

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 9

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 Memo	NSC Secret from James S. Lay, Jr. 1 p	02/17/61	A
#1b Report	NSC Secret <i>Sanitized</i> US Policy Toward West Africa <i>same same</i> 31 p <i>Open NLS 037-004-41 (9/02)</i>	04/09/60	A
#5 Action	NSC Top Secret 480th NSC Meeting 2 p	04/29/61	A
#2b Agenda	NSC Secret 492nd NSC Meeting 2 p	10/31/61	A
#6a Agenda	NSC Secret 480th NSC Meeting 1 p	04/28/61	A
#10 Agenda	NSC Secret 479th NSC Meeting 1 p	04/25/61	A
#11 Memo	NSC Secret <i>Sanitized</i> from Neilson G. Debevoise <i>Open NLS 037-004-42 (9/02)</i> 2 p	10/06/61	A
#12 Memo	NSC Conf. from Neilson C. Debevoise 12 p	08/14/61	A
#13a Actions	NSC Top Secret <i>Sanitized</i> 484th NSC Meeting <i>Open 7-6-93 NLS 92-64</i> 6 p	05/19/61	A
#14a Actions	NSC Top Secret <i>Sanitized</i> 484th NSC Meeting <i>Open 7-6-93 NLS 92-64</i> 6 p (duplicate of #13a)	05/19/61	A
#16 Memo	NSC Top Secret from McGeorge Bundy 1 p	05/18/61	A
#17 Memo	NSC Top Secret from Marion W. Boggs 1 p	05/10/61	A
#18 Agenda	NSC Secret 05/12/61 meeting 1 p	05/08/61	A
#19 Actions	NSC Top Secret <i>Sanitized</i> 483rd meeting <i>Open 10/23/13 per NLS/RAC 13-48</i> 5 p <i>more info released 6-26-91 NLS 87-138</i>	05/05/61	A
#21 Agenda	NSC Secret <i>same same NLS 037-004-44 (9/02)</i> 05/05/61 meeting 1 p	05/04/61	A

FILE LOCATION VP Security File, National Security Council
National Security Council - 1961

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2 of 9

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#24 Actions	NSC Top Secret 482nd NSC meeting 2 p	05/02/61	A
#25 Agenda	NSC Secret 482nd NSC Meeting 1 p	05/02/61	A
#26 Agenda	NSC Secret 481st NSC Meeting 1 p	05/01/61	A
#27 Actions	NSC Top Secret 481st NSC Meeting 1 p	05/01/61	A
#30 Memo	NSC Secret from Marion Boggs 1 p	04/24/61	A
#31 Memo	NSC Conf. NSC Memo #40 from McGeorge Bundy 1 p	04/24/61	A
#33 Actions	NSC Top Secret Sanitized 478th NSC Meeting <i>Open 7-6-93 NLS 92-64</i> 5 p	04/22/61	A
#34 Agenda	NSC Secret 04/22/61 meeting 1 p	04/20/61	A
#36 Memo	NSC CONF. from Marion Boggs 2 p	04/17/61	A
#37 Memo	NSC Secret from Marion Boggs 1 p	04/06/61	A
#38 Memo	NSC Secret Exempt from Marion Boggs 14 p	04/03/61	A
#40 Action	NSC Top Secret 477th NSC meeting 3 p	03/29/61	A
#48 Agenda	NSC Secret 02/09/61 meeting 1 p	02/06/61	A
#50 Action	NSC Top Secret 475th NSC Meeting 5 p	02/01/61	A
#55 Agenda	NSC Secret 475th NSC Meeting 1 p	01/26/61	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#56 Action	<i>all decisions per NSC 604 4/21/77</i> NSC Secret NSC Action no 2395 1 p	01/19/61	A
#57 Action	NSC Top Secret <i>Sanitized</i> NSC Actions Nos. 2393-2394 <i>open 7-6-93</i> 2 p <i>NL 592-64</i>	01/18/61	A
#58 Memo	NSC Secret from James S. Lay 1 p	01/18/61	A

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4 of 9

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1a Memo	State Secret <i>NSC la 4/25/77 State la 1/11/77</i> To the President from Dean Rusk	1 p 02/15/61	A
#9 Report	State Top Secret <i>State la 1/19/77</i> Strengthening Freedom...	5 p 04/26/61	A
#8 Report <i>open 2-6-97</i> <i>NLS 94-277 appeal</i>	State <i>exempt 10-18-94</i> Top Secret <i>Exempt State la 1/14/77</i> Plan for... NLS 94-277	12 p Undated	A
#15 Report	State Top Secret <i>State la 12/15/77</i> Laos	8 p Undated	A
#20 Report	State Top Secret <i>State la 1/19/77</i> Annex V	22 p Undated	A
#28 Cable	State Top Secret <i>State la 12/15/77</i> Embtel 1943 from Vientiane	2 p 04/26/61	A
#30a Report	State Secret <i>NSC la 4/25/77 State la 1/11/77</i> Policy Directive	13 p 04/20/61	A
#39 Report	State Top Secret Freedom Fund	6 p 04/26/61 <i>open 6-12-79 per</i> <i>AID 5-16-78</i>	A

68

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589

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	** TO BE SUBMITTED TO STATE DEPT. FOR CONCURRENCE**		
#6 Memo	WH <i>State let 11/11/76</i> Conf. to VP Johnson from Col. Burris 1 p	04/28/61	A
#32 Memo	Senate Secret <i>State let 11/11/76, NSC let 2/4/77</i> 3 p To Pres Kennedy & VP Johnson from Richard Russell	04/24/61	A

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6 of 9

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2e Memo	<i>all decisions per OASD 12/13/76</i> DOD Top Secret To the President from Gilpatrick 25 p	04/27/61	A
#7a Report	DOD Top Secret <i>Exempt</i> re: Cuba <i>Exempt per NLS 84-97</i> 10 p	04/25/61	A <i>Open per ROR 8-28-13</i>
#16b Memo	DOD Top Secret 2 p To Pres for Natl. Security Affairs from McNamara	<i>Exempt</i> 05/18/61	A
#35 Memo	DOD Top Secret for Deputy Sec. Def. from McNamara 1 p	04/20/61	A

38

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#16a Memo	JCS To Sec Def from Lemnitzer Top Secret 2 p	05/17/61	A
#17a Memo	JCS To Sec Def from Arleigh Burke Top Secret 1 p open 3-9-09	05/09/61	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#29 Cable	Army Secret <i>Army ltr</i> to CINCPAC from CHMAAC VIENTIANE LAOS	10/26/76 04/26/61	A
#23 Table of Contents	includes Johnson handwritten notes re Laos <i>open 3-9-09</i>	1 p undated	C

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9 of 9

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL HOLDERS OF NSC 6005/1:

The enclosed copy of a memorandum for the President from the Secretary of State on "Interpretation of National Security Council Policy on Africa", prepared in accordance with NSC Action No. 2404-b, is transmitted herewith for information and guidance.

JAMES S. LAY, JR
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 6005/1 4/21/77
By rmg, NARS, Date 5/4/77

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington

1a

C O P Y

February 15, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Interpretation of National Security
Council Policy on Africa

I am informed that certain portions of the guidance contained in present United States policy toward Africa (NSC 6005/1, Policy Toward West Africa, April 9, 1960; and NSC 6001, Policy Toward South, Central and East Africa, January 19, 1960) have in the past been interpreted in such a way as to limit unduly the flexibility and freedom of action required for an effective United States approach to African developments. These limitations have been based particularly on the interpretation of wording of paragraphs having to do with economic assistance. Typical of the language in question is that portion of paragraph 34-b of NSC 6005/1 which states that the United States should, to the maximum extent feasible, rely on specified sources other than the U. S.

I recognize how important it is that other Free World powers, particularly the former metropolises, continue and where possible expand their efforts to meet the need for external capital of the territories and emerging nations of the area. In our activities and programs we should not take any action that would serve to discourage or supplant these efforts--indeed we should make every effort to urge them to do more. It is my understanding, however, based upon our discussion at the Council meeting of February 9 in which the Secretary of the Treasury participated, that the language of the policy is in the future to be interpreted in such a way as to provide the needed flexibility and freedom of action. Under this interpretation we would not, for example, be called upon for such a strong burden of proof as has been required in the past that the needed assistance was not available from others, before proceeding with assistance deemed to be in the United States interest.

The Department is now reviewing the whole of United States policy toward Africa, and we will be developing new proposals for future guidance.

/S/ Dean Rusk

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 6005/1, State 4/25/77, State 1/11/77
By RMG, NARS, Date 6/17/77

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18

NSC 6005/1

April 9, 1960

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

U. S. POLICY TOWARD WEST AFRICA

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLE 037-004-4-1
By [signature] NARA, Date 8/15/02 NLE 93-368

~~SECRET~~

WARNING

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U. S. C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

April 9, 1960

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
U. S. POLICY TOWARD WEST AFRICA

- References:
- A. NSC 5818
 - B. NIE 70-59
 - C. NSC 6001
 - D. NSC 6005
 - E. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary,
same subject, dated March 15, 1960
 - F. Memos For All Holders of NSC 6005,
dated March 22 and 30, 1960
 - G. NSC Action No. 2199
 - H. NSC Action No. 2209

The National Security Council, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Philip A. Ray for the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 440th NSC Meeting on April 7, 1960, adopted the statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6005, subject to the amendments set forth in NSC Action No. 2209-b.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 6005, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 6005/1; directs its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government; and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

In adopting the statement of policy, the Council also (NSC Action No. 2209-c) noted the statement by the Under Secretary of State that the area covered by this paper has taken on great political importance to the United States, and the statement by the President that the Operations Coordinating Board should make a special effort to ensure the effective implementation of the policy contained in NSC 6005. The President also approved this action on April 9, 1960.

The enclosed statement of policy, as adopted and approved, supersedes those portions of NSC 5818 ("U. S. Policy Toward Africa South of the Sahara Prior to Calendar Year 1960") which relate to West Africa. A statement of policy toward South, Central and East Africa (NSC 6001) has been approved to supersede that portion of NSC 5818 relating to South, Central and East Africa.

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An Annex on "General Considerations Relating to Individual Countries and Territories of West Africa" and the Financial Appendix are also enclosed herewith for the information of the Council.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy

~~SECRET~~

U. S. POLICY TOWARD WEST AFRICATable of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS-----	1
OBJECTIVES-----	4
REGIONAL POLICY GUIDANCE-----	5
Independence, Nationalism and Regionalism-----	6
Racialism-----	7
Communist Activities-----	7
Military, Strategic and Internal Security-----	7
Economic-----	8
POLICY GUIDANCE ON INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES SUPPLEMENTAL TO THE "GENERAL POLICY GUIDANCE" ABOVE-----	10
Cameroun	
Malagasy Republic	
Guinea	
Liberia	
Ghana	
Nigeria	
ANNEX: General Considerations Relating to Individual Countries and Territories of West Africa-----	12
FINANCIAL APPENDIX-----	19

STATEMENT
of
U. S. POLICY TOWARD WEST AFRICA*

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS**

1. The primary importance of West Africa is its growing political significance. There is a developing awareness that Africa is an area which will have an increasingly important influence on the course of world events and that its political alignment will be deeply affected by the policies of Western European nations and the United States. This increasing influence may be expected to make itself felt primarily in the United Nations as a growing number of independent African nations take their seats and join in voting on many issues with the less-developed nations. African leaders seek the understanding and goodwill of the United States. Above all, they want to be accepted as equals and to be treated with dignity and respect. One of their criteria of success in this connection is membership in the United Nations.

2. West Africa is probably the fastest changing area in the world today. New countries are springing up with startling rapidity and the people of the area are determined that control of West Africa will be firmly in West African hands. Though many of the countries are sorely lacking in both human and economic resources, this fact does not and will not slow the drive toward self-government and independence. There are presently four independent countries in West Africa: Liberia, Ghana, Guinea and Cameroun. Independence is scheduled for Togo on April 27 and Nigeria on October 1, 1960. In addition Mali--an autonomous state, within the French community, formed by federation of the former colonies of Soudan and Senegal--is now negotiating with the French the terms under which it would attain independence, probably this summer, but with continued strong ties with France and with French assistance. The Malagasy

* Includes the independent states of Liberia, Ghana, Guinea, and Cameroun; the republics formerly federated in French West and French Equatorial Africa and now autonomous members of the French Community (Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, the Mali Federation of Senegal and Soudan, Niger, Voltaic Republic, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, and Gabon); the UN Trust Territory of Togo; the British colonies of Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Gambia; Portuguese Guinea; and Spanish Guinea. The Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) is also included in this paper because it is a part of the French Community.

** See attached Annex for General Considerations Relating to Individual Countries and Territories.

Republic has effected an arrangement looking toward its independence this summer, and other states of the French Community such as Dahomey, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast and Mauritania may follow their example soon thereafter. Sierra Leone will shortly begin discussions with the British regarding terms for its independence.

3. The political stability of the area faces severe trials as the remaining territories achieve independence, frequently accompanied by the tribal rivalries and external political pressures. At present the pace of political change is being set by a very small educated elite. The trend in most countries is toward domination by a single party and growing authoritarianism in government. Communism has not yet become a strong force in West African politics, and, except in the Malagasy Republic, there are no known Communist parties in the area. However, during the early days of independence, the opportunities for Communist penetration and influence are likely to increase and complicate an already difficult situation and make more difficult the area's continuing identification with the West.

4. In this connection, the West will have to contend with a growing Communist Bloc effort to gain influence in West Africa and to exploit anti-colonial sentiments. The Bloc has already established diplomatic missions and established economic and trade links with both Ghana and Guinea, and we can expect a rising tempo of such activities, as well as offers of credits, in other newly independent countries. A concerted Communist effort is also being made with some degree of success to cultivate and subvert African students in Europe and the Bloc.

5. West African leaders are jealous of their new-found political power and are unlikely to surrender it to elements not under their control. In the longer run, however, the efforts of younger leaders to obtain increased political power at the expense of the present political leadership could create a situation favorable to the growth of Communism.

6. Most new West African countries will probably adopt more or less neutralist foreign policies and seek to avoid cold war entanglements, although their underlying orientation may in fact remain more pro-Western than their official pronouncements suggest. Most African leaders have indicated a preference for Western assistance. However, some may turn to the Communist Bloc for aid, not only if they feel the West has not been sufficiently responsive to their needs, but also as a means of emphasizing their neutrality. Many of the new West African nations will probably also succumb to the temptation to play off the West against the East.

7. Within West Africa there are various schemes directed toward preventing the further "balkanization" of the area. They range in content from combinations to maintain common public services, through loose political alliances, to plans for Federal union. With independence,

however, the political benefits envisaged in most of these schemes have become considerably less attractive to many national leaders who regard such schemes as an infringement on their newly-won independence. Over the longer term, the less glamorous economic measures may provide a more solid basis for regional cooperation.

