

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 4

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#73e Report</del>	<del>State open 3-9-09 Secret Task Force Report on Korea</del>	<del>8 p 06/13/61</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#73f Report</del>	<del>State open 3-9-09 Secret Task Force Report on Korea</del>	<del>4 p 06/13/61</del>	<del>A</del>
#79d Memo	State Secret To the President from Dean Rusk	4 p 04/17/63	A

FILE LOCATION

VP Security File, National Security Council  
National Security Council (III)

RESTRICTION CODES

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	***TO BE SUBMITTED TO STATE DEPT. FOR CONCURRENCE*** <i>add discussion for state Sec 11/6/76</i>		
<del>#79 Memo</del>	<del>WH Secret To VP from Col. Burris</del>	<del>1 p 03/12/63</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#79g Memo</del>	<del>WH Conf. To VP from HG</del>	<del>2 p 11/09/62</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#79h Memo</del>	<del>WH [duplicate of #79g] Conf.</del>	<del>2 p 11/09/62</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#79f Memo</del>	<del>Senate Conf. To Pres. Kennedy from Senator Mansfield</del>	<del>4 p 05/01/61</del>	<del>A</del>

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4 of 4

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#66 Agenda</del>	<del>NSC Secret Meeting of 6/29/61</del>	<del>2 p 06/27/61</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#67 Agenda</del>	<del>NSC Secret Meeting of 6/13/61</del>	<del>2 p 06/08/61</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#68 Report</del>	<del>NSC Top Secret re: Berlin open 3-9-09</del>	<del>3 p 07/20/61</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#69 Report</del>	<del>NSC Top Secret notes on NSC meeting</del>	<del>5 p 07/19/61</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#69a Agenda</del>	<del>NSC Secret Meeting of 7/19/61</del>	<del>2 p 07/18/61</del>	<del>A</del>
#70 Report	NSC Top Secret re: Berlin Crisis	7 p Undated	A
<del>#71 Report</del>	<del>NSC Secret Actions of 486th Meeting</del>	<del>1 06/30/61</del>	<del>A</del>
#71a Notes	NSC <del>Top Secret</del> Meeting of 6/29/61	3 06/29/61	A
<del>#73 Report</del>	<del>NSC Secret Actions of 485th meeting</del>	<del>7 p 06/13/61</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#73a Memo</del>	<del>NSC Secret To holders of NSC Actions No. 2429-2430</del>	<del>2 p 06/15/61</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#73b Notes</del>	<del>NSC Secret NSC Meeting of 6/13/61</del>	<del>4 p 06/13/61</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#73c Memo</del>	<del>NSC Secret To NSC from McG. Bundy</del>	<del>1 p 06/12/61</del>	<del>A</del>
#75 Report	NSC Secret Actions of 484th meeting	5 p 05/19/61	A
<del>#77 Report</del>	<del>NSC Top Secret Actions of 483rd meeting</del>	<del>5 p 05/05/61</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#77a Notes</del>	<del>NSC Top Secret Meeting of 5/5/61</del>	<del>2 p 05/05/61</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION VP Security File, National Security Council  
 National Security Council (III)

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65

6/29/61

June 27, 1961

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in the  
Cabinet Room of The White House  
on Thursday, June 29, 1961,  
at ~~3:30~~ p. m.

4:30

1. Laos

(NSC Actions Nos. 2415, 2417 and 2418)

Report by the Secretary of State.

2. Berlin

Preliminary Presentation of Views on the Berlin Problem  
by Mr. Dean Acheson.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC LA 4/28/77  
By RMG, NARS, Date 6/17/77

486th NSC Meeting

NSC Control No. 8

~~SECRET~~

INVITEES IN ADDITION TO THE STATUTORY MEMBERS AND ADVISERS FOR THE  
486th NSC MEETING TO BE HELD ON THURSDAY, JUNE 29, 1961, AT 3:30 P. M.

For the first item:

The Attorney General  
The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Director, Bureau of  
the Budget  
The Deputy Secretary of  
Defense  
The Assistant Secretary  
of Defense (ISA)  
The Director, U. S. Infor-  
mation Agency  
The Military Representative  
to the President

The Deputy Under Secretary  
of State  
The Assistant Secretary of  
State (Far Eastern Affairs)  
The Special Assistant to the  
President for National  
Security Affairs  
The Deputy Special Assistant  
to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
The Military Aide to the  
President  
The Special Counsel to the  
President  
The Air Force Military Aide  
to the Vice President

For the second item:

The Attorney General  
The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Deputy Secretary of  
Defense  
The Assistant Secretary  
of Defense (ISA)  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director, U. S. Infor-  
mation Agency  
The Military Representative  
to the President

The Assistant Secretary of  
State (European Affairs)  
The Special Assistant to the  
President for National  
Security Affairs  
The Deputy Special Assistant  
to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
The Military Aide to the  
President  
The Special Counsel to the  
President

June 8, 1961

67  
~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in the  
Cabinet Room of The White House  
on Tuesday, June 13, 1961  
at 3:00 p. m.

1. REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE EUROPEAN TRIP
2. PRESENTATION OF THE TASK FORCE REPORT ON KOREA  
(NSC Action No. 2421; SNIE 42-2-61; Report of the Task Force  
on Korea, dated June 5, 1961)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 4/28/77

By RMG, NARS, Date 6/17/77

485th NSC Meeting

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NSC CONTROL NO. 3

INVITEES IN ADDITION TO THE STATUTORY MEMBERS AND ADVISERS FOR THE  
485th NSC MEETING TO BE HELD TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 1961, AT 3:00 P. M.

The following are being invited to attend this meeting:

The Attorney General	The Counselor, Department of State
The Secretary of the Treasury	The Assistant Secretary of State (Far Eastern Affairs)
The Director, Bureau of the Budget	The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Economic Affairs
The Deputy Secretary of Defense	Ambassador-designate Samuel D. Berger
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)	The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army	The Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Navy	The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology
The Secretary of the Air Force	The Military Aide to the President
The Joint Chiefs of Staff	The Special Counsel to the President
The Deputy Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Forces in Korea	
The Director, U. S. Informa- tion Agency	
The Adviser to the President for Para-Military Affairs	
The Deputy Under Secretary of State	

The Decision on Berlin

On June 29, 1961, Mr. Acheson submitted his report on Berlin to the National Security Council. In an oral presentation he went over its contents in considerable detail and explained the philosophy behind several aspects of his proposal. Following that meeting Mr. Bundy, by NSC Action Memorandum #58, assigned to an Interdepartmental Coordinating Group the responsibility for preparing further studies in response to the Acheson proposal. The Interdepartmental Coordinating Group consisted of the Secretaries of State, Treasury and Defense, with Mr. Rusk acting as Chairman.

The Report of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group was submitted to the NSC at its meeting on July 13. Prior to the meeting Mr. Bundy sent a memorandum to the President, the Vice President, Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, the Directors of CIA and USIA, Chairman JCS, and General Taylor, and by attachment outlined the four following military choices in Berlin planning:

1. Proceed at once with all possible speed with a substantial reinforcement of U.S. ground, air and naval forces. This course would require a prompt declaration of a national emergency and an immediate request for legislation giving stand-by controls over the economy.

2. Proceed at once with all measures not requiring declaration of a national emergency; in effect, this means everything but the call-up of units and specialists from the National Guard and Reserves. At a later date, related to the development of the crisis, declare a national emergency, with the understanding that there will be a delay of up to four months in the combat availability of units called to active service after the declaration of emergency. This course would also require stand-by controls, but the time of this need is not clear.

3. Proceed at once with a declaration of national emergency and with all preparations except a large-scale call-up of Reserves or Guard units. In this course the declaration would be put in as low a key as possible, and described as a means of freeing the President's hands for later action in an emergency. In this course, stand-by controls might be requested in the same tone of voice.

4. Avoid any significant military build-up at this time, on the ground that the crisis is one of political unity and firmness of will, and on the further ground that substantial military preparations at this stage would divide the alliance, stiffen the Russians, frighten our own people, and operate against an effective stand in Berlin under the fundamental shield of the nuclear deterrent.

July 20, 1961

EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLJ-037-004-3-1  
By *dwj/c*, NARA, Date 2-27-09

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EYES ONLY

In the special meeting which followed the Council discussions the President evidenced interest in supporting the first course of action. The Vice President subscribed to this point of view. Secretary Rusk objected to the choice and when asked his reason for disagreeing he offered no sound basis nor did he elect an alternate course of action. However, the apparent preference (of course of action) of the President, which was supported fully by the Vice President, was not altered in this latter discussion.

Following the meeting Mr. Bundy dispatched NSC Action Memorandum to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group and, in addition, to the Director of CIA, asking that implementing documents for military action be prepared in response to the President's decision. NSC Action Memorandum #59 however contained not the four courses of action referred to above, but rather two courses of action stated as follows:

1. A request about 2-3 weeks hence for \$4-5 billion, with necessary taxes, stand-by controls, other legislation and declaration of a national emergency.
2. An immediate request for \$1-1.5 billion without controls, taxes, etc., and a further request later if necessary. (The \$1-1.5 billion figure was changed to \$3.0 billion by the time the meeting convened.)

A third course of action was mentioned and differed from Course 2 only in that the increase in the Defense Establishment would be permanent rather than temporary.

The Interdepartmental Coordinating Group, with the Secretary of State as Chairman, addressed itself to the two courses of action (NSC Action Memorandum #59) and submitted its Report to the National Security Council on July 19. The Group in this Report came to the conclusion that course #2, specified above, was the only logical course to follow and the meeting proceeded seemingly in tacit acceptance of the Coordinating Group's recommendation. Mr. Acheson however took exception with the issue on the basis that the chosen course of action did not face up to the problem and, above all, did not elicit the President's decision which Acheson felt absolutely essential at the present time. Acheson felt that the Secretary of State could not establish the appropriate liaison with U. S. allies nor could the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the Treasury act to the extent necessary in the absence of a fundamental decision. In effect, he implied criticism of those who were seeking to

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

postpone the inevitable decision. Nevertheless the second course of action was adopted and, in the course of the discussion which followed, the Secretaries of State and Defense expressed the opinion that they could carry out their functions within the framework of the second course of action.

It is to be noted that the decision made on the Berlin issue constitutes little more than a budget request of \$3.0 billion and this particular course does not envision the declaration of a national emergency, necessary taxes, stand-by controls, etc. The decision relating to the recall of Reserve units is even deferred until approximately 1 September. In the meantime however discussions with U. S. allies will be carried out.

A decision to proceed at once with all possible speed with the declaration of a national emergency and with the reinforcement of U. S. forces has several supporting arguments:

1. Immediate mobilization would serve to convince the Soviets of the seriousness of U. S. intentions and would dispel the notion that the United States would not be willing to fight for Berlin.

2. Such action would make it possible for immediate reaction to any Communist blocking of the Berlin access and would not be dependent upon the deferred recall of Reserve troops.

3. The action itself might deter the Communists from instituting blocking action.

4. An improvement in the Free World's military posture would result regardless of how the Berlin crisis turns out and would therefore add strength to the Western position in negotiations.

5. Early mobilization would give the United States and its allies a head start in the event of a general war.

The principal arguments against early mobilization are:

1. Such action might make it difficult for the Soviets to gracefully abandon their threats concerning Berlin.

2. Rapid mobilization could create panic and disruptions in the domestic and international economy.

3. Certain allies might tend to abandon support of the United States in the face of such precipitous action.

Notes on National Security Council Meeting  
19 July 1961

Secretary Rusk outlined the Soviet motives for creating the Berlin crisis. He admitted that the U.S. reaction constituted a most difficult political problem. He stated his position that the U.S. should defend its interests by all means short of war. In such interim period as may exist the U.S. should attempt to convince the Soviets of our rights in Berlin and of our willingness to defend them. In the meantime the U.S. should seek the highest degree of allied unity and mobilize world public opinion and support of our cause. These actions should be carried on concurrent with (or perhaps precede) a buildup of United States military strength in a manner which would not create domestic or foreign panic, nor at a rate or form which would antagonize Khrushchev. At the same time the level of U.S. effort should be such as to be fully convincing of U.S. intent. Rusk observed that by the end of 1961 an additional 6 U.S. divisions would be required and equivalent buildups in respective NATO countries should also follow. The force levels prescribed in MC 70 should be attained insofar as possible.

