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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#43d Report	State Conf. <i>State Co 2/10/77</i> <del>AMB. Stenenson's Presentation at NSC meeting</del>	13p 06/26/62	A
#50b Report	State Secret <i>State Co 11-15-76</i> <del>The Volta River Project</del>	14p 12/05/61	A
#54a Report	State Secret <i>Sanitized State Co 11-15-76</i> <del>Review of Policy Factors...</del> <i>open 3-9-09</i>	16 p Undated	A

FILE LOCATION

VP Security File, National Security Council  
National Security Council (II)

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#37 Agenda	NSC <del>Secret</del> 504th NSC Meeting	2 p 08/31/62	A
#39 Actions	NSC <del>Secret</del> 503rd NSC Meeting	1 p 07/17/62	A
#41 Agenda	NSC <del>Secret</del> 502nd NSC Meeting	1 p 07/10/62	A
#43 Notes	NSC Top Secret <del>Example</del> NSC Meeting of June 26, 1962	2 p 06/26/62	A <sup>4-16-82</sup> <del>sanitized</del> NSC 1-20-82 NLS 80-84
#43a Agenda	NSC <del>Secret</del> 500th NSC Meeting	1 p 06/21/62	A
#43b Actions	NSC Conf. 500th NSC Meeting	1 p 06/26/62	A
#43c Memo	NSC Conf. To Col. Burris from Bromley Smith	1 p 07/23/62	A
#45 Notes	NSC Top Secret <del>Example</del> March 28, 1962 meeting	4 p 03/28/62	A <sup>4-16-82</sup> <del>sanitized</del> NSC 1-20-82 NLS 80-84
#46 Agenda	NSC <del>Secret</del> 498th NSC meeting	1 p 03/27/62	A
#48 Minutes	NSC <del>Top Secret</del> <sup>Downgraded per NLS 92-61</sup> December 19, 1961 meeting	3 p 12/19/61	A <sup>4-16-82</sup> <del>sanitized</del> NSC 1-20-82 NLS 80-83
#48a Agenda	NSC <del>Secret</del> 495th NSC Meeting	2 p 12/15/61	A
#48b Actions	NSC <del>Secret</del> 495th NSC Meeting	1 p 12/19/61	A
#50 Minutes	NSC <del>Top Secret</del> <sup>Downgraded per NLS 92-61</sup> Dec. 5, 1961 meeting	3 p 12/05/61	A <sup>4-16-82</sup> <del>sanitized</del> NSC 1-20-82 NLS 80-83
#50a Actions	NSC <del>Secret</del> 494th NSC Meeting	3 p 12/05/61	A
#52 Notes	NSC <del>Top Secret</del> <sup>Downgraded to SECRET per NLS 82-95</sup> 11/15/61 meeting	4 p 11/15/61	A <sup>4-16-82</sup> <del>sanitized</del> NSC 1-20-82 NLS 80-83

FILE LOCATION VP Security File, National Security Council  
National Security Council (II)

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**NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE**  
**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#52a Memo	<i>All documents to NSC by 4/19/77</i> NSC <del>Top Secret</del> to Sec State and Sec Def; re: So. VN 7 p	Undated	A
#52b Memo	NSC <del>Top Secret</del> To NSC from Bromley Smith 1 p	11/13/61	A
#52d Agenda	NSC <del>Secret</del> 493rd NSC Meeting 1 p	11/13/61	A
#54 Agenda	NSC <del>Secret</del> 491st NSC Meeting 2 p	10/11/61	A
#54a Notes	NSC <del>Top Secret</del> <i>Sanitized</i> <del>10/13/61 NSC meeting</del> <i>open 6-25-93</i> <i>NLS 92-61</i> 1 p	<del>10/13/61</del>	<del>A</del>
#54b Actions	NSC <del>Secret</del> 491st Meeting 1 p	10/13/61	A
#59 Notes	NSC <del>Top Secret</del> <i>Sanitized</i> <del>July 20, 1961 notes</del> <i>open 6-25-93</i> <i>NLS 92-61</i> 1 p	<del>07/20/61</del>	<del>A</del>
#59a Agenda	NSC <del>Secret</del> 489th NSC Meeting 1 p	07/18/61	A
#60 Actions	NSC <del>Secret</del> 489th meeting 1 p	07/20/61	A
#62 Actions	NSC <del>Secret</del> 488th meeting 1 p	07/20/61	A
#64 Actions	NSC <del>Secret</del> 487th meeting 1 p	07/13/61	A

FILE LOCATION VP Security File, National Security Council  
National Security Council (II)

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	**TO BE SUBMITTED TO STATE DEPT. FOR CONCURRENCE**		
<del>#55 Memo</del>	<del>WH</del> <del>To VP from Col. Burris</del>	<del>Secret</del> <del>open NLS 037004-2 (862)</del> <del>1 p</del>	<del>07/21/61</del> <del>A</del>
<del>#56 Memo</del>	<del>WH</del> <del>To VP from Col. Burris</del>	<del>Top Secret</del> <del>1 p</del>	<del>07/20/61</del> <del>A</del>
<del>#57 Memo</del>	<del>WH</del> <del>To VP from Col. Burris</del>	<del>Top Secret</del> <del>1 p</del>	<del>07/20/61</del> <del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

VP Security File, National Security Council  
National Security Council (II)

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9/6/62

August 31, 1962

*Did not attend - B* 37  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in the  
Cabinet Room of The White House  
on Thursday, September 6, 1962  
at 10:30 a. m.

ITEM 1 -- RESULTS OF 1962 NUCLEAR TEST PROGRAM  
TO DATE, AND TESTS PROPOSED FOR REMAINDER  
OF PROGRAM

(NOTE: Paper to be distributed prior to the meeting.)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC ltr 4/19/77  
By mmg, NARS, Date 5/10/77

504th NSC Meeting

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NSC Control No. 94



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
RECORD OF ACTIONS

NSC Action

2456

Results of 1962 Nuclear Test Program to Date  
and Tests Proposed for Remainder of Program

- a. Discussed a draft Department of Defense-Atomic Energy Commission letter, dated September 6, to the President advising him of the status of current preparations for continuing the high altitude tests in the Johnston Island area and requesting his approval for certain modifications and additions to the test program in Operation DOMINIC.  
  
(Note: The Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense subsequently revised the draft letter and formally submitted it to the President. The President approved the recommendations contained therein.)
- b. Noted the President's directive that the schedule proposed in the above-cited letter was subject to revision to accommodate the next MERCURY launching, and that he expected the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission and National Aeronautics and Space Administration to maintain constant coordination in this respect.
- c. Noted the President's directive that the usual "Notice to Mariners" closing the test area be issued through regular channels at the appropriate date. Noted also the President's decision that any announcement or statement describing or explaining the continuation of the current test series would require White House approval prior to release.

September 6, 1962  
504th NSC Meeting  
NSC Action 2456

~~SECRET~~

NSC Control No. 95

7/17/62



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

RECORD OF ACTIONS

DECLASSIFIED

NSC Action

Authority NSC Ltr 4/19/77  
By mmg, NARS, Date 5/10/77

2455

U. S. Economic Defense Policy

- a. Discussed the memoranda presented by the Departments of State and Defense.
- b. Noted the President's directive that the State and Commerce Departments add to the statement of U. S. Economic Defense Policy contained in NSC 5704/3 any language considered necessary to reflect pertinent legislation approved by the Congress this year.
- c. Agreed that no major review of NSC 5704/3 was necessary at this time.
- d. Noted the President's decision that for the next few months, until further review, the level of export controls would be that existing prior to August 1961. Pending export license applications will be decided in accordance with this decision.
- e. Agreed that licenses for export to the Soviet Bloc of automotive manufacturing machinery would be denied.
- f. Agreed that as a complementary approach to U. S. economic defense, an effort should be made in an appropriate Allied forum, OECD, the economic committee of NATO, or other suitable forum, to draft a Western code of fair trade practices for presentation to the Soviet Bloc.
- g. Noted that the State and Commerce Departments, taking into account the results of action initiated under f. above, will keep the U. S. economic defense policy under continuing review.

July 17, 1962  
503rd NSC Meeting  
NSC Action 2455

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NSC Control No. 91

40

7/12/62



July 10, 1962

41  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AGENDA

For the Meeting in the Cabinet  
Room of The White House  
on Thursday, July 12, 1962  
at 11:00 A. M.

ITEM 1 -- EAST-WEST TRADE POLICY  
(Memorandum for the NSC from the Secretary  
of State, dated July 10, 1962, "Export Control Policy")

Discussion of reference memorandum prepared by  
the Department of State.

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Authority NSC ltr. 4/19/77  
By rmg, NARS, Date 5/10/77

502nd NSC Meeting.

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NSC Control No. 86

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6/26/62



NOTES ON NSC MEETING, TUESDAY, JUNE 26, 1962

(2)

Mr. Stevenson read from a prepared paper relating to broad U.N. objectives and the relationship of U.S. foreign policy to the U.N. He stressed the importance of the relationship with the U.N. and the significance of its actions in furthering U.S. objectives. He noted that the U.N. was fundamentally more aligned with the forces of freedom than it was with the elements of tyranny. In this sense, the U.N. offered a brighter prospect for reasonable policies and proposals of the West than it did for schemes of the Communist bloc. Mr. Stevenson listed the achievements of the U.N., and at the same time pointed out what the organization can and cannot do.

In describing U.N. activities in general and assessing priorities to tasks as seen from the U.N., Mr. Stevenson divided activities into military, economic, political and social areas. He assessed highest priority to the military area and listed as priority items the keeping of the peace, control of armaments, agreements on disarmament and nuclear testing, and colonialism. This political factor was included because of the current disturbing military activity in various parts of the world to eliminate the last vestiges of colonialism. Stevenson added, with emphasis, that the United States must devote its efforts to ending colonialism as soon as possible.

Mr. Stevenson dwelt at length upon the need for the U.N. and the useful purposes which the organization performs. He also recognized deep-seated opposition and continuing criticism, and cited past and future usefulness. ||

E.O. 12064  
1-3016

The President commended Mr. Stevenson for his presentation and asked that the contents of the document from which he read be made available to his (the President's) staff for further use and dissemination.

A general discussion was held upon the various subjects expected to come up at the Seventeenth General Assembly. Tactics and techniques for handling difficult items, such as the question of seating Nationalist China, were discussed in general, although no specific conclusions were reached. Mr. Stevenson stated that the tactics would be finally determined as the various issues arose. In order to reap optimum advantage from this kind of operation, he suggested closer liaison with the White House and State, and in this context reminded the Council of his efforts to keep Washington informed through his daily report. The President asked that closer attention be paid to our efforts in the U.N.

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Authority NSC 1-20-82 Ac: NW 80-84By new, NARS, Date 4-16-82~~TOP SECRET~~

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Mr. Bundy asked if there were any misunderstanding or confusion on our efforts in our U. N. Outer Space Committee and whether these efforts conflict with reconnaissance satellite activities. Stevenson replied that he felt the issue was clear, although he was not completely informed on the latter project.

A general discussion was held on the treatment at the President's June 27th press conference of the implications of the Chinese Communist build-up. The President seemed to anticipate persistent questioning on the Quemoy-Matsu issue. The President concluded that he would simply state that the United States has a treaty with China which it intends to honor. It will be noted that the treaty is defensive in nature and does relate to these particular islands.

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C O P Y

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June 21, 1962

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AGENDA

For the Meeting in the Cabinet  
Room of The White House  
on Tuesday, June 26, 1962  
at 10:30 A. M.

ITEM 1 -- U. N. CONSIDERATIONS IN U. S. POLICY: REVIEW  
OF PLANS FOR 17TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Presentation by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson,  
U. S. Representative to the United Nations.

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Authority NSC la 4/19/77  
By rmg, NARS, Date 5/10/77

500th NSC Meeting

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NSC Control No. 78.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

RECORD OF ACTIONS

NSC Action

2451 U. N. Considerations in U. S. Policy -- Review  
of Plans for 17th General Assembly

Noted presentation by Ambassador Adlai  
Stevenson, U. S. Representative to the U. N.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 62 4/19/77  
By rmg, NARS, Date 5/10/77

June 26, 1962  
500th NSC Meeting  
NSC Action 2451

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NSC Control No. 87

43c

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON

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Authority NSC Ltr 4/19/77  
By mg, NARS, Date 5/10/77

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July 23, 1962

TO: Colonel Howard L. Burris  
Air Force Military Aide to  
the Vice President

FROM: Bromley Smith, Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Outline of Ambassador Stevenson's Presenta-  
tion at the National Security Council Meeting  
of June 26, 1962

In accordance with the wish expressed at the  
National Security Council Meeting of June 26, 1962, the  
outline of Ambassador Stevenson's presentation is being  
transmitted for the use of those who attended the Council  
meeting.

Attachment:  
As stated. Copy No. 23

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Outline Of Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson's  
Presentation At The National Security Council,

23

June 26, 1962

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AS SEEN FROM NEW YORK

The questions that come before the United Nations include almost every aspect of our foreign policy. As a sample -- during the past year we have dealt with the Congo, Cuba, disarmament, nuclear testing, outer space, colonialism, Bizerte, Goa, Angola, West New Guinea, the troika, economic development, financing -- and I could mention many more, like Kashmir, Ruanda-Urundi and Southern Rhodesia which are before us now.

But with your permission I have concluded not to talk about individual cases but first to outline briefly U.S. objectives as we see them at the U.S. Mission and what the UN can do about them, second, to talk in somewhat more detail about some of the broader aspects of the UN, and, third, to conclude with a little moralizing.

If time permits, I will then answer questions, and, of course, I hope you will feel free to interrupt with questions at any time.

I. Basic Objectives of U. S. Policy:

1. Security of the United States and world peace --
  - a) By maintaining our nuclear deterrent;
  - b) By balanced NATO defenses in Europe;
  - c) By improving the anti-guerilla and anti-subversion capabilities of US, its allies and other free nations;
  - d) By earliest possible control, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, and
  - e) By improving international peace-keeping machinery.

Note that only the latter two security objectives have any large component of United Nations responsibility.

2. Peaceful

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Authority State Sec 2/10/77

By rmg, NARS, Date 6/14/77

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2. Peaceful evolution in freedom and diversity --

- a) By strengthening international institutions to the point where it becomes politically unacceptable to use force in international relations;
- b) By strengthening the solidarity of the Atlantic community;
- c) By aiding Asia, Africa and Latin-America;
  - 1) to improve their military and other anti-subversive capabilities;
  - 2) to progress toward political maturity, economic and social reform, and
  - 3) by rapid economic development in the less developed areas;
  - 4) in areas which are not yet independent, to achieve it at an early date under circumstances most conducive to stability and as Western an orientation as possible.

II. UN Capabilities in relation to these Policies:

1. UN cannot

- a) Provide a military deterrent to major aggression,
- b) Prevent or settle direct clashes between Great Powers, though it can in some cases facilitate settlement,
- c) Force control or reduction of armaments, though it will exert increasingly heavy political pressure in this direction,
- d) Consistently check infiltration, subversion or guerilla action,
- e) And it cannot significantly direct or affect regional groupings.

2. UN can

- a) Play increasingly significant role in settling or cooling off major and minor international disputes, both before and after they become

acute

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acute -- (Congo, Kashmir, New Guinea). It does this (a) by providing impartial third party machinery which would otherwise not be available -- such as conciliators, mediators, commissions, etc; (b) by being a place to "blow off steam" -- debate and resolutions in themselves are often alternatives to violence on the ground; (c) by affecting the political climate -- a UN resolution, while not solving an issue, may alter the political balance of forces by throwing UN influence one way or another, e.g. Algeria and Angola, Cyprus; (d) by providing physical "presences" to avert or stop conflicts -- The UN presence in Jordan, the SC mission in Laos in 1959, observers in Lebanon in 1958, UNTSO in Palestine, UNEF on the UAR-Israeli Armistice Line, UNMO's in Kashmir -- UNOC in the Congo and soon a UN presence in Ruanda-Urundi; (e) the influence of the office of the Secretary General (U.S. flyers in Communist China).

