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April 24, 1961

**MEMORANDUM FOR PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND VICE PRESIDENT JOHNSON:**

This memorandum is submitted in compliance with your request for my suggestions for enhancing our capability for conducting limited war. These views are presented with full awareness that they are those of a civilian without professional competence in military strategy or tactics.

The expression "limited war" could refer to either the geographic area of the operation or the weapons employed, or both. This memorandum relates to a possible conflict utilizing conventional weapons in a restricted area, commonly called a "brush-fire" war.

It is manifestly impossible and economically undesirable for us to undertake to match the Soviet bloc in the numerical strength of ground forces. Granted this imbalance in numbers, it is exceedingly difficult to be finite about the number of divisions we should maintain on active duty to deal with emergency situations. The three STRAC divisions within the United States constitute our only Army force immediately available for deployment, except for the possible redeployment of the five divisions in Germany, the two in Korea or the one in Hawaii.

When the Marine Corps was reduced from 200,000 to 175,000 men, two battalion landing teams were inactivated within each of the three Marine Corps divisions. Although there has been a partial restoration, the Marine Corps needs about 15,000 men above the 3,000 increase already recommended by the President to bring its units up to full Table of Organization strength.

If a conventional-type combat in any foreseeable trouble spot should require the commitment of a substantial part of these units, additional ground forces, trained and equipped for immediate deployment, are highly desirable not only to assure victory, but to retain our posture of readiness and flexibility.

We know all too well the time required to create and train any additional combat-ready divisions to replace the deployed STRAC or Marine divisions.

For the first time in our history, practically all of the personnel of the National Guard units have had the benefit of the six months basic training with Army units. This trained personnel is now in 21 Infantry and 6 Armored divisions of the National Guard in varying

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Authority State Dec 11/74, CIA Dec 24/77  
By mmg, NARS, Date 6/17/77



degrees of readiness. Some of the divisions have been conducting unit training and are quite proficient. While bringing additional Army divisions to a state of combat readiness, it would seem that the most practical and economical method of making available a ready reserve would be to mobilize some of the National Guard units.

In the field of equipment and materiel, further mobility in the form of airlift is the greatest need. The President's action in ordering thirty more C-135's and twenty-three more C-130E's, in addition to the fifty C-130E's already programmed, will help. For the immediate future, it might be advisable to consider having the manufacturers of these planes expedite deliveries by adding additional shifts at their plants. For the longer term, the development and testing period of the C-141 should be accelerated if this be possible.

Enough troop transport, both by air and sea, is probably available to take care of any transport needs to areas in the northern part of this hemisphere, but existing sea and air lift is inadequate for the transport of substantial numbers of men and quantities of materiel to far distant trouble spots.

An immediate resurvey of all of the available facilities for both air and sea transport and adequate provision for their unified direction and utilization in an emergency are imperative.

As to training, I fear that the Army units in action may lack effective close air support of the type that has characterized Marine Corps operations. Studies to minimize this deficiency are in process. The solution may be to place units of the Air Force's Tactical Air Command under Army control.

The President's suggested program for specialized training in ranger or counter Guerilla operations for certain units of both Army and Marine Corps should be prosecuted with relentless vigor.

Among the materiel actions that seem desirable to me are these:

1. Accelerate procurement of the M-60 tank. I understand that at present rates the Army will not have its full initial allowance of these until about 1966.
2. Procure additional quantities of tank, infantry and artillery ammunition and provide more conventional ammunition for the Navy.
3. Speed the availability of additional anti-tank missiles and launchers of the ENTAC type. This should prove to be an effective weapon.

In general, I consider that a disproportionate part of Army resources has been applied to surface-to-air missile defense and to tactical nuclear weapons. Use of the latter seems likely to lead to unlimited war by escalation. Moreover, it is difficult to perceive their effective utilization without unacceptable damage to the populace and perhaps to our own forces.

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3.

Although not directly related to conventional war, development of a reconnaissance satellite, such as SAMOS, is of transcendent importance. Because of the relevance of this system to intelligence activities, let me restate the opinion I expressed to the President Friday afternoon that the position of Director of Central Intelligence Agency in these troublous days is second in importance only to the Presidency.

I have not undertaken to set forth the costs of any of the materiel or activities suggested herein. These should be readily available within the Department of Defense.

Respectfully submitted,

*Richard B. Russell*

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-64

By ing, NARA, Date 6-25-93

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COPY NO. 4

DRAFT RECORD OF ACTIONS

478th NSC Meeting

(4/22/61)

[Paragraph on attendance at the meeting to be inserted]

1. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA

- a. Noted the President's view that there should be no further discussion outside the Government of the meaning of recent landings in Cuba, since the object now is to move forward.
- b. Noted the President's view that U. S. citizens in Cuba should be shortly advised again of the view of this Government that they should leave Cuba, and that at an appropriate time publicity should be given to this advice.
- c. Noted the President's view that U. S. assistance to active guerrillas in Cuba should, for the present, be extended only where there is a moral obligation, or to assist in survival or evacuation. Guerrillas with whom the United States may be in contact should be advised to lie low for the present. This direction should, however, be constantly reviewed in the light of the changing internal situation in Cuba.

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**1. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)**

Action Memo  
sent to State  
and Defense

1. Discussed the training of Cuban soldiers, and agreed that the question of possible forms of large-scale, open enlistment of Cuban soldiers should be studied by the Departments of State and Defense.

Action Memo  
sent to HEN

2. Discussed the support of refugees, and noted the President's directive that levels of support should be reported to him with recommendations for their improvement, and his desire that such support should be open and overt. The President also directed that the adjustment of Cubans to life in the United States should be given particular attention by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

3. Noted that an interdepartmental study group would be considering an increase in U. S. assistance to Latin American countries in matters relating to internal security and counter-guerrilla activities, and agreed that a representative of the Department of Justice should be added to this group.

Action Memo  
sent to State  
and Treasury

4. Noted the President's desire that there be prompt recommendations with regard to trading with Cuba from the Departments of State and the Treasury.

Action Memo  
sent to State  
and Defense

5. Noted the President's directive that the question of unilateral or bilateral security assurances, primarily for Caribbean countries, should be studied by the Departments of State and Defense.

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1. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)

Action Memo  
sent to Justice  
and CIA

1. Noted that the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence would examine the possibility of stepping up coverage of Castro activities in the United States.

1. Noted that the Secretary of State had established an Operations Group to follow up for the Department of State on the proposals and studies in the Department of State check-list on Cuba distributed at the meeting.

Action Memo  
sent to State

1. Noted the President's request that he and the Vice President receive from the Department of State prompt information as to which governments have been helpful in various parts of the Cuban crisis, and which unhelpful.

Action Memo  
sent to Defense  
and CIA

1. Noted the President's desire that a prompt and up-to-date report on Soviet assistance to Cuba be furnished by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to the Director, U. S. Information Agency, and the Department of State.



**DRAFT**

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**2. STRENGTHENING THE BASIC U. S. POSTURE TOWARD THE COMMUNIST WORLD**

Action Memo  
sent to Defense  
and OCSM

- a. Discussed possible changes in the level of effort of the United States in the fields of military activity, foreign policy, civil defense, and paramilitary effort. The President announced his prospective appointment of General Maxwell Taylor to advise him with respect to ways and means of improving U. S. efforts in paramilitary, guerrilla and counter-guerrilla activities, in the light of recent experiences. It was agreed that the Department of Defense would review its military budget, and that the study of the civil defense posture of the United States should be expedited by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in consultation with the Department of Defense and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

Action Memo  
sent to  
Defense

- b. Noted the President's request to the Department of Defense for a prompt report to him on military planning for a possible crisis over Berlin.

Action Memo  
sent to State,  
Treasury,  
Defense and CIA

- c. Discussed the possibility of a large Contingency Freedom Fund to be administered under the direct supervision of the President. The President requested a report on the possibilities of such a

2. STRENGTHENING THE BASIC U. S. POSTURE TOWARD THE COMMUNIST WORLD (Cont'd)

and for consideration at the next meeting of the NSC, and asked that this report be prepared by the Department of State in consultation with the Departments of the Treasury and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. THE GENEVA TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS

Noted and discussed an interim report by Mr. McCloy on the current state of negotiations in Geneva for a nuclear test ban. It was agreed that Mr. Dean will soon be recalled for discussion, and that a strong preliminary US-UK effort should be made to create an effective international environment for a possible show-down on these negotiations.

4. REVIEW OF U. S. SPACE PROGRAM

Noted the President's announcement of his request to the Vice President for a prompt report on ways and means of accelerating the U. S. space program, particularly the areas of advanced scientific research and very large boosters.



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April 20, 1961

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

AGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in the  
Cabinet Room of the White House  
on Saturday, April 22, 1961,  
at 10:00 a. m.

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In addition to the Statutory Members and Advisers, the following are being invited to attend this meeting: The U. S. Representative to the United Nations; the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Director, United States Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology; the Counselor, Department of State; Assistant Secretary of Defense, Paul H. Nitze; the Military Aide to the President.

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ITEM FOR DISCUSSION

U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA

For discussion of future U. S. Policy in the light of recent events in Cuba.

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NSC la 4/21/77  
By pmg, NARS, Date 5/4/77

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

35

20 April 1961

DECLASSIFIED

Authority CSD ltr 12/13/76

By AMG, NARS, Date 6/7/77

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

This will confirm our discussion of this morning during which I stated that the President has asked that you:

- a. Appraise the current status and future prospects of the Communist drive to dominate South Viet-Nam.
- b. Recommend a series of actions (military, political and/or economic, overt and/or covert) which, in your opinion, will prevent Communist domination of that country.

The President would like to receive your report on or before Thursday, April 27.

During the course of your study, you should draw, to the extent you believe necessary, upon the views and resources of the State Department and CIA. Mr. Chester Bowles was present when the President discussed the matter with me, and I have reviewed the project with Mr. Allen Dulles. Further, the President stated that Mr. Walt Rostow would be available to counsel with you.

SIGNED

Robert S. McNamara

cc: The Vice President  
Secretary of State  
Under Secretary of State  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
Mr. Walt Rostow  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army  
Chief of Naval Operations  
Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force  
Commandant of the Marine Corps

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Page 1 of 1

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SecDef Cont. No. SD-552



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The Vice President  
Room P-38  
The Capitol Building  
Washington 25, D. C.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON

36

April 17, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Importation of Communist Propaganda

REFERENCES: A. Memo for NSC Planning Board from Director, Planning Board Secretariat, same subject, dated July 1, 1960  
B. Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 20, 1961

For your information, and for action by appropriate departments and agencies, the President, in addition to directing the rescission of the NSC Actions referred to in Reference B, has approved the recommendation contained in the report of the ad hoc committee dated June 29, 1960, which was enclosed with Reference A, as follows:

"The procedures under which printed material coming into the United States from Communist-dominated areas or Communist sources in other areas is examined should be maintained; such examination should be adequate to:

"(a) Identify, and permit the taking of requisite action against, material advocating or urging treason, sedition, insurrection or forcible resistance to any law of the United States (18 U.S.C. 1717; 18 U.S.C. 957; 19 U.S.C. 1305, see Exhibit 9).

"(b) Ensure that Communist propaganda material is marked with the English name of the country of origin in accordance with 19 U.S.C. 1304 (Exhibit 9) without regard to dollar value of the individual item.

"(c) Make available at the request of interested agencies of the Government, appropriate exemplars and statistics covering

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Authority NSC Dec 4/24/77  
By mg, NARS, Date 5/4/97

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material processed. Should changes in the intensity and nature of the communist propaganda be detected possibly constituting a significant danger to the national security, the information should be brought to the attention of the ICIS."



MARION W. BOGGS  
Acting Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Attorney General  
The Secretary of Commerce  
The Postmaster General  
The Director, Bureau of the Budget  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
The Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference  
The Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON

April 6, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL HOLDERS OF NSC 5438

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Information to the Watch Committee  
of the USIB

REFERENCES: A. NSC 5438  
B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Transmittal of Information to the IAC Watch Committee", dated November 30, 1954  
C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "National Security Council Intelligence Directives", dated September 15, 1958  
D. NSCID No. 1, paragraph 4e  
E. NSC 5906/1, paragraph 61-a and -b  
F. Memo For All Holders of NSC 4238, subject: "Transmittal of Information to the Watch Committee of the USIB", dated February 5, 1959

NSC 5438 contains a Directive approved by the President on November 30, 1954 (editorially amended to incorporate the new name of the Watch Committee and the number of the new DCID, transmitted by Reference F), and the Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/5 (new series, transmitted by Reference F).

DCID No. 1/5 has been editorially revised, without change in substance and, as revised, is transmitted herewith as DCID No. 1/5 (new series), effective March 7, 1961.

Accordingly, it is requested that the enclosed DCID No. 1/5 be substituted for the 1958 DCID No. 1/5; and that the superseded material be destroyed by burning, in accordance with security regulations.

MARION W. BOGGS  
Acting Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 644 4/21/77  
By AMG, NAAs, Date 5/4/77

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/5<sup>1</sup>

## TERMS OF REFERENCE, WATCH COMMITTEE OF THE USIB

(Effective 7 March 1961)

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 4e, NSCID No. 1, and paragraph 61, a and b, of NSC 5906/1 (approved by the President on 3 December 1959), the following terms of reference for the Watch Committee of the USIB are hereby established:

*Preamble*

The Sino-Soviet bloc, as a potential aggressor, has the capability to initiate, suddenly at any time and in a place and by methods of its own choosing hostile action<sup>2</sup> in such strength as to threaten gravely the security of the United States. The mission of providing earliest possible warning of hostile action or of impending developments that could eventuate in hostile action will be undertaken by the USIB agencies, within the scope of their responsibilities, as of the highest priority. The proper discharge of this mission depends upon the carrying out of complementary watch and estimating functions. It is recognized that, beginning with evidence of an attack having been launched, there are also complementary responsibilities for reporting and analysis by the intelligence mechanism and operational elements which report directly.

**A. Name**

Watch Committee of the USIB.

**B. Mission**

To provide the earliest possible warning to the United States Government of hostile action, or of impending developments that could eventuate in hostile action, by the Sino-Soviet bloc, which endangers the security of the United States.

**C. Functions**

1. To develop and operate on a current and continuing basis an intelligence plan for obtaining from USIB member departments and agencies, and from other U.S. departments and agencies through appropriate channels, the intelligence necessary to discharge the mission and for recommending collection priorities therefor.

<sup>1</sup> This Directive supersedes DCID No. 1/5, effective 14 November 1958, which in turn had superseded DCID No. 1/2 of 11 May 1954.

<sup>2</sup> Aggressive action by regular or irregular armed forces.

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Authority CIA LA 1/6/77  
By mmg, NARS, Date 4/7/77

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2. To analyze and evaluate information and intelligence, both current and cumulative, on an all-source basis, received or produced by all agencies to determine whether it may relate to the imminence of hostile action, and to develop therefrom the conclusions as to indications of Sino-Soviet bloc intentions:

a. to initiate hostile action against

- (1) the United States, U.S. possessions, or U.S. forces abroad,
- (2) U.S. allies or their forces,
- (3) other areas and forces outside the Sino-Soviet bloc.

b. to initiate hostile action in reaction to or in exploitation of any other development, actual or potential.

3. To draw conclusions regarding or to draw attention to, as appropriate, current and prospective developments involving the Sino-Soviet bloc which could eventuate in hostile action.

4. When necessary in developing its conclusions, to make provisional estimative judgments but to avoid duplicating USIB estimating functions.

5. To report promptly its conclusions, together with significant indications, to the principals of the USIB and, following their action, to make dissemination to other recipients as appropriate.

6. To make recommendations to the USIB, or member agencies thereof, on any matters appropriate to its mission, including such divergent views as may be recorded.

#### *D. Composition and Organization*

The Watch Committee will be composed of a Senior Officer representing each USIB member and a Chairman who will be designated by the Director of Central Intelligence after consultation with the USIB. The Committee will be assisted in its duties and responsibilities by the National Indications Center (NIC), headed by a Director to be provided by CIA and staffed with professional intelligence and administrative personnel to be furnished by the USIB members.

#### *E. Duties and Responsibilities*

The Watch Committee shall discharge, or direct the National Indications Center in the discharge of, the below-listed duties and responsibilities:

1. Meet on a regular schedule as determined by the Committee and on special occasions when requested by one or more of its members or their principals.

2. Arrange through the USIB or appropriate members thereof for the exploitation of every domestic and foreign source of information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee mission and for the prompt reporting of such information.

3. Arrange with USIB agencies for the systematic screening and forwarding to the National Indications Center of all pertinent informa-

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tion and intelligence, especially that required by NSC 5438. An agency evaluation, where appropriate, will be forwarded as soon as possible.

4. Maintain liaison with USIB agencies to ensure that all pertinent information and intelligence is made available to the National Indications Center.

5. Screen all pertinent information received from USIB agencies for indications relating to the Watch Committee mission and develop evaluations thereof in coordination with concerned USIB agencies.

6. Maintain a 24-hour watch function in order to carry out a continuous study of incoming information, alert members of the Watch Committee and NIC as required and obtain from USIB agencies evaluations of significant indications.

7. Review periodically any USIB-approved General Indicator List and recommend changes to it as appropriate.

8. Maintain files, graphic displays, charts and other devices to support and develop the interpretation of indications information. Study on a continuing basis the application of electronic data processing systems to the work of the NIC with a view to making appropriate recommendations to the USIB.

9. Study improvements in substantive analysis and analytical techniques in the field of responsibility of the Watch Committee, calling on USIB agencies for assistance when appropriate.

10. Perform such additional tasks as shall be required by the USIB in the discharge of the Watch Committee mission.

ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director of Central Intelligence

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39  
This document consists of 6 pages.  
Copy # 1 of 7 copies, Series B.

FREEDOM FUND

QUESTION: Should Congressional authorization and appropriation of \$1 billion be sought to provide a "Freedom Fund" for use by the President to meet contingencies?

CONSIDERATIONS

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AID letter MAY 16 1978

Authority By ip, NARS, Date 6-12-79

1. Existing authority and funds

A. Bureau of the Budget study dated February 28, 1961, appended, lists Authority and Funds for Emergencies and Unforeseen Needs presently in the hands of the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, et al.

While the authorities and funds so available are not unlimited in amount or use, they have proved adequate in the past to meet actual emergency and unforeseen requirements (short of war). It has sometimes been necessary to defer other requirements in order to meet such contingencies, but it is fair to say no critically important and urgent requirements has been unmet because of lack of authority or funds.

2. FY 1962 Budget provisions

Legislation for foreign aid has not yet been introduced, although the President's message forecast a request for authorization and appropriations of \$1.6 billion for military assistance and a separate request for authorization for economic aid of \$7.3 billion of public debt authority (\$900 million to be available in FY 1962) and appropriations of \$1.5 billion.

The economic

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The economic aid request is intended to include \$250 million of Contingency Funds. If the amounts requested are provided, the funds should be ample to meet any emergency needs for action in the non-military field. Presidential authority is generally adequate to provide flexibility in their use.

The military aid request calls for \$1.6 billion. The President's Message stated:

"I am frank to say that we cannot now say with precision whether this amount will meet the minimum level of military aid which our basic security policy might demand this year. The emergence of new crises or new conflicts may require us to make an even greater effort."

It remains the opinion of those charged with programming and planning military assistance that the basic security policies require a minimum level of \$2.4 billion in FY 1962 without the emergence of new crises or conflicts. Studies made of NATO needs (Acheson report) support this view, and further studies underway are expected to reinforce this opinion.

In any case, the \$1.6 billion request, if granted, will not provide funds adequate to meet foreseen needs, much less emergency or unforeseen needs. The possibility of a supplemental appropriation request for foreseen needs has been under advisement.

It had

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It had been planned to propose a modification of authorizing legislation to permit, in emergencies, diversion of up to \$200 million of Defense funds or equipment, subject to replenishment by later appropriation action. Such a provision, if granted, would provide a means of meeting emergency and unforeseen needs short of war.

Requirements for internal security or counter-guerrilla programs which have been considered do not appear to involve large amounts of funds. Current non-military activity in this field is less than \$10 million. Estimated needs for new starts were crudely estimated some weeks ago at a maximum of \$50 million. Even if these estimates are grossly low, the capacity of foreign nations effectively to absorb and use aid in this field is limited. At most a requirement of \$100-\$200 million might be foreseen.

In sum, the FY 1962 budget proposals provide generally adequate funds and authority in the non-military field and do not do so in the military field. If the military aid request were substantially increased (\$400 to \$800 million) and diversionary emergency authority to use Defense funds up to \$200 million were provided, funds and authority in the military field would also be generally adequate. Minor changes in law to increase flexibility in use of funds should probably be obtained in any case.

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3. Congressional

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3. Congressional attitudes

Congress usually is most reluctant to provide substantial amounts of money on an unprogrammed basis. It has been quite generous in this respect with regard to foreign aid funds. The generally accepted proposition is that the President should be able to meet emergencies without having to wait for Congressional action but that the kind of requirement for funds which exceeded in dimension or duration the existing authority is likely to be one of such importance as to warrant and necessitate Congressional action.

Congressional attitudes are, however, always sensitive to public opinion and temper. If there is a strong tide of public opinion supporting action, normal rules do not apply. In 1950 military assistance appropriations of a little over \$1 billion which had been slowly and grudgingly provided, were augmented by \$4 billion within a week after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. Dramatic events can produce abnormal patterns of Congressional action.

4. Foreign Reactions

A dramatic request for a \$1 billion Freedom Fund  
would

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would presumably be interpreted abroad as reflecting a hardening of American attitudes and a greater determination to meet the threat which confronts us. But the critical question will be as to the purpose for which the fund is sought. If it is not military aid, if it is not economic aid, then what is it for? To augment U.S. Defense budgets? To increase CIA activity? To train and arm revolutionaries covertly? The greater the uncertainty, the greater is the danger that fears and alarms will arise rather than reassurance of our capacity to lead.

#### CONCLUSIONS

1. The primary need for added funds lies in the field of military assistance where a persuasive case for more money to meet foreseen needs can be made now.
2. Present flexibility in the use of funds could be improved (increased) but is generally adequate to meet needs.
3. A case for a \$1 billion emergency fund cannot be made on grounds of present or foreseeable needs for any such amount.
4. There is a danger in seeking a \$1 billion emergency fund that if it is granted to meet unforeseen needs, it

will be

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will be at the expense of foreign aid appropriations required to meet needs we know exist. Thus we might have an excess of funds for emergencies and a shortage of funds for existing requirements.

5. Congressional reaction is uncertain. It is conceivable that an affirmative response would ensue as a political gesture.

6. Foreign reaction will depend on the purposes for which it is believed the fund is sought. There is real danger of misinterpretation and adverse reaction.

RECOMMENDATION

That the President ask for an increased military aid appropriation and greater authority to use these funds flexibly rather than seeking a separate new contingency fund.

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COPY NO. 2

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Authority NSC Ltr 4/21/77  
By RMG, NARS, Date 5/4/70

RECORD OF ACTIONS  
by the  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
at its  
FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SEVENTH MEETING  
held on  
March 29, 1961

(Approved by the President on April 5, 1961)

The President presided at this meeting. The Acting Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, participated in the action below. Mr. Dean Acheson; the Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology; the Counselor, Department of State; the Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Assistant Secretary of State Foy D. Kohler; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense William Bundy; the Military Aide to the President; and Mr. Henry Owen, Department of State, attended the meeting.

ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2405.

A REVIEW OF NORTH ATLANTIC PROBLEMS FOR THE FUTURE

(Report to the President on the subject, March 1961, prepared by Mr. Dean Acheson assisted by a Working Group which included Ambassador Finletter and representatives of the Departments of State, Defense and the Treasury, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs)

- a. Discussed, on the basis of a presentation by Mr. Dean Acheson, the proposed policy directive regarding NATO and the Atlantic nations contained in the "Conclusions" section of the reference report.
- b. Concurred in principle in the general guidelines recommended by the proposed policy directive, subject to the changes indicated below.
- c. Noted the President's desire that paragraph 2 of the proposed policy directive be reworded.

ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2405. A REVIEW OF NORTH ATLANTIC PROBLEMS FOR THE FUTURE (Continued)

- d. Agreed that the term "Atlantic Commonwealth" should be changed to "Community" and that the concept of such a community should be clarified by appropriate revisions in the proposed policy directive.
- g. Agreed that the concept in paragraph 6-a of the proposed policy directive be clarified by appropriate revisions, taking into account the language proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- f. Noted the statement by the Secretary of Defense that he agreed with paragraph 7-b of the proposed policy directive but that issues of interpretation might arise under this paragraph, e.g., the extent to which it was desirable to put additional resources into modernization of fighter aircraft and short-range missile systems under the proposed doctrine.

Action memo  
sent to  
Defense

- g. Noted that the Secretary of Defense would undertake the study called for by paragraph 7-c of the proposed policy directive.

Action memo  
sent to  
Defense

- h. Noted that the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with General Norstad and the Secretary of State, would make recommendations regarding SACEUR procedures for ordering the use of nuclear weapons.
- i. Noted the view of the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, that the importance of actions to strengthen NATO civil defense and to make SACEUR headquarters and communications more secure had not been adequately reflected in the proposed policy directive.
- j. Noted that paragraph 7-c of the proposed policy directive was to be replaced with suitable language from the body of the paper.
- k. Noted that paragraph 7-h of the proposed policy directive was to be deleted.
- l. Noted that the reference to "SAC forces in the UK" in paragraph 7-i of the proposed policy directive should be clarified.

ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2405. A REVIEW OF NORTH ATLANTIC PROBLEMS FOR THE FUTURE (Continued)

Action memo  
sent to  
State

- m. Noted the President's directive that paragraph 7-k of the proposed policy directive be deleted and that a group representing the Departments of State (Chairman) and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency should review the question of deployment of IREM's to Turkey and make recommendations to the President.
- n. Noted that the Secretary of Defense approved paragraph 7-m of the proposed policy directive, but might subsequently challenge the paragraph after a review within the Department of Defense of the provision of MREM's for NATO.
- o. Noted that the word "determined" in paragraph 11-a of the proposed policy directive should be replaced by some more suitable term, that reference should be made to an Atlantic development program, rather than merely an Atlantic Development Center, and that the U. S. role in regard to these OECD activities should be clarified.
- p. Approved the revised text of paragraph 12 of the proposed policy directive distributed by Mr. Acheson at the meeting.
- q. Agreed that a paragraph on equitable sharing by the NATO nations of the costs of the programs discussed in the proposed policy directive should be inserted in the Economic Section.
- r. Referred paragraphs c, d, e, i, k, l, o, p, and q above, as well as other drafting proposals made in the meeting, to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for preparation of a revised policy directive.
- s. Noted that the President would consider the revised policy directive in the light of the discussion at the meeting, after consultation with the Secretary of State.

Address Official Communications To  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
Washington 25, D. C.

[Seal]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington

41

MAR 22 1961

Dear Mr. Vice President:

As you know, negotiations have resumed at Geneva between representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. It is the objective of the United States in this Conference to negotiate a treaty with reliable safeguards which deals with the cessation of nuclear weapons tests and establishes an adequate control system. In this Conference it should be possible to determine, within a reasonable period of time, whether significant progress can be made toward this objective.

The President has designated Ambassador Arthur H. Dean to head the delegation which will represent the United States at this Conference.

In view of the great interest of the Congress in the subject matter of these negotiations, disarmament and atomic energy affairs, and the importance of close collaboration between Congress and the Executive Branch in a matter so vital to the security of the United States, it is highly desirable that members of Congress be included on the delegation as advisers, as has been the case in the past. It is the hope of the Department that you can nominate an appropriate number of members of the Senate to be included on the delegation as Congressional Advisers.

The Department

The Honorable  
Lyndon B. Johnson,  
Vice President of the United States.



- 2 -

The Department is prepared to make the arrangements and to defray expenses for transportation and participation of Congressional Advisers.

If any other members of Congress are in Geneva during the course of the negotiations, Mr. Dean will be glad to consult with them and have them serve as observers.

Sincerely yours,

*/s/ Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

February 19, 1961

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSEFOLLOWING IS A STATEMENT BY THE  
PRESIDENT UPON ISSUANCE OF EXECU-  
TIVE ORDER ABOLISHING THE OPERATIONS  
COORDINATING BOARD:

I am today issuing an Executive Order abolishing the Operations Coordinating Board. This Board was used in the last Administration for work which we now plan to do in other ways. This action is part of our program for strengthening the responsibility of the individual departments.

First, we will center responsibility for much of the Board's work in the Secretary of State. He expects to rely particularly on the Assistant Secretaries in charge of regional bureaus, and they in turn will consult closely with other departments and agencies. This will be our ordinary rule for continuing coordination of our work in relation to a country or area.

Second, insofar as the OCB -- as a descendant of the old Psychological Strategy Board -- was concerned with the impact of our actions on foreign opinion -- our "image" abroad -- we expect its work to be done in a number of ways: in my own office, in the State Department, under Mr. Murrow of USIA, and by all who are concerned with the spirit and meaning of our actions in foreign policy. We believe that appropriate coordination can be assured here without extensive formal machinery.

Third, insofar as the OCB served as an instrument for ensuring action at the President's direction, we plan to continue its work by maintaining direct communication with the responsible agencies, so that everyone will know what I have decided, while I in turn keep fully informed of the actions taken to carry out decisions. We of course expect that the policy of the White House will be the policy of the Executive Branch as a whole, and we shall take such steps as are needed to ensure this result.

I expect that the senior officials who served as formal members of OCB will still keep in close and informal touch with each other on problems of common interest. Mr. Bromley Smith, who has been the Executive Officer of the OCB, will continue to work with my Special Assistant, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, in following up on White House decisions in the area of national security. In these varied ways we intend that the net result shall be a strengthening of the process by which our policies are effectively coordinated and carried out, throughout the Executive Branch.

More

CCPY

EXECUTIVE ORDER

- - - - -

REVOKING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10700  
OF FEBRUARY 25, 1957, AS AMENDED

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes, and as President of the United States, it is ordered that Executive Order No. 10700 of February 25, 1957, entitled "Further Providing for the Operations Coordinating Board", as amended, be, and it is hereby, revoked.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

THE WHITE HOUSE  
February 18, 1961


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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON

February 14, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

There will be no meeting of the National Security  
Council during this week.

  
JAMES S. LAY, JR.  
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Director, Bureau of the Budget  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director of Central Intelligence



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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON

February 23, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL HOLDERS OF THE AGENDA FOR THE 477th NSC MEETING:

The 477th NSC Meeting, scheduled for Friday, February 24, 1961, at 10:00 a.m., as indicated in the above-mentioned agenda, has been cancelled.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.  
Executive Secretary

# THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MECHANISM SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM

THE PRESIDENT

## THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

### STATUTORY MEMBERS:

THE PRESIDENT  
THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF DEFENSE  
AND CIVILIAN MOBILIZATION

### STANDING REQUEST MEMBERS

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

### AD HOC MEMBERS

AS DIRECTED BY THE PRESIDENT

### ADVISERS

THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

*stat. change?*

*It - Exec. Order  
- advisory  
- Too much detail*

## THE N.S.C. SUBSTRUCTURE

### THE N.S.C. STAFF

THE OFFICE OF THE N.S.C. EXECUTIVE  
SECRETARY  
THE POLICY COORDINATING STAFF  
THE OPERATIONS COORDINATING  
BOARD STAFF

*Bundy briefs Pres (V.P.?)*

### THE N.S.C. PLANNING BOARD

MEMBERS: SPECIAL ASST TO THE PRES FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS (CHAIRMAN)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
OFFICE OF DEFENSE AND CIVILIAN  
MOBILIZATION

### ADVISERS:

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
OFFICE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
SECURITY OPERATIONS COORDINATION

### THE OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD

MEMBERS: SPECIAL ASST TO PRES FOR NAT.  
SECURITY AFFAIRS (CHAIRMAN)  
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLI-  
GENCE

DIRECTOR, U.S. INFORMATION  
AGENCY

DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL COOP-  
ERATION ADMINISTRATION

STNDG  
REQUEST: SPEC ASST TO PRES FOR SECURITY  
OPERATIONS COORDINATION  
(VICE CHAIRMAN)

CHAIRMAN, ATOMIC ENERGY  
COMMISSION

UNDER SEC OF TREASURY  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF  
THE BUDGET

*Page 1*

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON

April 10, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL HOLDERS OF NSC ACTION NO. 2405:

It is requested that, on page 2 of the above-mentioned NSC Action, in paragraph j, the first line be changed to read "Noted that paragraph 7-e....." instead of "Noted that paragraph 7-c.....".

MARION W. BOGGS  
Acting Executive Secretary

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Memorandum

February 8, 1961

To: The Vice President

From: Col. Howard Burris

Subject: National Security Council Briefings

One of the principal functions which the Military Aide or a member of his staff would normally perform is briefing you on Agenda items for the National Security Council meetings. Last week, Mr. Bundy briefed you, but the extent, complexities, and priorities of his duties with the President might preclude your reliance upon him in the future to any appreciable degree.

Presently, I am furnished a list of the Agenda items, but the background and ramifications of each item are available only from the NSC Planning Board, where all the decisions are discussed and put in final form for presentation to the President. Only in the Planning Board will there be available sufficient detail and facts on all aspects of these vital issues.

If you desire a weekly briefing on NSC Agenda items on the day or morning preceeding the meeting, I shall perform studies at the NSC Planning Board for this purpose. If you desire more comprehensive presentations, additional information on all items even proposed for NSC action, it will be necessary to assign an Officer full time to this function.

# # #



February 6, 1961

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC ltr 4/21/77  
By RMG, NARS, Date 5/4/77~~SECRET~~NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCILAGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in the  
Cabinet Room of The White House  
on ~~Wednesday, February 8, 1961~~, *Thurs., Feb. 9, 1961*  
~~from 2:30 to 4:15 p. m.~~ *at 10:00 a.m.*

In addition to the Statutory NSC Members and Advisers, the following are being invited to attend this meeting: The U. S. Representative to the United Nations; the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Director-designate, U. S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology; Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee; Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze; the Deputy Director (Intelligence), Central Intelligence Agency (for Item 1); and the Military Aide to the President.

ITEMS FOR DISCUSSIONITEM 1 -- SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY

For discussion, in the light of an oral briefing on the subject by the Director of Central Intelligence.

ITEM 2 -- DISCUSSION OF CRISIS AREAS

For discussion of crisis areas affecting the national security, especially Laos, the Congo, and Cuba.

ITEM 3 -- NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES REQUIRING URGENT ATTENTION  
(NSC Action No. 2400)

For discussion.

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON

February 3, 1961


MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: 476th Meeting of the National Security Council

The next meeting of the National Security Council will be held in the Cabinet Room of the White House on Wednesday, February 8, 1961, at 4:00 p.m.

An agenda for this 476th NSC meeting will be circulated on Monday, February 6.

The attendance at this next NSC meeting will consist of the same officials who were invited to attend the 475th NSC meeting on February 1, 1961.

  
JAMES S. LAY, JR.  
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

COPY NO. 2Authority NSC ltr 4/21/77By pmg, NAKS, Date 5/4/77

RECORD OF ACTIONS  
by the  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
at its  
FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIFTH MEETING  
held on  
February 1, 1961

(Approved by the President on February 2, 1961)

The President presided at this meeting. The Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, participated in the actions below. The Director-designate, U. S. Information Agency, the Under Secretary of State, the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology, Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze, and the Military Aide to the President attended the meeting. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Robert Amory, Jr., attended the meeting for NSC Actions Nos. 2396 and 2397.

ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2396. ATTENDANCE AT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETINGS

The President noted that he had invited certain officials other than the Statutory Members and Advisers for this initial NSC meeting of his Administration. He said that the list of those requested to attend any given meeting would be decided in the light of the business he wanted to discuss each time, but he emphasized his eagerness to keep such officers as Mr. Murrow fully informed of major issues.

2397. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY

- a. Noted and discussed an oral report by the Director of Central Intelligence which included discussion of the new President of Brazil; prospects for the Salazar regime in Portugal; the serious agricultural situation in Communist China; and recent developments regarding Indonesia and the Congo.

ACTION  
NUMBERSUBJECT2397. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY (Cont'd)

b. The Secretary of the Treasury stated that the Departments of State and Treasury were agreed that it would be desirable to make an early offer to the new President of Brazil of a \$100 million Export-Import Bank loan. Mr. Dillon was hopeful that the Bank would agree to take this step.

Action Memo  
sent to  
Dept. of State

c. The Council discussed a possible change in U. S. policy relating to the bunkering of Free World ships under Communist Chinese charter, provided such ships were carrying only food and paid cash. The President requested that the Secretary of State study this question further, particularly whether any such change in policy could be at the request of the Canadian Government.

d. The Secretary of State outlined a new proposed policy on the Congo which was being submitted to the President today after coordination with the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. The President subsequently reviewed and approved the State Department's proposal.

2398. MILITARY BUDGETS AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

a. The Director, Bureau of the Budget, reported that the past system of preparing military budgets has the following weaknesses:

(1) A lack of common assumptions and doctrines among the three military departments, resulting in differing strategic doctrines and appraisals of the threat, which were not adequately understood or taken into account in the budget process.

(2) A lack of common assumptions and doctrines among the three military departments, resulting in differing strategic doctrines and appraisals of the threat, which were not adequately understood or taken into account in the budget process.



ACTION  
NUMBERSUBJECT2398. MILITARY BUDGETS AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (Cont'd)

- (3) Military budgets were organized by departments and by in-puts (such as personnel, procurement, etc.), but not by out-puts (such as strategic deterrence, limited war capabilities, etc.), making it difficult to determine what objectives were being fulfilled.
  - (4) The perspective of the military budgets have been generally short-range, rather than being decided on the basis of five-year or longer range objectives.
- b. The Secretary of Defense reported that, with reference to the FY 1961 and 1962 military budgets, the following actions were being taken:
- (1) Acceleration of the procurement of five POLARIS submarines so that they would be completed nine to ten months earlier than previously planned.
  - (2) An increase in the airlift capacity of 50 transport aircraft, including 30 jets.
  - (3) A complete re-appraisal of the FY 1962 military budget, to be completed about March 1, 1961, based on studies by four groups, each headed by a senior official of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, on strategic weapons, requirements for limited war, selected weapons research and development programs, and base and installation requirements.
- c. The Secretary of Defense reported further that, in collaboration with the Director, Bureau of the Budget, he would develop, between March 1 and July 1, 1961, guidelines for the President's consideration as to the FY 1963 military budget.
- d. The Secretary of State said that he planned to send to the Secretary of Defense certain revisions in a previous memorandum of June 1960 which stated foreign policy requirements bearing upon

ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2398. MILITARY BUDGETS AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (Cont'd)

U. S. strategy. These revisions would relate to NATO strategic doctrine, airlift, counter-guerrilla forces (including greater U. S. capability in this field), as well as the desirability of improved civil defense.

Action Memo  
sent to Dept.  
of Defense

- e. The President requested that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with other interested agencies, should examine means for placing more emphasis on the development of counter-guerrilla forces.

Action Memo  
sent to Bureau  
of the Budget

- f. The President agreed with the suggestion by the Secretary of the Treasury that means be found to separate in the military and foreign assistance budgets the funds which would be spent in foreign countries, as a means of improving the control of such expenditures.

Action Memo  
sent to Dept.  
of Defense

- g. The President requested the Secretary of Defense to consult with the Atomic Energy Commission about a review of the purchases of uranium from foreign countries, as suggested by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

2399. STUDIES OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH ORGANIZATION

Action Memo  
sent to Bureau  
of the Budget

- a. Noted, in answer to the President's request, that the Director, OCDM, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, would report by the end of February on their study of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.
- b. Noted, in answer to the President's request, that the Secretary of State was submitting certain recommendations clarifying the relation between the educational exchange program and the foreign information program; and that the Director, U. S. Information Agency, would be submitting recommendations regarding that agency's program.

ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2399. STUDIES OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH ORGANIZATION (Cont'd)

Action Memo  
sent to Bureau  
of the Budget

- c. Noted the President's view that the foreign assistance program must be reorganized before presentation to the Congress; and that the Director, Bureau of the Budget, was planning to submit such a reorganization along with the new foreign aid program.

2400. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES REQUIRING URGENT ATTENTION

Deferred discussion of this subject, with the understanding that the Secretary of State would, after appropriate consultation, recommend to the President certain immediate changes in current U. S. policy on Africa, to permit more flexible action in economic support of certain new governments.

2401. ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs reported that in response to the President's desires a different organization and procedures would henceforth be used in the work of the National Security Council, involving fewer and smaller staff groups composed of more senior personnel. Policy recommendations would be brought to the NSC without being obscured by inter-agency processing but with adequate previous consultation and the presentation of counter-proposals. The preparation of such recommendations would require the full cooperation of all agencies in providing access to essential information.

Chart # 7

# THE PROPOSED CONCEPT







Chart #2

## THE PROPOSED CONCEPT



86th Congress }  
2d Session }

COMMITTEE PRINT

ORGANIZING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

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SUPER-CABINET OFFICERS AND SUPERSTAFFS

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STUDY

SUBMITTED TO THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS  
UNITED STATES SENATE

BY ITS

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL POLICY MACHINERY  
(Pursuant to S. Res. 248, 86th Cong.)



Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations

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UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON : 1960

63945

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## SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL POLICY MACHINERY

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BREWSTER C. DENNY, *Professional Staff Member*

HOWARD E. HAUGERUD, *Professional Staff Member*

WILLIAM O. FARRER, *Minority Counsel*

II

## FOREWORD

The Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery has been making a nonpartisan study of how our Government can best organize to formulate and execute national security policy.

During the past year, the subcommittee has sought the counsel of present and former officials of the Government, outstanding private citizens, eminent scientists, military leaders, and distinguished students of the policy process. The subcommittee has also taken extensive testimony in public and executive session. Throughout, the spirit of its inquiry has been scholarly and objective, and advice has been sought without regard to party.

In the next few months a series of staff reports will be issued containing recommendations for improvements of the policy process. These will be followed with proposals for legislative action where appropriate.

Among the matters to be discussed in these staff reports are problems of recruiting and retaining talented people for the national security departments and agencies; the National Security Council and its subordinate machinery; the budgetary process; the roles of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense; and the relationship of science and technology to the policy process.

Testimony given the subcommittee has established that the executive branch is not now organized to do its best in pulling together the policies and programs of the departments, agencies, and armed services in the cause of a coherent national strategy. The difficulties brought to light in the testimony are deep seated, and not amenable to quick or easy correction.

In the minds of some, these problems seem impossible of solution except through far-reaching and novel changes in Government organization. Such changes have in common the creation of a "super-Cabinet" officer or a "superstaff" to help the President better discharge his national security responsibilities.

The purpose of this first study is to examine the merit of such proposals and to provide an introduction to the specific recommendations for improvements in the policy process which will be discussed in subsequent reports.

HENRY M. JACKSON,  
*Chairman, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery.*

NOVEMBER 16, 1960.

III

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**T**

## ORGANIZING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

### SUPER-CABINET OFFICERS AND SUPERSTAFFS

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#### INTRODUCTION

This is the first of a series of staff reports to be issued by the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery during the next few months. Drawing upon testimony and counsel given the subcommittee during this past year, the reports will make detailed recommendations for improving the national security policymaking process.

These studies will be appearing at a time when a new President is preparing to take over the reins of our Government. There is widespread agreement that the executive branch of our Government is not now giving the President all the support he needs in meeting his responsibilities in foreign and defense affairs. This unsatisfactory situation has been clearly brought out in the testimony given the subcommittee and in comments by other competent authorities.

The magnitude and the apparent intractability of many of these difficulties have led some to believe that the problems can be solved only by radical organizational changes. The changes proposed would tend to shift the center of gravity in policy development and coordination away from the great departments of the Government and closer toward the Presidential level. The proposals have in common the creation of "super-Cabinet" officers or "super-Cabinet" staffs.

This first report has a limited aim. Its purpose is to examine the merit of these proposals and to provide a background for the detailed suggestions for improving policy machinery which will be contained in forthcoming reports.

#### THE BESETTING PROBLEM

By law and practice the President is responsible for the conduct of foreign relations. He is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. He directs the departments and agencies. He makes the key decisions on the executive budget. He cannot delegate these great tasks to any council or committee. The responsibility is his, and his alone.

New dimensions of national security make the proper exercise of the President's responsibility more difficult than ever before in our history.

The line between foreign and domestic policy, never clear to begin with, has now almost been erased. Foreign policy and military policy have become more inseparable than ever. The tools of foreign policy have multiplied to include economic aid, information, technical assistance, scientific help, educational and cultural exchange, and foreign military assistance.



Historically, a President has looked to the Department of State for his principal help in developing and executing foreign policy. But today the sphere of the Department of State is far narrower than the full range of contemporary foreign relations. As an organization, the Department of State can now claim no greater concern in certain aspects of foreign policy than the Department of Defense. The interest of Treasury and Agriculture in some areas of international affairs is almost equal to that of State.

Indeed, today, almost every department of our Government, and some 18 independent agencies also, are involved with national security policy. Four Government agencies and six international financial organizations work in the field of foreign economic aid alone.

The net result is this: The planning and execution of national security policy cut across the jurisdiction of many departments and agencies. This situation imposes upon the President a heavy burden. A host of responsible protagonists urge divergent advice upon him. He must resolve these conflicting approaches, select his own course of action, and see to its faithful and efficient execution by the very officials whose advice he may have rejected.

Presidents have in the past employed the budgetary process as an instrument for policy and program review and coordination. The budgetary process, in other words, has been traditionally much more than an exercise in accountancy, in the sense of merely keeping ledgers on the cost of ongoing and contemplated programs. Recent years, however, have seen a decline in the use of the budgetary process as a prime tool of the President in program evaluation and integration. The process has become more and more limited to an overly narrow concern for the fiscal aspects of foreign policy and defense programs.

Throughout the past decade, increasingly elaborate and complicated interdepartmental mechanisms have been created to assist the President in policy development, coordination, and execution. The best known of these bodies is the National Security Council and its subordinate organs, the Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board. At last count, there were some 160 other formal interdepartmental and interagency committees in the field of international affairs alone.

This interdepartmental machinery has certain inherent limitations in assisting the President.

Committees, including the National Security Council, are primarily coordinating mechanisms. But they can coordinate and integrate only what their members bring to them; they cannot originate national security policy. The role of a committee in policy formulation is essentially critical and cautionary, not creative. The prime source of policy innovations is the contribution of a responsible individual who wrestles day in and day out with the problems of national security. Given imaginative proposals from such individuals, a committee may be helpful in criticizing, countering, or embroidering them.

If interdepartmental committees have limitations in policy initiation, they also have inherent shortcomings in policy coordination. The heads of the great departments and major agencies have been unwilling for the most part to concede to interagency committees the authority in policy development and execution which they regard as their right or the President's.

When policy stakes are high and differences in outlook sharp, department heads traditionally have sought to bypass coordinating committees while keeping them busy with secondary matters. Where this has not been possible, department heads have traditionally tried to keep the product of coordination from binding them tightly or specifically to undesired courses of action. The net result has tended to be "coordination" on the lowest common denominator of agreement, which is often tantamount to no coordination at all.

The President has been left in an unenviable position. He has found it necessary to undertake an endless round of negotiations with his own department heads or else he has been confronted at a very late date by crisis situations resulting from the lack of adequate coordination at an earlier stage. The burdens of the President have been increased correspondingly, and after-the-fact improvisation has too often substituted for forward planning.

#### A FIRST SECRETARY OF THE GOVERNMENT?

Contemplating the problems now faced by a President, some have concluded that he requires the assistance of a new "super-Cabinet" official who would deal across the board with national security problems. The idea is not new. In 1955 former President Hoover suggested creating two appointive Vice Presidents, one responsible for foreign and the other for domestic affairs. More recently, President Eisenhower's Advisory Committee on Government Organization has studied variants of the concept of a "super-Cabinet" official.

In July of this year, Gov. Nelson Rockefeller, former Chairman of the Advisory Committee, appeared before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery and made a specific proposal for statutory creation of a "First Secretary" of the Government.

This officer would be appointed by the President subject to Senate confirmation. In Governor Rockefeller's words, he would be "above the Cabinet" and exercise Presidential authority by delegation in all areas "of national security and international affairs." The First Secretary would be authorized "to act for the President \* \* \* at the Prime Ministerial level." He would have statutory designation as "Executive Chairman of NSC" and would have statutory authority by delegation from the President to appoint the heads of subordinate and related interdepartmental committees. The First Secretary would have a staff of his own, and would supervise the personnel of the National Security Council and the Operations Coordinating Board. He would also be "empowered to use and reorganize all of the interdepartmental planning machinery \* \* \* in the area of national security and foreign affairs."

At first glance, the proposal may appear an answer to current difficulties in the operation of policy machinery. The First Secretary's perspective would be expected to encompass the whole range of national security problems. He would be charged with giving committee coordinating mechanisms the stiffening of authoritative direction. Theoretically, he would be no mere White House staff assistant but a super-Cabinet member, thus able to direct fellow Cabinet members in a way that ordinary Presidential aides cannot. Theoretically again, he could relieve a President of many burdens both

within the Government and in negotiations with other chiefs of Government. Finally, he could act as a first adviser to the President on foreign policy in its full modern context.

Careful analysis of the First Secretary proposal, however, reveals serious shortcomings and limitations. The proposal would fail to solve the problems it is meant to meet, and would also introduce grave new difficulties into the working of our national policy machinery.

This proposal raises two problems. One concerns a First Secretary's relationship with department heads.

Giving a man the title of "First Secretary" does not thereby give him power. Under this proposal, the Secretaries of State and Defense and other Cabinet officers would retain their present statutory functions and authority. These officials would continue to be accountable to the Congress for the proper performance of their statutory duties. They would equally continue to be responsible to the President.

Being responsible to the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense and other Cabinet officers would report directly to him. They would be bound to question the decisions of a First Secretary; his placement between them and the President would inevitably generate friction and resentment. The First Secretary could gain the power he needed only if the President consistently accepted the First Secretary's judgment over that of his department heads.

