries that would result from working itself into non-negotiable positions. We are willing to examine all agricultural issues, domestic and foreign, in preparing for this phase of the Kennedy Round. We trust that the Community is similarly disposed.

Anticipated Mansholt Position

These are complex issues to which the Community is now addressing itself. It will be difficult to accommodate the wishes of France, Europe's major agricultural producer, the German farmer, and other important elements in European agriculture.

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4. Proposed Steel Tariff Increases

Recommended U.S. Position

We are strongly opposed to any increase in tariff on iron and steel because of the generally adverse effect this would have on the Kennedy Round and the encouragement it would provide to protectionist tendencies in the U.S. as well as other steel industries. We hope that this issue can be discussed as a problem affecting not only the Six but also the US, UK, Austria, Japan and others.

Anticipated Mansholt. Position

Although this matter is not within the competence of the EEC but rather that of the ECSC, it would nevertheless be unwise for the Six to take such a measure at this time.

Topics Mansholt. May Raise:

1. EEC Program

Anticipated Mansholt. Position

The Community is regaining its purposeful drive. It has undertaken a large program of activity for the fall and winter, both internally and with regard to its external relations. These include:

- a. Movement toward a fusion of the executive bodies of the three communities,
- b. Preparations for the Kennedy Round,
- c. Settlement of outstanding agricultural issues cited above,
- d. Resumption of the dialogue with the UK through the forum of the Western European Union (WEU), and
- e. Consideration of a number of applications for closer relations, essentially agreements for association and trade agreements, between third countries and the Common Market.

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Recommended U.S. Position

This ambitious program appears to offer possibilities for the EEC to move forward on the Atlantic as well as European scale.

Drafted by:
EUR:RPE - Mr. Kaplan

Cleared by:
EUR - Mr. Burdett
RPE - Mr. Renner
RPM - Mr. Van Hollen
STR - Mr. Norwood
WE - Mr. Beigel

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE BENELUX COUNTRIES
November 3-10, 1963

EURATOM PRESIDENT PIERRE CHATENET

Topics the Vice President Should Raise

1. Problem

The U.S. and EURATOM are negotiating for an extensive exchange of information on "fast" reactor technology.

Recommended U.S. Position

Success in the current negotiations would be a tangible contribution to the developing Atlantic partnership in the nuclear field.

Anticipated EURATOM Position

EURATOM and its member states also look forward to an increasingly close partnership with the United States in the field of "fast" reactors and other areas of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Topics President Chatenet May Raise

1. Problem

A proposed amendment to the EURATOM Cooperation Act would enable the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to supply up to 500 kilograms of plutonium for the EURATOM "fast" reactor program.

Anticipated EURATOM Position

Passage of this legislation would facilitate the success of the current "fast" reactor negotiations.

Recommended U.S. Position

There appear to be no substantive reasons for delay in passage of the pending legislation. Even if passage were delayed until next year because of the heavy Congressional workload, the Atomic Energy Commission is prepared to schedule production of the plutonium required as soon as EURATOM is ready to undertake a firm commitment.

Drafted By: EUR/RPE/REKaufman:spe	Cleared by: EUR/WE - Mr. Stone
S/S-S I.L. Fuller, Ext. 7552, Room 7239	

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October 29, 1963

VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE BENELUX COUNTRIESNovember 3-10, 1963

BELGIUM - King Baudouin I

Background on King Baudouin I.

1. Biographic Information: Thirty-three year old King Baudouin ascended the throne in August 1951 at the age of 21, after the abdication of his father, King Leopold III. In the early years of his reign, Baudouin was considered a shy, remote figure, dominated by Leopold, and thus shared the latter's unpopularity with a large segment of the Belgian public. However, Baudouin has emerged from the shadow of Leopold as an earnest young monarch, increasingly capable of independent decision. The King is the symbol of unity in a nation historically divided by the Flemish (Dutch-speaking)--Walloon (French-speaking) split. Baudouin is extremely favorably disposed to the United States, an attitude reflected in his friendly manner with Americans. The King and his Spanish wife, Queen Fabiola, have no children. (Queen Fabiola suffered miscarriages in 1961 and August of this year.)

2. Visits to the United States: Baudouin visited the United States in 1949 and again in May 1959 on a State Visit at the invitation of President Eisenhower. The latter tour, his first official visit to any country, was an enormous success and greatly increased his popularity in Belgium. During this visit, he addressed a joint session of the Congress, and the Vice President presumably met him on this occasion.

3. Visits of Prince Albert to the United States: The King's younger brother, Prince Albert, has visited the United States three times: in September-November 1955 as a Belgian Naval Lieutenant; in October 1960 as the Head of a Belgian Trade Mission seeking to expand US investments in Belgium; and in February of this year on a trade and commercial mission, when he also visited Canada. The President gave a lunch for him on February 26 (the Vice President was invited to this lunch but regretted).

Drafted by:	Cleared by
EUR/WE - Mr. Andrews	WE - Mr. Stone
S/S-S: I. L. Fuller, Room 7239, Ext. 7552	

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE BENELUX COUNTRIES

November 3-10, 1963

BELGIUM - Prime Minister - Theodore Lefevre

1. Biographic Information: Lefevre has headed the present Social-Christian-Socialist coalition government since April 1961. This is the first Cabinet post which Lefevre has held. He has been a representative in the Chamber of Deputies since 1946 and was president of the Social-Christian (Catholic) Party from 1950 to 1961. Lefevre is a firm believer in European integration and has been a particularly active member of the Action Committee for a United States of Europe. He visited the United States on a Leader Grant in 1954 and is very well disposed towards the United States.

2. Points for the Vice President to Make: Since the Vice President's meeting with Prime Minister Lefevre is in the nature of a courtesy call, it is not expected that the conversation will be of a substantive character. Nevertheless, the Vice President may wish: (a) to underline our concepts of a united Europe and an Atlantic partnership in view of Lefevre's interest in European unity; and (b) to express our appreciation for the constructive role which Belgium has played in the Congo in cooperation with the United States. We hope that Belgium will be able to play an increasing role in providing economic and technical aid for the Congo.