It is through these unique facilities -- otherwise not available in international relations -- that the UN can be most effectively used. It is our job to see that they are intelligently applied in our interest.

What else can it do?

- b) Facilitate arms control and reduction agreements, and their implementation -- (Geneva),
- c) Play increasing role in nation-building through strengthening political maturity and economic development in new nations -- (experience in UN - technical assistance, special fund, regional economic commissions.)
- d) In new states which are not adequately prepared for independence -- but are about to achieve it anyway -- a UN presence can also be a buffer against Soviet penetration efforts. This was true in the Congo and may prove true in Angola and Mozambique in the future. The extremists will get covert help from USSR; we may be able to keep it out through UN.
- e) Continue to build a web of international structures in which the Soviet Union participates, so constructed as to increasingly raise the political costs for using force in international relations and to substitute institutional means for the settlement of disputes.

### III. Priorities

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III. Priorities in Execution of U.S. Policies as seen from New York:

1. Security

- a) Military deterrents are, we understand, on the whole, in good shape and should have less public emphasis. Too much talk of nuclear sharing etc. (reveals allied disagreements and unpopular military emphasis);
- b) Control and reduction of nuclear weapons systems requires, in the interest of US national security, the most intense and urgent concentration next to colonialism, disarmament, especially nuclear, commands most universal and emotional interest;
- c) Anti-guerilla and conventional capabilities of ourselves and our allies now receiving proper priority attention, we understand;
- d) UN presence should be used more in anti-guerilla, anti-subversion and colonial contexts.

After security policies comes, in order of priority

2. Political and Economic

- a) In absence of major war or of serious economic stagnation in West, critical theatre of East-West struggle will be Asia, Africa and Latin America. (While we don't deprecate the importance of Europe we don't deal (yet) with Berlin or provocations of rearmed Germany),
- b) Urgent objectives in these areas are progress toward independence in non-self-governing areas and toward political maturity and economic development everywhere,
- c) Instruments are international and regional institutions and national and international programs. Examples?,
- d) UN and

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- d) UN and its agencies in themselves constitute most effective instrument for political education, and
- e) In economic development gradual trend toward multilateral and away from bilateral programs is desirable, though for some time latter will remain more substantial.

#### IV. Some More Specific Observations:

##### 1. Opposition to the UN

The UN continues to provide an essential instrument of U.S. policy and of our national security. Foreign policy is conducted on three levels -- bilateral, nation-to-nation; multilateral, NATO, OAS; universal -- UN and specialized agencies. All are essential -- we have many bilateral problems with Canada for example; we have many multilateral relations with our friends in Latin America in a constant effort to preserve the solidarity of the hemisphere, with our friends in Europe through NATO, the common market, the OECD, etc., and, finally, things like colonialism, disarmament and the cold war are of universal concern.

Yet, there is, of course, a small group of die-hard isolationists opposed to the United Nations on principle. There is a larger group that distrusts the Organization because of Soviet participation in it and a vague emotional belief that the Soviets have somehow seized control of the United Nations (and its Afro-Asian members) and are using it to undermine the vitality of the West. This latter group overlooks the fact that the United Nations functions under a Charter that reflects essentially the kind of world that we and most other members, barring the Soviet bloc, would like to see, though we may frequently differ among ourselves on how to achieve it.

This group also overlooks the fact that no Soviet initiative in the Organization has ever succeeded over the opposition of the United States; that the United Nations has repeatedly acted favorably on United States initiatives in the face of Soviet opposition, for example, in Greece, in Korea, in Lebanon, in the Congo; and, finally, that the current Soviet drive to gain control of the Secretariat itself attests to the failure of Soviet efforts to control the Organization through other means.

##### 2. Colonialism:

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## 2. Colonialism:

Then there are those who are concerned over the pre-dominance of new African and Asian states in the United Nations. This concern has two apparent reasons: (1) the preoccupation of the new membership with the colonial issue and the problems this creates for the United States, both in its relations with its European friends and vis-a-vis the USSR; and (2) the Charter principle of one state-one vote.

The preoccupation with colonialism does bring issues to the United Nations when debate is, in our view, untimely and more likely to exacerbate than to alleviate a situation -- for example, the recent decision of the Assembly to inscribe on the agenda of this resumed session the question of Southern Rhodesia. It also leads to irresponsible Assembly action on occasion. Independence for the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi at this time without Belgian troops to keep order has the potentialities of another Congo, yet we cannot hope to defeat it. So we are therefore trying to develop some acceptable conditions to independence.

The obsession with colonialism has also made it difficult to persuade the new members to devote any real attention to the -- to them -- more remote dangers of Communist imperialism and has given some of them a strong anti-Western bias. (Guinea is a case in point. In one deplorable instance -- Goa -- this obsession led to the clear application of a double standard.) Finally, it cannot be denied that the colonial issue has complicated our relations with certain of our NATO allies -- at one time or another, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and most sharply, Portugal.

The US would have to face the basic problems here whether or not there were a United Nations. We have long been committed to the principle of self-determination. As the leader of the free world the US has a legitimate interest in the orderly progress toward self-government of those who have not yet attained it. The fact that this progress is faster and less orderly in some cases than we would desire is inherent in the present irresistible drive for independence by dependent peoples everywhere, and this drive does not originate in the United Nations. While the existence of the United Nations has perhaps intensified this drive in some instances by providing a forum and a focus for support it has at the same time provided a valuable safety valve, and the United Nations machinery has enabled the shift from dependent status to independence to take place with the minimum of disturbance and disorder in most cases.

There are

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There are some grounds for thinking that the new members are already learning the advantages in moderate and not too precipitate action. The chaos that followed the Congo's independence was a source of deep humiliation to the other newly independent African states, and while unwilling to postpone independence for Rwanda-Urundi, they seem anxious to avoid another Congo. The record of the 16th General Assembly on colonial issues, as against that of the 15th, showed a marked improvement.

An irresponsible Soviet proposal calling for independence for all colonies by the end of 1962 was categorically rejected.

Twenty African countries supported Premier Adoula in opposing a Soviet move to reopen debate on the Congo in the Security Council.

A Soviet bloc resolution on Angola calling for sanctions against Portugal was defeated.

While United States support of the moderate resolution on Angola adopted by the Assembly was highly unpalatable to Portugal, so was the basic position of the United States on colonialism and its bilateral policies in this field. There is a basic divergence in approach here. But the weight of opinion, even in NATO, is against the Portuguese position. On every one of the 20 colonial issues on which a vote was taken at the 16th General Assembly, the U.S. voted with the majority of NATO members and only Portugal (and, in some cases, France) voted against the moderate position taken by the NATO majority.

### 3. Soviet influence on the Afro-Asians

The impression that the Afro-Asians lean toward the USSR is erroneous. Of the 54 members from Africa and Asia, 8 are formally allied with the West. South Africa also remains firmly anti-Communist. The 12 French African states are Western oriented, as are Liberia and, in the Far East, Malaya. The remainder range from the moderate neutrals such as Tunisia, Libya, and Nigeria to the left-leaning extremists such as the Casablanca Group and Afghanistan, India, and Indonesia.

The Afro-Asians rarely vote as a bloc except on colonial issues and those of economic development and racism. And the fact that on these issues their votes coincide with the USSR rather than with the United States is not that they are supporting the USSR but that the USSR is supporting them. On some questions, it is in the United States interest to vote with them.

### 4. Afro-Asians

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#### 4. Afro-Asians and the Cold War

On cold war issues, the Afro-Asians split, with many abstaining. Their reaction to the nuclear testing issues is highly emotional, and here we may expect to find many of them supporting, as they did last year, irresponsible proposals unacceptable to this Government. At the same time, almost all of them voted for our appeal to the USSR at the 16th General Assembly not to explode the 50-megaton bomb and 36 of them voted in favor of the US-UK resolution calling for a nuclear test ban treaty with effective international controls. Their principal concern is a ban, with or without controls, and in this way they support neither the United States insistence on controls nor the Soviet refusal to consider them.

#### 5. Education through the UN

With the end of colonialism we should see an early improvement in relations between Europe and Africa and Asia with corresponding decrease in Soviet influence. And the situation will then be more favorable to developing among the new members a greater sense of common interest with the rest of the free world, which is essential both to their and our security. In this connection, their participation in the United Nations offers a unique educational opportunity from the standpoint of the West. For example, the disarmament discussions in Geneva have been of great value in educating the neutral members of the Commission in the complexities of the nuclear testing issue. Another example is the fact that it is only through the United Nations that many of these new states can become familiar with parliamentary institutions and procedures. Furthermore, the United Nations provides an invaluable channel for assisting the new states in their own nation-building, which, with disarmament, will undoubtedly be their principal preoccupation as the colonial issue recedes.

#### 6. The One-Nation One-Vote Criticism

The fact that Gabon has the same vote in the General Assembly as the United States does not cause me the great concern it does some others. The United Nations is an organization based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members -- large and small. This principle is one to which our smaller friends in Latin America and

elsewhere

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elsewhere attach great importance. It has not worked to our disadvantage in the General Assembly. Though we often do not obtain our optimum objectives, the action taken has usually been acceptable to us and where it has not been, it has offered no real threat to our national interests. The Assembly has only recommendatory powers, after all. Our views have not always prevailed in the case of some hortatory resolutions but they have almost always prevailed where some United Nations action was involved.

(I noticed that the recent Declaration of Principles issued by the Republican Party called for a change in "the method of voting in the General Assembly and in the specialized agencies so as to reflect population disparities ...")

It seems to me that the population criterion presents much greater hazards for the United States voting position than the one state-one vote principle. The populations of India and China so far exceed those of any other members that they are the principal gainers in any system of weighting in which population is the factor. With the rest of Asia they make up about three-fifths of the total population. This together with the fact that our friends in Latin America, and in Africa, are the principal losers under any such system, is not in our favor. Though the Latin Americans and Africans together constitute about half the United Nations membership, they have only about one-eighth of the population.

In any event, no suitable alternative to the one state-one vote principle has yet been devised.

#### 7. Doubts about the peace-keeping capacity of the UN

The United Nations Congo operation and the present financial crisis have raised doubts about its peacekeeping capabilities. But the United Nations resistance to aggression in Korea and the military operation in the Congo were both applauded in the first instance. When they proved costly to the United States either in manpower, or in money, or in both, and it appeared that they were unlikely to produce any final settlement of the basic problem for a long, long time, they became unpopular. It is now argued that in involving the United Nations in such situations as the Congo, we are shirking our own responsibilities and imposing on the United Nations burdens beyond its capabilities. I do not agree. I believe that United

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Nations involvement in the Congo was the only alternative to risking a great-power confrontation in the heart of Africa -- and that the United Nations continues to offer our best hope of shielding the developing states from great-power rivalries and conflicts.

At the same time, I believe the United States must be prepared to pay the large share of the financial costs of any such United Nations operations in the future, as it has in the case of the Congo. They are unlikely to be undertaken without our leadership and support and if we consider United Nations rather than direct United States involvement to be in our national interest, the cost to us of the former would be less than the costs of the latter.

#### 8. Conclusions

Let me conclude with some comments on the reasons for some disillusionment with the United Nations on the part of those who once tended to regard it as a panacea. In conclusion, it is not a world government. It is admittedly unable to impose any settlement on either the great or small powers against their will, though it can, on occasion, exercise a potent persuasive force. It is a reflection of the world in which we live and it is only effective to the extent its members permit it to be effective. However, it has repeatedly stopped hostilities and restored order -- even if only an uneasy order -- where the parties directly concerned were prepared to listen: in Indonesia, Kashmir, Palestine, Greece, Suez, and the Congo. Its mechanisms for peaceful settlement and change stand readily available for use if members desire or can be persuaded to use them and the consensus of its members, as expressed through the General Assembly and the Councils, represents a moral force that cannot be lightly ignored.

Perhaps the most important single impression that I want to leave with you is that we should think of the UN not just as a convenient repository for insoluble problems, but rather as an instrument of US policy which we should use to further our objectives.

It is a complicated instrument, of course, because it is also an instrument of the foreign policy of 103 other countries. But we are not without resources and skill to get our way where it matters.

It is

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It is also a limited instrument: if we want to defend Europe, the UN is largely irrelevant and NATO is essential. If we want to relate ourselves to the less-developed countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the UN is essential and NATO is irrelevant.

It is an important instrument, not only because it generates a great deal of the world's political noise, but because it now has the capacity to act: The UN system spends \$502.3 million a year, \$311.5 million of which is US contributions, to various programs and projects. The UN employs 33,494 civilians and has 22,600 troops in the field. It has successfully intervened in 9 peace-keeping situations (Palestine, Greece, Indonesia, Kashmir, Korea, Suez Crisis, Lebanon, Laos and the Congo) and has operated as the "third man" in a very large number of international disputes (current examples: Ellsworth Bunker on West New Guinea, Joseph Johnson on Palestine Refugees).

It is essential to make a clear distinction between what is symbolic and what is real in the UN. The General Assembly session we are just winding up contains one excellent example of each. The General Assembly has been (a) deciding the future of Ruanda-Urundi, making important executive decisions that will really affect the lives of five million Ruandans and Burundis; and (b) it has also been holding a big public protest rally on the situation in Southern Rhodesia, for which the General Assembly has no responsibility. It is notable that the delegates are a good deal soberer on Ruanda-Urundi than they are on Southern Rhodesia.

There is an analogy in the difference in our Congress between a joint resolution on freeing the captive nations of Europe, and an executive decision to move the Marines into Eastern Europe during the Hungary revolt -- which was carefully not done by the administration and not recommended by the Congress.

Throughout the field of UN affairs, it is essential to keep clearly in mind this distinction between what is talk and what is action. The newspapers do not make this distinction most of the time. But most of the UN delegates do make this distinction pretty clearly, and it behooves responsible Americans to be clear about it too.

It is unlikely that any great power, and probably no minor power either, is going to violate what it regards as its own security interests to bow to a majority of the UN or even to the principles of the Charter. Khrushchev has said this in so many words. (We have not, but only because we have had no need to.)

The differences

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The differences between the US and Soviet performances in the UN reflects the fact that the UN stands for a kind of world diametrically opposed to the Soviet vision of a Communist one-world; that the U.S. normally can agree with the majority of the members and the Soviet Union normally cannot agree with the majority; and that the Charter of the UN is an accurate projection of our own basic documents on the international plane and is anathema to the Soviet Union. And it is for these reasons essentially that the Soviet Union has cast 100 votes in the Security Council while the US has still to vote for the first time.

The UN is a politice-parliamentary mechanism which operates according to procedures which are familiar to us and unfamiliar to the Soviet Union, which partly accounts for why we do as well there as we do. Personally, I am much less impressed with the Russians now than I was when I took over this job a year and a half ago. In diplomatic maneuvering they seem to me to be rigid and often clumsy; and often they operate against their own long-range interests, as in boycotting the Security Council in 1950 and boycotting the operation in the Congo -- thereby excluding themselves from any influence in it or over it.

(We now have good pipelines into other delegations, into international caucuses -- good intelligence system in New York.)

It is well to remember that we were successful in all the major conflicts in the past year -- the election of U Thant and preservation of effective Secretariat, the Congo operation, the Angola resolution, the exclusion of Communist China, the resumption of disarmament talks in a suitable forum with suitable principles after 2 years suspension, and the defeat of all the Cuban complaints.

But frequently we can't claim public credit for what we've done because we often have to exercise leadership without appearing to lead, much less to dominate.

But there have been frustrations too, usually where we had the votes but the Russians vetoed any action, as in the cases of Goa and Kashmir.

There are many other frustrating, exasperating and exhausting things about the UN -- the speeches are too long, the parties too numerous, and the procedures need revision.

