

**NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE**  
**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#64 Memo	NSC Conf. <i>NSC Sec. 3/4/77</i> <del>National Security Action Memo No. 201</del> 2 p	<del>10/26/62</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

VP Security File, Nations and Regions  
Policy Papers and Background Studies on Cuba Affair (III)

## RESTRICTION CODES

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<b>**TO BE SUBMITTED TO STATE DEPT. FOR CONCURRENCE**</b>		
#57 Memo	WH Top Secret To Members of Exec. Committee from McG. Bundy	1 p 10/30/62	A
#62 Report	WH Top Secret re: Cuba	4 p Undated	A

*State Dec 3/18/77, NSC Dec 5/3/77*

*Exempt, State Dec 3/18/77, NSC Dec 5/3/77*

*open 13007*

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#49 Memo <i>open 6-26-09</i>	DOD Top Secret <i>Example NSC Dec 5/6/77, OSD Dec 2/14/77</i> For NSC Exec. Committee from Paul Nitze 2 p (duplicate of #34 in "II")	11/07/62	A
#60 Report	DOD Top Secret <i>Example NSC Dec 5/6/77, OSD Dec 2/14/77</i> re: Cuba 1 p <i>open 9-1-09 per RAC</i>	Undated	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#47 Cable	CIA TDCS 3/528,153 Secret (Gp 1) <i>Exempt, CIA Dec 2/15/77</i> <i>4</i> p	11/14/62	A

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687

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#41a Cable	State Secret Embtel 1264 from Moscow	5 p 11/13/62	A
#42a Cable	State Secret Embtel 1265 from Moscow	3 p 11/13/62	A
<del>#43 Cable</del>	<del>State Secret</del> <del>Embtel 1227 from Moscow</del>	<del>2 p 11/07/62</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#44a Cable</del>	<del>State Secret</del> <del>Deptel 938 to Latin American Diplomatic Posts</del>	<del>4 p 11/19/62</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#45a Cable</del>	<del>State Secret</del> <del>Circular NIACT 939</del>	<del>4 p 11/19/62</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#46 Cable</del>	<del>State Secret</del> <del>Deptel 2645 to Paris</del>	<del>4 p 11/19/62</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#48a Cable</del>	<del>State Conf.</del> <del>Embtel 1293 from Moscow</del>	<del>2 p 11/17/62</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#48c Cable</del>	<del>State Conf.</del> <del>Embtel 1293 from Moscow [duplicate of #48a]</del>	<del>2 p 11/17/62</del>	<del>A</del>
#50 Report	State Top Secret Cuba	10 p 11/06/62	A
#51a Cable	State Secret Embtel 1213 from Moscow	1 p 11/06/62	A
<del>#52 Report</del>	<del>State Top Secret</del> <del>Instructions for negotiations in Cuba</del>	<del>5 p 11/03/62</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#53 Report</del>	<del>State Secret</del> <del>Offensive Weapons</del>	<del>4 p 11/03/62</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#54 Cable</del>	<del>State Secret</del> <del>Airgram 127 to Rio de Janeiro</del>	<del>1 p 10/30/62</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#55a Memo</del>	<del>State Secret</del> <del>To Secretary from Roger Hilsman</del>	<del>4 p 11/01/62</del>	<del>A</del>
#56 Memo	State Top Secret To McGeorge Bundy from W W Rostow	14 p Undated	A

FILE LOCATION

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Policy Papers and Background Studies on Cuba Affair (III)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#63 Report	State Top Secret re: Cuba	4 p Undated	A
#65 Report open 6-26-09	State Top Secret Sanitized re Castro	1 p Undated	A
#66 Report	State Top Secret NSC ltr 10/3/77 Political Path	2 p Undated	A
#67 Report	State Top Secret NSC ltr 10/3/77 re: Turkey	1 p Undated	A
#68 Report open 6-26-09	State Conf. Sanitized Denuclearization Track	3 p Undated	A
#69a Cable	State Top Secret Embtel 917 from Rio de Janeiro	1 p 11/01/62	A
#70b Cable open 6-26-09	State Top Secret Sanitized Deptel to Rio de Janeiro	3 p 10/25/62	A
#71a Cable	State Secret State ltr 4/22/77, OS ltr 6/29/77 Embtel 174 from Wellington	2 p 10/25/62	A
#72 Cable open 6-26-09	State Secret Sanitized Embtel 1041 from Moscow	2 p 10/23/62	A

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85	1944	10:00		

**TO - L. D. Battle**

Executive Secretary  
Department of State  
Room 7224 NS/E  
Do Not File

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

VP

55-M  
Action  
EUR

~~SECRET~~

Control: 2479  
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 7, 1962  
4:02 PM

Info  
SS  
G  
SAL  
RMR

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

051

NO: 1227, NOVEMBER 7, 10 PM

PRIORITY

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

POLICY

SOME FOOTNOTES TO KREMLIN RECEPTION

1. THERE SEEMS TO ME NO DOUBT THAT EVENTS OF PAST 10 DAYS HAVE REALLY SHAKEN SOVIET LEADERSHIP. THIS SEEMED CLEAR FROM REMARKS BY ALMOST EVERY SOVIET WITH WHOM WE SPOKE, INCLUDING KOZLOV, MADAME KHRUSHCHEV, AND AIR MARSHALL (WHO TOLD MY WIFE HE WAS NOW WILLING TO BELIEVE IN GOD). INTELLIGENTSIA AND GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONARIES. THIS SEEMS TO ME MORE IMPORTANT, BASICALLY, THAN RUMORS AND SPECULATION ABOUT DIFFERENCES WITHIN THAT LEADERSHIP. THERE WAS IN FACT NO EVIDENCE OF SUCH DIFFERENCES DURING THREE HOURS OF RECEPTION TONIGHT AND KHRUSHCHEV WAS IN COMMAND.

2. AS THE PRESS WILL HAVE REPORTED IN DETAIL, KHRUSHCHEV MADE THREE SHORT EXTEMPORANEOUS SPEECHES CONCLUDING IN TOASTS: FIRST TO SOVIET PEOPLE AND BUILDING OF COMMUNISM; SECOND TO SOVIET YOUTH, I.E., THE FUTURE; AND THIRD TO "AMBASSADORS" AND PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP AMONG ALL PEOPLES. IN LATTER HE WAS BOTH AGILE AND RESTRAINED, FOLLOWING GENERAL LINE OF KOSYGIN'S REPORT LAST NIGHT AND MALINOVSKY'S SPEECH IN RED SQUARE THIS MORNING. PERHAPS MOST STRIKING ELEMENT NOW BEING INTRODUCED IS EXTENSION OF DEFINITION OF "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" TO INCLUDE CONCEPT OF THE NECESSITY OF MUTUAL "CONCESSIONS" TO PREVENT CONFLICT. / 3. DURING

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Authority FRvs 61-63, ul. 5 #260

By jc NARA. Date 8-18-05



~~SECRET~~

-2- 1227, NOVEMBER 7, 10 PM, FROM MOSCOW

3. DURING FIRST ROUND OF EXCHANGES WITH KHRUSHCHEV, IN WHICH ALL CHIEFS OF MISSION WERE BRIEFLY RECEIVED, I HAD RECOURSE TO A STORY WHICH HE HAD TOLD IN HIS OWN THIRD SPEECH, ABOUT TWO MEN WHO HAD ADDED DIFFERENT NUMBERS TO REACH SAME SUM. I SAID THAT I USED DIFFERENT NUMBERS THAN HE TO COME TO SAME RESULTS AS REGARDS DANGER OF SITUATION AND NEED TO SETTLE DIFFERENCES PEACEFULLY. HE SAID TOTAL SUM WAS IMPORTANT THING AND PROPOSED WE TOAST THAT.

4. LATER, KHRUSHCHEV CALLED ME OVER PRIVATELY AND IMMEDIATELY REFERRED TO OUR CONVERSATION ABOUT A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN THINKING FURTHER ABOUT THIS QUESTION. HE NOW THOUGHT WE SHOULD NOT RUSH INTO SUCH A MEETING. IT WOULD PROBABLY BE BETTER THAT THERE SHOULD BE ADVANCE PREPARATION ON ONE OR MORE QUESTIONS, SO THAT AGREEMENT WOULD BE IN VIEW. THEN PERHAPS THE PRESIDENT AND HE COULD MEET, MAY BE TOGETHER WITH SOME OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, AND REGISTER SUCH AGREEMENTS. HE ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS GREETINGS TO THE PRESIDENT.

5. DESPITE THE GESTURE TOWARD CUBA IN KHRUSHCHEV'S LAST SPEECH AND TOAST, THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR WAS IN FACT NEGLECTED DURING THE PROCEEDINGS.

DURING THE ENTERTAINMENT WHICH FOLLOWED, KHRUSHCHEV POINTEDLY BROUGHT MY WIFE FORWARD TO JOIN HIM AND MADAME KHRUSHCHEV. AT THE END HE AGAIN ASKED ME TO TRANSMIT HIS MESSAGE AND HIS REGARDS TO THE PRESIDENT, WHICH I ASSURED HIM I WOULD DO PROMPTLY.

KOHLER

COT

NOTE: RELAYED WHITE HOUSE 11/7/62

~~SECRET~~

NOTE: Advance copies to Mr. Owen (SOV) and SS 11-7-62 CWO-M



VICE PRESIDENT

44

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04266 44a

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
FARGE TO

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Nov 19 9 18 PM '62

52

Origin

SS

Info:

ACTION: CIRCULAR 938

ALL LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS  
RPTD INFO: JAMAICA, KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN, USUN  
POLADS CINCLANT, CINCARIB

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FOR AMBASSADOR

EXCOM  
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~~XXXXXXXX~~

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

As you know President is having press conference on Cuba November 20 at 6 p.m. Washington time. You are requested to make date with Chief of State or Foreign Minister at ; your discretion prior to that time and convey the following to him as position of US Government:

(a) The US has still been unable to obtain satisfactory performance from USSR with regard to withdrawal of IL-28s or adequate safeguards against presence and reintroduction of offensive weapons in Cuba.

(b) Recent reconnaissance has confirmed the presence of organized Soviet military units in Cuba with most modern field equipment. These cannot be ~~dismissed~~ dismissed merely as "Soviet technicians".

(c) Castro has now announced that he intends to fire on US reconnaissance planes. Continued US reconnaissance is essential action authorized by the OAS resolution.

Drafted by:

ARA:EMMartin:lh 11/19/62

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Clearances:

G - Mr. U. Alexis Johnson

~~S/S~~

White House/Mr. Bundy

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~~SECRET~~ S/S - Mr. Brubeck

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FORM DS-322

Authority State Ltr 4/22/77 NSC Ltr 10/3/77

By mrg, NARS, Date 10/28/77



~~SECRET~~

(d) Since the US must continue surveillance, there is serious possibility of incident against which US is determined to take retaliatory measures.

(e) Situation is fluid and may take one of several courses. Soviets may act against Castro or, in any event, may not support him in exchanges that might follow his interference with US reconnaissance. On the other hand they may provide military support to Castro. Nature of future US action will naturally depend upon which option the Soviets elect.

(f) Continued refusal on the part of the USSR to withdraw the IL-28s or active Soviet military participation in action against necessary surveillance might well require the reestablishment of the quarantine and its extension to POL.