8. If an orderly development of the countries of West Africa with a Western orientation and in cooperation with their former European metropolises is to be assured, it is important that the traditional economic ties which bind Western Europe and Africa be maintained and that every effort be made to encourage the former Metropolitan powers to continue economic and technical assistance. On the other hand, strong anti-colonial sentiments will linger and will make certain of the new countries reluctant to remain exclusively dependent upon their former metropolises.

9. The policies of the former metropolises regarding their ex-dependencies vary. The United Kingdom, which has provided economic assistance in the past, has explicitly acknowledged its willingness to continue public and private aid to less-developed members of the Commonwealth, and in September 1958 the U. K. Government announced new measures under which newly-independent members of the Commonwealth would continue to be eligible for development assistance loans from the U. K. Government. The British have also indicated a willingness to provide technical assistance grants to newly-independent Commonwealth countries. The French have said they are willing to continue helping independent members of the Community such as Mali which are willing to remain associated with France and who continue to support France in their foreign policies. However, former French colonies such as Guinea which choose to break with France, lose their claim on direct French development assistance, although some forms of indirect aid have continued. Such colonies also relinquish their claims on Common Market development funds. It is probable, therefore, that both the United Kingdom and France will continue to extend aid on a unilateral basis to their former colonies in Africa. It would be unrealistic, however, to look to the British and French Governments exclusively as sources of external assistance to their respective former dependencies in the area. In any event, probably U. K. and French assistance will be far short of the needs for outside public assistance which many of the former dependencies will probably feel they will require. Moreover, for reasons of political prestige and to reinforce their position of independence, the independent African countries will seek to develop other sources of aid.

10. The West African economy is characterized by the predominance of subsistence agriculture of very low productivity. In some areas (almost entirely limited to certain of the countries along the coast), impressive gains have been made in such export crops as cocoa, coffee, palm products, peanuts and rubber. As a result, some areas have accumulated substantial foreign exchange holdings; notably, Nigeria and Ghana which have reserves

of about \$600 million and \$500 million respectively. Throughout the area, efforts to increase the efficiency of food production have brought very slight results because of the lack of technical knowledge and capital, resistance to new methods, the system of communal land ownership, and unfavorable soil and climatic conditions.

11. The best prospects for long-term economic growth seem to lie in the further development of known mineral resources--iron in Mauritania, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Gabon; bauxite in Ghana and Guinea; scattered deposits of diamonds in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia; and manganese in Gabon. Modest oil deposits have been found in Nigeria and Gabon. The area's hydro-electric resources have so far been exploited only in Cameroun, but plans for major installations are in an advanced state in Ghana, Guinea, and the Congo Republic. However, the problem of financing remains largely unresolved.

12. American economic interests in West Africa are modest. In 1959 this area accounted for only about one per cent of U. S. trade (about \$276 million). American investment in the area is approximately \$225 million, but the greater bulk of it is in Liberia where until recently most of the American economic interest has focused.

13. Our primary strategic military interest in this area is to deny it to Communist control. We now have no significant military requirements in this area. However, control of sea and air communications in this and surrounding areas might become important to us in certain emergency situations, and U. S. requirements for installations, rights, and facilities in this area might develop with technological advances in weapons systems.

OBJECTIVES

14. Maintenance of the Free World orientation of the area and denial of the area to Communist domination, including:

- a. The minimization of Communist influence therein.
- b. Orderly economic development and political progress by the countries of the area in cooperation with the metropolises or former metropolises and other Free World countries.
- c. Access to such military rights and facilities and such strategic resources as may become necessary to our national security.
- d. Formation of federations or other larger political groupings of the nations of the area.

REGIONAL POLICY GUIDANCE

15. Impress on the countries of Western Europe, including the metropolises or former metropolises, the continuing importance to them of a stable and prosperous West Africa and conduct all U. S. activities with a realization that a continued close Eur-African relationship is important to the United States itself. Similarly, impress on the West Africans the fact that their national well-being depends in large part on a continued close economic and cultural relationship with Western Europe.

16. In applying the policy guidance which follows to all parts of this area except Guinea and Liberia, urge the Western European nations to expand their efforts to influence and support their respective dependent and recently independent areas and, to the extent feasible, to exercise primary responsibility for providing such influence and support, so long as this policy is consistent with U. S. national security interests. Seek to reach an understanding along the above lines with appropriate Western European nations.

17. Until an area achieves independence conduct U. S. activities and programs in the area in full recognition of the responsibilities of the metropolitan power involved, and, to the extent feasible:

a. Consult with the responsible metropolitan power on U. S. activities and programs in or relating to the area; and

b. Avoid actions in the area or directly relating to the area likely to cause serious misunderstandings between the United States and the metropolitan power involved.

18. In the event it does not appear feasible or consistent with U. S. national security interests for the European power concerned to exercise primary responsibility in a dependent area or a newly-independent area, be prepared to provide influence and support for such an area, taking into account:

a. The need for establishing friendly working relationships with the newly-emerging state.

b. The need to incline this state toward the Free World rather than the Communist world.

c. The effect of our policies on other Free World States having a colonial heritage.

d. The need for maintaining Free World harmony including friendly relationships and consultations as appropriate with the present or former metropolitan powers.

19. Pursue actions which will assist newly-independent areas to maintain a Western orientation, mindful of the natural desires and intense sensitivities of the Africans, particularly with respect to their newly-acquired independence. Make clear wherever possible that self-government and independence impose increasing responsibilities which the people must assume.

20. Encourage expansion of those United Nations activities in the area and assistance (other than development financing)* to the newly-emerging states which will assist in the constructive political and economic development of those states and will complement U. S. efforts to attain its objectives in the area.

Independence, Nationalism and Regionalism

21. Encourage those policies and actions of the former administering powers which assist the newly-independent nations to develop as a part of the Free World.

22. Encourage friendly relations between the nations and territories of West Africa and between those nations and territories and other African countries. Encourage friendly relations between West African nations and the United States.

23. As appropriate, encourage the formation of federations or other forms of association among the newly-emerged states which will enhance their political and economic viability.

24. As feasible, support constructive, non-Communist nationalist and reform movements, balancing the nature and degree of such support, however, with consideration of our relations with our NATO allies.

25. Discourage wherever possible, expansionist tendencies and ethnic xenophobia.

26. Recognizing the importance of non- and anti-Communist labor organizations, as well as farmer's, business and similar organizations to the political and economic development of Free World-oriented African societies, encourage such organizations to follow courses of action consistent with U. S. interests and the needs of the African people.

* This provision does not preclude the operations of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which is one of the specialized agencies of the United Nations.

Racialism

27. Encourage American companies to set an example in practicing non-discrimination to the maximum extent and to train Africans in managerial positions.

28. Seek to correct distorted African views of U. S. race relations, emphasizing, where appropriate, progress made by the United States in the race relations field.

Communist Activities

29. Cooperate locally with security organizations to combat Communist subversive activities.

30. Encourage, in independent areas where practicable, a full appreciation of the dangers involved in formal Sino-Soviet Bloc representation, in extensive use of Sino-Soviet Bloc technicians and in other Sino-Soviet Bloc economic and cultural contacts. Alert the governments of such nations, without causing false suspicions of our own objectives, to the probability that the Sino-Soviet Bloc will attempt to utilize trade and assistance programs as a technique for political subversion. Nonetheless, maintain a flexible posture that would minimize the damage to U. S. prestige in the event that such nations accept diplomatic or economic relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

Military, Strategic and Internal Security

31. Keep the area under periodic survey to determine any changes in the U. S. appraisal of the strategic value to the United States, bearing in mind that the United States may, in the future, require bases, rights or facilities.

32. Discourage the development of an arms race in Africa and of the concept that the United States is prepared to provide military assistance to any nation which requests it. As countries in the area become independent, encourage them to maintain adequately equipped and trained internal security forces. In those cases where external assistance is required for this purpose, encourage the appropriate former metropole to provide such assistance. If this approach fails and if required to achieve U. S. objectives, consider providing U. S. assistance to meet minimum legitimate internal security requirements, including technical training in U. S. military institutions.

33. Establish technically competent observers in African countries to keep abreast of military or internal security developments, subject in each case to the approval of the Secretary of State.

Economic

34. a. Encourage the independent countries and, as may be appropriate, those achieving independence: (1) to make the maximum contribution to their own economic development, (2) to eliminate barriers to trade and investment, (3) to take measures capable of attracting maximum amounts of external private capital, and (4) to look essentially to Western Europe, to the Free World international financial institutions, and to private investment to meet their needs for external capital so long as this is consistent with U. S. security interests.

b. Urge the United Kingdom, France, Portugal and Spain as well as other Free World powers, the Free World international financial institutions, organizations such as the Common Market, and private capital to expand their efforts and, to the maximum extent feasible, rely on these sources to meet the need of the territories and nations of the area for external capital. In meeting the desires of the newly-independent nations for external assistance from sources other than the former metropolises, utilize the Free World international financial institutions to the maximum extent possible, consistent with relevant U. S. loan policies.*

c. Wherever it is determined to be infeasible or inconsistent with U. S. national security interests to rely on the sources in subparagraph b to meet the external capital needs of a particular territory or nation, be prepared on the basis of case-by-case appraisal of country or major project requirements to extend economic development assistance or special assistance consistent with the foregoing guidance.*

d. Be prepared to extend to independent nations and, in consultation with the metropolitan power concerned, to dependent territories (1) U. S. technical assistance and (2) U. S. special assistance for the improvement of education and training, with particular emphasis to be given to the meeting of the needs which are common to all of the countries of the area. Be prepared to negotiate surplus commodity sales under P. L. 480 when appropriate.

e. Seek to avoid the creation of unrealistic African expectations of U. S. assistance. Accomplish this in part by conducting forthright discussions with the metropolises and countries concerned as to the probable limitations of U. S. assistance both as to type and amounts. Initiate such discussions prior to independence where possible; otherwise in close coordination with the former metropole.

* Specific guidance for Guinea and Liberia is provided in paragraphs 41 and 47 below.

35. In the provision of U. S. assistance, attention should be given to those activities which especially (1) complement the efforts already undertaken by and for the governments of the area concerned; (2) improve, develop or conserve human resources by programs of education, training, and health; (3) accelerate economic development by the selective application of skills to the resources available; (4) serve multi-national needs or are otherwise regional in scope.

36. Encourage U. S. and Free World business to participate more actively in the development of the economies of these countries by expanding trade and investment. Seek the denial or limitation of exports of strategic commodities from these areas to the Sino-Soviet Bloc in accordance with U. S. economic defense policy.

37. Encourage expanded efforts by private American institutions and foundations in the field of education, training and research on Africa.

38. Selectively increase educational exchanges between West Africa and the United States.

POLICY GUIDANCE ON INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES
SUPPLEMENTAL TO THE "GENERAL POLICY GUIDANCE" ABOVE

Cameroun

39. Support the stated UN recommendation for early free elections throughout the country.

Malagasy Republic

40. Cooperate with the Malagasy Government in its efforts to combat the local Communist party.

Guinea

41. Be prepared to extend economic assistance to Guinea.

42. Discourage a pro-Soviet orientation on the part of the Government of Guinea and encourage the development of a neutral policy as the first step toward persuading Guinea to adopt a pro-Western attitude. Recognize that use of excessive pressure at this stage in Guinea's development may produce negative results.

43. Exploit any opportunities tending to weaken the influence of the Communist Bloc.

Liberia

44. Encourage the continuation of close and friendly relations between Liberia and the United States and the rest of the Free World, bearing in mind the desirability of countering the general view of Liberia as a U. S. dependency.

45. Encourage friendly relations with the other independent African countries with a view to facilitating Liberia's role as a force for political moderation in West Africa.

46. Encourage Liberian efforts to bring the hinterland tribal peoples into the economic and political life of the nation.

47. Be prepared to extend economic assistance to Liberia.

Ghana

48. Discourage, whenever possible, Ghana's current tendency to support extremist elements in neighboring African countries.

Nigeria

49. Encourage close and friendly relations with other independent African nations with a view to facilitating Nigeria's role as a potential force for political moderation.

ANNEXGENERAL CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO INDIVIDUAL
COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES OF WEST AFRICAFrench Community

1. Members of the community are: Mali, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey, Niger, Chad, Central African Republic, Gabon and Congo.

2. All these states are autonomous republics of the French Community. The majority of them are dominated by the political party of Prime Minister Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA). Houphouet-Boigny has shown a marked distaste for a rapid evolution of the Community toward independence and has instituted loose association of the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey without a central executive.

3. The leaders of all the other African states of the Community are closely watching the results of the negotiations of Mali and the Malagasy Republic with France. In the future they may either individually or in groupings feel compelled to follow the irresistible trend of Africa toward independence.

Cameroun

4. The State of Cameroun, formerly a UN Trust Territory under French Administration, achieved independence January 1, 1960. In the two preceding years the present pro-Western government has been faced with a series of strong terrorist actions by an outlawed political party, the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC). However, UPC extremists, by continuing to support terrorist actions from abroad, have contributed substantially to the recent sharp deterioration of security conditions in the southwest where turbulence among Bamileke tribesmen, induced mainly by economic and social conditions, now has developed into virtual civil war. This situation has facilitated UPC objectives to discredit the present government and force the UN to reverse its decision to grant independence without prior elections. The UN did not honor UPC's demands.

Mali Federation

5. The Mali Federation came into being January 17, 1959, when the Republic of Senegal and the Soudanese Republic (both autonomous states in the French Community) agreed to federate. Almost immediately, Mali indicated its intention to become independent while retaining strong links with France. Until General de Gaulle formally recognized and approved this desire in December 1959 there was strong behind-the-scenes opposition to this rapid evolution of the Community. In Africa this opposition was sparked principally by the Prime Minister of the Ivory Coast, Houphouet-Boigny. On the other hand, the dynamic force behind Mali's push for independence came from Soudan, whose leaders are to various degrees influenced by Guinea with which Soudan has close ethnic and political ties.

6. In January 1960 negotiations started between the two countries on the method of achieving independence. If all goes well, Mali can now be expected to become independent in mid-1960, and in the beginning at least, it will retain strong ties with France. However, these ties will have been negotiated on a bilateral basis and may later be modified or abolished.

The Malagasy Republic (Madagascar)

7. After 50 years as a Colony (1896-1946), and twelve years as an Overseas Territory with representation in the French Parliament (1946-1958), the Malagasy Republic became an autonomous state within the Community following the Constitutional Referendum of September 1958.

8. The Malagasy Constitution, adopted April 29, 1959, provides for a democracy with a strong executive. The political scene is dominated by the Parti Social Democrate (PSD - Social Democratic Party) headed by President Philibert Tsiranana. There are, however, serious internal political problems which present a potential threat to the political stability of the Malagasy Republic. These problems, in order of importance, are Communism, nationalism and tribalism.