Drafted by:	Cleared by:
EUR/WE - Mr. Andrews	WE - Mr. Stone
	AFC - Mr. Ford
S/S-S: I. L. Fuller, Ext. 7552, Room 7239	

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE BENELUX COUNTRIES

November 3-10, 1963

LUXEMBOURG - Grand Duchess Charlotte

Background on Grand Duchess Charlotte:

1. Biographic Information. The Grand Duchess is the chief of state with the longest continuous tenure in the world today (44 years), having reigned since January 1919. She is married to Prince Felix of Bourbon-Parma and they have 6 children and 23 grandchildren. The Grand Duchess, who is now 67, is expected to retire in early 1964 and will be succeeded by her son, Prince Jean. However, no official announcement has yet been made of her retirement so it should not be referred to in any conversations.

2. Role During World War II. The Grand Duchess is a particularly revered figure in Luxembourg for her role during the last war. She was persuaded to leave Luxembourg when the Germans invaded in 1940 and barely escaped across the border. President Roosevelt sent a destroyer to Lisbon in 1940 to bring her to the United States, and upon her arrival received her at the White House. She spent the war years in Canada (the Government-in-Exile was established in Montreal) and made frequent trips to the United States. The friendship and support for the cause of free Luxembourg which she found in this country during those years made a strong impression upon her and Luxembourg generally.

3. State Visit to the United States, April 29-May 4, 1963. The Grand Duchess's state visit 6 months ago was a great success, and she was extremely pleased with the reception given her. She stopped briefly in Philadelphia before coming to Washington, and then visited Chicago (where there are 200,000 Luxembourg-Americans) and Cape Canaveral. The Vice President met the Grand Duchess at the President's State Dinner on April 30 as well as at the lunch hosted by the Grand Duchess the following day in honor of the President (the lunch was given at the residence of Luxembourg Ambassador Georges Heisbourg).

Drafted by:

Cleared by:

EUR/WE - Mr. Andrews WE - Mr. Stone

S/S-S: I. L. Fuller, Room 7239, Ext. 7552

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October 29, 1963

VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE BENELUX COUNTRIES

November 3-10, 1963

NETHERLANDS - Prime Minister - Victor G. M. Marijnen

1. Biographic Information: At 46 years of age the Prime Minister is younger and less experienced than many of his colleagues. He studied law and economics and, until his appointment to his present position in July this year, spent almost his entire career in the agricultural field. In the previous government Mr. Marijnen was Minister of Agriculture and as such visited Canada and the United States in the fall of 1962 for discussions with his counterparts. He is ambitious, intelligent, affable and articulate. He is married and is the father of six children. He enjoys camping as a hobby.

2. Attitudes: In his previous position Mr. Marijnen was the only EEC Agriculture Minister to favor a liberal trade policy for the Common Market. He opposes any tendency on the part of the Common Market to follow an excessively protectionist agriculture policy. However, as Prime Minister he may be forced to accept some compromise in the basically liberal Dutch attitude on EEC trade questions.

Mr. Marijnen seems anxious to increase the stature of the office of Prime Minister and has been at cross purposes with his strong-willed Foreign Minister on at least one occasion when he attempted to play a more active role in Dutch foreign affairs.

3. Topics for Conversation: Although this meeting is only a courtesy call, the Prime Minister will be interested in hearing U.S. Government views on the present state of and prospects for East-West relations following ratification of the Test Ban Treaty. He would also be interested in discussing U.S. Common Market relations.

Drafted by:	Cleared by:
EUR/WE - Mr. Andrews	WE - Mr. Stone
	EUR - Mr. Burdett
S/S-S: I. L. Fuller, Room 7239, Ext. 7552	

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III. BACKGROUND
PAPERS

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October 28, 1963

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE BENELUX COUNTRIES

November 3-10, 1963

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BACKGROUND PAPER

East-West Relations - Political and Economic

Summary:

The current general state of East-West relations can be described as one of somewhat reduced tension and of certain opportunities. That there has been some improvement can be seen by the partial test ban treaty, the United Nations resolution against nuclear weapons in orbit, the new policy on Western wheat sales to the USSR and Bloc states, the fact that recently the Soviets and Rumanians ceased jamming the BBC and the Voice of America, and the assertions of autonomy and nationalism in the Eastern European states. That the improvement is limited can best be seen by the recent Soviet harassment of US and British convoys on the Berlin autobahn. This improvement does not constitute anything approaching a breakthrough in the cold war, nor do we expect that it will lead to solutions of the major East-West issues. We can, however, hope for further improvement in a number of more minor issues. These would most probably be in the field of bilateral US relations with the USSR and Bloc countries, or some limited arms control measures, possibly ones taken unilaterally.

Background of Soviet Position:

Soviet aims remain unchanged. The Soviets have, however, modified their assessment of their means to achieve their aims. Most importantly, they have come to recognize the

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facts of the nuclear power equation. For some time, they have recognized that war, in the nuclear age, can no longer be considered as an extension of foreign policy. The failure of their Cuban adventure brought home to them the realization that Western strength made it too dangerous for them to use even the threat of nuclear war. Moreover, recent history has confirmed that a militant Soviet line tends to create an increase in Western strength -- the Western build-up at the time of the Berlin crisis is a clear example to them.

A theoretical possibility for the Soviets would be to engage in a crash military build-up, in the hopes of overtaking the West to the extent that they could again hope to use their power to back a virulent foreign policy. The arms race is becoming ever more expensive, however, and the Soviets probably question whether they could outrace the West. They are facing a serious problem in allocating resources, with such fields as the chemical industry and agriculture in need of more resources. Soviet wheat purchases have dramatized this problem. The Soviets, therefore, rather than engaging in a probably futile crash arms program would like to slow down the already mounting military expenditures, and to do so without affecting adversely the relative balance of power. They would therefore like to induce the West also to slow down its expenditures on arms.

