

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

10/3

FORM OF DOCUMENT	NLS-77-53	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
		TO BE SUBMITTED TO STATE DEPT. FOR CONCURRENCE		
#191 Memo	WH	Secret <i>Exempt State Dec. 3-7-78</i> To VP from Col. Burris 2 p	11/07/62	A
#192 Memo	WH	Top Secret <i>sanitized 10-3-79</i> To VP from Col. Burris <i>sanitized 5-4-92</i> 2 p <i>NLS 77-53 and NLS 89-01</i>	11/07/62	A
#193 Memo	WH	Top Secret <i>sanitized 10-3-79</i> To VP from Col. Burris <i>open 4-1-09</i> 2 p	11/06/62	A
#194 Memo	WH	Top Secret <i>sanitized 10-3-79</i> To VP from Col. Burris <i>sanitized 5-4-92</i> 2 p <i>NLS 77-53 and NLS 89-01</i>	11/06/62	A
<i>open 6-26-09</i> #196 Memo	WH	Secret <i>open 10-3-79</i> To VP from Col. Burris 1 p	11/06/62	A
#197 Memo	WH	Secret <i>sanitized 10-3-79</i> To VP from Col. Burris 3 p	11/05/62	A
<i>open 6-26-09</i> #198 Memo	WH	Top Secret <i>Exempt State Dec. 3-7-78</i> To VP from Col. Burris <i>Exempt State 3/27/79</i> 3 p	10/21/62	<i>again 12-13-58</i> <i>NLS 89-01</i> A
#201 Memo	WH	Top Secret <i>Exempt State Dec. 3-7-78</i> To VP from col. Burris <i>declass State 3/27/79</i> 2 p <i>NLS 77-53 and NLS 89-01</i>	10/30/62	A
#202 Memo	WH	Top Secret <i>open 10-3-79</i> To VP from Col. Burris 1 p	10/30/62	A

FILE LOCATION

VP Security File, Nations and Regions
Policy Papers and Background Studies on Cuba Affair (VI)

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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2 of 3

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<i>all decisions per State Dec. 3/3/79</i>			
#160a Cable	State Secret Embtel 1070 from Moscow	4 p 10/24/62	A
#162a Cable	State Conf. Deptel 997 to Moscow	2 p 10/25/62	A
#163a Cable	State Conf. Deptel 985 to Moscow	2 p 10/23/62	A
#163 c Cable	State Conf. Deptel to Moscow	1 p 10/23/62	A
#164 Cable	State Secret Embtel from Moscow	4 p 10/25/62	A
#168 Cable	State Conf. Embtel 1077 from Moscow	1 p 10/25/62	A
#170 Cable	State Secret Embtel 1042 from Moscow	2 p 10/23/62	A
#175 Cable	State Conf. Deptel 596 to Paris	1 p 11/01/62	A
#177 Cable	State Secret Embtel 512 from Paris	2 p 10/28/62	A
#178 Cable	State Secret <i>Exempt</i> Embtel 587 from Ankara (correction)	2 p 10/27/62	A
#179 Cable	State Secret Deptel 1082 to Bonn	1 p 10/28/62	A
#180 Cable	State Secret Embtel 1976 from Paris	2 p 10/28/62	A
#181a Cable	State Secret <i>Exempt</i> Embtel 587 from Ankara	6 p 10/27/62	A
#182 Cable	State Secret Deptel 578 to Paris	3 p 10/26/62	A
#183 Cable	State Secret <i>Exempt</i> Embtel 1234 from Bonn <i>Exempt State 3/27/79 re NLT-79-2</i>	2 p 10/28/62	A

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VP Security File, Nations and Regions
Policy Papers and Background Studies on Cuba Affair (VI)

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

3 of 3

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#184 Cable	<i>All decisions per State to 3/3/77</i> State Secret Deptel 2382 to Paris 2 p	10/20/62	A
#185 Cable	State Secret <i>Exempt</i> Embtel 1236 from Bonn <i>Exempt State 3/27/79</i> 2 p	10/28/62	A
#186 Cable	State Secret Embtel 1975 from Paris 2 p	10/28/62	A
#187 Cable	State Secret <i>Exempt</i> Embtel 1674 from London <i>Exempt State 3/27/79</i> 1 p	10/24/62	A
#189a Cable	State Secret Embtel 1970 from Paris 2 p	10/27/62	A