9. Communism came into the open as a potential threat to the country following municipal elections held throughout the country in October 1959. Although, on a country-wide basis, the party of President Tsiranana remained dominant, the Communist-dominated Congress Party for the Independence of Madagascar virtually captured all the seats in two of the principal and key cities of the island, Tananarive, the capital, and Diego Suarez, the second port and location of a strategically important French naval base.

10. There exist strong nationalist forces, some of which are deeply influenced by Communist-oriented leaders who were exiled following a bloody and abortive insurrection against the French in 1947. These forces have brought heavy pressure on the Government to request immediate independence from France. With the recent evolution of the Mali Federation, the Malagasy Government found it would be increasingly difficult to resist these nationalist forces and decided to follow Mali in requesting independence from France. Negotiations to this effect between France and the Malagasy Republic started in February 1960. The Malagasy Government hopes that with this move it will take the wind out of the sails of the nationalists, and thereby put a brake on the increasing influence of Communists in their ranks.

11. The tribal problem consists of active suspicion between the coastal tribes and the aristocratic Hova tribe of the high plateaus. The coastal tribes still remember that the Hovas were the hard masters of the island for a long time prior to the arrival of the French. The Hovas, in turn, are suspicious of the coastal people who are now running the government.

Republic of Guinea

12. Guinea became independent October 2, 1958, following its negative vote in the French Constitutional Referendum of September 28, 1958. As a result of the vote, French economic, technical and financial aid, which Guinea has been enjoying as one of the eight territories of the former French West African Federation, was immediately withdrawn. French civilian and military personnel and equipment were also immediately and completely withdrawn. The United States, in deference to very strong French representations, delayed its recognition of Guinea approximately one month. Other Western nations adopted the same position. This contributed to providing the USSR and other Bloc countries with an opportunity to achieve a prominent position in an area of West Africa where access had previously been denied them. In addition to prompt recognition of the new nation, military and economic aid (including a large number of Bloc technicians) was extended. The Soviet Union also provided a \$35 million, long-term low-interest line of credit. The United States granted 5,000 tons of rice and 3,000 tons of flour under the P. L. 480 program. Guinea has received more technical aid and economic assistance from the Soviet Bloc than from the West. Despite this situation, it is believed that the Government of Guinea is determined to pursue a policy of neutrality and that it will not willingly be drawn into either camp. This was recently made quite clear by President Sekou Toure of Guinea when he visited the United States and later when in the Soviet Union. However, some powerful elements in the Guinea Government are strongly inclined toward closer ties with the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

13. Guinea is economically poor, but it possesses potential mineral wealth. This wealth consists mainly of iron ore deposits and of huge bauxite deposits, a large part of which are being developed by an international consortium in which an American aluminum company holds the controlling interest.

Republic of Togo

14. The Republic of Togo is a United Nations Trust Territory under French Administration. It will become independent April 27, 1960. Togo is a very small country which cannot expect to become economically viable in the near future. Its existence has largely been made possible by French subsidization. The Government is stable and strongly pro-Western. The economic weakness of the country makes continued economic aid a matter of acute necessity. French assistance may be expected to continue on a smaller scale than heretofore. The desire for improved and expanding economic conditions has generated powerful political pressures, with the result that demands for additional assistance may be expected.

Liberia

15. Liberia, founded by freed American slaves, has had close ties with the United States for more than a century and was until recently the only independent country in West Africa. Continuance of political stability and a reasonable rate of economic growth for Liberia are increasingly essential if Liberia is to continue to be a stabilizing influence in the midst of the highly-charged atmosphere of new freedom, high economic aspirations and rising nationalism in West Africa.

16. U. S. influence on the policy and attitudes adopted by the emerging governments of West Africa is facilitated through its close connection with Liberia. Liberia has generally supported the U. S. position in international forums in disputes with the Soviet Bloc, and it has advocated in discussions with its neighbors a policy of moderation on issues involving African nationalism. Its recent more independent course in foreign policy lends Liberia greater weight in African councils.

17. The success of the "open door" for foreign investments in attracting \$100 million in U. S. investment provides the new countries of Africa a persuasive example as they choose between policies of encouraging private initiative and private foreign investment and policies of almost total reliance on government initiative and financing of economic development.

18. Although Liberia was able to increase its revenues sufficiently in 1959 to avert a financial crisis which threatened in 1958, the economy continues vulnerable because of its heavy dependence on rubber. The United States has sought to encourage continued economic growth through

development loans and through technical assistance to encourage higher health and educational standards and agricultural diversification. A small U. S. Military Mission helps Liberia in training the Liberian frontier force.

19. An Agreement of Cooperation between the United States and Liberia was signed on July 8, 1959. This Agreement, in part, provides for mutual determination of appropriate action in the event of aggression or threat of aggression against Liberia, and reaffirms the intention of the United States to continue to assist in the promotion of Liberia's economic development and in the preservation of Liberia's independence and integrity.

Sierra Leone

20. The Colony and Protectorate of Sierra Leone is a dependency of the United Kingdom located near the tip of West Africa and is bordered by Liberia, Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean. It has a population of approximately 2.5 million of which about 1,000 are Europeans.

21. Although Sierra Leone has slumbered quietly during most of its history, the stirring events of the independence of Ghana and Guinea and the forthcoming independence of other West African states has roused Sierra Leone to increased political activity and with the objective of independence within the next two years. It is expected that a Constitutional Conference between representatives of Sierra Leone and the United Kingdom will be held on April 20, 1960, at which a decision may be reached regarding Sierra Leone's political future. It is generally expected that agreement will be reached for full independence in 1961 or 1962.

22. The basic problems confronting Sierra Leone are that of improving economic conditions and of developing an effective national government preparatory to full independence. Sierra Leone, like most of West Africa, is seriously deficient in the trained personnel necessary for significant economic development, and looks to the West for assistance in meeting that deficiency.

Ghana

23. Ghana was the first nation in Africa south of the Sahara to gain independence during the present historic era of the awakening of Africa. Under the ambitious leadership of Prime Minister Nkrumah, Ghana acts as a powerful example to the emerging nations and to the still-dependent African territories. Ghana also has a strong voice in African affairs and is influencing African attitudes on domestic policies and international questions, although the Prime Minister's increasingly intemperate pronouncements concerning the African's political role is tending to isolate Ghana's leadership from the more moderate or conservative

African leaders. The United States desires to encourage this key nation in its political development and economic growth and to support the preservation of its basically Western orientation.

24. Recently Ghana's neutralism in foreign affairs has become more pronounced. In spite of these overtures on the part of the Soviet Bloc, Ghana remains basically Western in orientation, and it is not believed likely that the Government will turn to the Bloc for major assistance in its economic development unless Western sources fail to assist in the Volta River Project.

25. There has been criticism from the West regarding the authoritarian measures adopted by the Government against its political opposition. Ghana, however, has a stable government operated by competent African civil servants. In Ghana, as in other African countries, Western parliamentary democracy has not yet satisfactorily become adapted to African traditions and tribal culture. Continued contacts between the Ghanaian people and the United States will help ensure that Western principles of political and social democracy will remain predominating forces in Ghana's evolution.

26. In its efforts to gain what the Prime Minister has often referred to as its economic independence, the Government has requested technical assistance from Western Europe and the United States. The economy is basically dependent upon one crop--cocoa, a commodity notoriously subject to wide price fluctuations. Although cocoa prices remain high and Ghana is thus relatively prosperous by African standards, the Government is set upon diversifying its economy in order to avoid its vulnerability as a one-crop country.

27. In the industrial field, Ghana is still pre-occupied with the ambitious Volta River Project.* Progress toward establishing a consortium of aluminum companies to build and operate the necessary smelter has been extremely encouraging. The success of this major project will greatly reinforce Western and U. S. interests in Ghana.

* At the request of the Ghanaians, the World Bank is making an appraisal of the Volta River Project and its relation to the economy of the country. The Bank's report, expected to be available around May 1, 1960, should, if the findings are favorable, enable the Ghanaians to negotiate an agreement with a potential consortium of aluminum companies as to the rate to be charged for power should the consortium decide to erect an aluminum smelter in Ghana. If these negotiations are successful it should be possible to put the power project out to international tender by September 1, 1960.

Nigeria

28. Nigeria will become fully independent on October 1, 1960. By far the most populous country in Africa, with energetic, ambitious leadership and valuable resources and development potential, Nigeria will become a potent force among the free countries of Africa.

29. The national election of December 12, 1959, returned to power a government dominated by the Moslem traditionalists of the Northern Region. The election has not smoothed over the age-old ethnic and religious differences splitting the country and, with the guiding hand of the British removed, the stresses may become much more pronounced.

30. An independent Nigeria may be expected to follow a largely pro-Western policy, although it is certain to be under great pressure from other independent African states and from the Afro-Asian bloc to follow a neutralist course. All Nigerian leaders, however, are strongly anti-Communist and conservative in their political and economic policies.

31. Nigeria is an important producer of many tropical agricultural products. However, industrial development has not progressed beyond primary processing and simple manufacturing. American capital has begun to show definite signs of interest in Nigeria, particularly in the wake of a highly successful U. S. trade mission during 1959. Nigeria is highly receptive to foreign investment and welcomes U. S. technical cooperation activities. A major problem facing Nigeria is the absence of trained technicians, administrators and managers.

Gambia, Portuguese Guinea and Spanish Guinea

32. Although the British are reportedly anxious to leave Gambia and it is generally agreed that the most logical solution is some form of association with the Mali Federation, the Gambian Government recently announced it was "not in a position" to join the Federation at this time. Tentative proposals that Gambia enter the Federation as an equal partner of Senegal and Soudan have not been seriously considered by either the French or the Malians. Another complicating factor is Gambia's reluctance to leave the sterling area. Because of these difficulties and the underlying fear of being outnumbered by six million French-oriented Malians, Gambia is likely to retain the status quo for the present.

33. Despite recent riots which the Portuguese have traced to Guinea, Portugal's province of Guinea remains quiet on the surface. Similarly the Spanish territories of Rio Muni and Fernando Poo are somnolent despite the recent independence of Cameroun and relative independence of neighboring French areas.

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U. S. POLICY TOWARD WEST AFRICA

FINANCIAL APPENDIX

Cost estimates in the Financial Appendix indicate order of magnitude only.

Approval of the policy statement does not indicate approval of cost estimates in the Financial Appendix and is not to be interpreted as Council endorsement of, or limitation upon, the size of particular programs.

Appropriations and expenditures to finance the policy will be subject to determination in the regular budgetary process.

SPECIAL NOTES

1. All estimates are subject to the assumptions, footnotes, and summary explanations shown below in this Financial Appendix.
2. Although the Export-Import Bank was established by statute for the purpose of promoting the export of U. S. goods and services, Export-Import credits may normally also be expected to advance U. S. national security objectives. For this reason, data on Export-Import Bank lending is included in this Appendix.
3. The Development Loan Fund and the Export-Import Bank do not operate by programming the funds available to them among recipient countries, but in general await the receipt of applications for specific projects and act upon such applications according to their merits and the availability of financing from other sources. Neither the DLF nor the Export-Import Bank makes any forecast as to future commitments. These institutions, therefore, take no responsibility for the cost implications contained in this Appendix.
4. Similarly, data on P. L. 480 agreements are included because these agreements may be expected to serve U. S. national security objectives, even though a major purpose is the distribution of surplus agricultural commodities.

~~SECRET~~Table I. Current and Projected U. S. Programs or Authorizations

(Fiscal Years - Millions of Dollars)

	Cost Implications of:			Cost Implications of			
	Existing Policies			Proposed Policies			
	Actual	Est.		Projected		Total	
	1958:	1959:	1960	1961	1962	1963:	1960-63
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ^{a/}	--	*	.4	1.0	--	--	1.4
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE	<u>2.6</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>8.5</u>	<u>12.4</u>	<u>15.1</u>	<u>41.4</u>
Cameroun	--	--	--	.6	1.0	1.5	3.1
French Community States ^{b/}	--	--	--	.3	1.0	1.5	2.8
Ghana	.2	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.6	2.0	5.9
Guinea	:	:	.4 ^{c/}	1.0	1.5	1.5	4.4
Liberia	2.3	2.2	2.6	2.6	2.8	3.0	11.0
Nigeria	.1	.8	1.3	2.1	3.5	4.0	10.9
Sierra Leone	--	--	--	.4	.5	.9	1.8
Togo	--	--	--	.3	.5	.7	1.5
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE	<u>.1</u>	<u>.6</u>	<u>.5</u>				
Special Program for							
Tropical Africa ^{d/}	--	--	--	12.0	14.0	24.0	50.0
Other Special Assistance	.1	.6	.5	[est. for 3 yrs: 5.5-13.5]			
				5.0-13.0 ^{e/}			
LENDING INSTITUTIONS		<u>10.5</u>					
Development Loan Fund	--	<u>3.2</u>	--	100 f/			
Export-Import Bank	--	<u>7.3</u>	--				
P. L. 480		<u>2.6</u>		<u>2.0</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>8.0</u>
Ghana	--	.6	--	--	--	--	--
Guinea	--	2.6	--	2.0	3.0	3.0	8.0

Table I.
(Continued)

(Fiscal Years - Millions of Dollars)

	:Cost Implications of::			Cost Implications of			
	: Existing Policies ::			Proposed Policies			
	: Actual	: Est.	:	: Projected	:	: Total	
	:1958:	1959	: 1960	::1961	1962	1963:	1960-63
EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE	: .2:	.3	: .5	:: .8	.8	.8:	2.9
Cameroun	: *:	*	: *	:: .1	.1	.1:	.3
French Community States <u>b/</u>	: *:	*	: .1	:: .1	.1	.1:	.4
Ghana	: .1:	.1	: .1	:: .1	.1	.1:	.4
Guinea	: --:	--	: .1	:: .1	.1	.1:	.4
Liberia	: *:	*	: *	:: *	*	*:	
Nigeria	: .1:	.2	: .2	:: .3	.3	.3:	1.1
Sierra Leone	: *:	*	: *	:: *	*	*:	
Togo	: *:	*	: *	:: .1	.1	.1:	.3
INFORMATION PROGRAMS	: .5:	.7	: 1.0	:: 1.6	2.4	2.8:	7.9
Cameroun	: --:	--	: .1	:: .1	.1	.1:	.4
French Community States <u>b/</u>	: *:	.1	: .1	:: .4	1.1	1.3:	3.0
Ghana	: .2:	.2	: .2	:: .3	.3	.3:	1.1
Guinea	: --:	--	: .1	:: .1	.1	.2:	.5
Liberia & Sierra Leone <u>g/</u>	: .1:	.1	: .1	:: .2	.2	.2:	.7
Nigeria	: .2:	.3	: .4	:: .5	.5	.6:	2.0
Togo	: --:	--	: --	:: --	.1	.1:	.2

SEE FOOTNOTES ON PAGE 22.