Mr. McNamara then outlined the military program in considerable detail. The Defense Department proposals are in response to Course B as outlined in Annex A1 of the Report by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group in Germany and Berlin. He emphasized that this course of action did not envision the declaration of a national emergency. However a special authorization to call up the National Guard and Reserve would be requested from the Congress. Further, a request for a \$3 billion increase in the Defense budget will be submitted soon. Mr. McNamara outlined the plan for recall of the various Army and Marine divisions and specified certain air units which will not be deactivated, and delineated the augmentations of certain other forces.

The President outlined his impressions of the plan which seemed destined for acceptance. Essentially the plan envisioned a postponement of call-up of the Reserves. This deferment of decision would last until approximately 1 September. He noted that air units could be called to active duty without the declaration of a national emergency, which declaration he further noted could have a serious effect on the domestic economy, the gold flow and balance of payments.

Mr. Acheson expressed concern over the failure of the Council to take definitive action in some form at the present time. He posed the question as to what we would know in September that we do not know now

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-61

By WJP, NARA, Date 6-4-93

~~TOP SECRET~~

and suggested that we would have by that date lost valuable time for preparations. The President responded that we would know at least two things, the first of which would probably be further evidence of Khrushchev's intention and, secondly, indications of allied unity which we might expect. The President added that this period of time might also delay the precipitation of gold outflow. Mr. Acheson proceeded further with his point that the Council was failing to make a decision and by such delay the U.S. would be unable to discuss specifics with our allies. He pointed out that the United States might not go forward after 1 September if in the meantime the allies should balk at our proposals.

The President asked Mr. Acheson if his current thesis did not in a sense conflict with that portion of his report which prescribed a gradual buildup in forces and action as the intensity of the situation mounted. Mr. Acheson replied that there was no conflict in the scheme to build up in a phased manner but his point was that there was clearly an absence of a decision in the first place to build up later. Mr. Acheson again repeated his entreaty for a decision in some form. He pointed out that the Secretary of State would be unprepared to discuss courses of action in the near future with our allies and at the same time the Secretary of Defense would be unable to carry out his functions. Mr. Rusk agreed that he should be able to tell our allies what we are prepared to do and at the same time ask them to perform in a certain manner.

The President stated that he felt that the elements of the necessary decision were present and again asked Mr. Acheson if he agreed. Acheson replied that he assumed the decision is now taken to send 6 divisions to Europe by 1 January and these, if necessary, would come from the 8 divisions which are presently in the United States. He also assumed that by the first of September a further decision could be made as to whether or not Reserve divisions would be recalled and what further mobilization requirements should be met. He added that the utilization of the regular divisions in this fashion was a calculated risk which the President would have to assess.

Mr. McNamara stated that the September 1 decision for recall of certain Reserve divisions did not particularly concern him since he felt that this action could be accomplished between September 1 and January 1. Further, the entire action would be affected by such conditions as phasing of the recalls, state of readiness of the various divisions, etc. He expressed the opinion that the Secretary of State could at the present time

tell NATO allies of the U.S. ability to increase U.S. forces in Europe by "5 or 6 divisions" by 1 January. At the same time commensurate increases would be made in tactical aviation, airlift, sealift, etc.

The President asked Ambassador Finletter for his impressions of the proposed action. Finletter replied that the dispatch of 6 divisions to Europe as the result of the Berlin impasse would create a profound impression. He believed however that the NATO countries probably could not contribute to the overall effort to an equivalent degree. In response to the President's question as to the effect of mobilization, increased defense budgets and the presence of additional U.S. troops in the NATO area, Ambassador Finletter replied that the NATO countries would probably voice no objections providing they were reasonably sure that these measures and forces were temporary in nature and did not constitute more or less a permanent burden. He concluded with the suggestion that the U.S. tell its allies specifically what is proposed and requested of them, but above all not become involved in negotiations for troops, force levels, bases, etc.

The President requested the Secretary of the Treasury to furnish an economic plan as soon as possible. Particular attention should be paid to the budget increases, tax increases, economic controls, etc. He suggested that Mr. Dillon consult closely with Mr. Heller on taxes and budget levels.

Mr. Murrow expressed the opinion that the buildup of forces should be steady and gradual and that each step should be publicized fully. Each call-up of a division or major action related to the buildup should be utilized as an occasion to express United States aims and purposes. The President added that in addition to these particular releases there should be one or two themes symbolic of the U.S. purpose repeated over and over.

Secretary Dillon pointed out the need for a decision as to whether or not military aid would be furnished to allied nations in conjunction with the buildup. Mr. Rusk agreed that this decision must precede his discussions with the allied nations. He observed that the costs will fall unevenly on allies and on the U.S. and expressed the opinion that allies will not reach MC 70 goals without considerable military assistance from the U.S.

Mr. McNamara expressed the firm opinion that there should be no U.S. aid and that the allies should be told this from the beginning. He pointed out that 2/3rds of the MC 70 goals could be reached without aid

through the efforts of the U. S. and Germany alone. He observed that the U. K. is capable of greater effort and that the response of France will be affected by actions in Algeria. In any case, he repeated, no military aid should be provided as the result of the current proposals. Mr Rusk asked that no decision be made at this meeting on military aid. General Lemnitzer observed that such a decision was practically without meaning because not much military hardware was available above that which is required for equipping U. S. divisions. Further, the time period does not permit acceleration of production for the purpose.

The President made the decision that the Secretary of State in his forthcoming consultations would voice the policy that military aid and equipment will not be available from the United States. The same would hold true for economic assistance. The President added that it might be necessary to reconsider both of these policies to certain degrees at a later date.

Mr. McNamara reminded the President of the present move in Congress to procure additional manned aircraft in FY 62 by the addition of \$500 million for the purchase of B-52s, and \$300 million for acceleration of the B-70 program. Mr. McNamara stated that he wanted it clear that he would oppose this move as best he could in Congressional hearings now in progress. He stated that manned aircraft production programs would not be altered in any way. He expressed the opinion that production lines of these aircraft could be reinstated in years to come if necessary because of the present plans to stockpile supplies, "pickle tools", etc.

The President reviewed the schedule of activities for the immediate future as follows: Inform the British, the French and Germans, by notes, of U. S. intentions. Ambassador Finletter will inform the NATO Council. Mr. Kohler will depart soon to participate in the Working Group on the proposals; and Mr. Rusk will pursue the issues at the Foreign Ministers meeting on August 8. In discussions with allies, U. S. capability and plans (in contrast to specific intent) should be emphasized in case it becomes necessary to alter the proposed courses of action at a later date.

Ambassador Finletter stated that he would not inform the NATO Council of these proposals except from a written text. Mr. Bundy stated that such a text would be provided in the near future and that all the necessary action papers would also be forthcoming.

Finletter observed that the North Atlantic Council was not as effective as it should be and that consultations on these proposals would perhaps be

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difficult. The President asked Mr. Finletter to do what he could to strengthen the Council, but accepted the fact that Finletter's job would be difficult. He asked all departments to keep Finletter informed as completely as possible.

In conclusion, the President asked for complete security on these proposals and plans. He requested no dissemination or discussion of (1) U.S. capabilities, (2) plans and courses of action, and (3) fiscal measures.

~~TOP SECRET~~

July 18, 1961

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in the  
Cabinet Room of The White House  
on Wednesday, July 19, 1961  
at 4:00 p. m.

BERLIN

(Memo for the President from Mr. Dean Acheson, subject:  
"Berlin", dated June 28, 1961; NSC Actions Nos. 2432 and 2434)

Further report on actions authorized.

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Authority NSC Dec 4/28/77  
By rmg, NARS, Date 6/17/77

488th NSC Meeting

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NSC Control No. 13

**INVITEES IN ADDITION TO THE STATUTORY MEMBERS AND  
ADVISERS FOR THE 488th NSC MEETING TO BE HELD ON  
WEDNESDAY, JULY 19, 1961, at 4:00 p. m.**

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**The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Attorney General  
The Director, Bureau of  
the Budget  
The Deputy Secretary of  
Defense  
The Assistant Secretary  
of Defense (ISA)  
The Director, U. S. Infor-  
mation Agency  
The Military Representative  
to the President  
The U. S. Permanent Repre-  
sentative to the North  
Atlantic Council  
Mr. Dean Acheson**

**The Under Secretary of the  
Treasury  
The Under Secretary of State  
The Deputy Under Secretary  
of State  
The Special Assistant to the  
President for National  
Security Affairs  
The Deputy Special Assistant  
to the President for Na-  
tional Security Affairs  
The Military Aide to the President  
The Special Counsel to the  
President**

RECORD OF ACTIONS  
by the  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
at its  
FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SIXTH MEETING  
held on  
June 29, 1961  

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(Approved by the President on June 30, 1961)

ACTION  
NUMBERSUBJECT2431 KUWAIT

Noted the President's approval of the Secretary of State's recommendation that the U. S. give full political and logistic support, if required, to the United Kingdom in connection with certain actions it is taking to forestall any Iraq attempt to take over Kuwait by force.

2432 BERLIN

Discussed the Berlin problem on the basis of an oral presentation by Mr. Dean Acheson and noted the President's instruction to the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, in consultation with an interdepartmental group, to assign to appropriate departments and agencies specific studies and recommendations to be presented at a Council meeting within two weeks.

2433 LAOS

Discussed the Laos situation on the basis of a report by the Secretary of State, supplemented by Ambassador Harriman's summary of current negotiations in Geneva.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 92-64  
By sig, NARA, Date 6-25-93

Notes on National Security Council Meeting, 29 June 1961

The President expressed deep and serious concern over the disclosure of sensitive information to unauthorized persons. He referred specifically to the report in Newsweek about the Berlin proposals which had appeared in the press before they had even reached his desk. He expressed the hope that the individual guilty of this particular disclosure could be apprehended and observed that he ought to go to jail. He then appointed a committee, consisting of representatives from Defense and State, and Bundy, Dulles and Hoover of the FBI, to review security policies. The President expressed the view that the best way to control matters of highest national importance would be to severely restrict the number of individuals having access to such information. He stated he could see no reason why so many copies of the Acheson report should have been printed. He suggested that such a report should be available only in the offices of departmental heads and that staff assistants should be required to visit the office for reading the document.

Mr. Dulles gave a briefing on the Intelligence situation in Kuwait. He stated that the British were prepared to assist Kuwait on request

[REDACTED]

1.3  
(a)(4+5)

The U.K. will seek support of other Arab states. The President asked if the U.K. had sufficient airlift to meet its requirements. Mr. McNamara replied that this, as well as the utilization of MATS airlift and the Civil Air Fleet, was under study.

Mr. Acheson went over his report in detail. He emphasized the military and economic portions of the report and pointed up its negative aspects which he considered important to the operation. He suggested that the President begin a series of calculated moves and speeches designed to prepare the U.S. for the Berlin showdown. Mr. Acheson suggested that the President utilize radio and television to inform the country, in contrast to alarm, and further suggested that USIA place major emphasis on informing the world of the same ideas. He suggested the repetition of certain fundamentals, such as the meaning of peace in Berlin (it exists presently but, contrary to Khrushchev's statement, will not exist under his scheme). The basic facts of the Berlin issue as well as the plausible aspects of the unification of the German people

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-61

By WJP, NARA, Date 6-4-93

should also be set forth. Mr. Rusk suggested that the term "unification" give way to "self-determination" as being more clearly understood and expressive of the basic issue. Mr. Bundy suggested that the ultimate position which the United States wishes to assume should be kept clearly in mind and all statements should be related to one or more of the following criteria: (1) Self-determination; (2) Maintenance of the status quo; (3) Actions which are likely to precipitate war. The President asked whether or not a Berlin plebiscite should be held in the fall and in such a manner as not to be provocative. The President directed Mr. Bowles to study means as to how it could be done.

In reflecting on Khrushchev's comment about mobilization, the President asked how the U.S. could mobilize without inducing Russian mobilization and, later, escalation. Mr. Acheson replied that it would be extremely difficult to avoid these possibilities. Mr. Rusk observed that in any case the United States should, above all, maintain its flexibility of action. He confirmed Mr. Acheson's view that the purpose of the entire exercise should be essentially political rather than military.