To conclude, let me say that building the UN is the world's toughest, most complex, most delicate, most advanced task of institution-building in the world. It is only seized of disputes after other forums and tactics have been exhausted.

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If we sometimes become frustrated by the inability of the UN to find a solution or by the fact that the solution it does find is a compromise or an inferior decision, we must remember that the UN is essentially a fire brigade. We are trying to solve issues that have become insolvable through traditional diplomacy. It is sometimes the court of last resort before force is used. National passions are high and the problems acute. Looked at in this context the UN record is very good indeed.

And the stake is no less than a future system of world order in which the US can find long-term security in the post-colonial age of atoms and outer space. In a small way, we are learning some of the essential operational lessons that would make it possible to organize a world order -- if we can ever get anywhere in the disarmament negotiations.

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1 3/28/62

NOTES ON NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETINGWEDNESDAY - MARCH 28, 1962 - 10:30 A.M.

The President welcomed the return of the negotiating group from Geneva, complemented them on their performance, and expressed pleasure that Ambassador Thompson, Mr. Bohlen, and Mr. Kohler could be present.

Mr. Rusk stated that he would discuss the conference in terms of the following specific subjects:

- (1) Nuclear test ban.
- (2) General disarmament
- (3) Berlin

He said that the principal conclusion of the test ban discussion was that the Soviets would not accept inspections. Gromyko's position was adamant and was even a withdrawal from that taken in previous discussions. He would accept no proposals which related to inspections in conjunction with the test ban. The smaller nations at the conference became concerned over the impasse but the meeting was not without beneficial results for them. Earlier notions of inspections as a form of espionage was clarified and apparently accepted and understood. The issue of the spaciousness of the USSR and the fact that even if all U.S. conditions were accepted only one part in 2000 of the Soviet Union would be visited in one year at the most. This seemed to make the long-standing Soviet charge less realistic. The representative from Burma reported after these discussions that if a secret vote were taken the count would be 12 to 5 against the Soviet Union. However, smaller nations could not take their positions openly against the Soviet Bloc for fear of retribution. Mr. Rusk said that Dr. Weisner's presentation was especially helpful in clarifying the technical aspects of nuclear explosion and effect. He explained with great clarity the difference between earthquakes and nuclear tests and in displaying the techniques of detection, satisfied the smaller nations that it was impossible to distinguish and that on-site inspections were in fact necessary.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 04-146  
By 20, NARA, Date 1-27-05

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The President asked if the type of presentation which Dr. Weisner had made and the issue which had been set forth should be made a point in his press conference. Mr. Rusk thought this was not necessary.

He went on to say that he anticipates requests from various quarters for postponement of U.S. tests. He was confident however that no nation would leave the disarmament discussions in Geneva because of the U.S. tests. In this regard, he observed that the discussions in Geneva could go on for a long time and thought that useful purposes would be served if it did. Even, he mused, the disarmament discussions could become a profession. With regard of timing of U.S. resumption, Mr. Rusk saw no time which was good for renewing them. He was certain there would always be objections from certain quarters, and that there would always be events or proposals which suggest deferment. He was convinced, however, that there was a military necessity that the U.S. should proceed as scheduled in late April.

On general disarmament certain progress was made although the Soviets have taken the unique position in that they will permit inspection of disarmed forces but not the forces which were retained. Mr. Rusk observed that the Soviets again proved adamant on realistic inspection as related to disarmament and reflected the same old penchant for secrecy. Mr. Rusk observed that the bedrock issue of all discussions was that of inspection. He observed that there were, however, certain possible areas of compromise which would be explored in further discussions in Geneva. Possible areas include outer space, non-diffusion of nuclear weapons, non-transfer, etc. The Soviets were particularly insistent that limitations be placed upon the availability of nuclear weapons to both East and West Germany.

Mr. Foster pointed out that which he considered successes, however limited, of the conference. He was pleased that agreement was reached to follow the U.S. scheme of the conference. This suggested to him that the USSR was less adamant than anticipated and was somewhat disposed toward negotiations. He admitted that substantive agreement was not achieved but felt good groundwork was laid for future negotiations.

Mr. Rusk came to the conclusion that the U.S. proposals to reduce forces clearly revealed weaknesses in the satellite forces. Further, the proposals to dispose of 50,000 kilograms <sup>grams</sup> of nuclear material revealed a weakness in the Soviet stockpile. He cited Soviet

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comment on one occasion that the 50,000 kilo~~grams~~<sup>tons</sup> represented an insignificant amount, whereas this off-hand remark was really intended to conceal the limited aspects of the Soviet stockpile. He went on to say that he was convinced that in addition to the secrecy argument, the Soviet objection to inspection was more a determination not to reveal their true weaknesses. Mr. Rusk said he sensed the effects of hard Soviet political and military policy simply would not permit Khrushchev to make concessions. When coupled with the risk of revealing Soviet weaknesses, the inspection which the U.S. demanded had little chance of being accepted.

With further reference to Dr. Weisner's presentation in Geneva and in deferred response to the President's question, Mr. Rusk suggested that the data and information of Dr. Weisner's presentation be sent to all appropriate U.S. embassies. The Ambassador and staff members could then utilize the information as necessary in the various countries to clarify, as Dr. Weisner had done so well, misconceptions about explosion, detection, and inspection. Mr. Rusk felt that visual aids should also be provided, and that such information and items should be distributed to U.N. membership.

On the subject of Berlin, Mr. Rusk reported no change in the substance of the Soviet position but he nevertheless detected a change in mood. The Soviets definitely indicated their desire to continue the talks on a bilateral basis. He and Mr. Gromyko went over the proposals at length and he found the Soviets unwilling to alter, but desirous of U.S. acceptance. While some of the proposals had been re-worded, the substance was the same. He noted a new Soviet proposal on access authority but found it linked to the removal of allied troops from Berlin. Mr. Rusk challenged Gromyko on Soviet harassment particularly in the air corridors. He reminded Gromyko that the U.S. and its allies could not be insensitive nor unmindful of these actions as related to the overall problem. Gromyko pretended to have no knowledge of unusual activity in the corridors, particularly the dropping of chaff. However, Mr. Rusk and Lord Home were somewhat embarrassed in their discussions of the chaff-dropping incidents when they discovered that the practice had been going on for years. The President mentioned that this had been brought to his attention and Mr. Bundy said that the whole matter was being investigated and he would find out why the military had not informed the political segment of these actions.



In conclusion, Mr. Rusk felt that the U.S. must match Soviet persistence and determination in its goals. The U.S. must repeat its policy and determination over Berlin as though playing a broken record. He noted a definite reluctance on the part of the Soviets to join the issue in Geneva and was certain that the Kremlin had given Gromyko no room for maneuver in his discussions.

The President said he would like to pass quickly to three points. First, on space cooperation with the Soviets he felt that the matter should not be left to Ambassador Plimpton in the U.N. and wondered whether or not a high-level negotiator of the caliber of Mr. Dean or Mr. McCloy should be appointed. He understood that Mr. McGhee was studying the problem of whether or not such an individual should be appointed and, more fundamentally, whether or not there is anything to negotiate.

The President then asked what action the U.S. should take in British Guinea. Mr. Ball replied that the subject was being studied and as yet he could give no final conclusions but he was certain that the U.S. should take no action nor make comments which would build up Jagan.

[REDACTED]

3.3 (b)(1)

The President noted the presence of difficult minorities in that country and he was assured that this factor would be taken into consideration.

Finally, the President asked for further study on the Indonesian problem and asked whether or not Ambassador Bunker's letter had been sent to Sukarno. Mr. Ball said that it would go out before noon. He also said that he had turned down on the previous evening a request for shipment of aircraft directly from the Boeing factory to Indonesia. Mr. Bundy expressed concern that the Dutch ships which had been on an ostensible courtesy visit to the West Coast had been diverted by the Dutch to Indonesia.

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Authority NSC ltr 4/19/77  
By smg, NARS, Date 5/10/77

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March 27, 1962

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in the  
Cabinet Room of The White House  
on Wednesday, March 28, 1962,  
at 10:30 a. m.

ITEM 1 -- GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS

Presentation by Secretary of State Rusk.

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498th NSC Meeting

NSC Control No. 62

47

12/19/61

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SANITIZED

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Minutes of National Security Council Meeting  
19 December 1961

With the President and Secretary Rusk in private conference, the Vice President asked Mr. Gilpatric to give his report on the Paris meeting. Lemnitzer spoke first of the general acceptance achieved for MC-96, the force goals for the next five years, superseding MC-70. He read a detailed involved report of the military discussions at Paris. He listed as two achievements of the conference, (1) the Norstad explanation of the atomic weapons picture for NATO planning and (2) the apparent decision of the Germans to participate more fully in NATO activities.

Mr. Nitze listed the important points brought out at the meeting as (1) the Turks' plea not to change strategic concepts of NATO, and (2) the Strauss plea for an up to date plan for a nuclear weapons command and control. Strauss made it clear that Germany was against sole reliance on nuclear weapons and supported the theory of graduated deterrence. He also felt that it was unwise to notify the Soviets of Western political or military intentions in advance. Nitze cautioned against the use of the expression "NATO as a fourth nuclear power," since the implications are undesirable and perhaps erroneous.

Nitze commented on McNamara's report to the Council of Soviet ICBM capability and assessed U.S. superiority. The NATO members were impressed by this statement and particularly by McNamara's and Rusk's assurances in this context of the depth of U.S. commitment to NATO. Nitze went on to report some of the difficulties of the meeting, such as the U.K. deficiencies in manning its units, particularly the Army of the Rhine. The British are presently engaged in the process of reassessing their entire defense structure and may find it necessary to evacuate certain long-held installations. Nitze informed the U.K. representative that the United States would not be able to take over British commitments in such places as Aden, Singapore, and so forth, if the U.K. moved out.



SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ

92-61

By WJP, NARA, Date 6-4-93



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Mr. Rusk referred again in Paris to the President's offer in Ottawa to provide Polaris submarines to NATO. He asked for consultation with the representatives of any countries interested in this proposal. Since no defense nor foreign minister came forward at any time during his visit to Paris to discuss the proposal, Rusk came to the conclusion that no country was particularly interested in it.

The President entered the Council meeting and was informed of the reports just presented. He then turned to the subject of utilization of Reserve Forces in the current crisis. He noted the hearings which will begin early next year and suggested that the interval be utilized for developing positions and arguments in support of our actions. He felt that the use of the Reserves should be defended vigorously, that the number of complaints and perhaps hardships were minor in regard to the whole operation and that under these circumstances he anticipated no difficulty in the presentation of a case. General Taylor added that the use of the Reserves in the current crisis follows a principal justification for the existence of Reserve Forces. Taylor went on to say that the increase of the Regular Establishment to 16 divisions would permit the achievement of a truly effective force for the long term run and the interim utilization of the Reserves in this particular scheme will have given the United States more strength than originally contemplated.

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(3+5)

Mr. Dillon reported that approximately half of the NATO finance ministers were present at the meeting and that the principal agreement related to the International Monetary Fund. He reported that the sum of \$6 billion [REDACTED] has been committed for utilization. Mr. Dillon received a report that General De Gaulle was well pleased about this achievement. The President suggested that Mr. Rusk prepare a letter to De Gaulle expressing particular satisfaction also with the agreement. Mr. Murrow requested permission to release the President's letter but the President suggested deferment since it would appear that he would be taking unnecessary advantage of De Gaulle.

The President spoke of the status of negotiations with the Soviet and expressed somewhat pessimistically his feeling that our efforts to negotiate with the Soviets will be unsuccessful. He felt a treaty would then be signed and the troubles would begin with East Germany not only on the principal issue of recognition but also on the incidental harrassments. The President asked for a release of a statement on Latin America and also on the Dominican Republic. He felt it quite timely to release the latter one in order that it might have some effect on moving the Dominican situation toward a climax. The President

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directed Mr. Rusk to work out a plan of action if the Congo talks fail. The plan should also include proposed press statements. While speaking of the press the President questioned the handling of the press in Paris and added that he felt it was not very well done. Mr. Rusk concurred and admitted that there had perhaps been a breach of security and certainly one of confidence by the British. (A British brigadier briefed the press following an agreement that no releases would be made.)

The President departed and Mr. Rusk began a discussion of the unwillingness of the French to negotiate with the Soviet Union at the present time. The French thus far have failed to accept the logic of the U.S. position. Rusk perceives in De Gaulle a feeling of weakness rather than the generally conceded position of strength, particularly because of the precarious political position of De Gaulle. In this sense Rusk feels that the United States has previously underestimated the depth of De Gaulle's truculence. The one action that Rusk reported from the Paris meeting was the decision to proceed with the Thompson-Gromyko talks.

Rusk discussed with NATO Council members individually the Cuban matter and asked each representative to review the situation in the near future. Rusk concluded with a pessimistic remark on the achievements of the meeting and observed that perhaps the Congo situation tended to reduce its chances for success.

Lemnitzer reported certain details of the meeting which he and Secretary McNamara had at Honolulu with Nolting, McGarr and Felt. He termed the meeting very successful. (He did not mention Secretary McNamara's principal statement at the meeting to the effect that the United States had made the decision to pursue the Viet Nam affair with vigor and that all reasonable amounts of resources could be placed at the disposal of the commanders in the area.)

Rusk reviewed briefly his meeting with Franco. He was particularly concerned by certain press reports which were somewhat critical of the U.S. association with the Spanish monarch. Rusk feels that the United States should make no apology and that continued association with Franco should be wholeheartedly pursued. He noted that a great amount of work has been and is being done on the transfer of power at the conclusion of Franco's tenure.

December 15, 1961

*Cancelled*

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in the  
Cabinet Room of The White House  
on Monday, December ~~18~~<sup>19</sup>, 1961,  
at 11:00 a.m.

4:00 P.M.

ITEM 1 -- REPORTS ON PARIS MEETINGS

For discussion of recent NATO and Four Power meetings  
following presentation by the Secretary of State.

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Authority NSC ltr 4/19/77

By smg, NARS, Date 5/10/77

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**INVITEES IN ADDITION TO THE STATUTORY MEMBERS AND  
ADVISERS FOR THE 495th NSC MEETING TO BE HELD ON  
MONDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1961, at 11:00 a.m.**

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**The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Attorney General  
The U. S. Ambassador to  
the United Nations  
The Under Secretary of State  
The Counselor, Department  
of State  
The Deputy Secretary of Defense  
The Assistant Secretary  
of Defense (ISA)  
The Director, U. S. Information  
Agency**

**The Special Assistant to the  
President for National Security  
Affairs  
The Special Counsel to the President  
The Military Representative of  
the President  
The Air Force Military Aide  
to the Vice President**



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Authority NSC ltr 4/19/77  
By hmg, NARS, Date 5/10/77

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

RECORD OF ACTIONS

NSC Action

2445 REPORTS ON PARIS MEETINGS

Noted reports by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff covering the recent Four-Power Ministers Conference, the Special International Monetary Fund Ministerial Meeting, the NATO Council, and the NATO Military Committee.

December 19, 1961  
495th NSC Meeting  
NSC Action 2445

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NSC Control No. 37

49

12/5/61

Minutes of National Security Council Meeting  
December 5, 1961

Mr. McCone announced that the regular intelligence presentation would be deferred because of the President's heavy appointment schedule prior to his departure for New York. He described one principal item of intelligence relating to an anticipated space shot by the Soviets within the next ten days. [REDACTED]

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25X1D  
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He anticipated that the shot would be a multi-manned or extended time mission using the same vehicle which carried Titov.