FILE LOCATION VP Security File, Nations and Regions
Policy Papers and Background Studies on Cuba Affair (VI)

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KENNEDY-KHRUSH EXCHANGES

Dear Mr. President,

I have just received information from Mr. V. Kusnetsov, our representative at the negotiations in New York for liquidation of the tense situation around Cuba, that Mr. Stevenson handed him a list of weapons which your side calls offensive. I have studied the list and, I must confess, the approach of the American side to this matter has seriously worried me. In such a move, I will say frankly, I see a wish to complicate the situation, because it is impossible indeed to place into the category of "offensive" weapons such types of weapons which have always been referred to as defensive weapons even by a man uneducated militarily - by a common soldier, not to say of an officer.

It is hard for us to understand what aim is being pursued by the introduction of that list, by setting forth such a demand - in any case it must be some other aim, but not a desire for a speediest clearing of the atmosphere. And it is being done at a moment when we have already agreed with you on the main questions and when we on our part have already fulfilled what we agreed upon - have dismantled rocket weapons, are loading them now on ships and these weapons will be soon shipped from Cuba. That is why I feel greatly concerned with the advancing of such demand by the American side, concerned

with its possible consequences, if necessary reasonableness is not displayed.

The demand which has been set forth is evidently pursuing, as I have already said, some other aims and that - I would wish, Mr. President, that you understand me correctly - can lead not to the betterment of our relations but, on the contrary, to their new aggravation. We should understand the position each side is in and take it into consideration but not overburden, not complicate our relations, especially at such an important moment when measures are being taken to eliminate the accute tension and bring these relations to a normal state.

That is why I would ask you, Mr. President, to meet our anxiety with understanding, to take measures on your side in order not to complicate the situation and to give your representatives a directive to eliminate the existing tension on the basis upon which both of us have agreed by having exchanged public messages. You spoke to the effect that missiles which you called offensive should be removed from Cuba.. We agreed to that. You in your turn gave assurances that the so-called "quarantine" would be promptly removed and that no invasion of Cuba would be made, not only by the U.S. but by other countries of the Western hemisphere either.

Let us then bring the achieved understanding to a completion, so that we could consider that each side has fulfilled its pledges and the question has been settled. If, however,

additional demands are made, then that means only one thing - the danger that the difficulties on the way to eliminating tension created around Cuba will not be removed. But that may raise then new consequences.

I think that you will understand me correctly. For you and I will evidently have to deal not only with elimination of the remnants of the present tension - there lies ahead for you and me a great, serious talk on other questions. Why then start now complicating the situation by minor things. May be there exist some considerations, but they are beyond our comprehension. As for us, we view the introduction of additional demands as a wish to bring our relations back again into a heated state in which they were but several days ago.

Sincerely,

N. KHRUSHCHEV

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EYES ONLY

TO:
FROM: Moscow
NUMBER: 1070
DATE: 10/25/62

Signature Record

[illegible]

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S - William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

159

DRAFT
11/6/62

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am surprised that in your letter, which I received yesterday, you suggest that in giving your representative in New York a list of the weapons we consider offensive there was any desire on our part to complicate the situation.

The solution of the Cuban affair was established by my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of October twenty-eighth. You will recall that in my letter of October twenty-seventh, I referred to "all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use." You will also recall that in my broadcast address of October twenty-second that in addition to medium-range ballistic missiles, I mentioned specifically "jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons," as "an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas." Finally, my proclamation of October twenty-third entitled "Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba" specifically listed bomber aircraft. These facts were all known at the time of our exchange of letters on Cuba. *It seemed very clear speech from the deliberate* I cannot believe that there could have *further language supplied by Press Secretary* been any doubt in your mind that IL-28s, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, were included. *misprint*

Your letter says -- and I agree -- that we should not complicate the situation by minor things. But I assure you that this matter of IL-28s,

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or any possible future matter of submarines, is not a minor matter for us at all. It is true, of course, that these bombers are not the most modern of weapons, but they are distinctly capable of offensive use against the United States and other Western Hemispheric countries, and I am sure your own military men would inform you that the continued existence of such bombers in Cuba would require substantial measures of military defense in response by the United States. Thus, in simple logic these are weapons capable of offensive use. But there is more in it than that, Mr. Chairman. These bombers could carry nuclear weapons for long distances, and they are clearly not needed, any more than ^{missiles} rockets, for purely defensive purposes on the island of Cuba. ^{in the present context} Thus their continued presence would have the same effect in creating grave tension that the missiles would have, and their removal, in my view, is quite as necessary to a good start on ending the recent crisis.

