

10/5

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|------------------|---|---------------|-------------|
| #130 Notes | NSC Top Secret Exempt Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting <i>open 1-12-94 NLS 91-164</i> | 2 11/03/62 | A |
| #130a Notes | NSC Top Secret Exempt LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting <i>open 1-12-94 NLS 91-164</i> | 3 11/03/62 | A |
| #131 Notes | NSC Top Secret Exempt Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting <i>open 1-12-94 NLS 91-164</i> <i>some sanitization 11/17/15 per NLS/RAC 14-104</i> | 1 p 10/31/62 | A |
| #131a Notes | NSC Top Secret LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting | 1 p 10/31/62 | A |
| #132a Notes | NSC Top Secret Exempt Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting <i>Decl. NSC etc. 2/23/81 NLS 77-3</i> | 2 p 11/02/62 | A |
| #132b Notes | NSC Top Secret Exempt LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting <i>open 1-12-94</i> | 2 p 11/02/62 | A |
| #133 Notes | NSC Top Secret Exempt Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting <i>open 1-12-94 NLS 91-164</i> | 3 pn 11/03/62 | A |
| #133a Notes | NSC Top Secret Exempt LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting <i>open 1-12-94 NLS 91-164</i> | 4 p 11/03/62 | A |
| #134 Notes | NSC Top Secret Exempt Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting <i>open 1-12-94 NLS 91-164</i> <i>more info released 11/17/15 per NLS/RAC 14-104</i> | 1 pn 11/05/62 | A |
| #134a Notes | NSC Top Secret LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting | 1 p 11/05/62 | A |
| #135 Notes | NSC Top Secret Exempt Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting <i>open 1-12-94 NLS 91-164</i> | 1 p 11/12/62 | A |
| #135a Notes | NSC Top Secret Exempt LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting <i>open 1-12-94 NLS 91-164</i> | 2 p 11/12/62 | A |
| #136 Notes | NSC Top Secret Exempt Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting <i>open 1-12-94 NLS 91-164</i> | 1 p 11/12/62 | A |

FILE LOCATION

VP Security File, Nations and Regions
Policy Papers and Background Studies on Cuba Affair (V)

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
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| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|------------------|---|----------|--------------|
| #136a Notes | NSC Top Secret <i>all decisions for NSC see #2477</i> LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting <i>open 1-12-94 NLS 91-164</i> 12 p | 11/12/62 | A |
| #137 Notes | NSC Top Secret <i>Exempt</i> Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes <i>open 1-12-94 NLS 91-164</i> on meeting 1 p | 11/12/62 | A |
| #137a Notes | NSC Top Secret <i>open 1-12-94 NLS 91-164</i> LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting 1 p | 11/12/62 | A |
| #138 Notes | NSC Top Secret Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting 1 p | 11/29/62 | A |
| #138a Notes | NSC Top Secret <i>Open 11/30/77</i> LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting 1 p | 11/29/62 | A |
| #139 Notes | NSC Top Secret Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting 1 p | Undated | A |
| #139a Notes | NSC Top Secret <i>Open 11/30/77</i> LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting 1 p | Undated | A |
| #140 Notes | NSC Top Secret <i>Exempt</i> Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes <i>open 1-12-94 NLS 91-164</i> on meeting 1 p | Undated | A |
| #140a Notes | NSC Top Secret <i>open 1-12-94 NLS 91-164</i> LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting 1 p | Undated | A |
| #141 Notes | NSC Top Secret Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting 1 p | Undated | A |
| #141a Notes | NSC Top Secret <i>Open 11/30/77</i> LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting 1 p | Undated | A |
| #142 Notes | NSC Top Secret <i>Exempt</i> Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes <i>open 1-12-94 NLS 91-164</i> on meeting 1 p | 11/06/62 | A |
| #142a Notes | NSC Top Secret <i>open 1-12-94 NLS 91-164</i> LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting 1 p | 11/06/62 | A |

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| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|------------------|--|----------|-------------|
| #143 Notes | NSC Top Secret Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting | Undated | A |
| #143a Notes | NSC Top Secret LBJ handwritten notes on meeting | Undated | A |
| #144 Notes | NSC Top Secret Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting | Undated | A |
| #144a Notes | NSC Top Secret LBJ handwritten notes on meeting | Undated | A |
| #145 Notes | NSC Top Secret Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting | Undated | A |
| #145a Notes | NSC Top Secret LBJ handwritten notes on meeting | Undated | A |
| #146 Notes | NSC Top Secret Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting | 10/26/62 | A |
| #146a Notes | NSC Top Secret LBJ handwritten notes on meeting | 10/26/62 | A |
| #147 Notes | NSC Top Secret Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting | 10/23/62 | A |
| #147a Notes | NSC Top Secret LBJ handwritten notes on meeting | 10/23/62 | A |
| #148 Notes | NSC Top Secret Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting | Undated | A |
| #148a Notes | NSC Top Secret LBJ handwritten notes on meeting | Undated | A |
| #149 Notes | NSC Top Secret Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting | Undated | A |

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Policy Papers and Background Studies on Cuba Affair (V)

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| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
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| #149a Notes | <i>all decisions per NSC ltr 4/21/77</i> NSC Top Secret <i>open 1-12-94 NLJ 91-164</i> LBJ handwritten notes on meeting 1 p | Undated | A |
| #150 Notes | NSC Top Secret Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting 1 p | 11/08/62 | A |
| #150a Notes | NSC Top Secret <i>Open 11/30/77</i> LBJ handwritten notes on meeting 1 p | 11/08/62 | A |
| #151 Notes | NSC Top Secret Exempt <i>open 1-12-94 NLJ 91-164</i> Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting 1 p | 11/07/62 | A |
| #151a Notes | NSC Top Secret <i>open 1-12-94 NLJ 91-164</i> LBJ handwritten notes on meeting 1 p | 11/07/62 | A |
| #152a Notes | NSC Top Secret Exempt <i>open 1-12-94 NLJ 91-164</i> LBJ typed notes from handwritten notes on meeting 1 p | Undated | A |
| #152b Notes | NSC Top Secret <i>open 1-12-94 NLJ 91-164</i> LBJ handwritten notes on meeting 2 p | Undated | A |
| #153 Notes | NSC Top Secret Exempt Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting 1 p | <i>Decl. NSC ltr. 2/23/81 NLJ 79-3</i> 10/23/62 | A |
| #153a Notes | NSC Top Secret <i>open 9/12/97</i> LBJ handwritten notes on meeting 2 p | 10/23/62 | A |
| #154 Notes | NSC Top Secret Exempt <i>Decl. NSC ltr. 2/23/81 NLJ 79-3</i> typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting 1 p | 10/24/62 | A |
| #154a Notes | NSC Top Secret <i>open 9/12/97</i> LBJ handwritten notes on meeting 1 p | 10/24/62 | A |
| #155 Notes | NSC Top Secret Exempt <i>Decl. NSC ltr. 2/23/81 NLJ 79-3</i> Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes on meeting 2 p | 10/26/62 | A |
| #155a Notes | NSC Top Secret <i>Open 11-27-84</i> LBJ handwritten notes on meeting 3 p | 10/26/62 | A |

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Policy Papers and Background Studies on Cuba Affair (V)

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|------------------|--|----------|--------------|
| #156a Notes | NSC Top Secret <i>Example NSC doc 4/24/77</i> Typed notes from LBJ's handwritten notes <i>omit. NSC ltr. 2/23/81 NLJ 79-3</i> on meeting <i>open 1-12-94 NLJ 91-164</i> 2 p | 10/26/62 | A |
| #156b Notes | NSC Top Secret LBJ handwritten notes on meeting <i>open 1-12-94 NLJ 91-164</i> 4 p | 10/26/62 | A |

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VP Security File, Nations and Regions
Policy Papers and Background Studies on Cuba Affair (V)

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127

LBJ NOTES

Lyndon B. Johnson
VICE PRESIDENT

128

LBJ NOTES:

10:00 a.m. October 23

6:00 p.m. October 23

10:00 a.m. October 24

10:00 a.m. October 26 (3)

6:00 p.m. October 31

11:00 AM Nov. 2

10:00 AM Nov. 3

4:30 PM Nov. 3

10:00 AM Nov. 5

6:15 PM Nov. 6

5:00 PM Nov. 7

4:30 PM Nov. 8

4:30 PM Nov. 12 (2)

5:00 P.M. Nov. 12

10:00 AM Nov. 29

Misc
also articles

Office of the Vice President
Washington, D.C.

FREE

(See attached envelope)

~~TOP SECRET~~

LBJ Notes on Cuban Crisis

~~TOP SECRET~~

enclosures removed

8/25/76
in B

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-164

Saturday

By ju, NARA, Date 1-5-94

30

Pres. Idea U.N. should inspect Cuban refugee camps in Florida. Is there anything that would embarrass us. McCone. Would be discouraging affect morale - no such thing as a camp. McCone. No evidence of loading any ships. 2 more IL-28 fuselages had been uncrated.

| | Assembled | |
|---------|---------------|------------------------------------|
| Oct. 17 | 1 | - 3 partial |
| 26 | 3 | |
| 28 | 2 | 2 " |
| | 4 | |
| 29 | 4 | 2 partial |
| Nov. 1 | 1 operation - | 6 partial |
| 2 | 2 " | - 5 nearly - 2 removed from crates |

McCone

Havana has no specific situation. Cuba punctuated with caves. Some caves very large - close to IL-28 field - We have reported caves used for armaments & communications personnel - Dept. of State security just west of Havana. We cannot dismiss this lightly. Caves could be used to secrete missiles - IRBM sites 2 1/2 to 3 mos. build - detect 6 or 7 wks. before operationable. MRBM 3 to 4 wks. operational capability. 2 wks. before we could detect.

McNamara

As discussed with you, Mr. Pres. earlier, U-2 going in today -
14 sorties
4 against possible submarine base -
7 Priorities - Nov. 15 to 30 McCone before they take missiles out except deck loading - will not deck load - will store for 2 wks. or more to see where they are stored.

McNamara Priorities

(1) IL-28
(2) Havana - across harbor - find most of this equipment in port area.
Rusk says Havana no good for today because Mikoyan in Havana. McCone says our people haven't seen Castro end of island since Oct. 23 - we think whole eastern end of island for immediate photography. Pres. want photographs for tomorrow of all missile sites - Bundy says have not seen all.

Taylor says -

Where moved?
How much has moved?
Must look at ports frequently
(1) San Julian

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Rusk says we should keep daily watch on IL-28 to let Russians know we are watching -
Pres. - this memo does not address itself to outgoing cargo - this gvt issue - Bundy - either this or look into every cave - 48 missiles there - we've seen 33 missiles. Hold him to his agreement.
Pres. make for McCloy 4 or 5 things Khrushchev
Agreed to - & " fight for it -
Fight for U.N. inspection on ground if not at sea - Ball should coll Adlai; McCloy, Noyes, Peterson, etc., come down and get sense of urgency.
Scare U.N. We are about to invade. Keating asked 2 wks ago. They are building a major submarine base in Cuba -

Bundy

Publicly satisfied - privately dissatisfied.
McCone - while bases being - dismantling going on - everything else being accelerated - set this up conference 3:30 - McNomara insists on bring Adlai et al here.