But if the President were consistently so deferential to his First Secretary, who then would be President?

And who would then be willing to be Cabinet officers? The primacy of the First Secretary could conceivably be established by filling Cabinet offices with relatively submissive men who lack strong convictions or much will of their own. But this is a period of history when our Government needs more—not less—vigor and drive in high positions. This end would not be served by choosing for Cabinet positions men who could acquiesce to the downgrading of the historic posts that they are asked to occupy.

A second problem raised by this proposal involves the relations of the First Secretary to the President.

The historical record shows that Presidential assistants draw effective power from their demonstrated intimacy with the President. On numerous occasions in the past, a President has deputized an intimate adviser to take charge of certain plans or operations and to act for him in dealing with department heads. In varying degree, such men as House, Hopkins, Byrnes, and Adams have served effectively as Presidential deputies. But the positions of such men were always very different from that proposed for the First Secretary. Past deputyships have been ad hoc assignments given temporarily at the President's own pleasure to persons in his confidence whose intimacy with him was matched by their complete dependence on him. At the height of their effectiveness in Government, a Hopkins or an Adams drew power, not from statutes, titles, staffs, or paper prerogatives of any sort, but solely from the President's evident confidence in them and reliance on them.

Yet the proposed First Secretary would be in a very poor position to sustain that intimate relationship even if he had it at the outset. His statutory position, his formal status in the Government, his super-

vision of assorted staffs, his chairmanship of manifold committees, his attraction for the press, and his accountability to the Senate which confirmed him—all would mitigate against the maintenance of his close, confidential, personal relationship with the President.

It is most unlikely that a President would in fact give a First Secretary the consistent backing and support he would require to maintain his primacy over other Cabinet members. To do so would run the risk that the First Secretary would become an independent force, politically capable of rivaling the President himself. It would run the further risk of rousing combined opposition from departmental and congressional sources and from affected interest groups.

The likelihood of congressional opposition to domination of departments by a "super-Cabinet" officer rests on the fact that Congress is constitutionally the creator of departments, the source of their statutory mandates, and the steward of their operations. Congressional committees long associated with particular governmental agencies could be expected to side with those agencies in their efforts to assert independence of the First Secretary. He would enjoy no counterpart of the solicitude which congressional committees often show to the heads of departments and agencies within their jurisdiction.

It is essential that a President have full, frank, and frequent discussions with his departmental and agency chiefs. To fully understand the meaning and consequences of alternative courses of action, he must expose himself directly to the clash of argument and counter-argument between advocates of different policy courses. Papers, no matter how carefully staffed, can never convey the full meaning of the issues in question. To the degree a First Secretary insulated the President from day-to-day contact with key Cabinet officers, he would leave his chief less knowledgeable than ever about matters he alone had to decide.

Even if the President were to give the First Secretary substantial backing, this official would still be unable to do the job expected of him. For the critical budgetary decisions on the allocation of resources between national security needs and other national needs would still be outside his jurisdiction.

Only the President's responsibility is as wide as the Nation's affairs. Only he can balance domestic, economic, and defense needs—and if anyone else were to be given the job the President would become a kind of constitutional figurehead.

In summary: Our governmental system has no place for a First Secretary. He is thought of as a mediator and a judge of the conflicting national security policies advocated by the major departments, the Congress and its committees, and private groups. But in the American system only one official has the constitutional and political power required to assume that role and to maintain it. That official is the President of the United States. He cannot be relieved of his burdens by supplying him with a "deputy" to do what only he can do.

#### THE VICE PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

A variation of the First Secretary plan would assign to the Vice President continuing duties in the national security area as a matter of discretionary delegation from the President. One proposal recommends that the President authorize the Vice President to "coordinate

and direct the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and all of the other instruments of Government" in the general area of national security, excluding defense matters.

Such plans originate in the same dissatisfaction which gives rise to the First Secretary proposal. Yet assigning the Vice President this responsibility would not only create the same problems associated with a First Secretary—it would also produce still other problems.

The specific proposal in question would exclude defense problems from the surveillance of the Vice President. This means that his jurisdiction would end precisely at the wrong point—the point of coordination between diplomatic, economic, and information programs on the one hand and military programs on the other.

A "super-Cabinet" officer whose jurisdiction was confined to that of the most tradition-bound Secretaries of State could do little to integrate foreign and military policy. If anything, the plan would make integration more difficult than it now is. It would reduce the Secretary of State to the level of Vice President's Assistant, and add one more set of relationships which can only be adjusted by the President himself.

A deputyship of this kind for an elected Vice President creates still another difficulty for the President. A modern Vice President is likely to be a person of importance in the President's own party. A broad grant of executive authority to the Vice President could invite eventual misunderstandings and embarrassments between the two highest officials of our Government. The President, it must be remembered, has no control over the Vice President's tenure of office.

The role of the Vice President need not, of course, be limited to his constitutional obligation to preside over the Senate. Many ways of helping the President can be worked out by mutual agreement. When proper occasions arise, these can include tasks in the field of foreign policy. For example, a Vice President can relieve the President of part of the protocol burden; he can undertake special missions abroad; he can from time to time make special studies. He may, of course, play a role of great importance in the relations between the legislative and executive branches.

But any attempt to make the Vice President a kind of Deputy President for Foreign Affairs would be to give the wrong man the wrong job. It would impair the effectiveness of the responsible Cabinet officers, the Vice President, and the President himself.

There have been still more drastic proposals regarding the Vice President which would make him not merely the repository of delegated authority from the President but a full-fledged deputy in the executive branch, charged by statute with authority for direction and coordination.

But the Vice President is constitutionally the presiding officer of the senior body in the legislative branch. The executive power is constitutionally vested in the President who heads another branch. At a minimum, any proposal to vest executive authority in an officer of the legislative branch by statute would raise serious questions involving both the spirit and letter of the Constitution.

#### A SUPERSTAFF FOR NATIONAL SECURITY?

A "super-Cabinet" official charged with broad responsibilities for national security would, of course, require major staff assistance. Indeed, most proposals for a First Secretary assume he will have the help of a sizable staff.

Some who would stop short of the First Secretary concept would nonetheless establish major White House or Executive Office staffs for national security planning and coordination. A representative proposal of this type would replace the present National Security Council staff, the Planning Board, and the Operations Coordinating Board with a Presidential Staff Agency for National Security Affairs.

The appeal of such an above-the-department staff agency is readily apparent. Those associated with this Agency could presumably view national security problems "in the round"; their horizons would not be limited to the more parochial perspectives of the departments. And not being burdened with day-to-day operating responsibilities, they could presumably do a better job of long-term planning than their harassed counterparts within the departments.

But how much assistance would such an agency give the President? Its plans would lack the coloration, the perspectives, and the realism which come from actual involvement in operating problems. It would be hard to avoid ivory tower thinking. Beyond this, the Agency would create a new layer of planning between the President and the departments and thus insulate and shield him from the full flavor of the planning of responsible operating officials.

Such an agency would, of course, be a bureaucratic rival of the historic departments. It seems safe to say the rivalry would be one sided. The Staff Agency would confront the traditional unwillingness of the departments to surrender their own responsibility for policy development and execution. Lacking the autonomy and fixed entrenchments of a departmental base, such an agency could not compete for long, on favorable terms, with State, Defense, or Treasury.

The end result, in fact, might be the worst of two possible worlds, with the Staff Agency lacking enough power to give the President effective assistance, but sufficiently powerful nonetheless to meddle in the affairs of the great departments.

A President will, of course, need some assistants who concern themselves primarily with national security policy. But such assistants would act as extensions of the President's eyes and ears in a confidential relationship, not as members of a large and highly institutionalized "superstaff."

#### CONCLUSION

This study has argued that "super-Cabinet" officers or above-the-department "superstaffs" would not ease the problems now faced by the President in setting and maintaining our national course. In fact, such additions to the policy process would make his burdens heavier.

Reforms, to be effective, must be made in terms of the real requirements and possibilities of the American governmental system.

That system provides no alternative to relying upon the President as the judge and arbiter of the forward course of policy for his administration.



It provides no good alternative to reliance upon the great departments for the conduct of executive operations and for the initiation of most policy proposals relating to these operations. Departments possess the statutory authority, the knowledge and experience and the technical staffs needed to advise the President, and the line administrators who alone can implement executive decisions. They will always be the main wellsprings of policy ideas and innovations.

Finally, the American system provides no good alternative to reliance on the budget process as a means of reviewing the ongoing activities of the departments and raising periodically for Presidential decision issues of effectiveness in actual performance.

But to reject the radical solutions is not at the same time to dismiss the besetting problems in which they have their origin. The problems remain. They cannot be solved by maintaining the status quo.

Forthcoming staff reports will make wide-ranging recommendations for changes in the policy process. The promising paths to reform lead in these general directions:

*First: There are better ways for the President to delegate more authority for decisionmaking to individual heads of departments and agencies.*

There has been too much emphasis on coordination and too little on delegation. Policymaking has tended to be reduced to a group effort where no single person has real authority to act and where no one individual can be rewarded for success or penalized for failure. In the words of Mr. Robert Lovett:

\*\*\* The authority of the individual executive must be restored: The derogation of the authority of the individual in government, and the exaltation of the anonymous mass, has resulted in a noticeable lack of decisiveness. Committees cannot effectively replace the decisionmaking power of the individual who takes the oath of office; nor can committees provide the essential qualities of leadership \*\*\*.

*Second: There are better ways to make the National Security Council a forum for more meaningful debate on issues which the President alone can decide.*

One should not ask the National Security Council to do what it is not really capable of doing. The Council is an interagency committee; it can inform, debate, review, adjust, and validate. But, as a collective body, the Council cannot develop bold new ideas or translate them into effective action.

Yet the Council can still be a highly useful advisory mechanism to a President. The evidence strongly suggests that this role can best be discharged by a Council which has fewer rather than more participants in its meetings; which concerns itself only with issues of central importance for Presidential decision; which works through less, rather than more, institutionalized procedures; which relates its activities more closely to the budgetary process; and which gives the Secretary of State a greater role in the development of broad policy initiatives.

*Third: There are better ways to enable the Secretary of State to serve the President as first adviser in national security problems.*

The Secretary of State is the First Secretary of the Government. He should be able to advise the President on the full range of national

security matters, from the point of view of their relation to foreign problems and policies.

The Secretary of State need not and should not have any legal or supervisory authority over other Cabinet officers. Any moves in this direction would have many of the disadvantages of the "super-Cabinet" officer proposal. The goal is not to give the Secretary of State greater command authority: it is to enlarge the scope of his guidance and influence.

If the President is to ask more, and to get more, from the Secretary of State, the Secretary must be better staffed to offer policy guidance and initiatives across the whole span of national security problems. This does not mean a larger Department of State; it may well mean a smaller one. But it does mean a Department competently staffed with generalists, economists, and military and scientific experts to support the Secretary in understanding and following all fields falling within his broad concern.

*Fourth: There are better ways to relate military power more closely to foreign policy requirements.*

The Secretary of Defense shares with the Secretary of State the main burden of advising the President on national security problems. A full and welcome partnership of the Departments of State and Defense is the prerequisite of coherent political-strategic counsel for the President.

In viewing the Pentagon, one must guard against seeking organizational solutions for problems which are not really organizational in origin. Yet there are reforms which are promising of results. They point in the direction of more vigorous employment of the broad authority already invested in the Secretary of Defense; more active participation of the Secretary of Defense in the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; increased reliance upon the Joint Staff for planning; an acceleration of existing trends toward functional commands; a budgetary process more consonant with the requirements of modern weapons technology; a promotion system which encourages officers to become versed in the broad problems of national security; a Pentagon career service which does more to develop outstanding civilian officials; and selecting for top policy positions only candidates willing to remain in their posts well beyond the period of apprenticeship on their jobs.

*Fifth: There are better ways to make the budgetary process a more effective instrument for reviewing and integrating programs and performance in the area of national security.*

There is need to return to the earlier tradition which regarded the budgetary process as a key program management tool of the President.

Budget targets should be regarded not primarily as fiscal instruments but as policy instruments. The investigative analyses needed to achieve and adjust these targets must begin and end with substantive concerns and not simply considerations of administrative organization and financial management.

*Sixth: There are better ways to organize the Presidency to intervene flexibly, imaginatively, and fast where gaps in policy development or execution threaten to upset the President's cardinal objectives.*

This does not require new and elaborate staff offices or highly institutionalized interdepartmental committees. It calls rather for more discriminating use of able staff assistants right in the immediate office of the President himself who are alert to trouble spots and sensitive to the President's own information needs.

*Seventh: There are better ways to attract and retain outstanding officials for both appointive and career posts in the national security departments and agencies.*

Poor decisions often result less from poor organization than from poor policymakers. The one thing which could do the most to improve national security policy would be to raise the standards of excellence among career and appointive officials.

The Nation should be grateful for the skill and dedication of those who now man the posts of responsibility in the area of foreign and defense policy. But there is still room for vast improvement in developing and using the rich resources of talent now found among our career officials.

There is room for equally great improvement in eliminating the legal and financial problems which now discourage highly qualified private citizens from serving governmental tours of duty.

And, above all, there is need to abandon the outmoded conventions which have often deprived an administration of the service of members of the opposite political party. The yardstick for making appointments to key national security posts must be ability to do the job, regardless of party.

Specific recommendations for speeding progress in these seven areas, together with suggestions for other reforms of the policy process, will be contained in succeeding staff reports.





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COMMITTEE PRINT

ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY  
OF THE  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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STUDY

SUBMITTED TO THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS  
UNITED STATES SENATE

BY ITS

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL POLICY MACHINERY  
(Pursuant to S. Res. 248, 86th Cong.)



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II

## FOREWORD

The Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery was created in July 1959 for the purpose of making the first comprehensive review of our national security policy process since the discussion and debate preceding the passage of the National Security Act of 1947.

The goal of the Subcommittee has been to determine whether the policy-making machinery at the highest levels of our government is adequate to identify and plan ahead on the critical issues of national survival; to determine whether this same machinery promotes effective coordination of policies; and to make constructive recommendations for improvement where necessary.

The National Security Act of 1947 established the National Security Council as the main organ at the summit of the government for advising the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security. The National Security Council and its subordinate machinery have, therefore, been a central subject of the studies and hearings of the Subcommittee.

I asked the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council whether he and his staff would be willing to take on the task of preparing an organizational history of the Council, to be published as a Subcommittee print. This study represents their generous response to my request.

The two authors of the study, Mr. James S. Lay, Jr. and Mr. Robert H. Johnson, write from a unique background of experience. Mr. Lay has served continuously with the NSC staff since the Council was established in 1947—as Assistant Executive Secretary of the Council from 1947 to 1950 and as its Executive Secretary since that time. Mr. Johnson has been a member of the NSC staff since 1951 and, since August 1959, has been Director of the Planning Board Secretariat.

The Subcommittee is most grateful for this valuable work. I am confident it will prove of wide interest to the Congress, Executive Branch officials, scholars, and the general public.

HENRY M. JACKSON,

*Chairman, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery.*

AUGUST 11, 1960.

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## ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>

### I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

In a little less than thirteen years the National Security Council has been transformed from a brief statement of purposes in the National Security Act of 1947 into a well-established part of the governmental machinery. Two Presidents have endorsed, supported and fully utilized it. The organization and procedures of the Council have been adjusted to meet the individual needs and desires of each of the Presidents who have presided over it as well as the requirements of a changing world situation. However, the Council mechanism has also evolved continuously; each stage in its development has been built upon the stage before.

Even in advance of World War II there were individuals who saw the need for improved means of correlating our foreign policy with our military and economic capabilities. However, it was the deficiencies exposed by the pre-Pearl Harbor period of diplomatic and military maneuver, the handling of wartime problems involving relationships between foreign, military and domestic policies, and the development of policies for the postwar period that demonstrated to many individuals, in and out of government, the need for better machinery for relating our foreign and our military policies. During the wartime period General George C. Marshall is understood to have been an early advocate of improved top-level coordinating machinery.

The genesis of the National Security Council has, however, many sources. One such source was U.S. wartime participation with the British in combined committees, and more particularly, our experience with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In these committees the U.S. participants became familiar with British development and use of committees and committee secretariats. In the course of their collaboration with the British, U.S. officials also became familiar with the British Committee of Imperial Defense which had been established in 1904 as a means of assuring high-level coordination of national security matters.

U.S. officials recognized that any similar U.S. organizations would have to be adapted to the requirements of the U.S. Presidential system which are, of course, in important respects different from those of the British Parliamentary system. The experience of the United States with the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization was applied during

<sup>1</sup> This history deals only with the unclassified organization and procedures of the National Security Council. It does not include the substance of papers or discussions on national security matters within the NSC organization because they are of a confidential nature involving matters of Presidential privilege and because most of them must remain classified for security reasons. Obviously, it would be inappropriate for this history to contain any individual appraisal of the many distinguished officials who have been associated with the NSC organization. However, it should be recognized that the organization and procedures described herein were largely governed by the requirements of the subject matter and of the individuals involved in the work of the Council during the various stages of its history. In fact, the purpose of the organization and procedures on which this history concentrates is to serve the officials of the Council in dealing with the substantive problems and issues affecting the security of the United States now and in the foreseeable future.

the war to the development of the organizational structure of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as to the development of the staff and sub-committee structure of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), established late in 1944 to provide a more regular channel of communication between the State Department and the U.S. military on politico-military matters.<sup>2</sup>

The "Committee of Three" which was established during World War II and subsequently abolished was, in a sense, one of the predecessors of the National Security Council. This committee was composed of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and was designed to facilitate consultation among these Presidential advisers on politico-military matters.

<sup>1a</sup> In the immediate post-war period numerous individuals and groups studied the problem and advocated some kind of high-level coordinating mechanism. One of the more comprehensive of these studies, and the first one to suggest the name "National Security Council", was the report prepared by Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt for Secretary of the Navy Forrestal in September 1945 as a result of the controversy over unification of the armed services.<sup>3</sup>

So many different individuals and organizations contributed to the development of the concept and the specific legislative proposals relating to the National Security Council that analysis of this phase of the Council's history could readily provide the basis for a separate study. It is necessary in this short history of the Council, therefore, to concentrate essentially upon developments which began with the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947. Even for the period covered, this history does not pretend to be completely comprehensive, but it does attempt to cover all major developments.

The National Security Act, passed by a Republican Congress and approved by a Democratic President, is best known as the legislation that provided for "unification" of the armed services. However, it was the intent of Congress in passing the act "to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States"<sup>4</sup> and Title I of the Act provides coordinating mechanisms in three other areas of national security activity—i.e., the areas of national security policy; of intelligence; and of military, industrial and civilian mobilization. The National Security Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) were created to coordinate the various activities of the existing Executive departments and agencies in these three fields.<sup>5</sup>

The Act provided that the function of the Council should be to "advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security." It further stated that, subject to the direction of the President, the Council should:

a. . . . assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and

<sup>2</sup> SWNCC was reconstituted as the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC) following the end of the war. For discussion of the relationship of SANACC to the NSC see *infra*, pp. 14, 15.

<sup>3</sup> *Unification of War and Navy Departments and Post-war Organization for National Security*, Report to Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of Navy. (Committee on Naval Affairs, United States Senate, 79th Congress, First session), pp. 7-8, 55.

<sup>4</sup> National Security Act of 1947, Section 2.

<sup>5</sup> The Eberstadt report had also proposed creation of a CIA and an NSRB.

potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and

b. . . . consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and . . . make recommendations to the President in connection therewith.

The Central Intelligence Agency, created by the same Act, was placed under the Council.<sup>6</sup>

The Act specified that the Council should be composed of the President, Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force, and the Chairman, National Security Resources Board, but authorized the President to designate the Secretaries of executive departments, the Chairman of the Munitions Board and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board as Council members. The Act further stated that the President should preside over Council meetings, but provided that, in his absence, he might designate a member of the Council to preside in his place. Finally, the Act provided for the establishment of a career staff headed by a civilian Executive Secretary appointed by the President.

It is possible to identify three distinct phases in the Council's evolution: (a) an initial phase (September 1947-June 1950) during which the Council was organized and established itself as a useful part of the governmental machinery; (b) a second phase (June 1950-January 1953) during which the Council was reorganized in the light of operational experience and to meet the greatly increased demands placed upon it by the Korean War; and (c) a third phase (January 1953 to date) during which the Council mechanism was further strengthened and adjusted to the requirements of a new President.

## II. THE INITIAL PHASE

(SEPTEMBER 1947-JUNE 1950)

### Introduction

Those who participated in the initial organization and work of the Council were motivated by certain key principles. Central to everything else was their recognition of and emphasis upon the Council's role as a policy advisory body to the President.

At the time the Council was organized there were some within the Executive Branch who favored a somewhat different emphasis. They did not deny that the Council was fundamentally an advisory body to the President. But they believed that when, in the absence of the President, there was consensus within the Council on a particular matter; when the departments or agencies represented on the Council were able to carry out the decision reached; and when that

<sup>6</sup> Section 102(a). The relationship is spelled out in Section 102(d). A predecessor organization, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), had been established on January 22, 1946 by Presidential Directive. CIG was, in September 1947, therefore a functioning organization and provided the organizational base upon which CIA was built. The Presidential Directive of 1946 also created the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) (composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and a personal representative of the President) to seek to ensure that the foreign intelligence activities of the U.S. Government were "planned, developed and coordinated so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security". The Director of Central Intelligence, who headed CIG, performed his responsibilities "under the direction and control" of the NIA (11 *Federal Register* 1337-39, February 5, 1946). NIA was, in turn, closely associated with the so-called "Committee of Three" which had the same membership as NIA (except that it did not include a President's representative) but a broader role. Mr. Sidney Souers, who was named as the first Director of Central Intelligence, was subsequently the first NSC Executive Secretary.



decision was within the scope of previously approved Presidential policies, it would not be necessary to take the matter to the President for decision.

It was decided, however, that the Council's role should be limited strictly to advising the President. The advisory character of the Council was the principal theme of a statement of the "Concept" of the Council approved by the President in July 1948.<sup>7</sup> The only qualification placed upon this proposition was the recognition that, under the statute, the Council members had certain corporate responsibilities for issuing general directives concerning the organization and coordination of such foreign intelligence activities of the several government departments and agencies as relate to the national security. Even this is not truly an exception, for the President retains the ultimate power of decision within the Executive Branch.

Corollary to this emphasis upon the advisory character of the Council was the acceptance of the principle that divergencies of view as to national security policy should not be suppressed, but should be clearly reflected at each stage in the development of a policy. This principle has been applied to the Council's work throughout its history and regularly resulted in presentation to the President of what have come to be known as "split" policy recommendations.

Within the broad and basic concept as to the advisory character of the Council, the officials responsible for organizing the Council's work faced certain immediate practical decisions as to what kinds of problems should be tackled first. The Council's functions, as stated in the statute, were very broad indeed. It was believed, however, that the Council could most quickly establish itself as an organization of recognized usefulness to the President and to the departments and agencies if, initially, instead of concentrating on some of the broader, longer-range national security problems, it were to make itself available to the Council agencies for the development of policies to deal with problems which were of immediate, current concern to those agencies and which required Presidential decision. Finally, it was recognized that the Council was likely, under the circumstances existing at that time, to be concerned in very considerable measure with problems involving foreign affairs and that, accordingly, the State Department would play a major role within the organization.<sup>8</sup>

#### *The organization of the Council*

The National Security Act of 1947 was approved by the President on July 26, 1947. Mr. Sidney Souers, the Executive Secretary Designate, began assembling a small permanent Council Staff in August.<sup>9</sup> The Council held its first meeting on the effective date of the Act, Friday, September 26, 1947. Mr. Souers was sworn in as Executive Secretary just prior to the meeting, together with the heads of two other new agencies established by the Act, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman, National Security Resources Board.

Certain basic organizational decisions were made at the first meeting of the Council. It was decided that the permanent membership

<sup>7</sup> The immediate occasion for the preparation of the "Concept" was an appearance by the Executive Secretary before a Hoover Commission Task Force. However, it was based upon and codified similar statements that had been made upon earlier occasions.

<sup>8</sup> On this last point see Sidney W. Souers, "Policy Formulation and National Security". *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. XLIII, No. 3 (June 1949) p. 536.

<sup>9</sup> On the day the Council held its first meeting the Council had, in addition to the Executive Secretary, three employees, all detailed by participating agencies. One of these was the present Executive Secretary, Mr. James S. Lay, Jr.

should be restricted to those officials specified by the Act and that attendance of other officials would be only with the approval of the presiding officer. The heads of other agencies were regularly invited for items of interest to them.<sup>10</sup> It was agreed that the Director of Central Intelligence should attend all Council meetings as an adviser and observer. It was decided that no set schedule of meetings should be established, but that meetings should be arranged as required. The Council at this inaugural meeting also approved recommendations of the Executive Secretary, developed in consultation with the participating agencies, with respect to the functions and composition of the NSC Staff and with respect to the initial study assignment to the Staff. It was agreed that CIA should initially furnish necessary administrative services to the NSC (*e.g.*, fiscal, personnel and supply services).