Footnotes to Table I

- * Under \$50,000.
- a/ Includes the value of all grant military assistance whether on a country, regional, or worldwide basis; but not the value of excess stocks. Country programs include: equipment and supplies; training; and construction and consumables. Regional or worldwide programs include: packing, crating, handling, and transportation charges; follow-on spare parts; and the cost of repairing and rehabilitating excess stocks.
- b/ May include Mali, Malagasy Republic, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Dahomey, Central African Republic, Congo and Gabon.
- c/ Guinea -- A possible requirement of \$750,000 for scholarships has been identified.
- d/ The Special Programs for Tropical Africa is for all of Africa South of the Sahara, except the Union of South Africa. For FY 1961 the Executive Branch is requesting \$20 million for the area. All funds are to be made available on a project basis rather than by country allocation. Possible projects for FY 1961 in West Africa are estimated to total \$12 million; South, Central and East Africa, \$4 million; and the Horn of Africa, \$4 million. It is contemplated that at least a five-year program at somewhat increased levels after FY 1961 will be required to make an impact on the enormous problems which confront Africa.
- e/ Liberia -- Includes \$1.5 million for improvement of Roberts Field.
- f/ Assumes U. S. participation in financing of the Volta River Project in Ghana and a substantial volume of lending to Liberia.
- g/ USIA activities in Sierra Leone are directed from Liberia; therefore, financial data covers both areas.

Table II. Current and Projected U. S. Expenditures, Deliveries or Disbursements

(Fiscal Years - Millions of Dollars)

	:Cost Implications of::			Cost Implications of			
	: Existing Policies ::			Proposed Policies			
	: Actual	: Est.		: Projected		: Total	
	:1958:	1959 :	1960	::1961	1962	1963 :	1960-63
MILITARY ASSISTANCE <u>a/</u>	: -- :	* :	.4	:: .3	.4	.3 :	1.4
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE	: <u>2.2</u> :	<u>3.5</u> :	<u>4.2</u>	:: <u>6.3</u>	<u>9.7</u>	<u>12.0</u> :	<u>32.2</u>
Cameroun	: -- :	-- :	--	:: .3	.6	1.2 :	2.1
French Community States <u>b/</u>	: -- :	-- :	--	:: .3	.6	1.2 :	2.1
Ghana	: .2:	.8 :	.9	:: .9	1.1	1.4 :	4.3
Guinea	: -- :	-- :	--	:: .8	1.2	1.4 :	3.4
Liberia	: 1.9:	2.3 :	2.3	:: 2.3	2.4	2.6 :	9.6
Nigeria	: .1:	.4 :	1.0	:: 1.3	3.0	3.0 :	8.3
Sierra Leone	: -- :	-- :	--	:: .2	.4	.7 :	1.3
Togo	: -- :	-- :	--	:: .2	.4	.5 :	1.1
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE	: -- :	-- :	<u>.5</u>	::		:	
Special Program for	: -- :	-- :	--	::		:	
Tropical Africa <u>c/</u>	: -- :	-- :	--	:: 6.0	9.0	12.0 :	27.0
Other Special Assistance	: -- :	-- :	.5	:: <u>est. for 3 yrs:</u>			3.5-8.5
	: -- :	-- :	--	:: 3.0-8.0 <u>d/</u>			
LENDING INSTITUTIONS	: <u>4.3</u> :	<u>7.0</u> :	--	50.0-60.0 <u>e/</u>			
Development Loan Fund	: -- :	.1 :	--				
Export-Import Bank	: 4.3:	6.9 :	--				
P. L. 480	: -- :	<u>2.0</u> :	<u>.3</u>	:: <u>1.0</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>3.0</u> :	<u>7.3</u>
Ghana	: -- :	-- :	.3	:: --	--	-- :	.3
Guinea	: -- :	2.0 :	--	:: 1.0	3.0	3.0 :	7.0

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Table II.
(Continued)

(Fiscal Years - Millions of Dollars)

	:Cost Implications of::			Cost Implications of			
	: Existing Policies ::			Proposed Policies			
	: Actual	: Est.	:	: Projected	:	: Total	
	:1958:	1959 :	1960	::1961	1962	1963 :	1960-63
EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE	: .2:	.3 :	.5	:: .8	.8	.8 :	2.9
Cameroun	: *:	* :	*	:: .1	.1	.1 :	.3
French Community States <u>b/</u>	: *:	* :	.1	:: .1	.1	.1 :	.4
Ghana	: .1:	.1 :	.1	:: .1	.1	.1 :	.4
Guinea	: --:	-- :	.1	:: .1	.1	.1 :	.4
Liberia	: *:	* :	*	:: *	*	* :	
Nigeria	: .1:	.2 :	.2	:: .3	.3	.3 :	1.1
Sierra Leone	: *:	* :	*	:: *	*	* :	
Togo	: *:	* :	*	:: .1	.1	.1 :	.3
INFORMATION PROGRAMS	: .5:	.7 :	1.0	:: 1.6	2.4	2.8 :	7.9
Cameroun	: --:	-- :	.1	:: .1	.1	.1 :	.4
French Community States <u>b/</u>	: *:	.1 :	.1	:: .4	1.1	1.3 :	3.0
Ghana	: .2:	.2 :	.2	:: .3	.3	.3 :	1.1
Guinea	: --:	-- :	.1	:: .1	.1	.2 :	.5
Liberia & Sierra Leone <u>f/</u>	: .1:	.1 :	.1	:: .2	.2	.2 :	.7
Nigeria	: .2:	.3 :	.4	:: .5	.5	.6 :	2.0
Togo	: --:	-- :	--	:: --	.1	.1 :	.2

SEE FOOTNOTES ON PAGE 25.

Footnotes to Table II

- * Under \$50,000.
- a/ Includes the value of all grant military assistance whether on a country, regional, or worldwide basis; but not the value of excess stocks. Country programs include: equipment and supplies; training; and construction and consumables. Regional or worldwide programs include: packing, crating, handling, and transportation charges; follow-on spare parts; and the cost of repairing and rehabilitating excess stocks.
- b/ May include Mali, Malagasy Republic, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Dahomey, Central African Republic, Congo and Gabon.
- c/ The Special Program for Tropical Africa is for all of Africa South of the Sahara except the Union of South Africa. For FY 1961 the Executive Branch is requesting \$20 million for the area. All funds are to be made available on a project basis rather than by country allocation. Possible projects for FY 1961 in West Africa are estimated to total \$12 million; South, Central and East Africa, \$4 million; and the Horn of Africa, \$4 million. It is contemplated that at least a five-year program at somewhat increased levels after FY 1961 will be required to make an impact on the enormous problems which confront Africa.
- d/ Liberia -- Includes \$1.5 million for improvement of Roberts Field.
- e/ Assumes U. S. participation in financing of the Volta River Project in Ghana and a substantial volume of lending to Liberia.
- f/ USIA activities in Sierra Leone are directed from Liberia; therefore, financial data covers both areas.

DEFENSE COMMENTSExisting Program

Liberia is the only country in West Africa which has received military assistance. During the period FY 1950-60, U. S. provided \$1.464 million of assistance. Of the total, \$120,000 was direct grant materiel assistance and \$43,000 was for training. The balance, \$1.3 million, was on a long-term, no interest credit basis, which is chargeable against the military assistance program in the same manner as grant aid.

The U. S. has made no commitments for direct grant military assistance to Liberia; however, in June 1959, the U. S. offered Liberia additional long-term credit of \$1.5 million for the purchase of materiel for Liberia's security forces. Liberia has availed herself of approximately \$.425 million of this credit during FY 1960, all of which has been delivered.

All military materiel provided has been directed toward improving the internal security capabilities of the Liberian Frontier Force of approximately 2,700 men. Items furnished include tentage, ammunition, small arms, motor vehicles, 2 small patrol boats and training assistance. In addition, since 1951 the U. S. has maintained a small Military Training Mission in Liberia (current strength - 7 men) to assist in the training of the Frontier Force.

A United States Internal Security Survey Team recently completed a study of the requirements of the Liberian Frontier Force. The report recommends that future assistance be similar in composition and magnitude to that provided in the past.

Cost Implications of Proposed Policy

Liberia is the only country in West Africa presently under consideration for military assistance during the period FY 1960-1963. In accordance with paragraph 32, U. S. military assistance will be provided only for internal security purposes. It will be directed primarily toward improving the capability of the Liberian Frontier Forces to provide law enforcement service to the rural areas, patrol the frontiers, and maintain a mobile internal security force.

The projected FY 1960-1963 military assistance program is estimated at \$1.4 million. Of this amount, \$.4 million (the FY 1960 program) consists of long-term credits, chargeable to MAP, which the Liberians have utilized for the purchase of small arms and motor vehicles. It has not yet been determined whether the remaining \$1.0 million will also be provided on a long-term credit basis or on a grant basis.

It is anticipated that the projected FY 1961-1963 programs will include small arms, commercial-type light trucks, small patrol boats, communications equipment and light mission-type aircraft. The United States plans to continue to maintain a small military training mission in Liberia and provide a limited number of training spaces for Liberian personnel in U. S. training establishments.

The projected annual expenditure level for the FY 1960-1963 period would be higher than the annual level during the FY 1951-1959 period because of the recognition of continuing deficiencies in the internal security capabilities of the Liberian Forces.

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MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

The Attached document is for
consideration at the National
Security Council meeting
27 April 61. It is "SENSITIVE"
Top Secret

V-P

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recd
10:45 am
by special messenger
at

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2a

RECEIPT FOR CLASSIFIED MATERIAL			
ADDRESSEE The Vice President		PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN TO OSD IMMEDIATELY	NUMBER C- 80395
ORIGINATOR OR CUSTODIAN B/Gen Lansdale		CLASSIFICATION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TS <input type="checkbox"/> S <input type="checkbox"/> C	DATE OF TRANSFER 27 Apr 61
TELEPHONE NUMBER 57712			
SUBJECT (Use short title, i.e. short title for Subject "Shipment of Shoes and Dresses" would be "SOSAD.") (Including date of Document) 27Apr61, 1 Pg, w/2 Incls. Memo to The President			
Incl 1: Prog of Action 16 Pgs			
Incl 2: Annex A, 8 Pgs			
COPIES			
ORIGINAL Cy #10	CC	OTHERS 1	ENCLOSURES 2
DATE RECEIVED	RECEIVED BY (Signature)		

SD FORM 120
1 APR 53

White copy - Custodian. Pink copy - Recipient.
Post Card - Office of the Secretary of Defense.

October 31, 1961

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in the
Cabinet Room of The White House
on Thursday, November 2, 1961
at 10:15 a.m.

Item 1. NUCLEAR TESTING

Briefing by the Central Intelligence Agency, to be followed by a discussion of the criteria which will determine any resumption of U. S. testing in the atmosphere.

Item 2. VOLTA RIVER PROJECT

Report by the Department of State.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 4/2/77

By mmg, NARS, Date 5/4/77

492nd NSC Meeting

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NSC Control No. 28

**INVITEES IN ADDITION TO THE STATUTORY MEMBERS AND
ADVISERS FOR THE 492nd NSC MEETING TO BE HELD ON
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1961, AT 10:15 A.M.**

The Secretary of the
Treasury
The Attorney General
The U. S. Ambassador
to the United Nations
The Director, Bureau
of the Budget
The Director, Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Atomic
Energy Commission
The Deputy Secretary
of Defense
The Under Secretary of
State for Economic
Affairs
The Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State
(Charles E. Bohlen)
The Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense (ISA)
The Director, U. S. Infor-
mation Agency

The Deputy Under Secretary
of State
The Counselor, Department
of State
The Special Assistant to the
President for National
Security Affairs
The Special Assistant to the
President for Science
and Technology
The Special Assistant to the
President (Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr.)
The Military Aide to the
President
The Special Counsel to the
President
The Air Force Military
Aide to the Vice
President

For Item 2 only:

The Administrator, Agency for
International Development
The Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

April 27, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Program of Action for Vietnam

Pursuant to your decision at the Cabinet meeting on April 20, 1961, I am submitting for consideration by the National Security Council a program of action to prevent Communist domination of South Vietnam.

This program was prepared by an inter-departmental Task Force consisting of representatives from the Departments of State and Defense, CIA, ICA, USIA and the Office of the President. In addition, the Task Force had the benefit of advice from the Joint Staff, CINCPAC and the Chief, MAAG, Vietnam.

In the short time available to the Task Force, it was not possible to develop the program in complete detail. However, there has been prepared a plan for mutually supporting actions of a political, military, economic, psychological and covert character which can be refined periodically on the basis of further recommendations from the field.

Toward this end, Brigadier General E. G. Lansdale, USAF, who has been designated Operations Officer for the Task Force, will proceed to Vietnam immediately after the program receives Presidential approval. Following on-the-spot discussions with U.S. and Vietnamese officials, he will forward to the Director of the Task Force specific recommendations for action in support of the attached program.

You will be advised of any changes as this program proceeds and be provided status reports on actions as appropriate.

Roswell L. Gilpatric
Roswell L. Gilpatric
Deputy

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Authority ODS ltr 12/13/76
By nmq, NARS, Date 6/17/77

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TASK FORCE
26 April 1961

A Program of Action

To Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam

Appraisal of the Situation: After a meeting in Hanoi on 13 May 1959, the Central Committee of the North Vietnamese Communist Party publicly announced its intention "to smash" the government of President Diem. Following this decision, the Viet Cong have significantly increased their program of infiltration, subversion, sabotage and assassination designed to achieve this end.

At the North Vietnamese Communist Party Congress in September, 1960, the earlier declaration of underground war by the Party's Control Committee was re-affirmed. This action by the Party Congress took place only a month after Kong Le's coup in Laos. Scarcely two months later there was a military uprising in Saigon. The turmoil created throughout the area by this rapid succession of events provides an ideal environment for the Communist "master plan" to take over all of Southeast Asia.

Since that time, as can be seen from the attached map, the internal security situation in South Vietnam has become critical. What amounts to a state of active guerrilla warfare now exists throughout the country. The number of Viet Cong hard-core Communists has increased from 4400 in early 1960 to an estimated 12,000 today. The number of violent incidents

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per month now averages 650. Casualties on both sides totaled more than 4500 during the first three months of this year. 58% of the country is under some degree of Communist control, ranging from harassment and night raids to almost complete administrative jurisdiction in the Communist "secure areas."

The Viet Cong over the past two years have succeeded in stepping up the pace and intensity of their attacks to the point where South Vietnam is nearing the decisive phase in its battle for survival. If the situation continues to deteriorate, the Communists will be able to press on to their strategic goal of establishing a rival "National Liberation Front" government in one of these "secure areas," thereby plunging the nation into open civil war. They have publicly announced that they will "take over the country before the end of 1961."

This situation is thus critical, but is not hopeless. The Vietnamese Government, with American aid, has increased its capabilities to fight its attackers, and provides a base upon which the necessary additional effort can be founded to defeat the Communist attack. Should the Communist effort increase, either directly or as a result of a collapse of Laos, additional measures beyond those proposed herein would be necessary.