10:45 Wiesner & Chr ASC enter -

Test ban discussion. Pres. 'Do we have to test in '63?' In order to develop 50 megaton weapons in 10,000 lb. size would have to test in '63. Should be done in May. Some could be done underground. Rusk against time limit to test of weapons - we keep pressure on Soviet Union by not saying we will not test.

10 a.m.
November 3, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

Saturday - Nov. 3

Pres. Idea UN should inspect Cuban missile camps in Houth. to there anything that would embarrass us. ^{we are} Would be discouraging effect. Morale - no such thing as a ship. McCona No evidence of loading any ships. 2 more L28 possibly had been uncrated

Oct 17 assembled
26 1 - 3 partial
28 2 2

4
29 4 - 2 partial

Nov 1 1 operation - 6 "

2 2 " 5 nearly - 2 removed from Castro

McCona

Horana has no specific situation. Cuba punctuated with Cores. Some Cores very large. Close to L28 field. McCona reported Cores used for armaments & communications personnel. Dept of State security just west of Havana. We can not determine this lightly. Cores could be used to

THE WHITE HOUSE

Secret Missiles, L28 BM sites $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 months build - detect 6 or 7 weeks before operational. MRLB M 3 to 4 weeks operational capability. Weeks before we could detect.

McCona with you McCona earlier us standard discussion ^{with} going in today -

14 notices

4 against possible submarine base -

7 priorities. Nov 15 to 30 McCona before then take missiles out except deck loading. Will not deck load - Will store for 2 weeks move to see where they are stored.

McCona priorities

① I & L 28

② Horana, across harbor find most of this equipment in port area. Luck says Horana no good for today because McCona in Havana. McCona says our people

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-164

By JW/ica, NARA, Date 1-5-94

130a

THE WHITE HOUSE

haven't seen Eastern end of Island since Oct 23 -
We think whole eastern end of Island for
immediate photography.

Pres want photographs for tomorrow of all missile
sites - Bundy says have not seen all

Where moved? Taylor says -

How much has moved?

Must look at ports frequently

① @ Jan Julian

Bundy says we should keep daily
watch on D L 28 to let Russians know we are
watching -

Pres - this memo does not address itself to outgoing
Cargo - this just issue ^{Bundy} Either this or look
into every cave - ^{48 missiles there} We've seen 33 missiles. Know / told
him to his agreement.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Pres. Make for me Clay 4 or 5 things (Kruscher
agreed to - & " " fight for it -

fight for UN inspection on ground if
not at sea - Ball should call Adlai McClellan
Woyes, Peterson etc Come down & get sense
of urgency

Leave NY. We are about to invade

Keating, about 2 wks ago
They are building a major submarine base
in Cuba & Bundy -

Publicly satisfied - privately dissatisfied.
McConell - while bases being dismantling going on
everything else being accelerated. - Set this up
conference
13:30 - McNamara insists on bring Adlai Stalder

THE WHITE HOUSE

10:45 Wiersner & Chr ASC enter -
Test ban discussion: Pres 'Do we have to test in '63?'
In order to develop some new weapons in 10,000 lbs size would have
to test in '63, should be done in May. Some could
be done underground. Rush against time limit to
test of weapons - We keep pressure on Soviet Union
by not saying we will not test.

~~TOP SECRET~~EXEMPTIONS APPLIED TO THIS
DOCUMENT ARE ON THE BASIS
OF E.O. 13526

Wednesday Night 6 p.m. Security Council

Gen. Hickey (?) advises if put over anything will have warm session.
Kuznetsov says all anti-aircraft now in hands of Cubans.

McCone

3.3(b)(1)

McCloy - Kuznetsov

Russia ready to stay as long as possible - Dismantling & move to port 2 or 3 days. K no invasion from U.S. & other countries. K asked McCloy to dinner - anti-aircraft in hands of Cubans - no mention of Guantanamo - Pres. - says no one in govt. see anyone until we settle Cuba - Rusk says low level no high level on account weather. U Thant knows. we are going to survey - cancelling Press Conference - builds up pressure - quarantine - Hail & if reply satisfactory - if not report back to headquarters for suggestions.

14 planes surveillance tomorrow 1 p.m.

" " " will not be announced

quarantine " - " " after clearance with

Secretaries of Defense & State.

NATO Allies have been asked to tell Castro if he doesn't cooperate they will break relationship -

Doug Dillon

Novy - stopped PT 109 & arrested them out in waters.

Pres. Continue surveillance until U.N. comes up with something as substitute.

Rusk desires to see Thompson, Pres., Atty. Gen. on related matter including Sorensen -

October 31, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 172 AC 14-104

By UKL NARA Date 03-12-2015

LBS # 131

132

Soviet suggests formal _____ up

132

~~TOP SECRET~~

What should we do to have a meeting of the minds on IL-28 Bombers -

McCone - Ships being dismantled - bombers no -

Ball

Mikoyan dinner Int. Sov. trends - Hard line - Hard line - Could
much easier line before evening over - will try to make Castro 5 with
K&K agreement

- (1) No overflight
- (2) " economic aid
- (3) " help refugees
- (4) Guantanamo

Soviet suggests formal up - Stevenson says no -
Sov. deliberately deceptive on Sams site.

" may have committed to Castro to leave Sams - Mikoyan says no
expert on crating (Bombers)

They have not agreed to inspecting ships or sites. McCloy asked for
inventory and check list on outgoing.

Red Cross inspection limited to incoming ships. Gilpatric - must hold
them to unfulfilled obligation

6 points for Public

Missile sites dismantled - Started Sunday dismantled last Sunday -
Transfer depends on shipping 10 days - 2 wks.

IL-28 Bomber (nail down) Proclamation quarantine will not be lifted
until satisfactory.

Quarantine stays in effect until effective substitute arranged.

Means worked out.

Air surveillance will continue & will do whatever necessary until
adequate arrangements made. Castro 5 pts. not relevant & Guantanamo
not negotiable. Security Council next week & public can expect reports
from Sov. on agreement.

Pres.

We should continue to say if U.N. doesn't get inspection we continue
reconnaissance.

Pres. - Prepare set of instructions from here to McCloy -

- 1. Commitment on bombers
- 2. " " U.N. inspection or some substitute

Get pictures out & Presidential statement.

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Authority NSC ltr. 2/23/81 re NLJ 79-3

By LW, NARS, Date 2/22/82

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

No Guantanamo trip for press -
Continue to hail ships identify then pass -
McNamara - Paul Nitze -

USIA

Quote L.A. editorial opinions re Castro blocking agreement.

11:00 a.m.
November 2, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

40

1950

- ① What should we do to have a meeting of the minds on IAB Bombers -
- ②

1100 AM
Nov. 2

McCone, Hays King dismissed - Bombers 20
Hall

Midday dinner Int. for friends - 1st line
Could early much earlier time before evening
try will try to make contact with K + K present

- ① No oversight
- ② " Economic aid
- ③ " Help Refugees
- 4. Granting

Soviet supports formal wrap up. Stinson Dept
no.

Sov. deliberately deceptive on Skans etc.
4 may have committed to Foster to lead same
Mikoyan says no effect on Creating (Bombers)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 11r 2-23-81 (NLJ 79-3)

By RG/LW/ic NARA, Date 9-12-97

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

132-3

THE WHITE HOUSE

They have not agreed to inspecting ships or sites.
We clay asked for inventory and check list on
outgoing.

Red Cross committee limited to evening steps.
Jalpetrick - must hold them to unselfish
obligation

6 points for Ruben

Marble sites dismantled 5th & 6th
dismantled last Monday -

Transfer depends on shipping 10 Aug - 24th

2 L-48 Bomber (Mail Carrier) continuing quarantine will not be lifted until Schistosomiasis ^{diagnosis} is worked out. ^{if not} will effect the outbreak arranged.

Air Surveillance will continue & will
do whatever necessary until adequate reports
made. Contro 5 fts not relevant & ^{not} ^{negotiable} ^{negotiable}
Security Council must work & public can expect reports from Sec on Great

THE WHITE HOUSE

Mrs

We should continue to say if U.N. doesn't
let inspection we continue reconnaissance.

Pres. I Prepare set of instruction from her to Mr. Clay -
"Commandment on Bombers"

1. Commitment on Bombers

2 1.

1. ^{14X} Proposition w/ some substitute

Get pictures out of Presidential statement

No presidential trip for press -

Continue to hold ships identify Thompson -
By mail to

McNamara - Paul Villyte -

us la -

From L.A. Editorial opinion re Carter's
agreement.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-164

Saturday afternoon 4:30

By ju, NARA, Date 1-5-94

Pres. - Gov. appreciated your coming down - Be sure we move with direction and decision. We may find missiles out but don't know where they are - hostile atmosphere - refugees - bring to attention of Russia that we are going to hold them to their agreement, missiles must go - we must know how they went - bombers must go -

Rusk - most decisive deception since '45 - must not go thru 2nd round of deception. Verification essential to peace.

McCone

Missiles dismantled to unknown possibility. Missiles may have been concealed - may store them in caves - very large caves - easily stored in caves. Some weight on deception in operation ⁴⁸ because trucks not running on highways - USSR may have planned & may still plan to have a submarine base in Cuba - Soviet may not abandon Cuba but develop this valuable piece of real estate.

Pres. - we have a draft set of instructions - Pres. read tough draft of instructions. Pres. says Gov. what is your thought? Gov. Stevenson. We might review with you the problems that are outstanding with Soviets & U.N.

(a) Red Cross inspections on incoming shipments. This could be done by series of letters - lots of discussion # of questions however in view of Soviet govt. statement could not undertake this if Russia, Cuba & U.S. & all flags involved.

(b) Verification on ground

(c) Alternatives

(d) O.A.S. procedure if any

Ask Yost to bring you up to date on ships.

Yost says Soviet wants inspection to consist of only Hail & Pass - procedure, but I'm sure we can move them from this position.

Stevenson

2nd question - verification on ground - Khrushchev says can have verification at end - we are insisting on verification thru and at end. McCloy handling this on ground he should not explain status of negotiation.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

McCloy

We must continue area surveys, etc. If they can't arrange with Castro then how do they give us this guarantee - manifest suggested by Wash. - we think not very satisfactory - we should press for on site inspection. Think it essential we cover east side of island - submarines will bring up with Kuznetsov tomorrow - sent him by hand to effect IL-28's still being uncrated - think should press Kuznetsov to press Castro for on site inspections. I find no difficulties in pressing these demands - verification on ground at end - not only verification of site but verification of removal - if Castro refuses only thing

Stevenson

we can do is examine ingoing & outgoing manifests or examine at sea & how far (open crates, etc?)

Ball

If Russia wants Castro to cooperate they can make him 80% of his trade is with Russia.

Taylor says ask Russia what is your withdrawal plan. Stevenson problem is not with the Soviets but with Castro.