(g) The President intends to make clear to ~~the~~ Nation and world on Tuesday afternoon the present posture of affairs and to indicate that early resolution of remaining problems must be achieved. This approach would of course be altered materially if favorable answers were received from Khrushchev on IL-28s before press conference.

(h) US expects to be able to count on full cooperation of its Allies in event it becomes necessary to reimpose the quarantine--with or without an extended proscribed list--or

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

to take other appropriate action to deal with the situation.

You should also inform him that unless Soviets agree promptly to withdraw IL-28s US intends to ask for meeting of Organ of Consultation on Wednesday, November 21, to hear formal public report on situation and actions we may need to take ~~wj&~~ under October 23 resolution. We would also make clear that if situation develops in way which would call for important new actions on our part, we will call on Organ for further consideration of situation.

In period in which tension may be again heightened US is desirous of consulting and working closely with its allies in the Inter-American system and securing their support for such further actions as may be necessary in the light of situation as it develops. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ A continued demonstration of unity and firmness at Organ meeting would we feel be helpful in accomplishing our remaining objectives with a minimum risk of extending the area of conflict.

Report promptly your government's reaction to statement of US views contained in preceding paragraphs.

FYI Similar expression of views being made to NATO countries and will be conveyed here on 20th prior to press conference to LA Ambassadorial group. END FYI

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FOR USUN. You should inform SYG of points (a) ~~bx~~ through (g) for his own confidential information but not repeat not to be revealed to Russians.

RUSK

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VICE PRESIDENT

45

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DATE	OFFICER	SIGNATURE

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

04267

45a

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
CHARGE TO

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Nov 19 9 19 PM '62

52

Origin

ACTION: CIRCULAR NIACT 939

SS

Info

ACTION: Amembassy OTTAWA NIACT

21

Amembassy THE HAGUE NIACT

Amembassy OSLO NIACT

Amembassy COPENHAGEN NIACT

Amembassy LUXEMBOURG NIACT

Amembassy LISBON NIACT

Amembassy BRUSSELS NIACT

Amembassy REYKJAVIK NIACT

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Amembassy ANKARA NIACT

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Amembassy PARIS TOPOL NIACT

Amembassy TOKYO NIACT

INFO: Amembassy LONDON NIACT

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FOR AMBASSADOR

As you know President is having press conference on Cuba November 20 at 6 p.m. Washington time. You are requested to make date with Head of Government or Foreign Minister at your discretion prior to that time and convey the following to him as the position of the US Government:

(a) The US has still been unable to obtain satisfactory

Drafted by: EUR:JRSchaetzle:mt  
11/19/62

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

U. Alexis Johnson

Clearances:

EUR - Mr. Tyler

White House - Mr. McGeorge Bundy

S/S - Mr. Brubeck

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FORM  
8-61 DS-322

Authority: *nscltr 10/21/77*  
By: *img*, NARS, Date: *10/21/77*



SECRET

performance from the USSR with regard to the withdrawal of IL-28s;

(b) Nor have adequate arrangements been made for ground inspection in <sup>presence</sup> Cuba and adequate safeguards against the ~~presence~~ and reintroduction of offensive weapons.

(c) Recent reconnaissance has confirmed the presence in Cuba of organized Soviet military units in Cuba with the most modern field equipment. These cannot be dismissed merely as QTE Soviet technicians UNQTE.

(d) Castro has now announced that he intends to fire on US reconnaissance planes. Continued U.S. reconnaissance is essential action authorized by the OAS resolution.

~~him~~ (e) Since the US must continue surveillance, there is serious possibility of an incident against which the US is determined to take retaliatory measures.

(f) Situation fluid and may take one of several courses. The Soviets may act against Castro or in any event may not support him in exchanges that might follow his interference with US reconnaissance. On other hand, they may provide military support for Castro. The nature of the future US action will naturally depend upon which of options Soviets select.

(g) Continued refusal on the part of the USSR to withdraw the IL-28s or active Soviet military participation in action against necessary military surveillance might well require the reestablishment of the quarantine and its extension to POL.

(h) The President intends to make clear to the nation and the world on

SECRET



SECRET

Tuesday afternoon the present posture of affairs and to indicate that an early resolution of remaining problems must be achieved. This approach would of course be altered materially if a favorable answer were received from Khrushchev on IL-28s before press conference.

(i) The US expects to be able to count on the full cooperation of its Allies in the event it becomes necessary to reimpose the quarantine -- with or without an expanded ~~proscribed~~ proscribed list -- or to take other appropriate action to deal with the situation.

(j) The US is calling a meeting this week of the Organ of Consultation of the OAS so that we can make a full report on the measures taken under the ~~March~~ Resolution of October 23 which authorized all appropriate action including the use of armed force.

(k) You should advise that US Permrep NATO will call for special meeting NAC Tuesday afternoon, November 20, to inform his colleagues of foregoing.

FOR FINLETTER

Through Colonna you should ask for special NAC meeting, drawing on paras (a) through (j). Sherman Kent (CIA) arriving Paris a.m. November 20 to brief de Gaulle. Ask Kent accompany you to NAC meeting to assist you in such way as seems best to you and Kent.

FOR PARIS, LONDON AND BONN

You may draw on foregoing to supplement separate messages you are to deliver to Chiefs of State.

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

FOR TOKYO

You ~~may~~ should, in your discretion, inform Japanese Government of paras (a) through (j).

FOR ALL MISSIONS

Report promptly ~~about~~ host government's reaction to US views contained preceding paragraphs.

END.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
CHARGE TO

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4268

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Origin  
SS

VERBATIM TEXT

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS NIACT 2645  
Amembassy BONN NIACT 1203

Nov 19 021

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bution

INFO: Amembassy LONDON NIACT 2673

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Authority

NSC 68 10/3/77 State 4/22/77

By

mg, NARS, Date 10/28/77

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Following is text of personal message from the President to de Gaulle, Adenauer and Macmillan. Paris and Bonn should deliver soonest and discuss drawing on <sup>depcirtel</sup> ~~sextel~~ 939 as necessary. For info London message has been transmitted by White House wire to Macmillan. Bruce may make copy available Fonoff and/or offer discuss with Macmillan.

BEGIN TEXT

I think it is time for me to give you a further account of the situation in Cuba and our present intentions with respect to it. I shall be discussing this matter on Tuesday evening at 6:00 in my press conference and it seems to me important that you should have an up-to-date report before that time.

It is still possible that between now and Tuesday evening the Soviet Government will indicate clearly its readiness to remove

Drafted by:

EUR:WRTyler:mt  
11/19/62

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

U. Alexis Johnson

Clearances:

White House/Mr. Bundy

S/S - Mr. Brubeck

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the IL-28's promptly, without tying this removal to a series of unsatisfactory conditions as has been the case up to now. If such an assurance should be forthcoming, I will be able to take a relatively conciliatory tone in the press conference, with respect to the Soviet Union, to announce that the quarantine can now be lifted, and concentrate attention upon the total refusal of the Cuban Government to accept any arrangements for on-site inspection and verification, as well as on the danger presented by Cuban threats to fire on our surveillance aircraft.

On the other hand, if the Soviet Government does not make appropriate assurances on the IL-28's between now and tomorrow afternoon, it will be necessary to focus attention upon this Soviet failure to carry out an important part of the understanding. In that case I expect to announce that a meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the Organisation of American States is being called this week so that we can make a full report on the measures taken under the Resolution of October 23rd, which authorized all appropriate action, including the use of armed force.

Meanwhile, we are considering further actions, which may involve response from the air to any attack on our surveillance, or a reimposition and extension of the naval quarantine, or perhaps both in combination. The logical way of extending the quarantine would be to add oil products to the list of prohibited items, ~~and~~ since these are

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directly related to the operation of bombers.

We have a variety of instruments of pressure available, and the over-all situation is somewhat less dangerous than it was in October because Soviet missiles are no longer operational in Cuba. On the other hand, we have to face the fact that a second backdown for Khrushchev may be harder in some ways than the first. For this and other reasons we see some advantages in concentrating any action we may take on Castro, from now on, if it can be managed. But the Soviets say that the IL-28's are still under their control, and until they are removed we have very little choice but to apply at least a part of our pressure against direct Soviet interests. Our thinking is further affected by new evidence that Soviet forces in Cuba are considerably stronger than we earlier estimated. We have identified elements of four Soviet ground combat units, with a total strength of perhaps 3,000 men, and the whole Soviet military presence in Cuba may be on the order of 12 to 16 thousand men. We are making it clear to the Soviets that no real normalization of relations is possible while a Soviet military presence of this sort continues.

I expect to indicate clearly Tuesday that renewed action will be required very soon unless (1) the IL-28's begin to leave, and (2) our surveillance continues without challenge from Castro, pending the establishment of better safeguards. Our precise choices among the

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

numerous courses of action available to us will evidently be affected by what the Soviets and Cubans actually do.

In this general situation, while we believe that the main responsibility necessarily falls on us, we naturally value very highly the firm support which you and our other major allies have given. If we have to go forward again, your continued support will be of the greatest importance, and meanwhile I shall be very glad to have the benefit of your own thoughts on this problem. END TEXT

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

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## Department of State

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Action

Control: 6266

Rec'd: NOVEMBER 17, 1962

5:53 A.M.

1135

EUR

FROM: MOSCOW

Info

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

NO: 1293, NOVEMBER 17, 11 A.M.

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IN BRIEF CONVERSATION AT SOCIAL FUNCTION, DEPUTY HEAD USA SECTION KUDRYAVTSEV (FORMER AMBASSADOR HAVANA) TOLD EMBOFF HIS SECTION CONTINUES BE ALMOST AS BUSY AS IT WAS DURING PERIOD OCTOBER 23-28, WORKING NIGHTS AND SUNDAYS AS CIRCUMSTANCES DEMAND. KUDRYAVTSEV HIMSELF ENGAGED PRIMARILY IN DRAFTING INSTRUCTIONS FOR KUZNETSOV. HE VOLUNTEERED HOPE CUBAN AFFAIR WOULD SOON BE SETTLED, SAYING HE WAS CONFIDENT AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON BASIS WITHDRAWAL BOMBERS AND CERTAIN MINIMUM NUMBER ON-SITE INSPECTIONS, IF QUARANTINE WERE LIFTED AND RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS STOPPED. HE EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE STOPPING FLIGHTS, WHICH, HE SAID, COULD PRODUCE "DANGEROUS INCIDENT."

KUDRYAVTSEV SEEMED TO BE POSITING END OF QUARANTINE AND FLIGHTS AS PRECONDITION TO REMOVAL BOMBERS AND ON-SITE INSPECTION, BUT APPEARED TO BE CONSCIOUSLY FUZZING THIS POINT SO AS NOT TO ESTABLISH TOO STRONG A CONNECTION BETWEEN TWO ELEMENTS.

EMBOFF DID NOT PURSUE SINCE NOT FAMILIAR WITH CURRENT STAGE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT CONFINED SELF TO EMPHASIZING IMPORTANCE BOMBER WITHDRAWAL AND ON-SITE INSPECTION AS STILL UNFULFILLED COMPONENTS ALREADY EXISTING KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV AGREEMENT.

IN RESPONSE

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By cbu/jc, NARA, Date 3-3-09~~CONFIDENTIAL~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
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-2- 1293, NOVEMBER 17, 11 A.M. FROM MOSCOW

IN RESPONSE TO REMARK THAT MIKOYAN WAS STAYING VERY LONG  
TIME IN CUBA, KUDRYAVTSEV SAID, WITHOUT DWELLING ON MATTER,  
"HE SHOULD BE COMING BACK SOON."