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Mr. Rusk called the attention of the Council to the Department of State paper on the Volta River Project. He went on to explain Nkrumah's more recent political activities, the status of institutions in his country and his position among African nations. Essentially Nkrumah has manifested more pro-Leftist tendencies in recent months. He has muzzled the press, imprisoned his opposition and sent many trainees to Moscow. On the other hand Rusk expressed satisfaction with U.S. aid to Ghana which has been limited mostly to agricultural products and certain technical assistance. State nevertheless has concluded that the United States should proceed with the Volta River project because of: (1) Earlier commitments, and (2) the possibility that failure to do so would turn Ghana even further toward Moscow. As far as individual opinions were concerned, Mr. Randall personally felt that the decision to proceed should be postponed (Course of Action No. 2, Section 5). His two assistants felt that the United States should proceed immediately and State concurred with this opinion.

Mr. Rusk attached considerable importance to a cooperative spirit and attitude toward the British regarding the project. He suggested that the subject be discussed by the President with Mr. McMillan in Bermuda, at which time the essential elements of the proposal as well as the time schedule which we propose to follow should be presented. Rusk then observed that Congress was not informed as to the findings and proposals and suggested that the key members of Congress be called for a briefing on Saturday, Dec. 9.

The President interrupted Rusk to state his feeling that the Congress would certainly object. He therefore felt it wise not to consult the Congress because of an almost certain refusal to concur, after which the situation would be worse. An even more difficult position would be created if the President asked the leadership for support and got it, only to find that the Congress later expressed its disapproval.

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By [Signature], NARA, Date 8/15/02

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The President investigated the degree of U. S. monetary liabilities and commitments over the years. He weighed the advantages and disadvantages to the U. S. in case Ghana should nationalize the project and also in the event that Nkrumah should at some future date suddenly unmask himself as Castro has recently done. He also weighed the adverse effect of U. S. withdrawal at the present time or at some future date before the completion of the project. He concluded that unforeseen events which might occur within the next three years could permit U. S. withdrawal at a maximum financial sacrifice of approximately \$25 million. The President noted particular concern for the fact, as brought out in the report, that to proceed with the project suggests that the United States does ~~in~~ in fact reward its enemies more highly than its friends.

Mr. Dillon suggested that a judgment be rendered whether Nkrumah will turn out to be a Castro or a Nasser. His personal belief was that Nkrumah was an ardent Communist and in view of his recent conduct the United States should defer. He would then revive the project if Nkrumah fell from power or at such time as the United States received greater assurances and protection. Mr. Ball felt that in spite of all this the United States was compelled to proceed because of the various commitments over the past 3-1/2 years.

Mr. McCone reported that he had checked with industry as to the economic feasibility of this project: Kaiser and Reynolds have the necessary authority from their Boards of Directors and, with their financing and plans, stand ready to proceed. He noted that the withdrawal of Harvey and Alcoa was for other reasons and did not affect the decision of the major participants.

Mr. Williams felt that cancellation of the project would severely damage the United States' image not only in Africa but in other places of the world. Precipitate cancellation or severely conditioned actions necessary on Ghana's part would revive and perhaps sustain the image that United States aid does have strings attached or is another form of imperialism.

Mr. McNamara concluded that the United States had no alternative except to proceed because of earlier obligation. From the report as presented however he was uncertain as to the nature and extent of United States obligations (*monetary*).



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The President observed that there seemed to be general agreement to proceed with the project except for Mr. Dillon's objection. He then read the entire text of his letter to Nkrumah on June 29, 1961 and found that his commitment was much greater than that inferred by the extract contained in the report. The President observed that he did not see how he could get out now.

Mr. Robert Kennedy recalled his earlier visit to the Ivory Coast. Certain African leaders informed him at that time that the United States should not proceed with the project without assurances. Kennedy felt that the United States should make no commitment without getting something in return and that some scheme should be worked out for doing so. The President then directed the Attorney General and State to get together and determine the most favorable conditions and demands under which the United States might continue and, further, to analyze the conditions and effects for United States withdrawal. The President asked for a detailed plan of action and cover for both contingencies.

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Authority NSC ltr 4/19/77  
By mmg, NARS, Date 5/10/77

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

RECORD OF ACTIONS

NSC Action

2444

VOLTA RIVER PROJECT

Discussed the recommendation of the Secretary of State that the U. S. proceed with the project as summarized in a paper entitled, "The Volta River Project," dated December 5, 1961.

Noted that the President would defer his decision pending a report to be prepared by the Department of State and the Attorney General on legal aspects of the project.

December 5, 1961  
494th NSC Meeting  
NSC Action 2444

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NSC Control No. 35

December 1, 1961

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in the  
Cabinet Room of The White House  
on Tuesday, December 5, 1961  
at 11:00 a.m.

ITEM I -- INTELLIGENCE PRESENTATION

To be made by CIA Director McCone

ITEM II - VOLTA RIVER PROJECT

For consideration of recommendations  
to be made by The Secretary of State.

494th NSC Meeting

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NSC Control No. 33

**INVITEES IN ADDITION TO THE STATUTORY MEMBERS AND  
ADVISERS FOR THE 494th NSC MEETING TO BE HELD ON  
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1961, at 11:00 a.m.**

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**The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Attorney General  
The U. S. Ambassador to  
the United Nations  
The Director, Bureau of the  
Budget  
The Under Secretary of State  
The Deputy Secretary of  
Defense  
The Administrator, Agency  
for International Develop-  
ment  
The Assistant Secretary of  
Defense (ISA)  
The Director, U. S. Information  
Agency**

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President for National  
Security Affairs  
The Deputy Special Assistant  
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The Military Representative  
of the President  
The Military Aide to the  
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The Special Counsel to the  
President  
The Air Force Military Aide  
to the Vice President**



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Authority State Otr. 11-15-76  
By Chiu, NARS, Date 1-19-77THE VOLTA RIVER PROJECT

This paper is submitted by the  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
for consideration by  
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
on  
December 5, 1961

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NSC Control No 34

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## THE VOLTA RIVER PROJECT

### Summary

The attached paper describes the Volta River Project, its proposed financing, the extent of U.S. involvement, and the pros and cons of the decision for the United States to proceed with its share of the financing of the project.

The paper notes three possible courses of action: 1) proceeding with the project, 2) withdrawing, or 3) delaying a decision for one year.

After assessing the possible courses of action, the Department of State recommends that the United States proceed with the project. Also outlined are various procedural aspects for carrying out the decision.

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## The Volta River Project

### I. THE PROJECT

A. Description: The Volta River Project consists of two geographically separate but interrelated components.

The first is a hydro-electric installation consisting of a dam, and a backup lake, capable of generating 589,000 kilowatts of electrical energy. The lake behind the dam will comprise a reservoir wholly within Ghana, 300 miles long, and covering 120 million acre/feet. (Lake Mead behind Boulder Dam, by comparison, covers 39 million acre/feet.)

This complex, in addition to producing power, will contribute to the food supply through increased fish availability, and provide marine transportation to some of the remote areas of Ghana. In time, some irrigation facilities should also be developed.

Coupled with the dam and lake will be a large grid for transporting the electricity to the coast (to Accra and the smelter) and inland in Ghana.

The second aspect of the project is an aluminum smelter to be built by VALCO, a private corporation in which the principal stockholder will be an affiliate of the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation. The smelter will be the principal customer for the power from the dam; there is a firm contract by VALCO to take off eventually 300,000 kilowatts of power. This power will operate the smelter which initially will consist of four pot-lines capable of producing 94.4 thousand tons of aluminum. The plant will be capable of expansion to six pot-lines with an over-all capacity of about 140 thousand tons of aluminum annually. The smelter is an integral part of the project. Without the smelter to take-off the power, the dam would not be an economic undertaking.

Tema, where the smelter will be located, is a principal seaport of Ghana and a few miles from Accra. The dam site is located at Akosombo, approximately 60 miles from Accra.

The dam and related power facilities are to be completed by 1967, although the Master Agreement with VALCO permits extending the completion date until 1972 because of force majeure. The smelter must be in operation two years after completion of the dam and power facilities.

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B. COST OF PROJECT:

The dam, power plant, and transmission grid will have a total cost of \$196 million. The smelter, initially for a four pot-line plant, has a projected cost of \$128 million. To cover any possible "over-run" in these cost estimates due to escalation in prices or as a result of prolonged delay in finishing the dam, provision is made for the availability of an additional investment of \$36 million. This makes the potential cost of the smelter \$164 million. The over-all cost of the project therefore ranges from a minimum of \$324 million to a possible maximum of \$360 million.

C. SOURCES OF FINANCING

1. Dam

Sources of financing for the dam, power plant, and transmission grid are (\$ millions):

Government of Ghana	98
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External Loans:

World Bank	47
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United Kingdom	14
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United States:

DLF	27
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Eximbank	<u>10</u>
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TOTAL:	<u>196</u>
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2. Smelter

Financing for the smelter is as follows (\$ millions):

	<u>Initial</u>	<u>Additional</u> (for overrun)	<u>Potential Total</u>
Equity	32	22	54
Eximbank Loan	<u>96</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>110</u>
	128	36	164

(The equity investment is guaranteed up to \$54 million by the Development Loan Fund against political risks, including expropriations, war risk, and inconvertibility.)

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## II. U. S. INTERESTS AND INVOLVEMENT IN PROJECT

U. S. interests and involvement in the project extends back at least to 1958 when President Eisenhower indicated a willingness to explore the possibility of U.S. assistance for partial financing of the dam. It was not until 1960, however, that we became conditionally committed to assistance in financing the dam. In 1961 we agreed to provide an equity guaranty and debt financing to VALCO for the aluminum smelter. A detailed chronology of U.S. involvement is appended.

United States financial exposure in the project consists of loans for the dam by DLF (\$27 million) and Eximbank (\$10 million), and, in addition, an Eximbank loan (of up to \$110 million) and a DLF guaranty (of up to \$54 million) for the smelter. The total potential U.S. exposure therefore is \$201 million.

## III. PRESENT STATUS OF PROJECT

A. The project is already underway, a contract having been let by the Government of Ghana to a consortium of Italian firms, with the knowledge of the United States and the IBRD, for undertaking the initial engineering work on the dam. This contract initially permitted cancellation on October 17, 1961. This was subsequently extended for another 60 days.

B. The Government of Ghana has already spent about \$15-20 million on the project.

C. Kaiser Industries Corporation has spent perhaps as much as \$500 thousand for preparations for the smelter.

D. The \$47 million IBRD loan has been approved by the Executive Directors of the Bank but has not been publicly announced.

E. The United Kingdom money is available.

F. Negotiations have been completed on the DLF and Eximbank loans and the DLF guaranty has been signed.

In summary, the project, from both the engineering and financial standpoint, is ready to proceed should the United States, as the largest participant in the financial package, give the green light to sign the agreements involved. If the U.S. decides not to proceed, it is expected that the IBRD and the UK will drop the project.

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#### IV. REASONS FOR AND AGAINST PROCEEDING WITH PROJECT

Strong reasons can be advanced both for proceeding with, and withdrawing from, the project.

##### A. REASONS FOR U.S. PARTICIPATION

1. We Should Fulfill Our Moral Obligation - Since early 1958, the United States Government has evidenced both in writing and orally a progressively growing interest in the Volta Project. This was capped by President Kennedy's letter to President Nkrumah of June 29, 1961, stating that "all major issues involved in negotiations for the United States Government's share of the financing of the dam and smelter have now been resolved." Formal signature by the United States was said to be only "contingent upon your bringing negotiations with the IBRD to a successful conclusion." With the approval of a \$47 million loan to the Volta River Authority by the Executive Directors of the World Bank on September 7, 1961, it can be argued that the United States Government was thus committed morally, if not legally, to support the project.
2. A U.S. turndown would be interpreted as an open renunciation of the Administration's oft-stated policy of aid without political strings - If it is deemed necessary or even desirable, for domestic political or other reasons, to change our aid policies toward so-called non-aligned states like Ghana, it would seem preferable to do this gradually and more subtly. To use the Volta River Project, to which we are so heavily committed, as the watershed for a major shift in our aid policy would damage our posture among the less developed countries. The written correspondence between the United States and Ghanaian Governments on the Volta River Project undoubtedly would be used venomously against us.
3. Adverse African Reaction - Such a turn down could well undermine some of the important political gains we have made among the newly independent countries as a result of our increasingly forthright position on colonial issues, apartheid, and the like. While some countries in Africa (such as Liberia and Nigeria) would privately not be displeased if we were to withdraw from the project, information available indicates that most African countries would take public affront at a failure by the United States to move ahead with financing for this major African project. Our action would be portrayed as neo-colonialism in the stereotype cultivated by Soviet propaganda and nationalist spokesmen. For the future, failure to proceed might make it more difficult for moderate leaders in Africa to cooperate with

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the United States for fear of being labelled Western stooges by opposition elements.

4. Maintain Western Presence and Influence in Ghana - If the United States does not provide assistance for this project, it is probable that Nkrumah will react violently and turn even more to the Bloc for aid. He might well close out such activities in Ghana as USIA, the Peace Corps and our small technical assistance programs, and generally abandon his efforts to balance the East against the West in Ghana. Our action would make it extremely difficult for present Western firms to maintain a presence in Ghana and would probably close the door to the entry of any new large scale American enterprises there. Proceeding with the project, however, will provide a foothold for continued Western presence in Ghana.
5. U.S. Assistance Will be Provided over the Years on Basis of Performance - U. S. funds for this project are not turned over at once but are to be disbursed as the project proceeds through its various phases. The loan and related financial agreements have been drawn so as to permit termination of disbursements if Ghana does not meet its commitments on the project and provide for periodic consultation on economic conditions related to the project.
6. Project is a Key Development Activity in a Key Country - Ghana is one of the key countries of Africa. It was the first to become independent and has the best start in terms of civil service, education and infrastructure. The Volta River Project in Ghana is the core of the Ghanaian development program. It is the key to the future economic development of that country. The dam will provide power, facilitate transportation, and increase food stuffs and irrigation, while the smelter will provide the nucleus for future industrial development. In assisting this project we are assisting the economic advancement of the people of a key country.

B. REASONS AGAINST PARTICIPATING

1. Enemies vs. Friends - The United States would be placed in the awkward position of seeming to reward its enemies in Africa more highly than its friends. Most African countries are unhappy about the modest scale of United States economic assistance. The announcement of US participation to the extent of as much as \$201 million in the Volta Project undoubtedly will add to this unhappiness and will encourage friendly countries to pursue less cooperative policies on the theory that lack of cooperation pays.

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2. Support

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2. Support for the Volta project is unlikely to cause Nkrumah to change his present policies - Nkrumah probably will continue his attempts to reduce the dominating influence which private Western interests have in many sectors of the Ghanaian economy and is likely to continue to develop close economic and political relations with the Bloc. He will also increasingly develop an authoritarian form of government in Ghana. The result will be difficulties and strains in our dealings with Ghana.
3. The threat of expropriation - Once the smelter is completed it might become a target for nationalization. Wholly foreign-owned, and essentially exploitative in character, the smelter is an ideal target for extremists like Nkrumah and his followers.
4. Possible default in its obligations - While Ghana is far from facing an early financial collapse, its present ill-advised and extravagant program of expenditures could lead to serious difficulties in the next year or two which could jeopardize its debt repayment capacity. As regards this project, however, repayment is guaranteed out of the revenues of the smelter, and default is, therefore, no problem here.
5. Nkrumah's prestige - A U.S. decision not to participate would damage temporarily Nkrumah's prestige. The chances that any real threat to his authority will develop either within or outside his party in the next year or two, however, seem rather small.
6. U.S. opinion is likely to be unfavorable to the project - Proceeding with the project, particularly after Nkrumah's performance at Belgrade and in light of his increasing relations with the Soviet Bloc, might have adverse repercussions for the U.S. aid program and the Administration generally. On the other hand, important segments of opinion, such as The New York Times, favor the project.

#### V. POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION

##### A. Three courses of action appear open to the United States.

1. Withdraw from project, on the assumption that the repercussions of such action, while bad, will be less harmful in the long-run than proceeding.
2. Delay decision for one year, on the assumption that we can then take a better reading of the situation.
3. Go ahead with the project, on the assumption that the risks of going ahead will be less adverse for U.S. interests over-all than not going ahead.