The Sino-Soviet dispute has become another factor in this problem. It has

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become a major preoccupation of the Soviet leadership, which would like to avoid having to fight a cold war on two fronts. In this dispute, the Soviets have taken their stand on the principle of "peaceful coexistence", and would like to demonstrate its value. They would also like to isolate Communist China politically. To portray Communist China as warmongering and the USSR as respectable, responsible and peaceloving could assist in this isolation. The Sino-Soviet dispute, furthermore, has progressed to the point where the Soviets no longer see much usefulness in adopting a militant posture vis a vis the West in order to try to placate the Chinese Communists. They still, however, must take into account the effect that Chinese Communist criticism of their actions will have within the Communist movement. In short, the Sino-Soviet dispute can serve as a factor favoring some agreements with the West, but one obstructing other agreements, especially ones involving Soviet concessions.

Because of the considerations mentioned above, the USSR would like to achieve a spirit of detente with the West, and use this spirit to obtain without risk what it has been unable to obtain by a harsher line. It is trying, for example, to bring about strains within NATO and to obtain greater recognition of East Germany and of the status quo in Eastern Europe through proposals such as those for a non-aggression pact, observation posts, a Central European nuclear free zone, troop reductions in Germany, etc. If it finds, however, that it cannot otherwise maintain the desired spirit of detente, it might then be willing to reach further limited agreements with the West, agreements that are to the advantage of both East and West. Much, therefore, depends upon Western actions.

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Prospects:

We see little prospect for an early settlement of major issues, such as Berlin, or significant progress toward general and complete disarmament. On the other hand, we believe the USSR desires to avoid any major confrontations with the West, though as long as such dangerous issues as Berlin and Cuba remain unsettled, such confrontations can spring up. If the West maintains its strength and at the same time shows a willingness to negotiate on issues where this is possible, we may achieve further progress on some lesser issues.

For our own part, we think some progress may be possible on a number of bilateral US-USSR issues, such as the consular convention we are currently negotiating in Moscow, further cooperation in outer space, and expansion of exchanges of persons. As for international issues, there is at least some possibility for greater Soviet cooperation in certain fields, such as an agreement on legal principles for outer space, and some possibility for progress on limited arms control measures.

In the economic field, the US is reviewing its policy. The Secretary suggested to Gromyko talks on what could be done to improve Soviet-US trade, specifically mentioning problems on our side, such as lend-lease and various legislative obstacles. Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Borisov is now in the United States. Whatever the outcome of eventual talks, and of the US policy review, there should be no effect on Western European trade policies towards the USSR. The US has no intention of trading strategic commodities to the USSR, and in any case the US interpretation of what is a strategic

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commodity is more stringent than that of the Western European countries. US-Soviet trade in non-strategic goods has been a small fraction of the trade of Western European countries with the USSR, and any conceivable increase that might occur would only bring the US trade level part way up to the European-Soviet trade level. The US still believes as strongly as ever in the importance of COCOM, in the importance of not letting trade with the USSR in any item expand to the point of disrupting traditional trade outlets or creating undue dependence upon the Soviet market, and in the importance of limiting credits to the USSR. Should the US wheat sale materialize, for example, it would be for either cash or on normal commercial credit terms, and would represent private trade consistent with our standing trade policy.

Eastern Europe:

One of the most interesting recent developments, has been the increasing assertions of autonomy and nationalism by the countries of Eastern Europe, especially Rumania and Hungary. There have also been important changes in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the direction of more freedom for the individual. The pace of increasing diversity in Eastern Europe, national differentiation, and transformation of the monolithic bloc into a group of states with distinct and separate individualities has quickened noticeably in the past year. A significant factor in this process has been the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Because of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Soviet Union needs the support of the Eastern European countries, but is less able than heretofore to exert pressure on them. These countries now have the option of playing off, or threatening to play

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off, the USSR against Communist China, and of pointing to Soviet acceptance of fully independent Yugoslavia as a "socialist" state as an example that could apply to them. At present, the most fruitful area for attempting to exploit the opportunities these developments may present would seem to be in the fields of trade and commercial relations and cultural exchange. We therefore believe it important to distinguish between Eastern Europe and the USSR in the formulation and application of Western policies, particularly in the trade and cultural fields, and in general, as circumstances warrant, to apply a more liberal policy to Eastern Europe.

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE BENELUX COUNTRIES

November 3-10, 1963

Background Paper

The OECD

The OECD has begun showing signs of fulfilling some of its real potential for making a solid contribution to Atlantic Partnership. In our view, its primary function is to serve as the Atlantic Community forum for dealing with the common economic problem of the area.

Although the OECD has the legal power to take binding decisions, it seldom does so; rather, it relies very heavily on consultation. Consultation covers a wide range of economic problems. Consultation can be a fruitful means of finding answers to some of the complex problems which confront member countries only if Governments are willing to make the necessary investment of time and talent. The uniqueness of the OECD consultative process is that it depends primarily on the attendance of policy making officials from capitals who make or influence decisions in their own governments.

Concerting Policy on Issues Arising in UNCTAD

At the OECD Ministerial meeting which takes place November 19-20, an effort will be made to get member countries to agree to try to concert policy on the major issues arising in UNCTAD. Thus far, the Western countries have been in a state of disarray in their handling of this series of issues. The effort to concert policies is important both to try to bridge differences among the industrialized countries and to try to come up with a constructive response to the demand of the ldc's on constructive action.

Non-Tariff Barriers

The OECD is now dealing with some important non-tariff barrier problems. These include studies on the trade effects of anti-dumping practices of member countries and of border tax adjustments, import licensing procedures and government procurement regulations.

Agriculture and Economic Policy

The Economic Policy Committee of the OECD will initiate discussion this November of agriculture's contribution to economic growth. This will mark the beginning of an effort to find an effective means of having domestic agricultural policy looked at in the context of overall economic policy by high level officials responsible for the formulation of national economic policies.

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International Payments Problems

That the proposal made to the Congress for the introduction of interest equalization taxes was well received in Europe is due at least in part to discussions which have taken place in the OECD's Working Party 3. This is the group dealing with balance of payments problems to which Under Secretary Roosa is the senior U. S. delegate.