Point 3

(3) Assurance against future exchanges paragraph 1 & 2 of Kennedy letter. Nowhere in Khrushchev letter. Pres. says we should get agreement on overflights - Lead man only Russian on SAMs sites - rest are Cubans - Adlai says we have no assurance that we will not be molested. Stevenson's alternatives - 1. Nuclear force Latin American proposal of Brazil, (2) Commission to study. Pres. says we must have proposals on future assurances. U.S. guarantee against invasion must be conditioned on satisfactory guarantee against reintroduction of weapons - Air surveillance is the easiest. Must find another proposal - Stevenson says personally has no doubt but what they will take them out thru Brazil to Dakar - fly them out - McCloy says maybe see Mikoyan next few days - more advantages in seeing him than not to see him. McCloy recommends - psychological advantages - Rusk says if basket full should see him if mean no -

Pres.

Held off until
end of week.

(4) Security Council procedure

Simple exchange of
letters on Red Cross.

(5) OAS procedure

-2-

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Ball - we should ask for performance! Art 6 Rio Post says Protect Peace of Hemisphere. If Castro issues orders to blow up L.A. we can't agree not to invade him.

McNamara

Can't overemphasize importance IL-28 - Press & force answer. 40 planes there (Cuba) IL-28's - 9 uncrated - Johnson - Have they ever admitted bombers offensive weapon - No - always say missiles & bombers & offensive weapons. Taylor - we must overfly tomorrow U 2 (serious).

What should be our public position next few days -

Pres. letter Oct. 27 - (background) Never did accept - then Pres. wrote him he understood acceptance - Ctro did not accept by word or deed -

Nuclear Testing

Saturday
November 3, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

Saturday afternoon 4:30

Pres - for appointments after coming down - be
sure we move with direction & decisions -
We may find ourselves out but don't know where
they are - hostile atmosphere - Refuges -
Bring to attention of Russia that we
are going to hold them to their agreement,
missiles must go - we must know how they
went - bombs must go -

Rusk - most decisive deception
since 45 - must not go thru 2nd round
of deception, Verification essential to peace -
we come

Missiles dismantled to unknown possibility
Missiles may have been concealed - May
store them in Caves - Very large Caves - easily
stored in Caves, some weight on deception

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-164

By JW/jis, NARA, Date 1-5-94

THE WHITE HOUSE

lie operation ⁴⁸ because trucks not running
on highways - USSR may have planned
& may still plan to have a submarine base
in Cuba - Soviet may not abandon Cuba
but develop this valuable piece of real estate -

Pres - We have a draft set of
instructions - Pres read tough draft of instructions
for Stevenson

Pres says for what is your thought? We might discuss
with you the problems that are outstanding with Soviet
& U.S.

(1) Red Cross Inspection on incoming shipments
This could be done by series of letters - lots of discussion
of questions however in view of Soviet past statement
could not undertake this if Russia asked & U.S. & all
flags involved

(1) Verification on ground

(2) Alternatives

(1) OAS procedure if any - 2nd/1/2/3/4/5/6/7/8/9/10/11/12/13/14/15/16/17/18/19/20/21/22/23/24/25/26/27/28/29/30/31/32/33/34/35/36/37/38/39/40/41/42/43/44/45/46/47/48/49/50/51/52/53/54/55/56/57/58/59/60/61/62/63/64/65/66/67/68/69/70/71/72/73/74/75/76/77/78/79/80/81/82/83/84/85/86/87/88/89/90/91/92/93/94/95/96/97/98/99/100/101/102/103/104/105/106/107/108/109/110/111/112/113/114/115/116/117/118/119/120/121/122/123/124/125/126/127/128/129/130/131/132/133/134/135/136/137/138/139/140/141/142/143/144/145/146/147/148/149/150/151/152/153/154/155/156/157/158/159/160/161/162/163/164/165/166/167/168/169/170/171/172/173/174/175/176/177/178/179/180/181/182/183/184/185/186/187/188/189/190/191/192/193/194/195/196/197/198/199/200/201/202/203/204/205/206/207/208/209/210/211/212/213/214/215/216/217/218/219/220/221/222/223/224/225/226/227/228/229/230/231/232/233/234/235/236/237/238/239/240/241/242/243/244/245/246/247/248/249/250/251/252/253/254/255/256/257/258/259/260/261/262/263/264/265/266/267/268/269/270/271/272/273/274/275/276/277/278/279/280/281/282/283/284/285/286/287/288/289/290/291/292/293/294/295/296/297/298/299/300/301/302/303/304/305/306/307/308/309/310/311/312/313/314/315/316/317/318/319/320/321/322/323/324/325/326/327/328/329/330/331/332/333/334/335/336/337/338/339/340/341/342/343/344/345/346/347/348/349/350/351/352/353/354/355/356/357/358/359/360/361/362/363/364/365/366/367/368/369/370/371/372/373/374/375/376/377/378/379/380/381/382/383/384/385/386/387/388/389/390/391/392/393/394/395/396/397/398/399/400/401/402/403/404/405/406/407/408/409/410/411/412/413/414/415/416/417/418/419/420/421/422/423/424/425/426/427/428/429/430/431/432/433/434/435/436/437/438/439/440/441/442/443/444/445/446/447/448/449/450/451/452/453/454/455/456/457/458/459/460/461/462/463/464/465/466/467/468/469/470/471/472/473/474/475/476/477/478/479/480/481/482/483/484/485/486/487/488/489/490/491/492/493/494/495/496/497/498/499/500/501/502/503/504/505/506/507/508/509/510/511/512/513/514/515/516/517/518/519/520/521/522/523/524/525/526/527/528/529/530/531/532/533/534/535/536/537/538/539/540/541/542/543/544/545/546/547/548/549/550/551/552/553/554/555/556/557/558/559/560/561/562/563/564/565/566/567/568/569/570/571/572/573/574/575/576/577/578/579/580/581/582/583/584/585/586/587/588/589/590/591/592/593/594/595/596/597/598/599/600/601/602/603/604/605/606/607/608/609/610/611/612/613/614/615/616/617/618/619/620/621/622/623/624/625/626/627/628/629/630/631/632/633/634/635/636/637/638/639/640/641/642/643/644/645/646/647/648/649/650/651/652/653/654/655/656/657/658/659/660/661/662/663/664/665/666/667/668/669/670/671/672/673/674/675/676/677/678/679/680/681/682/683/684/685/686/687/688/689/690/691/692/693/694/695/696/697/698/699/700/701/702/703/704/705/706/707/708/709/710/711/712/713/714/715/716/717/718/719/720/721/722/723/724/725/726/727/728/729/730/731/732/733/734/735/736/737/738/739/740/741/742/743/744/745/746/747/748/749/750/751/752/753/754/755/756/757/758/759/760/761/762/763/764/765/766/767/768/769/770/771/772/773/774/775/776/777/778/779/780/781/782/783/784/785/786/787/788/789/790/791/792/793/794/795/796/797/798/799/800/801/802/803/804/805/806/807/808/809/810/811/812/813/814/815/816/817/818/819/820/821/822/823/824/825/826/827/828/829/830/831/832/833/834/835/836/837/838/839/840/841/842/843/844/845/846/847/848/849/850/851/852/853/854/855/856/857/858/859/860/861/862/863/864/865/866/867/868/869/870/871/872/873/874/875/876/877/878/879/880/881/882/883/884/885/886/887/888/889/890/891/892/893/894/895/896/897/898/899/900/901/902/903/904/905/906/907/908/909/910/911/912/913/914/915/916/917/918/919/920/921/922/923/924/925/926/927/928/929/930/931/932/933/934/935/936/937/938/939/940/941/942/943/944/945/946/947/948/949/950/951/952/953/954/955/956/957/958/959/960/961/962/963/964/965/966/967/968/969/970/971/972/973/974/975/976/977/978/979/980/981/982/983/984/985/986/987/988/989/990/991/992/993/994/995/996/997/998/999/1000/1001/1002/1003/1004/1005/1006/1007/1008/1009/1010/1011/1012/1013/1014/1015/1016/1017/1018/1019/1020/1021/1022/1023/1024/1025/1026/1027/1028/1029/1030/1031/1032/1033/1034/1035/1036/1037/1038/1039/1040/1041/1042/1043/1044/1045/1046/1047/1048/1049/1050/1051/1052/1053/1054/1055/1056/1057/1058/1059/1060/1061/1062/1063/1064/1065/1066/1067/1068/1069/1070/1071/1072/1073/1074/1075/1076/1077/1078/1079/1080/1081/1082/1083/1084/1085/1086/1087/1088/1089/1090/1091/1092/1093/1094/1095/1096/1097/1098/1099/1100/1101/1102/1103/1104/1105/1106/1107/1108/1109/1110/1111/1112/1113/1114/1115/1116/1117/1118/1119/1120/1121/1122/1123/1124/1125/1126/1127/1128/1129/1130/1131/1132/1133/1134/1135/1136/1137/1138/1139/1140/1141/1142/1143/1144/1145/1146/1147/1148/1149/1150/1151/1152/1153/1154/1155/1156/1157/1158/1159/1160/1161/1162/1163/1164/1165/1166/1167/1168/1169/1170/1171/1172/1173/1174/1175/1176/1177/1178/1179/1180/1181/1182/1183/1184/1185/1186/1187/1188/1189/1190/1191/1192/1193/1194/1195/1196/1197/1198/1199/1200/1201/1202/1203/1204/1205/1206/1207/1208/1209/1210/1211/1212/1213/1214/1215/1216/1217/1218/1219/1220/122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THE WHITE HOUSE

Upst: says Soviet wants inspection to consist of only
Hail & Pass Procedure but in here we can move
them from this position.

^{Stenson}
Inspection - Verification on ground - Kravchenko says
Can have verification at end - We are insisting on
Verification thro & at end. Mc Clay handling this on
ground he should now explain status of negotiation
Mc Clay -

We must continue aerial survey etc. If they can't
arrange with Castro then how do they give us this
guarantee - Manifest suggested by Wash -
We think not very satisfactory - We should
press for on site inspection. Think it
essential. We cover East side of island -
Aubermann will bring up with Kunitz or
transmission ^{sent} told him by hand to effect
I & J still being executed - Think should press
Kunitz to press Castro for on site inspections

THE WHITE HOUSE

I find no difficulties in pressing these demands -
Verification on ground at end -
Not only Verification of site but Verification
of removal - If Castro refuses only thing
We can do is ^{Stenson} examine incoming & outgoing
manifests or examine at sea & how far
(Open Crates etc?)

Ball

If Russia wants Castro to cooperate they can make him
go go of his trade is with Russia

Taylor says ask Russia what is your withdrawal plan

Stenson problem is not with Soviet but with Castro

Point 3.

③ Assurance against future exchanges
Paragraph 1 & 2 of Kennedy letter. Nowhere in
Kravchenko letter. Pres. says we should get agreement
on overflights - And mean only Russian on same

THE WHITE HOUSE

Sides - rest are Cubans - added says we have no assurance that we will not be molested.

Stemmons Alternatives - 1. Nuclear free Latin America proposal of Brazil (2) Commission of Study.

Pres says we must have proposals on future assurance

U.S. guarantee against invasion must be conditional on satisfactory guarantee against re introduction of weapons - Air Surveillance is the easiest. Must find another proposal - Stemmons says personally has no doubt but what they will talk them out thro Brazil to Daker fly them out - McClay says maybe see Miloyan next few days - more advantages in seeing him than not to see him. McClay recommends - psychological advantages - Risk says at worst he should see him if mean no -

THE WHITE HOUSE

Pres

- (4) Security Council procedure ^{! hell of limited end of next wk.}
- (5) O.A. Procedure ^{Simple exchange of letters on Red Cross -}

Ball - we should ask for performance! - Art 6 Report says Protect Peace of Hemisphere. If Castro issues orders to block up LA. We can't agree not to invade him.