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B. Discussion



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## B. Discussion

### 1. Withdrawal

- a. Effect in Africa -- We believe that withdrawal from participation is likely to drive Nkrumah irrevocably toward the Soviet Bloc. The Russians may well respond to Ghana's requests for aid to continue the project. In other parts of Africa, the U.S. action will be construed as politically motivated, and make difficult the cooperation of moderate Africans with the United States and its policy. In addition, we believe the U.S. action will damage U.S. prestige in Africa and make increasingly difficult the maintenance of a Western presence there.
- b. Effect in United States -- At home, withdrawal would give aid and comfort principally to those who are opposed to all forms of foreign aid. It would preclude some Congressional and business community criticism of the AID program. On the other hand it would represent a major failure of an initiative for private investment. We believe the gains from withdrawal to be transitory.

Recommendation: We recommend against withdrawal.

### 2. Delay

A delay in our decision, for six months or a year, in order to keep the situation under review, would be regarded by the Ghanaians as tantamount to withdrawal. Nkrumah has contracts on the dam which must either be terminated in mid-December or carried out. He will not wish to delay proceeding with the project, but will regard delay as rejection and turn to the Soviets for aid. In other parts of Africa, delay will be regarded as politically motivated. Furthermore, we doubt that a period of delay, if acceptable to Nkrumah, will serve to make him any more Western oriented. Instead, we may be faced with an even more independent Nkrumah at the end of the period.

Recommendation: We reject delay as a course of action.

### 3. Go Ahead

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3. Go Ahead

We believe this course of action is the only course consonant with our past actions and future position in Africa. It is a decision requiring courage, as it will result in considerable criticism of the AID program and the Administration. This is a risk which we believe should be taken. We believe that, before the Congress and elsewhere, we can make a good case for our action.

Recommendation: We recommend proceeding with the project.

VI. METHOD OF PROCEEDING

- A. We recommend an affirmative decision to proceed.
- B. We recommend that once made, the decision be communicated to Nkrumah by sending Clarence Randall to Ghana as a personal emissary. (Mr. Randall could carry a private letter from President Kennedy to President Nkrumah simply indicating that the President had asked Randall to convey the decision and that our decision was based upon the assurances that Mr. Randall had received from Nkrumah last October.)
- C. We recommend that the subsequent signing of the financial agreements take place in Washington rather than Accra. (The initial splash of publicity will come when our decision is known. It is probable that little publicity will attend subsequent action such as the signing of the financial agreements. In any event it is suggested that it might be desirable not to have these agreements signed in Accra, where Nkrumah would make them the occasion for his own political advancement, but rather in Washington.)
- D. We recommend that just prior to the announcement of the decision we call on key Senators including Senators Fulbright and Gore, and on Representative Morgan to explain the foreign policy basis of our decision.

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Appendix

Chronology of United States Interest in the Volta Project

January 3, 1958

President Eisenhower, in reply to a letter from Prime Minister Nkrumah about the Volta River Project, stated with reference to financing that "...we would have to have assurances not only that the project is economically and commercially sound, but also that the total financing...is obtainable. ...it is apparent that the active participation of the aluminum industry...is essential to the success of the total project...When you have assurances concerning the establishment of an aluminum industry, this Government would be pleased to explore further with the Government of Ghana the possibility of assistance in financing a part of the project, such as a portion of the hydroelectric installation." (Underlining added.)

January 13, 1958

The first direct U.S. commitment to Ghana concerning the Volta Project was made to the Prime Minister, Kwame Nkrumah, by the U.S. Ambassador, Wilson Flake. The substance of the commitment was that the U.S. would explore the possibility of a loan to assist in financing the hydroelectric project if and when private investors decided to finance and operate an aluminum smelter. Meanwhile, the U.S. Government would help through ICA and the Department of Commerce by determining the extent of U.S. private capital interest in such a project and the possibility of financing from any source provided the Ghana Government cleared up the question of bauxite concessions held by a Canadian firm. The ICA Private Investment Division and the Department of Commerce publicized the potential investment opportunities related to the proposed Volta River Development.

July 25, 1958

During the course of second echelon discussions held on the occasion of Prime Minister Nkrumah's visit to the United States, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, C. Douglas Dillon, informed Ghana's Minister of Finance, Komla A. Gbedemah, that the U.S. Government "is most anxious to see increased interest by the aluminum companies in Ghana's Volta River Project...(Kaiser Industries had offered to update the 1955 engineering study without profit.)... We believe this is a good proposal, would like to see an engineering company undertake such a report, and are willing to assist in financing it...the U.S. would be willing to bear half the cost..."

May 9, 1959

After completion of the aforementioned survey, which was financed by the U.S. and Ghana, Ambassador Flake handed a letter to the Ghanaian Minister of External Affairs addressed to the Prime

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Minister reaffirming the position taken by President Eisenhower in the letter of January 3, 1958, and in discussions with the Prime Minister in Washington in July, 1958; namely, "that when there is firm indication of intention from the aluminum industry to participate and necessary assurances of financial support from either private or public sources for a major part of the financing, the United States Government will be pleased to explore with you what possible assistance it might be able to provide toward financing a portion of the hydroelectric project."

May 11, 1959

The Acting Secretary of State, C. Douglas Dillon, informed the Ambassador of Ghana, Mr. D. A. Chapman, that DLF financing for the Volta Project would be available and that the usual terms for dam projects are 3½ per cent, repayable in 15 to 20 years. The Acting Secretary said "it is too big for DLF alone and the question what would be a reasonable amount DLF could furnish would depend on what Ghana is able to get from other sources." He advised Ghana to ask the World Bank to act as a focal point for arranging financing and for assistance in determining an appropriate rate for power to be sold to the proposed aluminum industry.

July 9, 1959

Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon wrote to Eugene Black, President of the World Bank, concerning the Bank's proposed survey of the Volta Project in relation to Ghana's development potential. It was stated that "the Volta Project is obviously of considerable economic and political significance" and said further that "from the point of view of the U.S. Government, it would be useful if the proposed survey be undertaken and completed as soon as possible."

June, 1960

The IBRD completed its survey of the economy of Ghana and the Volta River Project. It found the project economically feasible.

August 17, 1960

The United States informed the Government of Ghana that it "is prepared to provide funds totaling \$30,000,000....towards the financing of the Volta River Project when the Government of Ghana reaches a satisfactory arrangement with the owners of the proposed aluminum smelter and the financing required in addition to the possible U.S. participation is assured." A press release to this effect was issued on August 18, 1960.

IX. September, 1960

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September, 1960

President Eisenhower in reply to a letter from President Nkrumah expressed the hope that an early settlement of the power rate question could be reached so that the project might proceed.

November 17, 1960

President Nkrumah and Edgar Kaiser initialed a draft "master agreement" between the Government of Ghana and the Volta Aluminum Company (VALCO) covering all important features of their relations over a 30-year period including the rate for power and tax treatment of VALCO. Partners in VALCO were Kaiser Aluminum, Reynolds Metals, and Olin Mathieson. The last-named company later withdrew from the joint venture.

Spring, 1961

Negotiations for an investment guaranty of the American companies' proposed investment in VALCO were begun as were negotiations between the Export-Import Bank and VALCO for a loan to the latter for the proposed smelter.

May 20, 1961

The Government of Ghana was informed that the U.S. Government was prepared to provide up to \$7 million on a loan basis to assist in financing the extended transmission grid. Ghana was to finance one-half the cost and the World Bank one-fourth, with the total cost estimated at \$28 million. This brought the total cost of the hydroelectric project to \$196 million.

June 29, 1961

President Kennedy wrote to President Nkrumah that "all major issues involved in negotiations for the United States Government's share of the financing of the dam and smelter have now been resolved." Signing by the United States was said to be "contingent upon your bringing negotiations with the IBRD to a successful conclusion."

September 1, 1961

An investment guaranty contract providing substantial protection for the proposed equity investment by Kaiser Aluminum and Reynolds Metals in the VALCO smelter was initialed by representatives of the Development Loan Fund and the investors.

September 7, 1961

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September 7, 1961

The Executive Directors of the World Bank approved the proposed loan to the Volta River Authority in the amount of \$47 million.


September, 1961

Negotiations for United States lending agency loans for the U.S. portion of the financing were completed during the month of September. Loan agreements have not been signed.

October 25-28, 1961







A mission headed by Mr. Clarence B. Randall visited Ghana for the purpose of making a reassessment of the project prior to a final decision regarding United States participation in financing the project.


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VOLTA RIVER PROJECT  
AND  
VOLTA ALUMINIUM COMPANY

LEGEND

-  ...BAUXITE DEPOSITS  
 ...RESERVOIR  
 ...PRINCIPAL TOWNS  
 ...RAILROADS  
 ...ROADS  
 ...TRANSMISSION LINES

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Notes on National Security Council Meeting  
15 November 1961

Mr. Dulles opened the meeting with the reading and discussion of a prepared report on the Soviet-Chinese rift. Following the presentation the President asked for the basis of the current impasse between Russia and Albania. Mr. Dulles replied that it was obviously ideological since Albania was one of the smallest countries in Europe with the lowest per capita income and possibilities and potential in general. Mr. Amory then discussed the current food and agricultural shortages in Communist China and brought out the fact that Chinese advances have been generally retarded across the board because of crop shortages. The deficient diet has tended to diminish efficiency in other fields of endeavor. Production generally is on the decline. A brief outline of the size and disposition of Chinese armed forces was given. The President then asked what routes of movement are available for these troops from China to North Viet Nam. Mr. Amory pointed out and described the condition of railway and roads of access and cited the generally inadequate aspects of these avenues. Mr. Dulles cautioned that it should not be assumed that the Chinese setbacks as well as the ideological rift were such that the Soviets and Chinese would not be able nor willing to engage jointly any nation which threatened Communist interests.

Mr. Rusk explained the Draft of Memorandum on South Viet Nam. He added the hope that, in spite of the magnitude of the proposal, any U. S. actions would not be hampered by lack of funds nor failure to pursue the program vigorously. The President expressed the fear of becoming involved simultaneously on two fronts on opposite sides of the world. He questioned the wisdom of involvement in Viet Nam since the basis thereof is not completely clear. By comparison he noted that Korea was a case of clear aggression which was opposed by the United States and other members of the U. N. The conflict in Viet Nam is more obscure and less flagrant. The President then expressed his strong feeling that in such a situation the United States needs even more the support of allies in such an endeavor as Viet Nam in order to avoid sharp domestic partisan criticism as well as strong objections from other nations of the world. The President said that he could even make a rather strong case against intervening in an area 10,000 miles away against 16,000 guerrillas with a native army of 200,000, where millions have been spent for years with no success. The President repeated his apprehension concerning support, adding that none could be expected from the French, and Mr. Rusk interrupted to say that the British were tending more and more to take the French point of view. The President compared the obscurity of the issues

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FRUS, Vol. 1, # 254  
By: cm/jr, NARA, Date: 2-27-09

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in Viet Nam to the clarity of the positions in Berlin, the contrast of which could even make leading Democrats wary of proposed activities in the Far East.

Mr. Rusk suggested that firmness in Viet Nam in the manner and form of that in Berlin might achieve desired results in Viet Nam without resort to combat. The President disagreed with the suggestion on the basis that the issue was clearly defined in Berlin and opposing forces identified whereas in Viet Nam the issue is vague and action is by guerrillas, sometimes in a phantom-like fashion. Mr. McNamara expressed an opinion that action would become clear if U.S. forces were involved since this power would be applied against sources of Viet Cong power including those in North Viet Nam. The President observed that it was not clear to him just where these U.S. forces would base their operations other than from aircraft carriers which seemed to him to be quite vulnerable. General Lemnitzer confirmed that carriers would be involved to a considerable degree and stated that Taiwan and the Philippines would also become principal bases of action.

With regard to sources of power in North Viet Nam, Mr. Rusk cited Hanoi as the most important center in North Viet Nam and it would be hit. However, he considered it more a political target than a military one and under these circumstances such an attack would "raise serious questions." He expressed the hope that any plan of action in North Viet Nam would strike first of all any Viet Cong airlift into South Viet Nam in order to avoid the establishment of a procedure of supply similar to that which the Soviets have conducted for so long with impunity in Laos.

Mr. Bundy raised the question as to whether or not U.S. action in Viet Nam would not render the Laotian settlement more difficult. Mr. Rusk said that it would to a certain degree but qualified his statement with the caveat that the difficulties could be controlled somewhat by the manner in which actions in Viet Nam are initiated.

The President returned the discussion to the point of what will be done next in Viet Nam rather than whether or not the U.S. would become involved. He cautioned that the technique of U.S. actions should not have the effect of unilaterally violating Geneva accords. He felt that a technique and timing must be devised which will place the onus of breaking the accords on the other side and require them to defend their actions. Even so, he realized that it would take some time to achieve this condition and even more to build up world opinion against Viet Cong. He felt that the Jordan Report might be utilized in this effort.

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The President discussed tactics in dealing with the International Control Commission. He delineated a clever plan to charge North Viet Nam with the onus for breaking accords. Following this he envisioned the initiation of certain U.S. actions. He realized that these actions would be criticized and subject to justification in world opinion but felt that it would be much less difficult if this particular U.S. action were secondary rather than primary. He directed State to study possible courses of action with consideration for his views relating to timing and to the Geneva Accords. He asked State also to consider the position of the individual members of the ICC and further suggested that the time was appropriate to induce India to agree to follow U.S. suggestion.

Mr. Murrow reported that parts of the Jordan Report are already in the hands of the ICC. He questioned the value of utilizing the report in the suggested manner since to do so would simply be to place a U.S. stamp on the report. Such action might not reap the desired effects.

The President asked what nations would possibly support the U.S. intervention in Viet Nam, listing Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand (?). Mr. Rusk replied that they all would but the President implied doubts because of the pitfalls of the particular type of war in Viet Nam. He described it as being more a political issue, of different magnitude and (again) less defined than the Korean War.

Mr. Fowler said that the studies suggested to him that the job to be done has been magnified, thereby leading to pessimistic conclusions as to outcome. Taylor responded that although the discussion and even some of the draft memoranda were somewhat pessimistic, he returned from Viet Nam with optimism over what could be done if certain clear-cut actions were taken. He envisioned two phases: (1) the revival of Viet Nam morale, and (2) the initiation of the guerrilla suppression program. Mr. McNamara cautioned that the program was in fact complex and that in all probability U.S. troops, planes and resources would have to be supplied in additional quantities at a later date.

The President asked the Secretary of Defense if he would take action if SEATO did not exist and McNamara replied in the affirmative. The President asked for justification and Lemnitzer replied that the world would be divided in the area of Southeast Asia on the sea, in the air and in communications. He said that Communist conquest would deal a severe blow to freedom and extend Communism to a great portion of the world. The President asked how he could justify the proposed courses of action in Viet Nam while at the same time ignoring Cuba. General Lemnitzer hastened to add that the JCS feel that even at this point the United States should go into Cuba.

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The President stated the time had come for neutral nations as well as others to be in support of U.S. policy publicly. He felt that we should aggressively determine which nations are in support of U.S. policy and that these nations should identify themselves. The President again expressed apprehension on support of the proposed action by the Congress as well as by the American people. He felt that the next two or three weeks should be utilized in making the determination as to whether or not the proposed program for Viet Nam could be supported. His impression was that even the Democratic side of Congress was not fully convinced. The President stated that he would like to have the Vice President's views in this regard and at that point asked if there was information on the Vice President's arrival. The President then stated that no action would be taken during the meeting on the proposed memorandum and that he would discuss these subjects with the Vice President. He asked State to report to him when the directed studies had been completed.

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By RMG, NARS, Date 5/10/77

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO.

TO: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: South Viet-Nam

The President today considered a memorandum on the subject of South Viet-Nam, submitted by the Secretary of State for himself and the Secretary of Defense.