Although President Truman presided at the first Council meeting and occasional meetings thereafter, he did not regularly attend such meetings until the beginning of the Korean War.<sup>11</sup> The President's decision not to attend Council meetings was based upon his concern that the discussion might be terminated prematurely by too early an expression of his own views<sup>12</sup> and upon his view that in this way he could best preserve his full freedom of action with respect to the policy recommendations of the Council, including any dissents thereto.

There were those who argued that, in view of the statement in the statute that "The Secretary of Defense shall be the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the national security", he should preside in the President's absence.<sup>13</sup> However, the President decided that the Secretary of State, as the second ranking member of the Council as then constituted, would preside. This decision was also consistent with the concept that, under the circumstances then existing, the State Department would play a major role in the organization.

The Council's recommendations were brought to the President for his consideration following the meeting, ordinarily by the Executive Secretary who served, in effect, as an Administrative Assistant to the President for national security matters. The President was kept regularly informed of the status of Council business through regular briefings by the Executive Secretary. The Executive Secretary saw the President daily to brief him on the latest foreign intelligence as well as on Council matters.<sup>14</sup> Even though the President did not regularly preside, Council meetings were, from the beginning, held in the Cabinet Room of The White House.

During this period certain changes occurred in the initial arrangements regarding meetings and Council participation. In May 1948 the Council agreed that meetings should be regularly scheduled twice a month. However, a meeting might be cancelled if there was no

<sup>10</sup> It would not be useful to list for the period 1946-50, or for subsequent periods covered in this history, all of the other officials who participated in Council meetings on an *ad hoc* basis. However, it may be of interest to note that the following participated on this basis during the period September 1947 to December 1948: The Secretaries of Treasury, Commerce and Labor; the Attorney General; the Economic Cooperation Administrator and the Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board.

<sup>11</sup> President Truman presided at twelve of the 57 Council meetings which were held during the period from September 26, 1947 through June 23, 1950.

<sup>12</sup> Souers, *op. cit.*, p. 541.

<sup>13</sup> National Security Act of 1947, Section 202(a). In 1949 this section was amended to provide that "The Secretary of Defense shall be the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense."

<sup>14</sup> With the retirement of Admiral William H. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President, on March 26, 1949, the Executive Secretary assumed full responsibility for briefing the President daily on politico-military affairs, a task he had previously performed in cooperation with Admiral Leahy.

business to transact and special meetings might be scheduled as required. These rules prevailed until the beginning of the Korean War. Two significant changes in membership occurred in the period. In January 1949 the President directed that the Secretary of the Treasury attend all Council meetings. On August 19, 1949, the President approved amendments to the National Security Act which created the Department of Defense as an Executive Department and greatly strengthened the position of the Secretary of Defense, giving him clear primacy over the Service Secretaries.<sup>15</sup> These amendments also eliminated the Service Secretaries from the Council membership and added the Vice President. The same amendments made the Joint Chiefs of Staff military advisers to the Council. The Chairman, JCS, thereafter attended all Council meetings. By Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1949, effective August 20, 1949, the Council was placed in the Executive Office of the President, thus formalizing a *de facto* situation.<sup>16</sup>

A Council staff and committee structure to deal with U.S. internal security problems was developed as a result of Council action initiated in April 1948. At that time the Council employed Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, former Chief of the Internal Security Division of the FBI, as a consultant. Mr. Coyne, who was recommended to the Council by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, undertook at the Council's request a survey of the problem of internal security. His report, submitted to the Council in August, concluded that a more thoroughly coordinated and integrated effort was required in this field. To this end, he proposed creation of a Special Assistant on Internal Security to the National Security Council who would be charged with responsibility for making an assessment and appraisal of the over-all internal security program on a continuing basis and who would arrange through interested agencies for studies of particular internal security problems with a view to developing agreed solutions to such problems. In carrying out this function this individual was to work closely on a consultative, advisory and mutually cooperative basis with the representatives of the interested Executive departments and agencies. The Council adopted the conclusions of this report, but deferred action on the recommendation with respect to a Special Assistant.

After further consideration of the problem the NSC in March 1949 approved a directive establishing the already existent Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) as a committee of the NSC and creating a new Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS).<sup>17</sup> Specific charters for the two committees were approved subsequently by the Council. The IIC was already responsible for the coordination of the investigation of all domestic espionage, counter-espionage, sabotage, subversion and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security. The ICIS was made responsible for coordination of all other internal security matters.

<sup>15</sup> Public Law 216, 81st Congress.

<sup>16</sup> The Council offices were from the beginning located in the Executive Office Building. There were those who, at the time the Council was getting organized, favored locating Council offices in the Pentagon. In fact, office space was provided for the Executive Secretary in the Pentagon, but never occupied. The decision to locate the Council offices in the Executive Office Building reflected a conscious recognition of the Council's role as a staff arm to the President.

<sup>17</sup> At the time it was established as a committee of the NSC, the IIC was made up of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice; the Director of the Intelligence Division of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; and the Director, Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force. The membership today is the same except that the title of the Army representative is now "Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army" and, of the Air Force representative, "Director of Special Investigations, the Inspector General, Headquarters U.S. Air Force". The ICIS was, and continues to be, composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice and the National Military Establishment (now, the Department of Defense).

The directive of March 1949 also created an NSC Representative on Internal Security who, under the direction of the Executive Secretary, was responsible for (a) assisting and advising the NSC in coordinating the activities of the IIC and the ICIS; (b) assisting and advising the IIC and the ICIS in carrying out their responsibilities; (c) submitting to the IIC and the ICIS questions which, in his opinion, required their consideration; (d) participating, as the representative of the NSC, as an observer and adviser in all meetings of the IIC and the ICIS; (e) submitting for NSC consideration any problems which could not be resolved by the IIC and the ICIS, outlining divergent solutions proposed and making his own recommendation; and (f) reporting to the NSC at least quarterly on progress being made in the provision of adequate internal security. It was specified, however, that he should have no power of instruction, direction or supervision over the IIC or the ICIS. Mr. Coyne was designated as the NSC Representative on Internal Security.

When, acting within its Presidentially-approved charter, either of the committees reached an agreement on a particular course of action, that agreement could be referred to the appropriate agency for implementation without prior reference of the matter to the NSC. The NSC Representative on Internal Security sought to ensure that matters that did appear to require Council action were brought to the Council's attention. The Council was kept regularly informed of the committees' activities through reports on those activities.

Beginning with this initial period and thereafter throughout its history, the Council has from time to time established other standing committees or subcommittees. Such standing committees occasionally include members from non-Council agencies. However, they have characteristically been created to deal with some particularly sensitive subject or with a subject of direct interest to only a few of the agencies that participate in the Council's work.<sup>18</sup>

#### *The organization of the staff*

A major consideration in the initial organization of the Council's staff was stated as follows by the first Executive Secretary of the Council:

In organizing the staff, an effort has been made to steer a middle course between two undesirable extremes. If the personnel were entirely composed of permanent Council employees, there would be a tendency to reach "ivory tower" conclusions out of step with operational developments. On the other hand, if the personnel were solely officers detailed from the participating departments, unavoidable turnover might cause a loss of continuity. The staff, therefore, is a mixture of these two types.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> It may be useful here to compare the recommendations of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (the "Hoover Commission") regarding the NSC with the organizational changes described above. The Hoover Commission in 1949 recommended *inter alia*: (a) that the President be given authority to determine the membership of the Council; (b) that better working level relationships be established between the JCS organization and the NSC and other agencies; (c) that internal security planning be improved; (d) that CIA be improved and strengthened; and (e) that the Council be placed formally within the President's Office. The 1949 statutory changes helped ease some of the immediate problems with respect to membership by limiting the military establishment to a single Council representative. The statutory change with respect to the JCS relationship to the Council eased, but did not completely solve, the problem referred to in (b); further organizational changes effected in 1950 did, however, largely solve this problem (*infra*, p. 19). The surveys of internal security and intelligence activities (on the latter see *infra*, p. 10), which had already been undertaken by the Council, together with the Council actions flowing therefrom, covered the matters mentioned in (c) and (d). Placement of the NSC in the Executive Office of the President dealt with the recommendation referred to in (e).

<sup>19</sup> Souers, *op. cit.*, p. 537.

That part of the staff organization drawn from the agencies that participate in the Council's work has, throughout the Council's history, performed two basic functions. On the one hand, the individuals who comprise this part of the staff have been individually responsible for bringing the resources of their respective departments and agencies to bear upon the Council's work. On the other hand, these individuals have, as a group, prepared the papers considered by the Council. The permanent career staff of the Council has provided certain central services and has been a source of independent analysis of the subjects before the Council and its subordinate interdepartmental staff groups.

The Council Staff, as initially organized, had three principal components: (a) the Office of the Executive Secretary; (b) a Secretariat which performed such usual secretariat duties as circulating papers, preparing agenda and recording Council actions; and (c) a unit called "The Staff" which developed studies and policy recommendations for Council consideration. The office of the Executive Secretary and the Secretariat were composed entirely of permanent Council employees. "The Staff", on the other hand, initially consisted wholly of officials detailed on a full-time basis by the departments and agencies represented on the Council, though it was assisted by permanent staff members. Because, as earlier noted, it was anticipated that the majority of problems dealt with by the Council under then-existing conditions would relate primarily to foreign affairs, the State Department was asked to provide an official to head this Staff. This official was called the "Coordinator of the Staff". In December, 1947, a permanent Council employee was added to "The Staff". Obtained by permanent transfer from State, he was designated "Assistant to the Coordinator". Immediately following the first Council meeting, full-time members of "The Staff" were designated by State, Army, Navy, Air Force and CIA. The State Staff Member was not initially the same individual as the "Coordinator". The Secretary of Defense, who was not at this time represented on "The Staff", designated a Special Assistant to maintain liaison with the Executive Secretary. Because it was itself in process of organization during this period, the NSRB did not designate a Staff member until February 1948. Non-members of the Council were represented at meetings of "The Staff" on an *ad hoc* basis when subjects of concern to them were being considered. Members of "The Staff" were generally of the rank of lieutenant colonel or colonel (Navy: commander or captain) or equivalent Civil Service rank; the Coordinator was a senior Foreign Service Officer.

It might be noted here that the changes that have occurred during the life of the Council in the terminology applied to the different parts of the Council staff organization have been a source of some confusion to those outside the organization. Thus initially, as indicated, the term "The Staff" was applied to the principal interdepartmental component of "The NSC Staff".<sup>20</sup> Following the 1950 reorganization the interdepartmental components, the "Senior NSC Staff" and the "Staff Assistants", were formally still considered a part, along with the permanent career staff, of "The NSC Staff". However, in practice it became customary to apply the latter term to the permanent

<sup>20</sup> Hereafter when reference is made to this interdepartmental staff component of the 1947-50 period, it will be identified as "The Staff" in quotation marks.

career staff only. This practice was formalized at the time of the 1953 reorganization.

In November 1947 a fourth component was added to the Council staff structure. As a result of a meeting of the Four Secretaries (Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force) attended by Mr. Souers, the chiefs of the plans and operations divisions in the three military services were designated "Consultants" to the Executive Secretary. The Secretary of State similarly agreed to designate the Chief of the Policy Planning Staff as the State Consultant to Mr. Souers. A Consultant was named by NSRB in June 1948, and the Director of Central Intelligence performed this function for CIA. In addition, the Secretary of Defense designated the Director of the Joint Staff to advise the Executive Secretary. Although a number of important changes have been made in the Council staff organization since 1947, the basic pattern of a two-level interagency staff organization, established in 1947, has persisted down to the present day.

Only relatively minor changes occurred in this staff organization during the period under review. In April 1949, after Mr. Louis Johnson became Secretary of Defense, he named a Member for "The Staff" and formally designated the Director of the Joint Staff as his NSC Consultant. The position of State Member of "The Staff" and the position of the Coordinator of "The Staff" were combined in July 1949. After the National Security Act was amended in August 1949, the three members of "The Staff" from the military services were redesignated "Advisers" and the representative of the Secretary of Defense became the sole member from the Defense Department. The Service Advisers continued, however, to participate fully in the work of "The Staff".

#### *Staff and Council procedures*

Something of the character of the problems with which the Council was concerned during this period, as well as during subsequent periods, may be suggested by a brief description of the four principal categories of policy papers considered by the Council. First and most important are the basic over-all policy papers which cover a wide range of national security problems and contain related political, economic and military strategy. Second are the papers covering individual foreign countries or larger geographical regions. A third category might be called "functional" policies. These cover such national security policy matters as mobilization, atomic energy, Free World-Sino-Soviet Bloc trade, and regulation and control of armaments. Organizational policies constitute the final category. These include, among others, policies relating to the Council's own organization, internal security organization and the general policy directives relating to the organization and coordination of foreign intelligence activities which are issued by the Council pursuant to the National Security Act.

The Council at its first meeting, on the recommendation of the Executive Secretary, made the assessment of U.S. objectives, commitments and risks in relation to actual and potential U.S. power a continuing, long-range study assignment of the NSC Staff. However, in accordance with the basic approach described earlier, it was decided very early that this assignment should be tackled initially through studies of certain critical areas of the world. It was agreed that these studies should subsequently be incorporated in an over-all appraisal of U.S. objectives, commitments and risks.



During much of the period 1947–50, therefore, the great majority of the policies considered by the Council were policies dealing with particular foreign countries or larger geographical regions which presented problems of critical significance at the time. Initially papers of this kind were focused on single (though major) problems and in some cases provided quite detailed policy guidance for dealing with those problems. Papers dealing with a single foreign country did not attempt to deal with all aspects of U.S. relations with the country, but only with certain key aspects. However, as the months and years passed the Council and its staff progressively tackled broader, longer-range problems and broadened the scope and coverage of country and regional policy papers. The first paper of a broad over-all character dealing with the basic national security problems facing the United States was adopted by the Council in November 1948.

In this initial phase of the Council's existence relatively few policies of the "functional" variety were acted upon by the Council. However, because the Council was establishing many of its basic organizational arrangements during this period and was also making recommendations for organizational change in areas of governmental activity related to the Council's work, organizational policies constituted an important proportion of the Council's business. For example, the Council began in December 1947 to discharge its responsibilities under the National Security Act for issuing general policy directives concerning the organization and coordination of such foreign intelligence activities of the several departments and agencies as relate to the national security. In January 1948 the Council initiated a general survey of foreign intelligence activities. This survey was made by a group of consultants from outside the government and marks the first such use of outside consultants by the Council.<sup>21</sup> The recommendations made by this survey group were subsequently considered in the Council.

Some reorientation was given to the work of the Council and "The Staff" when, on May 4, 1949, not long after the beginning of President Truman's second Administration, the Executive Secretary met with the Under Secretary of State, the Chief of the Policy Planning Staff and other State Department officials to discuss the work of the Staff, and, in particular, the type of reports that the Staff had been preparing. On the basis of the conclusions reached in that discussion, the Executive Secretary on May 26 issued instructions to the Coordinator of "The Staff" requesting "The Staff" (a) to conduct a periodical review of all current national security policies in order to determine what revisions were necessary; and (b) to undertake a program of studies on major policy problems which would appraise the national security aspects of those problems and analyze alternative courses of action open to the United States, without, however, making policy recommendations. These instructions thus initiated two new types of staff activity—a general review of existing policies, and the preparation of papers which discussed policy alternatives without recommending a particular policy.<sup>22</sup> Both types of activity have been a recurrent feature of Council business in the period since 1949.

From the beginning, proposals for Council projects could and did originate in a variety of different ways. In the first year of the

<sup>21</sup> One of the members of this survey group was Mr. Allen W. Dulles, the present Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>22</sup> The review of policies was undertaken immediately; the first Staff report analyzing policy alternatives was discussed in the Council in August 1949.

Council's operation, for example, State was the most important single source of the Council's agenda subjects but the Secretary of Defense, the Army and the Air Force together originated nearly as many Council projects. In fact, a striking feature of the Council's early activities was the leading role which the late Mr. Forrestal played in initiating Council projects during the period that he was Secretary of Defense. The NSC Staff, the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee,<sup>23</sup> CIA and Commerce were other sources of projects during the first year.

Members of "The Staff", though assigned to the Council on a full-time basis and physically located together in the NSC offices, also maintained offices in, and regular contact with, their respective agencies. Meetings of "The Staff" were conducted on an informal basis with the Coordinator serving as chairman. The first step in the preparation of a paper was a meeting of "The Staff" to discuss the policy problem and to define the scope of the particular report. Although the principal participants in these Staff discussions were the members detailed by the agencies, certain members of the permanent career staff also participated. While the latter did not make policy recommendations, they did raise questions, suggest additional issues, and often prepared redrafts of papers on the basis of the Staff discussions.

Each Staff member obtained the staff-level views of his respective department or agency with respect to the matter under review. These views were sometimes submitted in writing. After one or more Staff discussions, in the course of which the agencies represented on "The Staff" further clarified their views on the subject, one member of "The Staff" was ordinarily requested to prepare a draft report. In the usual case, the first draft of the report was prepared by the State Department member. As a variant of this procedure, utilized particularly in the early days of the Council, the members of "The Staff" were requested to prepare individual agency contributions which were subsequently integrated into a single report.

The usual policy paper prepared by "The Staff" during this period consisted of three basic elements: (a) a very brief and quite general statement of the problem to which the paper was addressed; (b) an analysis of the problem; and (c) conclusions. The analysis normally included such elements as a statement of U.S. objectives, a statement of existing policies and commitments, an estimate of the situation and possible future developments, and an analysis of the alternative courses of action open to the United States. The "Conclusions" were the only section of the paper normally acted upon by the Council. The paper as a whole was ordinarily very brief.

After several meetings of "The Staff" on a policy draft, it was sent to the Consultants for concurrences. The Consultants were not requested to concur in a paper in all of its particulars, but only to indicate their views as to whether the paper was in such condition as to be suitable for Council consideration. Although ordinarily these concurrences were obtained without a meeting of the Consultants, meetings were occasionally called by the Executive Secretary, particularly when there was a difference of view among the Consultants. Following such clearance, the paper, including any continuing diver-

<sup>23</sup> On the relationships between the Council and SANACC see *infra*, pp. 14, 15.

agencies of view, was submitted to the Council for its consideration.<sup>24</sup> The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were obtained by the Secretary of Defense on any papers having military implications and were circulated to the Council prior to its consideration of the paper.

Ordinarily the policy proposals acted upon by the Council were prepared by "The Staff". In these cases where a Council member submitted a policy proposal directly to the Council for consideration, it was usually referred, sometimes after preliminary Council discussion, to "The Staff" for preparation of a report and recommendations. Nonetheless, there were a number of instances in which the Council acted directly upon a report submitted by one of its members (generally the Secretary of State). Upon occasion the Secretary of State submitted reports for the information, rather than for the consideration, of the Council. Such reports, stating the current U.S. foreign policy position on some subject, were often discussed in Council meetings and were occasionally concurred in by the Council and the President.<sup>25</sup>

One of the features of the latter part of the period under review was the increasing use by the Council of *ad hoc* committees to prepare reports for its consideration. Such committees were generally, at least in original membership, composed of higher-level agency representatives than was "The Staff." They often included representatives of agencies which were not regularly represented on "The Staff." *Ad hoc* committees were assigned responsibility for recommending policies on some of the more critical problems during the latter part of this period.

The Council agenda from the start included a variety of different types of reports. Some were submitted for consideration as the basis for policy recommendations to the President. Others were submitted solely for Council information though, when scheduled on a Council agenda, they might provoke a Council discussion. Some reports were specifically designed to serve as the basis for Council discussion. Some Council papers were submitted by Council members, some by "The Staff," some by non-members of the Council, and others by special committees or by consultants. In some instances these were regular periodic reports, in other cases they were prepared in response to specific request or because of some development or anticipated development. The agenda also included both oral and written reports.

Certain regular reports were a standing feature of the Council agendas. Thus in the first year of the Council's existence a written current intelligence report was regularly placed on the agenda for the Council's information. Subsequently this report was submitted and scheduled monthly. In 1950 it was dropped altogether as an agenda item. Instead, the Director of Central Intelligence would from time to time in the course of Council discussion call the Council's attention to intelligence information which had a bearing on the policy papers under consideration or which was otherwise of interest to the Council. Beginning in May 1948 a report prepared by the NSC Secretariat on the current status of work on Council and Staff projects also became a regular agenda item.

<sup>24</sup> The first policy paper prepared by "The Staff" was submitted to the Council in mid-October, 1947, and considered and adopted in November. Since this paper was prepared before there were Consultants, it went directly to the Council.

<sup>25</sup> Souers, *op. cit.*, p. 539.

In the Council meeting, the Executive Secretary introduced each subject on the agenda, but generally did not attempt to summarize the contents of the reports before the Council on the assumption that each participant had done his "homework" in advance. The presiding officer was sometimes the first to comment upon a policy paper; on other occasions he called first upon the other Council members for comment. A general discussion of the policy paper followed.

A decision was made at the beginning of the Council's existence not to prepare written minutes which would reflect the Council discussion. It was believed that to do so would have an undesirable inhibiting effect upon the discussion. Therefore, throughout the Council's history, the only permanent official record that has been made is a record of the Council's action on the various subjects it has considered. During the period 1947-53, this record was prepared by the Executive Secretary on the basis of his understanding of the Council's actions, but was not normally circulated to the Council members for clearance in advance of its submission to the President. Council members could, of course, raise questions as to the Executive Secretary's interpretation of what had occurred in the meeting, following circulation of the approved record. Such action was seldom taken, however.

It should be noted that occasionally, when it did not appear necessary to have a formal Council discussion of a report, the Council acted upon it by memorandum approval. This practice, originating in the earliest months of the Council's activity, continues to the present though it is used infrequently.

A day or two after the Council meeting the Executive Secretary submitted to the President the record of the Council's actions and the policy papers as amended and adopted by the Council, including any remaining differences of view. He also submitted any Joint Chiefs of Staff views on the paper. The President acted upon the Council's recommendations, deciding any remaining differences of view. The President approved only the "Conclusions" of the policy paper; these became the national security policy on the subject.

Following the President's action upon them, the record of the Council's actions and the approved policy papers were circulated to all Council participants. From the beginning, when the President approved policy recommendations submitted to him by the Council, he directed that they be implemented "by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination" of the department or agency head who had the primary responsibility for implementation of the policy involved. In most cases this was the Secretary of State. The head of a department or agency which had been assigned responsibility by the President for implementation of a Council action or for the coordination of implementation of a policy paper was informed of his responsibility by individual memorandum from the Executive Secretary. It was the responsibility of the coordinating agency to notify all other departments and agencies of the actions for which each was responsible in implementation of the paper, and to ensure that such actions were taken in a coordinated manner. The coordinating agency was also responsible for ensuring appropriate dissemination of the policy, or extracts from it, to agencies of the government which were not members of the NSC.



The Council in 1948 established an *ad hoc* committee to re-examine procedures for the implementation of national security policies. That committee recommended, and the Council in October 1948 approved, continuation of existing procedures with the additional provision that the "coordinating agency" would submit progress reports at appropriate intervals which summarized the implementation of the policy. These reports were circulated to the Council for its information and scheduled on the agenda of a Council meeting. Thus an opportunity was provided for discussion at the Council level of the implementation of approved policies. Progress reports were quite brief (generally no more than one or two single-spaced pages). They sometimes reported on implementation on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis but initially there was no standard format. In the early period they were sometimes submitted as frequently as every month or two, though four to six months was the more usual time period.

Subsequently the instructions relating to the implementation of national security policies were amended to provide further that, if the coordinating agency and another participating agency differed as to interpretation of the policy or as to methods of implementation and were unable to resolve their differences, the divergent views would be submitted in writing through the Executive Secretary to the President for his decision.

#### *The State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee*

In late 1944, as noted earlier, there had been established, by agreement between the Secretaries concerned, a State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). When the Air Force was established as a separate department by the National Security Act of 1947 it was added to the membership of the committee and the committee was re-christened the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC). Although SANACC dealt with a broad range of problems, those relating to occupied areas constituted its most important single field of activity.

Soon after the Council was organized SANACC began to submit policy papers to it for its consideration. These were generally referred to the Staff for revision following preliminary Council consideration. Occasionally the Council in turn requested SANACC to prepare a report for it. The Executive Secretary of the Council maintained regular contact with the secretariat of SANACC and received SANACC papers. In this way, duplication of effort was avoided. However, it was evident that SANACC's functions closely paralleled, if they did not indeed in many respects duplicate, the functions of the NSC Staff.<sup>26</sup> An important difference (and one of the reasons that SANACC was temporarily continued) was the fact that, unlike the Council or its staff, it could, through action by its members, initiate implementation of its decisions, provided, of course, that the subject was within its terms of reference and that Presidential consideration was not required.<sup>27</sup>

An *ad hoc* committee of the Council was established in March 1948 to study the relationship between SANACC and the Council. That committee proposed interim terms of reference for SANACC which the Council approved in August 1948. Those terms of reference

provided that SANACC's principal functions would be (a) to advise and assist the NSC, preparing reports and studies requested by it; and (b) to coordinate matters referred to SANACC by any of its members or by the NSC. Thus SANACC was, in effect, recognized as being a part of the Council's staffing mechanism while at the same time it continued to perform coordinating functions on matters which did not come before the Council.

In accordance with the interim terms of reference, the Council made a further review of SANACC six months after approval of the terms of reference. That review resulted in action by the Council to dissolve SANACC as of June 30, 1949.