The OECD may play a significant role in the studies of International Monetary reform which is now being discussed among the Group of 10.

Meeting of Science Ministers

In early October there was a meeting of Ministers of Science from OECD countries (the first of its kind). As a consequence of the meeting, considerable attention will be given in the future to the examination of problems involving both national and international science policies. These discussions are expected to bring together senior officials from OECD member countries.

Development Assistance

There has been considerable progress in the Development Assistance Committee in dealing with problems of aid to less developed countries. Particularly noteworthy during the past year was agreement on a Terms of Aid resolution which should take DAC members toward greater liberalization of loan terms. A good deal of attention has also been given to the examination of individual developing countries.

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE BENELUX COUNTRIES
November 3-10, 1963

BACKGROUND PAPER

EURATOM AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

EURATOM

The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) consisting of France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries was established in 1958 as one of the three European Communities. It is responsible for encouraging and undertaking development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, including the production of electric power. There are over 2,000 EURATOM employees engaged in nuclear research. Its budget for a five year period ending in 1967 totals \$420 million.

Relations with the U.S.

a. U.S.-EURATOM Joint Program

In 1958 a joint nuclear power program was established for the purpose of constructing within the Community a number of proven U.S.-type reactors. An essential part of the program is a jointly-financed research and development effort designed to improve the performance and operating costs of three reactors to be constructed. While construction of U.S.-type reactors in the Community will be left exclusively to private initiative, joint research activities will continue at least until 1969 on a matching fund basis.

b. Supply of Nuclear Fuel

The EURATOM Supply Agency was created in 1960 pursuant to the EURATOM Treaty which provides that the Community should have the exclusive right to contract for supplies of fissionable materials. Although this statutory provision has not been fully implemented as yet, the U.S. has agreed to supply the Agency with approximately 30 tons of enriched uranium as well as small quantities of plutonium. Pending legislation would increase this total to 70 tons of enriched uranium and 500 kilograms of plutonium.

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c. Safeguards Against Diversion from Peaceful Uses

EURATOM and the U.S. have developed mutually acceptable safeguards practices which are compatible with the standards established by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Inspection reports on U.S.-supplied fuel made by EURATOM safeguards inspectors are made available to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

d. Future Cooperation

The U.S. and EURATOM are attempting to establish a close complementary relationship in advanced nuclear technology by means of joint research efforts and cooperative exchanges of information in the civil uses field. We now are negotiating for a cooperative exchange of information on "fast" reactor technology, a concept which gives promise of providing an almost inexhaustible source of cheap nuclear power.

President Pierre Chatenet

Chatenet was appointed to his present position as one of the three highest officials of the European Communities in January 1962. Although considered to be a follower of General de Gaulle, Chatenet has expressed public sympathy for an Atlantic nuclear partnership.

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DEFINITION OF A "FAST" REACTOR

Broadly speaking, there are two types of nuclear reactors being developed, "converters" that produce less fissionable material than they consume and "breeders" that produce more than they consume. Although "converters" are at present the most economical and reliable, they cannot make appreciable use of the relatively limited supply of fissionable materials on which we must depend in the long range future.

There are two basic types of "breeder" reactors, "fast breeders" and "thermal breeders". Both types appear to have great promise at this early stage of development. It is expected, however, that in the 1970s or 1980s the "fast breeders" will be commercially competitive with "converters".

An essential difference between "fast" and "thermal" reactors is the energy level of the neutrons utilized in the nuclear reaction. The neutrons emitted from a fissioning nucleus have very high velocities and are spoken of as being "fast" unless their speed is moderated to an energy level termed "intermediate" or "slow".

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October 29, 1963

VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE BENELUX COUNTRIES

November 3-10, 1963

BACKGROUND PAPER

The European Coal and Steel Community

Summary

The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the first of three European communities, was established in 1952 by the governments of France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg to govern the operation of the coal and steel industries in those six countries. Although the High Authority, the executive arm of the ECSC, has powers which have been described as "supranational", its effectiveness during the years has diminished.

Background

Politically, the ECSC, which was first proposed by French Foreign Minister Schumann in 1950, represented tangible proof of the desire of France and Germany to cooperate so effectively in the administration of these key areas of their national economies that war between them would be rendered impossible. Equally important, the supranational character of the ECSC was to provide an example of European collaboration at its best, the pooling of the power of decision in a vital area of European life.

As an economic entity, the ECSC was established to bring order to the myriad of coal and steel industrial complexes of the six member countries, mostly by eliminating inefficient production and thereby reducing costs and prices, eliminating restrictive practices, regulating the market within the Community, fostering increased trade in coal and steel in the world market, and promoting expansion and modernization of production facilities in the Community.

The Community was established with the High Authority as its executive body and the Council of Ministers as its top level of government representatives of the member countries. The Court of Justice and Parliamentary Assembly, which were established at the same time, now serve all three of the Communities (the ECSC, the European Economic Community and EURATOM).

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The High Authority has "supranational" powers over the operation of the coal and steel industries located within the Community which are binding upon the member countries. At its outset, the High Authority was an effective instrument. Its influence has diminished, however, as a result of the regularization of the industries involved, some deep-seated differences which have prevented the Community from making progress in key fields, e.g., energy and transport, and a lack of initiative on the part of High Authority members, some of whom are clearly lackluster.

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DEL BO, Rinaldo (Dino)

Rinaldo Del Bo was named President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) on 9 October 1963 to complete the term of his fellow countryman, Piero Malvestiti, who took Del Bo's seat in the Italian Chamber of Deputies.



25X6
25X6 Del Bo, 47 years old, [REDACTED] has held several high positions in various Italian Cabinets. He has served as Minister of Foreign Trade (1959-60), Minister Without Portfolio for Relations with Parliament (1957-59), Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs in charge of emigration (1955-57), and Undersecretary for Labor and Social Welfare (1951-52; 1953-54).