1. The President approved the recommendation that the Department of Defense be prepared with plans for the use of United States forces in South Viet-Nam under one or more of the following purposes:

(a) Use of a significant number of United States forces to signify United States determination to defend South Viet-Nam and to boost South Viet-Nam morale.

(b) Use of substantial United States forces to assist in suppressing Viet Cong insurgency short of engaging in detailed counter-guerrilla operations but including relevant operations in North Viet-Nam.

(c) Use of United States forces to deal with the situation if there is organized Communist military intervention.

Planning under (b) should embrace initially actions within South Viet-Nam. Actions that might be taken against North Viet-Nam or guerrilla bases in Laos should be considered separately. In connection with all the plans, the Department of Defense should consider the feasibility of moving troops or equipment in the near future to advanced positions in the Pacific, and submit recommendations concerning such action.

2. The following actions in support of the Government of Viet-Nam will be undertaken immediately, subject to the understanding that these actions would not take effect within South Viet-Nam, be communicated to subordinate Vietnamese officials or made public until after the exchange of letters with President Diem contemplated in Paragraph 5 below:

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(a) Provide increased air lift to the GVN forces, including helicopters, light aviation, and transport aircraft, manned to the extent necessary by United States uniformed personnel and under United States operational control.

(b) Provide such additional equipment and United States uniformed personnel as may be necessary for air reconnaissance, photography, instruction in and execution of air-ground support techniques, and for special intelligence.

(c) Provide the GVN with small craft, including such United States uniformed advisers and operating personnel as may be necessary for quick and effective operations in effecting surveillance and control over coastal waters and inland waterways.

(d) Provide expedited training and equipping of the civil guard and the self-defense corps with the objective of relieving the regular Army of static missions and freeing it for mobile offensive operations.

(e) Provide such personnel and equipment as may be necessary to improve the military-political intelligence system beginning at the provincial level and extending upward through the Government and the armed forces to the Central Intelligence Organization.

(f) Provide such new terms of reference, reorganization and additional personnel for United States military forces as are required for increased United States participation in the direction and control of GVN military operations and to carry out the other increased responsibilities which accrue to MAAG under these recommendations.

(g) Provide such increased economic aid as may be required to permit the GVN to pursue a vigorous flood relief and rehabili-

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tation program, to supply material in support of the security effort, and to give priority to projects in support of this expanded counter-insurgency program. (This could include increases in military pay, a full supply of a wide range of materials such as food, medical supplies, transportation equipment, communications equipment, and any other items where material help could assist the GVN in winning the war against the Viet Cong.)

(h) Encourage and support (including financial support) a request by the GVN to the FAO or any other appropriate international organization for multilateral assistance in the relief and rehabilitation of the flood area.

(i) Provide individual administrators and advisers for insertion into the Governmental machinery of South Viet-Nam in types and numbers to be agreed upon by the two Governments.

(j) Provide personnel for a joint survey with the GVN of conditions in each of the provinces to assess the social, political, intelligence, and military factors bearing on the prosecution of the counter-insurgency program in order to reach a common estimate of these factors and a common determination of how to deal with them.

3. Ambassador Nolting is to be instructed to make an immediate approach to President Diem to the effect that the Government of the United States is prepared to join the Government of Viet-Nam in a sharply increased joint effort to cope with the Viet Cong threat and the ravages of the flood as set forth under 2., above, if, on its part, the Government of Viet-Nam is prepared to carry out an effective and total mobilization of its own resources, both material and human, for the same end. Before setting in motion the United States proposals listed above, the United States Government would appreciate confirmation of their acceptability to the GVN, and an expression from the GVN of the undertakings it is prepared to make to insure the success of this joint effort. On the part of the United States, it would be expected that these GVN undertakings would include, in accordance with the detailed recommendations of the Taylor Mission and the Country Team:

(a) Prompt and appropriate legislative and administrative action to put the nation on a wartime footing to mobilize its entire resources. (This would include a decentralization and broadening



of the Government so as to realize the full potential of all non-Communist elements in the country willing to contribute to the common struggle.)

(b) The establishment of appropriate Governmental wartime agencies with adequate authority to perform their functions effectively.

(c) Overhaul of the military establishment and command structure so as to create an effective military organization for the prosecution of the war.

4. An exchange of letters between Diem and the President is to be expedited.

(a) Diem's letter would include: reference to the DRV violations of Geneva Accords as set forth in the October 24 GVN letter to the ICC and other documents; pertinent references to GVN statements with respect to its intent to observe the Geneva Accords; reference to its need for flood relief and rehabilitation; reference to previous United States aid and the compliance hitherto by both countries with the Geneva Accords; reference to the USG statement at the time the Geneva Accords were signed; the necessity now of exceeding some provisions of the Accords in view of the DRV violations thereof; the lack of aggressive intent with respect to the DRV: GVN intent to return to strict compliance with the Geneva Accords as soon as the DRV violations ceased; and a request for additional United States assistance in the framework of foregoing policy. The letter should also set forth in appropriate general terms steps Diem has taken and is taking to reform Governmental structure.

(b) The President's reply would be responsive to Diem's request for additional assistance and acknowledge and agree to Diem's statements on the intent promptly to return to strict compliance with the Geneva Accords as soon as DRV violations have ceased.

5. The "Jorden Report" is to be printed as a United States "white paper" and distributed to the Governments of all countries with which

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we have diplomatic relations, including the Communist states, to coincide as nearly as possible with the release of the exchange of letters between the President and Diem and shortly before the arrival in South Viet-Nam of the first increments of U. S. military personnel and equipment described in Paragraph 2, above, which would exceed the Geneva Accord ceilings.

6. The President directed that the following actions be considered for carrying out at the appropriate time in relation to the exchange of letters and other developments:

(a) A private approach to the Soviet Union that would include: our determination to prevent the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism by whatever means is necessary; our concern over dangers to peace presented by the aggressive DRV policy with respect to South Viet-Nam; our intent to return to full compliance with the Geneva Accords as soon as the DRV does so; the distinction we draw between Laos and South Viet-Nam; and our expectation that the Soviet Union will exercise its influence on the Chicoms and the DRV.

(b) A special diplomatic approach to the United Kingdom in its role as co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference requesting that the United Kingdom seek the support of the Soviet co-Chairman for a cessation of DRV aggression against South Viet-Nam.

(c) A special diplomatic approach to India, both in its role as Chairman of the ICC and as a power having relations with Peiping and Hanoi. This approach should be made immediately prior to public release of the "Jorden report" and the exchange of letters between Diem and the President.

(d) Special diplomatic approaches to Canada, as well as Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia, Ceylon, the UAR, and Yugoslavia. SEATO, NATO, and OAS members should be informed through those organizations, with selected members also informed individually. The possibility of some special approach to Poland as a member of the ICC should also be considered.

7. The President directed the Departments of State and Defense to develop detailed recommendations for a US command structure in South Viet-Nam that would have a senior US commander assuming responsibility

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for all phases of US activity, including economic aid, related to the counter-insurgency effort. Such a commander should report directly to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense for operational purposes.

8. The President directed General Taylor and Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, in consultation with the Attorney General, to prepare statements to be used for background purposes pending release of the exchange of letters with Diem and other fuller disclosures of US policy.

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**INVITEES IN ADDITION TO THE STATUTORY MEMBERS AND  
ADVISERS FOR THE 493rd NSC MEETING TO BE HELD ON  
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1961, at 10:00 a.m.**

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**The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Attorney General  
The U. S. Ambassador to  
the United Nations  
The Director, Bureau  
of the Budget  
The Deputy Secretary  
of Defense  
The Under Secretary of  
State for Economic  
Affairs  
The Administrator, Agency  
for International Development  
The Deputy Under Secretary  
of State  
The Counselor, Department  
of State  
The Assistant Secretary of  
State for Far Eastern  
Affairs**

**The Assistant Secretary of  
Defense (ISA)  
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
The Director, U. S. Information Agency  
The Special Assistant to the  
President for National  
Security Affairs  
The Deputy Special Assistant  
to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
The Military Representative  
of the President  
The Military Aide to the  
President  
The Special Counsel to  
the President  
The Air Force Military Aide  
to the Vice President**



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Authority NSC let. 4/19/77  
By pmg, NARS, Date 5/10/77

November 13, 1961

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

**SUBJECT: South Viet-Nam**

The attached draft National Security Action Memorandum is transmitted herewith for discussion in connection with the Council meeting at 10:00 a.m. on November 15, 1961.

*Bromley Smith*  
Bromley Smith  
Executive Secretary

**Attachment:**

**Draft NSAM re South Viet-Nam.**

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NSC Control No. 31

November 15, 1961

The Vice President

Colonel Burris

Security Council Meeting, 15 November

Until Monday, November 13, the regular meeting of the Security Council for Thursday, November 16 was canceled due to the President's visit to Seattle. No alternate period was set aside in the President's schedule for this particular meeting. However, late on Monday evening the President told Mr. Bundy that he felt that a meeting should be held prior to his departure. On Tuesday morning the President's schedule was rearranged and a Security Council meeting was scheduled for 10 AM on Wednesday. At the same time, a memorandum on the principal subject to be discussed was circulated to individuals who would attend. That memorandum arrived in Room 274 EOB at 11:10 AM.

Although I had been in close communication with members of the NSC staff, the information confirmed over and over was that the meeting was canceled. Nevertheless when Mr. Bundy's implementation of the President's request arrived, Mrs. Stifflemire and I both called your office several times to insure the item was on your schedule, to pass a message to you regarding the time and place, and finally to confirm that you had been informed. In an attempt to verify that you had received the information prior to departure from Washington for Detroit, I called you in the car but failed to establish contact. I later discovered that Walter had talked with you by car phone about the same time, regarding the meeting.

Just prior to the opening of the Security Council meeting, Mr. Bundy asked if you would be able to attend. I informed him that the only flight which you could get back from Detroit arrived just after 11:00 AM. He then asked if you would drop by the meeting after you arrived. I replied that I was not aware of your plans.

The meeting proceeded in the normal fashion with the first hour being consumed by the presentation of reports. Discussion continued until about 11:30, at which time the President asked me if I had further information on your arrival and, when I replied in the negative, he asked if I would check. I went outside the meeting and called Walter and discovered that you had informed him around midnight of your difficulty in returning to Washington last night by private plane because of weather and of the possibility that you might not return to Washington as scheduled but might proceed to Seattle. I returned to the meeting and informed the President that I could not ascertain the details of your flight and arrival at the moment. The President then suggested that the meeting be adjourned and that he would discuss the subjects with you later.

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November 13, 1961

Authority 475C-66 4/19/77

By rmg, NARS, Date 5/10/77

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in the  
Cabinet Room of The White House  
on Wednesday, November 15, 1961  
at 10:00 a.m.

ITEM 1 -- SOUTH VIETNAM

(Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject:  
"South Vietnam", dated November 13, 1961)

Discussion of the above subject.

493rd NSC Meeting

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NSC Control No. 31

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Authority NSC Ltr 4/19/77  
By LMG, NARS, Date 5/10/77

October 11, 1961

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in the  
Cabinet Room of The White House  
on Friday, October 13, 1961  
at 10:30 a.m.

POLICY TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA AND POLAND

("Review of Policy Factors Concerning Licensing of Exports to  
Yugoslavia and Poland", dated October 10, 1961 (to be circulated))

Presentation by the Acting Secretary of State.

491st NSC Meeting

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NSC Control No. 25



**INVITEES IN ADDITION TO THE STATUTORY MEMBERS AND  
ADVISERS FOR THE 491st NSC MEETING TO BE HELD ON  
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1961, AT 10:30 A. M.**

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<b>The Secretary of the Treasury</b>	<b>The Military Aide to the President</b>
<b>The Attorney General</b>	<b>The Special Counsel to the President</b>
<b>The Acting Secretary of Commerce</b>	<b>The Air Force Military Aide to the Vice President</b>
<b>The Deputy Assistant Secre- tary of Commerce for International Affairs</b>	
<b>The Director, Bureau of the Budget</b>	
<b>The Deputy Assistant Secre- tary of Defense (ISA)</b>	
<b>The Director, U. S. Informa- tion Agency</b>	
<b>The Military Representative to the President</b>	
<b>The Administrator, Agency for International Development</b>	
<b>The Counselor of the Depart- ment of State</b>	
<b>The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs</b>	

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Notes on Meeting of National Security Council  
October 13, 1961

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-61

By ig, NARA, Date 6-4-93

Mr. Bundy announced that NSC meetings in the future would be held biweekly, on Thursday, and that the Agenda and supporting documents would be circulated as early as possible in advance of each meeting. He urged members of the Council to study the documents and to present their views on the various problems.

Mr. Ball discussed the report on Yugoslavia which had been prepared by the State committee. Mr. Goodman of the Department of Agriculture expressed that Department's support of the report, particularly that portion pertaining to P.L. 480. Mr. Sorensen suggested that action be taken to screen the list of all goods going to Yugoslavia for items of strategic importance. He suggested also that material and goods to be shipped be scrutinized as items which might possibly become the subject of Congressional criticism. The President then directed the creation of a group composed of representatives from State, ICA and Treasury to study the problem and to recommend future courses of action toward Yugoslavia. He suggested that the group be composed of individuals who could make recommendations also on the nature and degree of technical assistance.

With regard to the timing of any possible action against Yugoslavia, Mr. Dulles recommended that no contemplated action be taken until after the conclusion of the Communist Party Congress in Moscow.

The President directed State to inform Ambassador Kennan immediately of the resumption of the licensing of exports. The President then asked what Senator Humphrey had reported following his visit to Belgrade. Mr. Kohler reported that Humphrey did not go because the Yugoslavs let it be known that he was not welcome. Sen Humphrey made certain intemperate remarks about going to a non-free country and the Yugoslavs declined to make the appropriate arrangements for Humphrey's visit.

Mr. Ball went over the Polish problem as set forth in the report of the committee. No major objections were voiced to the recommendation that relations with Poland be restored. Mr. Dillon suggested that all requests for items going to Poland be screened more closely and Mr. Goodman replied that Agriculture had already established a screening procedure. The President observed that he considered it appropriate for the United States to continue the maintenance of amicable relationships with Poland.

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Review of Policy Factors Concerning Licensing of  
Exports to Yugoslavia and Poland

**PROBLEM:** The President decided at the White House meeting on September 22 that export licenses for shipments to Yugoslavia and Poland should not be issued pending review of this question. Such licenses have been withheld since September 18.

Prior to September 18 our treatment of exports to Yugoslavia and Poland was derived from our general policy toward those countries, based upon a careful and continuing analysis of our long range interests and objectives. To make a determination on the future licensing of exports to Yugoslavia and Poland, it therefore seems essential to re-examine the validity of our general policies toward those countries. A re-examination of our general policies is also desirable in order to provide future guidelines for other aspects of US relations with these two countries, including the daily conduct of diplomatic contacts, aid programs, trade policies, technical assistance activities, cultural exchange arrangements, etc.

It is important at the outset to emphasize the profound differences between Poland and Yugoslavia. Their internal political and social structures are different; their general international postures are different; their relations with the US are different. Accordingly, the treatment they have received from the US has differed considerably. The principal point of similarity between the two countries is their mutual dedication to the general philosophy of Marxism, but even this philosophy has been interpreted and applied in different ways.

In terms of US interests and objectives, there is no more validity in lumping Poland with Yugoslavia than there would be in lumping Tunisia with Ghana. Therefore, while the need for re-examining our policies is equally urgent for both countries, it is essential that each country be considered separately.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By cbw/jc, NARA, Date 3-3-09

I. YUGOSLAVIA

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NSC Control No 26



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## I. YUGOSLAVIA

### A. General Policies

Up to the present time, US policy toward Yugoslavia has been based on the following premises:

1. Yugoslavia, while subject to a Communist dictatorship, is not a part of the Sino-Soviet bloc. In 1948 the Yugoslav Government, under Tito's leadership, broke away from Soviet control and the international Communist movement. Since that time Yugoslavia has shown a vigorous determination to preserve its national identity and freedom from outside domination.