In short, the situation in South Vietnam has reached the point where, at least for the time being, primary emphasis should be placed on providing a solution to the internal security problem.

The U.S. Objective: To create a viable and increasingly democratic society in South Vietnam and to prevent Communist domination of the country.

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Concept of Operations: To initiate, on an accelerated basis, a series of mutually supporting actions of a military, political, economic, psychological and covert character designed to achieve this objective. In so doing, it is intended to use, and where appropriate extend, expedite or build upon the existing U.S. and Government of Vietnam (G.V.N.) programs already underway in South Vietnam. There is neither the time available nor any sound justification for "starting from scratch." Rather the need is to focus the U.S. effort in South Vietnam on the immediate internal security problem; to infuse it with a sense of urgency and a dedication to the over-all U.S. objective; to achieve, through cooperative inter-departmental support both in the field and in Washington, the operational flexibility needed to apply the available U.S. assets in a manner best calculated to achieve our objective in Vietnam; and, finally to impress on our friends, the Vietnamese, and on our foes, the Viet Cong, that come what may, the U.S. intends to win this battle.

Program of Action:

1. General: A most significant step taken to counter Communist subversion in South Vietnam has been the development of the Counter-Insurgency Plan. This Plan, (a summary of which is attached as Annex A), which has been fully coordinated within the U.S. government, has been forwarded to President Diem. Those portions of the Plan which are agreed to by the G.V.N. will be implemented as rapidly as possible.

As a part of the overall program, the proposed visit of the Vice President to Vietnam at an early date should be of material assistance in securing the cooperation of President Diem in carrying out the Program.

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2. Political:

a. Assist the G. V. N. under President Diem to develop within the country the widest consensus of public support for a government dedicated to resisting Communist domination.

b. Obtain the political agreements needed to permit prompt SEATO military intervention in South Vietnam should this become necessary to prevent the loss of the country to Communism and expedite the development of plans for such a contingency.

c. Obtain the cooperation of other free nations in the area in support of regional measures designed to inhibit the transit or safe haven of Communist subversive or guerrilla forces operating in South Vietnam. In particular, secure the cooperation of Cambodia and Laos in the implementation of appropriate military and civil measures to prevent the use of their territory for the infiltration of Communist personnel or supplies into South Vietnam. The ultimate achievement of U. S. objectives in Vietnam will depend largely on effectively blocking the land corridors in Laos through which much of the Communist support to the Viet Cong passes. U. S. positions in the negotiations on Laos should take this fact into account.

d. Assist the Vietnamese to become the polarizing spirit against Communism in the Southeast Asia region. Encourage closer working liaison with other anti-Communist Asian nations. Step-up the exchange of visits of political, cultural, civic, military, veterans, youth,

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and labor groups between Vietnam and her neighbors. Increase and systematize existing exchanges of information on Communist agents, couriers, and terrorists between national governments throughout the region.

f. Where restrictions on U.S. operations exist as a result of the 1954 Geneva Agreement, take such measures as may be necessary to prevent them from interfering with the implementation of this program.

3. Military

a. Increase the MAAG as necessary to insure the effective implementation of the military portion of the program including the training of a 20,000 men addition to the present G.V.N. armed forces of 150,000. Initial appraisal of new tasks assigned CHMAAG indicate that approximately 100 additional military personnel will be required immediately, in addition to the present complement of 685.

b. Expand MAAG responsibilities to include authority to provide support and advice to the Self Defense Corps with a strength of approximately 40,000.

c. Authorize MAP support for the entire Civil Guard force of 68,000. (MAP support is now authorized for 32,000; the remaining 36,000 are not now adequately trained and equipped).

d. Install as a matter of priority a radar surveillance capability which will enable the G.V.N. to obtain warning of Communist overflights being conducted for intelligence or clandestine air supply purposes. Initially, this capability should be provided from U.S. mobile radar capability, with permanent AC&W installations established as rapidly as practicable.

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e. Provide MAP support for the Vietnamese Junk Force as a means of preventing Viet-Cong clandestine supply and infiltration into South Vietnam by water, (MAP support, which was not provided in the Counter-Insurgency Plan, will include training of junk crews in Vietnam or at U.S. bases by U.S. Navy personnel).

f. Assist the G.V.N. to establish a Combat Development and Test Center in South Vietnam to develop, with the help of modern technology, new techniques for use against the Viet Cong forces.

4. Economic:

a. The G.V.N. should be assured that the U.S. will provide the additional piaster resources needed for the expanded counter-insurgency effort, including the present 170,000 G.V.N. forces, in excess of those which the G.V.N. itself can provide.

We should continue to encourage G.V.N. as appropriate to (a) increase tax revenues through improved administration and modification of the tax structure (b) use its foreign exchange resources more effectively, and (c) effect a devaluation of the present unrealistic foreign exchange rate.

The precise level of U.S. support of the G.V.N. military budget shall be determined through appropriate negotiations but the guiding principle in these negotiations shall be to insure that the confidence of President Diem in the wholehearted U.S. support of

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the counter-insurgency program is not prejudiced. Within these guidelines, the Country Team should study and recommend realistic steps to ameliorate the adverse economic effects of more generous defense support.

b. Organize functional field teams composed of public administrators, public health officials, educators, agricultural experts, etc., to be sent to pacified areas to undertake, preferably in cooperation with local authorities, a series of simple, inexpensive projects, the benefits of which can be quickly and readily recognized.

c. Review the Buy-American Act to determine whether it would be in the mutual interest of both countries for the President to make an exception in the case of Vietnam.

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5. Psychological

a. Encourage the G.V.N. to continue liberalizing its public information policies to help develop a broad public understanding of the actions required to combat Communist insurgents and to build public confidence in the G.V.N.'s determination and capability to deal with the problem.

b. Assist the G.V.N. to develop and improve the USOM-supported radio network for the country, to include the prompt establishment of the presently planned new stations at Soc Trang, Banmethout and Quang Ngai and the installation of the more powerful, new transmitters now on USOM order for Saigon and Hue.

c. Assist the G.V.N. to initiate a training program for information and press attaches in the various ministries and directorates.

d. Assist the G.V.N. to establish a Press Institute for the training of selected young people for careers in journalism.

e. In cooperation with the MAAG and the Ministry of Defense, make use of the troop information and education program of the G.V.N. armed forces as a channel of communication between the Government and the people in the rural areas.

f. Encourage President Diem to continue the effective "fireside chat" and other getting-to-the-people techniques which were begun during the recent election campaign. Provide maximum press, film, and radio coverage for such appearances.

g. Reorient the programming of the existing USIS bi-national centers so that they can serve as training centers for rural information and educational cadres.

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h. In coordination with the MAAG, CIA, and the G. V. N. Ministry of Defense, compile and declassify for use of media representatives in South Vietnam and throughout the world, documented facts concerning Communist infiltration and terrorists' activities and the measures being taken by the G. V. N. to counter such attacks.

i. In coordination with CIA and the appropriate G. V. N. Ministry, increase the flow of information to media representatives of the unsatisfactory living conditions in North Vietnam.

j. Develop agricultural "show-places" throughout the country, with a view toward exploiting their beneficial psychological effects. This project would be accomplished by combined teams of Vietnamese (Civic Action personnel), Americans (Peace Corps), Filipinos (Operation Brotherhood), and other Free World nationals.

k. Exploit as a part of a planned psychological campaign the rehabilitation of Communist Viet Cong prisoners now held in South Vietnam. Testimony of rehabilitated prisoners stressing the errors of Communism should be beamed to Communist-held areas, including North Vietnam, to induce defections. This rehabilitation program would be assisted by a team of U.S. personnel, including U. S. Army (Civil Affairs, Psychological Warfare, and Counter-Intelligence), USIS, and USOM experts.

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6. Covert Actions:

a. Intelligence: Expand current positive and counter-intelligence operations against Communist forces in South Vietnam and against North Vietnam. These include penetration of the Vietnamese Communist mechanism, dispatch of agents to North Vietnam and strengthening Vietnamese internal security services. Authorization should be given for the use in North Vietnam operations of civilian air crews of American and other nationality, as appropriate, in addition to Vietnamese. Consideration should be given for overflights of North Vietnam for photographic intelligence coverage, using American or Chinese Nationalists crews and equipment as necessary.

b. Communications Intelligence: Expand the current program of interception and direction finding covering Vietnamese Communist communications activities in South Vietnam, as well as North Vietnam targets. Obtain USIB authority to conduct these operations on a fully joint basis, permitting the sharing of results of interception, direction finding, traffic analysis and cryptographic analysis by American agencies with the Vietnamese to the extent needed to launch rapid attacks on Vietnamese Communist communications and command installations.

This program should be supplemented by a program, duly coordinated, of training additional Vietnamese Army units in intercept and direction finding by U.S. Army Security Agency. Also, U.S. Army Security Agency teams could be sent to Vietnam for direct operations, coordinated in the same manner.

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c. Unconventional Warfare:

Expand present operations of the First Observation Battalion in guerrilla areas of South Vietnam, under joint MAAG-CIA sponsorship and direction. This should be in full operational collaboration with the Vietnamese, using Vietnamese civilians recruited with CIA aid.

In Laos, infiltrate teams under light civilian cover to Southeast Laos to locate and attack Vietnamese Communist bases and lines of communications. These teams should be supported by assault units of 100 to 150 Vietnamese for use on targets beyond capability of teams. Training of teams could be a combined operation by CIA and US Army Special Forces. These operations should continue despite a possible cease-fire in Laos.

In North Vietnam, using the foundation established by intelligence operations, form networks of resistance, covert bases and teams for sabotage and light harassment. A capability should be created by MAAG in the South Vietnamese Army to conduct Ranger raids and similar military actions in North Vietnam as might prove necessary or appropriate. Such actions should try to avoid any outbreak of extensive resistance or insurrection which could not be supported to the extent necessary to stave off repression.

Conduct over-flights for dropping of leaflets to harass the Communists and to maintain morale of North Vietnamese population,

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and increase gray broadcasts to North Vietnam for the same purposes.

d. Internal South Vietnam:

Effect operations to penetrate political forces, government, armed services and opposition elements to measure support of government, provide warning of any coup plans, and identify individuals with potentiality of providing leadership in event of disappearance of President Diem.

Build up an increase in the population's participation in and loyalty to free government in Vietnam, through improved communication between the government and the people, and by strengthening independent or quasi-independent organizations of political, syndical, or professional character. Support covertly the G. V. N. in allied and neutral countries, with special emphasis on bringing out G. V. N. accomplishments, to counteract tendencies towards a "political solution" while the Communists are attacking G. V. N. Effect, in support, a psychological program in Vietnam and elsewhere exploiting Communist brutality and aggression in North Vietnam.

e. The expanded program outlined above will require an additional 40 personnel for the CIA station and an increase in the CIA outlay for Vietnam of approximately \$1,500,000 for FY 62, partly compensated by withdrawal of personnel from other areas. The US Army Security

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Agency actions to supplement communications intelligence will require 78 personnel and approximately \$1.2 million in equipment.

7. Funding:

Direct that \$49 million from the FY-62 MAP Contingency Fund be added to the current FY-62 Military Assistance Program for VN to meet this emergency. The current military assistance program for VN of \$60.8 million in FY-62 provides only minimum funds required to maintain existing G. V. N. armed forces of 170,000 and 32,000 of the Civil Guard. In order to provide necessary new equipment, training and other support required for G. V. N. armed forces of 170,000, a Civil Guard of 68,000, and Self Defense Corps of 40,000, an additional \$49 million for MAP is required in FY-62 for a total of about \$110 million. Additional funds will be required for Defense Support to meet the local currency for the G. V. N. military budget (see paragraph 4a).

Estimates to cover the use of the Peace Corps and Operations Brotherhood are being developed.

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8. Follow on Actions

a. Hold a Counter-Insurgency Conference in Saigon of MAAG Chiefs from Southeast Asia countries for the purpose of developing best methods and procedures for mutual support on a regional basis.

b. Authorize the construction of a highway from the Vietnam Coast through Laos to the Mekong as an international "Peace Highway" for the economical betterment of Southeast Asia. Publicly announce plans to eventually extend this "Peace Highway" to Rangoon. In this connection, consider the use of U.S. Army combat engineers to assist in this project.

c. Determine the feasibility of an appeal by Vietnam to the U.N. to provide ground observers to help control subversion and infiltration of South Vietnam by the Communists.

d. Study the need for further possible increases in Vietnamese military strength to meet the growing threat to the security of the G. V. N.

e. Encourage other Free World countries to assist the G. V. N. in achieving its goal of preventing Communist domination of Vietnam.

f. Provide adequate funds for an impressive U.S. participation in the Saigon Trade Fair of 1962.

g. Sponsor the visit of a practical U.S. economic team, drawing heavily on U.S. private industry, to South Vietnam to work out with the Vietnamese effective plans to speed up national development (including goals for each of the next five years) to give Vietnam a better tax

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structure, to establish a sound basis for foreign investment, and to institute specific programs designed to have an early impact upon agricultural areas now vulnerable to Communist take-over.

h. Develop a long-range plan for the economic development of southeast Asia on a regional basis, allocating priority of funds and technical assistance to South Vietnam.

9. Organizational Arrangements:

For purposes of U.S. actions in support of this program, the President hereby declares that Vietnam is a critical area and approves the organizational concept whereby over-all direction, inter-agency coordination and support of the program will be effected through a Presidential Task Force constituted as follows:

Director:	Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric
Operations	
Officer:	Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale
Executive:	Col. Edwin F. Black
Liaison:	Mr. Frank Hand
Defense:	Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Paul H. Nitze
JCS:	Major General C. H. Bonesteel and Colonel R. M. Levy
State:	Deputy Under Secretary Alexis Johnson (or Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Walter P. McConaughy)
ICA:	Mr. William Sheppard
CIA:	Chief, Far East Division, Mr. Desmond FitzGerald
USIA:	Deputy Director Thomas C. Sorensen
Office of the President:	W. W. Rostow

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The Ambassador as head of the Country Team is assigned the authority and the responsibility to see that the Program is carried out in the field and to determine the timing of the actions. He is authorized to advise the Director of the Task Force of any changes which he believes should be made in the Program.

In carrying out his duties while in the field, the Operations Officer of the Task Force will cooperate with the Ambassador and the Country Team.

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ANNEX A

STATUS OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY PLAN FOR VIETNAM

Following is the status of major actions proposed by the Counter-Insurgency Plan:

Military

1. Establish an Emergency Operations Control System.

a. The Internal Security Committee now meets bi-weekly, with the Permanent Security - General having responsibility for implementation of council actions.

b. Executive internal security councils, representing civil and military agencies, have been agreed to at Region and Province levels. G. V. N. will encourage officials at District and Village level to meet frequently, but will not formalize councils.

c. Complete agreement has not been reached on establishment of a logistical command system. G. V. N. has agreed to establish field logistical commands but is uncertain of the type of overall logistical command.

d. G. V. N. has agreed verbally to designate a central headquarters for overall planning and control of all military operations but has not yet formally done so.

e. A decree has been published eliminating the military Regions and designating the three Corps as area commands responsible for counter-insurgency within their areas. Each Corps area will be subdivided into tactical zones and sub-zones, the latter under command of military province chiefs.