Mr. Acheson expressed the belief that reinforcement of the seven divisions should begin soon. This action would be followed by others, admittedly dangerous, if no improvement in the general situation were noted. In perusing the possibilities of failure, Mr. Acheson placed miscalculation high on the list, with the loss of allies second. He admitted however that if allies were to be lost it would be far better to lose them early in the game and, for this reason alone, our intentions should be made clear to our allies from the beginning.

Mr. Rusk asked if there should be an effort to increase the de facto relations between East and West Germany. Mr. Acheson replied that this should not be done, either in an incidental or deliberate sense.

The President asked Mr. Acheson for his opinion as to the appropriate course of action in case Khrushchev offers to negotiate at some point along the line of implementation of the plan. Mr. Acheson was unable to respond to the general question but stated firmly the U.S. should not be a party to Khrushchev's scheme. He reaffirmed his earlier statement that we would have to be firm and determined in our plans, aims and execution. The President argued that it might be difficult to convince the U.S. and indeed the world of the validity of our position, especially if Khrushchev exhorted his determination and desire to negotiate. Mr. Acheson mused that it would be appropriate to sit down with Khrushchev and the world would note that nothing would result.

The President directed Secretary McNamara to continue the military planning toward the implementation of the Acheson plan. McNamara observed that an additional two weeks would be required for a full presentation of all aspects of the military plan. Mr. Dillon was directed to expedite economic planning, particularly in the area of control of prices and of augmentation of the budget.

Mr. Bundy stated that the committee (designated earlier) would assign further tasks as suggested in the report. He added that the report itself would be withdrawn in the meantime. Mr. Dulles was directed to make a full and complete appraisal on the Intelligence possibilities of the Berlin situation. Mr. Murrow was directed to prepare a plan for overseas as well as domestic information activities on the Berlin issue.

With regard to Laos, Mr. Rusk gave a summary of the Zurich meetings during which Phoumi was treated with contempt. It was clear from the meetings that a neutralist government in Laos would be difficult, if not impossible, to establish. Mr. Rusk said that he had come to the conclusion that within 7 to 10 days certain difficult decisions must be made: If all cease-fire efforts fail and no further progress is made the United States must decide whether or not to intervene in Laos and to invoke, initially, Plan Five. He expressed the belief that the British would support intervention as would certain SEATO members. He observed that the issue in Laos was of such international concern that the United States of necessity had to be firm. He cited the relationship to the Berlin issue.

The President inquired as to the status and condition of the government forces in Laos and added he was suspicious of relying on airstrips in Laos any longer. General Lemnitzer replied that training had continued during the cease-fire (reported by Phoumi to Lemnitzer this date). Also, two battalions have recently completed training in Thailand, and government forces now total about 32,000. The President asked for additional details and suggested to General Lemnitzer that a more complete military appraisal be made. The President suggested that Ambassador Brown maintain close relationships with the British and French to determine their reactions and their willingness to respond with the United States.

Mr. Harriman reported on deliberations of the ICC and inferred pessimism of the outcome. He expressed the belief that Souvanna will probably become Prime Minister of Laos and the President agreed. The President felt that it would be good under these circumstances for Souvanna to visit the United States and directed Rusk to have Gavin attempt to arrange such a visit.

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6/13/61

RECORD OF ACTIONS  
by the  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
at its  
FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIFTH MEETING  
held on  
June 13, 1961  
(Approved by the President on June 13, 1961)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 92-64  
By inc, NARA, Date 6-25-93

ACTION  
NUMBERSUBJECT2429. REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE EUROPEAN TRIP

Discussed certain developments in the context of the President's European trip.

2430.

KOREA

(NSC Action No. 2421; SNIE 42-2-61; Report of the Task Force on Korea, dated June 5, 1961)

- a. Discussed the Report of the Task Force on Korea and concurred in the following recommendations:

U. S. Actions to be Undertaken Immediately

1. The new U. S. Ambassador to Korea should undertake early discussions with the appropriate leaders of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction along the lines described in paragraphs a and c through e (pp. 5-6) of the report.
2. With reference to paragraph b (p. 5), in these early discussions and subsequently the Ambassador should seek to create a gradual recognition among the leaders of the Supreme Council that it is in their interest and in the interest of their country that they from time to time publicly reaffirm their intention eventually to restore representative government and constitutional liberties; and that failure over the long run to demonstrate their good faith in this matter will compromise them in the eyes of the people of the United States and other Free World countries and in the United Nations.

ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2430. KOREA (Continued)

3. The Ambassador is authorized to invite the Chief of Government to Washington for an informal visit including conferences with the President and the Secretary of State.
4. Provided assurances are given in respect to the matters to be discussed under 1 and 2 above and that the Korean Government undertakes actions immediately with respect to certain essential reforms, including the completion of fiscal, foreign exchange and stabilization reforms, the rationalization of the corporate structure and rates in the power and transportation industries, and the bringing into production of certain factories already built; and provided the Ambassador is satisfied with evidences of Korean willingness and capacity to carry out mutually agreed plans and programs, then the Ambassador is authorized:
  - (a) to indicate U. S. willingness to release approximately \$28 million in remaining defense support funds for FY 1961;
  - (b) to state that the United States is willing to enter into agreed commitments for specific projects for expansion of the power industry, immediately upon appropriation of funds;
  - (c) to indicate U. S. willingness to support through U. S. aid the expansion and intensification of the National Construction Service on a long-term basis;
  - (d) to offer technical experts to assist the Korean Government in preparation of its Five-Year Development Plan; and
  - (e) to state that, provided substantial progress is made in the next few months, the United States will be prepared to provide resources to the Korean Government to help carry out a Five-Year Development Plan. As a long-term policy, U. S. influence should be reinforced by making economic development assistance (as distinguished from supporting assistance) available in increments which can be withheld in the event of Korean failure to carry out agreed programs.

ACTION  
NUMBERSUBJECT2430. KOREA (Continued)

5. The Director of the International Cooperation Administration should take immediate measures to improve the administration of the United States Operations Mission in Korea, including action to concentrate the U. S. effort on the most essential projects and to reduce or eliminate others.

Subsequent U. S. Actions

6. Upon a determination of the Secretary of State that the Korean Government is sufficiently stable and cooperative to justify provision of long-range development assistance to it, the actions specified in paragraphs a through d (pp. 7-8) should be taken, including the appointment of a Special Envoy of the highest stature to visit Korea at a time recommended by the Ambassador. The Envoy will be accompanied by a group of economic advisers to perform functions along the lines of those described in Appendix A to the report, including assistance in the definition of Korean economic goals. While the Koreans must establish and take responsibility for their own goals, the United States can, having defined its goals, help advise the Koreans toward goals that are realistic and consistent with our own. The economic goals which the United States should seek to achieve in Korea include: (1) reversal of the present downward trend in the rate of economic growth and establishment of a specific target of an average annual growth rate for the first five-year plan (rate in 1960: 2.3 per cent); (2) reduction of the present unemployment and underemployment rate (estimated at 35 per cent); (3) increase in average real farm income; and (4) consistent with (1)-(3) above, reduction of the present wide gap between imports and exports (\$30 million v. \$345 million) in a staged progression toward an eventual balance in Korea's international accounts.
7. Subject to concrete action by the Korean Government to increase electric power rates, consolidate the power companies and eliminate power losses, announce U. S. willingness to provide, subject to Congressional appropriation, the external resources

ACTION  
NUMBERSUBJECT2430. KOREA (Continued)

required to carry out an agreed five-year plan of electric power development. In addition announce that Korean power requirements for the next ten years will be further reviewed and the level of U. S. support re-examined following development of an adequate Korean Five-Year Development Plan.

8. The Secretaries of State and Defense should conduct an urgent review of the force and equipment levels of Korean Armed Forces, including in the first instance a military assessment of (a) the missions of these forces, in the context of overall U. S. Far East strategy and in the light of the Communist threat and of the anticipated deployment and use of U. S. forces; and (b) the strategic implications of alternative force and equipment structures, including the adequacy of the existing level of forces. Such a military assessment should then be keyed to political and economic factors, to produce a recommendation for long-term force goals and for immediate actions, as necessary and practical, to move toward these goals. This review should be completed in time for use as a basis for allocation of FY 1962 military assistance funds.
9. U. S. military personnel should be directed to encourage and support greater participation by Korean armed forces in the work of the National Construction Service and in other appropriate civil works projects. The review referred to in 8 above should also include the preparation, and the assessment of the economic and military implications of, a program to place far greater stress than heretofore on the training of Korean military personnel in skills and vocations which will permit them to make a greater contribution to the development of Korean infrastructure and the civilian economy.
10. The improvement of Japanese-ROK relations, along the lines called for in paragraph f (p. 9), should be discussed with the Japanese Prime Minister during his visit to Washington and should be urged upon the new regime in Korea. (It is recognized that this is an extremely sensitive issue with the present ROK regime.)

ACTION  
NUMBERSUBJECT2430. KOREA (Continued)

11. The Director of the U. S. Information Agency should arrange for USIS to assist the Korean Government, as may be appropriate, in defining and propagating national ideals and goals and in improving the Korean image abroad.

Required Korean Actions

12. The following basic requirements must be pressed upon the Koreans from the outset if they are to achieve meaningful progress and to make profitable use of U. S. development assistance:
  - (a) Formulation and implementation of a National Development Plan, with short-range, measurable elements susceptible of prompt fulfillment; and in conjunction therewith, undertaking long-range social planning including definition and public promulgation by national leaders of national goals and ideals; reform of civil service and police (including salary increases); achievement of better relations with students, intellectuals, and the press; and enhancement of Korea's national image;
  - (b) Consideration of the preconditions for the eventual return to civilian rule;
  - (c) Assurances that the new regime does not interfere with CINCUNC in the discharge of its military responsibilities;
  - (d) Endorsement by deed and word of the constitutional freedoms of individuals to the maximum extent consistent with the emergency nature of the government, and avoidance of promiscuous abuse of power, ex post facto laws, blood-purges, or other excesses;
  - (e) Protection of the rural population against the exorbitant interest rates of the money-lenders; and
  - (f) Formulating and implementing a thorough anti-corruption program along the lines outlined in Appendix B to the report.

ACTION  
NUMBERSUBJECT2430. KOREA (Continued)

- b. Agreed that NSC 6018/1, "U. S. Policy Toward Korea", is no longer applicable.
- c. Noted that the Task Force would remain in being for such follow-through action on the above directives as its Chairman deems appropriate.

The President presided at this meeting. The Secretary of the Treasury and the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget, participated in the Council actions below. The Attorney General; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA); the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Acting Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force; the Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, UN Forces in Korea; the Adviser to the President for Para-Military Affairs; James Killen, International Cooperation Administration; the Deputy Under Secretary of State; the Counselor, Department of State; the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; the Ambassador-designate to Korea; the U. S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology; the Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Military Aide to the President; the Special Counsel to the President; the Air Force Military Aide to the Vice President; Bromley Smith and Robert H. Johnson, NSC Staff, attended the meeting.

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON

June 15, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL HOLDERS OF NSC ACTIONS NOS. 2429-2430:

It is requested that the attached corrected page be substituted for page 7 of the above NSC Actions; and that the superseded page be destroyed by burning, in accordance with security regulations.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC Dec 4/28/77  
By mmg, NAK, Date 6/17/77

NSC Control No. 7

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The President presided at this meeting. The Secretary of the Treasury and the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget, participated in the Council actions below. The Attorney General; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA); the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Acting Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force; the Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, UN Forces in Korea; the Adviser to the President for Para-Military Affairs; James Killen, International Cooperation Administration; the Deputy Under Secretary of State; the Counselor, Department of State; the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Economic Affairs; the Ambassador-designate to Korea; the U. S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology; the Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Military Aide to the President; the Special Counsel to the President; the Air Force Military Aide to the Vice President; Bromley Smith and Robert H. Johnson, NSC Staff, attended the meeting.

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Notes on NSC Meeting, 13 June 1961

The President asked who was responsible for planning and coordination on Berlin contingencies. Mr. Rusk replied that State was responsible and was presently in process of looking at all aspects of the problem, particularly that portion which related to the Department of Defense. He expressed the view that Khrushchev had deliberately chosen a "collision course" on the Berlin issue and all planning would attempt to preclude an incident. Mr. McNamara was asked the status of his review of the problem. He replied that adequate supplies were available: specifically, 6 months' military supplies, 18 days of rations, with an adequate civilian back-up. The President reported that he and De Gaulle discussed Khrushchev's belief that nuclear weapons preclude a general war, and they agreed that a conventional war is more likely. Since there remains the possibility of a nuclear war, the President asked Mr. Ellis for a report on Civil Defense planning.