2. To a considerable extent, Yugoslavia has opened itself to Western ideas and institutions. It has also evolved an economic and political system which differs substantially from that of the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia's economy has undergone a process of decentralization with definite elements of competition and individual incentive. In this connection, it is important to note that Yugoslavia has achieved a rate of economic growth greater than is found anywhere in the Soviet bloc.

3. Yugoslavia's independence of Soviet control has been emphasized by Yugoslavia's participation as member or observer in certain international organizations in which the Soviet bloc does not participate and which, in some respects, are antithetical to Soviet ambitions. These include the GATT, the European Productivity Agency, the OEEC and the new OECD. Yugoslavia is also a member of the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, which protects US patent and trade mark rights in Yugoslavia. While the US has no formal copyright relations with Yugoslavia, few serious copyright problems have actually arisen.

4. Within the context of the "cold war", Yugoslavia is a neutral country and usually behaves as such. It frequently takes positions on international issues that are opposed to US attitudes and interests, but this is equally true of other neutral nations. In the UN, for example, Yugoslavia's voting record

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record corresponds more closely with that of India than with that of the Soviet bloc.

5. US trade with Yugoslavia, while moderate in volume, nevertheless serves US economic interests. Our overall balance of trade with Yugoslavia is decidedly favorable, and Yugoslavia is a significant market for US agricultural surpluses.

6. The US has a definite interest in maintaining Yugoslav freedom from Soviet control. In addition to our obvious desire to prevent the expansion of Soviet domination over Yugoslavia itself, the continued independence of Yugoslavia affords certain special advantages in our world-wide resistance to Sino-Soviet imperialism. It has profoundly disturbed the political and ideological unity of the international Communist movement. It has definitely encouraged nationalist, anti-Soviet tendencies among the populations of the Soviet-dominated states of Eastern Europe. The fierce Soviet and Chinese attacks on Yugoslav "revisionism" and "deviationism" have vividly reminded Marxist sympathizers in all parts of the world that the Sino-Soviet bloc is not satisfied with a mere triumph of ideological principles, but demands direct subservience to the bloc.

On the basis of the foregoing considerations, the US has maintained a relationship with Yugoslavia generally similar to that maintained with other neutral nations. We have pursued friendly and frank diplomatic contacts, have conducted extensive information activities in Yugoslavia and have carried on a broad exchange program. Yugoslav requests for economic and technical assistance have been considered on their merits, and trade with Yugoslavia has been conducted as with other friendly and neutral countries.

The US Government had reason for keen disappointment concerning Tito's speech and the general role of Yugoslavia at the recent Belgrade Conference. We have already expressed to the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the Yugoslav Ambassador here, as well as in writing to the Yugoslav Government in Belgrade, our disappointment and displeasure over the Yugoslav performance. However, as Ambassador Kennan

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has pointed out, we would be merely sowing misunderstanding if we took action which would imply that the Belgrade Conference has created a wholly new and unprecedented situation.

It seems clear that our diplomatic pressures have already produced certain effects. Foreign Minister Popovic's recent speech at the UN clearly indicates a Yugoslav desire to redress the balance and to reaffirm Yugoslavia's status as a truly non-aligned country.

Despite the frequent differences that will inevitably arise between the US and Yugoslavia, it is important that the US never lose sight of its own basic interests. It is important to the US that Yugoslavia remain independent, that it continue to present to the satellite states the magnetic picture of a successful alternative to bloc membership under Soviet domination and that it continue to be a disruptive element in the international Communist movement.

The Department is well aware of the domestic implications of any US policy toward Yugoslavia. The fact that Yugoslavia has adopted the Communist ideology inevitably creates strong domestic pressures against amicable US-Yugoslav relations. These pressures tend to increase when the Yugoslav Government makes offensive pronouncements. Nevertheless, affirmative US policies toward Yugoslavia have, over the years, been supported consistently by informed public opinion and by the Congress in a long series of legislative actions.

The Department believes that the fundamental interests of the US are served by continuing to recognize and support the independence of Yugoslavia from Sino-Soviet domination. Continuity is obviously a vital ingredient in the success of such a policy. We cannot succeed if we permit our basic premises and goals to fluctuate with the constantly shifting winds of international events.

B. Special Problems: In the practical application of our general policies toward Yugoslavia, it is necessary to give attention to such problems as (a) trade relationships,

(b) economic

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(b) economic grants and loans, (c) technical assistance, (d) travel, (e) cultural exchanges, etc. At the present time, however, the only issue which requires an urgent decision by the US is the recent suspension of export licensing.

The US already has certain agreements with Yugoslavia on technical assistance. Any extension of these agreements will require review and possible revision. Yugoslavia has also filed a new application for one million tons of grain under the PL 480 Program, but this application is very recent and has not yet even been discussed with the Yugoslavs. It may also be desirable to review certain other specific aspects of our relations with Yugoslavia. However, with the single exception of export controls, all these matters can be considered with relative leisure.

The Department believes that the recent suspension of export licenses to Yugoslavia is inconsistent with US interests for the following reasons:

1. The suspension of licenses implies that the US is lumping Yugoslavia with the remainder of the Soviet bloc, which is not only unsound on factual grounds, but which also has a political significance far out of proportion to its economic effects.

2. The economic significance of withholding individually validated licenses for exports to Yugoslavia is limited. About 92 per cent of the items controlled by the Department of Commerce can be exported to Yugoslavia without individually validated licenses, and over 80 per cent of US-Yugoslav trade is in this category. For the remaining 8 per cent of controlled items, licenses have generally been issued subject to Yugoslav assurances concerning transfer to third countries. We have no evidence that the Yugoslavs have ever failed to honor these assurances, with one exception in 1957, when the Yugoslavs admitted a mistake in permitting the diversion of a borax shipment.

3. Virtually all the items withheld from Yugoslavia by our recent suspension of licenses can be obtained without

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difficulty from Western Europe, Japan or elsewhere in the Free World. Thus, even if it were assumed that the export of certain items to Yugoslavia might somehow threaten our security interests (a highly dubious assumption) the suspension of licenses would accomplish little or nothing in protecting our security.

4. The only substantial effect of withholding licenses for exports to Yugoslavia would be political. A continued suspension would be interpreted to mean that the US has altered its basic concept of Yugoslavia as an independent nation, or else would be interpreted as an indication that the US is reacting toward Yugoslav behavior at the Belgrade conference in an abrupt and vindictive manner. In either case, the basic interests of the US would suffer, both in terms of our relations with the Yugoslavs themselves, and in terms of the attitudes of other nations toward the US. In the words of Ambassador Kennan, "It is one thing to speak of modifying previous levels and nature of aid programs; it is another thing to deprive the Yugoslavs of normal opportunities for trade with the US... Drastic and punitive measures affecting trade as well as aid would only silence our friends, vindicate anti-Western extremists...and cut off more hopeful possibilities. So final would this be in its effect on possibilities for my own usefulness here that I would hope the Department would give me an opportunity for personal consultation before taking steps of such gravity."

C. Recommendations:

1. That the US reaffirm the basic principles of its policy toward Yugoslavia.

2. That the current suspension of export licenses for shipments to Yugoslavia be removed, and that the US revert to the policies and practices previously in effect, under which Yugoslavia received treatment comparable to that accorded other neutral nations.

3. That our policies toward Yugoslavia with respect to aid, technical assistance, development credits, etc., be

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carefully reexamined, with attention both to our long-range objectives in Yugoslavia and to our immediate tactical relations. Ambassador Kennan, for example, has recommended that we fulfill existing technical assistance contracts but negotiate no new ones; that we continue to make developmental loans on a project-by-project basis; that the work of voluntary relief agencies be re-examined; and that we grant only about 40 to 50 per cent of outstanding Yugoslav requests for wheat, and considerably less in other commodities. All these recommendations should be carefully reviewed here in Washington, but there is no great urgency involved.

## II. POLAND

### A. General Policies

Poland, unlike Yugoslavia, is clearly a member of the Soviet bloc. It is bound to the USSR not only through such formal instrumentalities as the Warsaw Pact, but also because of its exposed geographic position, its heavy economic dependence upon the Soviet Union, its desire for support against fears of a resurgent Germany, etc. Even more important is the fact that Soviet troops are still present in Poland. The Polish Government, in any "show-down" situation, would have no genuine alternative but to submit to the Soviet will. The Polish position on international issues is rarely distinguishable from that of the Soviet Union itself. In brief, Poland is under heavy Soviet influence and US policies must fully take account of this fact.

On the other hand, it is equally important to recognize that Poland is by all odds the softest spot in the Soviet system. It differs from the other bloc members in a number of significant respects. First, since the establishment of the Gomulka regime in 1956, the Polish Government has enjoyed a measure of independence which, while limited, is nevertheless unique within the bloc. The people of Poland have a long-standing antagonism toward Russia and a basic orientation toward Western civilization. Only a small part of Polish agricultural land has been collectivized. Essential freedom of worship exists in Poland, including the teaching of religion to children by the clergy and the operation of a university and seminaries

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seminaries by the Catholic Church. The Polish Government permits a diversity of expression in the arts which is unmatched elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, and intellectual activity is fairly vigorous. The Polish Government has also been more restrained in the exercise of police power, as evidenced by the relative absence of political arrests and greater freedom of movement within the country. Finally, the Polish regime permits more extensive and active contacts with the West than are permitted by other satellite states. This is true in terms of scientific and cultural contacts, tourist travel and the emigration of large numbers of Poles to various Western countries.

Under the Gomulka regime, there has also developed a considerable expansion of relations with the US. US officials in Poland are able to maintain and develop broader contacts, both with officials and with private citizens. US consular officers are able to carry on their activities with considerable freedom and on a much larger scale than is possible in other bloc countries, including services on behalf of American citizens. US volunteer agencies (CARE, Church World Service, etc.) are able to administer food distribution programs which include full identification of the source of the distributed goods. The US has been able to maintain a USIA-type program in Poland, including the establishment of a reading room open to the public, the distribution of the Information Bulletin, the publication of a monthly magazine and the circulation of a considerable volume of American books, films, etc. The US has formal treaty relations with Poland covering patents, trademarks and copyrights, and there has been no evidence of Polish "piracy" with respect to any of these rights. VOA broadcasts are not jammed in Poland. Finally, the US has been able to develop a far more extensive exchange program with Poland than with any satellite country.

Total US exports to Poland are similar in dollar volume to US exports to Yugoslavia. The balance of trade is distinctly favorable to the US, and the US retains the right to demand gold or hard currency for its exports to Poland. Surplus agricultural commodities represent a sizable proportion of Polish imports from the US. Thus, the US itself derives a

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significant economic advantage from its trade relations with Poland.

In developing future US policies toward Poland, it would be erroneous and dangerous to base such policies on the illusion that Poland is likely to be detached from the bloc in the immediate future. On the other hand, in view of the circumstances described above, it is apparent that Poland enjoys a significant measure of autonomy, particularly in the pursuit of internal policies, which the rest of the bloc does not possess in any comparable degree.

In essence, two courses of action are open to the US. The first is simply to write off Poland, along with all other countries within the Soviet bloc, as a "lost cause" and to concentrate our energies solely on maintaining a defensive posture against the further expansion of Sino-Soviet influence. The second alternative is to take such steps as are available and practical to "carry the war to the enemy"--specifically, to seize all reasonable opportunities to increase Western influence and weaken Soviet influence in Poland over an extended period of years, with the ultimate objective of helping Poland to become a completely independent nation.

The second alternative necessarily implies the application of special policies to Poland in such fields as trade, commercial credits, economic and technical assistance, exchanges of persons, etc. The application of these special policies inevitably involves uncertainties, since our ultimate goals can be achieved, at best, only over a long period of years.

In brief, the second alternative is a calculated gamble. However, the first alternative is wholly defeatist. The first alternative would imply US acceptance of the thesis that a Communist triumph in practically any country must be regarded as permanent, and that the continuing struggle between the Sino-Soviet empire and the Free World must therefore be waged exclusively upon the territory of the latter.

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For the reasons indicated, the Department has accorded Poland a considerable measure of special treatment since 1956. This policy was never expected to produce any sudden or dramatic results. On the other hand, this policy has unquestionably brought some visible gains. It has helped to preserve the changes distinguishing Poland from the other bloc states, to keep the door open to wider American access to the Polish people and to maintain the intrinsic Western orientation of the great mass of the Poles. This policy also continues to provide a lever by which the US can hope to influence the future destiny of Poland and to moderate the actions of the entire Soviet bloc. Because of these benefits, our policy has received widespread support among interested domestic groups, such as the Polish American Congress.

#### B. Special Problems

The application of our general policies toward Poland to the specific areas of trade, aid, exchanges of persons, etc., obviously requires greater tactical flexibility than is the case with Yugoslavia. This is true because our immediate objectives are more limited, because our contacts with the Poles are more restricted, because the risks of liberal treatment are greater and because Poland, as a member of the bloc, is necessarily involved in US decisions affecting the bloc as a whole, such as the Berlin crisis.

At the present time, there are two issues in our relations with Poland that require urgent decision. The first involves the willingness of the US to conclude an agreement already tentatively reached with Poland for the shipment of 86 million dollars worth of grain under the PL 480 program. The terms of this tentative agreement provide that Poland will pay for this grain in local currency, which the US will have the option of either using within Poland or, at the end of a 10-year period, converting into dollars or gold. (These terms are similar to those which have been applied to past PL 480 transactions with Poland.)

While naturally Poland is anxious to conclude this agreement, the US has thus far hesitated to do so because of the Berlin crisis.

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The second problem requiring urgent decision involves the field of export controls, and specifically the recent suspension of licenses for shipments to Poland. In past years, the policy of giving special treatment to Poland has been applied to the field of export controls, as well as to other activities and relationships. The preferential treatment given Poland has been limited, but it is perhaps the basic explanation of the fact that Poland, as compared with other bloc countries, accords the US special treatment in overall relations.

Our preferential treatment of Poland can best be illustrated by comparing the export licensing policy applicable to Poland with the licensing policy which has been applied to the remainder of the Soviet bloc. In the past, about 10 per cent of the items controlled by the Department of Commerce could be exported to the Soviet bloc under general license. Another 80 per cent required individually validated licenses, which were usually granted upon application. The remaining 10 per cent, consisting of items on the Positive List and the GRO Exception List, likewise required individually validated licenses, but applications for these were usually denied to other bloc countries.

In the case of Poland, about 90 per cent of the items controlled by the Department of Commerce could be exported under general license. The remaining 10 per cent, consisting of items on the Positive List and the Polish GRO Exception List, required individually validated licenses. Licenses for these items were sometimes granted to Poland if they were determined to be "reasonable and necessary to the Polish civilian economy".

The recent decision to suspend export licenses for shipments to Poland and Yugoslavia still leaves Poland in a better position than the remainder of the Soviet bloc with respect to general licenses, but actually gives the other bloc countries somewhat better treatment than is given to Poland in the issuance of individual licenses, since action is at least permissible on applications from the former. This is wholly incongruous with the general US policy toward Poland.

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Since August 25, 1961, there has been a more rigorous application of criteria in our controls over exports to Eastern Europe as a whole. The Department concurs in this tightening of export controls, which apply to Poland along with the remainder of the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, the Department strongly believes that the general freeze on individual licenses for exports to Poland should be lifted, and that we should revert to the previous policy of according preferential treatment to Poland, for the following reasons:

1. The maintenance of preferential treatment for Poland in granting US export licenses is an extremely important element of our overall policy toward Poland. The termination of this preferential consideration would be interpreted by the Poles, and by various allied and neutral nations, as an indication of a basic change in the US policy of distinguishing between Poland and the remainder of the bloc, and might well be interpreted by the Polish people as evidence of a US decision to "write off" Poland as a lost cause. This would inevitably strengthen the hard-line, pro-Soviet Communists in the Gomulka regime, would have a profoundly discouraging impact upon Western-minded Poles, and would tend to nullify the gains that we have made in our relations with Poland since 1957.