### III. THE SECOND PHASE

(JUNE 1950—JANUARY 1953)

#### *Introduction*

Though by the time of the Korean War the Council was a well-established, functioning organization, certain problems relating to the initial organizational arrangements began to become apparent. Attendance at the Council meetings, originally confined to the Council members themselves, gradually broadened to include the Consultants and other departmental advisers. This tended at times to have an inhibiting effect upon discussion and to result in undue reliance by Council members upon departmental advisers during the Council discussion. The absence of the President from the Council table, though it had been thought desirable for certain reasons noted earlier, tended to produce a less sharply focused discussion than if the President had been present, and action on important points at issue was sometimes deferred or was taken later outside the Council. Though the Council discussion was subsequently summarized for the President by the Executive Secretary, the President's absence from the meeting deprived him of the opportunity of hearing the Council members' direct expression of their own views, and of the opportunity to ask questions and to engage personally in the interchange of views around the Council table. Council members, lacking an opportunity to present their respective positions directly to the President in Council meetings, sometimes took occasion to do so individually following the meeting.

Moreover, detailed members of "The Staff", working as a group in the NSC staff offices, tended increasingly to be looked upon as "foreigners" by their respective agencies. On the other hand, the Consultants, all of whom had heavy departmental responsibilities, tended over time to give less and less attention to NSC matters. These tendencies toward the isolation of "The Staff" members from their agencies and toward the increased absorption of the Consultants in agency work produced two additional results: (a) the tendency of Council members to submit policy recommendations directly to the Council, by-passing "The Staff"; and (b) the tendency of the Council to refer many problems to *ad hoc* Council committees.

Experience had shown that direct referral of departmental papers to the Council, without joint staff work, led generally to delay. In the absence of such staff work which exposed pertinent facts, viewpoints and alternative policies and which clearly defined the issues in advance of the Council meeting, the Council generally found it neces-

<sup>26</sup> The Eberstadt report had recommended that the NSC take over the functions of SWNCC (*op. cit.*, p. 7; see pp. 53-54 of that report for a brief description of SWNCC organization and activities).

<sup>27</sup> In this respect SANACC was somewhat similar in character to the internal security committees of the Council established in 1949 and to the Operations Coordinating Board established in 1953.

sary to refer such papers to "The Staff" or to an *ad hoc* committee for interdepartmental staffing prior to final Council action.

*Ad hoc* committees were sometimes a useful and occasionally a notably successful device, but regular referral of problems to such committees often also delayed work unduly. Such delays were the results of such factors as (a) the heavy departmental responsibilities of many of the members of such committees; (b) the difficulties such committees have in arranging meetings and meeting deadlines (contrasted with staff groups that have regular, fixed meeting times and work programs); (c) the unfamiliarity of many of the members of such groups with Council requirements as to substance, format and procedure; and (d) finally, and most important, the frequent inability of such committees to relate their work on a particular policy problem to other pertinent approved national security policies. *Ad hoc* committee members also tended to approach problems primarily as representatives of their respective agencies.

Another problem was the lack of a Joint Chiefs of Staff representative on "The Staff". This lack made it very difficult to anticipate and take into account probable JCS views on a subject under discussion in advance of receipt of their formal written views. Such views, which were submitted only after staff work had been completed and the paper circulated to the Council for consideration, frequently required referral of the paper back to "The Staff" for reconsideration.

A final problem related to the chairmanship of the Council's major interdepartmental staff groups. As noted earlier, the State Department was from the beginning assigned a major role in the Council because of State's leading role in foreign affairs and because of the expectation that the Council's major concerns would be in the foreign affairs field. As an application of this principle, a State representative had been made Coordinator (chairman) of "The Staff". As the Council developed, the matters which were of concern to it gradually broadened to include many problems which did not relate solely or even primarily to foreign affairs, though many of these problems had important foreign affairs aspects, *e.g.*, military, defense mobilization, internal security and atomic energy problems. This gradual development was accelerated by the beginning of hostilities in Korea, which increased the importance and urgency of military and defense mobilization problems and the role of the military and defense mobilization representatives in the Council organization. In other words, while the majority of the policy papers with which the Council continued to be concerned were papers dealing with foreign affairs and while the State Department continued to play the major role in the development of these policy papers, the number of subjects involving direct, major responsibilities of other departments and agencies increased and with it, their role. In these changed circumstances the dual role of the State Coordinator of "The Staff", as an impartial chairman and as advocate of a State Department position, became increasingly difficult. Over time the feeling grew that other departments and agencies would cooperate more effectively in the work of the Council in matters directly affecting their own responsibilities if the major interdepartmental staff groups were chaired by someone without departmental ties. Finally, and of great importance, was the recognition that the work of the interdepartmental staff group which prepared reports for the NSC could be fully effective in serving the Council only

if the chairman of the group was personally cognizant, through regular contact with the President, of his desires and requirements regarding the work of the Council.

#### *Reorganization of the Council and the Staff*

All of these problems had been under consideration for some time by the Executive Secretary and others associated with the organization. They were provided with an opportunity to do something about them in connection with a general review of basic U.S. security policies in the winter and spring of 1950 which produced, as an early by-product, a general recommendation for a revised and strengthened staff organization. In response to this recommendation, the Executive Secretary<sup>28</sup> on April 17, 1950, submitted his proposals for the reconstitution and strengthening of the NSC Staff. He proposed the creation of a senior staff group composed of one representative designated by each Council member, with a military adviser designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and an intelligence adviser designated by the Director of Central Intelligence. In addition, other agency heads invited by the President to participate in Council work might, when appropriate, designate an *ad hoc* representative on this staff. The members of this senior staff group were to be individuals who could fully and accurately reflect the views of their principals and were to have such departmental status and freedom from other duties as to permit them to devote a large part of their time to Council work. The existing Staff members were to become assistants to the senior staff group so as to take full advantage of their experience and background and to ease the transition to the new organization.

One objection that was soon raised to these proposals related to the matter of JCS representation. It was argued that it was impossible for an individual "adviser" to represent a corporate body like the Joint Chiefs of Staff in such a staff organization.

In May 1950 the whole problem was referred by the Council to a special NSC committee, consisting of representatives of State, Defense, and NSRB, for the preparation, in collaboration with the Executive Secretary, of appropriate recommendations. However, the Korean hostilities began before the committee was ready to submit its report. Immediately following the beginning of the Korean War, President Truman began presiding regularly at all Council meetings except for occasional instances when he was unable to attend.<sup>29</sup> In those instances the Secretary of State presided. At about this same time the President directed that the Council meet regularly every Thursday and that all important recommendations relating to national security policy be coordinated through the Council and its staff.

On July 19, 1950, the President issued a directive with respect to the reorganization and strengthening of the Council and its staff. Once more he emphasized that all major national security policies should be recommended to him through the Council. He directed that Council attendance be restricted to the statutory members of the Council plus the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman, JCS, the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. W. Averell Harriman (Special Assistant to the President), Mr. Souers, and the Executive Secretary.

<sup>28</sup> Mr. Souers resigned as Executive Secretary effective January 15, 1950, and was succeeded by Mr. Lay. Mr. Souers was appointed a Special Consultant to the President and continued to attend all Council meetings until January 1953.

<sup>29</sup> President Truman presided at 62 (or 87 percent) of the 71 Council meetings held from June 28, 1950, through January 9, 1953.

He further directed that participation of other officials be only with his specific approval. He requested the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, NSRB, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence each to nominate a member for a senior staff group. The President himself designated the members of the senior staff group on the basis of these nominations. Finally, he named the Executive Secretary, NSC, chairman of the senior staff group.

Members of the senior staff group, or the "Senior NSC Staff" as it was soon called, were quickly nominated and, at the Senior Staff meeting on August 11, 1950, they in turn designated their assistants. Shortly thereafter Mr. Harriman also nominated a representative for the Senior Staff. Mr. Marion W. Boggs, a member of the career NSC Staff and former Assistant to the Coordinator of the Staff, was named Coordinator (*i.e.*, chairman) of the Staff Assistants. He also served as the executive secretary of the Senior Staff. The functions of these two interdepartmental staff groups continued to be those functions that the Council had assigned "The Staff" at the first Council meeting in 1947. On August 10, 1950, the Council directed that the Senior Staff assume responsibility for projects formerly assigned to *ad hoc* committees of the Council.

These changes were directed toward solving the problems noted above. The relationship between the changes in Council arrangements and the problems noted earlier is obvious and direct. The relationship between the changes and the problems at the staff level needs some elaboration, however. At the senior level the agency representatives on the Senior Staff were drawn much more fully and actively into the work of the Council than their predecessors, the Consultants. Whereas the Consultants had played a largely passive role, the Senior Staff replaced "The Staff" as the principal staff arm of the Council and absorbed the assignments of existing *ad hoc* committees. The members of the Senior Staff were generally of Assistant Secretary level or above and met as a group approximately twice a week (sometimes more frequently) during the first year. Thus the Council was provided continuous staff support by a high-level interdepartmental staff group.

Meanwhile, the Staff Assistants, unlike the members of "The Staff", no longer spent almost full time in NSC offices, but instead maintained offices only in their respective agencies where they could play a more active role in the development of agency views on papers before the Senior Staff and the Council. The Staff Assistants as a group, however, continued to do much of the pick and shovel work of redrafting papers for the Senior Staff. Thus, while their semi-estrangement from their agencies was ended, they continued, as a group, to look at national security problems from more than an agency perspective and to take, as did the Senior Staff and the Council, a national point of view.

Another change of considerable significance was the arrangement with respect to the chairmanship of the two major interdepartmental staff groups. The April proposals of the Executive Secretary had made no recommendations on this point. The selection by the President of the Executive Secretary as the Chairman of the Senior Staff provided the principal staff body with a chairman who, as head of the permanent NSC Staff in the Executive Office of the President, was an

official without departmental ties. Although he maintained a neutral position as to policy recommendations, he participated actively in leading the discussion in an effort to bring out all relevant facts and viewpoints and to explore all feasible alternative policies. Of greatest significance was the fact that the Executive Secretary, because of his daily contact with the President, was in a position to know or to ascertain the President's desires and requirements with respect to problems before the Senior Staff and the Council. Selection of a member of the permanent Council staff as the chairman of the Staff Assistants was a change of parallel significance.

The 1950 changes also improved considerably the relationship between the Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the staff level by placing a JCS representative on both of the new interdepartmental staff groups. Finally, the changes provided the Secretary of the Treasury who, as previously noted, had been a regular Council participant since 1949, with representation at the staff level.

#### *Subsequent changes in the Council and Staff organization*

Two major changes in Council membership and staff participation occurred during the period following the 1950 reorganization. Immediately after the beginning of the Korean War, the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) was created to coordinate mobilization activities immediately connected with the war, as contrasted with general long-range mobilization planning, responsibility for which continued to reside in NSRB. In December 1950 the President requested that the Director of Defense Mobilization participate in all Council meetings and in March 1951 the Director nominated a Senior Staff Member. The Economic Cooperation Administration had participated on an *ad hoc* basis in Council activities at both the Council and staff levels since 1948. However, the foreign assistance organization began participating in all Council activities in October 1951 when the Mutual Security Act of 1951<sup>30</sup> amended the National Security Act to make the Director for Mutual Security (a newly created office) a statutory member of the Council. He, in turn, nominated a member for the Senior Staff.<sup>31</sup>

In August 1951 the Bureau of the Budget designated an individual to serve as its representative in a purely advisory role at meetings of the Senior Staff and as its channel of communication with the Senior Staff. This representative did not attend all Senior Staff meetings. The Director, Bureau of the Budget, did not normally attend Council meetings.

In August 1951 an additional function was assigned to the permanent career staff of the Council. The President at that time, in connection with his action on a report relating to the status of current national security programs, directed the Executive Secretary to create, as a part of the NSC Staff, a small reporting unit to work with the responsible departments and agencies to ensure that reports on the status of such programs were made available promptly to the Council or to the President. Initially two members of the NSC Staff were assigned to this function. They concentrated primarily upon the

<sup>30</sup> Mutual Security Act of 1951, Public Law 165, 82nd Congress, Title V, Section 801-(e)-(1) (effective October 10, 1951).

<sup>31</sup> Since Mr. Harriman, who was designated Director for Mutual Security, had been attending Council meetings as a Presidential assistant and since he had a representative on the Senior Staff, the change in the statute did not affect attendance at Council and Senior Staff meetings though it did change the status of Mr. Harriman and his Senior Staff representative.



development and improvement, in cooperation with the agencies concerned, of regular semi-annual (later annual) status reports to the Council. These reports have regularly covered the military, mutual security, atomic energy, civil defense, mobilization, foreign information (now USIA), foreign intelligence, and U.S. internal security programs.<sup>32</sup> After the basic job of organizing this work had been done, the unit required only the part-time services of one individual. Apart from this addition and the designation of the Coordinator of Staff Assistants from the membership of the permanent career staff of the Council, the career staff was not basically changed as to function or organization during this period. However, members of the permanent career staff assisted the Executive Secretary in his roles as Chairman of the Senior Staff and as an assistant to the President for NSC matters by such means as suggesting questions with respect to papers before the Senior Staff, redrafting papers to reflect Senior Staff discussion, and suggesting deficiencies in existing policy coverage.

#### *Senior Staff and Council procedures*

During the last half of 1950 and the first half of 1951 the Senior Staff and Council were very active, largely on policy matters relating to Korea and other problems arising out of the generally tense international situation. Questions relating to the strengthening of major national security programs occupied a significant proportion of the time of the Senior Staff and the Council during this period. As has been indicated, the Senior Staff met approximately twice a week and sometimes met more frequently during the first few months of its existence. The Council was meeting an average of three times a month.

The latter part of 1951 and all of 1952 were characterized by a resumption of a regular pattern of Council business. The Senior Staff reviewed existing policies and prepared policies on new subjects in response to changes in the situation or anticipated developments. It met on an average of about once a week.<sup>33</sup> Though a weekly NSC meeting continued to be scheduled, the scheduled meetings were sometimes cancelled and the Council met an average of somewhat less than twice a month during this period.

Also during the period 1950-51, as a result of Congressional passage of the "Cannon Amendment" on September 27, 1950, and the "Kem Amendment" which superseded it on June 2, 1951,<sup>34</sup> the Council was given new statutory responsibilities of a rather unprecedented character. In essence, the Cannon Amendment provided that, during any period in which the armed forces of the United States were engaged in active hostilities carrying out a decision of the Security Council of the United Nations, no financial or economic assistance (other than military assistance) could be provided to a foreign country whose trade with Sino-Soviet Bloc countries was found by the NSC to be contrary to U.S. security interests. This legislation did not require reports to Congress. The Kem Amendment spelled out in somewhat more detail what kinds of commodities fell under the trade proscription and required the Secretary of Defense to prepare a specific list of such commodities. It required certifications by the countries

receiving U.S. assistance that they had not been engaging in such trade, but provided that exceptions could be made to these requirements upon official determination by the NSC that such an exception was in the security interests of the United States. The Council was required to report any such exception, with the reasons therefor, immediately to the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives, to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House. The Council was also required to make a quarterly review of such determinations and to report the results of its review to these committees. Finally, the Kem Amendment specified that each of these reports should contain an analysis of the trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc of the countries covered by the reports.

A Special Council Committee on East-West Trade undertook the required staff work.<sup>35</sup> The Council made an initial over-all determination under the Cannon Amendment in December 1950 but directed its Special Committee to make a continuing review and recommendations as required. The Council approved its second (and last) determination under the Cannon Amendment in February 1951 and directed the Special Committee to continue its review. Twenty determinations affecting thirty-six countries were prepared by the Special Committee under the Kem Amendment and submitted through the Senior Staff to the Council which approved them, transmitted them to the specified Congressional committees and released them publicly.<sup>36</sup> The Committee also prepared, and the Council approved, a final report and review of its determinations. The legislative requirement for such Council determinations was eliminated when the Kem Amendment was superseded by the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act (the "Battle Act") on October 26, 1951.<sup>37</sup>

Following the 1950 reorganization the State Department continued to be the source of first drafts of foreign country and regional policy papers which continued to constitute a major share of the Council's business. As in the past, other departments were the source of a first draft where the subject fell primarily within their area of responsibility and sometimes drafts were prepared in the Staff Assistants or in the Senior Staff on the basis of contributions from several agencies. After a preliminary discussion in the Senior Staff, a draft policy paper was ordinarily referred to the Staff Assistants for redrafting in the light of the discussion. The Staff Assistants' redraft was circulated to the Senior Staff for further consideration. This process was sometimes repeated one or more times before the paper was submitted to the Council. When the nature of a problem and the timing of action so dictated, the Senior Staff's work on a paper could, of course, be considerably speeded up. During the discussion of a draft policy paper in the Senior Staff, any Senior Staff member could suggest new ideas or alternative policies. The many ideas and policy alternatives generated by this process of interchange in the Senior Staff frequently provided the basis either for agreed or for "split" policy recommendations to the Council.

<sup>32</sup> Membership of this committee consisted of representatives of State, Treasury, Defense, Commerce, NSRB, ODM, ECA, JCS, CIA, Export-Import Bank, and Mr. Harriman's office.

<sup>33</sup> A number of additional countries provided the required certifications thus obviating the need for Council determinations to cover them.

<sup>34</sup> Public Law 213, 82nd Congress.

<sup>35</sup> Recently a report on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration programs has been added.

<sup>36</sup> In addition, Senior Staff steering committees were meeting during this period.

<sup>37</sup> Section 1304, Public Law 543, 81st Congress, September 27, 1950, and Section 1802, Public Law 45, 82nd Congress, June 2, 1951.

Toward the end of this period an increasing amount of the preliminary preparation of papers was done in steering committees of restricted membership from the Senior Staff and Staff Assistants prior to consideration by the full membership of these groups. A principal objective of this arrangement was to permit greater frankness of interchange on sensitive subjects among the representatives of those agencies which had the most direct concern with the particular subject matter.

In September 1950, shortly after the Council reorganization, the Senior Staff agreed to a new format for Council policy papers. What had formerly appeared at the end of the paper as "Conclusions" was now placed at the front of the paper as a draft "Statement of Policy". This Statement of Policy contained the Council's policy advice to the President and was the only part of the paper that the Council adopted and the President subsequently approved. The Statement of Policy was followed by an "NSC Staff Study" which normally included four major sections: (a) a statement of the problem; (b) an analysis, which usually included such elements as a statement of approved policies and other relevant facts bearing on the problem, an assessment and appraisal of U.S. objectives, commitments and risks in relation to actual and potential U.S. military power, an estimate of the situation and probable future developments, and other more particular factors bearing on the problem; (c) an enumeration and analysis of alternative courses of action; and (d) conclusions. During this period the format of the Statement of Policy went through a further evolution. By the end of the period it typically included three elements: (a) general considerations which consisted essentially of a summary statement of the elements contained in the analysis section of the staff study; (b) a statement of U.S. objectives; and (c) courses of action.

With staff work completed, the paper was circulated to the Council in advance of the Council meeting. The Joint Chiefs of Staff ordinarily submitted their views on the paper in advance of the meeting and these too were usually circulated. Each Senior Staff member was responsible for briefing his principal in advance of the meeting on the subjects before the Council; the Executive Secretary similarly briefed the President. The Council's agenda, which was determined by the President in consultation with the Executive Secretary, continued to include a variety of different kinds of reports and presentations. In the Council meeting the Executive Secretary, as Chairman of the Senior Staff, presented the Senior Staff's papers. Other procedures remained basically unchanged. Though the President now presided at Council meetings, he continued to reserve his own decision on Council policy recommendations until after the Council meeting when those recommendations were presented to him by the Executive Secretary for approval together with the record of the Council's actions.

When the President approved a policy recommended to him by the Council, he continued to designate the department or agency which had primary responsibility for action to coordinate its implementation. During this period he sometimes designated two agencies (e.g., State and Defense) as joint coordinators. The coordinating agency continued to submit progress reports; in the case of policies under joint coordination these were joint reports. Toward the end of the 1950-52 period, progress reports were often submitted less frequently than every six months.

The format for progress reports, as it had developed by this time in the Council's history, contained two basic elements: (a) a summary of important U.S. actions to implement the policy, and important developments which had favorably or unfavorably affected the policy or its implementation; and (b) a brief assessment of the effectiveness, adequacy and timeliness of the policy and its implementation. Progress reports did not propose specific changes in policy, but indicated the respects, if any, in which the policy was inadequate and needed review. If the Council recommended, on the basis of the information in a progress report, that a policy be reviewed and if the President approved that recommendation, the review itself was undertaken by the Senior Staff.

#### *The Psychological Strategy Board*

The Council had, virtually since its inception, regularly considered problems relating to the organization of psychological (including foreign information) activities. As a result of one such discussion in January 1951 the President requested Mr. Souers, his Special Consultant, and the Bureau of the Budget to make a further study and recommendations. Based upon this study the President in the spring of 1951 issued a directive establishing the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB).<sup>38</sup> With a basic membership of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence and with a full-time Director and staff, the PSB was responsible for the "formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations, of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort". Although the PSB was established outside the NSC structure, the Board was directed to report to the Council "on its activities and on its evaluation of the national psychological operations including implementation of approved objectives, policies, and programs by the departments and agencies concerned". The Director of the PSB was invited to attend Council meetings as an Observer and was represented by an Adviser on the Senior Staff.<sup>39</sup>

### IV. THE THIRD PHASE

(JANUARY 1953 TO THE PRESENT)

#### *Introduction*

The third phase of the Council's existence began with a thorough reappraisal of the Council's organization, as it had developed to 1953, and of the then current national security policies. By direction of President Truman, current national security policies were made available shortly after the 1952 election to President-elect Eisenhower, together with brief progress reports on each and related intelligence material. In late December 1952 the President-elect advised the Executive Secretary that Mr. Robert Cutler would be his Administrative Assistant with special responsibilities for the NSC. Mr. Cutler visited Washington soon after, and, on January 21, 1953, was sworn in as Administrative Assistant to the President. Mr. Cutler immediately embarked upon a thorough, wide-ranging study of the Council

<sup>38</sup> White House Press Release, June 20, 1951.

<sup>39</sup> Mr. Gordon Gray was one of the Directors of PSB who attended Council meetings as an Observer and Mr. Robert Cutler was one of those who served as PSB Adviser to the Senior Staff. Both of these individuals were later to serve as Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs.



organization. At the same time he began to attend and to take an active part in Senior Staff meetings.

The President on January 21 asked each statutory Council member (excepting the President and Vice President), the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence to designate, on a temporary basis pending permanent arrangements, an acting member of the Senior Staff. This temporary Senior Staff continued in existence until the President approved Mr. Cutler's proposals for Council reorganization in March. Attendance at the first Council meeting of the new Administration on January 29, 1953, was restricted to the statutory members and advisers. However, the Secretary of the Treasury was invited by the President on February 2 to attend all Council meetings and to designate an acting member of the Senior Staff.<sup>40</sup>

The reappraisal of the Council by the new Administration was designed to strengthen and improve it and to adapt it to the needs and desires of President Eisenhower. This reappraisal was based upon certain fundamental concepts with respect to the nature of the Council and how it should operate. These concepts contained a number of important elements of innovation; other elements were derived from the National Security Act itself or were built upon prior experience in the development and operation of the Council. Together these concepts form a coherent body of thinking on the subject, the understanding of which is important to an appreciation of the changes subsequently made in the Council organization. They are stated here as eight key considerations:<sup>41</sup>

1. The importance of the Presidential advisory character of the Council, and, deriving therefrom, the importance of adjusting the Council's operation to the needs of the new President.

2. The importance of achieving a proper balance in Council attendance between the consideration on the one hand of obtaining the advice of all who have some responsibility for the subject matter under consideration, and; on the other, of restricting attendance to that level which would permit intimate, frank and fruitful discussion.

3. The importance of a highly active, vigorous organization; an organization characterized by regular and frequent meetings, full agenda, vigorous discussion and strong leadership at all levels.

4. The importance of the most thorough sort of discussion in inter-departmental staff groups below the Council as a means of ensuring preparation of "precisely worded, carefully studied, and well presented" <sup>42</sup> papers which avoided *ex parte* presentation on the one hand, and the suppression of real differences of view on the other.

5. The importance of viewing the Council and its subordinate groups as bodies made up of individuals advising the President in their own right and not simply as the representatives of their agencies.

6. The importance of relying fundamentally upon the responsible officials represented on the Council and upon their staffs for ideas, for analysis and for the preparation of policy advice, thus avoiding an "ivory tower" approach or the interposition of individuals without departmental responsibilities between the President and his responsible Cabinet officials. At the same time, the importance of (a) bringing fresh points of view to bear upon the Council's work through increased

use of outside consultants; and (b) strengthening the capabilities of the permanent Council staff for independent analysis and review of national security problems and policy papers.

7. The importance of taking into account the financial implications of proposed policies; their effect upon the fiscal and budgetary situation and upon the domestic economy.

8. The importance of ensuring that approved national security policies are implemented in an integrated, coordinated fashion and in such a way as to make a full contribution to the particular climate of opinion the United States is seeking to achieve in the world.