KOHLER

CT

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, 11-17-62, 6:11 A.M., RNL.

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## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

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42-L

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Action

Control: 6266

Rec'd: NOVEMBER 17, 1962 034  
5:53 A.M.

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Info

FROM: MOSCOW

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1293, NOVEMBER 17, 11 A.M.

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IN BRIEF CONVERSATION AT SOCIAL FUNCTION, DEPUTY HEAD USA SECTION KUDRYAVTSEV (FORMER AMBASSADOR HAVANA) TOLD EMBOFF HIS SECTION CONTINUES BE ALMOST AS BUSY AS IT WAS DURING PERIOD OCTOBER 23-28, WORKING NIGHTS AND SUNDAYS AS CIRCUMSTANCES DEMAND. KUDRYAVTSEV HIMSELF ENGAGED PRIMARILY IN DRAFTING INSTRUCTIONS FOR KUZNETSOV. HE VOLUNTEERED HOPE CUBAN AFFAIR WOULD SOON BE SETTLED, SAYING HE WAS CONFIDENT AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON BASIS WITHDRAWAL BOMBERS AND CERTAIN MINIMUM NUMBER ON-SITE INSPECTIONS, IF QUARANTINE WERE LIFTED AND RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS STOPPED. HE EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE STOPPING FLIGHTS, WHICH, HE SAID, COULD PRODUCE "DANGEROUS INCIDENT."

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EMBOFF DID NOT PURSUE SINCE NOT FAMILIAR WITH CURRENT STAGE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT CONFINED SELF TO EMPHASIZING IMPORTANCE Bomber WITHDRAWAL AND ON-SITE INSPECTION AS STILL UNFULFILLED COMPONENTS ALREADY EXISTING KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV AGREEMENT.

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EX-104  
NOV 17 1962  
DEC 1 1962

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-2- 1293, NOVEMBER 17, 11 A.M. FROM MOSCOW

IN RESPONSE TO REMARK THAT MIKOYAN WAS STAYING VERY LONG  
TIME IN CUBA, KUDRYAVTSEV SAID, WITHOUT DWELLING ON MATTER,  
"HE SHOULD BE COMING BACK SOON."

KOHLER

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49

~~TOP SECRET~~

7 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

From: Paul H. Nitze

A suggested course of action re the contingency one of our surveillance planes is shot at or destroyed.

1. Time permitting we should lay an appropriate base of public understanding of the current situation as a foundation for future action. As soon as we have confirmation that the ships carrying Soviet missiles have actually departed Cuban waters, the public should be informed that the Soviets have carried out only a portion of their obligations pursuant to the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of letters and that they have given no indication as yet of intending to fulfill other essential portions of those commitments. Specifically, they have refused to acknowledge that IL-28's are weapons systems "capable of offensive use". They have not made it possible for the UN effectively to verify the dismantling and removal of all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use, and have concurrently denied the legitimacy of U.S. surveillance in the absence of effective UN verification. Together with the Cuban regime, they appear to be frustrating the development of effective safeguards against the reintroduction of offensive weapons systems. Until we have evidence of a definite program in resolving these three issues, the U.S. in its own defense and in the defense of the security of the Hemisphere must take those steps called for by elemental prudence, including a continuance of aerial surveillance.

2. In the event one of our surveillance planes is shot at or destroyed, we should first establish the facts beyond any reasonable doubt.

3. We should then communicate to the Russians, reiterate our understanding of the original exchange of commitments, cite the history of our warnings to them with respect to interference with surveillance, and inform them that, unless they will give us prompt and specific assurances that our planes will not be interfered with, we will have to take appropriate measures to protect our surveillance flights and reimpose and extend the quarantine.

4. Simultaneously we would announce to the public that one of our planes had been shot at or destroyed and indicate the nature of the position we were communicating to the Soviet Union.

5. After the elapse of sufficient time for the message to the Soviet Union to have reached Moscow and for them to have instructed their people in Cuba, we should resume surveillance flights.

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By cbm/jc, NARA, Date 3-3-09

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Page 1 of 2 Pages



~~TOP SECRET~~

6. If it becomes necessary to act to defend our surveillance planes, the specific action taken would depend upon the circumstances of the interference. If a U-2 has been shot down, the appropriate action would be first to eliminate the particular SAM site or sites responsible for the action, then to communicate a second time with Moscow, and finally, in the absence of satisfactory assurances, eliminate the remainder of the SAM system. If MIGs are involved in an isolated incident, the appropriate action would be against MIGs whether in the air or on airfields. If short-range anti-aircraft were responsible, this would presumably be action by Cubans not Russians, and action directly against those positions would be appropriate.

7. After evaluation of U.S.S.R. and Cuban counter-action to our actions under Paragraph 6 above, the quarantine could be reimposed and extended to include POL, at least until such time as we receive satisfaction that the removal of the IL-28's and the security of our surveillance pending adequate and continuing safeguards have been assured.

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## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

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Action

Control: 1781

Rec'd: November 6, 1962

7:07 a.m.

SS

Info

FROM: Moscow

012

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1213, November 6, 1 p.m.

EYES ONLY

POLICY

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Authority State 4/22/77

NOFORN

By rmg, NARS, Date 6/22/77

French Ambassador claims to have following from reliable Soviet source in position to know:

Khrushchev letter of Friday, October 26 was written and despatched by him personally without consultation with anyone. When Khrushchev action reported to other leaders, apparently that night, long meetings and heated discussion ensued, leading to despatch published letter of Saturday, October 27. Similar meetings and discussion ensued after receipt President's letter October 27, but Khrushchev finally won approval of position represented by his letter October 28. Malinovsky only person identified as opposing withdrawal weapons but he is said to have been supported by some members civilian leadership.

We have no corroborating evidence and are reporting this for what it may be worth.

KOHLEK

REE

Note: Passed White House 11-6-62 7:30 a.m.

NOTE: Passed principle officers Executive Committee per SS -  
Mr. Little.  
Handled EO at request SS.

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EYES ONLY



November 3, 1962

52

Instruction from the President to all concerned with present negotiations in Cuba

It is time for a review of our basic position in these negotiations and for a clear restatement of our policy and purpose.

We have good evidence that the Russians are dismantling the missile bases. We have no decisive evidence of what they will do with this equipment. The assembly of IL28's continues. There is some evidence of an intent to establish a submarine-tending facility. The future of the SAM sites is unclear. We have no satisfactory assurances on verification. Our aerial surveillance still proceeds without guarantee of safety.

This crisis is likely to move in one of two major directions, in the next few weeks. On the one hand, we may be able to make arrangements which will in fact ensure the verified removal of all Soviet offensive weapons systems from Cuba, and establish reliable safeguards against their reintroduction. This is the object of our policy, and it is precisely stated in my letter to Khrushchev of October 27: "You would agree to remove these weapons systems (previously defined as 'all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use') from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba."

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Authority 425C/10/3/77  
By JK/mg, NARS, Date 10/13/77

11/3/62

Chairman Khrushchev's message of 28 October contained an explicit undertaking to dismantle, crate and return to the Soviet Union under UN verification, "the weapons which you describe as 'offensive'." It is the position of the United States Government that this is a clear acceptance of my proposal of October 27.

This requirement means removal of all offensive missiles and supporting equipment, and of all bombers and their equipment. These items and associated equipment are generally described in my statement of September 13 and in my address of October 22; they are clearly defined in my Proclamation of October 23. All Americans should stick firmly to this position (see quotation in Annex A). We should add that a submarine base is equally unacceptable -- as Chairman Khrushchev has acknowledged by clear inference in his assurances on the fishing facility.

In blunt summary, we want no offensive weapons and no Soviet military base in Cuba, and that is how we understand the agreements of October 27 and 28.

If in fact the Soviet Government executes this kind of removal with the associated and necessary inspection, supervision, and safeguards against reintroduction, then we in turn will hold with equal clarity to the undertaking given in my letter of October 27, as follows: "(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba." We also have an obligation to work with other Western Hemispheric countries to get them to take a similar position.



11/3/62

The exact terms and meaning of this undertaking require further work, but its broad implication is clear: in the absence of other provocation or justification, we will not invade Cuba if we are properly assured that Cuba ceases to be a Soviet military base, and ceases to harbor offensive weapons.. This commitment in no way derogates from our Hemispheric obligations to deal with aggressive or subversive activities by the present regime in Cuba.

There is another major course which events may take. It is one with which all who have negotiated with the Soviet Government in the past are familiar. It is a course in which bargains are fudged, secrecy prevents verification, agreements are reinterpreted, and by one means or another the Soviet Government seeks to sustain and advance the very policy which it has apparently undertaken to give up.

There is much evidence to support the conclusion that this is what is now beginning.

This second line of Soviet conduct is unacceptable to the United States. To prevent it we must make it very clear, at every stage, by both word and act, that the United States Government will not accept a mere gentlemen's agreement relating only to visible missiles on identified launch pads. We must have adequate arrangements for verification and inspection to be sure both that offensive weapons are removed and that ~~no~~<sup>no</sup> more are introduced. Without them, both surveillance and the quarantine

11/3/62

must be continued and both may need to be extended. (This condition does not exclude temporary relaxation of either quarantine or surveillance in return for useful steps toward fully effective arrangements.) All the offensive weapons systems, including anything related to a submarine base, must be removed, or we shall have to consider further action of our own to remove them.

Finally, and most generally, the undertaking of the United States against invasion cannot take effect in any atmosphere of ambiguity or uncertainty such that the American Government or the American people would lack proper assurance against the existence in Cuba now, or at any future time, of any Soviet military base or offensive weapons. The Soviet Government must recognize that the events of the last three weeks have made it impossible for opinion in this Hemisphere to be satisfied with Soviet assurances alone. Verification is essential if the Governments of the Western Hemisphere are to be able to live with this situation without further action.

I repeat that this statement of policy should be taken as binding guidance by all who are engaged in the framing of instructions or the conduct of negotiations on this matter. It is of fundamental importance that we speak as one voice and continue to keep it entirely clear to all Soviet representatives that the agreements of October 27 and 28 must be carried out in full -- and that otherwise the United States Government will find it necessary to move again by its own means to



11/3/62

insure itself against a repetition of the extraordinary act of deception which initiated this crisis. In this situation the Soviet Government has a clear choice between verified removal of all offensive weapons systems and renewed action by the United States. It has no middle choice, and we believe its own interests should lead it to accept the honest and full execution of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, and to see to it that Castro provides the necessary cooperation.

Detailed guidance in support of this general policy has been provided in approved instructions to USUN earlier this week. The basic messages are 1147 of October 31, as amended, 1157 of November 1, <sup>1166</sup> 1166 of November 1, and 1177 of November 2. A codification of this guidance will be produced next week. My only addition at present is that I now believe we should not be satisfied, as 1147 suggests, with aerial surveillance and post-removal ground inspection for departing offensive weapons. We must also have some way of verifying the re-export of the missiles, and the best practicable way seems to be to count them on departing ships. This can be done with no violation of Soviet security by reliable and non-technical non-Americans, and we should insist on this or an equally effective verification.

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EYES ONLY

OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

Chairman Khrushchev states, in his letter of October 28:

"...the Soviet Government, in addition to earlier instructions on the discontinuance of further work on weapons construction sites, has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union."

What are the arms which President Kennedy had, prior to Chairman Khrushchev's letter of October 28, "described as offensive"?