Del Bo is usually known by his nickname "Dino." He holds degrees in law and political science and has taught related subjects at the university level for many years. He was a Christian Democratic Party (DC) underground organizer during World War II and has been a member of the Chamber of Deputies since 1948.

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He favors "an opening to the left," contingent upon the Socialists' (PSI) willingness and ability to become effectively autonomous and independent of the Communists (PCI). In recent public statements on foreign policy, he has taken positions more friendly toward the US and somewhat closer to the center of the Italian political spectrums. /

Del Bo has only a very slight knowledge of English.

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
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WEHRER, Albert

LUXEMBOURG

Albert Wehrer, 68, the Luxembourg member of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) since 1952, is a career diplomat and international lawyer who has earned the unqualified respect of his diplomatic colleagues and the full confidence of the Luxembourg government. First and foremost a Luxembourger, he is also an enthusiastic but realistic supporter of the further integration of the Western European community, is favorably disposed toward the US and has no sympathy for the USSR.



Wehrer's long and outstanding career with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began in 1920 with his appointment as attaché. In the following years he was named, successively, to the posts of Legal Adviser to the Ministry, delegate to the meetings of the Assembly of the League of Nations and Secretary General of the Luxembourg Government. In 1940, after serving for two years as Chargé d'Affaires of the Legation in Berlin, Wehrer was left completely in charge of occupied Luxembourg, a position which he held until his removal and deportation by the occupying authorities. In the post war period he represented his country at various important international meetings or conferences, including sessions of the UN General Assembly and, for a brief period (1951-52), served as Minister to France and Permanent Delegate to the North Atlantic Council.

Alert and shrewd, Wehrer is said to combine a superior intelligence with a great deal of common sense. In appearance he is tall, broad-shouldered and solidly built, with an air of hearty well-being. A warm and hospitable host, Wehrer displays a genial personality and a robust appreciation of the material pleasures of life. He is an excellent raconteur and an expert hunter. Wehrer, a Roman Catholic, is married to the former Martha Prussen, described as a very pleasant woman and an able hostess. They have three children, two married daughters and a son. Wehrer speaks excellent French and German and some English.

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October 30, 1963

VICE PRESIDENT'S VIST TO THE BENELUX COUNTRIESNovember 3-10, 1963BACKGROUND PAPER

Proposed European Steel Tariff Increases

Summary

The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) is considering increases in its iron and steel tariffs because of the difficulties being faced by its industry. Firms are producing below capacity, prices have been falling, and imports, principally from Austria, the U.K., Japan and Eastern Europe (primarily the U.S.S.R), have made a serious impact of late on the Community's domestic markets. Inconclusive meetings within the ECSC were held on this subject on October 24 and 25. The issue is also scheduled for discussion at a meeting of the ECSC Council of Ministers on December 2. We feel that it should be treated as a global steel problem and have initiated discussion in the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development).

U.S. Position

1. The U.S. strongly opposes an increase in steel tariffs in general and particularly at this time because of the overall adverse effect such increases would have on the Kennedy Round. Such a step by so important an industry would provide a signal for other industry groups to press for maintenance of or increased protection.

2. The U.S. does not believe that tariff increases would significantly improve conditions in the steel industry. Most imports come from within the ECSC, enter duty free and would not be affected by the duty increase. The problem is one that faces the entire Free World, since industry in major steel producing countries suffers from overcapacity and generally weak prices.

3. The U.S. is under strong pressure from our steel industry and the steel workers union to maintain or increase existing levels of protection, since the U.S. industry is operating at much lower capacity than that of the ECSC. Furthermore, the U.S. is a net importer of steel products whereas U.S. export of steel products to the ECSC is rather modest.

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Background

We have provided both the Germans, who are the most interested in an increase of tariffs, and the High Authority with our views. We have also initiated discussion in the OECD so that most of the industrialized nations of the Free World can discuss this issue and seek an alternative solution.

It is apparent that not all the six members of the ECSC favor a rise in steel tariffs. The Dutch are reported to be resolutely opposed. Some of the others will evidently not impede action by the ECSC if on a "moderate" or theoretically temporary basis.

We are certain to obtain support from countries which export considerable amounts of steel to the ECSC countries. These imports represent a relatively small proportion of steel consumption in the Community but they are vital to the exporting countries, many of whom have a general trade balance not in their favor.

Our main objective is to dissuade the ECSC from failing to see the forest for the trees and urge them not to raise the tariffs and cast a pall over the Kennedy Round.

The following is a summary of Ambassador Leddy's statement at the OECD Council meeting on October 22:

The prospect of tariff increases on steel by the ECSC is a matter of serious concern. The effects of competition resulting from depressed prices, unemployment and underutilization of plant is characteristic of the Free World's steel industry at the present time. There is doubt that tariff action by the ECSC would solve the problem of the ECSC's steel industry, since the great pressure of competition in any one ECSC country comes from other producing countries in the ECSC. It would, on the other hand, intensify competition in other markets which could only react on the ECSC itself. Furthermore, the U.S. has a heavy deficit in its steel trade and its steel industry is operating at even lower capacity than foreign industry. Finally, tariff increases would dim the prospects for success of what may be the greatest effort in history to reduce tariffs and trade barriers and would intensify pressures in all countries for special treatment of particular industries.

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October 30, 1963

VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE BENELUX COUNTRIES
November 3-10, 1963

Review of Outstanding World Problems

NATO

Political Issues: The major question is how the Alliance can maintain its cohesion in the atmosphere of relaxed tension which has followed the signing of the limited Test Ban Agreement. We want NATO support for the continuation of the US dialogue with the Soviets. We will fulfill our commitment to consult closely with our NATO partners on those East-West issues affecting their interests. We are not hopeful of significant breakthroughs as long as the problem of Berlin and Germany remains unsolved. France and Germany feel that the Belgians are not "hard" enough on East-West issues. The Dutch take a less optimistic view of future East-West relations and are more sensitive to the French and German concerns.