#### *Reorganization of the Council and the Staff*

In the course of Mr. Cutler's study of the Council organization he consulted regularly with the President and solicited views from a number of people both inside and outside the government who had knowledge of and, in many cases, direct experience with the Council mechanism. Included in these consultations were former Council and Senior Staff Members and the former and present Executive Secretary. In addition to obtaining the individual views of such knowledgeable persons orally or in writing (or both), Mr. Cutler met with small groups of them in all-day sessions. Mr. Cutler also consulted with and obtained the assistance of the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and his staff and the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization.

On March 16, 1953, he submitted his report to the President who approved it the following day. The report recommended many changes, but because it also incorporated all of the basic instructions governing the organization and operation of the Council and its subordinate bodies, it confirmed a number of already existing arrangements as well.

After reaffirming the Presidential-advisory character of the Council, the report found that no changes were required in the existing statutory statement of the functions of the Council.

On the subject of attendance at Council meetings the report stated that, as a general rule no more than eight persons should have the right to participate as Council members. The report distinguished the several types of attendance at Council meetings, establishing five different categories of attendance: (a) statutory members, (b) participant members, (c) advisers (statutory and other), (d) observers, and (e) staff. Within the category of "participant members" a further distinction was made between those individuals who were invited on a "standing-request" basis to attend all Council meetings until the President otherwise decided and those who were invited to attend a meeting or a part of a meeting on an "*ad hoc*" basis. The categories generally formalized prior practice and were of value in providing a framework within which individual decisions on attendance could be made on a flexible basis in the light of the requirements of a particular Council agenda.

The report confirmed existing arrangements as to actual Council attendance with two exceptions: (a) it provided that the statutory membership of the Chairman, NSRB, should be transferred to the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization,<sup>43</sup> and (b) the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Planning became an Adviser to the

<sup>40</sup> The activities of the Senior Staff and Council during these first two months are set forth on pp. 25, 26.

<sup>41</sup> Most of these considerations can be readily derived from an article by Mr. Cutler in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 34, pp. 441-458 (April 1956), or from his March 1953 report to the President.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 447.

<sup>43</sup> Reorganization Plan 3 of 1953 (effective June 12, 1953) abolished NSRB and transferred all of the functions of the Chairman, NSRB (except those that it abolished altogether) to the Director, ODM.

Council while the Director, Psychological Strategy Board, was eliminated as an Observer. Thus, the Council membership was limited to a regular group of seven participants (the statutory members<sup>44</sup> and the Secretary of the Treasury). The two statutory advisers plus the Special Assistant for Cold War Planning also attended regularly. The absorption of NSRB by ODM had reduced the number of Council participants by one.

An important innovation was the provision that, if the President was unable to attend a Council meeting, the Vice President would preside in his stead.<sup>45</sup> Only in the absence of both the President and the Vice President would the Secretary of State preside. The report specified that a regular weekly meeting time should be established and ordinarily maintained.

The report explicitly rejected participation in the Council by individuals who had no departmental responsibilities. However, it provided for the appointment on an *ad hoc* basis of Consultants from outside the government who would, either individually or in groups, serve as informal advisers to the Council. Two examples were cited of the potential use of such Consultants: (a) to consider some specific new proposals or long-range project and report to the Council (in such a case its report would be reviewed by the agencies concerned); and (b) to review for the Council a proposal developed by the Planning Board.

The Senior Staff was renamed the "Planning Board", but retained the same functions. With the exception of the elimination of NSRB, the agency representation on the Planning Board remained unchanged though the representatives of the JCS and CIA were re-designated "Advisers" rather than "Members".<sup>46</sup> However, as Advisers they retained their right to have their dissents, if any, included in Planning Board reports to the Council. As in the past, other agencies might be invited by the Chairman to attend Planning Board meetings for items of interest to them. The chairmanship of the Planning Board was assigned to the newly established Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs<sup>47</sup> instead of the Executive Secretary. This assignment was consistent with the important principle, mentioned earlier, that the Chairman of the Council's principal policy-formulating staff body should be a person without departmental ties who, through a direct and close staff relationship with the President, was fully cognizant of the desires and the requirements of the President.

Mr. Cutler's report renamed the "Staff Assistants" the "Board Assistants". They continued, however, to have the same functions and to be chaired by a Coordinator from the NSC Staff.<sup>48</sup>

Though, apart from the change in chairmanship, the membership and functions of the Planning Board were not essentially changed by

<sup>44</sup> The President and Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director for Mutual Security and the Director, ODM.

<sup>45</sup> President Eisenhower has presided at 306 (or 90 percent) of the 338 Council meetings held from January 29, 1953, through June 30, 1960.

<sup>46</sup> Members of the Planning Board at this time were, in addition to the Special Assistant, representatives of State, Treasury, Defense, Mutual Security and ODM. JCS, CIA, and PSB were represented by Advisers. When PSB was later abolished and the Operations Coordinating Board established, a member of the OCB Staff (usually the Executive Officer or his Deputy) was a Planning Board Adviser. As noted below, this arrangement was further amended in 1967.

<sup>47</sup> The functions of the Special Assistant are described in greater detail just below.

<sup>48</sup> The Advisers from the three military services ceased attending Board Assistants meetings after April 1953. They continue, however, to provide support to Defense and JCS Planning Board representatives by assisting in the development of service views on the papers before the Planning Board and the Council.

the report, the report did contain some important specifications with respect to appointment of individual Planning Board Members and Advisers. It continued the provision for nomination by the agency head and appointment by the President (after approval by the Special Assistant).<sup>49</sup> It stated that each Member or Adviser should have direct access to and the personal confidence of his agency head. (Generally speaking, Planning Board Members are Assistant Secretaries, or equivalent, within their departments or agencies.) Most importantly, the report specified that each Member or Adviser should:

... have as his principal responsibility, which overrides all other duties and with which no other duty can interfere, his work with the Board, including preparation for and attendance at meetings; yet at the same time continue to be sufficiently in the stream of activity of his department or agency so as to be capable of representing its views.

This requirement was addressed to a problem that had appeared toward the end of the 1950-53 period. Senior Staff Members, though of high caliber and adequate rank, frequently became so absorbed in departmental responsibilities that they found it difficult to devote sufficient time and attention to NSC work. They tended to delegate real responsibility for Senior Staff work to alternates or to the head of the office within their agencies who was responsible for the particular subject matter being considered.

The report emphasized the importance of ensuring that the Board was constantly aware of the matters in which the Council was interested, though ideas for projects might germinate at any level in the organization. Finally, it stated that if conflicts of view could not be fairly resolved, they should never be suppressed or compromised, but should be reported to the Council.

The report simply listed the other existing standing committees of the Council and proposed no changes in them at that time.

One of the most important changes introduced by the report was the creation of the position of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Special Assistant was named the principal executive officer of the Council and Chairman of the NSC Planning Board. This change represented the designation by the President of a member of the White House Staff as his principal staff officer for national security affairs. The Executive Secretary, who had previously performed this general role, was reappointed head of the career staff of the Council and was designated to act for the Special Assistant in his absence and to advise and aid him in the performance of his duties.

The Special Assistant was made responsible for determination, subject to the President's desires, of the Council agenda, for briefing the President in advance of Council meetings,<sup>50</sup> and for presenting matters for discussion at the Council meetings. As Chairman of the Planning Board he was responsible for scheduling Planning Board work and for the manner of presentation and quality of such work. He was to appoint (subject where necessary to the President's ap-

<sup>49</sup> Each Planning Board Member and Adviser receives a personal letter of appointment from the President.

<sup>50</sup> It might be noted here that, with the beginning of the new Administration in 1953, responsibility for daily briefing of the President on current foreign politico-military developments was transferred from the Executive Secretary to the White House Staff Secretary. The Executive Secretary did continue to participate in the Special Assistant's briefing of the President before Council meetings.

proval) such *ad hoc* committees, such consultants from outside the Government and such mixed governmental-non-governmental committees as might be required. He supervised the work of the NSC Staff through the Executive Secretary.

Finally, the Special Assistant was charged with bringing to the attention of the President, with recommendations for appropriate action, lack of progress by an agency in carrying out any policy assigned to it; provided it was not possible to expedite performance at the Planning Board level. The report emphasized, however, that responsibility for implementation rested with the agency head concerned and that the role of the Special Assistant was, on behalf of the President, to inspect, not to evaluate or to direct. Mr. Cutler was named the President's first Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.<sup>51</sup>

The NSC Staff, headed by the Executive Secretary, was to continue to provide the secretariat for the Council and the Planning Board, to act as the official channel of communications for the Council and to provide, with CIA support, administrative services for the Council. The report confirmed the new arrangement under which the NSC Staff was responsible for briefing the Vice President on the matters before the Council.

In addition, as a final important change, the report provided for the strengthening of the NSC Staff by the establishment within it of a small "Special Staff" under the supervision of the Deputy Executive Secretary with, among others, the following duties: (a) independent analysis and review of each Planning Board report before its submission to the Council; (b) continuous examination of the totality of national security policies with a view to determining if gaps existed which should be filled and if important issues or anticipated developments were sufficiently explored; (c) continuing integrated evaluation of the capabilities of the free world versus the capabilities of the Soviet and Satellites, and estimates of the situation, in order to bring such evaluations and estimates before the Council; (d) providing a chairman or member of, or observer with, *ad hoc* non-governmental or mixed governmental-non-governmental committees, and assistance in recruiting such committees; and (e) keeping currently informed on the status of all national security programs and seeing that reports and pertinent information thereon were currently available (thus incorporating the functions of the Reporting Unit). The Special Staff, when it was established, was made up of two members of the existing professional staff of the Council (plus the Deputy Executive Secretary) and three additional staff officers. It continues to have, in addition to the Deputy Executive Secretary, five professional members today.

The report re-affirmed and emphasized the distinction between the Council, the Planning Board and the Special Assistant on the one hand and the NSC Staff on the other. The former group, it was recognized, was a part of and would change with changes in the Administration; the latter group, the report stated, should not be subject to change with political change.

<sup>51</sup> Mr. Cutler served from March 1953 to March 1955 and again from January 1957 to July 1958. Others who have held this position have been Mr. Dillon Anderson (April 1955–August 1956); Mr. William H. Jackson (Acting) (September 1956–December 1956); and Mr. Gordon Gray (July 1958 to the present).

### *Subsequent changes in the organization of the Council and the Planning Board*

The basic organization of the Council established by the March 17, 1953, report has been altered in only one fundamental respect since that time. That alteration occurred later in the same year when, on September 3, the President issued an Executive Order creating the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). Because the development of the OCB is itself a large subject, it has been treated separately below, along with changes in the NSC Staff that relate to the integration of the OCB within the NSC structure in 1957.

Several changes in Council participation, and related changes in Planning Board participation, occurred during the period. Attention will be concentrated here upon the changes that have occurred in the group of officials who have been entitled to participate fully in the work of the Council either as statutory members or as "participant members".

Beginning in early February 1953 the Director, Bureau of the Budget, began to attend Council meetings. Although he attended almost all meetings, he was, until July 1953, invited on an *ad hoc* basis for particular agenda items. During this period a representative of Budget also participated in the work of the Planning Board on an *ad hoc* basis.<sup>52</sup> In early July 1953 the Director became a standing-request participant member of the Council and was represented thereafter on the Planning Board by a full member.

As already noted, the Council membership of the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) was transferred in 1953 to the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). On July 1, 1958, the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization was established, absorbing the functions of ODM and the Federal Civil Defense Administration and assuming ODM's Council and Planning Board memberships.<sup>53</sup> When the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) succeeded the Mutual Security Agency on August 6, 1953, the membership on the NSC of the Director for Mutual Security was transferred to the new Director of FOA.<sup>54</sup> When FOA was subsequently abolished on June 30, 1955, and its functions were transferred to the new International Cooperation Administration (ICA) within the State Department, the membership of the Director, FOA, on the Council was abolished.<sup>55</sup> However, the Director of ICA was authorized by the President to attend Council meetings as an adviser to the Secretary of State. Subsequently, when responsibility for over-all coordination of the Mutual Security Program was assigned to the Under Secretary of State, he was invited to attend Council meetings as an observer, in lieu of the Director, ICA.<sup>56</sup> The Mutual Security program function was represented on the Planning Board by a member until FOA was abolished. At that time an ICA Observer was designated to provide staff support for the State Member of the Board, attending Board meetings when items of interest to ICA were under consideration. These arrangements continue to the present.

<sup>52</sup> The Director designated an individual who was available for such case-by-case participation as was determined necessary. This Budget representative was assisted by an individual who served as the normal point of contact and liaison with the NSC Staff. Budget during this period received the agenda and reports of the NSC and the Planning Board.

<sup>53</sup> Reorganization Plan 1 of 1958.

<sup>54</sup> Reorganization Plan 7 of 1953.

<sup>55</sup> His membership on the NSC was abolished by Executive Order 10610, Section 303 (a) and (b). FOA itself was abolished by the Mutual Security Act of 1954. (Public Law 865, 83d Congress.)

<sup>56</sup> The Director, ICA, does, however, attend Council meetings from time to time on an *ad hoc* basis.



A further sub-category was added to the list of categories of Council participation during this period in order to provide a further degree of flexibility. A distinction was made between "Regular Participant" members who attended all Council meetings until the President otherwise determined (*i.e.*, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget) and "Special-Request Members" who had a standing Presidential invitation to attend Council meetings, but only for meetings or parts of meetings which were concerned with matters relating to their official responsibilities. The practice of making such a distinction developed gradually in the period 1955-57. This practice was formalized by Mr. Cutler when he returned as Special Assistant in early 1957 and issued, on July 1, 1957, a Presidentially-approved revision of his statement of March 17, 1953, on the structure and functions of the Council. These Special-Request members are represented by observers on the Planning Board who have a similar standing invitation to attend Planning Board meetings for items of interest to their agencies. They receive Council and Planning Board agendas and other necessary Council and Planning Board documents. Currently Special-Request members of the Council are the Attorney General, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), and the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).<sup>57</sup> In the past the officials in this category have included the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament,<sup>58</sup> and, before FCDA and ODM were combined, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.

Various officials have, from time to time, been invited to attend Council meetings for items of interest to them as "Observers". Though no attempt will be made to recount all of the changes in this group, its composition may be illustrated by the following list of officials who are presently in this category: The Assistant to the President and The Deputy Assistant, the Director, U.S. Information Agency (USIA),<sup>59</sup> the Special Assistants to the President for Foreign Economic Policy and for Science and Technology, and the White House Staff Secretary and his assistant. The Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and Security Operations Coordination, together with the Executive Secretary and his Deputy, regularly attend Council meetings as the Council staff. Ordinarily the Council participants, apart from the Secretaries of State and Defense, do not bring supporting staff personnel to the meeting except as may be necessary when they make special presentations to the Council. USIA and the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, as well as Justice, AEC and NASA, are represented at the Planning Board level by Observers.

It should be noted that actual attendance at Council meetings varies according to the type of report being considered and the character of the meeting. Thus, when the Council hears a presentation of some special study or report, a number of additional officials may be invited

<sup>57</sup> The Attorney General began attending Council meetings regularly during the President's first illness in the fall of 1953. Following the President's recovery he was given the status described above. The Chairman, AEC, began attending meetings on the above basis in January 1956. Earlier he had attended as an observer in his capacity as Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy Matters and continued to do so from time to time after January 1956 when he was not participating as the Chairman, AEC. The Administrator of NASA was given this status on August 19, 1958, just after approval of the National Aeronautics and Space Act which established NASA.

<sup>58</sup> The Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament was represented on the Planning Board by a Member.

<sup>59</sup> The Director, USIA is the only Observer who sits at the Council table.

to attend and the purpose of the meeting may be largely expository. At the other end of the spectrum is an occasional Council meeting on a sensitive subject to which only the statutory members of the Council, the statutory advisers and essential Council and White House staff are invited. Attendance at the usual Council meetings, when the agenda is a normal one of Planning Board and other reports, falls somewhere between these two unusual cases. The regular Council attendants who sit at the Council table are the five statutory members (the President, Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director, ODCM), the two regular participant members (the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget), the two statutory advisers (the Chairman, JCS, and the Director of Central Intelligence), the Director, USIA, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Executive Secretary and the Deputy Executive Secretary.

In February 1953 the Council had agreed that the existing internal security organization of the Council should be continued. However, in April 1954, the President requested the Attorney General, in cooperation with the interested departments and agencies, to make a study of the internal security organization of the government and to make recommendations to the Council on the subject. On September 10, 1954, the President approved recommendations by the Attorney General, as amended and adopted by the Council. In general these recommendations continued the existing internal security organization of the Council, including its two internal security committees (the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS)) and its Representative on Internal Security. The major new provisions were as follows: (a) the Chairmen of the two committees were hereafter to be designated by the President from the membership of the committees after consultation with the Attorney General; (b) the Attorney General was to continue to take a leading role in NSC consideration of internal security matters and the Justice Observer was to take a similar role in the Planning Board (receiving all necessary Planning Board papers); (c) representatives of the IIC and ICIS were to attend meetings of the Planning Board or other committees of the NSC to participate in matters relating to the responsibilities of the two committees; and (d) the joint report on the internal security program, which IIC and ICIS were already submitting as a part of the semi-annual (later annual) status reports on national security programs, was to be considered a substitute for separate reports to the Council by the NSC Representative on Internal Security; subject, however, to the understanding that the latter might submit comments on the joint IIC-ICIS report.<sup>60</sup>

#### *Planning Board and Council procedures*

On October 13, 1953, the Council noted a statement by the President that his conception of the NSC was that of:

a corporate body composed of individuals advising the President in their own right, rather than as representatives of their respective departments and agencies. Their function should be to seek, with their background of experience, the

<sup>60</sup> The NSC Representative on Internal Security has since 1949 attended meetings of the Council whenever matters relating to internal security are scheduled for consideration.

most statesmanlike solution to the problems of national security, rather than to reach solutions which represent merely a compromise of departmental positions. The same concept is equally applicable to advisory and subordinate groups, such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NSC Planning Board.<sup>41</sup>

This concept continues to govern the work of the Council and its subordinate bodies.

On January 21, 1953, at the time that Council members were asked to designate acting members for a Senior Staff, they were also informed that the initial assignment of the new Senior Staff members would be to develop, after consultation with their respective principals, an agenda of policy questions listed in approximate order of priority, based upon: (a) a preliminary review of current policies; (b) examination of currently active Council projects; and (c) initiation of new policies or projects.

The period 1953-54 was marked by very great activity. The Planning Board (before March 17, 1953, the Senior Staff) met regularly three times a week. During particularly busy periods it met even more frequently. Meetings were from three to five hours long and the agenda regularly included from three to five items. The Council met an average of once a week and its agendas, too, were very full.

During 1953 much of the Council's and Planning Board's time was devoted to: (a) certain urgent and critical international problems; (b) certain problems relating to the scope and character of major national security programs; and (c) a thorough examination of alternative over-all strategies and policies. At the same time a general review of existing national security policies was undertaken. In 1954 an increasing amount of the Council's and Planning Board's time was devoted to this review and by the end of that year it had been largely completed. Interspersed with these activities was the development of policies on a number of new subjects.

With the end of hostilities in Korea and Indochina in 1953 and 1954 and with the completion of the initial review of national security policies in early 1955, the Council and Planning Board entered a period characterized by a somewhat reduced pace of activity and by reversion to a regular pattern of business. Beginning in mid-1955 and continuing to the present time, two Planning Board meetings per week became the rule, though additional meetings were sometimes scheduled. The Council has also met somewhat less frequently than in the first two years, the number of meetings ranging from 36 to 43 per year. Much of the Council's and Planning Board's time in the years 1955-56 was devoted to regular activities involved in developing new policies or reviewing existing policies in the light of current and anticipated developments. Perhaps the most significant individual projects during these two years were comprehensive studies which were done for the Council by outside groups or government committees of certain important national security programs. Thus certain military programs were studied in the light of technological developments. Similarly, a study was made of certain aspects of the foreign assistance programs. Both of these studies initiated long

<sup>41</sup> When the President approved a revised statement of the structure and functions of the NSC on July 1, 1957, the OCB was added to the list of advisory and subordinate groups, and the statement was clarified by addition at the end of the phrase "although the members of the latter two boards (i.e., the Planning Board and the OCB) are responsible also for stating the views of their respective departments and agencies."

cycles of Planning Board and Council activity during which new policy guidance affecting important programs was developed.

A new aspect of the value of the National Security Council was demonstrated in the fall of 1955 at the time of the President's first major illness. By that time, as noted, the Council had built up a reservoir of Presidentially-approved national security policies. These permitted the heads of the various government departments to carry on "with full knowledge of the continued validity of the broad concepts established by the President in the cumulative experience of the NSC."<sup>42</sup> The Vice President presided over the Council during this period and the Council provided a useful forum for discussion of national security problems. Shortly after the middle of October 1955 the President began to be kept informed of the Council's actions and began acting upon them. The Council performed in a similar fashion, though for a shorter period, following the President's second illness in June 1956.

The second Administration of President Eisenhower began in the Council with a reevaluation of various major elements of basic security policy on the basis of a series of discussion papers, each of which examined one of the major aspects of the over-all U.S. security policy. On the basis of the new basic policy, certain other security policies were also re-examined. Further studies were also made of certain national security programs. New policies were prepared against the background of a world situation characterized by such outstanding features as the developing capabilities of the United States and the U.S.S.R. in the field of intercontinental ballistic missiles; the actual or anticipated emergence of a large number of newly independent countries; and the beginning of the exploration of outer space. The Council also reviewed its general directives relating to the organization and coordination of the foreign intelligence activities of the several departments and agencies.

In the latter part of the period there has been a resumption once more of the regular process of policy re-examination and revision, but there has also been an increased effort to use the Council for discussion of major policy issues facing the United States now and in the future, without necessarily seeking immediate policy decisions on those issues. To this end increased use has been made of consultants and of discussion papers which consider the pros and cons of policy alternatives without themselves recommending a policy. There has also been an emphasis upon the preparation of long-range studies of major problems the United States is likely to face over the next five to ten years as background which will be of assistance in the development of future policies.

The procedures of the Planning Board during the entire period from 1953 to the present date have not varied significantly in basic outline although, of course, they have been adjusted when necessary to meet the requirements of a particular policy problem or the character of a particular type of report. The procedures are also in many fundamental respects comparable to those which earlier characterized the activities of the Senior Staff. Before the first draft of a new policy paper is prepared, the subject is sometimes discussed on the basis of the existing policy, an intelligence estimate, a military appreciation

<sup>42</sup> Dillon Anderson, "The President and National Security," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 197, p. 442 (January 1956).



or similar material. An intelligence estimate may be requested if a current one is not available. The CIA representatives maintain close contact with the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and with the NSC Staff in order to ensure, so far as possible, that intelligence estimates are available at the time required.

First drafts of foreign country and regional papers continue to be prepared in the State Department, just as first drafts of other types of papers are ordinarily prepared by the agency of primary interest, or, in some instances, by a Planning Board Committee. As in the past, papers are upon occasion prepared directly by the Planning Board or the Board Assistants, sometimes on the basis of a first draft prepared by the NSC Staff to reflect a Planning Board discussion.

The format of Council papers went through a further evolution during this period. Initially the statement of policy of a typical country or regional policy paper continued to consist of three basic elements: general considerations, objectives, and courses of action. In 1955 and 1956 there was some experimentation with the addition of a new section of "policy conclusions" which, in general character, fell somewhere between general considerations and courses of action. Essentially the "policy conclusions" constituted a statement of the main policy guidelines. Beginning in 1957 such policy conclusions began to be eliminated; the courses of action were renamed "major policy guidance" and were changed somewhat by the inclusion in them of material that had previously been contained in the "policy conclusions" section. This change was in line with the affirmation by the President at about this time of the principle that, except as directed by him, matters to be considered by the Council should insofar as possible deal with the making or alteration of broad policies—either policies for the future or policies required by currently developing events.

Initially almost all policy papers were accompanied by a staff study. In fact, the preparation of such a staff study and its discussion in the Planning Board was sometimes the first step in the preparation of a new or revised policy paper. More recently staff studies have not usually been prepared, except in the case of a wholly new policy subject or in a case where developments since the approval of the last policy paper are such as to seem to require preparation of such a staff study. The general considerations, of course, cover the same ground, though in somewhat less detail, and they are regularly supported by the more detailed treatment of a current intelligence estimate.

The above-described format applies particularly to country and regional policy papers. As an outline it also covers the principal elements of almost all other policy papers considered by the Council though the material in some of these may be somewhat differently organized.

The most important innovation in the format of Council papers during the period was the addition, in July 1953, of a "Financial Appendix" to policy papers having financial implications. Such appendices are included in "functional" as well as country and regional policy papers. Though the form of Financial Appendices has evolved since 1953, its purpose and its general content have remained

essentially unchanged.<sup>43</sup> The primary purpose of the Financial Appendix is to indicate, for the information of the Planning Board and the Council, the cost implications of the proposed policy. It normally contains information on past expenditures and order of magnitude estimates of future programs. It includes statements of assumptions and other information essential to an understanding of the cost data. The Financial Appendix does not presume to dispose of policy issues. It is submitted purely for the information of the Council and the Planning Board. Approval of a policy statement does not indicate approval of the cost estimates in the Financial Appendix.