The answer to this question is to be found primarily in four documents.

Press Conference of September 13

The first document is the transcript of the President's press conference of September 13, 1962, in which he made clear that the United States could not accept a Communist buildup in Cuba that might "endanger or interfere with our security in any way" nor could we accept to have Cuba "become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union". Later in the press conference the President refined this concept further by making it clear that the United States would act "if Cuba should possess a capacity to carry out offensive action against the United States." This concept that offensive arms are those that provide a capacity to

deliver

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Authority

By mmg, NARS, Date 10/31/77~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

-2-

deliver weapons against the soil of this country or of the soil of other American states is the implicit theme in all of the President's subsequent references to the subject.

Address of October 22

The second relevant document is President Kennedy's address of October 22, 1962, a copy of which was formally delivered to the Soviet Government. In his address, President Kennedy spoke of the discovery of "offensive missile sites" in Cuba, stating that the "purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere." After discussing these missile sites, the President states:

"In addition, jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated and assembled in Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being prepared".

The President further said:

"This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base--by the presence of these large, long-range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction, constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas."

Proclamation of October 23

The concept of offensive weapons as including both missiles and jet bomber systems was given more precise

definition

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EYES ONLY

-3-

definition in the Proclamation issued by President Kennedy on October 23, entitled: "Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba." The proclamation was directed at preventing "the delivery of offensive weapons and associated materiel to Cuba." It specified as "prohibited materiel":

Surface-to surface missiles; bomber aircraft; bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the above items; and any other classes of material hereafter designated by the Secretary of Defense for the purpose of effectuating this Proclamation.

Letter of October 27

In addition to these three documents, the President's letter of October 27 to Chairman Khrushchev should also be regarded as illuminating the term "offensive weapons." In that letter, the President stated:

"The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements."

The

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-4-

The letter further provides:

"You would agree to remove these weapons systems  
from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation  
and supervision . . . ."

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1 Page, 65 Copies

TO : American Embassy, RIO DE JANEIRO

FROM : Department of State

DATE:

Oct 30 - 7 46 PM '62

SUBJECT: GOB Posture in Cuban Crisis

REF: EMBTELS 881, 895

We would appreciate Embassy's comments on President Goulart's statement that if he had endorsed whole US position in recent Cuban crisis and offered participation Brazilian military units, neither US Ambassador nor he would have been safe in Rio streets. This seems to imply:

1. GOB unable or unwilling cope with security problem which would have been created by expected reaction from communists,
2. GOB not confident of substantial Brazilian public support for US position, or,
3. GOB unwilling for domestic political or other considerations to mobilize substantial public support which does exist for hemisphere policy.

RUSK

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Authority State Sec 4/22/77

By nmq, NARS, Date 6/22/77~~SECRET~~

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

Contents and Classification Approved by:

ARA:EST:HRWellman:alc:red 10/30/62

ARA/EST - Mr. Wellman

ances:

EST/B - Mr. Burton

ARA - Mr. Martin



55

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

November 2, 1962

Mr. Johnson:

Certain pitfalls of our present course of action in not witnessing the actual departure of the missiles from Cuba has been studied in State. Of particular interest is paragraph 3. As described to you previously, the possibility in the last statement in that paragraph is of serious concern to the Defense Department, not so much for bargaining value, but for the threat which could be reassembled practically overnight.

H. L. B.

~~SECRET~~

Vice Pres Johnson (info)

55a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

019

Research Memorandum  
RSB-175, November 1, 1962

TO : The Secretary  
THROUGH: S/S  
FROM : INR - Roger Hilsman

*Roger Hilsman*

SUBJECT: Moscow's Current Goal: Minimize Inspection --  
Maximize Assurances for Castro

Latest developments -- including the Soviet assurance to U Thant that the missiles in Cuba will be dismantled by November 2 -- suggest that Moscow still means to go through with the basic provisions of the Kennedy-Khrushchev arrangement, but that in doing so it will seek to keep verification to a minimum while obtaining maximum further guarantees for Castro.

This paper briefly summarizes the latest developments and assesses their significance. It is written on the assumption that U Thant has been accurately informed of Soviet intentions -- an assumption which cannot be confirmed at least until the results of today's reconnaissance flights are in.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Soviet plan to dismantle missile bases by tomorrow can, if actually implemented, put the USSR in an optimum negotiating position to resist US pressures on questions connected with verification while demanding more in the way of US assurances to the Castro-regime.

1. Soviet Schedule for Dismantling Sites

In Havana, Soviet General Stazenko informed U Thant and General Rikhye that orders to begin dismantling had been received in Cuba between 1:00 and 3:00 p.m. on Sunday, October 28, and that work began at 5:00 p.m. (this is not confirmed nor necessarily disproven by our own reconnaissance on Monday). Missiles and major equipment will be removed from the sites by tomorrow and bulldozing of the sites will begin then. In New York, Kuznetsov told McCloy yesterday that the dismantling of "relevant facilities" would be completed either November 2 or 3.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *1-23-07*



Kuznetsov said he did not know the precise details of what dismantling would entail. While no mention was made of aircraft, the Secretary General in Havana had the impression that all of the equipment in the hands of the Soviet military would be withdrawn together with the Soviet personnel. TASS published U Thant's public statement that he had been reliably informed of the dismantling of the missile sites.

## 2. Aerial Reconnaissance Discouraged

At the same time both the Soviets and the Cubans attempted to discourage US or UN aerial reconnaissance. When told that the US would resume reconnaissance today, and that a dangerous situation would arise if surveillance planes were shot at or downed, Kuznetsov replied that all anti-aircraft weapons in Cuba were in Cuban hands. In Havana, Castro strongly opposed aerial reconnaissance of any kind as well as inspection on Cuban soil.

## 3. Implications for Further Negotiations

The Soviet timetable outlined above refers to the dismantling of the equipment, and not to its return to the USSR. Once having carried it out, the Soviets would regard themselves in a strong position for further negotiations.

- They would have made a forthcoming gesture to which world opinion would expect the US to respond.

- Their reputation for probity, badly damaged by American evidence of their secretive installation of the missiles, would at least in part be restored and the US rationale for demanding strict controls would be undercut.

- Meanwhile the crisis would appear to world opinion to have receded, and the pressure on the USSR to meet US demands would be reduced.

- At the same time, the Soviet missiles though in storage rather than on launchers would still be in Cuba and Moscow would still have bargaining value.

## 4. Quarantine

Kuznetsov already indicated the form of such bargaining yesterday when he observed to McCloy that the length of time required for shipping the equipment back to the USSR would

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- 3 -

depend on the availability of shipping which in turn would depend on the US position with respect to the quarantine. The persuasiveness of Kuznetsov's line of reasoning is perhaps illustrated by the Secretary General's statement last night to Ambassador Stevenson that he believed that the "blockade" was no longer necessary.

However, Kuznetsov did not oppose Red Cross (ICRC) inspection of incoming shipping to Cuba, and even Castro acquiesced in inspection of ships at sea (but not in Cuba).

## 5. Verification

The Soviets apparently hope that by implementing half of the first phase of the removal without verification, they will be able to minimize US demands for further verification. The Soviets will almost certainly seek to reduce to a minimum the controls required in order to:

- (1) reduce Cuban opposition,
- (2) avoid setting a precedent which might be used against them in disarmament negotiations, and
- (3) prevent the further US intelligence gain that would result from observation of the act of dismantling.

However, we cannot exclude the possibility that the Soviets may invite UN representatives to witness the bulldozing of revetments in order to vividly demonstrate their fulfillment of their part of the bargain. In so doing they would hope to convey the impression that such measures as inspection of other locations, inspection of the actual movement out of Cuba, overflights and continuing control over possible reintroduction of Soviet missiles were unnecessary.

## 6. Guarantees for Cuba

Kuznetsov indicated that Moscow will seek further US guarantees for the Castro regime. He suggested that to give substance to the assurance that no invasion will take place from the US or a Latin American country, there ought to be a guarantee that no invasion preparations were occurring and that there would be no subversive activities directed against Cuba whether in the US or in other Latin American countries.

Meanwhile Moscow propaganda continues playing up the theme of danger to Cuba, alleging US bad faith in the Khrushchev-Kennedy exchange of letters, and supporting Castro's five demands. Polyakov, Izvestiya's authoritative

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commentator, said on October 31 that fulfillment of these demands is necessary to guarantee Cuba's security.

7. Mikoyan Trip

Castro remained adamant in his opposition to all forms of inspection on Cuban territory, and indicated to U Thant that he had been embittered by Khrushchev's sending his October 28 letter to the President without first consulting him.

Mikoyan is en route to Cuba, apparently to cajole Castro into agreeing to an arrangement which the US might accept. Inclusion of Alikhanov (Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations) on the delegation suggests that additional economic aid may be forthcoming. References in Soviet propaganda to the effect that the USSR will not leave Cuba undefended suggest the possibility that Mikoyan may offer the Cubans a formal alliance; however, on balance it appears doubtful that Castro would value such an assurance at a time when he feels betrayed, or that the Soviets want to deepen and further formalize their military commitment.

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The Vice President

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TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy,  
The White House

FROM: W. W. *W. W. Rostow*

SUBJECT: Attached Paper on the Cuban Base Problem in Perspective

As discussed with you this morning herewith is the first product of our planning operation on the Cuban crisis. The paper was prepared in the Policy Planning Council on the basis of discussions involving members of the Council, representatives from other appropriate areas of the Department, representatives from Henry Rowen's shop in Defense, and representatives of CIA. The paper reflects judgments of individual participants in the discussions, but has not been formally cleared, either by those individuals or the offices they represent. Responsibility for the paper should therefore be placed on the Policy Planning Council.

As events unfold, we may have reason to modify, supplement or strengthen the judgments in the paper. The effort the paper represents will therefore be a continuing one.

Attachment

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Authority *NSC 64 10/3/77*

By *JK/mg* No. *10/3/77*



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The Cuban Base Problem in Perspective

1. The Soviet decision to establish nuclear strike bases in Cuba must be considered one of the boldest taken by the Soviet leadership since Korea. And like the Korean decision it was an "out of character" decision in the sense that it broke the pattern of immediately past conduct, among other things inviting a US reaction of a type that Moscow previously had attempted to avoid. This suggests that the Soviet decision was born either of a calculation that they could get away with establishing bases in Cuba without substantial risk, or compelling motivation, or both.

a. That the Soviets downplayed the likelihood of a dangerous US reaction would seem a very good possibility. Cuba fell into the Soviet lap without particular efforts or costs on Moscow's part. Events moved in a way, however, which came heavily to engage both Soviet resources and prestige. At the same time, the Castro regime showed itself pliable to the Soviet will and the US demonstrated a clear unwillingness to get itself directly involved in a move to get rid of the regime. The USSR and the Satellites were able to move into Cuba in a way and to an extent that might well have suggested almost no limit to possibilities. Thus the Bloc largely took over the economy, the administrative structure, and the military establishment. With the Cubans having welcomed, and the US having tolerated, Soviet military advisers and probably some operational

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operational personnel, Soviet tanks, and up-to-date Soviet combat aircraft, Moscow may have reasoned that it could take the next logical step and safely make Cuba into an offensive base that would give it a concrete and telling military presence at a strategic point in the western hemisphere. As an adjunct to this empirical evidence of likely US passivity weight might have been given to Khrushchev's oft-voiced conviction that Soviet power being what it is, US leaders would not dare to use force to prevent or undo any particular communist move that did not involve a direct use of force by one of the socialist countries.

b. Strong motivation must also be allowed:

1. The Soviets may have aimed at offsetting the damage done in recent months to their military power image as against the US and hence to get themselves in a better position to press the US to reach settlement on Soviet terms of various problems -- of which Berlin might be the first but hardly the last. In connection with this possibility:

--- The Soviet line since 1957 has been that the US must accept as a fact of life a shift in the world power balance in favor of the USSR. As long as "the missile gap", etc., was accepted by the US, Moscow apparently believed it could increasingly capitalize on this line in crisis confrontations with the US. But the trend in the US from the summer of 1961 in the way of both an accelerated

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build-up of our own military capability and a downgrading of Soviet strength in comparison with our own has knocked the ground from under Soviet calculations. The Soviets have consequently needed quickly to redress the balance and at the same time to convince the US that it had been redressed, or more than redressed. Otherwise Moscow would be at a grave, and perhaps growing, disadvantage in its continuing struggle against the US.