The Director of OCDM reported that his programs were generally in order and that he was asking for \$300 million in FY 62 for marking and upgrading certain existing structures which would qualify as air raid shelters. The Vice President asked if this sum of money were required simply to locate shelters. Mr. Ellis replied certain construction was included, as well as were certain communications facilities.

The President suggested that by the end of this calendar year he inform all U.S. citizens more clearly, and by direct means if possible, of the requirement for air raid shelters. He would seek the assistance of state governors, make a TV appearance if necessary, and conduct a nationwide drill which would include all citizens and not just government workers in the metropolitan areas. He requested Mr. Ellis to have for presentation at the next NSC meeting a "program of immediacy." Ellis suggested a presentation of this program at the Governors Conference in Hawaii next month, and the President replied that he wanted the program sooner and further that he probably would not attend the Honolulu conference. Mr. Rusk asked that efforts in regard to this matter not create a state of alarm and thereby diminish the effectiveness of U.S. efforts at such other places as the U.N., Geneva, etc.

The President quoted Khrushchev as saying that the Soviets would not cross frontiers since this operation was not necessary for success, as in Iran and South Viet Nam. Therefore, every effort must be made to

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obtain approval of the Aid Program to meet this Communist effort. The President observed that legislative leaders this date reported that the program was in trouble. The Vice President confirmed this view but expressed the opinion that some of the difficulties could be overcome in spite of the fact that the Majority leader has forecast a cut of 20% to 30%. The Vice President suggested that the Secretaries of Treasury, State and Defense restudy the presentations and make them as effective as possible and then assure themselves that only the best people and the most fully informed continue the presentations. Emphasis should be placed upon the assurance to the Congress that the money is to be well-spent and that requirements are specific and necessary. In this fashion a certain amount of confidence might be restored. The Vice President suggested a dramatic program to select the most competent young people from industry, the legal profession, banking, etc., to administer the aid program. Even a degree of compulsion might have to be utilized to persuade these individuals of the serious and worthwhile aspects of the effort.

The President asked Mr. Labouisse of his opinion regarding the program and he confirmed anticipated difficulties, especially for military items. The amount of money in most cases appears to be less an issue than the question of the necessity for certain kinds of military equipment. The Congress wants confirmation that this Administration has made a thorough analysis of the Aid Program and has made necessary adjustments rather than have projected programs and issues of the past few years. Labouisse pointed out that the Congress wanted assurance that the United States will encourage or insist that the various countries of the world institute reforms and help themselves, and that United States programs will not be continued forever.

The Vice President repeated the Congressional mood of demanding better management of the enormous aid funds. He cited as an example the opinion frequently held that the \$300 million spent in South Viet Nam was poorly managed and the results are therefore meager. The Vice President suggested that in the various countries a commission similar to the one in Taiwan be established to administer the U.S. program. He felt this kind of effort would assure more efficient utilization of resources and at the same time restore confidence in the Congress.

The President said that Khrushchev repeated that wars of liberation are necessary and that the Soviets will support them. Khrushchev

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made it clear that so-called peaceful Soviet efforts in other areas would not deter this activity. The President observed that Khrushchev was making an obvious distinction between conventional wars and nuclear wars which he apparently thought would not break out. In confirming that the U.S. must assist countries which are targets of Soviet aggression, the President asked for suggestions as to what might be done to further our efforts and effectiveness in any fashion. Mr. Robert Kennedy offered the suggestion that corruption should be curbed in the many countries where it is rampant and where it reduces not only the effectiveness of the political and military machines but also the moral fiber of the country. A by-product is the world-wide criticism of U.S. efforts to assist countries who are unwilling or otherwise incapable of curbing corruption.

In taking up the report of the Task Force on Korea, Rusk summarized the history of political development of that country and outlined U.S. aims and intentions. He also cited certain economic figures. In response to a question by the President about the relative status of North and South Korea, Mr. McConaughy replied that approximately 35% of the working force is unemployed or only partially employed in South Korea, in contrast to no unemployment in North Korea. He added quickly that this figure for North Korea was deceiving because of the Communist methods of utilizing labor, frequently under slave conditions. Although agriculture is better in South Korea, manufacturing is more highly developed in the north where the gross national product is rising, but only to be plowed back into the industrial base and war potential. He went on to say that the greatest hindrance to Korean development was the continued animosity between Japan and South Korea and the failure to re-establish relations which would prove mutually beneficial. He said that one of the principal missions of Ambassadors Berger and Reischauer should be to attempt to establish a reconciliation between the two countries.

McNamara wanted to go on record as opposing any decrease in the level of the armed forces of Korea at this time. He felt that any proposed decrease would first of all alienate the new military leadership; secondly, it would contribute further to the serious unemployment problem; and thirdly, it was well worth keeping effective troops on the front line at a cost of only \$5 per month, especially when a decrease of approximately 100,000 soldiers would save only \$6 million per year.

The President asked if it would be possible to increase to any measurable extent the contribution of the armed forces to civilian work.

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The Deputy Commander-in-Chief, UNC, replied that road and mining projects are presently being performed by certain units of the armed forces, but expressed the opinion that little more could be done without an unacceptable decrease in military effectiveness. Lemnitzer interrupted with the observation that from a military standpoint force levels are presently below that which is necessary for an adequate defense of Korea. He said that he is simply repeating the views which he and Generals Taylor and Decker have expressed previously. He cited the 157-mile front which must still be defended against the same threat and even against a more highly efficient North Korean force than existed during wartime -- all this even without regard to the fact that a state of war technically still exists.

The President expressed the view that the economic and political situation in and about Korea were such as to present a hopeless situation. McConaughy confirmed that it was bad and perhaps would not improve principally because of an unstable economy, limited resources and an explosive population. Rostow disagreed with the acceptance of a hopeless economic situation and cited the following three factors as the basis for a certain degree of optimism:

1. New effective economic and social planning.
2. Young, aggressive, capable people in government.
3. Better relations with Japan.

The President concluded that the best opportunity for improvement among those mentioned would appear to be the improvement of Korean-Japan relations and directed Ambassador Berger to concentrate on the issue. The President suggested that the U. S. should also have a look at its own program and position and asked what we should demand of the Koreans. McConaughy and Berger agreed that a start should be made by demanding a decrease in corruption. The President stated that he would take up the subject of improvement in relations with Korea with the Japanese Prime Minister next week.

General Decker stated that in his view the most ominous and difficult problem in Korea is the control of the country by a bunch of junior officers and suggested that the United States demand the return of control of the armed forces and the country immediately to senior officers "rather than to a bunch of lieutenant colonels." He went on to say that he had already conveyed this idea to the Korean officer who has just departed the U. S. to become the new Defense Minister. The President disagreed with General Decker and expressed the opinion that the United States had no alternative except to deal with the people in power.

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON

June 12, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Report to the NSC by the Presidential Task  
Force on Korea, dated June 5, 1961

At the request of the Department of Defense, the enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the above subject are circulated for the information of the National Security Council.

McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC Dec 4/29/67

By mmg, NARS, Date 6/10/67

NSC Control No. 5

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
Washington 25, D. C.

C O P Y

June 12, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Report to the National Security Council by  
the Presidential Task Force on Korea (U)

1. The Report of the Presidential Task Force on Korea, dated 5 June 1961, was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment and recommendations. It is considered that the Report, with certain changes indicated below and in the Appendix hereto, contains recommendations which are adequate to meet the new situation arising from the coup and to implement US policies still valid from the past.

2. It is considered that review of force and equipment levels is primarily a responsibility of the Department of Defense, and that once these have been reviewed they should be coordinated with the Department of State to integrate political and economic considerations. Therefore, it is recommended that subparagraph e, page 8, of Recommendations be changed as follows: First line, "Direct the Secretaries-of-State-and Secretary of Defense to conduct . . ."; tenth line between words "them" and "be" insert "coordinated with the Secretary of State in order to".

3. To emphasize the importance of the over-all Communist threat in reviewing force and equipment levels of the Korean armed forces, it is recommended that the phrase, "in the light of the communist threat," be inserted between the words "strategic" and "and of" on page 8, subparagraph (1), second line, of Recommendations.

4. Other detailed comments are contained in the Appendix hereto. It is recommended that the Secretary of Defense support the Report of the Presidential Task Force on Korea subject to the comments contained herein.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(SIGNED)

L. L. LEMNITZER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By cbu/jc, NARA, Date 2-27-09

Attachment

APPENDIX

The following detailed changes to the Report to the National Security Council by the Presidential Task Force on Korea are recommended:

a. Introduction, page 1, lines 7 through 9, paragraph 1, revise as follows:

". . .; and a demonstration of US readiness to contribute significant-additional continue assistance, . . ."

REASON: Significant additional assistance could add to the corruption with a resultant disaffection and a decrease of US influence.

b. Introduction, page 2, paragraph 3, reword the third sentence as follows: "in contrast with past American aid which has been devoted to military security objectives, war damage repair, and the provision of a bare subsistence for the people, the new emphasis should be on long-range economic, political, and social development, as well as continuing support to the defense establishment."

REASON: To emphasize the strategic importance of Korea to the United States and to be in consonance with other recommendations contained herein.

c. Page 6, subparagraph f (1) of Recommendations, revise as follows:

"(1) To issue an invitation to the Chief of Government to make a an-informal-<sup>U</sup>working visit to Washington to confer with the President and the Secretary of State."

REASON: An informal working visit can do considerable harm to oriental "face" and thus increase tensions between the United States and Korea. Proper treatment can result in better relationships.

d. Page 8, subparagraph e of Recommendations, add new sentence at end of second line, "See Appendix E".

REASON: To highlight the military assessment contained in Appendix E.

e. Page 8, subparagraph (1), second line of Recommendations, insert "US" between "Over-all" and "Far East".

REASON: Clarity.

f. Page 8, subparagraph (2), third line of Recommendations, delete word "substantial".

REASON: The word "substantial" appears to prejudice the results of the study into the force and equipment levels of the ROK Armed Forces. A reduction may or may not prove feasible as a result of this study.

g. Page 10, subparagraph d, third line, add after the word "power", "ex post facto laws".

REASON: Ex post facto laws would have important bearing on negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement.

h. Page 18, first paragraph, last sentence of Discussion, add the following: "providing such actions do not detract from the primary mission assigned to the ROK military forces".

REASON: To insure that the fighting effectiveness of the ROK Armed Forces is not diluted by extraneous missions and the over-all strategic position of the United States in the Western Pacific thereby weakened.

i. Appendix E, page 1, under Broad US Policy, next to last line, change word "reliance" to "emphasis", and add "d" to increase (increased) and add "emphasis" after increased.

REASON: Accuracy.

j. Appendix E, page 3, paragraph beginning with "Continued utilization . . .", delete remainder of first sentence after word "response".

REASON: Maintenance of current force levels does not permit "raising the threshold".

k. Appendix E, page 3, lines 16 through 19, delete last sentence.

REASON: It is not considered feasible and is fallacious reasoning to adhere to a policy of substituting tactical nuclear weapons for manpower. Moreover, additional tactical nuclear weapons would not be an effective measure to redress the balance of military power if such weapons were also used by the Communists.

l. Appendix E, page 8, eighth line from bottom of page, change sentence as follows: "With respect to nuclear weapons it remains the policy of the US to ~~avoid their careless or irresponsible use but to~~ use them, if they should be required, in order to fulfill the treaty obligations of the US or to preserve vital national interests."

REASON: Present wording implies carelessness on the part of the US in the employment of nuclear weapons.

m. Appendix E, page 12, lines 6 and 7, revise as follows: ". . . significantly in favor of CHICOM/N.K. forces in both an expanded conventional conflict and in general war."

REASON: Accuracy.

n. Appendix E, page 15, subparagraph 3 b, change to read as follows:

"b. Permitting a suitable, selective, swift and effective response to communist aggression in the North Asia area."

REASON: Same as j above.