2. Implement National Planning, Programming and Budgeting Systems.

G. V. N. has agreed to develop national plans. A national military operations plan has just been completed. Progress is being made on capabilities and requirements plans.

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3. Obtain Optimum Employment of Military Forces.

G. V. N. has appointed a general officer to head a task group to review jointly with MAAG, MAAG's doctrinal study on tactics and techniques of counter-insurgent operations with a view to integrating Vietnamese experience into the doctrine. When this study is completed, this combined doctrine will be applied to field operations.

4. Develop an Effective Intelligence and Counterintelligence Capability.

President Diem has selected a head for the new CIA and his appointment is expected soon. Other improvements in military intelligence training and operations are under way or are included as a part of the 20,000 force increase.

5. Establish an Effective Border/Coastal Patrol.

This plan is still under study although action has been taken to activate, train and employ junk forces for coastal surveillance. MAP support for those forces should appreciably expedite their effectiveness.

6. Develop the Civil Guard into an Effective Security Force.

The Civil Guard has been transferred to the Department of Defense and its Director has been integrated into the General Staff as a Deputy Chief of Staff. Training of Civil Guard began on 9 January 1961 with 300 guardsmen entering training weekly. The first units from the training centers will receive equipment beginning 1 May 1961, prior to entering the final unit training phase. Five Civil Guard battalions have been inspected and tested and determined to be qualified to receive new equipment. This equipment has been issued.

7. Organize 20,000 Man Force Increase for Maximum Effectiveness.

6,000 reserves have been recalled to active duty as the initial increment of the force increase. President Diem

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states he can call no more at this time because of fund limitations. Action in this plan to authorize additional Defense Support funds should alleviate this situation. G. V. N. has agreed to accept the US-proposed activation schedule, with four ranger companies to be activated 1 May 1961 and four every 11 weeks thereafter. Three infantry regiments will also begin activation incrementally beginning 1 May 1961.

Political

1. Basic Reorganization and Decentralization of Government Announced by Diem in February.

Both Diem and Thuan have assured the US Ambassador that reorganization will be announced before Diem's inauguration April 30. Whether this "deadline" will be met or not is not known. Basic reorganization, however, is essential to effective G. V. N. operation and thus to achievement of goals in CIP.

2. Payment for Community Development Labor.

Thuan has stated that non-compensated labor is now used only for village projects where villagers themselves benefit and that on larger projects, e. g., airfield construction, laborers are paid. Thuan agreed that this new policy should be formalized in instructions to province chiefs and publicized, but this has not yet been done.

3. Better G. V. N. -RKG Relations.

The G. V. N. has taken some real steps towards improving its relations with the RKG, e. g., Vice President Tho's meeting with RKG Foreign Minister Tiouloung and implementation of press truce. Diem told the US Ambassador on April 17 that consultations between RKG and G. V. N. province chiefs on both sides of the border were proceeding fairly well. However, there is no indication that Cambodia will agree to effective border cooperation or that G. V. N. is prepared to compromise on financial problem under 1954 Paris Accords in a real effort to induce Cambodian border cooperation.

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4. Encourage Increased Legislative Initiative in National Assembly and more Public Debate.

Thuan has said that the Assembly is encouraged to adopt greater initiative and is doing so. He further agreed that the government would encourage the Assembly to permit the press to attend committee hearings.

5. Encourage National Assembly to Investigate any G. V. N. Department or Agency and Make Results Public.

Thuan has stated that the G. V. N. is willing to have Assembly committees question, in the presence of the press, ministers and other high ranking officials and to propose investigations in special cases but has insisted that the executive branch itself will conduct its own investigations.

6. Surface or Dissolve the Can Lao Party.

It is increasingly obvious that we will probably not obtain G. V. N. agreement to this proposal.

7. Bring into the G. V. N. One or Two Responsible Non-Communist Oppositionists.

In mid-March Diem told the US Ambassador that oppositionists are in the process of realizing that it is in the national interest for them to work more closely with the G. V. N. Diem stated that it was therefore too soon to offer Cabinet posts to any of them, but he indicated that if some non-oppositionists could agree with the basic policy of the G. V. N. he might take them into the government after the election. However, a conversation which he had with Mr. Colby in mid-April offers little hope that Diem will really implement this proposal.

8. Press Attendance at National Assembly Committee Meetings.

This has been agreed to.

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9. Liberalize the Press Code.

A bill for this purpose is to be adopted at the current session of the National Assembly.

10. Provide Greater Freedom of the Press.

Criticisms of G. V. N. by the press is now somewhat more open.

11. Improve Treatment of Domestic and Foreign Press.

Much improvement has been made, with many press conferences by high officials including the President. Foreign press were well treated during the April elections and have been permitted to visit combat areas.

Economic

1. Avoid Imbalance between Medical Doctors in the Military and Civilian Fields.

Drafting of doctors into the army has been stopped.

2. Fiscal Reforms and Assuming greater share of Cost of Military Budget.

G. V. N. has asked USOM to sketch with precision steps to be taken in Fiscal affairs in view of the prospect of increased local expenditures when revenues from sale of foreign aid are declining, due to increasingly greater local self sufficiency. When USOM's ideas have been presented, G. V. N. promises thorough discussion. Meantime G. V. N. is working all possible angles to obtain more defense support aid as well as military hardware, despite increased foreign exchange balances which are now well over 220, 000, 000 in dollars and other hard currencies. Not enough action in fields of taxation and fiscal reforms has been taken.

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3. Export trade.

G. V. N. is continuing to show lively and effective interest to build up export trade and is publicizing results in local press.

4. Economic development.

G. V. N. is pushing ahead with a variety of important development projects, the sum total of which for initiation this year approximates \$110,000,000 in dollars and other foreign currencies for government projects alone; development in the private sector is also accelerating.

5. Development of Civil Police.

G. V. N. is moving slowly to cooperate in civilian security sectors - Police, Sureté, etc.; as in other aid matters, G. V. N. prefers aid to advice.

Psychological

1. Establishment of radio stations.

Radio Soc Trang in the delta area is now under construction and will be in operation in 30 to 45 days. This is a most significant step towards keeping the people informed. Current plans to intensify the signal strength at Radio Soc Trang will enhance the role of this station to meet CIP objectives

2. Military Psywar Capabilities.

Some progress also is reportable towards strengthening ARVN Psywar Directorate capabilities. Particularly noteworthy is activation of Montagnard Psywar company which should be available to support radio information propaganda to mountain tribes by 10KW Banmethuot station now being installed as part of the VTVN network. Also, the Presidency has assured Country Team Psychological Operations Committee it may be possible to strengthen ARVN Psywar capabilities for reaching deep into Delta population by transfer of mobile unit equipment from Vietnamese Information Service. These units should provide additional radio listening facilities to people otherwise cut off even from Radio Soc Trang and thus at the mercy of Viet Cong radio resources. In this

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connection it is important to note that increased signal strength of Radio Soc Trang now under study, as noted above, should effectively inhibit, without jamming, reception of Radio Hanoi (135KW).

3. Surrender of Viet Cong.


First steps have, apparently, also been taken within the G. V. N. to establish a system of rewards for the capture of or for inducing the surrender of Viet Cong cadre. It is hoped that this system will be expanded to include perhaps an amnesty and re-settlement program for defecting Viet Cong, complete with appropriate publicity.

Summary.

In summary the following actions, considered most critically important to the objectives of the Counter-Insurgency Plan, have not received adequate agreement from G. V. N. These should be discussed with President Diem by Vice President Johnson, urging early acceptance.

1. Designate a central headquarters for overall control of all military operations.
2. Organize, with MAAG assistance, an efficient logistical command system.
3. Complete the planned governmental reorganization as early as possible.

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September 4, 1961

Dear Senator Jackson:

I have thought hard about your letter of July 13th, which asks for official memoranda that would be the current equivalent of memoranda submitted by the previous Administration. I find that this is not easy to do, but let me try. The previous Administration wrote out of many years of experience in which it had gradually developed a large and complex series of processes. This Administration has been revising these arrangements to fit the needs of a new President, but the work of revision is far from done, and it is too soon for me to report with any finality upon the matters about which you ask. It seems to me preferable, at this early stage in our work, to give you an informal interim account in this letter.

Much of what you have been told in the reports of the previous Administration about the legal framework and concept of the Council remains true today. There has been no recent change in the National Security Act of 1947. Nor has there been any change in the basic and decisive fact that the Council is advisory only. Decisions are made by the President. Finally, there has been no change in the basic proposition that, in the language of Robert Cutler, "the Council is a vehicle for a President to use in accordance with its suitability to his plans for conducting his great office." As Mr. Cutler further remarked, "a peculiar virtue of the National Security Act is its flexibility," and "each President may use the Council as he finds most suitable at a given time."⁽¹⁾ It is within the spirit of this doctrine that a new process of using the NSC is developing.

The specific changes which have occurred are three. First, the NSC meets less often than it did. There were sixteen meetings in the first six months of the Kennedy Administration. Much

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I know you share my understanding that the National Security Council has never been and should never become the only instrument of counsel and decision available to the President in dealing with the problems of our national security. I believe this fact cannot be overemphasized. It is not easy for me to be sure of the procedures of earlier Administrations, but I have the impression that many of the great episodes of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations were not dealt with, in their most vital aspects, through the machinery of the NSC. It was not in an NSC meeting that we got into the Korean war, or made the Korean truce. The NSC was not, characteristically, the place of decision on specific major budgetary issues, which so often affect both policy and strategy. It was not the usual forum of diplomatic decision; it was not, for example, a major center of work on Berlin at any time before 1961. The National Security Council is one instrument among many; it must never be made an end in itself.

But for certain issues of great moment, the NSC is indeed valuable. President Kennedy has used it for discussion of basic national policy toward a number of countries. He has used it both for advice on particular pressing decisions and for recommendations on long-term policy. As new attitudes develop within the Administration, and as new issues arise in the world, the NSC is likely to continue as a major channel through which broad issues of national security policy come forward for Presidential decision.

Meanwhile the President continues to meet at very frequent intervals with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other officials closely concerned with problems of national security. Such meetings may be as large as an NSC meeting or as small as a face-to-face discussion with a single Cabinet officer. What they have in common is that a careful record is kept, in the appropriate way, whenever a decision is reached.

Where primary responsibility falls clearly to a single Department, the primary record of such decisions will usually be made through that Department. Where the issue is broader, or where the action requires continued White House attention, the decision will be recorded through the process of the National Security Council. Thus the business of the National Security staff goes well beyond what is treated in formal meetings of the National Security Council. It is our purpose, in cooperation with other Presidential staff officers, to meet the President's staff needs throughout the national security area.

The second and more significant change in the administration of the National Security Council and its subordinate agencies is the abolition by Executive Order 10920 of the Operations Coordinating Board. This change needs to be understood both for what it is and for what it is not. It is not in any sense a downgrading of the tasks of coordination and follow-up; neither is it an abandonment of Presidential responsibility for these tasks. It is rather a move to eliminate an instrument that does not match the style of operation and coordination of the current Administration.

From the point of view of the new Administration, the decisive difficulty in the OCB was that without unanimity it had no authority. No one of its eight members had authority over any other. It was never a truly Presidential instrument, and its practices were those of a group of able men attempting, at the second and third levels of government, to keep large departments in reasonable harmony with each other. Because of good will among its members, and unusual administrative skill in its secretariat, it did much useful work; it also had weaknesses. But its most serious weakness, for the new Administration, was simply that neither the President himself nor the present Administration as a whole conceives of operational coordination as a task for a large committee in which no one man has authority. It was and is our belief that there is much to be done that the OCB could not do, and that the things it did do can be done as well or better in other ways.

The most important of these other ways is an increased reliance on the leadership of the Department of State. It would not be appropriate for me to describe in detail the changes which the

Department of State has begun to execute in meeting the large responsibilities which fall to it under this concept of administration. It is enough if I say that the President has made it very clear that he does not want a large separate organization between him and his Secretary of State. Neither does he wish any question to arise as to the clear authority and responsibility of the Secretary of State, not only in his own Department, and not only in such large-scale related areas as foreign aid and information policy, but also as the agent of coordination in all our major policies toward other nations.

The third change in the affairs of the NSC grows out of the first two and has a similar purpose. We have deliberately rubbed out the distinction between planning and operation which governed the administrative structure of the NSC staff in the last Administration. This distinction, real enough at the extremes of the daily cable traffic and the long-range assessment of future possibilities, breaks down in most of the business of decision and action. This is especially true at the level of Presidential action. Thus it seems to us best that the NSC staff, which is essentially a Presidential instrument, should be composed of men who can serve equally well in the process of planning and in that of operational follow-up. Already it has been made plain, in a number of cases, that the President's interests and purposes can be better served if the staff officer who keeps in daily touch with operations in a given area is also the officer who acts for the White House staff in related planning activities.

Let me turn briefly, in closing, to the role of the Presidential staff as a whole, in national security affairs. This staff is smaller than it was in the last Administration, and it is more closely knit. The President uses in these areas a number of officers holding White House appointments, and a number of others holding appointments in the National Security Council staff. He also uses ~~extensively~~ the staff of the Bureau of the Budget. These men are all staff officers. Their job is to help the President, not to supersede or supplement any of the high officials who hold line responsibilities in the executive departments and agencies. Their task is that of all staff officers: to extend the range and enlarge the direct effectiveness of the man they serve.

- 5 -

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Sincerely,

McGeorge Bundy

The Honorable Henry M. Jackson
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

4

September 4, 1961

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Sincerely,

McGeorge Bundy

The Honorable Henry M. Jackson
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

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Authority NSC 66 4/21/77
By MMG, NARS, Date 5/4/77

COPY NO. 2

DRAFT RECORD OF ACTIONS

480th NSC Meeting

(4/29/61)

The President presided at this meeting. The Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, participated in the actions below. The Attorney General; the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Under Secretary of State; the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; the U. S. Ambassador to Thailand; the Under Secretary of State (Economic Affairs); the Assistant Secretary of State (Far Eastern Affairs); the Assistant Secretary of State (U. N. Affairs); The Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology; the Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Counselor, Department of State; the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA); the Chief of MAAG in Viet Nam; the Deputy Director, J-3 (Operations), Joint Chiefs of Staff; the U. S. Ambassador to Viet Nam; the Special Counsel to the President; Mr. John Steeves, Department of State; Mr. John Siegenthaler, Department of Justice; the Military Aide to the President; the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC; and Mr. Bromley Smith, NSC Staff, attended the meeting.