Military Issues: Of the Benelux countries, the Dutch role has been the most positive. They regard NATO as one of the important corner stones of their foreign policy and their military commitments to NATO have generally come up to the agreed force levels. The Belgians also have given strong political support to NATO but the Belgian military record has not been as satisfactory.

US TROOPS IN EUROPE

Recent events, including the NATO BIG LIFT Exercise and Secretary Gilpatric's Chicago speech, have stirred up speculation about the possible substantial withdrawal of US combat forces from Europe. In reply to these concerns, we have made it clear that: (a) US has no plan to withdraw from its overseas commitments

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and will continue to have large combat forces in Europe; (b) at same time, US does not wish to preclude changes in future level of US combat forces overseas, on basis of consultation with our Allies, when there is agreement that such changes do not reduce the military effectiveness of the Alliance.

THE PROPOSED MULTILATERAL FORCE

(Our proposal of a fleet of surface vessels, carrying medium range ballistic missiles, multilaterally manned, owned and controlled.)

The United States, Germany, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Belgium, and the United Kingdom have joined in a Working Group in Paris composed of Permanent Representatives at NATO to consider in detail the basic elements of the MLF concept. The Netherlands may enter into these talks soon. Participation in the talks is without commitment to join in MLF.

NATO SYG Stikker, invited to attend Working Group meetings on a personal basis, decided not to attend because of exclusion of his International Staff.

BERLIN

The relative calm which prevailed last summer was recently marred by the Soviets trying to get one British and two American troop convoys to dismount from their vehicles at autobahn check-points. These actions caused serious delays for the convoys. The incidents may have been due, partly, to Soviet misunderstanding concerning the Allies' convoy procedures. The Americans and British firmly maintained their position and the Soviets backed down.

Berlin remains a major area of tension. The Western Allies are not prepared to permit their rights in West Berlin and their access rights to the city to be eroded by Soviet or East German action.

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MALAYSIA

Malaysia, proclaimed on September 16, 1963, is strongly opposed by Indonesia, which regards it as a "neo-colonialist" state and a barrier to Indonesian ambitions for hegemony on the area. Indonesia avows it will destroy Malaysia and has refused diplomatic recognition, severed trade ties, cut off communications and persisted in subversion and small scale armed infiltration of Malaysian territory. The Philippines has also opposed Malaysia and refused recognition.

We welcome Malaysia as a friendly, anti-communist state with an impressive record of economic development. We hold that Britain and Australia have primary responsibility for assistance in its defense. We have avoided open involvement in the dispute but have utilized our influence in an effort to restrain Indonesia and to repair the breach between Malaysia and the Philippines. The Foreign Minister of Thailand has undertaken to reconcile Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines and we support these efforts.

THE POULTRY WAR

The long controversy between the US and EEC over the increase in German duties on our poultry is (possibly) approaching a resolution--satisfactory to neither side, but tolerable to both. We and EEC have requested the GATT to appoint a panel to make an objective determination of the actual value of the trade affected. When this value has been established, we are planning to withdraw tariff concessions hitherto granted to the EEC in a similar amount. It is unlikely that EEC will seek to retaliate by making counter-withdrawals, and it is also unlikely that EEC will advance any acceptable proposals for resolving the issue otherwise.

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE BENELUX COUNTRIES
November 3-10, 1963

SCOPE PAPER

I. OCCASION FOR VISIT.

At the request of Secretary of Agriculture Freeman, the Vice President will open the U.S. Food and Agricultural Exhibition at Amsterdam on November 7. The exhibition will be the largest US agricultural promotion ever staged overseas. It is a cooperative effort of US agriculture and food industries with our Department of Agriculture. During a concurrent symposium of European and U.S. leaders in agriculture, public debates will take place on urgent agricultural policy questions facing the European Community and the U.S.

Rulers of all three Benelux countries have in recent years paid visits to the United States: Queen Juliana of the Netherlands in 1952, Princess Beatrix of the Netherlands in 1959 and in April 1963, King Baudouin of Belgium in 1959, and Grand Duchess Charlotte of Luxembourg in April 1963. In view of the Presidential visit to Italy and Germany last June-July, a visit by a top Government leader to Benelux has become increasingly desirable. Only one U.S. President has ever visited Benelux. Woodrow Wilson went to Belgium in 1919.

II. PURPOSE OF VISIT.

Psychological: There is a large reserve of good will for the United States in the Benelux countries. At the same time, these three relatively small countries feel that the United States often takes them for granted. The visit by the Vice President, as the President's personal representative, will demonstrate our real concern and interest in these countries and will have great symbolic importance for them.

Substantive: The Vice President will be able to (i) reaffirm strongly the concept of Atlantic partnership and its benefits to Europe; (ii) encourage Benelux to insist on a liberal European Community; (iii) restate the US commitment to Europe's defense; (iv) drive home the political necessity for the success of the Kennedy round; (v) set out US policies on agricultural questions and quicken interest in the U.S. Food and Agricultural Exhibition at Amsterdam.

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III. VISIT IN PERSPECTIVE.

The mission begun by the President on his visit to Italy and Germany can be further advanced by the Vice President in a visit now to Benelux. The Benelux countries are of particular importance to us in their collective role in emerging European institutions. They have generally adopted positions in the EEC which have supported U.S. objectives. The Common Market has reached a critical moment in deciding its own agricultural policies on which will depend its common external tariff and the outcome of the Kennedy round negotiations within GATT. Majority opinion in Benelux differs with deGaulle over NATO and the US and British role in Europe, but is anxious to preserve the economic and political gains of European unity. A high level U.S. spokesman of the stature of the Vice President can make a major contribution by setting forth publicly principles the United States stands for in the coming trade negotiations.

IV. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES.

Reaffirmation of Atlantic Partnership: The Vice President can offset doubts which have recently arisen in Europe over rumored withdrawal of U.S. combat troop units. He can emphasize our respect for the role of even the smaller states of the Atlantic Alliance as we move toward a real partnership with Europe, thereby offsetting the Gaullist concept of a Europe independently strong, its ties with the U.S. loosened. In this connection, the Vice President can emphasize the importance the US attaches to close political consultation on major East-West issues.