SUMMARY AND REVISION OF RECOMMENDATIONS  
OF  
TASK FORCE REPORT ON KOREA

(Including pertinent Task Force references per Secretary's Request)

Category 1: U.S. Actions to be Undertaken Immediately

1. The new U.S. Ambassador to Korea should undertake early discussions with the appropriate leaders of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction along the lines described in paragraphs a and c through e (pp. 5-6<sup>1/2</sup>) of the report.

1/Task Force Report reference:

- "a. To inform them that the U.S. is prepared to deal on a friendly and cooperative basis with the new regime;
- . . . . .
- "c. To affirm the intention of the U.S. to continue supporting assistance to the civilian economy and defense establishment;
- "d. To make clear that higher levels of assistance to support a National Development Plan will be provided only as the Korean Government enters into and carries out firm and specific commitments for reform, including certain reforms which have been under consideration for a long time. In this connection, the U.S. is prepared to offer technical and managerial experts to the Supreme Council;
- "e. To obtain renewed assurances that the SCNR will recognize the authority of CINCUNC to exercise operational control over the Korean Armed Forces, as a constituent element of the UN Command."

2. With reference to paragraph b (p.5<sup>2/2</sup>), in these early discussions and subsequently the Ambassador should seek to create a gradual recognition among the leaders of the Supreme Council that it is in their interest and in the interest of their country that they from time to time

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Authority FRS 61-63 vol. 22 #230  
By pc. NARA, Date 8-18-05

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publicly reaffirm their intention eventually to restore representative government and constitutional liberties; and that failure over the long run to demonstrate their good faith in this matter will compromise them in the eyes of the people of the United States and other Free World countries and in the United Nations.

2/Task Force Report reference:

"b. To impress on them that it is in their own national interest that the Supreme Council publicly and repeatedly reaffirm its adherence to the principle of representative government and constitutional liberties and its intention to restore these at the earliest possible time; and that the failure to demonstrate their good faith in this matter will ultimately compromise them in the eyes of the free world and of the people of the United States, and in the forum of the United Nations."

3. The Ambassador is authorized to invite the Chief of Government to Washington for an informal visit including conferences with the President and the Secretary of State.
4. Provided assurances are given in respect to the matters to be discussed under 1 and 2 above and that the Korean Government undertakes actions immediately with respect to certain essential reforms, including the completion of fiscal, foreign exchange and stabilization reforms, the rationalization of the corporate structure and rates in the power and transportation industries, and the bringing into production of certain factories already built; and provided the Ambassador is satisfied with evidences of Korean willingness and capacity to carry out mutually agreed plans and programs, then the Ambassador is authorized:

- (a) to indicate U.S. willingness to release approximately \$28 million in remaining defense support funds for FY 1961;
  - (b) to state that the United States is willing to enter into agreed commitments for specific projects for expansion of the power industry, immediately upon appropriation of funds;
  - (c) to indicate U.S. willingness to support through U.S. aid the expansion and intensification of the National Construction Service on a long-term basis;
  - (d) to offer technical experts to assist the Korean Government in preparation of its Five-Year Development Plan; and
  - (e) to state that, provided substantial progress is made in the next few months, the United States will be prepared to provide resources to the Korean Government to help carry out a Five-Year Development Plan. As a long-term policy, U.S. influence should be reinforced by making economic development assistance (as distinguished from supporting assistance) available in increments which can be withheld in the event of Korean failure to carry out agreed programs.
5. The Director of the International Cooperation Administration should take immediate measures to improve the administration of the United States Operations Mission in Korea, including action to concentrate the U.S. effort on the most essential projects and to reduce or eliminate others.

Category 2: Subsequent U.S. Actions

6. Upon a determination of the Secretary of State that the Korean Government is sufficiently stable and cooperative to justify provision of long-range development assistance to it, the actions specified in paragraphs a through d (pp. 7-8<sup>3</sup>/) should be taken, including the appointment of a Special Envoy of the highest stature to visit Korea at a time recommended by the Ambassador. The Envoy will be accompanied by a group of economic advisers to perform functions along the lines of those described in Appendix A to the report, including assistance in the definition of Korean economic goals. While the Koreans must establish and take responsibility for their own goals, the United States can, having defined its goals, help advise the Koreans toward goals that are realistic and consistent with our own. The economic goals which the United States should seek to achieve in Korea include: (1) reversal of the present downward trend in the rate of economic growth and establishment of a specific target of an average annual growth rate for the first five-year plan (rate in 1960: 2.3 per cent); (2) reduction of the present unemployment and underemployment rate (estimated at 35 per cent); (3) increase in average real farm income; and (4) consistent with (1)-(3) above, reduction of the present wide gap between imports and exports (\$30 million v. \$345 million) in a staged progression toward an eventual balance in Korea's international accounts.

3/Task Force Report reference:

- "a. Authorize the Secretary of State to determine when the Korean Government is sufficiently stable and cooperative to justify long-range development assistance.
  - "b. Upon such finding, and at a time recommended by the Ambassador, appoint a Special Envoy of the highest stature to visit Korea. This envoy would be accompanied by a group of economic advisers and would carry out the terms of reference set forth in Appendix A.
  - "c. Announce, on the recommendation of the Special Envoy and the Ambassador, the readiness of the U.S. to make available, in concert with other nations of the Free World, external resources to support a Korean Five-Year National Development Plan.
  - "d. Authorize the Secretary of State to explore, with nations most likely to make a contribution to Korean development (e.g., Japan and Germany) their willingness to contribute to such a program."
7. Subject to concrete action by the Korean Government to increase electric power rates, consolidate the power companies and eliminate power losses, announce U.S. willingness to provide, subject to Congressional appropriation, the external resources required to carry out an agreed five-year plan of electric power development\*. In addition announce that Korean power requirements for the next ten years will be further reviewed and the level of U.S. support re-examined following development of an adequate Korean Five-Year Development Plan.
8. The Secretaries of State and Defense should conduct an urgent review of the force and equipment levels of Korean Armed Forces, including in the first instance a military assessment of (a) the missions of these forces, in the context of over-all U.S. Far East strategy and in the light of the Communist threat and of the anticipated deployment

\*The United States is currently seeking discussions with the Korean Government of a five-year power program involving the construction of 400,000 kw of additional generating capacity. A very rough estimate of the total foreign exchange costs over a five-year period of such a program would be \$150 million. These discussions are intended solely to achieve agreement on the kind of program required without commitment as to financing.

and use of U.S. forces; and (b) the strategic implications of alternative force and equipment structures, including the possibility of a substantial reduction in forces. Such a military assessment should then be keyed to political and economic factors, to produce a recommendation for long-term force goals and for immediate actions, as necessary and practical, to move toward these goals. This review should be completed in time for use as a basis for allocation of FY 1962 military assistance funds.\*\*

9. U.S. military personnel should be directed to encourage and support greater participation by Korean armed forces in the work of the National Construction Service and in other appropriate civil works projects. The review referred to in 8 above should also include the preparation, and the assessment of the economic and military implications of, a program to place far greater stress than heretofore on the training of Korean military personnel in skills and vocations which will permit them to make a greater contribution to the development of Korean infrastructure and the civilian economy.
10. The improvement of Japanese-ROK relations, along the lines called for in paragraph f(p.9<sup>4</sup>/), should be discussed with the Japanese Prime Minister during his visit to Washington and should be urged upon the new regime in Korea. (It is recognized that this is an extremely sensitive issue with the present ROK regime.)

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\*\*A preliminary review by the Department of Defense is included in the report as Appendix E.

4/Task Force Report reference:

"f. Discuss with the Japanese Prime Minister during his forthcoming visit, the U.S. planning for Korea and the ways in which economic and political differences between Korea and Japan can be bridged, despite the recent change of government. It should be understood that while the U.S. will not participate actively in negotiations, it should be prepared to act as a catalyst in seeking a settlement. The Prime Minister should be encouraged to continue efforts recently begun to develop Japanese trade with Korea, and to provide economic assistance for Korean development coordinated with American programs. It should be made clear that Japanese settlement of GARIOA is not to be related to U.S. and Japanese aid to Korea. (The U.S. should also urge the SCNR to be responsive to Japanese overtures.)"

11. The Director of the U.S. Information Agency should arrange for USIS to assist the Korean Government, as may be appropriate, in defining and propagating national ideals and goals and in improving the Korean image abroad.

Category 3: Required Korean Actions

12. The following basic requirements must be pressed upon the Koreans from the outset if they are to achieve meaningful progress and to make profitable use of U.S. development assistance:
  - (a) Formulation and implementation of a National Development Plan, with short-range, measurable elements susceptible of prompt fulfillment; and in conjunction therewith, undertaking long-range social planning including definition and public promulgation by national leaders of national goals and ideals; reform of civil service and police (including salary increases); achievement of better relations with students, intellectuals, and the press; and enhancement of Korea's national image;

- (b) Consideration of the preconditions for the eventual return to civilian rule;
- (c) Assurances that the new regime does not interfere with CINCUNC in the discharge of its military responsibilities;
- (d) Endorsement by deed and word of the constitutional freedoms of individuals to the maximum extent consistent with the emergency nature of the government, and avoidance of promiscuous abuse of power, ex post facto laws, blood-purges, or other excesses;
- (e) Protection of the rural population against the exorbitant interest rates of the money-lenders; and
- (f) Formulating and implementing a thorough anti-corruption program along the lines outlined in Appendix B to the report.

SUMMARY AND REVISION OF RECOMMENDATIONS  
OF  
TASK FORCE REPORT ON KOREA

Category 1: U. S. Actions to be Undertaken Immediately

1. The new U. S. Ambassador to Korea should undertake early discussions with the appropriate leaders of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction along the lines described in paragraphs a and c through e (pp. 5-6) of the report.
2. With reference to paragraph b (p. 5), in these early discussions and subsequently the Ambassador should seek to create a gradual recognition among the leaders of the Supreme Council that it is in their interest and in the interest of their country that they from time to time publicly reaffirm their intention eventually to restore representative government and constitutional liberties; and that failure over the long run to demonstrate their good faith in this matter will compromise them in the eyes of the people of the United States and other Free World countries and in the United Nations.
3. The Ambassador is authorized to invite the Chief of Government to Washington for an informal visit including conferences with the President and the Secretary of State.
4. Provided assurances are given in respect to the matters to be discussed under 1 and 2 above and that the Korean Government undertakes actions immediately with respect to certain essential reforms, including the completion of fiscal, foreign exchange and stabilization reforms, the rationalization of the corporate structure and rates in the power and transportation industries, and the bringing into production of certain factories already built; and provided the Ambassador is satisfied with evidences of Korean willingness and capacity to carry out mutually agreed plans and programs, then the Ambassador is authorized:
  - (a) to indicate U. S. willingness to release approximately \$28 million in remaining defense support funds for FY 1961;
  - (b) to state that the United States is willing to enter into agreed commitments for specific projects for expansion of the power industry, immediately upon appropriation of funds;
  - (c) to indicate U. S. willingness to support through U. S. aid the expansion and intensification of the National Construction Service on a long-term basis;

- (d) to offer technical experts to assist the Korean Government in preparation of its Five-Year Development Plan; and
  - (e) to state that, provided substantial progress is made in the next few months, the United States will be prepared to provide resources to the Korean Government to help carry out a Five-Year Development Plan. As a long-term policy, U. S. influence should be reinforced by making economic development assistance (as distinguished from supporting assistance) available in increments which can be withheld in the event of Korean failure to carry out agreed programs.
5. The Director of the International Cooperation Administration should take immediate measures to improve the administration of the United States Operations Mission in Korea, including action to concentrate the U. S. effort on the most essential projects and to reduce or eliminate others.

Category 2: Subsequent U. S. Actions

6. Upon a determination of the Secretary of State that the Korean Government is sufficiently stable and cooperative to justify provision of long-range development assistance to it, the actions specified in paragraphs a through d (pp. 7-8) should be taken, including the appointment of a Special Envoy of the highest stature to visit Korea at a time recommended by the Ambassador. The Envoy will be accompanied by a group of economic advisers to perform functions along the lines of those described in Appendix A to the report, including assistance in the definition of Korean economic goals. While the Koreans must establish and take responsibility for their own goals, the United States can, having defined its goals, help advise the Koreans toward goals that are realistic and consistent with our own. The economic goals which the United States should seek to achieve in Korea include: (1) reversal of the present downward trend in the rate of economic growth and establishment of a specific target of an average annual growth rate for the first five-year plan (rate in 1960: 2.3 per cent); (2) reduction of the present unemployment and underemployment rate (estimated at 35 per cent); (3) increase in average real farm income; and (4) consistent with (1)-(3) above, reduction of the present wide gap between imports and exports (\$30 million v. \$345 million) in a staged progression toward an eventual balance in Korea's international accounts.