2. The current suspension of individually validated licenses for exports to Poland has a relatively minor effect upon the total volume of US exports to Poland. Nor is it likely to have any significant effect upon US strategic interests. As Embassy Warsaw points out, refusal of licenses will have no economic result except to divert Polish hard currency earnings to other Western suppliers. Here again, as is true in the case of Yugoslavia, the principal impact is political and psychological.

3. In one sense, the present freeze tends to discriminate against Poland in relation to the remainder of the bloc. We have no basis whatever for justifying such discrimination, either to the American people, to the Poles or to other nations of the world.

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4. Within the framework of our general policy toward Poland, it is recognized that tactical situations may arise which will make it desirable for the US Government to exert pressures upon Poland. It is also recognized that the general field of export controls affords an opportunity for the exertion of such pressures. However, it seems obvious that the US must give the most careful consideration to any measures of this kind before putting them into effect. We must have a clear understanding of our objectives in exerting pressure, we must choose the particular measures most likely to be effective, we must choose the proper time and circumstances and, finally, we must always try to maintain a balance between our short-term and long-term objectives.

Leaving aside all other considerations, it seems obvious that the present moment is the worst possible time to exert special pressures against Poland in the field of export controls. In the near future, we may be required to take stern measures against the Soviet bloc as a whole, including Poland, because of the Berlin crisis. Western contingency planning for economic countermeasures against the Soviet bloc is already under way. However, there are three vital elements to be considered in planning these countermeasures. The first is that the economic countermeasures should not be applied unilaterally by the US but should be applied by the NATO countries as a whole. Second is that such economic countermeasures should be applied to the entire Soviet bloc, without distinction among individual members of the bloc. The third is that these economic countermeasures should be applied at a time when they are likely to produce a maximum impact upon the Soviet bloc in relation to the Berlin crisis.

The withholding of licenses for exports to Poland represents a unilateral move by the US, prematurely timed and directed against a particular country. The continued withholding of these licenses would thus diminish the force of properly-timed, concerted Western countermeasures, and would also severely complicate the difficult problem of obtaining an agreement among the NATO countries on the application of such countermeasures. In brief, we seem to be bringing pressure against the wrong country at the wrong time in the wrong way.

C. Recommendations

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C. Recommendations

1. That the general US policy of seeking to maintain a "special relationship" with Poland be reaffirmed. This implies a measure of preferential treatment for Poland as compared with other bloc countries.

2. That the current suspension of export licenses for shipments to Poland be removed. The US should follow the course agreed to on August 25, 1961, of applying more rigorously the criteria for granting individual licenses, in accordance with the general tightening of controls over exports to the Soviet bloc as a whole. However, Poland should continue to receive the same degree of preferential treatment over other bloc members that it has been accorded in past years, unless and until the Berlin crisis warrants a general economic blockade against the entire Soviet bloc.

3. That no decision be made on the conclusion of the pending PL 480 agreement with Poland until the Department has had an opportunity to examine more carefully the possible consequences of this agreement, both in terms of the fluid Berlin situation and in terms of selecting the most effective tactics in the application of our general policies toward Poland.

4. That other aspects of our relations with Poland, especially those involving preferential treatment, be carefully reviewed during the next few months, taking full account of the recent recommendations by Embassy Warsaw.

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POLISH FOREIGN TRADE, 1958  
Millions of Zlotys\*

	<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>			
Imports from:						
Soviet bloc	2,414.9	3,110.4	3,697.9			
US	406.8	284.0	336.5			
Rest of Free World	<u>2,085.6</u>	<u>2,284.0</u>	<u>1,945.5</u>			
Total	4,907.3	5,678.4	5,979.9			
Exports to:						
Soviet bloc	2,344.4	2,645.2	3,157.7			
US	107.1	122.2	126.0			
Rest of Free World	<u>1,786.0</u>	<u>1,813.1</u>	<u>2,018.4</u>			
Total	4,237.5	4,580.5	5,302.1			
Turnover with:				<u>Percent Distribution</u>		
				<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>
Soviet bloc	4,758.3	5,755.6	6,855.6	52.0	56.1	60.8
US	613.9	406.2	462.5	6.7	4.0	4.1
Rest of Free World	<u>3,772.6</u>	<u>4,097.1</u>	<u>3,963.9</u>	<u>41.3</u>	<u>39.9</u>	<u>35.1</u>
Total	9,144.8	10,258.9	11,282.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

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\* For. exchange zlotys - 4 zlotys = US \$1

Note: Detail not necessarily additive due to rounding.

YUGOSLAV FOREIGN TRADE, 1958-60  
Millions of Dinars\*

	<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>
Imports from:			
Soviet bloc	57898**	50951**	63782
US	40198	42004	26574
Rest of Free World	<u>107408</u>	<u>113201</u>	<u>157839</u>
Total	205504	206156	248195

Exports to:			
Soviet bloc	36793**	44093**	54960
US	9889	9344	11477
Rest of Free World	<u>85737</u>	<u>89558</u>	<u>103643</u>
Total	132419	142995	170080

Turnover with:	<u>Percent Distribution</u>					
	<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>			
Soviet bloc	94691**	95044**	118742	28.0	27.2	28.4
US	50087	51348	38051	14.8	14.7	9.1
Rest of Free World	<u>193145</u>	<u>202759</u>	<u>261482</u>	<u>57.2</u>	<u>58.1</u>	<u>62.5</u>
Total	337923	349151	418275	100.0	100.0	100.0

\* Off. exchange rate -- 300 dinars = US \$1

\*\* Excluding Asian Communist countries (Communist China, Mongolia, North Korea, North Viet-Nam)

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Authority NSC ltr. 4/19/61  
By mmg, NARS, Date 5/10/61

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

RECORD OF ACTIONS

NSC Action

2438 FUTURE MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL

Noted the announcement by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs that henceforth the Council would regularly meet on alternate Thursday mornings.

2439 POLICY TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA AND POLAND  
("Review of Policy Factors Concerning Licensing of Exports to Yugoslavia and Poland.")

- a. After discussing the paper entitled, "Review of Policy Factors Concerning Licensing of Exports to Yugoslavia and Poland", agreed:
  - (1) To remove the current suspension of export licenses for shipments to Yugoslavia and Poland, and
  - (2) To revert to previous practices, including the careful screening of all export licenses issued.
- b. Noted the President's request that the Secretary of State review all types of economic assistance being extended to Yugoslavia and Poland and to present to the Council recommendations with respect to future assistance. These recommendations should rest on a review and restatement of U. S. policy toward each country.

October 13, 1961  
491st Meeting  
NSC Actions 2438-2439

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NSC Control No. 27



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MEMORANDUM

File

Noted - LBJ

55

DATE: 21 July 1961  
TO: The Vice President  
FROM: Colonel Burris  
RE: Developments on the Berlin Issue

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko charged that the Western responses to Khrushchev's June 4 Aide Memoire foment an atmosphere of crisis. He further charged that Soviet proposals are being distorted in order to create the new wave of "war hysteria" as a means of blocking negotiations. Gromyko warned the West German Ambassador of the consequences of a Western military move after a separate peace treaty, which he said would be concluded by the end of the year if no "satisfactory arrangements" were reached beforehand. Gromyko also revealed that Soviet troops would be stationed on the German border after a separate treaty and that if the West wanted war, it could have it. On at least two occasions during Gromyko's several conversations with Western diplomats he indicated a willingness to negotiate, but was specific only in one instance in which he offered to consider a free city status for Berlin.

In a meeting on July 18 with General Norstad, the West German Ambassador to France expressed considerable apprehension over the developing situation. He expressed the personal belief that the West Germans themselves would be unwilling to fight over Berlin. (This view is diametrically opposed to that of Adenauer and the CDU.) The German Ambassador suggested that negotiation was the only reasonable course of action in the present impasse and further suggested the following concessions on the part of the West to satisfy the Soviets:

- (1) Cease propaganda and intelligence activities in Berlin.
- (2) De-emphasize Berlin as the traditional Capital of Germany.
- (3) Accept the Oder-Niesse Line as the eastern boundary of Germany in discussions involving the establishment of a re-unified state.
- (4) Accept a de facto recognition of the East German Regime.

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Authority NET 037-004-2-3  
By JP, NARA, Date 8/15/02

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LW

56

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM

DATE: July 20, 1961  
TO: The Vice President  
FROM: Colonel Burris  
RE: Soviet Threats in Bangkok

Thai Foreign Minister Thanat told Ambassador Young that in a farewell call on Sarit on July 12, the Soviet Ambassador abruptly demanded Thai acceptance of Soviet aid or face the consequences. The consequences would be the Soviet Government support of all popular movements for liberation of the country and the Soviet Government would take steps if these movements were thwarted in any way by local government or outside supporters. Sarit and Thanat rejected accusations that they were personally dependent upon the U. S. and expressed displeasure over the Russian's comments. However Ambassador Young is not certain how the Thais reacted to the Soviet aid offers. Thanat fears the Soviets will take external and internal action against Thailand, possibly within the next few weeks. The Foreign Minister considers the Soviet threat to be also a warning to the U. S.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/PAC 19-27  
By CTS NARA, Date 9/20/19

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EYES ONLY

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EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM

DATE: July 20, 1961

TO: The Vice President

FROM: Colonel Burris

RE: Indian Reaction to Ayub Visit

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC Lett 4/21/77, State Lett 11/16/76  
By smg, NARS, Date 6/16/77

Following is a State Department report on the Ayub visit:

"Indian Reaction to Ayub Visit Reported - Embassy New Delhi believes that the Ayub visit and communique have so far had no harmful effects on US-Indian relations. The Indians, while generally recognizing Ayub's personal success here, believe he failed either to commit us to support Pakistan's claims in Kashmir or to induce us to modify our aid program for India. The evidence of greater economic aid for Pakistan is universally approved by the Indians. Indian-Pakistan relations, however, have not fared so well, as the Indians resent bitterly what they see as official Pakistan efforts to mount a 'hate India' campaign in the US.

"The principal Indian concern at present centers on the interpretation of the word 'extended' used in the communique in connection with our military aid to Pakistan, and the Embassy foresees future difficulties in this regard. If Pakistan receives F-104s and air-to-air missiles shortly, the Indian public will almost certainly attribute this to the Ayub visit, which will lead to a vigorous round of press and public criticism of us for having set off a new arms race to the detriment of economic development programs. Also, it is likely that India will seek comparable weapons from other sources, including the USSR, and we may thus be confronted with the prospect of the Soviets' supplying major components of India's weapons system."

The last two sentences reflect the State Department tendency to wither in the face of criticism as well as to manifest uncertainty as to our own aims and purposes.

EYES ONLY

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7/20/61

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

59

Notes on National Security Council Meeting  
July 20, 1961

General Hickey, Chairman of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, presented the annual report of his group. General Lemnitzer stated that the assumption of this year's study was a surprise attack in late 1963, preceded by a period of heightened tensions.

After the presentation by General Hickey and by the various members of the Subcommittee, the President asked if there had ever been made an assessment of damage results to the U.S.S.R. which would be incurred by a preemptive attack. General Lemnitzer stated that such studies had been made and that he would bring them over and discuss them personally with the President. In recalling General Hickey's opening statement that these studies have been made since 1957, the President asked for an appraisal of the trend in the effectiveness of the attack. General Lemnitzer replied that he would also discuss this with the President.

Since the basic assumption of this year's presentation was an attack in late 1963, the President asked about probable effects in the winter of 1962. Mr. Dulles observed that the attack would be much less effective since there would be considerably fewer missiles involved. General Lemnitzer added a word of caution about accepting the precise findings of the Committee since these findings were based upon certain assumptions which themselves might not be valid.

The President posed the question as to the period of time necessary for citizens to remain in shelters following an attack. A member of the Subcommittee replied that no specific period of time could be cited due to the variables involved, but generally speaking, a period of two weeks should be expected.

The President directed that no member in attendance at the meeting disclose even the subject of the meeting.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 92-61  
By ig, NARA, Date 6-4-93

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EYES ONLY



July 18, 1961

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC Ltr. 4/9/77  
By mmg, NARS, Date 5/10/77

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in the  
Cabinet Room of The White House  
on Thursday, July 20, 1961  
at 10:00 a. m.

THE NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE  
(NSC 5816; NSC Action No. 2223)

Presentation of the report by the Chairman of the  
Subcommittee.

489th NSC Meeting

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NSC Control No. 24

**INVITEES IN ADDITION TO THE STATUTORY MEMBERS AND  
ADVISERS FOR THE 489th NSC MEETING TO BE HELD ON  
THURSDAY, JULY 20, 1961, AT 10:00 A.M.**

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The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Attorney General  
The Director, Bureau of the  
Budget  
The Deputy Secretary of  
Defense  
The Assistant Secretary  
of Defense (ISA)  
The Director, U. S. Infor-  
mation Agency  
The Military Representative  
to the President  
The Under Secretary  
of State  
The Deputy Under Secretary  
of State  
The Secretary of the Army  
The Secretary of the Navy  
The Secretary of the Air  
Force

The Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Chairman, Atomic  
Energy Commission  
The Chairman, Interdepart-  
mental Intelligence  
Conference  
The Chairman, Interdepart-  
mental Committee on  
Internal Security  
The Special Assistant to the  
President for National  
Security Affairs  
The Deputy Special Assistant  
to the President for Na-  
tional Security Affairs  
The Military Aide to the  
President  
The Special Counsel to the  
President

Vice President

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC ltr 4/19/77  
By rmg, NARS, Date 5/10/77

NSC ACTION NO. 2436

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RECORD OF ACTIONS  
by the  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
at its  
FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-NINTH MEETING  
held on  
July 20, 1961  

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(Approved by the President on July 21, 1961)

ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2436      THE NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE  
(NSC 5816; NSC Action No. 2223)

Received the report of the Subcommittee.

NSC ACTION NO. 2436

~~SECRET~~

NSC Control No. 19

61

7/19/61

V.R. 62

DECLASSIFIED

NSC ACTION NO. 2435

Authority NSC Doc 4/19/77  
By nmq, NARS, Date 5/10/77

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RECORD OF ACTIONS  
by the  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
at its  
FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-EIGHTH MEETING  
held on  
July 19, 1961  
(Approved by the President on July 20, 1961)

ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2435.

BERLIN

(Memo for the President from Mr. Dean Acheson,  
subject: "Berlin", dated June 28, 1961; NSC Actions  
Nos. 2432 and 2434)

Discussed alternative courses of action to deal  
with the Berlin problem on the basis of reports  
prepared by the appropriate departments and  
agencies in response to the assignments con-  
tained in National Security Action Memorandum  
No. 59, dated July 14, 1961.

NSC ACTION NO. 2435

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NSC Control No. 18



63

7/13/61

NSC ACTION NO. 2434

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NSC 66 4/19/77  
By mg, NARS, Date 5/10/77

V.S.  
64  
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RECORD OF ACTIONS  
by the  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
at its  
FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SEVENTH MEETING  
held on  
July 13, 1961  

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(Approved by the President on July 20, 1961)

ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2434.

BERLIN

(Memo for the President from Mr. Dean Acheson,  
subject: "Berlin", dated June 28, 1961; NSC Action  
No. 2432)

Discussed various proposals for U. S. approaches to the Berlin problem on the basis of studies and recommendations presented to the Council in response to assignments made to the appropriate departments and agencies in the National Security Action Memorandum No. 58, dated June 30, 1961. Noted the President's instructions to the appropriate departments and agencies to prepare evaluations of alternative courses of action and specific recommendations for the implementation of such actions in preparation for a National Security Council meeting on July 19, 1961.

NSC ACTION NO. 2434

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NSC Control No. 17