1. U. S. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO LAOS

- a. Discussed the situation with respect to Laos, including the considerations involved in various alternative courses of action.
- b. Agreed to undertake certain military and diplomatic measures before the next meeting of the National Security Council on Monday, May 1, including consultations on the progress of the cease-fire negotiations, on the International Control Commission, and on possible action in the UN and SEATO.

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2. U. S. POLICY IN VIET NAM

(Memo for the President from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, subject: "Program of Action for Viet Nam", dated April 27, 1961)

*Memo
in envelope*
Action Memo
sent to
Defense and
Treasury

- a. Approved paragraphs 3-a through -a, 6-b and 6-a of the enclosure to the reference memorandum, without public announcement of these measures at this time.
- b. Agreed that the Task Force, which prepared the enclosure to the reference memorandum with the addition of a representative of the Department of the Treasury, should prepare a revision of the enclosure to the reference memorandum for further consideration by the National Security Council.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6

MEMORANDUM

DATE: 28 April 1961

TO: Mr. Johnson

FROM: Colonel Burris

RE: NSC Meeting, Saturday April 29

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Sec. 11/11/76
By rmg, NARS, Date 5/10/77

The principal subject for discussion at the Saturday NSC meeting is the report of the Department of Defense task force group, sometimes referred to as the Gilpatric Report. As you will recall, Mr. Bowles asked at the Thursday meeting that consideration of the report be deferred in order to permit further study by State. Apparently, considerable objections have arisen in State over the assignment of primary responsibility for the study as well as implied primary responsibility for the overall effort to Defense. Apparently, State feels that sufficient emphasis has not been accorded to the political importance of this mission.

According to Mr. Bundy's office, members of the Security Council have considerable interest in reactions of the Legislative Branch to Thursday's presentation. You will be expected to reflect these views in Saturday's discussions.

Although not listed as an Agenda item, it is expected that the situation in Laos will be discussed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 28, 1961

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in the
Cabinet Room of The White House
on Saturday, April 29, 1961
at 10:30 a.m.

In addition to the Statutory Members and Advisers, the following are being invited to attend this meeting: The Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology; the Deputy Under Secretary of State; the Counselor, Department of State; the U. S. Ambassador to Viet Nam; the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA); the Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Adviser to the President for Para-Military Affairs; the Chief of MAAG in Viet Nam; and the Military Aide to the President.

U. S. POLICY IN VIET NAM

(Draft Record of Actions of 479th NSC Meeting, Item 2-a)

The report on "A Program of Action to Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam", prepared by a Task Force under the Deputy Secretary of Defense and discussed on a preliminary basis at the April 27 meeting of the Council, will be considered. Any member of the Council having a specific objection to the report will be expected to propose alternative language.

* * * * *

NOTE

Another meeting of the Council is scheduled for Thursday, May 4, 1961, at 10:00 a.m., for discussion of U. S. Policy Toward Cuba. Papers for discussion at this meeting should be delivered to the NSC Secretariat not later than noon, Tuesday, May 2, for circulation to the Council.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC Doc 4/24/77

By mcg, NARS, Date 5/1/77

480th NSC Meeting

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Brig Gen J.H. Polk		X I-18414/61		I-18431/61	
FROM Policy Ping/3E283/72247		LOG NO.			
CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET		DATE 26 April 1961			
C. R.					
C. P.	Cy 2:		Cy 3:		
REFERRED	Mr. Williams		Mr. Rowen		
ISSUE DATE	4/26/61		4/26/61		
DUE DATE					
SUBJECT Latin American Projects:					
1. Cuban Freedom Brigade; 2. U.S. Guarantees Against					
External Aggression in LA; 3. Internal Security in LA;					
4. Western Hemisphere Security Force;					
& Policy Towards Cuba.					
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				CONTROL REFERENCE	

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 94-283 NW-028-4-7-1
By etv, NARA Date 7-22-96
8-28-13

CUBAN FREEDOM BRIGADE

April 25, 1961

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

To assess the political and military implications of introducing Cuban exiles into the U.S. Armed Forces, or forming a Freedom Brigade.

ASSUMPTIONS

1. Extra-Continental, Sino-Soviet influence in Cuba, Article 6, Pact of Rio, is a "fact or situation" which endangers the peace of America. The United States will undertake to assist the people of Cuba in reasserting their political independence.
2. The Organization of American States will be unwilling as a body to concert with the United States in armed action against Cuba; but one or two American states will act with the United States under the spirit of the Declaration of Washington, 1951, and Resolution 93 of the Tenth International Conference of American States, Caracas, 1954, which recognize that aggression by international communism ending in the domination or control of American states constitutes a threat endangering the peace of America.
3. U.S. armed action, either unilateral or in concert with other states, will be designed to free the Cuban people to choose their own government under their own constitution, but a period of time will be required after the defeat of Castro to set in motion the re-establishment of free institutions; a Free Cuba force in-being could assist and reduce the time of post-Castro occupation.
4. U.S. interests will be served by the creation of a Free Cuba force, either in or out of the U.S. Armed Forces, provided it is employed in battle before the corrosive element of delay destroys its effectiveness.

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Page 1 of 10 Pages

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5. Any armed intervention in Cuba by the United States, with other States or by itself, will cause adverse public reaction in many quarters; adverse reaction will be mitigated if action is taken under the OAS, but in any case, adverse reaction against the United States will be mitigated to the extent that it is clear that the United States is fighting for and with democratic Cubans.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

Sufficient legal authority exists to constitute, equip, arm, train and pay Cuban exiles who are brought into U.S. armed forces by draft or enlistment, or who are constituted into either a Free Cuba Brigade without the status of official armed forces of a state, or into a cadre of future forces of Free Cuba which is officially sanctioned by a government-in-exile of Free Cuba. There are legal difficulties, but they are not insurmountable.

There are approximately 5,000 male Cuban exiles of military age who are the raw material of any force to be so constituted.

All aliens, except diplomats and students, must register for the draft six months after entry into the United States. Those who register with proof as intending to be permanent residents are eligible immediately to be drafted, while those who do not register as permanent residents, are eligible one year after entry into the United States for the draft.

Aliens who register as intending to remain permanently do not necessarily have to wait to be drafted. They may enlist, providing they can pass a security test.

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Most Cuban Exiles of military age desire to return to Cuba; almost all of them who are "middle class", desire fervently to return to a free Cuba, and are not interested in service in the Armed Forces of the United States. They will willingly meet their military obligation under the laws of the United States but they are, at heart, Cubans.

The United States has not yet found a formula for the creation of a Freedom Corps which has been completely successful. Recent attempts of the Lodge Act, 1950, the Volunteer Freedom Corps Act of 1951, and the Army Labor Service Organization, have been only partially successful.

There are numerous examples, on the other hand, of successful Volunteer Corps. General de Gaulle's Free French are famous, as is General Vlasov's Brigade. All of the democratic western nations occupied by the Nazis were represented by Volunteer Corps during World War II. In addition to General Vlasov's Brigade, the Nazis made good use of the Spanish Blue Division. General Ander's Polish Legion gave a good account of itself in World War II, as did the Israeli who fought with the British during that war.

DISCUSSION

There are three distinct alternative methods of utilization of Cuban Exiles for present military purposes. The advantages and disadvantages of each are discussed below.

The first alternative is to draft or enlist them into the U.S. Armed Forces. The following advantages apply:

1. Exiles will receive first-class training and discipline in the Army, Navy, Air Force or Marines.

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2. Exiles will associate with U.S. citizens who are among the best "salesmen of democracy" the United States has.

3. Inclusion in U.S. Armed Forces is probably the least expensive choice that exists.

4. Completion of military duty will expedite absorption of exiles who intend to remain in the United States into the American way of life.

5. Absorption into U.S. Armed Forces is legal and will be accepted as such abroad. Cuban exiles are refugees who must be in the United States one year before they can be voluntarily inducted.

To the first alternative there are disadvantages:

1. Cuban Exiles will tend to lose their identity as Cubans and will serve in parts of the world foreign to them.

2. Most Cuban Exiles do not want to become soldiers of the United States, and their motivation is not best served by this alternative; they want to return to Cuba.

3. Cubans now in Cuba will not be motivated to escape Castro to join the Armed Forces of the United States.

4. Time will be lost by this method, if the United States intends to constitute an all-Cuban force.

5. There is little or no foreign propaganda advantage to the U.S. in this method.

6. Cubans cannot become officers in the Armed Forces of the United States; citizenship is a basic requirement. Development of officer capability is a critical requirement to an effective Cuban force.

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The second alternative is to form a Free Cuba Corps or a Freedom Brigade.

There are advantages:

1. Guerrillas already in place in Cuba and now in training could be declared members of this Corps, or could declare themselves members of it.
2. The purposes of anti-Castro resistance would be militantly manifested in a positive way.
3. Cuban identity would be retained for anti-Castro fighters.
4. A Cuban force would be available for overt attribution as a democratic rallying point.
5. A Cuban force would be readied for OAS use, should that organization break with Castro/Communist Cuba, and prepared for action should the United States act unilaterally, or in concert with other American states.
6. Guerrillas now occupy territory in Cuba and, as members of a Free Cuba Corps, could help give factual and legal credence to the right of a Provisional Cuban Government to be recognized by the United States, particularly if the Free Cuba Corps were a viable force.
7. A Free Cuba Corps would perhaps attract further defections from Cuba, both in and out of Castro's forces.
8. A Free Cuba Corps would permit the placement of Officers in a fighting body, a step precluded in the first alternative.
9. A Free Cuba Corps could aid materially in relieving U.S. Armed Forces from occupation duty after a defeat of Castro.

Disadvantages to the second alternative are:

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1. There are probably an insufficient number of trained Cuban Officers to command it.
2. There are legal difficulties which could delay organization of the Free Cuba Corps unless high priority were given to their resolution.
3. A Free Cuba Corps needs legal coloring. The best employment of a Free Cuba Corps would be as official forces of a recognized Provisional Government which could ask for individual action by the United States and other states prior to consultation, under the Pact of Rio, 1947. However, a Provisional Government requires unity and Cuban Exiles find difficulty even in participating in a Revolutionary Council.
4. A Free Cuba Corps would require special U.S. training areas and a number of specially detailed U.S. officers from all U.S. Armed Forces; this procedure will take time for resolution of the necessary administrative and logistical problems.
5. A Free Cuba Corps could not be expected to assist materially in the military defeat of Castro which will require an appreciable commitment of U.S. Armed Forces, although it could assist in drawing off Castro forces from principal areas of attack, and could materially assist in occupation.
6. A Free Cuba Corps would be a major embarrassment to the United States if it were not employed against Castro; it should not be constituted until U.S. policy concerning its location, status, and employment were resolved.

The third alternative is to form the cadre of the future Armed Forces of Cuba. The advantages of this alternative are:

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1. With or without the organization and recognition of a Provisional Government of Cuba, the overthrow of Castro and the rehabilitation of Cuba will require secure, trained, and responsible Armed Forces during and after the occupation of Cuba. They will be needed the moment victory is assured to maintain the security of a free Cuba and, therefore, must be trained in advance of victory for this duty. The foundation of a cadre would be advantageous to our interests in securing a stable post-Castro Cuba.

2. The cadre technique recognizes the need to train an Officer and non-commissioned Officer Corps and has the advantage of rotating trainees from one command position to another, from line to staff function, from one echelon of responsibility to another.

3. The cadre technique begins with military reality by assuming that no participant is ready to assume command responsibility over entire units, and has the advantage of gradually building confidence within the cadre.

4. No Officer of man is assigned permanently to a position until he has proven to himself and to others that he is the best man for the assignment; this technique leads to competition and the recognition of the principle of proven merit, and was the basis for the professional development of the Nazi Armed Forces. The technique has relevance in overcoming the Cuban tendency to elevate officers of wealth and family who are not necessarily qualified to command.

5. The cadre technique has the advantage of keeping personnel mobile and permitting them to move from one training assignment to another, utilizing specialized training installations already in being.

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6. The cadre technique implies a definite U.S. commitment to utilize the future Armed Forces of Free Cuba and will assist Cuban personnel in thinking responsibly of their individual futures, as well as that of Cuba.

There are disadvantages to the cadre technique:

1. Many Cuban Exiles will not desire to commit themselves to a military career.

2. The cadre technique sacrifices immediate combat unit esprit de corps for a later, improved, professional force.

3. The cadre technique postpones an appreciation of the worth of personnel and organization which will later be brought together; there is no way to determine professional competence in the early stages.

4. The cadre technique complicates the present problem of handling guerrillas in Cuba, by removing Cuban officers from guerrilla Base Headquarters in order to train them elsewhere.

5. The cadre technique is best employed when based upon traditions of a service which give officers the strength to step down in status for the good of that service; no such tradition exists among Cuban Exiles.

6. The cadre technique requires a Government in being at the same time as the cadre is formed; otherwise, future armed forces will be trained without having legal status; it is not certain that a Provisional Government could be formed, and if formed, recognized.

The three alternatives are all based upon the assumption that the U.S. is committed to assist free Cubans who will fight Castro. If and when that assumption become false, free Cubans involved in a U.S. program will become an embarrassment to the U.S. Therefore, none of these alternatives should

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be adopted unless U.S. long-range policy is firm.

The political implications of all three alternatives are that the U.S. intends to use force to defeat Castro, although timing of attack and extent of U.S. involvement are not narrowly implied.

Acceptance of the two latter alternatives implies U.S. acceptance of an appreciable amount of negative reaction from within and outside the Hemisphere. It also implies that the speech of the President of the United States before the American Society of Newspaper Editors is an expression of U.S. policy which is now being implemented, putting all contracting members of OAS on notice that U.S. considers Cuba to be Communist dominated and that a factual situation exists "endangering the peace of America", which the U.S. has pledged to oppose.

The acceptance of these same alternatives implies willingness to proceed against Castro outside the mechanism of the OAS, if necessary. Several Latin American States friendly to the U.S. will be subjected to increased pressure from the left, and a decision by these states to participate with the U.S. in concerted armed action against Castro will require great political courage by them.

The military implications will include an assessment by the USSR and Castro that a later attack by the U.S. can be expected in Cuba, inasmuch as a force of Cuban exiles cannot by themselves overthrow Castro. A military buildup will be accelerated in Cuba.

The USSR can anticipate the maintenance by the U.S. of a joint force, ready and committed to invade Cuba. This might lead to further pressure by the USSR in other countries of the world, depending upon its military estimate of the situation.

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A policy of open support of Cuban Exiles for military purposes implies a future commitment to the people of Cuba to assist them in the post-Castro period, including the establishment of a free Government and the holding of free national elections.

Support of Cuban Exiles and their organization into a military unit can best be accomplished in conjunction with the formation of a Provisional Cuban Government, giving legal form to the existence of a Cuban Free Force. This would make it legally possible for the Provisional Government to call upon the U.S. for assistance under the Pact of Rio, 1947, which authorizes individual assistance when called upon. Guerrillas in Cuba should be supported not only for moral reasons, but to establish de facto control of territory for the Provisional Government.