7. Subject to concrete action by the Korean Government to increase electric power rates, consolidate the power companies and eliminate power losses, announce U. S. willingness to provide, subject to Congressional appropriation, the external resources required to carry out an agreed five-year plan of electric power development.\* In addition announce that Korean power requirements for the next ten years will be further reviewed and the level of U. S. support re-examined following development of an adequate Korean Five-Year Development Plan.
8. The Secretaries of State and Defense should conduct an urgent review of the force and equipment levels of Korean Armed Forces, including in the first instance a military assessment of (a) the missions of these forces, in the context of over-all U. S. Far East strategy and in the light of the Communist threat and of the anticipated deployment and use of U. S. forces; and (b) the strategic implications of alternative force and equipment structures, including the possibility of a substantial reduction in forces. Such a military assessment should then be keyed to political and economic factors, to produce a recommendation for long-term force goals and for immediate actions, as necessary and practical, to move toward these goals. This review should be completed in time for use as a basis for allocation of FY 1962 military assistance funds.\*\*
9. U. S. military personnel should be directed to encourage and support greater participation by Korean armed forces in the work of the National Construction Service and in other appropriate civil works projects. The review referred to in 8 above should also include the preparation, and the assessment of the economic and military implications of, a program to place far greater stress than heretofore on the training of Korean military personnel in skills and vocations which will permit them to make a greater contribution to the development of Korean infrastructure and the civilian economy.
10. The improvement of Japanese-ROK relations, along the lines called for in paragraph f (p. 9), should be discussed with the Japanese Prime Minister during his visit to Washington and should be urged upon the new regime in Korea. (It is recognized that this is an extremely sensitive issue with the present ROK regime.)

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\* The United States is currently seeking discussions with the Korean Government of a five-year power program involving the construction of 400,000 kw of additional generating capacity. A very rough estimate of the total foreign exchange costs over a five-year period of such a program would be \$150 million. These discussions are intended solely to achieve agreement on the kind of program required without commitment as to financing.

\*\* A preliminary review by the Department of Defense is included in the report as Appendix E.

11. The Director of the U. S. Information Agency should arrange for USIS to assist the Korean Government, as may be appropriate, in defining and propagating national ideals and goals and in improving the Korean image abroad.

Category 3: Required Korean Actions

12. The following basic requirements must be pressed upon the Koreans from the outset if they are to achieve meaningful progress and to make profitable use of U. S. development assistance:
  - (a) Formulation and implementation of a National Development Plan, with short-range, measurable elements susceptible of prompt fulfillment; and in conjunction therewith, undertaking long-range social planning including definition and public promulgation by national leaders of national goals and ideals; reform of civil service and police (including salary increases); achievement of better relations with students, intellectuals, and the press; and enhancement of Korea's national image;
  - (b) Consideration of the preconditions for the eventual return to civilian rule;
  - (c) Assurances that the new regime does not interfere with CINCPAC in the discharge of its military responsibilities;
  - (d) Endorsement by deed and word of the constitutional freedoms of individuals to the maximum extent consistent with the emergency nature of the government, and avoidance of promiscuous abuse of power, ex post facto laws, blood-purges, or other excesses;
  - (e) Protection of the rural population against the exorbitant interest rates of the money-lenders; and
  - (f) Formulating and implementing a thorough anti-corruption program along the lines outlined in Appendix B to the report.

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5/19/61

SANITIZED

RECORD OF ACTIONS  
by the  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
at its  
FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FOURTH MEETING  
held on  
May 19, 1961  
(Approved by the President on May 24, 1961)

ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2426

MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN THE RESUMPTION  
OF NUCLEAR TESTING

Noted and discussed a presentation by Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, based on a paper circulated to the members of the National Security Council on May 15 which reflects the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense.

2427

U. S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN  
(NSC Action No. 2420; Report of the Task Force on Iran dated May 15, 1961, entitled "A Review of Problems in Iran and Recommendations for the National Security Council")

SANITIZED  
Authority NSC LA 4/28/77  
By mmg, KMS, Date 6/12/77

NSC Control No.



ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2427

U. S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN (Continued)

NSC ACTION NOS. 2426-2428

- 2 -

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ACTION  
NUMBER

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SUBJECT

2427

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN (Continued)

NSC ACTION NOS. 2426-2428

- 3 -

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ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2427

U. S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN (Continued)

2428

U. S. POLICY IN VIET-NAM

(Memo for the President from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, subject: "Program of Action for Viet-Nam," dated April 27, 1961; NSC Action No. 2416; National Security Action Memorandum No. 52, dated May 11, 1961)

Noted that National Security Action Memorandum No. 52 required no revision.

NSC ACTION NOS. 2426 -2428 - 4 -

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
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The President presided at this meeting. The Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget participated in the Council actions above. The Attorney General; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Acting Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Acting Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Acting Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Counselor, Department of State; the Deputy Under Secretary of State; the Special Counsel to the President; the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA); the Military Aide to the President; and Bromley Smith, NSC Staff, attended the meeting. The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Acting Secretary of the Army; the Acting Secretary of the Navy; the Acting Secretary of the Air Force; the Director of Defense Research and Engineering; the Adviser to the President on Disarmament; the Deputy Adviser to the President on Disarmament; and the Deputy Director, U.S. Disarmament Administration, attended the meeting for Item 1. The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; the U.S. Ambassador to Iran; and Robert W. Komer, NSC Staff, attended the meeting for Item 2. The Director, Task Force on Viet-Nam attended the meeting for Item 3.

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5/5/61

RECORD OF ACTIONS  
by the  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
at its  
FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-THIRD MEETING  
held on  
May 5, 1961  
(Approved by the President on May 16, 1961)

The President presided at this meeting. The Acting Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, participated in the actions below. The Attorney General; the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare; the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Under Secretary of State; Theodore C. Achilles, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; Stephen E. Smith, Assistant to Mr. Achilles; the Special Counsel to the President; the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Special Assistant to the President; the Assistant to the Special Counsel to the President; the Assistant to the Vice President; the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA); the Adviser to the President for Para-Military Affairs; the Military Aide to the President; the Deputy Director (Plans), Central Intelligence Agency; the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC; and Bromley Smith, NSC Staff, attended the meeting.

ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2420. U. S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN

Agreed that a Task Force should be established under the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs to prepare and circulate a report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on May 19.

2421. U. S. POLICY TOWARD KOREA

Agreed that a Task Force under the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs should be established to prepare and circulate a report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on May 19.

ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2422.

U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA

(NSC Action No. 2413-c; Memo for NSC, same subject, dated May 4, 1961)

- a. Agreed that U. S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro, and that since the measures agreed below are not likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at intervals with a view to further action.
- b. Agreed that the United States should not undertake military intervention in Cuba now, but should do nothing that would foreclose the possibility of military intervention in the future.
- c. Agreed that the United States should not impose a naval blockade or attempt an air war against Cuba; it was noted that neither course had the support of the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- d. Noted the importance the President attaches to obtaining timely and adequate intelligence as to Cuban military capabilities, especially the enhancement of such capabilities by Sino-Soviet Bloc military assistance, so that U. S. capabilities for possible intervention may be maintained at an adequate level.
- e. Noted the importance the President attaches to publication in the Free World press of the terroristic actions of the Castro regime, and to possible political action to end the current terror.
- f. Noted the President's direction that the Central Intelligence Agency, with other departments, should make a detailed study of possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements which exert control in Cuba today.
- g. Agreed that relations with the Revolutionary Council should be improved and made more open, and while it cannot be recognized as a government-in-exile, support should be given to it insofar as it continues to represent substantial Cuban sentiment.

ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2422. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)

- h. Agreed that no separate Cuban military force should be organized in the United States, but that Cuban nationals would be encouraged to enlist in the U. S. armed forces under plans to be developed by the Secretary of Defense.
- i. Agreed that Cuban nationals now holding U. S. visitors' visas will be given refugee status and assisted, under a program to be developed and directed by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, in carrying on their former occupations. Refugees now in Miami will be encouraged to locate in other areas. Cuban nationals entering the United States will be given refugee status. All refugees will be eligible to apply for travel privileges, and it was understood that they would also be eligible for citizenship.
- j. Agreed not to impose an immediate trade embargo on Cuba. The Secretary of State agreed to send to the President an analysis of the effects of a U. S. embargo on trade with Cuba in relation to the Battle Act. It was agreed that when an embargo is imposed, it should be as complete as possible, with certain exceptions for Canada and with Red Cross distribution of drugs.
- k. Agreed that the United States should at once initiate negotiation to enlarge the willingness of other American states to join in bilateral, multilateral and OAS arrangements against Castro, such as (1) breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba; (2) controlling subversive activities of Cuban agents; (3) preventing arms shipments to Castro; (4) limiting economic relations with Cuba; (5) creating a Caribbean security force; (6) initiating a naval patrol to prevent Cuban invasion of other states in the Caribbean; and (7) denunciation of Castro as an agent of international communism by all nations of this hemisphere.

ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2422. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)

- l. Agreed that the Alliance For Progress should be strengthened by such measures as (1) rapid implementation of selected social development projects; (2) acceleration of the implementation of other Latin American aid; and (3) provision of additional resources for Latin American economic and social development, including consideration of a supplemental appropriation for development loans of the order of \$200-\$400 million.
- m. Agreed that the U. S. Information Agency would expand its existing program in Latin America, but not initiate electronic warfare against the Castro regime; means of propaganda should be made available to non-U. S. groups.
- n. Agreed that U. S. military officers, under general guidance to be prepared by the Department of State, would discuss the Castro threat to all Latin America with Latin American officers.
- o. Agreed that the Secretary of State should prepare a report on a possible new juridical basis for effective anti-communist action.
- p. Agreed that pending appoint of an Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, the Task Force on Cuba should be continued under the chairmanship of Richard N. Goodwin, Assistant to the Special Counsel to the President.

2423. U. S. POLICY TOWARD THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI

Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would prepare promptly both emergency and long-range plans for anti-communist intervention in the event of crises in Haiti or the Dominican Republic. Noted the President's view that the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before we knew what government would succeed him, and that any action against Trujillo should be multilateral.

ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2424. U. S. POLICY TOWARD BRITISH GUIANA

Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would consider what can be done in cooperation with the British to forestall a communist take-over in that country.

2425. U. S. POLICY IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA

- a. Noted that efforts should be made to reassure Sarit and Diem that we are not abandoning Southeast Asia.
- b. Noted the President's view that Sarit could be told that we are considering inclusion of U. S. troops in SEATO forces to be stationed in Thailand, the timing to be dependent on developments during or after the forthcoming 14-nation Geneva Conference.
- c. Noted that the Secretaries of State and Defense would be sending recommendations to the President promptly on U. S. training troops in Viet Nam.

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NOTES

Meeting of National Security Council, 5 May 1961

The President directed the establishment of a task force to study the Iranian problem and suggested that Mr. Talbot head the group. Mr. Rusk pointed out that General Bakhtiar visited the United States comparatively recently and that a coup involving him would possibly embarrass the United States. The President discounted the possibility.

The President directed that a group study the Korean problem and report its findings within two weeks. Mr. McConaughy will head the group of Defense, CIA, State and Treasury representatives. Mr. McNamara appointed Mr. William Bundy to represent Defense.

The President asked Mr. Nitze for a report on the Cuban situation. Nitze replied that the Navy could blockade the island but results would not be immediate but rather long-range, and in the course thereof unfavorable world reaction would probably accrue. Admiral Burke pointed out that only complete interception of all ships approaching Cuba would achieve eventual success, and the job could be done with 24 ships. Mr. Rusk interrupted Admiral Burke to point out that such action would be an act of war and was wholly impracticable.