^{The Honorable}
^{importance}
 Can't overcomplicate ¹ of L 25 - Pres & force ¹ ^{plow them (Cuba)}
 40 of L 25 - 9 uncorrelated - John How they
 ever admitted members of private weapon - 200
 always say missiles & Bombs & Oppression Regimes
 Taylor - We must verify tomorrow U 2 (serious)

THE WHITE HOUSE -

What should be our public position
next few days -

Pres letter Oct 27 - (background)

Kenn did accept - Then Aves wrote
him he understood acceptance -
He did not ^{accept} by word or deed -
Nuclear testing

~~TOP SECRET~~

134

Security Subcommittee

EXEMPTIONS APPLIED TO THIS
DOCUMENT ARE ON THE BASIS OF
E.O. 13526

10:05 Monday

McCone gives intelligence briefing including read out of Sat. and Sun.

1. Mexico may support OAS demand to support OAS resolution to support forces against Cuba. This may mean a break of relations with Cuba. All satellite leaders except Hungary and Rumania have been called to Moscow in last few days. Rusk says McNamara 2 U-2 aborted because of camera failure. 5 U-2's out today. We proposed send some more tomorrow. 6 sorties low level going out today OK by President.

3.3(b)(1)

Pres. says plain they are going to have trouble on IL-28's.

Pres. We must have U N presence on Cuba or overflight Cuba, Florida, Puerto Rico - Pres. says we should prepare reply to McCloy conversation.

November 5, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 112AC 14-104

By WJL NARA, Date 03-12-2013LBJ #
134

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-164

By pw, NARA, Date 1-5-94

Kuznetsov & McCloy

What protections are we going to require to prevent reintroduction of offensive weapons -

You have carried out your obligations.

1. Break Relations (Mexico -
2. Get ships out of Cuban trade
3. Step up Surveillance
4. Take pictures of decks of ships

Air attack
Blockade

Bombers - Non-performance
Safeguards against re-entry

Should keep agreement -

ground inspection -

I would like to see letter pointing out how he hasn't kept his agreement.

- (1) Complaint to U Thant on lack USSR performance.
- (2) Non-performance on U Thant letter to Castro.

Obligations to Agreement

L.A. add ships to blockade -

- (1) IL-28's there
- (2) No safeguards on re-entry
- (3) No inspections -
- (4) " invasion -

November 12, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handwritten & Mailed

12 Nov.

What protections are we going to
require to prevent reintroduction
of offensive weapons -

you have said out
yourself.

1. Break Relations (Mexico -
2. get ships out of Cuban Trade
3. Map up Surveillance
4. Take pictures of deck of ships

• Air attack -
• Blockade -

Bombers - non performance
Baptists - against receiving
(Surrendering)

Should keep agreement -
ground inspection -

I would like to see letter pointing out
how he hasn't kept his agreement.

- ① Complaint to UThreat on last USSR perf.
- ② Non performance on UThreat letter to Castro

Obligations to agreement -

L.A. add ships to blockade

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-164
By JW/ua, NARA, Date 1-5-94

3. If 28s there

- ① no safeguards on country
- ② no inspections -
- ③ " invasion -

~~TOP SECRET~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-164

By fw, NARA, Date 1-5-94

Monday a.m.

President came in at 11:07 along with Stevenson - Bobby and Secretary Rusk joined us. Bundy asked for intelligence. President asked for state of preparedness - air alert - 14,000 call up - question when we reduce air-borne alert 68 planes - President decided we bring this up again end of week. McCone - Since August Soviet has sent 1/2 billion in military equipment. McCone says this very serious situation. Think President should realize aside from missiles Cuba has a substantial arms build-up. This disturbs us on covert possibilities, Haiti, etc. Rather large volume and upsurge in communications to Moscow.

Rusk

General political situation not changed. Have not heard from top Soviets in Moscow. Kuznetsov says they have nothing to do on IL-28's. We have compliance on missiles but (2) no compliance on IL-28's and inspection.

Stevenson

Castro thanked U Thant for his interest but Castro could not give on-site inspection. Secretary suggested any 5 ambassadors conduct on-site inspection - b loc countries, etc. Stevenson suggests compromise - IL-28 removal and partial inspection - no reintroduction - then we give up blockade - inspection, etc. President says hold to our position until we get answer from Khrushchev to Kennedy letter. Should write a statement of our position - If we don't get IL-28's out, what is our position?

McCloy

Get into record that Red Cross breaking down. Mikoyan and Kuznetsov indicated other warheads still in Cuba. McCloy proposed compromise before they get inflexible. He give us statement IL-28's and warheads - we immediately remove quarantine and inspect our training camps. I think some merit in proposal before get hard reply from Khrushchev. President says we must continue surveillance and if they hit us we take action. President says what should we decide? Stevenson says decide whether await reply to letter or present package. What should package be?

November 12, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday 6.11.68

Dres came in at 11:00 along with Hedman - both of the back
joined us. Barry asked for intelligence. Dres asked for
State of preparedness - bar alert. 14,000 call up - present
which we reduce to about 68 planes - Pres decided
we bring this up again end of the week.

McCone - since August Soviet has sent 1/2 but in realising
1" says this very serious situation. Think Dres should
reality write from middle Cuba has a substantial
arms buildup - This disturbs us on covert possibilities
Hattie etc. ^{rather large volume of weapons in communication to Havana}

General political situation not changed - have not heard
from Sog Nov in this case - Kennedy says they have
nothing to do on L 28's - We have compromise on
matters but @ 1 no compromise on L 28's & inspection

Sturgeson

Costas Thout without for his interest but Castro could not give on
site inspection - Security suggested by 5 ambulatory conduct
on site inspection - also countries etc.

Sturgeson suggests compromise - 1 L 28's removed &
partial inspection - no reintroduction ~~state~~ then we give
up blockade - inspection etc. Pres says hold to our
position until we get answer from Kennedy to Kennedy letter.
Should write a statement of our position -

If we don't get L 28's but what is our position?

The Clay

Get into record that that Red Cross building down
Mulligan & Kennedy indicated other War heads
still in Cuba. - The Clay proposed compromise

before they get inflexible - He gives us ^{separate} L 28's
& Workheads - we immediately remove from
& inspect our training camps.

I think some march is proposed before ^{get back} reply from Kennedy.

Pres says we must continue surveillance & if they back
we take action.

Decide whether we should ^{get back} reply from Kennedy.
Decide whether we should ^{get back} reply to letter or present forking
what should package be.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-164

By JW/iss, NARA, Date 1-5-94

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday Afternoon - 4 o'clock postponed until 5 p.m.

President, Rusk, Bobby, and Bundy came in at 5:30 for 5 o'clock meeting. Bundy says have a message from Mr. Khrushchev - all missiles, warheads and air equipment on IL-28's - doesn't see why we insist but has some give - most interesting thing is his responses on IL-28's currently under Soviet control. We need not worry about them, Secy. McNamara says submit McCloy proposal to agree to take out IL-28's. We will do away with quarantine but if he refuses IL 28's we must reimpose quarantine which would be very serious business - may result in sinking Russian ships. Bobby suggests alternative to strong we have a hell of a lot of cards. Rusk says we say we will immediately give up quarantine if he will take out IL-28's in 2 weeks. Bobby - anybody against lifting quarantine for IL-28's. President says he must give order to get them out in 30 days (reasonable time). Rusk - prepared to lift quarantine if IL-28's removed in 30 days. Flights 5 U-2's - 10 regular flights.

Should determine:

1. Reimpose quarantine, or
2. Pursue alternative pressures (I) pressure Allies - OAS withdraw, etc. Get into fight, get fired upon

Quarantine for IL-28's

Safeguards for no invasion

November 12, 1962

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-164
By fw, NARA, Date 1-5-94

~~TOP SECRET~~

[THE WHITE HOUSE]

Monday Afternoon 4:00 pm

Pres

Rusk, Bell, and Bundy come in at 5:30 for Subell meeting - Bundy says he has a message from Mr. Khrushchev all missiles, Warheads & Air Equipment on I L 2's doesn't see why we insist but then some give - Most interesting thing is his response on I L 2's currently under Soviet Control. We need not worry about them. Bell & Hansen says submit the day proposal to agree to take out I L 2's & we will do arrange with quarantine but if he refuses I L 2's we must reimpose quarantine which would be very serious business may result in ending Russian ship - Bell suggests alternative to string. We have a hell of a lot of cards. Rusk says we say we will immediately give up quarantine if he will take out I L 2's in 2 weeks. Bell says against lifting quarantine for I L 2's. Pres says he must give order to get them out in 30 days (reasonable time) Rusk. Proposed to lift quarantine if I L 2's removed in 30 days. Bell's I L 2's - 10 regular flight

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NEJ 91-164
By SW/ics, NARA, Date 1-5-94

THE WHITE HOUSE

Should determine

① temporary quarantine

② pursue alternative pressures
③ pressure allies - S.A.S. situation etc. get into fight, get fired upon

quarantine for 24-48

safeguards for no mission

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday 10 a.m. Nov. 29

So long as Soviet trying to establish base in Cuba no such thing as normal relationships with Cuba - Hemisphere has rejected this theory many times.

Bobbie Daniel Reader's Digest

McCone

- (1) Invasion)
-)
- (2) Inspection)

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Authority NSC ltr 4/21/77

By hmg, NARS, Date 6/20/77

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday 10 June 1960

THE WHITE HOUSE

So long as I'm trying to establish
bond in Cuba no such thing as
normal relationships with Cuba -
Hemisphere has repeated this
theory many times.

Robert Daniel Leuter Dietz

Mc Lane

THE WHITE HOUSE

① Initiation - }
② Inspection - }

~~TOP SECRET~~

139

Ship will be in quarantine area tomorrow. K said they will not go into quarantine area - now they are moving into area.

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Authority NSC Let 4/21/77
By DMG, NARS, Date 6/20/77

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

Ship will be in quarantine area tomorrow
K said they will not go into quarantine area. Now
they are moving into area

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~~TOP SECRET~~

140

Sov. will attack Turks when we attack Cuba. If Soviet attacks Jupiter in Turkey then we must respond.

McNamara - Polaris for Jupiters - Means safety to you.

Boll - Jupiters for MRBM's in Cuba - McNamara - calls up 300 Reserve Troop Carrier Transports.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-164
By ju, NARA, Date 1-5-94

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

Sov will attack Turkey when we attack Cuba
 If Soviet attacks Jupiter in
 Turkey then we must respond

Polaris for
 Mc Namara - Jupiter - means safety to you

Ball - Jupiter for ~~for~~ MRBMs in Cuba -
 Mc Namara - Calls up ^{Reserve} → 300 Prop Carrier Transport

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 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
 NEJ 91-164
 By SW/ica, NARA, Date 1-5-94

~~TOP SECRET~~

101

regarding the peace in the Caribbean -

By strike no later than Mon. a.m.