-- There has been evidence of a general effort of the Soviets both to build up their actual military capability and to improve their power image since last fall: renewal of testing; a succession of decisions indicating an increased resource allocations to the military despite admitted heavy costs to other pressing programs (i.e., no increase in investments in agriculture; food price rises; curtailment of housing construction; etc.); a spectacular revival of intense activity in space over the past several months; the second round of testing; and the newly announced series of rocket tests in the Pacific.

--- Build-up of a Soviet medium and intermediate ballistic capability in Cuba, and medium range bombers, would fit into such a forced draft Soviet effort. Either one of two considerations may have been governing; (a) Moscow may have estimated that too much time would be required to enable it to mount enough ICBM strength to intimidate the US (perhaps even to deter the US) and hence it

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faced urgent need to work out some means of putting the US under the same sort of direct threat of intermediate range missiles that now hangs over Western Europe, and as early and cheaply as possible. (It should be noted that what has reportedly gone into Cuba consists of items that the USSR has in great quantity. It should also be noted that the military importance that Moscow would have attached to the Cuban bases must be judged on the basis of what they expected to get if they got away with the operation, not what they have so far gotten. A parallel automatically suggests itself between the Soviet effort in Cuba and the considerations that led to the US forced draft Polaris program.) Or (b) the Cuban capability may be intended as only one step in a series that Moscow calculates will weaken confidence of the US and especially of others in US military superiority. (If this last should be correct we should look for what Moscow might expect to be a surprise in connection with further nuclear tests, or, especially, in connection with the forthcoming Pacific missile shots. We should also be alert to an early space spectacular.)

-- It is important to recall that beginning in the spring a relative lull appeared to set in in Moscow's prosecution of its foreign policy objective. While this may have been due to indecision, the possibility was noted at the time that Moscow

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might be marking time pending improvement in its military capability and posture. Because of lead factors, the Soviet decision to establish offensive bases in Cuba would have had to be made at about that time (or at least no later.)

ii. The possibility has to be allowed that the Soviets had in mind something more than simply improving their over-all military posture as against the US.

-- It cannot be entirely ruled out that the Cuban operation is part of a general plan to achieve a military position that would enable the Soviets to engage with maximum chance of success in a final military showdown with the US. The Cuban build-up would obviously be of great value in the case since it would give the Soviets at relatively small direct cost an important added capability against the US. (No concrete or inferential evidence exists that this is actually the Soviet intention. It should be accepted as a speculative possibility, however, because we cannot now, any more than in the past, dismiss out of hand a Soviet resort to force in its contest with us, given either an estimate of an assumed decisive military advantage over us or an estimate that the contest was otherwise going hopelessly and permanently against them.)

-- Another possibility that has to be allowed as a general caveat is that the Soviets have in mind heating up the cold war and  
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has chosen Cuba as a point of departure. The US would be expected to react to Cuba in such a way as to give the Soviets an opening to make a serious move or demand in regard to Berlin, or even Turkey, Iran, or some other area where the US has a foreign base; or the US might be expected to so concentrate its attention on Cuba that it would prove unable to react effectively to some other crisis. This possibility like the foregoing, would require a Soviet readiness to take risks to the point of extreme brinkmanship. (We have no evidence that the Soviets are prepared to take such risks; we again should allow the possibility, however, because it represents a danger that has to be considered inherent in the Soviet campaign against us.)

iii. Aside from direct military and related political considerations, or more probably as a typically Soviet "alternative objective" designed to get something else of value if the prime objective fails, Moscow may have had in mind using the Cuban base development as a pawn in the cold war, exploiting its nuisance value if nothing else. They might expect our reaction to get us into hopeless messes with our allies. They might also expect to capitalize on the Cuban base either through trading them off in a "deal" with the US re Berlin, or to use them to get us to give up some of our own bases, or to secure important concessions on our part re nuclear capability for the West Germans and general nuclear

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nuclear proliferation, or even location of nuclear weapons outside national territories; or they might expect it to have a sobering effect on us in connection with our over-all stance on negotiations, including the firmness of our stand on Berlin (even if we showed no interest in a straight "deal" on Berlin.)

2. Although the US has reacted strongly, it does not follow that the Soviets will simply beat a retreat in the face of the action the US has so far taken. This is all the more true since they appear to have strong motives for seeing the business through if they possibly can.

a. If other maneuvers do not work, the Soviets will almost certainly want at some stage to test how far the US is prepared to go. Initially the USSR may ostentatiously avoid a test in "the interest of peace" and to "give reason a chance to prevail". But if the US in spite of indirect pressures perseveres in its apparent firmness, the Soviets will probably want to see just how solid that firmness is. Conceivably, Moscow is, or will become, as much impressed by what we are not doing as by what we are doing. Being old hands at talking a better fight than they intend to make, they will allow a possibility of sheer bluff, or at least of a weakening will if hard choices are concretely presented.

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b. Even after ascertaining the US means business,  
(e.g., the US uses whatever force necessary to make the  
blockade effective), the Soviets can hardly be expected to  
meet our demand that the bases be liquidated. It can be  
assumed that they will want to keep what they have (unless we  
are willing to pay a high price in exchange. Unless -- contrary  
to our estimates -- they are ready for general war in any case,  
they probably will be unwilling to go to war to prevent us from  
liquidating their bases, or to punish us through a resort to war  
after the fact. But they will have no reason to relieve us of the  
burden of getting rid of them. They may well reason that we  
simply will not be able to bring ourselves to this extreme  
(a line of thought our past policies might encourage), or that  
if we do go all the way we would have to pay a heavy price in  
our relationships with the Latins and the neutrals generally.

c. The soundest calculation seems to be that both before  
and after the Soviets have tested our intent and found it serious,  
and assuming that in the testing process incidents do not occur  
that would force them in deeper than they would like to go, the  
Soviets will seek first to blunt the edge and then to smother  
over a protracted period our resolve re the bases, holding on  
meanwhile to what they already have. To this end they would see  
as useful instruments many time-tested devices and tactics:

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long and deceptive debate in the UN, play upon world-wide concern that war be avoided "at any cost", calls for a summit meeting (by themselves or by others) and other forms of negotiations and utilization of these if they occur to confuse and get around the central issue; organization of "Hands off Cuba" movements; exploitation of incidents; and all against the background of studied Soviet innocence. They will reason time is on their side; that the will of the Latins and of our European allies can be undermined; that ultimately our own resolve will be lost; that every month that passes with the bases intact will result in increased acceptance of them as a fact of life.

3. From the standpoint of US policy stress should be placed on the key fact that the dramatic suddenness and decisiveness of the President's action have created a new image within the world of an aroused US Government. Out of this vigorous action there has arisen a remarkable degree of support of the US position among the non-Communist nations, as evidenced by the nearly unanimous pro-US vote in the OAS, and indications of a probable initial majority support within the General Assembly of the United Nations. This degree of support is, however, likely to become a wasting asset in the event of a protracted blockade which does not achieve the result of removal of the presently  
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implaced missiles. Our experience in the Korean War indicates that the support of our allies is likely to become increasingly restive and, furthermore, that internal political support within the US will tend to erode with the passage of time and failure to accomplish minimum objectives to which the President is publicly committed.

The Soviets may be counted upon in their counteractions to seek to exacerbate the foregoing potential weakness of democratic countries in alliance. Furthermore, the mere passage of time will facilitate the resumption of political initiative by the Soviets whereas early follow-up action by the US to liquidate the Cuban missiles will tend to keep the Soviets off balance.

4. The conclusion is almost inescapable, therefore, that US interests will be seriously jeopardized if the US does not follow up a refusal by the USSR to liquidate the bases by forcefully liquidating them ourselves.

a. The chances of escalating incidents will increase in ratio to the length of time a tight blockade is effectively enforced.

b. Time may indeed work in favor of the Soviets as envisaged above. (We believe it almost certainly would).

c. The Soviet missiles are a threat to a sizeable portion of the US strategic forces, which would receive little warning of a missile attack. The US retaliatory force, on which our allies

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allies depend, would be degraded according to the damage sustained. Knowledge of this potential operational loss would adversely affect the validity of the allied nuclear deterrent. In turn, the will of our allies to resist Soviet aggression could be reduced.

d. Political considerations are equally compelling. Indefinite retention of the bases would necessarily have an adverse impact on the struggle between anti-communist and pro-communist elements in a number of Latin American countries and thus seriously impair our whole program there. It would shake general confidence in US firmness in other crisis areas of the world. Moreover, protracted uncertainty in regard to ultimate US intentions, including uncertainty in connection with negotiations, could have costly political consequences. If the idea should spread, justifiably or unjustifiably, that the US was considering a Cuba-for-Turkey deal, or a grand mutual withdrawal around the globe, growing doubts would be raised about the dependability of US commitments. If negotiations should actually occur in the context of such possibilities, doubts would strengthen, find open expression, and thereafter multiply. The Soviets would thus have achieved a signal success. And they would have done this without having to agree to give up the Cuban bases. We would still have the problem of force-fully effecting

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fully effecting this end, and under greatly worsened circumstances, if it were ever to be accomplished.

e. While risks would certainly exist in case of our forcefully liquidating the capability, it seems likely now, as it has seemed likely in the past, that the Soviets will not get themselves involved in a war over Cuba, or over any other particular issue, that they are not ready for general reasons to undertake. Hence if it is to be a matter of war, we can expect to face that hard fact of life over some other issue if Cuba does not produce the result.

f. At this stage in the East-West struggle it is vital that the Soviets not be allowed a success of the magnitude that an effective base on Cuba would represent. The Soviet decision to establish the base, involving the risks that it clearly does, suggests more an act of boldness to secure significant gain. If Moscow gets away with it, the result will doubtless be a definite reduction in pressures operating on it, both internally (e.g., the arms race) and internationally. It would at the same time increase our own defense problems and adversely affect our prestige. It would, in other words, constitute a ridiculously cheap but highly important tour de force on Moscow's part. Here it should be stressed that the Cuban development is not parallel to what we have done in Turkey,

Western

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Western Europe or elsewhere, but to what would be represented by our establishing a base in Finland or even Hungary.

g. As Soviet success in their Cuban venture would give the Soviets a big power and psychological boost, its failure might prove of great importance to our efforts to get the Soviet problem firmly under control. If, as can well be argued, this is a watershed period for the USSR -- a time of great decision re whether to continue or backtrack in pursuit of cold war objectives, slamming this particular door might prove decisive. This ought to be kept uppermost in mind when considering courses of action. The US stance should surely and finally be that the base is not permissible or negotiable.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 30, 1962

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MEMORANDUM TO: Members of the Executive Committee

There will be a meeting without the President in the Conference Room of the Under Secretary of State at 6:00 p.m. this evening, at which time Mr. Ball will lead discussion of some of the outstanding issues. It will be helpful if members can find a little time to think about them beforehand. Among these issues are the following:

1. What are the conditions for lifting the quarantine, either temporarily or permanently?
2. What other procedures for inbound inspection of shipments from the bloc are practicable?
3. What is our plan for the resumption, the continuance, and the possible abandonment of aerial reconnaissance?
4. What is our policy for the problem of definition of offensive weapons?
5. What verification do we expect before the re-export of offensive weapons?
6. What shape and definition can we give to our undertaking not to disturb the peace of the Caribbean?
7. What are the elements of a new policy toward refugee Cubans?
8. What political action can we take to exploit strains in the Castro regime?
9. What can be the long-term balance of assurance of our undertakings as against those of the USSR?