The President asked about a reported letter from Senator Goldwater in which the statement is made that the Air Force could resolve the Cuban situation. Admiral Burke replied that there had in fact been an Air Force proposal with which other services had disagreed, especially the Marines. In any case, the Air Force had made the suggestion that the Cuban problem be resolved through rather heavy and perhaps indiscriminate bombardment. The President immediately rejected such an idea, and added further that there would be no Navy blockade. He emphasized the importance of more effective watch committee action on Cuba. He also asked Mr. Dulles what new information was available on foreign equipment going into Cuba. Mr. Dulles replied that we know practically everything about the equipment, but offered no specifics. The President directed that close surveillance be continued including overflight with an American pilot. The President approved flights of a frequency of every two or three days, but suggested extreme caution.

The President suggested that all Americans be urged to leave Cuba and asked Secretary Johnson to study ways and means of exit and transit visas.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 92-61  
By lip, NARA, Date 6-4-93

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Mr. Murrow assessed world-wide reactions to the U.S. position with regard to Cuba. He felt that the departure of the clergy, the reign of terror, and such incidents as the imprisonment in the theater will result in favorable reactions toward the U.S. and tend to considerably offset the unfavorable ones. He felt that world-wide impressions of the United States were improving generally. The President suggested that the Iranian issue might be interpreted abroad as a possible result of the failure of the U.S. to act in Laos. He suggested action by USIA to discount this possible impression. Secretary Rusk suggested the over-riding theme of U.S. rejection of Castro and went on to say that the U.S. must take all measures to precipitate his downfall or face the possibility that all South America will come under Communist influence.

The President asked what specific courses of action we should take to prevent the crippling influence of the Cuban fiasco, assuming that no military action by the U.S. will be taken. At the same time the President asked what circumstances would have to exist before the United States could move unilaterally against Cuba. Rusk stated that action could be taken under Article 51 of the Rio Treaty. In this connection the President asked if the U.S. could recognize the Cuban Government in Exile and what might be expected of this group. Rusk replied that such recognition was not possible because of the absence of certain essential elements of a governmental organization, identity and territory. The question then arose as to the status of the Cubans in the United States and Robert Kennedy replied that they should be designated refugees and stated that legislation exists to handle them under this designation. The Department of HEW will begin registering the refugees with the assistance of CIA. The President stated that the United States will invoke the Trading With the Enemy Act across the board as far as Cuba is concerned at such time as some overt act or incident occurs in Cuba. The President gave as an example the shooting of a United States citizen. The President would exempt from the restrictions of the Act some \$30 million for food and drugs. At the suggestion of Mr. Fowler, Under Secretary of the Treasury, the drugs should be donated to the Cuban people through the Red Cross. The President suggested the acceptance of the policy to encourage all Latin American states to sever relations with Cuba and to establish a complete economic boycott. The United States however should draw the line on becoming involved in the affairs of another country, such as active participation in the overthrow of Trujillo. Instead, the United States should determine appropriate courses of action in case Trujillo falls. The common danger in Haiti should be included in these considerations.

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MEMORANDUM

79

DATE: March 12, 1963  
TO: The Vice President  
FROM: Colonel Burris  
RE: Latin American Policy

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State la 11/6/70  
By RMG, NARS, Date 6/17/77

The attached Rusk policy statement on Cuban policy is a reasonably comprehensive expression of Latin American policy. In fact, it will satisfy your request for a summary statement of U. S. activities and actions in regard to the Cuban problem.

Additionally two or three other actions are within the realm of possibility. Mr. McNamara has some of them under study. They are in the military field and the principal one relates to the establishment of a military body associated with the Organization of American States and operating somewhat in the fashion of NATO. Each state would make contributions to this hemispheric defense arrangement in accordance with its particular capability. That is, some states would contribute Naval units, others ground forces, and others transport. The United States would necessarily contribute most of the airlift.

To begin with, Naval patrols would be established to secure the Latin American waters and to inhibit the export of Communist agents and materiel from Cuba. Further along, specific armed forces units would be earmarked for commitment to any portion of the hemisphere where their employment might be required, and as the OAS determined.

This development of military cooperation along these lines seems to be the principal means for augmenting efforts towards security in the hemisphere.

On the political and economic side, the development of the Alliance for Progress still offers the greatest possibilities for success. However, much remains to be done if this program is to become effective.

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REVIEW OF THE CUBAN SITUATION AND POLICY  
(Talking Points)

I Policy Objectives

- (a) We shall continue to safeguard the security of the United States through whatever measures may be necessary. Our purpose is to achieve security, not only for the United States but for the Hemisphere. In this effort we shall work so far as possible through collective action. Our interest is in practical results and not flamboyant measures.
- (b) We shall continue to fight against the spread of Castroism through Latin America not only by intensifying existing efforts directed specifically toward this task, but also by helping to eliminate poverty and inequity which is the building ground for infection. This we shall do through an expansion and development of the Alliance for Progress.
- (c) On the basis of the progress of the great strides already made toward increased inter-American cooperation we shall continue to tighten the noose around the Cuban economy and to increase the isolation of the Castro regime from the political life of the hemisphere until that regime becomes a complete pariah.
- (d) We will not be satisfied until the Cuban people have been assured the opportunity of freely choosing their own government.

II Success of our Policy So Far

- 1. We have substantially isolated Cuba from access to the industrialized nations of the free world:
  - (a) Trade with Cuba between the Atlantic Community and Latin America during 1962 dropped to one-third of what it was during 1961.
  - (b) The year 1963 will undoubtedly be the worst year economically that Cuba will have known in recent times.
  - (c)

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- (c) As the Cuban economy continues to deteriorate Cuba will become an even greater economic burden for the Sino-Soviet Bloc. We estimate that Cuba is currently costing the Bloc at least \$1,000,000 a day.
2. We have substantially reduced the availability of free world shipping for Cuba (either direct or under charter to the Soviet Bloc). The number of free world ships calling at Cuba ports has dropped from 128 in January 1962 to 12 in January 1963. We are continuing to reduce the number of free world ships in the Cuban trade by achieving the cooperation of Free World nations and through various shipping measures.
3. We have brought a major reduction in the political influence of Castroism in the Hemisphere:
- (a) During October 1962 complete hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue was achieved for the first time by a unanimous vote in support of our quarantine.
- (b) In January 1962, at Punta del Este, the United States effectively excluded the Castro Government from the Inter-American System.
- (c) Fourteen Latin American countries have broken diplomatic relations with Cuba and only five (Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Uruguay and Bolivia) continue to maintain such relations. The Federal Republic of Germany was the latest country to break relations.
- (d) Significant gains for the democratic forces have been shown by recent student and labor elections in the Hemisphere during the past two years. They show a significant decline in Castro/Communist influence.

(e)

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- (e) As a result of economic chaos which has been produced in Cuba as a result of Communist mismanagement and Cuban isolation from the rest of the Free World, Latin America has been given a visual demonstration that Communism has little to offer it. This demonstration has been reinforced by growing evidence of the subservience of the Castro Regime.
4. We have made great progress in countering Cuban subversion and propaganda efforts:
- (a) The cooperation of the Organization of American States (OAS) has been successfully enlisted in countering subversive activities. The OAS Special Consultative Committee on Security has just submitted its report. It has made recommendations to Member States regarding measures to counteract these activities.
- (b) We are actively working with Latin American countries in developing programs to counter subversion. This includes our whole police and counter-insurgency program.
- (c) We have substantially strengthened the United States Information Program beamed to Cuba and the Hemisphere. The Voice of America has stepped up its broadcasting in Spanish from one hour a day in 1960 to nine hours a day at the present time. We have delivered 8 million copies of anti-Castro books as well as films and TV programs describing the nature of Castroism in Cuba.
5. We have insured the protection of our national security by the legitimizing of our aerial surveillance of Cuba. This has been achieved on the basis of OAS action.

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*The Vice President*

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APR 17 1963

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Free World Shipping to Cuba

I. Present Status. Discussions which the United States has conducted with other maritime nations during the past several months about shipping in the Cuban trade resulted in positive action to remove Free World ships from the Cuban trade. Liberia, Turkey, Honduras and Panama have issued official decrees barring their ships from all trade with Cuba. West Germany has issued a decree prohibiting ships under its registry from trade between the Soviet Bloc and Cuba. More recently, a Greek decree prohibited Greek vessels not presently under charter to the Bloc from carrying cargoes to Cuba, and provided that Greek vessels will be withdrawn from the Cuban trade, as present charters expire. The Lebanese have assured us of their cooperation and state that they hope to rewrite their shipping laws within three months. Repeated approaches to the United Kingdom have not been productive, and HMG has reiterated its position that it does not have a legal basis for pulling its vessels out of the Cuban trade. However, HMG has engaged in informal discussions with British shipowners with some effect.

A further spur to action by foreign governments in this regard has been Section 107(b) of the Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1963, which in substance provides that no United States economic assistance (not including PL 480) shall be furnished to any country which "permits" ships under its flag to carry "items of economic assistance" to Cuba.

Another factor has been the fear of shipowners and operators that the IIA would not load cargoes in American ports if their ships engaged in the Cuban trade.

The result of all this has been that the number of Free World vessels calling at Cuban ports was reduced from 337 in the first three months of 1962, to 62 in the first three months of 1963. However, while the number of such ships reached a low point of 12 in January of 1963, it increased to 22 in February and to 28 in March. (The foregoing figures are in part based upon classified information and the public list of ships released by the Maritime Administration

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in accordance with NSAM 220 shows 12 in January, 19 in February, and 23 in March.) However, as a part of the increased number of vessels shown for March arrived in ballast to carry out sugar cargoes, there has not been a corresponding increase in the goods brought to Cuba by Free World ships. Preliminary information indicates that the amount of such imports was about the same in March as in January.

The following is a breakdown of the flags of the 78 ships which have arrived through April 17, 1963: United Kingdom 32, Greece 20, Norway 6, Lebanon 6, Italy 4, Yugoslavia 4, Spain 2, Japan 1, West Germany 1, Denmark 1, Morocco 1.

Since January 1, 1963, no Free World ship which has called at a Cuban port has subsequently called at a United States port. One vessel called at a United States port and then proceeded to Cuba. Pursuant to NSAM 220, commitments to withdraw their vessels from all Cuban trade have been or are in the process of being received from a line in each of Japan, Italy, Denmark, and West Germany.

II. Discussion. The Soviet Bloc has thus far readily replaced Free World vessels withdrawn from the Cuban trade, and can presumably do the same for the remaining vessels. Thus the effects on the Cuban economy are minimal. However, Free World vessels calling at Cuban ports have, in domestic opinion, become a symbol of the willingness of the Free World to cooperate with us with respect to Cuba. Replacement of Free World vessels also in some small degree may increase the cost to the Soviet Bloc of maintaining Cuba.

NSAM 220 was confined to vessels calling at Cuban ports rather than to all ships owned or controlled by a line largely in order at that time further not to exacerbate our relations with Poland and Yugoslavia. To have applied the NSAM to ships owned or controlled by would have meant that ships of those two countries could not have carried their customary share of PL 480 cargoes destined for those two countries. The shipping of those two countries to Cuba has averaged one or two ships per month. It is likely that they will continue their participation in the Cuban trade irrespective of whatever measures we may take short of a naval blockade. Polish and Yugoslav ships are currently carrying United States-financed cargoes under the PL 480 agreements with those countries signed on February 1, 1963, and November 28, 1962, respectively. Yugoslav ships are also carrying some merchandise financed under an outstanding Export-Import Bank credit. Subsequently, a ship of the Moroccan Government line has called at a Cuban port. As this line is also carrying PL 480 cargo from the United States to Morocco, the effects on Morocco would be similar to those on Poland and Yugoslavia.

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The strict application of Section 107(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act raises serious problems of fact and policy. Questions of fact are whether a country has "permitted" its ships to carry "economic assistance" and what cargoes may in fact be "economic assistance" as opposed to normal trade. Stringent and extreme application of the Act could result in the cutting-off of all economic assistance to the United Kingdom possessions such as Kenya, British Guiana, et cetera, as well as to Greece. The political disadvantages of such drastic action are of course obvious. Nevertheless, we have and are continuing to press the countries involved to purge themselves of all actions that could require us to invoke the Act. The Battle Act administrator (the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs) is, in accordance with the law, now assembling and transmitting to the AID Administrator factual information bearing on the application of Section 107 for legal determination required of the AID Administrator.