Invasion

6:20

Pres, Rusk, Bundy, Taylor & McNamara, McCone, Sorensen, Bobby, Thompson retire to Pres. private office - Dillon, Johnson, Ball, Alex Johnson & Disarmament Chief stay in Cabinet Office.

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Authority NSC 62 4/21/77
By rmg, NARS, Date 4/20/77

~~TOP SECRET~~

141a

THE WHITE HOUSE

Regarding the peace in the Caribbean -

By 12:00 no later than
noon a.m.

Invitation

6:20

Pres. Rusk, Bagley, Taylor & Mc Nemara, McCone
Lorenson, ~~Bobbie~~, Thompson
retire to Presidential office - Dillon
Johnson, Hall, Alex Johnson & disarmament chief stay in
Cabinet office

~~TOP SECRET~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-164
By ju, NARA, Date 1-5-94

that not only - but -

2 other items:

What is our public posture. Should we surface what has been leaked - Rusk - want missiles off before get IL-28's.

Method of verification (Tarpaulin photography)

Verified that 3 have left - how do you know? We don't know.

2 left today 9 or 10 missiles.

9 Radio station VOA Network - want election & football - 2 stations put them on air - 2 off - 2 on

Pres.

3 U-2's Wed.

10 Low Level

- 4 - storage Havana -
- 2 - IL-28
- 2 - Isabella Port
- 2 - Guantanamo - San Diego (Santiago?)

Rusk, McNamara against 4 Havana rec. by Chiefs -
Both argue against it - McCone agrees -

Pres asks - We ought to think what we do when 1 of our planes shot at or down?
What we do? Come forward with a plan next 24 hrs.

6:15 p.m.
November 6, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

that not only — but —

other items:

What is our public posture. Should we surface what has been leaked — Rusk — What missiles off before get 82's

Method of Verification (telescope photography)

Verified that 3 had left — (how do you know?)

We don't know

~~3 ships~~ missiles went out. 400 lbs
2 left today 9 or 10 missiles

9 Radio station VOA network — wait election
football — 2 stations put them on air — 2 off — 2 on

Security Conference

6:15 P.M.

11/6/62

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-164
By JW/jes, NARA, Date 1-5-94

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3 U.S. 100

10 Low level

4 - storage Havana

2 97's

2 Gravela Port

2 Guantanamo Bay ships

Rest: We remain against 4 Havana rec by chiefs.

Both agree against it. We come again.

~~Paesley~~
We ought to think — what we do when 1 of our planes
that it or down? Come forward with a plan next 24h.
What we do

142

~~TOP SECRET~~

Stop const. Take missiles off. Alert. Get Hare counsel - not trade off

(Finletter) Remove missiles

(Norstad) Inspection

Dismantle defense of NATO because const. experts & technicians invade Cuba
& point missiles at us.

Const.

(1) Ships moving

(2) Missile blgs.

Why not get immediate reaction of Hare (Turkey) Finletter & Norstadt (NATO)
to Mr. K's Turkey proposals - What counter proposal would they think it advisable
and agreeable for us to talk with Mr. K about if anything.

West Hem -

Nato - inspection

Threat

U.S. year ago out of Turkey. Useless.

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By mg, NARS, Date 4/20/77

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

Stop Const

get Hare
Counsel

Take men off alert

not Trade off

Remove Missiles

Inspection

(Finletter
Hornstad)

Disarm the defense of NATO
because a ~~const~~ ~~spoke~~ ~~whisper~~
a ~~trader~~ ~~Alaska~~
against members at us.

missile center + Const
① Ships moving
② make beg.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Why not get immediate
reaction of Hare (Finley)
Finletter & Hornstad (NATO)
to Mr. K's Turkey Proposals.
What counter proposal
would they think it
advisable ^{and agreeable} for us to ~~do~~ ~~to~~
talk with Mr. K about ^{if anything}

THE WHITE HOUSE

Walt Hall

NATO - inspection

Threat A

US year ago out of Turkey
users.

~~TOP SECRET~~

McCloy talk U Thant - Russians agree Int. Red Cross. Inspect all cargo coming in from neutral ships - not U.S. man of war. All ships from all bloc ports. No on-site inspection until dismantling had been completed. Russia says take 1 wk. Rusk says if no inspection must have surveillance either satisfactory U.N. or U.S. They - USSR - don't want other people touching or seeing their missiles.

(1) Can we agree on Red Cross - Pres. says no objection

(2) U Thant visit to Cuba - Turkey visits carrying unidentified crates - Anderson wants to pick it up - President says think it should go thru.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-164

By fw, NARA, Date 1-5-94

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Obviously Russians prepared to pay quite a price for time. Ships Returning, etc.

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Authority NSC 4/21/77
By img + Date 11/30/77

~~TOP SECRET~~

Obviously Russians
prepared to pay quite
a price for time
ships returning etc

~~TOP SECRET~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-164

By fw, NARA, Date 15-94

Orderly type of planning -

- (1) POL concept in operation draft Herwitz.
- (2) Day and Owen and Pentagon - Pol. Mil. Pressure Track.
- (3) Politically negotiating track - Henry Owen.
- (4) Intelligence on Cuba - Real vulnerability in Cuba. Venezuela
Com. Party - we are thru if you don't do something beside run.

Ball

Taylor -

Ability thru take out 9 Sams sites -

300 Planes all " "

Low level attacks with fighter bomber 102's once out Sams site can't
be put together again. Full attack on all offensive weapons in Cuba.
4 or 5 airfields and all Migs and IL-28's.

3 to 4 categories of planes (photograph cap above island)

Strike Planes

50 total planes in one day - go back day after day - to see what had.
Invasion must follow - killed thousands (1) casualties 2-5 thousand,
(2) uprising must follow (McNamara) strike \neq 7 days - D day 7 days.
90,000 after landing 11 days _____ (?) accompanied by mobiliza-
tion reserves - \neq requisition ships. Limited attack on 6 \neq IL-28 10-50
planes - make site inoperable

(1) Provocation

(2) Opinion

- | | |
|----------------------------|--|
| 1. Missiles alone | <u>Limited Target</u> (6) Limited Effort |
| 2. Air Strike | |
| Full Target - Full Effort. | |
| 3. Invasion | |

I plan to avoid unpredictable, excessive, uncontrollable Soviet response.
McNamara plan not destroying Russians and Latin Americans - not killing L.A.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Blockade

Tighten POL

After 10 tomorrow take a look at political look at strike (McNamara).
People who fought off warhawks have won a round

- (1) Pol background of strike - Rowan and Kitchen
- (2) P.O.L. Herwitz
- (3) Henry Owen on negotiating track.
- (4) Map of blockade option. McNamara, Ball or Rostow.

10:00 a.m.
October 26, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

Orderly type of planning -

① P of Concept in operation Kraft/Kennedy

② Day & Order & Pentagon - Pol Mil Pressure
Track -

③ Politically negotiating track
Henry Owen -

④ Intelligence on Cuba - Real Vulnerability
in Cuba - Venezuela Comm. Party we
are thro' if you don't do something
before run

Bell

Taylor

Able to take out some sites -

300 planes all

Low level attacks with fighter bombers 100's
once out some site can't be put together again
Full attack on all offensive weapons in Cuba

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4-600 Airfields & all mps +
I & 28's -

3 to 4 Categories of planes (Photograph
Capable of doing)

Strike planes

500 total planes in one day
go back day after day -
to see what had

Invasion must follow. Killed
thousands - 2.5 thousand
① ^{Disruption}

② Uprising must follow (McNamara)
Strike + 7 days - all day 7 days

90,000 after landing 11 days

2 day - accompanied by mobilizing
Reserves - 6 Repair ships

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-164

By JW/is, NARA, Date 1-5-94

146a

Limited attack on 6 + J L 28
10-50 planes -
Make site inoperable

- ① Provocations
- ② Opinion

1. Missiles alone ^{Limited Target} - (6)
2. Air Strike ^{Limited Effort}
Full Target - Full Effort.
3. Invasion
to avoid ^{1 Plan} ~~unpredictable, excessive, uncontrollable,~~
Direct Response
Not destroying ^{The Hamana} ~~the room & kitchen~~
Not killing L.A. -

Blockade

Tighten R.O.L.

After 10 tomorrow take
a look at Political
look at Strike (the Hamana)
People who fought off Warlocks
have won a round

① ^{background} of Strike Room & Kitchen

② P.O.L.

Hermitz

③ Henry Olsen on repeating track

④ Map of blockade options.
The Hamana - ball or kitchen.

~~TOP SECRET~~

6 PM - 23 Oct.

July Increase Sov. Bloc shipping
Oct 14 Flight unmistakably evidence Sophisticated
25 Sov Block on way
18 in Port
175 Ships to Cuba since July
2/3 MRBM 16 ready to go - 2 more by Oct. 30 - 20 Launchers in place -
12 IRBM in Dec. some perhaps wks (?) in advance.

Russell

Assemble as rapidly as possible sufficient capacity to wipe out. These people have been warned. Khrushchev will rattle missiles & lose more men than now. We will photograph our shots) Russell K had debated before Hungary we would have kicked off W. War III.

6 P.M. Tuesday - ExSubCom -

Pres. reviewed, TCS amended & Pres approved Proclamation - Rusk.
New pictures low level ??
Norstadt - Lemnitzer

McNamara leaves for dinner.

Pres. 92 million 58 cities of 100,000
What could we do to lessen risks peoples lives.
Stuart -
Reply - Military men brand caves & bldgs.
Pres. Get Gov. Com on Civil Defense -
Should we run our forces up to Autobahn.

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Authority

NSC ltr. 2/23/81 re NLS 79-3

By

LW

NARS, Date

2/22/82

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

6 PM - 2300

July Inquest not happening

Oct 14 ^{light} immediately evidence Sept 14

25 ARV Black on way

18 in Port

175 Ships to Cuba since July

Y^m 16 ready to go - 2 more by Oct 30 = 50 now in place - 14 Q RBM in place some perhaps MKs in advance

Russell

Assemble as rapidly as possible
Sufficient Capacity to wipe out
these people have been warned
Krusch will rattle nerves
& lose more men than now.

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Authority NSC 14r 2-23-81 re: NLS 79-3

By rg/12/12 NARA, Date 9-12-97

THE WHITE HOUSE

"We will photograph our shots Russell
L had debated before Hungary we
would have kicked off W. War III

THE WHITE HOUSE


6 P. M. Tuesday — Sec. Sec. Com —

Pres reviewed, FES amended & Pres approved
Proclamation - Rusk

new pictures low level ??

Nordstadt - Remnitz — McNamara leaves for dinner

Pres 92 million 58 cities of 100,000
What could we do to lessen risks people live
^{Stuart} reply - Military men brand cores & bldgs -
Pres. get gov. Com on Civil Defense -
Should we move our forces up to Antioch.



ESTAS BASES PONEN EN PELIGRO VIDAS CUBANAS

Esta fotografía fué tomada un día de la semana pasada desde un avión que voló sobre Cuba. Ella muestra una base de proyectiles nucleares de carácter ofensivo cerca de San Cristobal. Esta es una de varias bases que apresurada y secretamente fueron construídas por los rusos y para los rusos.