McGeorge Bundy

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Authority NSA 5/3/77

By MBAR/C, NARS, Date 5/16/77



[contents of document #58 retyped as original not very legible.]

8/20/76 isp

October 27 1962

Several inconsistent and conflicting proposals have been made by the USSR within the last 24 hours, including the one just [the proposed broadcast this morning] made public at Moscow. ~~Some of these proposals~~ involve the security of nations outside the Western Hemisphere. But ~~is~~ is the [it] Western Hemisphere countries and they alone [that are subject to the immediate threat which has produced the present crisis] [new] an ~~immediate~~ threat! and a growing one, from the missiles which [have secretly introducing offensive weapons into] the Soviets have put in Cuba and on which they are continuing work. The first imperative must be to deal with the immediate threat under which no sensible negotiation can proceed.

The United States is accordingly notifying the USSR that as an urgent preliminary to consideration of any proposals work on [Offensive weapons] the Cuban bases must stop ~~at once, the missiles already completed~~ must be rendered inoperable, and further shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba must cease. [all under effective verification.]

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

*Gilpatrick*

October 27 1962

Several inconsistent and conflicting proposals have been made by the USSR within the last 24 hours, including the one made public in Moscow. *- the proposal is inconsistent*

Security of nations outside the Western Hemisphere. But it is the Western Hemisphere countries and they alone which are subject to an *imminent* threat, and a growing one, from the missiles which the Soviets have put in Cuba and on which they are continuing work. *The threat is the immediate threat which has placed the present crisis*  
The first imperative must be to deal with the immediate threat under which no sensible negotiation can proceed.

The United States is accordingly notifying the USSR that as an *urgent* preliminary to consideration of any proposals, the Cuban bases must stop *offensive weapons* and further shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba must cease. *all under effective supervision*

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



*Gilpatrick*

October 27 1962

Several inconsistent and conflicting proposals have been made by the USSR within the last 24 hours, including the one just made public at Moscow. *the proposed amendments are very* Some of these proposals involve the security of nations outside the Western Hemisphere. But in the Western Hemisphere countries and they alone which are subject to an ~~immediate~~ *immediate* threat, and a growing one, from the missiles which the Soviets have put in Cuba and on which they are continuing to *immediately introducing offensive weapons into* The first imperative must be to deal with the immediate threat which no sensible negotiation can protect.

*immediate threat which is a real present danger*

The United States is accordingly notifying the USSR that as an urgent preliminary to consideration of any proposals with the Cuban issue must stop at once, the ~~offensive weapons~~ *offensive weapons* must be rendered inoperable and further shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba must cease. *all under effective American*

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October 27, 1962

Several inconsistent and conflicting proposals have been made by the USSR within the last twenty-four hours, including the one just made public in Moscow. The proposal broadcast this morning involves the security of nations outside the Western Hemisphere. But it is the Western Hemisphere countries and they alone that are subject to the ~~new~~ threat that has produced the current crisis -- the action of the Soviet Government in secretly introducing offensive weapons into Cuba. Work on these offensive weapons is still proceeding at a rapid pace. The first imperative must be to deal with this immediate threat under which no sensible negotiation can proceed.

*It is therefore the position of the United States*

~~The United States is accordingly notifying the USSR that~~  
~~as an~~ urgent preliminary to consideration of any proposals work

on the Cuban bases must stop; offensive weapons must be rendered inoperable; and further shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba must cease -- all under effective <sup>international</sup> verification.

<sup>As soon as</sup>  
As to proposals for <sup>increasing</sup> the security of nations outside this Hemisphere, the United States and its allies have long taken the lead in seeking properly inspected arms limitation, on both sides. These efforts can continue <sup>as soon as</sup> when the present Soviet-created threat is ended.



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A limited attack on 6 of the missile sites and IL28 field, assuming that:

1. The Soviets have instructed the Cubans to avoid a provocative incident and therefore the operational readiness of the Cuban SAM installations and the MIG aircraft is substantially degraded.
2. A pattern of low-level surveillance by a few U.S. aircraft at frequent and irregular intervals has been established.
3. No shots have been fired by either side prior to the attack.
4. It will be implied to the Cubans that further development of their offensive weapons capability will be followed by further action, and, to insure that we are informed as to whether such further development is taking place, close surveillance will be maintained following the initial attack.
5. Complete preparations have been made for immediate follow-up of the initial limited attack with the full air strike. Launching of the full strike would depend upon a number of factors including whether: (a) the initial strike accomplished so little as to make the full strike necessary to eliminate the majority of the offensive weapons; (b) the danger to the U.S. of allowing the remaining weapons to remain undamaged; and (c) the U.S. casualties on the initial strike are so high as to require immediate activation of the full strike as a reprisal action.

The objective of this attack is to eliminate a substantial portion of the offensive weapons on the soil of Cuba with the lowest possible amount of force and the lowest possible price in the form of a response from the Soviet Union.

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By cbm/p NARA, Date 4-1-09

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TALKING PAPER

on

JCS RECOMMENDATIONS RE POST-CUBA ACTIONS

- . Within past 24 hours JCS have addressed problems of post-Cuba actions in following areas:
  - Points to be considered in current negotiations
  - Measures to sustain U.S. initiative and deterrent posture
  - UN inspection of Soviet offensive weapons withdrawal
- . Memo to Sec Def on current negotiations recommended U.S. insist on certain conditions for terms of agreement on removal of Soviet offensive capability from Cuba, namely,
  - elimination of all Soviet and Bloc offensive weapons, including bombers
  - immediate cessation of all missile site and bomber base construction
  - right of blockade until U.S. satisfied threat is removed
  - U.S. aerial surveillance
  - UN inspection teams limited to technically qualified non-Bloc personnel
  - U.S. refusal to enter any agreement restricting right of Cuban people wherever they may be to determine for themselves Cuba's political future.
- . Item to sustain U.S. initiative, etc., (not yet approved by JCS) contains Memo to Sec Def which raises following points:
  - immediate aftermath of crisis is a most critical period

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Authority

JCS 11/8/77

By

smg

NARS, Date

6/22/77

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- could be a decisive turning point in cold war, or merely temporary detente
- Soviet missile buildup evidence of failure of U.S. deterrence
  - . in disregard of U.S. warnings
  - . Soviets miscalculated U.S. resolve
  - . required intensive and costly politico-military actions to convince them.
- We proved them wrong; now must insure they do not misread our determination again
- Ultimate outcome could be net loss or gain, depending in large part on what we do in immediate future
- To insure long-term gain, U.S. must
  - . maintain initiative
  - . take further actions to give continuing effect to recent demonstration of resolve.
- To this end JCS recommends U.S. take certain measures which give promise of immediate and successful results. Among them:
  - . military aid to India
  - . revise U.S./French nuclear policy in direction of cooperation
  - . full U.S. participation in CENTO
  - . continue and expand nuclear test program
  - . effect permanent improvement of STRICOM forces.

The JCS are reviewing and commenting on a proposed State message to the USUN outlining suggestions regarding UN inspection procedures during and after dismantling and withdrawal of Soviet offensive weapons. The proposed message has raised a large number of questions related to

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principle as well as the technical and mechanical competence of the UN to accomplish this surveillance.

Questions of the following type are being posed within the Joint Staff:

- What measures in this plan will prevent, or even restrict the normal and expected Communist tactic of systematic delay in carrying out substantive measures of inspection?
- What assurance will the U.S. have as to the technical competence of the inspectors to be used? Is not some statement regarding U.S. satisfaction regarding the technical competence of the inspection personnel a requirement?
- Are we talking of inspecting ship cargoes only, or will we have provisions to inspect Air Cargoes?
- Is the inspection scheme based on the principle that there must be 100% assurance that no nuclear delivery capability remains in Cuba?
- What offensive actions can be taken if inspection is conducted in part and a disagreement and/or impasse results?
- How will inspectors verify the contents of sealed containers? Will they take the Soviets' word, or will they break the seals and physically inspect?
- American shipping firms have stated that almost anything can be concealed aboard ship if adequate time is available and proper planning is accomplished. Are UN inspection teams equipped to cope with professional "smugglers"?
- Can inspectors distinguish between offensive weapon components and other non-offensive weapon components (SAMs, jet fighter engines, etc.)?

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-- Even if Soviets furnish inventory, shouldn't UN  
inspection force verify by physical check?

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From WH - No office  
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Final Draft

Scenario for Airstrike against offensive  
missile bases and bombers in Cuba.

ADVANTAGES

1. Carries out President's pledge to eliminate offensive threat to U.S. and Hemisphere from Cuba and avoids any erosion of U.S. momentum and position. The pledge carried out shows that U.S. has will to fight and to protect vital interests (of great importance vis-a-vis Berlin).

2. Since directed at offensive weapons, keeps issue focused on Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba in defiance of OAS and majority of Security Council.

3. Sharp, possible one time action, may carry smaller risks of further escalation than a series of confrontations over a period of time. Soviet decision to risk major war unlikely to be decisively affected by this action in an area non-vital to the Soviets.

4. Prompt action will avoid danger of a growth of hands-off Cuba movement throughout Latin America which might make it increasingly difficult to strike at offensive weapons. Present willingness of Latin Americans to support strong action probably cannot be maintained indefinitely.

5. Signals clearly that U.S. not prepared to bargain bases in Cuba for positions in Berlin, NATO and elsewhere.

6. It could demonstrate to Cubans, Castro and others, the weakness of Soviet position in Cuba. In the absence of a strong Soviet reaction in defense of Cuba, we would start the process of disenchantment and disaffection requisite to undermining Castro and Cuban reliance on the Soviet Union. We would also weaken any tendencies to rely on Soviets elsewhere in world.

7. Removes a military threat to U.S. from Cuban territory.

8. Denies Khrushchev a possible cheap victory through successful maintenance of offensive weapons in Cuba.

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Authority NLS.027.008.003/1

By jc NARA, Date 1-23-07



Final Draft

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DISADVANTAGES

1. This action may force Khrushchev to react strongly and could result in some type of war. Khrushchev will not order launch of a missile from Cuba unless he is ready for war essentially on other grounds. There is greater likelihood of a riposte in kind. However, it is unlikely that the risks of major war are greater than through escalation of blockade.
2. There is remote possibility that some local Soviet commander in Cuba may order firing of a missile.
3. Adverse effect on U. S. image of initiation of use of force against a small country. This can be minimized by making attack selective and focused on Soviet offensive weapons. At same time there would be positive increments to our image from demonstration of clear willingness to take on the Soviets in protection of our vital interests.
4. Unless carefully handled could damage long-range U.S.-Cuban relations.
5. May not totally eliminate offensive weapons thus calling for follow up attacks and/or invasion, unless full and unlimited international inspection is agreed to.