Encouragement of Liberal EEC: The Vice President will give encouragement to the liberal Atlantic-minded forces not only in Benelux but in other EEC countries as well. He can reduce the tendency of Benelux leaders to bend themselves to the will of the larger EEC powers and urge them to strive for Community policies that conform to European political and economic interests in an Atlantic setting.

Trade and Agricultural Policies: In opening the U.S. Food and Agricultural Exhibition at Amsterdam at the request of the Secretary of Agriculture, the Vice President will underscore the political importance the U.S. attaches to liberal trade

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and agricultural policies. His presence and his statements will help bring Europeans to realize the importance of the agriculture question and to support outward-looking Community trade policies.

Recognition of Helpful Cooperation: Belgian-American relations were seriously affected by the crisis that erupted with the Congo's independence in July 1960. Similarly U.S.-Dutch relations went through difficult moments over Indonesian independence and the West New Guinea problem. Nevertheless, both the Belgian and Dutch governments worked closely with us during both episodes in the face of frequently hostile public opinion. The Vice President's recognition of this cooperation will help erase the few remaining traces of resentment.

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BELGIUM

King BAUDOUIN I

Baudouin I, Belgium's fifth King, was crowned in 1951 on his 21st birthday, following the abdication of his father, King Leopold III. Early in his reign, Baudouin was considered a shy, remote figure dominated by Leopold, and thus shared the latter's unpopularity. He has recently succeeded, however, in reshaping his public image to conform to the role of popular sovereign, and has emerged from his father's shadow as a young monarch increasingly capable of independent action. His marriage in 1960 to Donna Fabiola de Mora y Aragón, daughter of an aristocratic Spanish family, increased his popularity.



Baudouin has an extremely favorable attitude toward the US, and this is reflected in his friendly manner with Americans. He visited here in 1948 and 1959. His 1959 tour was his first official visit to any state and it was a notable success. The King has long been interested in scientific matters and during his last tour he visited the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. A highlight of his trip was the impressive address he delivered in flawless English before a joint session of Congress.

Baudouin is tall and slender. Although he has a serious mien, he possesses a keen sense of humor. He is informal and enjoys outdoor life and sports, including golf, swimming, and sports cars. Baudouin has one sister, Princess Josephine-Charlotte, wife of Prince Jean, Hereditary Grand Duke of Luxembourg; one brother, Albert, Prince of Liege; a half-brother, and two half-sisters.

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BELGIUM

Queen, FABIOLA

Donna Fabiola de Mora y Aragón, daughter of a wealthy and aristocratic Spanish family, married King Baudouin I in 1960. Fabiola was educated mostly at home and, instead of a university education, studied nursing in Spanish military hospitals. Her cosmopolitan background is the result of extensive travel and long periods of residence abroad with her family. Fabiola is a devout Roman Catholic and before her marriage she led a quiet life consisting largely of churchgoing and charitable works. She was rarely seen in Madrid society. She has designed Christmas cards in her spare time and has published a children's book entitled The Twelve Marvelous Tales. The attractive, dark-eyed Queen has become very popular with her Belgian subjects, who shared her grief over her miscarriages in 1961 and 1963.



Fabiola is described as quiet and shy, yet gracious, serene and assured. She has a warm personality and an engaging smile. She plays the piano and guitar and enjoys swimming and tennis. The Queen speaks French, German, and English. She has mastered Flemish and uses it frequently, much to the delight of her Flemish-speaking subjects.

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BELGIUM

Prince ALBERT of Liège

Albert, Prince of Liège, is King Baudouin's brother and heir presumptive to the Belgian throne. The popular and dashing 29-year-old Prince further endeared himself to his people in 1959 when he married the attractive and popular Italian Princess, Paola Ruffio di Calabria. The couple has a son, Philippe, and a daughter, Astrid, and expect a third child this October.



Albert was commissioned an ensign in the Royal Navy in 1953. He has taken several cruises on Belgian naval vessels and has participated in NATO exercises. Duties of protocol, public relations, and sinecure positions, however, have since kept him away from the sea he loves and out of the maritime questions that interest him. He currently holds several honorary positions, is president of the Belgian Red Cross, and is active in promoting Belgian international trade.

Prince Albert visited the US in 1955 on a short educational tour. He came again in 1960 as head of a Belgian trade mission to the US and Mexico to stimulate American investment in Belgian industry. As a result of this trip, the Prince developed an increased interest in export promotion. He has since traveled extensively on behalf of Belgian trade, visiting Japan in 1962 and returning to the US in early 1963.

Albert is tall, blond, and handsome. He has a most pleasant personality and meets people easily. His hobbies are golf, skiing, motoring, and photography. Albert speaks French, Flemish, and excellent, but accented, English.

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BELGIUM

Theodore LEFEVRE
Prime Minister

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Theodore Lefevre has been Prime Minister since 1961. This is his first tenure as head of a Belgian government. He has been president of the Catholic Social Christian Party (PSC) since 1950 and has been a representative to the Chamber of Deputies since 1946. He has not been a member of previous cabinets.



Lefevre is highly partisan in promoting the interests of his party, but he has nevertheless shown a willingness to support measures which, though apparently risky and often opposed by other elements of the PSC, have eventually brought fruitful political dividends. He has strong convictions on matters of substance and a sensitive intuition for what will work politically. This combination has helped significantly to further his career. He weathered a crisis this spring when longstanding disputes between the Flemish and Walloons over linguistic legislation threatened to bring down the government.

Lefevre has a law degree. He became active in the resistance during World War II and founded a small clandestine paper. His political career began in 1945 when he was elected PSC secretary for East Flanders. He is tireless and zealous and has astutely maintained effective control over the diverse factions of the PSC. He does not, however, have the respect reserved for elder statesmen. Lefevre is a firm believer in European integration. He has been a particularly active member of the Action Committee for a United States of Europe.