LA VERDAD

Los rusos secretamente han construido bases de proyectiles nucleares de carácter ofensivo en Cuba. Estas bases ponen en peligro vidas cubanas y la paz del mundo, porque Cuba es ahora una base de avanzada para la agresión soviética.

Los rusos, con el consentimiento de Castro, llevaron a cabo su trabajo en secreto. Los cubanos no tienen acceso a esas bases. Pero las bases están allí.

Para proteger al pueblo cubano, y a todos los pueblos del hemisferio occidental, el Presidente Kennedy con la aprobación de todos los países latinoamericanos ha impuesto una cuarentena para evitar que este equipo bélico de carácter ofensivo sea desembarcado en Cuba. Los alimentos no son detenidos, las medicinas no son detenidas, sólo es detenido el material de guerra agresivo de los rusos.

Cuando ese material de guerra sea retirado de Cuba la cuarentena terminará.



Ocho de diez bases de proyectiles nucleares de carácter ofensivo, están localizadas en las cercanías de Guanajay, Remedios, San Cristobal y Sagua la Grande.

Nov. 2, 1962

Matter of Fact By Joseph Alsop

The Real Intelligence Story

NORMALLY, public discussion of secret intelligence is best avoided. But since the role of the American intelligence community in the Cuban crisis is becoming a topic of partisan controversy, it may be justifiable to set out the hard, rather simple, and far from discreditable facts.



Alsop

Beginning, then, at the beginning, the normal methods of intelligence collection, by refugee interrogation, agent reports, and the like, were ordered supplemented as soon as Fidel Castro first began to receive Soviet military supplies in large quantities.

Thenceforward, a close sea watch was kept on all vessels coming into Cuba. In addition and more important, air surveillance was begun, by planes equipped for lateral photography along the coasts, and by two U-2 flights over Cuba each month.

In the summer months, and particularly in August, numerous refugee reports told of new rocket emplacements in Cuba, and a good many reports described the installation of rockets of such size that an offensive character was indicated. All these reports were checked. Emplacement of anti-aircraft rockets was verified, but this was all.

The last U-2 mission on the old two-a-month schedule was flown on Sept. 1 in good weather with extensive coverage. It showed anti-aircraft rockets in plenty, as before. But like its predecessors, it showed no trace whatever of ballistic missiles of the medium and intermediate-range offensive types.

TOWARD the beginning of September, there was something of a flap when the Chinese Communists brought

down a Chinese Nationalist U-2. This led to pleas for caution in the air surveillance of Cuba. Nonetheless, the schedule of U-2 missions was stepped up in September to four each month.

The September missions covered areas of Cuba where there had been no successful earlier photo reconnaissance; and these missions also failed to reveal any material change in the picture. At the very end of September, however, far more circumstantial refugee reports began to be received, describing the appearance of missiles far too big to be fitted into the familiar anti-aircraft category.

Immediate resurvey of the areas covered by the Sept. 1 and earlier U-2 missions was quickly decided upon, despite the obvious risk from the numerous anti-aircraft rockets known to be present. The first resurvey by U-2 was scheduled for Oct. 7; but the weather turned bad, and the bad weather built up into Hurricane Ella. Thus the mission first scheduled for Oct. 7 could not be flown until Oct. 14.

The rest of the story—the U-2's return that Sunday evening, the processing of its photographs in Washington on Monday, and the notification of the President in his bedroom on the morning of Tuesday, Oct. 16—all this is already well known. The whole story bespeaks a diligent, courageous, and decidedly risky effort of surveillance.

IN THE LIGHT of this undoubtedly authentic story, there should be no further talk about "bad faith" in the Government's negative answer to Sen. Kenneth Keating's warnings of Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba. Sen. Keating was speaking from refugee evidence, which the Government also had.

In addition, the Government had something that Sen. Keating did not have—numerous proofs, by a series of earlier photographic checks, of the tendency to exaggera-

tion in refugee evidence. Until Oct. 15, when the U-2 photos taken after Hurricane Ella were analyzed, the American policy-makers believed the picture of missile deployment in Cuba provided by the earlier photo-reconnaissance, which showed no offensive missiles and no preparations to emplace them.

In fairness to Sen. Keating, it must be added that he was one up on the Government in one respect. He evidently thought it likely that the Soviets would emplace offensive missiles in Cuba. Within the Government, there were certain policy-makers, including CIA Director John A. McCone, who at least thought this was quite possible. But the governmental consensus ran against Sen. Keating's opinion.

THE CONSENSUS was rational, because the Soviets had never before permitted such weapons beyond their own border, and for many other reasons. In the event, however, the governmental consensus was proved wrong and Senator Keating's warnings were justified. But this matters much less than another point, which is too easily forgotten. In brief, no action could possibly have been taken, in any case, on the basis of the loose sort of evidence which Senator Keating used.

Without photo reconnaissance to support the U. S. Government's charges, the Western Allies and the nations of this hemisphere would certainly have acted very differently. And with the Latin-American and Western European nations in paroxysms of indignation about "crass, brutal American imperialism"—paroxysms that would surely have ensued if the U. S. Government had not been able to corroborate its charges—Khrushchev might also have acted very differently when he was finally challenged by President Kennedy.

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Matter of Fact By Joseph Alsop

The Soviet Deception Plan

IN ONE of the most revealing episodes of the Cuban crisis, the hero (or victim? or villain?—who can say?) was a junior official of the Soviet embassy in Washington. This man, who had better be nameless, is very much more genial, natural, and forthcoming than the dour, lumpish average run of Soviet diplomat. Largely by accident, he came to know two or three New Frontiersmen without foreign policy responsibilities in the early days of the Kennedy Administration.



Alsop

He had even been taken up, in a limited way, by Attorney-General Robert Kennedy. Behind their informal contacts, there was a practical motive. It was hoped to convey to the Kremlin an especially accurate and convincing picture of the President's viewpoint and purposes, as described by the President's own brother.

Last summer this man went home to Russia for a vacation. When he returned to Washington in early October, he at once sought out Attorney General Kennedy, with the urgency befitting the bearer of a private message from one chief of state to another.

On Oct. 1, he said, he had been summoned for a long private talk with Nikita S. Khrushchev and Anastas Mikoyan — an extraordinary honor for an official in his fairly humble position. Khrushchev and Mikoyan had asked him many questions about the President; and they had also discussed Cuba.

KHRUSHCHEV had gone out of his way to declare that President Kennedy might rest assured that the Soviet Union would never send to Cuba any weapon "capable of reaching American targets." Whereupon Mikoyan had intervened, saying pointedly,

"be sure that this message reaches the President himself." Such, then, was the message that the Russian brought to Washington.

On Oct. 1, of course, medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles had already been clandestinely landed in Cuba; and construction had just begun at the missile launching sites. But what makes the episode of the personal message to the President so astonishing and so significant is not the revelation of Soviet duplicity. That was proven long since, by the false protestations of Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

The episode of the message is so significant only because of the direct participation of Khrushchev himself and his Armenian deputy. For a chief of state to take great pains to cause a grossly and demonstrably false personal message to be transmitted to another chief of state is something altogether novel in post-war political history.

Khrushchev's role in this amazing episode, in turn, makes it quite clear that an elaborate deception-and-cover plan, of strictly military character, was an integral part of the larger scheme to upset the nuclear balance with Soviet missiles in Cuba. Nor was the main part of the scheme by any means as harebrained as many people now seem to suppose.

THE DANGERS of air reconnaissance were perhaps underrated by the Soviet planners. The Soviet Defense Ministry, after all, is completely controlled by a collegium of aging Marshals and colonel-generals, none of whom has real experience of the capabilities of air reconnaissance. And generals always underrate techniques they have not used themselves, even if they ought to know better.

In reality, however, the risk of air reconnaissance boiled down to the sole risk of observation by American U-2s. Contrary to what many

believe, the Cuban missile sites were hidden, by convolutions of terrain, from the side-viewing cameras of the other American aircraft regularly patrolling the Cuban coasts. And the missile sites were also placed in areas heavily defended by anti-aircraft missiles of the SA-II type, which are useless against low-altitude attack but can kill U-2s, as was first discovered by Francis Gary Powers.

The original plan, one may be pretty sure, called for using the SA-II anti-aircraft missiles to shoot down any U-2s which might intrude after installation of the offensive missiles began. It is interesting, not to say chilling, to speculate on what would have happened if the crucial, eye-opening U-2 flight on Oct. 14 had merely resulted in a "Cuban U-2 incident," with attendant world tumult.

IN FACT, however, the anti-aircraft missiles were not ready. Some merciful technical mistake or logistical failure had left the SA-IIs without a workable command and control system until the final, climatic Saturday of the Cuban crisis, when an American U-2 was indeed shot down.

One must conclude that the Soviet commander in Cuba dared not confess this grave failure to his superiors, or that the pre-set timetable was too tight and compelling, or that the danger of a breach of security resulting from delay was considered to be greater than the danger of U-2 observation. In any case, the timetable was so swift, clandestine installation of the offensive missiles was adhered to, even though the anti-aircraft missiles were not ready to keep off the U-2s.

Add these facts to the stark fact of Khrushchev's role in the first incident recounted. The sum is a grave and terrible warning that Soviet methods of waging the cold war are coming very close to hot-war methods.

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New York Herald Tribune, Inc.

~~TOP SECRET~~

4:05 Sat. Afternoon

Mr. Rusk. 2 U-2 aborted. Low flight - McNamara subsequently said 1 aborted mechanical difficulty. Pres. We are glad to discuss Turkey et al when work stops - Mr. K. says to U Thant - Will Russia cease work and make missiles inoperable.

The message this a.m. introduces matter outside Cuba controversy & involving nations out of this hemisphere which are quite complicated. Will U Thant get assurance that work will stop on bases & they will become inoperable in order to make it possible for discussion all these matters.

More 8 planes 16:41 - 1 mechanical

1730 SD's. Mr. McNamara One of our afternoon aircraft hit by 37 mil. shell - quite a change in orders.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC ltr 4/24/77
By mmg, NARS, Date 6/20/77

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

4:05 Sat afternoon

8:15

Mr Rusk. 2 U & aborted - Low flight.
 Mr McNamara subsequently said 1 aborted mechanical
 difficulty Pres. We are glad to discuss today at all
 while Mr K stops - Mr K says to be heard - Will Russia
 cease work make missiles inoperable.

The message this am introduces another outside Costa Rica
 & another nations out of this hemisphere which are quite
 complicated. Will without get for summer that Mr K will
 stop on base & they will become impossible in order to
 make it possible for discussion all these matters.

more 8:16:41 - 1 message

6:20 S.O.S. ^{Mr McNamara} One of our afternoon aircraft hit
 by 37 mil shell - find a change in orders.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Because of nature of danger to NATO Pres. ordered missiles diffused -
If U.S. attacks Cuba - then USSR will attack Italy & Turkey.
Take it or leave it - Inst. to heads of all NATO Govts. - offer to
give additional assistance.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-764

By pw, NARA, Date 1-5-94

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

Because of nature of danger to NATO
Pres ordered missiles deployed -
If US attacks Cuba - then USSR
will attack Italy & Turkey
Take it or leave it - Just to
heads of all NATO govt - offer
to give additional assistance.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-164
By JW/ica, NARA, Date 1-5-94

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday 4:30

Salinger, McNamara, Defense (Sylvester) - Defense releases agreed statement.