Final Draft

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PREREQUISITES FOR DECISION

1. Veto of U.S. resolution in Security Council.
2. Evidence that Soviets have continued build-up of existing offensive capability in Cuba in defiance of Presidential warning and OAS resolution.

ACTIONS PRIOR OR SIMULTANEOUS TO STRIKE

1. White House statement that offensive build-up is continuing, a dangerous and provocative act, which increases gravity of situation. Repeats warning for those engaged in this work.
2. Delivery of copy of White House statement to Cuban representative at UN.
3. Evacuation warning (as long as militarily feasible) to personnel in strike areas by leaflet drop. A strike plan designed to accomplish mission with minimum damage to non-military targets.
4. Inform OAS (Chairman) shortly in advance of strike.
5. Arrange for Ambassadors to notify Latin American heads of state at zero hour.
6. Inform NATO Allies and others at appropriate time.
7. Letter to K delivered at zero hour, describing action and indicating regret that continuation of work at offensive sites had forced action, limited nature of operation, our effort to limit personnel losses, and calling for immediate consultations to reduce world-wide tensions.



4  
Final Draft

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

FOLLOW UP ACTIONS

1. Continuation of close air surveillance.
2. Be prepared to hit SAM sites and airfields if reconnaissance planes attacked.
3. Immediate report to Organ of Consultation (OAS) and adoption of resolution requesting Soviets to evacuate offensive forces from Cuba under international inspection.
4. Report to UN Security Council explaining limited nature of operation and requesting immediate despatch of UN observer team to Cuba.
5. Maintenance of blockade extended to include POL until clear evidence is available that offensive bases have been eliminated.
6. Major Presidential address including special message to Cuban people.
7. Appropriate leaflet drops over Cuba.

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- SENSITIVE

Final Draft

Scenario for Airstrike against offensive missile bases and bombers in Cuba.

ADVANTAGES

1. Carries out President's pledge to eliminate offensive threat to U.S. and Hemisphere from Cuba and avoids any erosion of U.S. momentum and position. The pledge carried out shows that U.S. has will to fight and to protect vital interests (of great importance vis-a-vis Berlin).
2. Since directed at offensive weapons, keeps issue focused on Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba in defiance of OAS and majority of Security Council.
3. Sharp, possible one time action, may carry smaller risks of further escalation than a series of confrontations over a period of time. Soviet decision to risk major war unlikely to be decisively affected by this action in an area non-vital to the Soviets.
4. Prompt action will avoid danger of a growth of hands-off Cuba movement throughout Latin America which might make it increasingly difficult to strike at offensive weapons. Present willingness of Latin Americans to support strong action probably cannot be maintained indefinitely.
5. Signals clearly that U.S. not prepared to bargain bases in Cuba for positions in Berlin, NATO and elsewhere.
6. It could demonstrate to Cubans, Castro and others, the weakness of Soviet position in Cuba. In the absence of a strong Soviet reaction in defense of Cuba, we would start the process of disenchantment and disaffection requisite to undermining Castro and Cuban reliance on the Soviet Union. We would also weaken any tendencies to rely on Soviets elsewhere in world.
7. Removes a military threat to U.S. from Cuban territory.
8. Denies Khrushchev a possible cheap victory through successful maintenance of offensive weapons in Cuba.

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Authority

NSC 6010/13/17

By

JKWing, NARS, Date 10/13/77



2.  
Final Draft

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

DISADVANTAGES

1. This action may force Khrushchev to react strongly and could result in some type of war. Khrushchev will not order launch of a missile from Cuba unless he is ready for war essentially on other grounds. There is greater likelihood of a riposte in kind. However, it is unlikely that the risks of major war are greater than through escalation of blockade.

2. There is remote possibility that some local Soviet commander in Cuba may order firing of a missile.

3. Adverse effect on U. S. image of initiation of use of force against a small country. This can be minimized by making attack selective and focused on Soviet offensive weapons. At same time there would be positive increments to our image from demonstration of clear willingness to take on the Soviets in protection of our vital interests.

4. Unless carefully handled could damage long-range U.S.-Cuban relations.

5. May not totally eliminate offensive weapons thus calling for follow up attacks and/or invasion, unless full and unlimited international inspection is agreed to.

Final Draft

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- SENSITIVE

PREREQUISITES FOR DECISION

1. Veto of U.S. resolution in Security Council.
2. Evidence that Soviets have continued build-up of existing offensive capability in Cuba in defiance of Presidential warning and OAS resolution.

ACTIONS PRIOR OR SIMULTANEOUS TO STRIKE

1. White House statement that offensive build-up is continuing, a dangerous and provocative act, which increases gravity of situation. Repeats warning for those engaged in this work.
2. Delivery of copy of White House statement to Cuban representative at UN.
3. Evacuation warning (as long as militarily feasible) to personnel in strike areas by leaflet drop. A strike plan designed to accomplish mission with minimum damage to non-military targets.
4. Inform OAS (Chairman) shortly in advance of strike.
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Final Draft

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

FOLLOW UP ACTIONS

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64

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 26, 1962

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 201

TO:       The Vice President  
          The Secretary of State  
          The Secretary of Defense  
          The Secretary of the Treasury  
          The Attorney General  
          The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
          The Director of Central Intelligence  
          The Under Secretary of State  
          The Deputy Secretary of Defense  
          The Ambassador at Large  
          The Special Counsel to the President  
          The Acting Director, U. S. Information Agency  
          The Director, National Security Agency  
          The Administrator, National Aeronautics and  
              Space Administration  
          Chairman, Federal Communications Commission  
          Administrator, Federal Aviation Agency  
          Administrator, General Services Administration  
          Director, Office of Emergency Planning  
          Assistant Secretary of Defense (International  
              Security Affairs)  
          The Counselor of the Department of State

SUBJECT: Establishment of Subcommittee on Communications

There is hereby established a Subcommittee on Communications of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council. It shall be the responsibility of this subcommittee, under the direction of the Executive Committee, to ensure the establishment of a national communications system which will make the worldwide communications available to the United States Government as prompt, reliable, and secure as possible. The President has designated William H. Orrick, Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, to be Chairman of this subcommittee. Mr. Orrick will take whatever action is necessary to eliminate deficiencies

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 66314/77  
By mg, NARS, Date 6/24/77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

which presently exist. He will look to all agencies for prompt and immediate support. He will have as Vice Chairman an officer designated by the Secretary of Defense, who shall be the representative of the Department of Defense, who has undertaken to give particular support to the pursuit of this objective.

In this task, Mr. Orrick should consult with and secure the cooperation of other departments, agencies, and the public sector as appropriate, drawing to the extent necessary upon the work done by the Emergency Planning Committee under NSAM 127. By copy of this memorandum, other agencies are instructed to cooperate with Mr. Orrick in this mission to the fullest extent. If Mr. Orrick encounters difficulties or resistance, he will report at once to the President.

*McGeorge Bundy*  
McGeorge Bundy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~3. Approach to Castro

An approach would be made to Castro through a Latin American representative in Cuba, probably the Brazilian Ambassador, pointing out that Cuba was merely being exploited in the interests of the Soviet Union and that any of the possible paths by which the Cuban crisis can be expected to develop will result in the overthrow of his regime, if not its physical destruction. It could be pointed out that President Kennedy has stated that only two subjects were not negotiable between the United States and Castro: military ties to the USSR and aggressive actions of any kind in Latin America.

If the Castro Government considers it has no freedom to act because of the presence of Soviet technicians, we would be prepared to undertake to deal with this problem. We would have to give some assurances, regardless of whether we intended to carry them out, that we would not ourselves undertake to overthrow the regime or support others trying to do so.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By chm/jc NARA, Date 3-3-09

~~TOP SECRET~~



DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~Authority NSC 6210/3/177

October 25, 1962

By JK/long NAM, Date 10/13/77POLITICAL PATH

This path has several branches, both as to the forum in which negotiations are carried out, and with regard to the steps to be taken.

With respect to the forum, we are already in the UN and this could be combined with private approaches on the side. We could follow up the U Thant proposals in order to get into prompt discussion with the Soviets. This is almost essential since the Soviets will almost certainly not put forward or indicate agreement to proposals publicly made.

Another method would be to propose or have someone such as U Thant propose a direct meeting with Khrushchev. He has publicly indicated his readiness for such a meeting in his letter to Bertrand Russell and could not have been expected, at this stage, to have made proposals directly to the President for fear of a rebuff. It would be difficult, however, for him to refuse an invitation from the President. A direct meeting would have to mean the continuance of the quarantine and would be difficult for us unless there was progress on proposals to ensure a standstill under UN control. It would probably involve discussions over Berlin or, as a minimum, our missile base in Turkey. A prompt proposal for an agreement to a meeting

~~TOP SECRET~~

with Khrushchev might defer or avoid strong Soviet reaction to our stopping one of their ships.

As a background for political action that would have any hope of success, it would be important to minimize, so far as possible, any forceful action against Soviet vessels in carrying out the quarantine.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

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Authority MS/LA 10/13/77  
By MM/JK, NARS, Date 10/13/77

The following political actions might be considered:

1. A proposal in some forum to withdraw our missiles from Turkey in return for Soviet withdrawal of their missiles from Cuba. This might be expressed in generalized form, such as withdrawal of missiles from territory contiguous or in proximity of the territory of the other.
2. An alternative approach might be to have a proposal for the UN to send teams to Cuba and Turkey to take control over the missiles there pending the outcome of negotiations. U Thant might be put up to advancing such proposals.

~~TOP SECRET~~

68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DENUCLEARIZATION TRACK

1. It may take as much as 24 hours to persuade the Brazilian Government to sponsor our resolution in place of theirs in the Organ of Consultation and the United Nations. A telegram to Ambassador Gordon and conversations with the two Brazilian Ambassadors here would initiate action.

2. With Brazilian sponsorship it should be possible in 24 hours to secure action close to unanimity by the Organ of Consultation on the resolution. Telegrams to our Ambassadors in each of the Organ of Consultation countries, as well as Ambassadors here, would be utilized to secure support.

3. Immediately the Organ of Consultation has acted the Brazilians should submit a similar proposal to the United Nations for approval.

There is attached a draft resolution which we would ask the Brazilians to sponsor.

It is possible that the above 48 hour schedule could be cut, and, if approval is given tonight, the Organ of Consultation might act Saturday morning.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By bm/jr NARA, Date 3-3-09

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHEREAS:

The Council of the Organization of American States Acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation in its Resolution of October 23, 1962, recognizing that "Incontrovertible evidence has appeared that the Government of Cuba, despite repeated warnings, has secretly endangered the peace of the Continent by permitting the Sino-Soviet powers to have intermediate and middle-range missiles on its territory capable of carrying nuclear warheads" called for "the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability; the e

The establishment of nuclear missile capability on the territory of an American Republic which did not possess such capability at the date on which the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance came into effect creates a situation which would endanger the peace and security of the continent and is thus inconsistent with the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the OAS;

THE COAS/OC

1. Decides that no American Republic referred to in the preceding paragraph shall establish or permit the establishment within its territory of nuclear missiles or missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads;

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

: 2. Decides that upon the allegation by an American Republic that a Member State is failing to comply with, or is preparing to violate, paragraph 1 of this Resolution, that State shall permit without delay duly qualified observers appointed by the appropriate body of the OAS (or of the UN) to enter ; its territory for the purpose of verifying the truth of falsity. of the allegations.