Lefevre's belligerent style, his fiery temper, and his frequent use of undiplomatic language are legendary in Belgian political circles. When not engaged in partisan battle, he is reasonable, intelligent, and pleasant. Lefevre is well-disposed toward the US. He visited here on a leader grant

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BELGIUM

in 1954 and expressed enthusiasm about the US on his return to Belgium. A Fleming despite his French name, Lefevre is bilingual in Flemish and French.

He has a slight knowledge of English. He is 49 years of age, is married to the former Marie-Josée Billiaert, a Dutch woman, and is the father of two children.

BELGIUM

Paul-Henri SPAAK
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Paul-Henri Spaak has been Vice Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1961. He is widely regarded as one of the truly great "Europeans" and has been in the forefront of every major effort toward European unification. He has played a dominant role in the formulation of Belgian foreign policy. He is a former Secretary General of NATO (1957-61) and has led his country in constructively working for European and Western solidarity in the NATO context.



Spaak is a lawyer. Early in his career, he edited a radical socialist weekly and acquired a reputation as a violent left-winger. Since assuming his first ministerial post, however, he has gradually moved to the right wing of the Socialist Party.

Spaak is often compared with Winston Churchill in physical appearance and gesture. Despite his size, Spaak is physically agile. He is described as a bon vivant who sparkles with wit and charm and is renowned for his ability to consume food and wine. He often drops into a movie house to spend an evening, and seems to prefer this form of relaxation to reading, although he admits a liking for "whodunits."

Spaak is 64 years of age. He is married to the former Marguerite Malvey, daughter of a wealthy Namur industrialist; they have three children. Their only son, Fernand Paul, is Director General of the Supply Agency of EURATOM.


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WEHRER, Albert

LUXEMBOURG

Albert Wehrer, 68, the Luxembourg member of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) since 1952, is a career diplomat and international lawyer who has earned the unqualified respect of his diplomatic colleagues and the full confidence of the Luxembourg government. First and foremost a Luxembourger, he is also an enthusiastic but realistic supporter of the further integration of the Western European community, is favorably disposed toward the US and has no sympathy for the USSR.



Wehrer's long and outstanding career with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began in 1920 with his appointment as attaché. In the following years he was named, successively, to the posts of Legal Adviser to the Ministry, delegate to the meetings of the Assembly of the League of Nations and Secretary General of the Luxembourg Government. In 1940, after serving for two years as Chargé d'Affaires of the Legation in Berlin, Wehrer was left completely in charge of occupied Luxembourg, a position which he held until his removal and deportation by the occupying authorities. In the post war period he represented his country at various important international meetings or conferences, including sessions of the UN General Assembly and, for a brief period (1951-52), served as Minister to France and Permanent Delegate to the North Atlantic Council.

Alert and shrewd, Wehrer is said to combine a superior intelligence with a great deal of common sense. In appearance he is tall, broad-shouldered and solidly built, with an air of hearty well-being. A warm and hospitable host, Wehrer displays a genial personality and a robust appreciation of the material pleasures of life. He is an excellent raconteur and an expert hunter. Wehrer, a Roman Catholic, is married to the former Martha Prussen, described as a very pleasant woman and an able hostess. They have three children, two married daughters and a son. Wehrer speaks excellent French and German and some English.

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THE NETHERLANDS

MANSHOLT, Sicco Leendert

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Sicco Mansholt has been Vice President of the Commission of the EEC since 1958. He was formerly Netherlands Minister of Agriculture for a record-breaking period of 12 years. Mansholt is a prominent labor party member and sincere believer in European integration. He devised the Mansholt Plan for the gradual unification of European agricultural production and marketing under a supranational authority. Recently, he advocated some form of economic association between the EEC countries and the other member countries of the OECD.



Mansholt was reportedly enraged when General de Gaulle succeeded in preventing Britain's entry into the Common Market. He is said to have played a major role in winning concessions on domestic agriculture from the British and was particularly disturbed that De Gaulle's move came at the very moment when, in his opinion, the negotiations were about to succeed. Mansholt has been regarded by many as a possible future premier or foreign minister. /

Mansholt is intelligent and cool headed, has excellent judgment, and possesses the understanding, training, and experience required of a statesman.

He is friendly to the US.

He has visited this country on a number of occasions.

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Mansholt is 55 and tall, bald, and handsome. He is rather shy, but he has a likable personality and forms close friendships which he makes an effort to maintain in spite of his busy schedule. He is a lively conversationalist, particularly on political topics, and speaks English, French, and German. He is married to the former Henny Postel, an unaffected and attractive woman with an independent mind to match that of her strong-willed husband. The Mansholts have four children, live simply, and avoid formal social life as much as possible.

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FRANCE

CHATENET, Pierre

Pierre Chatenet has been president of EURATOM since January 1962.



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His performance, so far, has indicated that while not a zealot, he can be counted on to support de Gaulle's policies and will make no effort to seek any significant modifications.

Born in France on 6 March 1917, Chatenet was graduated with honors from the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques. Closely associated with Alexandre Parodi in the Resistance during World War II, he became chef de cabinet when Parodi was Minister of Labor. From 1946 to 1947 he held the post of Counselor of Embassy with the French Permanent Delegation to the UN. He was Political Counselor to the French Resident General in Tunis from 1947 to 1950, Counselor to the French NATO delegation from 1950 to 1954, and head of the French civil service from 1954 until 1959. Chatenet was appointed Minister of Interior in the Cabinet of his friend Michel Debré in May 1959, retaining that position until May 1961 when he was replaced, ostensibly at least, because of illness.

B-3
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A hard worker who never leaves his office until late in the evening, Chatenet has been [redacted] reportedly never happier than when in New York. Enthusiastic about modern art, and an avid reader of history when time permits, he is also fascinated by railroads. His wife, the former Jacqueline Parodi, sister of the French Vice President of the Council of State, has been described

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as a delightful person with a fresh, esthetic spirit. She does not, however, share her husband's enthusiasm for New York. Chatenet speaks English and is a Knight of the Legion of Honor. He is the father of one child, a son about twelve years of age.

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