Pres. says

'We will know more in 24 hrs. about IL-28's and inspections at sea.'

Allies should help put squeeze upon shipments to Cuba

2 alternatives

Dillon (Hit planes or strengthen quarantine)

McNamara

Weather bad today 5 U-2 tomorrow

10 low level - interesting construction (2) 1 may be atomic storage in center of island.

November 8, 1962

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC ltr 4/21/77

By rmg, NARS, Date 4/20/77

~~TOP SECRET~~

150a

THE WHITE HOUSE

8 Nov. Thursday 4:30 -

Saltzman, Knamy, ~~Spencer~~ ^{Spencer} & defense release agreed
Statement.

Pres. says

We will know more in 24 hrs about

I L 28's and inspections at Sir
Allies should help put squeeze upon
shipments to Cuba.

2 Alternatives

Belton (1st planes or strengthen quarantine)

McNamara

Weather bad today

Wx tomorrow

10 low level - interesting construction (2) may be
atomic storage in center of island

~~TOP SECRET~~

151

33 missiles identified visually

16 Mariel Port 14 Casilda Ports - 12 not yet loaded - then 24 of 42 not yet loaded - 18 missiles shipped out.

IL-28's assembly 9 observed 5 operational 20 crates notes -
These 9 ships will be checked tomorrow by

Bombers

No prog war head removal

Air surveillance

IL-28 - or (1) surveillance
on site inspections - (2) quarantine

Pres. says State should come up with statement on where we are with Russia -

5:00 p.m.
November 7, 1962

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-164
By fw, NARA, Date 1-5-94

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
33 missiles identified visually

16 missile Port 14 Casilda Port - 12 not yet
Coded - then 24 of 42 not yet coded - 18 missiles
shipped out.

JL 28's assembly & observed 5 operational

20 crates notes -

These 5 ships will be checked tomorrow
by

Bombers

No more war head removals

Air Surveillance

JL 28 -

On file inspections -

On Surveillance
On quarantine

5:00 P.M.
7 Nov.

THE WHITE HOUSE
Mr. Saye State should come up
with statement on where we are
with Russia -

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-164
By us/jw NARA, Date 1-5-94

Date

152

Stevenson _____ (?) by McCloy.

~~TOP SECRET~~

108-2

11:30 Friday a.m.

McCone

Soviet military forces in Cuba - these forces very formidable military array - Very concerned with Soviet maintaining military base in Cuba - this much more dangerous than IL-28's.

McCloy - If missiles, IL-28's and nuclear weapons go then will be very expensive.

Stevenson by McCloy -

Fooling 'round getting nowhere at U.N. with USSR. Adlai says you took missiles and take out IL-28's and nuclear weapons - we can't say no invasion unless you give U.N. inspection on Cuba - We will not invade if you behave yourself.

1. Get Pres. statement Tuesday.
2. McCloy OK's Kuznetsov when mil. unit leaves.
3. We ought to have proposal on long term verification.
 - (1) Brazilian proposal of nuclear free Caribbean
 - (2) U.N. Commission on Caribbean. Fla., Guantanamo
 - (3) Soviet ports

Rusk says we will get something working. Pres. says Chiefs should suspend flight (low level) recommended for tomorrow - McNamara says I think this wise.

Surveillance or Blockade - (one of maneuvers available)

Wait until statement - Explain surveillance - notify world - then overflight and tighten quarantine.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-164
By pw, NARA, Date 1-5-94

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

THE WHITE HOUSE

Mc Cone 11:30 Friday 6. 1961.
Soviet Military forces in Cuba - these forces
Very formidable Military array -
Very concerned with Soviet maintaining
Military base in Cuba - this much more
dangerous than I L 28's.

Mc Clay - If missiles, I L 28's and Nuclear weapons
so then will be very expensive

Stevenson says by Mc Clay -

Forley round getting nowhere at 22 Northless
Adlai - says you took missiles and take
out I L 28's and Nuclear weapons - we can
say no invasion unless you put US invasion
on Cuba - We will not invade if you
behave yourself.

1. get Pres statement Tuesday
2. Mc Clay asks Kennedy when will unit leave.
3. We ought to have proposal on long term verification
of proposed proposal of nuclear free Caribbean.
- (2) US Commission on Caribbean - The president
- (3) for ports (x)

Butt they are still at something working
Pres says chiefs should suspend flight (how long)
recommended for Thompson - Mc Namara
says I think this will -

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-164

By JWP/ia, NARA, Date 1-5-94

THE WHITE HOUSE

Surveillance of blockade - time of presence available /
Wait until statement - Explain Surveillance - Notify Work -
Then over flight and light presentation.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday 10 a.m. Oct. 23

McCone - Starts by reading summary contents overnight intelligence - 3 missiles have disappeared. Pres. When do we first intend to interfere with a ship? McNamara. We have a plan. Pres. says. Bobbie 2 points which cause concern - Why didn't we locate this ahead of time - why locate missiles & lock doors after horse is

Bill White (Ball says LBJ)

Pres. says CIA should give us effect of total blockade on Cuba and Germany - McNamara. We are taking U-2 photographs daytimes and targeting them that night. When will proclamation effective - soon after OAS action dawn tomorrow go after this ship - (Chenault) McNamara says extend tours of duty for Navy and Marines. U-2 accident - SAC instructed 15 min when U-2 goes off course send out 8 planes to destroy Sams site. Pres. delegates to Secy. Defense authority to destroy Sams site only if clearly they shot down our U-2 & only if Pres. unavailable - OAS resolution (Ball) gives us everything we could ask for. Longest lead time - ships - must charter all possible - then requisition 90 or 100 ships.

Than must call up transport aircraft. We propose to exclude ^{POL}Oil Lubricants from goods. Low level flights in order to prove to layman existence of missiles. There will be six flights low level - Debate on other flights - may call up 10,000 Navy men to man destroyers - Take over West Palm Beach - strafing airports if we knock out. McCone & Ball get photographs for Stevenson. Pictures. O.A.S. Ambassadorial group 6 P.M. Meeting.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC ltr 2/23/81 re NLJ 79-3

By LW, NARS, Date 2/22/82

~~TOP SECRET~~

153a

THE WHITE HOUSE

Mr. Cone - Tuesday 10 A.M. Oct 23 - Starts by reading
 3 missile launchers -
 Summary contents overnight intelligence.
 Pres. When do we first intend to interfere with ship?
 Mr. Hamora: We have a plan.
 Pres. says: Better 2 points which cause concern.
 Why didn't we locate this ahead of time. Why locate
 missile & look down after horse is
 Bill White (Bill says it)
 Pres. says CIA should give us effect of total
 blockade on Cuba & Germany -
 Mr. Hamora: We are taking U-2 photographs daytime and
 targeting them that night -
 When will proclamation be effective - soon after
 OAS action down tomorrow go after this ship -
 (Chenault) Mr. Hamora says extend hours of duty for Navy & Marine
 U-2 accident - SAC instructed 15 min when it goes off course
 send out 8 planes to destroy launch site. Pres. delegates to

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 14r, 2-23-81 (NLJ 79-3)

By R6/LW/10 NARA, Date 9-12-97

THE WHITE HOUSE

Army defense authority to destroy same site
 only if clearly they shot down our U-2 & only
 if Pres unavailable - OAS resolution Ball
 gives us everything we could ask for.
 Conflict dead time - Ships - Must chart all
 possible - Then requisition 900x100 ship -
 Then must call up transport aircraft.
 He propose to exclude ^{POZ} out submarines from ports
 low level flights in order to prove to layman
 existence of missiles. There will be six flights
 low level debate on other flights - May call up
 10,000 navy men to man destroyers - Take over
 West Palm Beach. Stripping airports if we knock out
 McCona & Ball get photographs for Stevenson.
 Pictures OAS. Ambassadors group
 6 P.M. Meeting

ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE CONCERNING DOCUMENTS 154, 154A

Someone on Vice President Johnson's staff, possibly Howard Burris, prepared the typed versions of Vice President Johnson's handwritten notes which are found in this file. Document 154 is a typed version of document 154a and is dated October 24, 1962; however, the notation "24 Oct" on the original handwritten note is written in pencil, not in pen as are the rest of the notes, and is not in Vice President Johnson's handwriting. This notation might have been added by the transcriber at the time the typed notes were prepared.

The Pre-Presidential Daily Diary indicates that Vice President Johnson attended NSC Executive Committee meetings at 10:00 A.M. on Wednesday, October 24, 1962, and at 10:00 A.M. on Wednesday, October 31, 1962. The content of documents 154 and 154a indicate that these notes were probably taken at the October 31 meeting, not the October 24, 1962 meeting.

REGINA GREENWELL
Senior Archivist

September 12, 1997

~~TOP SECRET~~

154

Wednesday Security Meeting
10:00 a.m.

Clear evidence that construction & concealment have continued at MRBM sites in Cuba since Oct. 27. Our photography precludes positive assessment of construction activity. We note considerable increase in Operational Radar. We should try to get Kuznetsov to recommend removal of Sam sites. He wouldn't want us to get this technical information. McCone says he had intuition feeling NIE Sept. 21st says Russia

Rusk

Says postpone until Friday - Pictures will be available. Rusk says we must (Thurs. a.m.) fly high & low level photographs. If Castro does not agree to Red Cross quarantine must go back on. Pres. We will wait until later today to decide (1) reconnaissance or (2) quarantine. Rusk suggests cable to all free world countries to say to Castro we 'free world' will break relations unless you cooperate with U.N.

October 24, 1962

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC ltr. 2/23/81 re NLJ 79-3

By LW, NARS, Date 2/22/82

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

Wednesday Security Meeting 2400

70. A-M

Clear evidence that Construction & Casement
have continued at MRB sites in Cuba since
Oct 27. Low photography precludes positive assessment
of Construction activity.

We note considerable increase in Operational
Radar. We should try to get Kuntzov to recommend
Removal of base sites - He wouldn't want us
to get this technical information.

Mc Cone says he had intuition feeling NDE Sept 21st
says again

Rusk

Days postpone until Friday - Perhaps will be available
Rusk says we must (Thurs a.m.) fly high & low level photographs
If Castro does not agree to Red Cross quarantine must be taken
Pres we will wait until Carter today to decide
on quarantine or quarantine

THE WHITE HOUSE

Rusk says just cable to all free world countries
to say to Castro we 'free world' will break relations
unless you cooperate with U.N.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 11r. 2-23-81 (NL 379-3)

By RG/LW/LS NARA, Date 9-12-97

~~TOP SECRET~~

155

Pres. to Don Wilson USIA - Should we drop pictures to Cuba - Has Castro admitted missiles -

McCone

Const. on sites continuing - armed forces continue on alert. Dissidents being rounded up. Turk & Copenhagen & other sources say 14 (19?) of 22 have turned back - 1 ship has 12 helicopters aboard. See no crash procedures re Soviet armed forces. Canada found 2 East German missile technicians & 5 Czeck technicians. (They were allowed to continue.) Low level photography very successful - Castro sent drug list - baby food - plasma - turned over to Donovan - great anxiety in Havana.