A first draft of a policy paper is ordinarily discussed first in the Planning Board and then referred to the Board Assistants for revision in the light of the discussion. This process may, if necessary, be repeated several times. When a problem is particularly urgent the Planning Board has on occasion met in almost continuous session and has itself done the essential redrafting.

In the process of Planning Board and Board Assistants discussion the Planning Board members and their Board Assistants obtain their agencies' views on each successive draft. The NSC Staff, and more particularly, the Executive Secretary, his Deputy and members of the Special Staff, support the Special Assistant in his role as Chairman of the Planning Board. Members of the Special Staff make an independent analysis and review of each Planning Board paper at each stage in its development for the benefit of the Special Assistant and the Executive Secretary. They also participate in the meetings of the Board Assistants.

The Special Assistant plays a leading role in the Planning Board meetings as presiding officer and as a non-voting participant. He expresses his personal views in the course of the Planning Board discussion of a subject, but as the principal staff officer of the President for national security affairs, he is concerned primarily to ensure that the paper is adequate and that it satisfactorily reflects the views of the members of the Planning Board representing the various agencies. In particular, he is concerned with ensuring that, if there are significant differences of view as to policy recommendations within the Board, they are fully discussed and presented to the Council as clearly and accurately as possible. In recent experience about two-thirds of the papers sent to the Council by the Planning Board have contained such "splits". The Special Assistant's own views are not recorded in the paper when it goes forward to the Council. In the Council meeting, he makes an impartial presentation of the views of the Planning Board members, but also, if he wishes, expresses his own personal views to the Council following such presentation.

When a paper has been submitted by the head of an agency for direct circulation to the Council, the Planning Board almost always discusses it in advance of its consideration in the Council and sometimes prepares written comments upon it for consideration by the Council. Similarly, oral presentations for the Council are often made first to the Planning Board. Reports by outside study groups, by

<sup>43</sup> Financial Appendices are prepared by the NSC Staff on the basis of contributions from the agencies responsible for the programs involved and are reviewed by the Planning Board. For the current directive on the use of Financial Appendices see "Organizing for National Security", *Selected Materials prepared for the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, and its Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery*, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 26-28.

consultants or by special Council committees are also regularly discussed in the Planning Board prior to their consideration by the Council and may be referred back to the Planning Board for the preparation of recommendations following preliminary Council consideration. These procedures help ensure that Council members will be well briefed on Council agenda subjects prior to Council meetings. Nonetheless the Council does, when the occasion warrants it, consider reports, either oral or written, which have not been discussed first in the Planning Board and which are not the basis of subsequent Planning Board work.

In the usual case a Planning Board paper is circulated to the Council ten days in advance of the Council meeting at which it is considered in order to give the agencies sufficient opportunity to prepare for Council consideration and to give the Joint Chiefs of Staff time for preparation of their comments. Written JCS comments are submitted on most policy papers and are normally circulated to the Council in advance of the meeting. Each Planning Board member is responsible for briefing his Council principal on the matters before the Council in advance of the Council meetings.

As has been indicated, the character of the reports that the Council considers may be of various kinds. Such reports may include, for example, proposed policies prepared by the Planning Board, policy proposals submitted directly by Council members or other agency heads, oral presentations of special studies, OCB Reports and regular briefings.

In accordance with a directive of the President in January 1953, one feature of every Council meeting is an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence summarizing important developments that are occurring throughout the world. He gives particular attention to those areas which are on the Council agenda that day.<sup>64</sup> "The President looks to the Special Assistant at Council meetings to present the items upon the agenda, to brief the Council on their background, to explain any 'splits' and to initiate discussion. Views are sought around the table so as to bring out relevant facts and opinions and so as to give those present an opportunity to participate in making policy which they must later carry out."<sup>65</sup> In the course of the Council discussion, the Council members may agree upon a resolution of the policy questions at issue or the President may indicate his own decision. The discussion sometimes stimulates a request by the Council or the President for an additional report on a related subject.

Following the Council meeting a record of the Council's actions is drafted by the Executive Secretary and his Deputy, reviewed by the Special Assistant and then circulated for comment by the Council members and advisers. This latter procedure, introduced at the beginning of the Eisenhower Administration in 1953, gives the Council participants an opportunity to see and comment upon the record of actions before it is submitted to the President. The President's

<sup>64</sup> The report on the status of NSC projects has been dropped as a regular agenda item. Instead a forward agenda and a summary of Council and Planning Board projects are issued regularly and are periodically reviewed by the Planning Board.

<sup>65</sup> Gordon Gray, "Role of the National Security Council in the Formulation of National Policy," paper prepared for delivery at the 1960 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 10-12, 1960, (reproduced in "Organizing for National Security": Selected Materials prepared for the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, and its Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, p. 66).

action on this record, including his resolution of any remaining differences of view, constitutes his authoritative decision on the matters considered by the Council. The Presidentially-approved actions and policy papers continue to be communicated to the Council participants by the means described above.<sup>66</sup>

Much use has been made of outside consultants and consultant groups during this entire phase of the Council's existence. Such consultants have been utilized upon approximately twenty occasions.<sup>67</sup> The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs may himself arrange to call in such consultants, or one of the Council members may be asked to contract with some existing institution or to form a special consultants group to make a particular study. Essentially, use of such consultants has served one of three purposes: (a) to make an independent study of some proposal or of some problem; (b) to review existing policy on a subject and to make comments with respect thereto; or (c) to comment on tentative recommendations being considered by the Planning Board prior to their submission to the Council. As a general rule such consultants discuss their recommendations with the Planning Board prior to Council consideration of them. In cases where the consultants have made a study and specific recommendations, those recommendations have regularly been referred to the responsible agencies for comment prior to final Council action. The Council's and Planning Board's work on such consultants' recommendations has often involved thorough study over a period of several months, followed by later progress reports and follow-up recommendations by the agencies concerned.

There is so much variation in the manner that the Planning Board's and the Council's basic procedures are applied to particular problems that it is difficult to attempt anything like a completely comprehensive account of them here. However, it is important to emphasize that, if the urgency of the situation requires it, many of the usual Planning Board and Council procedures can be foreshortened or altogether dispensed with. For example, if necessary a subject may be considered in the Council on the basis of oral presentation with little or no prior staff work.

#### *The Operations Coordinating Board*

*Origin of the OCB.*—As indicated in the earlier discussion, the primary function of the Council machinery has been to provide policy advice to the President. It has not been itself involved in the implementation of policies. From the beginning of the Council's existence, when the President approved policies recommended to him by the Council, he directed that they be implemented by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies and he designated the department or agency which had primary responsibility for implementation as the coordinator. It was the responsibility of this coordinating agency to see that actions by other agencies to implement the policy were taken in a coordinated manner. In the defense mobilization field there was an established coordinating agency (at first the NSRB, then ODM, and now, the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization)

<sup>66</sup> *Supra*, p. 13.

<sup>67</sup> In a recent review of a fundamental policy paper 23 consultants met with the Planning Board in groups of four or five and gave their views on the policy under review; later a large group of them met in a body with the Planning Board and commented upon the revised draft of the policy paper prepared by the Board. (Gray, *op. cit.* p. 65.)

with interdepartmental coordinating mechanisms and procedures. Similarly, after 1949 the internal security committees of the Council provided an organized means of effecting coordination of the implementation of the policies in this field. There were other cases where the problem of coordination hardly arose because the responsibility for implementation resided almost entirely in a single agency.

The coordination problems were most difficult with respect to the policies dealing with international affairs which constituted a majority of the policies recommended to the President through the Council. As has been indicated, the normal procedure was to designate the Department of State as the coordinating agency for such policies though their implementation almost invariably involved action by a number of other agencies of the government as well. In order to deal with this problem, responsibility for coordination was sometimes assigned jointly to State and another agency. Such arrangements were, however, of an *ad hoc* character and as of January 1953 there was no regular, established interdepartmental mechanism directly charged by the President with broad responsibility for coordinating the implementation of policies dealing with international affairs.

This problem received new attention as a result of the establishment by President Eisenhower, on January 24, 1953, of the "President's Committee on International Information Activities" to make a survey and evaluation of the international information policies and activities of the Executive Branch and of policies and activities related thereto, with particular reference to the international relations and national security of the United States. The Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. William H. Jackson, made its report to the President on June 30, 1953.<sup>68</sup> General recommendations of the report were released publicly on July 8, 1953.<sup>69</sup>

The Committee concluded that the existing Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) should be abolished because it was

... founded upon the misconception that "psychological activities" and "psychological strategy" somehow exist apart from official policies and actions and can be dealt with independently by experts in this field. In reality there is a "psychological" aspect or implication to every diplomatic, economic, or military policy and action. This implication should receive more careful attention, both in the planning and execution stage of policy, but not to the exclusion of other vital factors.

In its place, the Committee recommended the creation of an Operations Coordinating Board within the NSC structure. The principal function of the new Board, which would consist of agency representatives at the Under Secretary level, would be the coordination and development by departments and agencies of detailed operational plans to carry out national security policies. This recommendation, it was stated, was designed "to achieve better integrated direction of the program of the United States in the world struggle and to fill the gap which has existed in the past between the formulation of general objectives and the detailed actions needed to give effect to them."

<sup>68</sup> Other members of the committee were Robert Cutler, Gordon Gray, Barklie McKee Henry, John C. Hughes, C. D. Jackson, Roger M. Kyes, and Sigurd Larson.

<sup>69</sup> White House Press Release, July 8, 1953. Information on the contents of the report in this history, including the quotations on this page, is taken from that press release.

On July 2, 1953, the NSC considered these recommendations and referred them to the Director, Bureau of the Budget, for preparation of a draft Executive Order. An Executive Order creating an Operations Coordinating Board and abolishing the Psychological Strategy Board was approved by the President on September 2, 1953.<sup>70</sup> It provided for an OCB membership of the Under Secretary of State (Chairman), the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, the Director of Central Intelligence and a representative of the President to be designated by the President. Heads of other agencies were to be invited to send a representative to OCB meetings when the OCB was dealing with matters bearing directly on their responsibilities. The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs might attend any meeting of the Board and the Director, USIA, was to advise the Board at its request. The Executive Order provided for the creation of a staff and for the appointment of an Executive Officer for the Board.

The functions of the Board were stated as follows by Section 2 of the Executive Order:

The National Security Council having recommended a national security policy and the President having approved it, the Board shall (1) whenever the President shall hereafter so direct, advise with the agencies concerned as to (a) their detailed operational planning responsibilities respecting such policy, (b) the coordination of the interdepartmental aspects of the detailed operational plans developed by the agencies to carry out such policy, (c) the timely and coordinated execution of such policy and plans, and (d) the execution of each security action or project so that it shall make its full contribution to the attainment of national security objectives and to the particular climate of opinion the United States is seeking to achieve in the world, and (2) initiate new proposals for action within the framework of national security policies in response to opportunity and changes in the situation. The Board shall perform such other advisory functions as the President may assign to it and shall from time to time make reports to the National Security Council with respect to the carrying out of this order.

Though the Board was instructed to report to the NSC, it was not at this time placed within the structure of the NSC as recommended by the Jackson Report.

In essence, the OCB was to provide a regular means through which the responsible agencies could consult and coordinate their actions under approved national security policies or with respect to other operational matters of common concern not specifically related to a particular policy assigned to the Board. The OCB was to "advise with" the agencies; it had no power to direct action. It was to operate by agreements, and agreements reached in the Board would be implemented by each member of the Board through appropriate action within his own agency. The provision that the membership of the Board should be at the Under Secretary level was designed to ensure that the Board members would have sufficient authority within their respective agencies to direct the implementation of agreements reached

<sup>70</sup> Executive Order 10463.



within the Board. In this manner the coordinated implementation of policies was to be achieved without interposing the OCB between the President and the heads of the executive departments and agencies.

In practice, though it was not so specified in the Executive Order, the OCB was limited to policies dealing with international affairs or having an international affairs aspect, and was specifically excluded by the Executive Order from two fields in which coordinating mechanisms already existed—the fields of internal security and defense mobilization. Initially OCB was assigned coordinating responsibility for only those national security policies relating to international affairs which were approved by the President following the issuance of the Executive Order. As new policies were approved by the President and as existing policies were transferred to it, the OCB came to be the designated coordinator for the bulk of Presidentially-approved national security policies since the majority of such policies relate to international affairs. In addition, the OCB assumed responsibility for all PSB projects. After a review of them, it retained and completed work upon the majority of current PSB projects while dropping others. In accordance with the Executive Order, the OCB also developed additional projects of its own under the "climate of opinion" provision and under its authority to initiate new proposals for action within the existing framework of national security policies.

*Organization of the OCB.*—The basic pattern of OCB organization was set during the first month or two following the issuance of the Executive Order and has changed very little since that time. It is a three-level interagency organization—consisting of the Board itself, the OCB Assistants (or "Board Assistants" as they are commonly called) and the OCB Working Groups—assisted at all levels by the OCB Staff. The basic types of reports and plans developed by the Board during these first months have continued to the present day, though the content of these documents has undergone a number of changes during the period.

Standing and *ad hoc* OCB working groups or committees have existed since the beginning of OCB and, in fact, can be traced back to antecedents in the interagency "panels" of the Psychological Strategy Board. When the President designates the OCB as coordinator for a national security policy, that policy is referred to an existing working group or, if such a working group does not exist, to a new working group created for the purpose. The working groups are composed of responsible operating officials from the agencies concerned with the implementation of the policy and a representative from the OCB Staff.<sup>71</sup> The agency which has chief responsibility—usually State—chairs the group. Agencies which do not regularly participate in the activities of the Board but which have implementation responsibilities in connection with a particular policy (e.g., Commerce or Labor) may be regular participants at the working group level. The working groups have essentially two functions: (a) to provide a regular mechanism at the working level for consulting and for coordinating actions to implement national security policies or actions on other matters of mutual concern, and (b) to prepare

<sup>71</sup> Agency representation on the working groups is approximately at the desk officer level, though the designated chairmen are usually Office Directors or Deputy Office Directors from the State Department and during periods when particularly significant or critical problems are under consideration may be of even higher level.

reports (periodic or special) and operations plans for consideration by the Board.

Each Board member is assisted by a Board Assistant, an individual from the Board member's agency whose rank is such as to give him direct access to the principal operating officials in his agency. The OCB Assistants were not specifically provided for in the Executive Order, but were designated by the OCB at the first OCB meeting on September 17, 1953, and began meeting together as a group under the chairmanship of the Board's Executive Officer shortly thereafter. Individually, the OCB Assistants provide staff support for their respective Board members, assist them in intradepartmental and interdepartmental cooperation on subjects dealt with by the Board, and aid their agency's working group members in meeting OCB requirements. As a group, the OCB Assistants meet once each week to review papers prepared (in the usual case by the working groups) for Board consideration to ensure that they are ready for Board consideration; they seek to ensure that these papers are adequate and that they accurately reflect any differences of view among the agencies. The OCB Assistants may, in some cases, also act on behalf of their principals when they consider that they have the authority to do so and when the Executive Officer concurs in such a procedure.

No changes have been made in the prescribed functions of the OCB since the issuance of the original Executive Order, but a number of changes have occurred in participation and membership. The Director, USIA, was added to the Board's membership by Executive Order on February 28, 1955.<sup>72</sup> Up to that time he had regularly attended OCB meetings as an Observer. When the Foreign Operations Administration was abolished by statute effective on June 30, 1955, the membership of the Director, FOA, on the OCB was also abolished. An Executive Order issued at this time provided, however, that the Director of the new International Cooperation Administration or his representative should "participate in the deliberations, and assist with the affairs of" the OCB.<sup>73</sup> Pursuant to this authority and by agreement of the Board, the Director, ICA, participated with the Board in an informal status as an adviser until July 1, 1957, when a revised Executive Order made him a Member.<sup>74</sup> During this entire period ICA representatives participated regularly in the work of the OCB Assistants and Working Groups. By decision of the President, the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament participated during the period 1955–58 in OCB meetings when matters of interest to the Disarmament Staff were under consideration.

By action of the OCB on March 13, 1957, following a general review by it of arrangements with respect to participation, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, the Under Secretary of the Treasury and the Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget, became "Standing-Request" members of the OCB.<sup>75</sup> Standing-Request members are authorized to participate in the work of the OCB to the extent that they consider desirable. In practice these three agencies have par-

<sup>72</sup> Executive Order 10598.

<sup>73</sup> Executive Order 10610, Section 303(b).

<sup>74</sup> Executive Order 10700, Section 1(b).

<sup>75</sup> Prior to March 1957 AEC and Treasury had for some time been frequent participants in OCB meetings under the provision of the Executive Order with respect to participation by non-member agencies. Treasury and Budget had been participating in the work of the OCB Assistants and of many of the working groups.

ticipated in differing degrees at the three interdepartmental levels of the OCB organization. Treasury representatives are full participants at all levels. The Chairman, AEC, regularly attends the informal weekly luncheon meetings of the OCB. AEC representatives attend formal OCB meetings and Board Assistants meetings only when a subject of interest to AEC is to be considered and AEC is represented only on those working groups in which it has a direct interest. Budget does not attend OCB luncheon meetings, usually attends formal OCB meetings in an observer status, but is a full participant at the Board Assistants and working group levels.

At the time of the issuance of the Executive Order creating the OCB the President designated his Special Assistant for Cold War Planning as his representative on the OCB.<sup>76</sup> Initially the primary responsibility of this Presidential representative lay in the "climate of opinion" area referred to in the Executive Order establishing the Board. The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs also attended all OCB meetings and was a full participant in its activities.<sup>77</sup>

The creation of the OCB and the assignment to it of operations coordinating functions had the effect of superseding the responsibilities for follow-up of the implementation of national security policies which had been assigned to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by the March 17, 1953, report on the NSC.<sup>78</sup> Nonetheless, something of this follow-up function continued to be performed by the President's representative on the Board. As the OCB evolved and as new Special Assistants occupied the position of President's representative, there was a gradual increase in emphasis upon the follow-up function of the President's representative and he became tied more closely to the normal activities of the OCB. This change received some formal recognition in May 1955 when the President's representative became Vice Chairman of the Board. During the fall of 1956 Mr. William H. Jackson, who was already a Special Assistant to the President and his representative on the OCB, also became Acting Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. When Mr. Robert Cutler resumed the position of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in January 1957 he temporarily assumed both of these roles. However, it was not until the changes of July 1957 (discussed below) that the functions of the President's representative were clearly restated to accord with the developing practice.

**The OCB Staff.**—The Executive Order of September 1953 which established the OCB instructed the agencies represented on the Board to contribute to its financial support. Until fiscal year 1958 the OCB agencies contributed on an agreed-share basis to the OCB budget. State provided logistical support for the Board.

The Executive Order also authorized the OCB agencies to detail personnel to the OCB Staff. It was the policy of the OCB from the beginning, in the selection of its professional staff, to maintain a balance between permanent staff officers who provided continuity and staff officers on two to three year assignments from the OCB member agencies who contributed experience derived from personal contact

<sup>76</sup> Officials who held the position of President's representative (and Special Assistant to the President) through 1956 were C. D. Jackson (Special Assistant from February 1953 and the President's representative from September 1953–March 1954); Nelson A. Rockefeller (December 1954–December 1955); William H. Jackson (March 1956–December 1956).

<sup>77</sup> The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs was represented on the OCB Assistants until 1957.

<sup>78</sup> *Supra*, p. 28.

with the operations of their respective agencies. For a short period the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Planning served as the Board's Acting Executive Officer. However, on November 4, 1953, Mr. Elmer B. Staats became the full-time Executive Officer.

As initially organized in October 1953, the OCB Staff consisted essentially of four elements: (a) the Office of the Executive Officer and Deputy Executive Officer; (b) the Secretariat; (c) the Special Staff headed by an official who was also the Special Assistant for Intelligence; and (d) the Executive Assistant.

The members of the secretariat unit provided executive secretaries for the working groups, contributed to drafting of documents by the working groups, provided substantive staff support to the Executive Officer on subjects within their areas of responsibility and generally facilitated the process by which OCB member agencies reached decisions with respect to implementing actions to carry out national security policies. In January 1954 this unit was reorganized on a geographical area basis and its members began reporting directly to the Executive Officer and his Deputy, rather than through a Chief of the Secretariat (a position which was abolished). They were made members of the working groups dealing with those national security policies for which they had responsibility and were designated the "OCB Staff Representative" on the working group instead of "Executive Secretary". This part of the OCB Staff is presently called the "Area Staff".

The Special Staff (later called the "Special Projects Staff") was established primarily to perform two functions: (a) to provide staff support to the President's representative on the Board and to carry out special assignments for him; and (b) to provide the President's representative and the Executive Officer current background information on foreign political, military, economic and social developments affecting implementation of national security policies. The importance of the former of these two functions gradually declined as the President's representative's role within the OCB changed to emphasize the "follow-up" function over the "climate of opinion" function. Accordingly, in January 1956 this unit was renamed the "Intelligence Liaison Staff" and its functions were largely limited to the second of the two functions described above.

The Executive Assistant was a general assistant to the Executive Officer, performed secretariat functions for the Board itself, maintained liaison with the NSC Staff and supervised administrative functions and certain reporting functions not performed by the working groups.

A reorganization of the OCB Staff in September 1954 added a "Communications Staff" with personnel drawn from other sections of the Staff. This unit, which was subsequently renamed the "Media Program Staff", and, still later, the "Information and Education Projects Staff", was concerned with OCB activities in the information, communications, education, cultural and ideological fields which cut across the geographical organization of the Area Staff. It was a "functional" staff.

To sum up, the OCB Staff organization at the beginning of 1957 included the following elements: (a) the Office of the Executive Officer and the Deputy Executive Officer; (b) the Office of the Executive Assistant; (c) the Area Staff; (d) the Information and Education Projects Staff; and (e) the Intelligence Liaison Staff.



*Placement of the OCB within the NSC Structure.*—On February 25, 1957, the President issued a revised Executive Order formally placing the OCB within the structure of the National Security Council as of July 1, 1957.<sup>79</sup> After well over three years of activity the OCB had proved its value; the time had therefore come to place it on a more permanent footing and to establish "a closer relation between the formulation and the carrying out of security policies."<sup>80</sup> In addition, the order added ICA to the membership of the Board (as already noted), changed the arrangements with respect to the chairmanship and vice chairmanship of the OCB, and affected the relationship of the OCB Staff to the NSC Staff.<sup>81</sup> Whereas the earlier order had provided that the Under Secretary of State would be chairman of the Board, the new order stated that the President would appoint the chairman and vice chairman from among the members of the Board. The President, at the time of the issuance of the order, appointed Mr. Christian A. Herter, the then Under Secretary of State, as Chairman and Mr. Robert Cutler, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, as Vice Chairman. However, in May 1957, upon the recommendation of his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the President established a new position, that of Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations Coordination. The President appointed Mr. Frederick M. Dearborn to the new position.<sup>82</sup> He designated Mr. Dearborn Vice Chairman of the OCB and his principal representative on the OCB. The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs continued as a second representative of the President on the OCB. The new Special Assistant's functions were much more closely tied to the normal operation of the OCB mechanism than had been true in the case of previous Special Assistants who had served as the President's representative on the OCB. Thus, his duties included, in addition to serving as Vice Chairman and participating in the meetings of the OCB: (a) consulting with the OCB Executive Officer as to the agenda and scheduling of work for OCB meetings; (b) collaborating with the Chairman and the OCB Executive Officer to assure the effective functioning of the Operations Coordinating Board; (c) developing for OCB consideration new proposals for action within the framework of national security policies in response to opportunity and changes in the situation; (d) attending Council meetings and presenting thereat OCB reports; (e) attending and participating in, as appropriate, meetings of the NSC Planning Board, of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, and other relevant groups;<sup>83</sup> (f) maintaining close liaison with the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs; and (g) such other assignments related to security operations coordination as the President might direct. In performing all of these duties he was to act in close collaboration with the Chairman of the OCB. Following Congressional action creating a second Under Secretary of State, the President, on September 16, 1959, designated Mr. Robert D. Murphy, the new Under Secretary for Political Affairs, as Chairman of the OCB. When Mr. Murphy resigned the chairmanship in

<sup>79</sup> Executive Order 10700.

<sup>80</sup> Quotation from White House Press Release, February 25, 1957.

<sup>81</sup> The effect of the Order on the NSC and OCB Staffs is discussed in the next major section.

<sup>82</sup> Following Mr. Dearborn's death on February 25, 1958, Mr. Karl G. Harr was appointed Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination.

<sup>83</sup> The Special Assistant became a Planning Board Adviser. At this time the OCB Adviser to the Planning Board was eliminated. The Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination also attends meetings of the Cabinet and of the National Aeronautics and Space Council.

connection with his retirement from government service, the President, on January 13, 1960, designated Mr. Gordon Gray, his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, as chairman. In taking this action the President stated in a letter to Mr. Gray:

In view of your continuing responsibility as the principal supervisory officer of the work of the National Security Council in formulating national security policies including those assigned by me to the OCB for coordination, you are in a position to provide impartial and objective guidance and leadership to the Board. This new assignment is one step which I feel should be taken toward enabling the President to look to one office for staff assistance in the whole range of national security affairs.<sup>84</sup>

In a letter to his Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination, Mr. Karl G. Harr, on the same day the President assigned Mr. Harr special responsibility in two areas of the Board's work: (a) taking the lead in initiating new proposals to the Board for actions within the framework of national security policies in response to opportunity and changes in the situation; and (b) seeing that Board actions contribute fully to the climate of foreign opinion the United States is seeking to achieve in the world.<sup>85</sup> This assignment constituted reaffirmation of the President's desire that these two aspects of the OCB's activities receive fullest possible attention in the implementation of national security policy.