CONCLUSIONS:

The adoption of the first alternative, to draft, enlist, or include Cuban Exiles into U.S. Armed Forces, is not a solution best serving U.S. interest at this time. Cuban Exiles in general, will not join U.S. Armed Forces.

The second alternative, to form a free Cuba Corps, should be adopted immediately; it should include all guerrillas in and out of Cuba, under the nominal but not exclusive direction of the Revolutionary Council.

If and when the Provisional Government is announced as established, the cadre technique should be instituted for those Cubans who are suited for a lifetime career as professional military persons, and who desire such a career. This will lay the base for a western oriented and professional military organization for free Cuba.

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PLAN FOR CUBA

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 94-277 appeal
By sig, NARA Date 12-17-96

Problem:

To remove the threat to the United States and to the hemisphere posed by the Soviet-dominated Castro regime in a manner which will advance rather than injure our other hemispheric and world-wide interests.

Among possible future courses of action toward Cuba, two strategic alternatives stand out. We can adopt a short term strategy of eliminating the Castro regime in the relatively near future, or a long term strategy of isolation and containment which might ultimately lead to change of regime, but would in any case make the present one relatively impotent beyond its own borders.

This paper does not elect between the strategies. It recommends that we undertake painstaking intelligence estimates and other studies before making an irrevocable choice. Such choice need not be made in the immediate future, since it is possible for the time being to prepare for the implementation of either strategy. An ultimate choice in favor of the long term strategy could, however, be prejudiced by the style and precipitateness with which we might implement certain of the paper's recommendations.

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Discussion:

The complete defeat of the volunteer Cuban liberation force which had been encouraged by the United States and covertly assisted with training, equipment, and transportation strengthened Castro internally, weakened the morale of anti-Castro forces in Cuba and elsewhere and gravely damaged United States prestige. Part of the lost ground has been recovered by a declaration of President Kennedy on April 20 to the effect that if it should ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of non-interference merely concealed or excused a policy of non-action, and if the nations of the Hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration, the United States Government would not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations, which are the security of our nation. The world is now waiting to see what the United States will do.

Action to correct the intolerable Cuban situation - which for practical purposes means the overthrow of the Castro regime - must be taken if communist penetration of the hemisphere and the disastrous drain on United States prestige in the world are to be stemmed. Yet the situation is not so bad but that ill-considered, poorly-timed action would not make it infinitely worse.

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It could disrupt the OAS. It could turn most of Latin America against us. It could weaken our position in other areas. It could trigger a World War.

Recommendations Concerning Courses of Action:

Whatever decisive measures may in due course be decided upon to bring about the downfall of the Castro regime it is clear that three courses should forthwith be pursued vigorously:

- 1) Implementation of the Alliance for Progress,
- 2) Development of a realistic, sound and honest moral posture based upon the President's April 20 statement, which must be able to withstand before world opinion and in the U.N., the distortions of an all-out Communist propaganda offensive and provide the justification for progressively more drastic actions against Castro.

- 3) Develop the

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- 3) Develop the fullest and most accurate intelligence possible on the attitude of the Cuban people towards Castro. Such intelligence is essential before deciding upon possible courses of decisive action. If a majority is opposed to Castro, we must find the best means of helping the majority to overthrow him. If a majority support Castro and what he stands for, the problem will be far more difficult and military action would be undesirable as leading to a prolonged occupation of a hostile population with serious consequences elsewhere. If that is the case, slower methods such as quarantine and efforts to change the views of the maximum number of Cubans, would be indicated.

Individual consultation with the other American Governments has been in progress since April 23 to ascertain their views towards the best means of removing the menace to hemispheric peace and security caused by the intrusion of extra-continental power into Cuba. The consultation is designed to ascertain whether the other Governments recognize the nature of this menace, whether they recognize the distinction between "intervention" in the internal affairs of another state and defense against a widening area of domination by extra-hemispheric powers, and their attitude toward OAS action or

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action or possible narrower collective or unilateral action. Effective action through the OAS if it can be secured would obviously be desirable. Many American Governments, however, while privately expressing the hope that the U.S. will act unilaterally, quickly and decisively to overthrow Castro, continue reluctant to stand up publicly and be counted and would in varying measure publicly criticize such U.S. Action. Nevertheless, OAS consideration would be desirable provided that we have a clear view of the results desired and reasonable expectations that we would have the votes to obtain them.

If the recommended approach to the OAS yields nothing in the way of tangible support for us on the Cuba problem, we will still be able to consider moving unilaterally against Castro in support of the Cuban rebels, if that is what we want to do. Other recommended actions insure that the intervening time will not be lost.

Courses of Action:

I. U.S. should unilaterally, without awaiting outcome of other actions:

1. Push ahead energetically with the Alliance for Progress, including, as soon as funds are available, implementation of readied housing and other projects giving visible proof that

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it is being implemented.

2. Establish a strong moral posture commanding the respect of unbiased opinion everywhere based on steady development of the themes in the President's April 20 statement and including the following elements:
 - a. U.S. love of and willingness to fight for "freedom".
 - b. Recognition that the U.S. faces a world-wide relentless struggle against an expansionist Sino-Soviet bloc, including its use of non-military aggression.
 - c. U.S. has long since abandoned "intervention" in the internal affairs of its neighbors and cannot tolerate the intervention of extra-continental powers such as has occurred in Cuba.
 - d. U.S. objective is to see the Cuban people freed from alien domination and free to choose their own government and forms of economic and social development.
3. Maintain active overt and covert psychological campaign designed to weaken Castro in Cuba and outside.
 - a. Make an official public statement - to which other American

Governments

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Governments could subscribe - setting forth our liberal aspirations for a post-Castro Cuba in the political, economic and social fields.

- b. Formulate and announce concrete measures which the U.S. contemplates to assist the Cuban people and economy after Cuba is again free.
 - c. See that Campaign is fully and continuously coordinated between State, USIA, CIA and DOD.
4. a. Apply the Trading with the Enemy Act to Cuba.
- b. Consider gradual reduction, through amendment of existing regulations, of the export of foods and medicines to Cuba.
5. Continue to give open encouragement to the Cuban liberation movement both in Cuba and outside.
6. Continue to assist Cuban liberation efforts by covertly:
- a. Training Cuban freedom fighters, especially for guerrilla service in Cuba. (They are the indispensable component for any plan to oust Castro.)
 - b. Arming Cuban freedom fighters inside Cuba.
 - c. Supporting Cuban underground capabilities for intensified sabotage of

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sabotage of Cuban economy.

d. Encouraging defections.

7. Develop study in depth of vulnerabilities of Castro regime and possible courses of action to exploit them, and of strengths and means of countering them.
8. Develop fullest possible intelligence on
 - a. Degree of support Castro enjoys among Cuban people and why.
 - b. Castro's military strength.
9. Intensify measures to provide assistance to any Latin American country requesting help in defending itself against armed attack or subversion by Castroism. Implement existing programs and accelerate surveys of requirements of governments where this is a particular problem.
10. Establish system of surveillance in Caribbean to identify and frustrate armed assistance to subversive movements in other countries.
11. Deport known non-U. S. Castro agents from U. S.
12. Develop and hold in readiness military plans for forcible overthrow of Castro by
 - a. Overt U. S. action, whether alone or assisted by Latin American countries.
 - b. Covert

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- 8 -

b. Covert support of Cuban action sufficient to accomplish objectives.

13. Should any Latin American country offer to mediate differences between U.S. and Cuba, accept offer but only subject to Cuba's severance of relations with Sino-Soviet bloc and agreement to hold OAS-supervised elections.

II. Redefine and reinterpret what constitutes aggression and what constitutes legal governments. We should elaborate a new doctrine in close association with certain Latin Americans and other friendly powers, which would spell out the concepts embodied in the President's speech of April 20. Such an interpretation of our obligations under the UN and OAS Charters is needed to enable us to justify publicly the actions which might be necessary to deal with Communist takeovers from within a country. In this connection, we should consider recognizing and mobilizing support for a Cuban Government in exile as an alternative to Castro.

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- III.- 1. With all deliberate speed carry on consultations with each Latin American Government regarding a possible Meeting of Foreign Ministers, either under the Rio Treaty or the OAS Charter, to consider a resolution calling on Cuba to:
- a. Allow free exercise of normal civil rights and prepare for elections under OAS supervision.
 - b. Give effect to its OAS commitments with respect to communism.
2. If result of consultation is reasonably promising, request Meeting of Foreign Ministers.
3. Seek in Meeting of Foreign Ministers as wide agreement as possible on a line of specific sanctions, as follows, designed to quarantine Cuba in the Hemisphere, if Cuba refuses to heed call mentioned in 1 above:
- a. Breaking of diplomatic relations with Cuba.
 - b. Expel or exclude Castro regime from OAS.
 - c. Economic sanctions.
 - d. Support for armed effort to liberate Cuba if Meeting is willing to this far.

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4. Propose collective OAS quarantine against Dominican Republic similar to that against Cuba on grounds of interventionist activities and manifest suppression of human rights.

IV. If support of collective OAS action under III is insufficient to isolate Cuba in Hemisphere, seek to get informal agreement among as many Latin American countries as possible on course of sanctions mentioned in III - 3 - a, c, and d.

V. Upon completion of III and IV but not before, unless future developments so require, take decision as to whether danger to U.S. security is sufficiently great to resort to force to overthrow Castro in spite of our international commitments, and if so, whether action should be overt or covert. Then carry out action at earliest possible date.

VI. All planning and operations under this plan should be examined in the light of the repercussions their implementation would have in the U.N.

VII. Keep NATO, or principal NATO allies, informed of major U.S. decisions and actions under 1 to IV above, and at

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- 11 -

appropriate time seek their cooperation in the application of economic measures against the Castro regime.

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April 26, 1961

STRENGTHENING FREEDOM IN THE AMERICAS

Problem

To take effective measures for coping with the threat of Castro-Communism in the Western Hemisphere, in the light of the Cuban exiles' failure to overthrow Castro and restore freedom in Cuba.

Discussion

The failure of the recent attempt of Cuban exiles to end Castroism in Cuba by force of arms has tightened the grip of Castro's dictatorship. His perpetuation in power continues the operation of an important agency of Communist penetration and subversion in the countries of Latin America.

The United States is confronted by the problem of (1) turning back and defeating attempts to extend Castroism in this Hemisphere, and (2) restoring democratic government and effective national independence in Cuba. But we should not let our chagrin at the recent events in Cuba distract us from our long-term objective in Latin America.

That objective is to build a free, prosperous, and stable Hemisphere. This requires economic development, social progress, and a greater part in the processes of government for the mass of the people in the countries of Latin America. We want to create on their part a greater stake in and commitment to the organized society in which they live.

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Authority State Dec 4/9/77
By smg, NARS, Date 6/17/77

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Significant progress towards the basic United States objective will take time. It will require effort in the Latin American countries and assistance from outside. During the period in which this work of construction and development is undertaken and carried out, it will be necessary to maintain in Latin America those conditions of peace and order in which the hard work of progress can take place.

In Cuba, a totalitarian dictatorship is in power. Here we are confronted with a threshold question: What is the nature and immediacy of the threat posed by the Castro regime -- is it such a clear and present danger to the safety of the United States as to require emergency action including the use of force? Or is that regime a painful and infecting "thorn in the flesh, rather than a dagger pointed at the heart?" The two situations are different, warranting different responses, and indeed requiring, from the legal and political point of view, different responses.

The Castro regime today constitutes an intrusion of Soviet Communism into the Western Hemisphere. It does not at this time threaten armed attack against the United States. While the conclusion is not so clear, it apparently does not presently threaten such attack against any of the American republics either. It does, however, threaten them with Communist penetration, subversion, and the establishment of further totalitarian regimes.

At the time of the Cuban exiles' landings, the situation was not considered such as to require the action of United States armed forces in a direct effort to overthrow Castro. In commenting on the landings, the President said April 21: "Any

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unilateral armed intervention in the absence of an external attack upon ourselves or an ally would have been contrary to our traditions and to our international obligations." The situation does not appear to have changed so materially in the intervening period as to require a different conclusion now.

In the absence of such an attack, we are bound by the Charters of the United Nations, and the Organization of American States and by the rules of international law to refrain from a unilateral resort to the use of armed force. For the United States to break, as the result of deliberate calculation, these fundamental treaty and other international obligations, would be destructive of our position in this Hemisphere, and would have grave effects world-wide.

We should, of course, engage in a continuing reassessment of the situation so that, if we should at any time change our estimate, we could then take measures accordingly.

Given the above assessment of the situation at the present time, we should pursue in relation to Cuba a variety of measures designed to encourage anti-Castro elements, to make the maintenance of its rule more difficult for the Castro regime, and to prepare the way for the eventual restoration of freedom and independence to Cuba. But it must be remembered that these measures are subordinate to and must be designed to fit the context of a greatly enlarged and speeded up program for social and economic development and progress in Latin America at large. It is therefore important to avoid measures in regard to Cuba which would (a) tend to interfere with the carrying-out of the overall United States program in Latin America when gradual

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but steady progress was being made, or (b) operate in practice to involve the United States in a resort to forcible measures at a time when the actual situation was not such as to call for such action.

It must be recognized that this approach will take time, especially with respect to Cuba.

Recommendations:

1. That the United States reiterate its firm guaranty under Article 3 of the Rio Treaty to meet an armed attack against any of the American republics, which the treaty provides "shall be considered as an attack against all."

2. That a coordinated program be developed against Communist infiltration and subversion in the American republics, including a system of surveillance in the Caribbean to identify and frustrate armed assistance from Cuba to subversive movements in other countries.

3. That further economic pressures be applied against the Castro regime, including controls available under the Trading-with-the-Energy Act, cessation of imports, and of remaining exports.

4. That a stepped-up program of information and propaganda be directed at Cuba and the other American republics; this would emphasize our liberal aspirations and our efforts at Latin American development, and would present tangible measures which the United States contemplates to assist the Cuban people and economy when Cuba is again free.

5. That we move ahead with all urgency on the Alianza Para Progreso as the basic economic and social program for Latin America designed to produce

progress

progress, freedom and stability in the Hemisphere.

6. Procedures: Most of the above recommendations may be pursued unilaterally. It is important, however, to build a vividly perceived sense of community among the nations of the Hemisphere in pursuit of our objectives. To this end we should

a. Intensify systematic consultation and exchange of views with Latin American governments both in Washington and in the capitals.

b. To the extent possible, we should secure the cooperation and joint action of other nations of the Hemisphere in pursuit of the courses of action outlined above.

c. It would of course be desirable to have OAS action on these lines, but only if careful canvass of the situation indicates that meaningful action can be obtained. On the other hand, resort to the OAS which fails to achieve substantial action will be generally construed as a diplomatic defeat for the U.S.

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