Overnight Military Sit

McNamara 6 Eastern Time Destroyer Interceptor tanker Bucharest - Black Sea - Havana POL Destroyer maintaining surveillance - should selectively board non-bloc ship - establish boarding as a pattern. Tanker will reach barrier 8 p.m. Fri. night (ammonia tanks). Low level surveillance consistent with air attack - evidence camouflaged Sams sites - Instructed planes not to fire & subs instructed not to attack - Naval craft not to move out of port. 3 advantages low level flights - 1. Intelligence, 2. Pattern of attacks reduces warning, 3. Not only stop missiles but determine whether they have removed missiles. 8 U4A aircraft - IL-28 - Mig & 9 missile sites - Sams sites - Komar & coastal missile sites & nuclear storage sites - announce unarmed surveillance OAS, etc. - ordered done - Pres.-Taylor-Telephones. Some possibility can destroy missile sites with very few aircraft. Missile sites ore 8 hrs. from launch & aircraft have orders not to fire. Then we might go in & take missiles out. - McNamara - Include in list missile - a number of tankers without deck cargo were passed.

Rusk political question U.N. Harlan Cleveland Stevenson would like reply with short -

McNamara - quarantine must not be removed unless we can get missiles & planes removed.

Major Alternatives for Removing Missiles

(1) Do we go get a ship - between now & tomorrow a.m. Do we move toward U Thant (status quo) - What is minimum status quo - We have stopped offensive weapons to Cuba 1/2 of our objective ground. How do we get other 1/2 remove missiles -

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DSC ltr. 2/23/81 NLJ 79-3
By LW, NARS, Date 2/22/82

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

1. Political, 2. Military, 3. Economic.

Thorough studies are being made for quick take out of missiles.

1. Warning to personnel - pamphlets -

McCone - missiles can be moved out in minutes

Escalating the blockade - (1) Expand coverage of items prohibited,

(2) Provoking Cuban attacks on our forces, (3) Escalate reconnaissance,

(4) Go to Mig fields, (5) attacking sites -

Bobby. Have month to get big missiles out & accomplish something.

Taylor Military escalation possibilities - Political escalation possibilities.

Think they are letting us enjoy the fruits of our quarantine as they continue to complete action on destroying us -

Pressures to accompany - Political moves Rusk has spoken of -
bomber fuel - surveillance - sonic booms - photos -

Latin America - Denuclear Zone

(1500 Technicians

(500 Czech Industrial Workers -

10:00 a.m.

October 26, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

155a

Pres to ^{Wick} ~~Abraham~~ ^{THE WHITE HOUSE} - Should we drop
pictures to Cuba - Has Castro admitted ~~murder~~
the Come -

Crust on sites continuing - Armed
forces continue on alert. Dissidents
being rounded up. ^{+ Copenhagen} Tark & other
sources say 14 of 22 ¹ have turned
back - 1 ship has ² helicopters aboard
see no crash procedures or forest around from
Canada found 2 east german missile technicians
& 5 Czech technicians. (They were allowed to continue)
Have held photography very successful - Castro sent drug list
body pack - Panama - turned over to Donovan - great anxiety
in Havana (X)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 79-3

By LW/10 NARA, Date 11-27-84

THE WHITE HOUSE
Major Alternatives for Moving Windows -

Do we get a ship - between now & tomorrow A. M.

Do we move toward A threat (Status quo) - What is minimum ^{entry} _{quo}
We have stopped offensive weapons to Cuba $\frac{1}{2}$ of our objective found
How do we get other $\frac{1}{2}$ remove missiles -

Thorough studies are being made ~~for~~ ^{to} find take out of missiles
1. Warning to personnel - pamphlets - ~~for~~ ^{to} find take out of missiles
McCone - Missiles can be moved out in minutes

Escalating the blockades - ² expand coverage of items prohibited
 Promoting Cuban attacks on our forces - ³ Escalate assassinations ⁽⁴⁾ go to miq
 fields ⁵ attacking sites.
 Really. Have months to get big things out & accomplish something
 Taylor Military Escalation possibilities - Political Escalation possibilities.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Think they are letting enjoy the fruits of our quarantine
as they continue to complete action on destroying
us -

Att 2

at -
- Presures to accompany - Petetical
- Power - Surreliance - Pomic - Photos
Miss Luck has spoken of -

Latin America - ^{1st} Nuclear Zone

{ 1500 Technicians
 { 500 Czech Industrial Workers -

156

Santa Diego ????

Santiago ?

Date????

~~TOP SECRET~~

56

Berlin - Nitze

Policy - Rostow

Communications

Civil Defense - Pittman

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-164

By fw, NARA, Date 1-5-94

McNamara - on board Lebanese Freighter under charter - ship cooperated - Soviet Cargo - Passenger Ship - East Germany - Passenger Ship - no other ships in easy range. Grosvenor Tanker with deck load tomorrow night. Karl Marx barrier on Oct. 31 2 a.m. E Daylight Time.

Assembly IL-28 has continued at accelerated rate and to proclamation - missile site - Fuel that contributes to const. site - Rusk asks be postponed 24 hrs. in view U Thant discussions -

Dillon - says missile bases are going ahead full steam - Put pressure on U Thant inspectors - McBundy & McNamara not sure serious as Dillon says. McNamara policy to continue surveillance day & night. 8 aircraft over Cuba by noon - 4 tonight using flares - 10 planes per target - opening serving as basis for photographs - Stevenson says do not announce surveillance - Pres. says wait until political discussions -

Rusk

- (1) good job Stevenson
- (2) USIA go ahead - drop leaflets Havana Sant
18 pictures specially selected for Time Magazine.
Wilson leaves to get leaflet pictures.
These are minimum U.S. conditions
No more offensive arms to Cuba
No more buildup
U.N. take over sites so missiles inoperable - Desanitize of present sites
300 minimum U.N. personnel - Canadians et al not Burmese or Cambodians -
Station Navy Inspection personnel all Army ships as to cargo, etc. - U.S. to back up U.N. inspection. McCloy says take point 3 first. Very imp. to public.
Encourage Brazil & Mexico to push hard for a Latin Free Latin America - not Puerto Rico - not Panama Canal - could involve storage nuclear weapons in Panama - could bar weapons passing thru Latin America.
McNamara - Chief against - I'm for it - Rusk - This may be face saving formula - Gen. Taylor says skepticism that it will be effective - Divert U.N. attention. Too much discussion in U.N. before decision - finally this linked with Africa. What would De Gaulle do - would create problem be - Algeria not DeGaulle testing site. We might let DeGaulle use our atomic testing site - McNamara - I'm in favor as long as linked to point one -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

no more -

Rusk reads proposed telegram to Rio as proposal to Castro -

Gov. Stevenson -

Track on political procedures

Missiles must be kept inoperable.

Works on sites close -

Missile be insured that they are inoperable.

No ship carrying arms -

Withdraw from hemisphere UN Inspections in Cuba

Dismantle existing sites

They want guarantee integrity of Cuba

Dismantle missiles in Turkey, Italy

Cuba agreement nuclear free zone

McCloy - Says don't agree - this handicaps us carrying
quarantine

get them out or trade them out.

Bundy

Negotiating for status quo not acceptable U.S.

continues

Work is going on missile sites - very dangerous

Tomorrow -

Extend Blockade P.O.L.

Work going on - Pres. speech -

10 a.m.

October 26, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

156-8

THE WHITE HOUSE

Berlin - Nilsen

Policy - Rostov

Communication

Civil Defense - Peltman

Mc Namara - On board Lebanese freighter under charter.
Ship Cooperated - Soviet Cargo - Passenger Ship -
End Germany - ~~Intercept~~ other ships in easy range
Government Tugboat with deck load tomorrow night
Karl Marx barrier on Oct 31 24 M E Daylight Turner

Assembly I L 28 has continued at accelerated rate
Add to proclamation - missile site - Fuel that contributes
to Const. site - Rust water be pumped 24 hrs. in view of threat
discussions -
Dillon - says missile boxes are going ahead full steam - Put pressure
on U.S. threat inspectors - Mc Namara has seen Dillon says

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-164

By W/is, NARA, Date 1-5-94

THE WHITE HOUSE

Mc Namara policy to continue surveillance day & night
8 aircraft over Cuba by noon. 4 tonight
using flares - 10 flares per target - opening
serving as basis for photographs - Stevenson
says do not announce surveillance - Pres says wait
until political discussions. -
Russell

① good job Stevenson

② US & A go ahead - drop leaflets Havana

Santa Digo - 15 pictures ^{specifically} selected for Time magazine

Weldon leaves to get leaflet pictures.

There are minimum US conditions

No more offensive arms to Cuba

" " buildup

UN take over sites to monitor inoperable - ^{Desamulge of} present status

300 minimum UN personnel - ^{Caribbean} at at not

business of Caribbean

Stithum Navy Inspection personnel all army ships as

to Camp etc - US to work up UN inspection.

Mc Clay says take 3 first - Very Am to public

THE WHITE HOUSE

Encourage Brazil & Mexico to push hard for a
Latin Free Latin America - not Puerto Rico, not
Panama Canal - Could involve storage nuclear weapons
in Panama - Could bar weapons passing through
McKean - Chief against - bin for it - After
Rusk - This may be fore seeing formula - Gen Taylor
says McPherson that it will be effective - Desert
W H attention - Has much discussion in W H
before decision - finally this settled with Gines
What would de Gaulle do - would create problem
he - Algeria what de Gaulle testing site
We might let de Gaulle use our atomic testing site -
McPherson - bin in favor as long as linked
to point one - no more -
Rusk reads proposed telegram to Rio as proposal
to Castro -

THE WHITE HOUSE

gov Stevenson -

Work on political procedures

Work on sites cease -
Missile be ^{insured that they are} inoperable.
No ships carrying arms -

Missiles must be kept inoperable

WLC

Withdraw from hemisphere WLC inspectors in Cuba
Dismantle existing sites

They want guarantee integrity of Cuba
Dismantle missiles in Turkey, Italy

Cuba agreement nuclear free zone

McClay - Says don't agree - This handicaps us
Carrying

guarantee -
get them out or trade them out.

Bundy

Negotiations for status far not acceptable US

THE WHITE HOUSE

Continues
Work is going on missile sites - Very dangerous
Tomorrow

Extend Blockade P.O.L.

Work goes on - Pres speech.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

from Juanita:
Mr Reardon's

Office called -
Pres. has called a
Cabinet meeting
for 4:30. Would
like to know if
you will attend.

Meeting - 2:00 PM
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

message from Juanita -

McGeorge Bundy's office called -

The President had called an
NSC meeting for 3 pm in the
Cabinet Room. On the record
meeting - no agenda.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

November 5, 1962

Mr. Johnson:

According to Juanita, the message from Mr. Bundy was received on 22 October at approximately 10:00 a. m. (Monday).

The message from Mr. Reardon was received at approximately 10:10 a. m. Juanita promptly called Mrs. Abell and relayed the messages to her. The reply she gave Juanita after delivering the messages to you was that you would phone the above people personally.

The President's TV address was at 7:00 p. m. , Monday, October 22.

Juanita has noted that you talked with Larry O'Brien at 10:30 that morning and with McGeorge Bundy at 10:45.

H. L. B.