Because of measures now taken by the Greek Government, it appears that, as their charters expire, most if not all of the 20 Greek vessels which have called at Cuban ports since January 1 will be withdrawing from the Cuban trade. (The Greek Government is now assembling exact information on the terms of the various charters.) Commitments from the lines now being obtained will also assure the withdrawal of at least one of the four Italian ships, the one Japanese ship, the one Danish ship, and a West German ship which is now completing its charter. The principal remaining problem is thus the 32 British and six Norwegian ships.

The minimal additional public action that we could now take would be the extension of the provisions of NSAM 220 to all ships owned or controlled by anyone owning or controlling vessels engaged in the Cuban trade. Apart from the not inconsiderable problem of exacerbation of our relations with Morocco, Yugoslavia and Poland, this could have useful and important domestic and international psychological effects. At the request of the Department of State, the Maritime Administration is now urgently studying shipping patterns in order to arrive at some estimate of its practical effect. Preliminary information indicates that its practical effects might be minimal with respect to tankers, which comprise 16 of the 32 British ships engaged in the trade. Mr. McCone feels, and I agree, that it would not be desirable to take additional public steps during the present stage of Mr. Donovan's negotiations for the release of American prisoners in Cuba.

III. Recommendations. Considering all of the foregoing factors, I recommend that:

1. We

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1. We make another approach to the United Kingdom, through their Ambassador here as well as in London, seeking United Kingdom cooperation and pointing out the necessity of our taking further action unless a prompt reduction in United Kingdom shipping to Cuba can be achieved.

2. Similar approaches be made to Norway, Italy and Spain.

3. We now make all administrative preparations for the issuance, at a time to be subsequently determined, of an extension of the provisions of NSAM 220 to ships owned or controlled by persons owning or controlling vessels engaged in the Cuban trade with a grace period of forty-five days to permit withdrawal of vessels in the course of a voyage at the time the extension is made public.

4. At a time subsequently to be determined, request United States owned or controlled oil companies to refrain voluntarily, within the Western Hemisphere, from bunkering vessels known to be engaged in the Cuba trade, and seek the cooperation of the United Kingdom in the application of a similar policy by British oil companies. (This would have its principal impact on a number of very small vessels which now may be operating between Central American ports and Cuba.)

*/s/ Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

S/S - RO

APR 17 1963

A true copy of signed original

G:UAJohnson:ges

4/17/63

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**OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON**

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Col. Burris -----

Put in safe. with other papers  
during Cuba crisis.

LBJ/mjdr

2/18/63

5 p. m.

I welcome Chairman Khrushchev's statesmanlike

decision to stop building bases in Cuba, dismantling <sup>offensive weapons</sup> the equipment

<sup>and dismantling</sup> and <sup>send</sup> sending it back home under UN supervision. This is an

important and constructive contribution to peace. I repeat my

assurance, that the United States <sup>desires peace in the Caribbean area.</sup> will not invade Cuba since the

necessity for military action would disappear with the removal

of offensive weapons.

We shall be in touch with the Secretary General of the

United Nations with respect to reciprocal measures to assure

peace in the Caribbean area.

It is my earnest hope that the governments of the world

can, with a solution of the Cuban crisis, turn their urgent

attention to the compelling necessity for ending the arms race

and reducing world tensions. This applies to the military

confrontation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries  
as well as to other situations in other parts of the world where  
tensions lead to the diversion of resources to weapons of war.

In Safe

May 1, 1961

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TO : The Honorable  
John F. Kennedy  
President of the United States of America

FROM : Senator Mike Mansfield

SUBJECT: The Cuban Aftermath.

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The consequences of the recent incident in Cuba give us some guidelines as to how to proceed in the weeks and months ahead. The principal consequences would appear to be the following:

(1) Responsible world opinion was, to say the least, somewhat shocked by this episode.

(2) Significant Latin American opinion was hard-put to express a reaction which would not alienate us by criticizing us but, at the same time, would not put the Latin Americans in the position of endorsing our course in this incident. For this restraint on their part, the promise of the Alianza para Progreso, deserves full credit. Without that promise, Mexico, Brazil and others might have been vehement in their criticism.

(3) The most articulate support at home for our role in the course leading to the episode and the episode itself was Republican and the clamor for further action is largely Republican and, significantly, not the Senate Minority Leader or Governor Rockefeller.

(4) The incident showed Castro solidly entrenched and this was not anticipated. Oddly enough, Castro reacted with comparative mildness to the incident and this was not generally anticipated either. This would suggest that our sensitivity to this personality and to the Cuban people is not what it ought to be. The post-incident reaction of Castro, moreover, suggests that he might have been shocked, at least partially, into a realization of how provocative he had become. The mixed and mild Latin American reaction may have brought home to him the fact that he had alienated some mighty good people in this hemisphere. Finally, he may have been brought to realize how heavily dependent he has become on a far-away country and on a system which has become less and less Cuban and more and more alien.

It should hardly be necessary to add that the above analysis is highly speculative. Nevertheless, it is not an inadmissible hypothesis. The point is that we have not gauged Cuban affairs effectively in the past and we do not now really know the implications of the unexpected Castro reaction. It is highly in our interests to explore this reaction rather than merely to dismiss it curtly.

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(5) The Cuban exiles' reaction to the incident is one of bitterness and, as might be expected from our well-intentioned but ineffective involvement we are blamed for their frustrations. It will be a long time, if at all, before this same group is likely to prove effective, in any movement to unseat the Cuban government, with or without U.S. financial help and with or without strengthening by U.S. guerrilla-type forces.

### Responses

Historically, revolutions have been successful in Cuba when a relatively small group of Cubans acting largely with their own blood and fortunes choose that decisive moment when the mass of the Cuban people have had a surfeit of an existing regime. That moment is likely to come for the Castro regime if it continues in its present ways. The small group that will tip the balance will find its own methods. If the circumstances are right, the group will succeed without U.S. help of any significance as, in fact, Castro succeeded and, before him, the revolutionists against Machado.

The problem for us is to face up to the fact that we have made a mistake. If we react in frustrated anger we are likely to intensify the mistake. It will not be easy to face the fact; political pressures at home to the contrary will be applied. Nevertheless, it is the courageous thing to do and the sensible thing to do. For if we yield to the temptation to give vent to our anger at our own failure, we will, ironically, strengthen Castro's position with his own people, jeopardize our relations with much of Latin America and do further damage to our position throughout the world.

This does not mean that the use of force on our part is ruled out in all circumstances. Here are specific situations in which its use would probably be acceptable to Latin America and world opinion:

(1) Guantanamo -- Force as a response to a Cuban effort of force to take over this base is essential even though the base may have little military value and, in other circumstances, its relinquishment through negotiation might be indicated.

(2) Force to prevent the establishment of Soviet missile or any other kind of base for Russian forces in Cuba, provided we are seriously re-evaluating our own base-policies on the rim of the Soviet Union.

(3) Force in support of other Latin American nations subject to a military invasion by Cuba.

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The key to the effective use of force in these situations, however, is its restraint. It has got to be clear that the force is adjusted in quantity to the specific acceptable objectives involved in each situation and that we are not using the situations merely as an excuse for a general intervention in Cuba. To those who would suggest directly or indirectly that they be so used, these questions might well be put: What if we do intervene directly and succeed in overthrowing Castro? What have we really achieved beyond, perhaps, a certain measure of self-satisfaction that at least we can stop the Communists in Cuba? If the timing of the intervention is bad, we will have a long drawn-out guerrilla war with substantial casualties and great costs. When it is over we will have to install some kind of government in Havana and prop it up with a costly aid program for a long time to come. We will probably have to reinstate the sugar quota. We will have, in short, a devastated Cuba, no closer to freedom and stability than it has been in the past and, brought to that point at enormous cost to ourselves and to the Cuban people.

If we eschew the temptation to strike back in frustrated anger, then the course of policy which suggests itself is this:

- (1) A gradual disengagement of the U.S. government from anti-Castro revolutionary groups; let them proceed on their own if they wish, without blessing or financial support from the United States.
- (2) A taciturn resistance to the political blandishments or provocations from those at home who would urge that we act directly in Cuba.
- (3) A cessation of violent verbal attacks on Castro by officials of the government, at least pending an evaluation by Latin American friends of his somewhat unusual reaction to the incident of the invasion. And in this connection, a little less vehemence in our refusal to countenance his suggestions for talks about our difficulties is clearly indicated.
- (4) If possible, let the lead on condemning the Castro government in inter-American meetings come from friendly Latin American countries rather than from ourselves. Similarly, let the lead on proposals for a boycott or other acts short of war come from them. We should go along with these attempts to pressure Cuba but we should do so with a minimum of ostentation and we should not lose patience if the pressures cannot be built on a hemispheric basis at this time.
- (5) For the present, abstain from and stall on but do not condemn in advance, efforts of significant Latin American countries to bring about a partial reconciliation between Cuba and the United States if they feel these efforts are worth making.

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(6) Push hard and fast with the follow-through on the Alianza para Progreso. Reorganize the relevant Departments and Agencies in the Executive Branch for this purpose. Assign outstanding men from the White House staff and elsewhere to direct the effort. This is the key to our relations with all of Latin America in the next decade, and unless it is turned, Castroism is likely to spread elsewhere in Latin America whether or not Castro remains in power in Cuba. The best prospect of preventing this spread is to render the soil of the balance of Latin America sterile to the growth of this off-spring of mass discontent. The Alianza para Progreso is a sound concept for bringing about the sterilization. The problem now is to act on its premises rapidly and sure-footedly. If it works, there is a good possibility that Castro will either wither on the vine and be eventually overthrown by the Cubans themselves. Faced with that prospect it is not inconceivable that he may try to lead Cuba back into the House of the Hemisphere or yield to someone who can.

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MEMORANDUM

November 9, 1962

TO: The Vice President  
FROM: HB  
SUBJECT: U. S. Policy Toward Cuba

In discussions of U. S. policy toward Cuba, these points should be advanced for consideration:

1. The key policy objective in the Department of State memorandum of September 25, 1962, is that of getting rid of "Soviet Communist influence." This objective must remain foremost. The U. S. is dealing directly with the Soviet. In these negotiations, the Soviet has acknowledged, by implication, its offensive intent. Furthermore, Chairman Khrushchev specifically acknowledged that the purpose of the presence of Soviet personnel in Cuba was to command and control the offensive weapons. Hence, it is an entirely valid U. S. position to insist upon withdrawal of Soviet personnel -- and, thus, Soviet influence -- on the basis that offensive weapons and offensive personnel are inseparable.

2. If the objective of forcing Soviet withdrawal of personnel is pursued, this will retain for the U. S. a position of initiative in negotiations until the very end. Khrushchev, certainly, is unlikely to fight over the right to maintain personnel in Cuba. U. S. insistence on withdrawal of personnel -- i.e., stripping Castro of the last vestige of foreign support -- would be constructive in maintaining public trust of the Administration, in maintaining a position which allies in both Hemispheres could continue to support, in encouraging Latin allies to outlaw Communist Parties and to control possible Soviet infiltration through oversize Embassy missions.

3. Pinpointing our negotiating objectives on the withdrawal of offensive Soviet personnel from Cuba would make it possible for the U. S. to maintain a better position in relations with Latin allies than if we focus on the issue of overthrowing Castro. U. S. declarations of intent to "get rid of Castro" could eventually turn Latin sentiment back into Castro's favor. By keeping the emphasis on Soviet personnel would serve to enlarge the image of Castro as a Soviet puppet.

4. Unless the withdrawal of Soviet "influence" -- i.e., personnel -- is incorporated into our negotiating objectives, the Administration's present course will stimulate a non-constructive national debate over what weapons can or cannot be tolerated in Cuba. The American public is unlikely to appreciate the fine points of the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons. Indications on our part of willingness to permit the continuation of any Soviet-made weapons in Cuba creates a situation permitting Khrushchev to retain his personnel in Cuba on the predicate -- already relayed in his messages -- that the Soviet officers must be kept there to retain control of the weapons in the "interest of peace."

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5. If the U. S. argues against Soviet personnel in Cuba, it is inevitable that Khrushchev would reciprocate by arguing against American personnel in countries bordering the Soviet. Provoking him into this position might well be beneficial as a basis for our saying that the solution to the troop deployment issue lies in negotiations between the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. on disarmament.

6. Under any circumstances, our policy should remind the world throughout these negotiations that Khrushchev -- the new apostle of "peace" -- sent his personnel to this Hemisphere for purposes which he has tacitly admitted to be offensive and aggressive.

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