3. Expresses the hope that the United Nations will recognize the significance and wisdom of this decision and will promptly take appropriate ; measures to collaborate with the OAS in helping to assure compliance with it.



CONFIDENTIAL

SPECIAL HANDLING

EYES ONLY

## THE VICE PRESIDENT

TO:  
FROM: Rio de Janeiro  
NUMBER: 917  
DATE: 11/1/62 TOP SECRET

су 16

## Signature Record

[illegible]

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S - William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
101	102	103	104	105	106	107	108	109	110	111	112	113	114	115	116	117	118	119	120	121	122	123	124	125	126	127	128	129	130	131	132	133	134	135	136	137	138	139	140	141	142	143	144	145	146	147	148	149	150	151	152	153	154	155	156	157	158	159	160	161	162	163	164	165	166	167	168	169	170	171	172	173	174	175	176	177	178	179	180	181	182	183	184	185	186	187	188	189	190	191	192	193	194	195	196	197	198	199	200

34 *Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce*

**THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED  
TO - L. D. Battle  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State  
Room 7224 NS/E  
Do Not File**

**THIS DOCUMENT**

**REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING**



INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

69a

VP

~~TOP SECRET~~

M  
Action

Control: 151  
Rec'd: November 1, 1962  
8:54 a.m.

SS  
Info

FROM: Rio de Janeiro

TO: Secretary of State

016

NO: 917, November 1, 10 a.m.

PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Sec 4/22/77

EYES ONLY

By mmg, NARS, Date 6/22/77

(A) EMBTEL 915 and (B) DEPCIRTEL 807

May I assume in light reference A that Rio not expected to act on reference B? GOB has been extensively advertising role as potential mediator and would be totally non-responsive to idea diplomatic rupture. If issue moving to UNGA we might be able promote constructive line there.

GORDON

HMR/1

~~TOP SECRET~~

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EYES ONLY

70

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

October 26, 1962

The Honorable Lyndon Johnson

The attached draft EYES ONLY telegram to Rio de Janeiro is to be considered at the Friday meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council.

Copies have been transmitted to the other members of the Committee.

*WB*  
William H. Brubeck

Attachment

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~ Attachment



70a

TO: RIO, Control 13136  
FROM:  
NUMBER:  
DATE: 10/26/62  
Cy #7

[illegible]

THIS DOCUMENT

**REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING**

1953-1954

[illegible]

Figure 1 shows the chemical structures of three compounds. Structure 1 is 1,2,3,4-tetrahydro-6-methyl-5H-benzothiazepine, which consists of a benzene ring fused to a five-membered ring containing a nitrogen atom at position 5 and a sulfur atom at position 2, with a methyl group at position 6. Structure 2 is 1,2,3,4-tetrahydro-6-methyl-5H-benzothiazepine-2-thione, which is similar to structure 1 but with a double bond to a sulfur atom at position 2. Structure 3 is 1,2,3,4-tetrahydro-6-methyl-5H-benzothiazepine-2-thione-2-oxide, which is similar to structure 2 but with an additional oxygen atom double-bonded to the sulfur atom at position 2.

**TO - L. D. Battle**  
**Executive Secretary**  
**Department of State**  
**Room 7224 NS/E**

**Do Not File**

**REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING**



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

13136

706

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
TARGET TO

41

~~TOP SECRET~~

OCT 26 12 25 AM '62

Origin **ACTION:** Amembassy RIO DE JANEIRO NIACT  
ExCom  
Info: AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY EYES ONLY

007

We believe time has come for representative friendly country to discuss with Castro alone predicament in which Soviet actions have placed him. We also believe Brazilian Ambassador in Havana is best person to do this and therefore wish you to see Hermes Lima as soon as possible to secure his agreement to instruction to their Ambassador along following lines. Naturally we would hope matter could be handled by Brazillians with greatest discretion. Report reaction NIACT.

Would wish instructions to Ambassador Luis Batian Pinto to read substantially as follows:

1. The world now knows without any question and in great detail the nature and size of the buildup of Soviet offensive ~~missile capability~~ missile capability in Cuba. There can be no valid question in anyone's mind on this point.

Cuban soil as sites for  
2. The action of the Soviet Union in using/offensive nuclear missiles capable of striking most of the Western Hemisphere has placed the future of the Castro regime and the well-being of the Cuban people in great jeopardy.

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

ARA:EMMartin:lh 10/25/62

Classification approved by:

S - The Secretary

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRV 61-63, vol. XI #81

By *jk* NARA, Date 8-18-05 TOP SECRET

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~~TOP SECRET~~

3. The countries of the Inter-American System have unanimously called for their removal and approved and are participating in the measures being taken to eliminate this Soviet threat to all of them.

4. The Soviet Union is turning around its cargo ships in face of US blockade which the countries of hemisphere have authorized, <sup>x.</sup> not only is the Soviet Union failing to support Cuba on this matter, <sup>N</sup> but numerous feelers have been put out by high Soviet officials to allied governments for exchanges of their position in Cuba for concessions by the NATO countries in other parts of the world. Thus you are not only being used for purposes of no interest to any Cuban, but deserted and threatened by betrayal.

5. It is also well-known that work is proceeding rapidly to complete and make operational the offensive nuclear missile installations and to assemble the IL-28 bombers. The threatened countries clearly cannot sit still while the threat against them is being increased in this fashion. Further steps will clearly have to be taken <sup>XXXXXXXX</sup> and very soon.

6. The first and most modest measures will probably be an extension of the quarantine to all petroleum products. Since Cuba imports all her needs, this would quite quickly force the Cuban economy to a complete stop and the people of Cuba to a desperate hand-to-mouth existence.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

7. Castro might recall that President Kennedy has said publicly that only two issues were nonnegotiable between Castro and the US -- the military ties to the USSR and the aggressive attitude toward the internal affairs of other Latin American countries. This view will be shared by other members of the Inter-American System. Of course this now means giving up the offensive nuclear capability being established in Cuba and sending home Soviet military personnel, on which help can certainly be given if needed. From such actions many changes in the relations between Cuba and the OAS countries, including the USK, could flow.

8. Time is short and perhaps not more than 24 hours remains for Castro to decide whether to devote his great leadership abilities to the ~~service~~ service of his Cuban peoples or to serving as a Soviet pawn ~~power~~ in their desperately risky struggle for world domination by force and threat of force.

9. If Castro tries to rationalize the presence of these missiles as due to Cuban fear of a US invasion, Ambassador Batian should reply that he is confident that the OAS would not endorse an invasion of Cuba once the missiles were removed and that the US would not risk upsetting hemispheric solidarity by invading without OAS blessing.

~~TOP SECRET~~

RUSK





Department of State  
Room 7224 NS/E

**Do Not File**

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TO - L. D. Battle  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State  
Room 7224 NS/E  
Do Not File**

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

7/12  
Vice Pres

W

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 17708

Rec'd: October 24, 1962

SS

1255 p.m.

Info

FROM: Wellington

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 174, October 25, 3 p.m.

EYES ONLY

NIACT

EYES ONLY RUSK, HARRIMAN AND SORENSON (WHITE HOUSE)

Reference Cuba Quarantine.

Believe obviously highly desirable accomplish if possible without sinking ships or loss of life. This connection following suggestion offered.

When warning shot across bow ignored, instead of firing second shot to kill purpose would be accomplished if only propellers of ship destroyed or damaged beyond use.

As you know, since World War II Navy has had ASW torpedo that homes on propellers cavitation principle. This device homes on propeller in water with same accuracy sidewinder homes on heat in air,

Naturally present warheads have tremendous explosive capability and are intended to destroy entire submarine or vessel. However, Navy ordnance can prepare within matter of hours warheads or similar device with limited explosive capability which would destroy only propellers with chance of minor damage of hull of vessel. As targets would be setting ducks and would not need to be sought out process would be extremely expeditious. This would result in immobilized ships which would thus constitute case for tugboat rather than international incident.

-I-

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Dec 4/22/77, OSD Dec 4/29/77

By mg, NARS, Date 7/22/77



~~SECRET~~

-2- 174, October 25, 3 p.m. from Wellington

I have discussed my idea informally with Admirals Tyree and Reedy. They are accord on feasibility and believe possible Navy has not considered such device.

AKERS

DMB

. Note: Passed White House 10/24/62

~~SECRET~~

## INCOMING TELEGRAM

~~EYES ONLY~~  
*Department of State*VP  
112

32

Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~Control: 17192  
Rec'd: OCTOBER 23, 1962  
11:50 AM

015

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1041, OCTOBER 23, 5 PM

NIACT

ELITE

POLICY

EYES ONLY

ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER KUZNETSOV CALLED ME IN AT 3:00 P.M. MOSCOW TIME TO HAND ME LETTER FROM KHRUSHCHEV TO PRESIDENT (TRANSLATION OF WHICH FOLLOWS SEPTEL), TOGETHER WITH STATEMENT OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN REPLY PRESIDENT'S SPEECH. STATEMENT RELEASED 4:00 P.M. MOSCOW TIME (9:00 A.M. WASHINGTON TIME), SHORTLY AFTER I RETURNED TO EMBASSY. KUZNETSOV TOLD ME TEXT OF LETTER WOULD NOT BE PUBLISHED "FOR TIME BEING."

KUZNETSOV'S ATTITUDE WAS RESTRAINED AND NOT UNFRIENDLY ON PERSONAL LEVEL. HE MADE NO ADDITIONAL COMMENTS OF ANY SUBSTANCE.

LETTER CHARGES THAT US HAS "OPENLY TAKEN PATH OF GROSS VIOLATION OF UN CHARTER, OF VIOLATION INTERNATIONAL NORMS FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION ON HIGH SEAS, AND OF AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS BOTH AGAINST CUBA AND AGAINST SOVIET UNION," AND DECLARES SOVIET UNION CANNOT RECOGNIZE RIGHT OF US ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER ARMAMENTS NECESSARY TO CUBA TO STRENGTHEN ITS DEFENSES. LETTER "CONFIRMS THAT ARMAMENTS AT PRESENT ON CUBA, REGARDLESS OF CLASSIFICATION TO WHICH THEY BELONG, ARE DESTINED EXCLUSIVELY FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES."

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By cbw/jc, NARA, Date 3-3-09~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
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~~SECRET~~

-2- 1041, OCTOBER 23, 5 PM FROM MOSCOW

BOTH DOCUMENTS AVOID SPECIFIC THREATS AND ARE RELATIVELY RESTRAINED IN TONE. STATEMENT OBVIOUSLY DESIGNED FOR PROPAGANDA EFFECT ON SOVIET PEOPLE. LETTER, HOWEVER, APPEALS TO USG TO "SHOW PRUDENCE."

STATEMENT SAYS SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS INSTRUCTED ITS UN MISSION REQUEST IMMEDIATE CONVOCAION SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONSIDER QUESTION: "ON VIOLATION UN CHARTER AND THREAT TO PEACE BY UNITED STATES AMERICA."

KOHLER

DT

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 10/23/62 11:59 AM WVC

~~SECRET~~