*The Work of the OCB.*—The OCB meets at 1:00 p.m. every Wednesday. The first hour and a quarter is an informal luncheon meeting to which designated members only are regularly invited. At the luncheon meeting members bring up any matters that they consider appropriate. There is no agenda although frequently members of the Board give advance notice of topics they wish discussed. No minutes are kept for these meetings. The Executive Officer is the only staff officer who attends the luncheon meetings.

Board discussions at the luncheon meeting are rarely conducted on the basis of staff papers. Rather, the luncheons serve as an extremely valuable means by which the OCB members consult informally as ranking government officials with respect to important matters of mutual concern within the wide range of the Board's interests. This activity is thus distinguished from the more formal part of the Board's work which is concerned in large measure with discussion, revision and approval of written documents such as Operations Plans and reports.

Agreements may be reached during the luncheon on some of the matters discussed, others are referred to the appropriate working group for study and later recommendations, and still others are referred to the agencies concerned for decision outside the OCB framework. The Executive Officer records the Board's actions and later advises the interested agencies of them.

Items on the OCB agenda are discussed at the formal session which is convened at 2:15 p.m. As indicated previously, OCB documents prepared by the working groups are usually presented to the Board only after they have been reviewed by the OCB Assistants. Usually the Chairman of the working group which has prepared a particular

<sup>84</sup> White House Press Release, January 13, 1960.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*

document (and in many instances an Assistant Secretary from the same agency) attends the Board meeting to answer questions and to report on developments which have occurred since the document was prepared.

The Board members discuss and settle or agree on a method for seeking settlement of all differences of view contained in the document under consideration. As previously indicated, the OCB always acts by "agreement" or "concurrence"; it does not "decide" or "direct". Action on a document therefore consists in concurring in it and agreeing to carry out any actions it contains. When there is a difference of view among the OCB members which cannot be resolved within the OCB itself, it is referred to the respective agency heads. If they cannot resolve the difference, it may be taken to the President for resolution, sometimes directly, but normally through the NSC.

The agenda, which is determined by the Board upon the recommendation of the Executive Officer, includes the following principal types of documents: (a) operations plans for foreign countries or regions or major "functional" areas; (b) reports to the NSC on assigned policies; (c) semiannual appraisals of the validity of assigned policies and evaluations of their implementation; (d) the Activity Report and other standing items (such as the minutes of the previous meeting); (e) special reports for the OCB or the NSC prepared by OCB working groups to meet specific needs for information or action; and (f) oral reports which may serve as background briefings for papers on the agenda or as the basis for discussion of current problems of major interest. It is impossible to generalize about the last two types of reports because their character is determined by the special needs which give rise to their preparation. However, the first four types of reports have a history of development which is summarized below.

When the President, after approving a national security policy, assigns it to OCB to coordinate implementation, the Board requests the working group which has responsibility for the foreign country or area to prepare Operations Plans for each country. Such Plans are comprehensive, detailed outlines of operating guidance to implement a policy.

Initially the working groups had carried out their coordinating responsibilities directly under the policy. In September 1954, however, following suggestions by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director, Foreign Operations Administration, the OCB Assistants agreed, on behalf of their principals, to initiate preparation of Operations Plans. Their purpose, as stated in 1954, was to provide a means by which the Board would review the working group's agreement as to basic approach, emphasis, timing and agency action responsibilities under the policy.

The Plans were, and continue to be, prepared by the working groups on the basis of material submitted by the responsible agencies. Under the original instructions approved in 1954 the Operations Plan<sup>86</sup> contained two basic elements: (a) a statement of basic approach which indicated the concept of operations; and (b) a statement of actions agreed upon, agency responsibilities for implementation, and timing of actions. In addition the Plan included annexes listing for consideration by the Board: (a) desirable actions which had not

been included because of policy, funding or other limitations;<sup>87</sup> and (b) proposed actions on which there was not agreement between the agencies. Those proposals in the annexes in which the Board concurred were included in the final agreed Plan, the rest were eliminated from the Plan.

During the following two years a financial annex and a statement of major U.S. commitments (financial, military and political) with respect to the country were added. In July 1957 agreed courses of action based upon the courses of action in the policy paper were eliminated in favor of statements of existing and projected agency programs. In making this latter change, the Board made the OCB Assistants and the working groups specifically responsible for assuring that proposed agency programs fully reflected the national security policy objectives and courses of action.

In the course of a general review by the OCB of its reports in the spring and summer of 1959, following issuance of the new Presidential instructions on reporting, the format and content of Operations Plans was also reviewed. The plans now contain two major sections: (a) a section containing objectives and major policy directives; and (b) a section containing operational guidance. This latter section consists of a series of paired paragraphs, the first of which states a problem; this problem statement is followed by one or more paragraphs of operational guidance. There may be "splits" in these sections when the Plan goes to the Board. Following the main body of the Plan are annexes containing: (a) a statement of arrangements or agreements between the country concerned and the United States; (b) statements of the agency programs for carrying out the Plan prepared by the agencies responsible for the programs; (c) financial data on U.S. assistance and other programs in the country concerned; and frequently (d) an estimate of Sino-Soviet activities and intentions with respect to that country.

Preparation of an Operations Plan helps to identify, clarify and resolve differences of policy interpretation, operating responsibility, or required actions. It also exposes operating difficulties and recommends practical guidance for the more effective implementation of the policy. The approved Plan is designed to provide useful guidance for agency operations in Washington and in the field, with particular reference to those activities that are of interagency character and that require interagency coordination. Before a draft Plan is completed, interested diplomatic missions abroad are asked to comment upon it. When the Board has concurred in a Plan, it is sent by the State Department to the appropriate Chiefs of Mission abroad and by Defense to the appropriate unified commands. Copies or appropriate extracts are provided by other Washington agencies to their field representatives. A Plan is subject to review at any time and may be modified to meet changed circumstances. All Plans are formally reviewed, and revised as necessary, every six months.

What are called by the OCB "Reports to the NSC" are the current form of progress reports on policies assigned to the OCB for coordination. A September 9, 1953, NSC instruction on progress reports confirmed the existing NSC directive that Progress Reports should contain two elements: (a) a summary of significant actions taken

<sup>86</sup> Initially called "Outline Plans of Operations".

<sup>87</sup> This annex was later supplanted by a listing, on a selective basis, of additional proposals under consideration in the working group which appeared to be outside existing policy.

to implement the policy; and (b) an evaluation of the effectiveness, timeliness and applicability of the policy. This instruction indicated that the "appropriate interval" for the submission of reports would be three to six months. A May 11, 1954, amendment to the instructions gave the coordinating agency authority to determine the appropriate interval. These general instructions still govern the content, though not the form or frequency, of progress reports.

The first OCB instruction on the subject, dated April 30, 1954, provided that progress reports should be submitted every six months unless otherwise specified. Initially the progress reports contained both a summary statement of significant actions taken to implement the policy and a more detailed treatment keyed, on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis, to the policy. Later this detailed treatment was dropped and by September 15, 1955, OCB reports contained three major sections: (a) a listing of major developments during the period; (b) a summary statement of operating progress in relationship to major NSC objectives (including recommendations on the need for policy review); and (c) major problems or areas of difficulty. A financial annex was attached to the report. Reports continued to include these same elements until 1959, although changes in format gave increasing emphasis to the "major problems" section.

Until January 1959 reports were ordinarily submitted to the Council every six months, though there were cases of both more and less frequent reporting. On January 29, 1959, the President directed that progress reports normally be transmitted at yearly intervals unless the coordinating agency considered that there were significant developments affecting the policy or wished to recommend a review. The President's January directive was superseded on July 29, 1959, by a new directive which required each coordinating agency to continue to reappraise the validity and evaluate the implementation of policy, as required by developments or periodically, normally at six-month intervals. It eliminated the requirement for annual reporting to the Council, stating instead that reports should be submitted whenever the coordinating agency wished to recommend a policy review or considered that there had been developments of such significance as to warrant a progress report. Both directives pointed out, in addition, that any Council Member or Adviser or the Planning Board could recommend review of a policy whenever developments were believed to justify it. The purpose of these directives was to eliminate routine reports to the Council and to concentrate the Council's time and attention on those cases where significant developments had occurred or where the policy appeared to need review. They also placed additional and significant responsibility upon the OCB itself for determining, through periodic (normally semiannual) appraisals, the need for a report to the NSC.

As a result of these changes, the OCB made a general review of its reports. Under revised OCB instructions, evaluations of the validity and the implementation of assigned policies continue to be prepared periodically (normally semiannually) by the working groups for the Board. These semiannual appraisals become reports to the Council only when the Board determines that developments or the need for policy review justify such action. In view of the new focus of the reports, the "major problems" section has been dropped, but, as indicated above, is now incorporated in the Operations Plans. The re-

ports to the Council contain two sections: (a) a statement on the adequacy of the policy; and (b) a summary evaluation of progress in accomplishing U.S. objectives. The financial annex has been eliminated; as noted, such an annex is included in the Operations Plans. OCB reports to the Council continue to be discussed in the Planning Board prior to the Council meeting. The Council notes or discusses the report and acts upon any recommendation for policy review. If it determines that such review is necessary, it directs the Planning Board to undertake it.

Since October 21, 1953, an important item on the agenda of every OCB meeting has been the weekly "Activity Report." The report presently contains the following types of information: (a) follow-up on Board actions or matters discussed at Board meetings; (b) significant developments related to major operating problems described in the latest plan or report; (c) significant matters considered at the meetings of the Board Assistants or working groups and committees; (d) schedules of pending OCB papers; and (e) new assignments to the OCB with follow-up plans for coordination. Substantially the present format, which is organized on a geographical area basis and seeks to relate the report closely to OCB activities, was adopted in March 1956. The Report is prepared by the Executive Officer with the assistance of the OCB Staff (more particularly the OCB Staff Representatives on the working groups and committees). It is based upon current material obtained primarily from the OCB agencies but due to time limitations is not formally cleared in advance with them. The Report helps keep OCB Members informed of current developments relating to the work of the OCB and discussion of the report in the OCB may result (for example) in agreement to request a report, to take action, or to follow-up on actions previously taken.

#### *Changes in the NSC Staff since July 1, 1957*

The Executive Order of February 25, 1957, brought the OCB Staff within the NSC Staff, effective July 1, 1957. In anticipation of this action the offices of the OCB Staff were moved into the Executive Office Building in space adjacent to the offices of the NSC Staff and the two Special Assistants. A single NSC budget for fiscal year 1958, including funds for both the NSC and the OCB, was presented to Congress in January; upon its approval the OCB Staff was for the first time financed directly by a Congressional appropriation for the NSC rather than indirectly through contributions from OCB constituent agencies.

The revised Executive Order had three major effects upon the NSC and OCB Staffs: (a) it integrated the staffs, making them into a single NSC Staff headed by the Executive Secretary of the NSC; (b) it provided for close liaison between members of the staffs and for better correlation of the staff work for the NSC and the OCB; and (c) it permitted the consolidation of certain administrative services for both staffs in the interests of economy and efficiency. The specific effects of the reorganization upon staff organization can best be illustrated by a description of the present organization of the new NSC Staff in the course of which changes will be indicated.

The first major unit within the NSC Staff is the Office of the Executive Secretary. The NSC Executive Secretary, as has been noted, acts for the Special Assistant to the President for National Security



Affairs in his absence (including acting as Chairman of the Planning Board)<sup>80</sup> and advises and aids him in the performance of his duties. He continues to be responsible for the over-all supervision of the NSC Staff, to supervise directly the staff services for the Council itself, and to give general direction to the Policy Coordinating Staff and the Administrative Office. The Administrative Office, headed by an Administrative Officer, was created on July 1, 1957, as a part of the Office of the Executive Secretary to perform for the entire NSC Staff certain personnel, budget, fiscal, supply and general services and records, reproduction, courier and related services. The Administrative Office maintains liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency which continues to perform certain supporting administrative services on a reimbursable basis for the entire NSC Staff.

A second major unit of the NSC Staff is the Policy Coordinating Staff, headed by the NSC Deputy Executive Secretary.<sup>81</sup> This Staff is comprised of two elements: (a) the Policy Coordinating Special Staff; and (b) the Planning Board Secretariat. The principal functions of the Special Staff continue to be to (a) assist the Special Assistant and the Executive Secretary by preparation for them of an independent analysis and review of each Planning Board report at each stage in its preparation; (b) assist the Special Assistant by preparation of drafts of the briefing notes used by him in presenting policy papers to the Council; (c) perform staff work in connection with the Special Assistant's membership on other interdepartmental bodies;<sup>82</sup> (d) seek to determine whether gaps exist in national security policies and whether the policy implications of current or anticipated developments are being explored; (e) provide NSC Staff representation on *ad hoc* Council or Planning Board committees; and (f) assist in the preparation of the annual status reports on national security programs. The Planning Board Secretariat continues to perform secretariat functions for the Planning Board, and its Director serves as chairman of the Planning Board Assistants. The Deputy Executive Secretary, in addition to heading the Policy Coordinating Staff, acts for the Executive Secretary in his absence, advises and aids him in the performance of his duties, and is directly responsible for Council secretariat activities.

The third major unit in the NSC Staff is the OCB Staff, headed by the Executive Officer of the OCB.<sup>83</sup> On July 1, 1957, when the OCB Staff was brought within the NSC Staff, it continued to consist of five elements: (a) the Office of the Executive Officer and Deputy Executive Officer; (b) the OCB Secretariat (formerly the Office of the Executive Assistant); (c) the Area Staff; (d) the Information and Education Projects Staff (recently renamed the Information, Education and Special Projects Staff); and (e) the Intelligence Liaison Staff.

In addition to heading the OCB Staff, the Executive Officer is chairman of the OCB Assistants. He serves the Board as its principal staff officer, providing impartial and confidential staff work and advice

<sup>80</sup> The Executive Secretary does not act for the Special Assistant in his role as Chairman of the OCB. That function is performed by the Vice Chairman of the OCB.

<sup>81</sup> Mr. S. Everett Gleason, who had been Deputy Executive Secretary of the NSC since March 6, 1950, left the NSC Staff on August 16, 1950, and was replaced as Deputy Executive Secretary by Mr. Marion W. Boyce.

<sup>82</sup> The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs is a member of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy and may attend Cabinet meetings. He is authorized to attend the meetings of certain other bodies of a standing character such as the National Aeronautics and Space Council and the Federal Council for Science and Technology. He is also from time to time a member of various *ad hoc* committees and groups.

<sup>83</sup> Mr. Elmer B. Staats resigned as Executive Officer September 12, 1958, and was replaced by Mr. Bromley Smith on January 1, 1959.

for the Board and for the agencies involved in OCB activities. He is expected to bring to the attention of the Board any matter that, in his judgment, should receive its consideration. He is responsible for the organization of necessary staff work for the Board, for obtaining the assistance of nonmember agencies in work on Board projects, and for ensuring that qualified personnel are assigned by all agencies to such staff work. Through general supervision of the work of the working groups, he seeks to ensure that they carry out their assigned functions and that documents prepared by them are responsive to the needs of the Board both as to timing and as to substance.

The OCB Secretariat under a Director who is also Executive Assistant to the Executive Officer performs secretariat functions for the OCB and the OCB Assistants and assists in the administration of the OCB Staff. The members of the OCB Area Staff and the Information, Education and Special Projects Staff, under the supervision of the Executive Officer and the Deputy Executive Officer, serve as members of working groups to which they are assigned, contributing to the drafting of documents, preparation of agenda and minutes, and identification of problems requiring interagency coordination; select information for inclusion in the weekly Activity Report; and help identify opportunities for psychological exploitation. Since the OCB Intelligence Liaison Staff has recently been absorbed into a new NSC Staff unit, it will be dealt with separately below.

Until July 1, 1957, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs had a representative on the OCB Assistants who participated as a member of that group and who assisted the Special Assistant in the performance of his OCB membership functions.<sup>84</sup> This representative was a member of the NSC Special Staff. In connection with the creation of the position of Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations Coordination, and the placing of the OCB Staff within the NSC Staff, the separate representation of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs on the OCB Assistants was eliminated. Since July 1, 1957, staff support for both Special Assistants in their OCB work has been provided by the OCB Staff. This arrangement was continued when the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs became chairman of the OCB. Members of the Policy Coordinating Special Staff may, however, attend OCB Assistants meetings as observers for items of interest to them and OCB Staff members enjoy similar rights with respect to Planning Board and Planning Board Assistants meetings. The new organizational association, as well as the physical location of the Policy Coordinating and OCB Staffs together, has increased markedly the exchange of information and ideas between them.

The fourth major unit of the NSC Staff is the Internal Security Coordinating Staff, headed by a Director who is also the NSC Representative on Internal Security.<sup>85</sup> In addition to performing the internal security functions of the latter office, the Director now provides staff analysis, advice and assistance on behalf of the NSC Staff in connection with the responsibilities of the NSC for issuing general directives for the purpose of organizing and coordinating the foreign intelligence

<sup>84</sup> Except for a brief period, the Special Assistant who was the President's representative on the OCB did not have a representative on the OCB Assistants. Staff support for the President's representative was provided by the Executive Officer of the OCB and the OCB Staff.

<sup>85</sup> Mr. J. Patrick Coyne continues to hold this position.

activities of the several agencies of the government. He also performs on assignment the functions of a Policy Coordinating Special Staff member with respect to certain policies and programs.

The fifth and final unit of the NSC Staff is the Research and Intelligence Liaison Staff. The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in early January 1960 arranged for a study of research in relationship to national security policy. The Planning Board, after discussion of the results of this study, agreed that a unit should be established within the NSC Staff to serve as a clearing house on research on national security problems being done inside and outside the Government. The Planning Board did not believe that enough was known about the adequacy of such research and about whether there are serious gaps in research coverage to justify action beyond the creation of such a clearing house unit at this time.

The President approved the creation of such a clearing house. The new unit was created, effective June 1, 1960, by abolishing the OCB Intelligence Liaison Staff and creating a new "Research and Intelligence Liaison Staff" under a Director with the following functions: (a) keeping the NSC Planning Board, the Operations Coordinating Board, the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination and other components of the NSC Staff informed of research being done within and outside the Government which has significant bearing upon their responsibilities for national security policy-making or operations coordination; (b) facilitating appropriate access within the Government to such research; and (c) in cooperation with intelligence and other NSC participating agencies, obtaining or developing intelligence and other background information needed by the NSC Staff and the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination.<sup>24</sup>

The foregoing history indicates three fundamental organizational attributes which appear to be required for the effective functioning of the National Security Council:

1. Ready adaptability of the organization to the particular needs and desires of each President during the course of each Administration.
2. Well-established organizational structure and procedures which are thoroughly understood by officials who participate regularly in the work of the Council.
3. Sufficient flexibility as to the manner and timing of the use of the organization to enable each project to be handled in accordance with its particular character and urgency.

Experience since its creation in 1947 has shown that the National Security Council, when organized with the above attributes, is a valuable instrumentality for providing the President integrated advice on policies required for the Nation's security.

<sup>24</sup> The OCB Intelligence Liaison Staff, while continuing formally to be a part of the OCB Staff, had, in fact, for some time served the Policy Coordinating Staff as well as the OCB Staff. The Director of the new Staff is Mr. Neilson C. DeBevoise who was formerly Chief of the OCB Intelligence Liaison Staff.



January 26, 1961

~~SECRET~~ 55NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCILAGENDA

For the Meeting to be held in the  
Cabinet Room of The White House  
on Wednesday, February 1, 1961,  
at 10:00 a.m.

ITEMS FOR DISCUSSIONITEM 1 -- SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY

For discussion, in the light of an oral briefing  
on the subject by the Director of Central  
Intelligence.

ITEM 2 -- MILITARY BUDGETS AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

For discussion, on the basis of comments to  
be presented at the meeting by the Secretary  
of Defense and the Director, Bureau of the  
Budget.

ITEM 3 -- NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES REQUIRING URGENT ATTENTION

For discussion.

ITEM 4 -- ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

For discussion of initial plans for the  
structure and functioning of the NSC  
organization.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

nsc ltr 4/21/77

By

mmg

NARS, Date

5/4/77

RECORD OF ACTION  
by the  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
by  
MEMORANDUM ACTION  
as of  
January 19, 1961

The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, participated in the action below.

ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2395. ATTACK WARNING CHANNELS AND PROCEDURES FOR CIVILIANS  
(NSC 5513/1; NSC Action No. 1565; Memos for NSC, same subject, dated February 20, 1957, December 3, 1959, and December 14 and 28, 1960; NSC Action No. 2363; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 17, 1961)

Adopted the chart on the subject transmitted by the reference memorandum of January 17, 1961.

NOTE: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to all holders of NSC 5513/1.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC Sec 4/21/77  
By nmq, NARS, Date 5/4/77

RECORD OF ACTIONS  
by the  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
by  
MEMORANDUM ACTION  
as of  
January 18, 1961

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 92-64  
By 48, NARA, Date 6-25-93

The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and the Director,  
Bureau of the Budget, participated in the actions below.

ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2393. U. S. POLICY TOWARD THE SUDAN  
(NSC 5820/1, paragraph 42; NSC Action No. 2264 (NOTE);  
Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "U. S.  
Policy Toward the Near East", dated July 19, 1960;  
NSC 6011; NSC 6106; Memo for NSC from Executive Secre-  
tary, subject: "U. S. Policy Toward the Sudan", dated  
January 10, 1961)

Adopted the draft statement of policy contained in  
NSC 6106, subject to the following comments:

Secretary of State: "Reword paragraph 25, 'A Sudan  
friendly to but not under the domination of  
the UAR', to avoid the misleading implication  
that Sudan-UAR friendship is itself a primary  
objective of the US. To express correctly  
what the Planning Board had in mind, I recom-  
mend paragraph 25 be changed to read:

"'A Sudan, although inclined by geograph-  
ical, economic and political considerations to  
seek friendly relations with the UAR, able and  
willing to resist the political domination of  
its northern neighbor.'"

Assistant Secretary of the Treasury: "Concurred in  
on the understanding that a Financial Appendix  
will be supplied projecting economic assistance  
programs in the general order of magnitude of  
\$7 to \$10 million a year, technical assistance

ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2393. U. S. POLICY TOWARD THE SUDAN (Continued)

programs of less than \$5 million per year, loans by the lending institutions in the order of \$15 million over the next four years, P. L. 480 programs in the order of magnitude of \$10 million per year, and negligible amounts of military assistance for training."

NOTE: In approving NSC 6106, the President approved for inclusion therein the revision recommended by the Secretary of State. NSC 6106, as amended and approved, has been circulated for implementation by all Executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

2394. NATO ALERT PROCEDURES

(Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 20, 1954; NSC Action No. 2215-c; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 9, 1961)

Concurred, with the exception of the Secretary of Defense, in a recommendation to the President (as proposed by the NSC Planning Board in the reference memorandum of January 9, 1961) that the reference memorandum of May 20, 1954, be rescinded because the policies therein are no longer valid. The Secretary of Defense recommended that the memorandum of May 20, 1954, not be rescinded and that the procedures be revised along the lines of MC 67/1, "The NATO Alert System", dated August 10, 1960.

NOTE: The President, on January 18, 1961, after consideration of the above recommendations, directed that the reference memorandum of May 20, 1954, should not be rescinded at this time and that the Secretary of Defense should request the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare, for consideration by the National Security Council, the revision recommended by the Secretary of Defense.



~~SECRET~~ 58

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 4/21/90

By mmg, NARS, Date 5/4/97

January 18, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


SUBJECT: U. S. Policy on Austria

REFERENCES: A. NSC 5603  
B. SNIE 25-59  
C. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary,  
same subject, dated May 27 and  
December 9, 1960  
D. NSC 6020  
E. NSC Action No. 2389

The National Security Council, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, by Memorandum Action (NSC 2389) adopted the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6020.


The President, on this date, approved NSC 6020 for implementation by all Executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government, and referred it to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

NSC 6020 supersedes NSC 5603.

  
JAMES S. LAY, JR.  
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Attorney General  
The Director, Bureau of the Budget  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director of Central Intelligence

# COPY



## DUTIES OF AIDES

- (a) Aide for National Security Council handles all affairs pertaining to the National Security Council for the Vice President.
- (b) Aide for Public Information handles relations with the Press and Civic Organizations such as the American Legion in coordination with the Press Secretary.
- (c) Aide for Liaison. Handles matters of liaison with the Congress and Departments of the Executive Branch except for those relations with the military departments other than his own.
- (d) All aides will maintain direct liaison with their own departments in its relationship with the Vice President and the Executive Assistant and when desired will accompany him on visits which primarily involve their own departments.