I am not clear as to what items you object to on the list which Ambassador Stevenson handed to Mr. Kuznetsov. I can assure you I have no desire to cause you difficulties by any wide interpretation of the definitions of weapons which we consider offensive and I am instructing my representative in New York to confer promptly with Mr. Kuznetsov and to be as forthcoming as possible in order to meet any legitimate complaints you may have in order to reach a quick solution which would enable our agreement to be carried to completion. I entirely

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agree with your statement that we should wind up the immediate crisis promptly, and I assure you that on our side, we are insisting only on the bare minimum of what is immediately essential for progress in this matter. In order to make our position clear, I think I should go on to give you a full sense of the very strong feelings we have about this whole affair here in the United States.

These recent events have given a profound shock to relations between our two countries. It may be said, as Mr. Kuznetsov said the other day to Mr. McCloy, that the Soviet Union was under no obligation to inform us of any activities it was carrying on in a third country. But I cannot accept this view; ^{because of historical & treaty responsibilities in this hemisphere} I think you would not either, if the activities being carried on in a third country were such as to threaten a major alteration in the world balance of power upon which our present uneasy peace depends. And however one may judge that argument, the fact of the matter is not only that we were not informed of what your Government was doing secretly in Cuba, but that active steps were taken to mislead us about what was being done.

^{only (PFC)}
I do not refer here to the TASS article of September, but ^{also} ~~the~~ rather to communications which were addressed to the highest levels of our Government through channels which heretofore had been used for confidential messages from the highest levels of your Government. Through these channels we were specifically informed that no missiles would be placed in Cuba which would have a range capable of reaching the United States. In reliance upon these assurances I attempted, as you know, to

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Brundage
attested
as Clay letter
draft

I think
you
are
familiar
(Add 1 but document is for
your
files)

restrain those who were giving warnings in this country about the trend of events in Cuba. Thus undeniable photographic evidence that offensive weapons were being installed was a deep and dangerous shock, first to this Government and then to our whole people.

As you think about this matter, let me ask you to consider how you would have felt if the situation had been reversed and if a similar effort had been made by us in a country like Finland. If in Finland, or even Sweden, there had developed a government increasingly hostile to you and if then, during a very short period of time -- while public and private reassurances were being given -- there had been secretly sent to Finland a whole variety of dangerous means of destruction which were discovered only at the last moment, I am sure you know how the Soviet Government and people would have reacted. And that is how the action of your side in Cuba appears to us.

In the aftermath of this shock, to which we replied with ^{the} ~~the~~ ^{67 measured} ~~but~~ ^{minimum} necessary response, I believe it is vital that we should re-establish some ^{degree} ~~measure~~ of confidence in communication between the two of us. If the leaders of the two great nuclear powers cannot judge with some accuracy the intentions of each other, we shall find ourselves in a period of gravely increasing danger -- not only for our two countries but for the whole world.

I therefore hope that you will promptly recognize that when we speak of the need to remove missiles and bombers, with their immediate supporting equipment, we are not trying to complicate the situation but

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simply stating the bare minimum of what was clearly included in our understanding of October twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth. I shall continue to abide fully by the undertakings in my letter of October twenty-seventh, and specifically, under the conditions stated in that letter I will hold to my undertaking "to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba." This undertaking has already come under attack here and is likely to become increasingly an object of criticism by a great many of my countrymen. And the very minimum that is necessary *in regard* for me to be able to give ^{to} these assurances is ^{as was agreed the} the verified removal of the missile and bomber systems, together with real ^{safeguards} assurances against their reintroduction.

I should emphasize to you directly, Mr. Chairman, that in this respect there is another problem immediately ahead of us which could become very serious indeed, and that is the problem of continuing verification in Cuba. Your representatives have spoken as if this were entirely a problem for the Castro regime to settle, but the continuing verification of the absence of offensive weapons in Cuba is ^{an} entirely- ^{safeguard} essential ^{and the other countries of this hemisphere} for the United States, and is an explicit condition for the undertakings which we in our turn have agreed to. The need for this verification is, I regret to say, convincingly demonstrated by what happened in Cuba in the months of September and October.

For the present we are having to rely on our own methods of surveillance, and this surveillance will surely have to be continued unless, *as we much prefer, a better & durable method can be found*

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

a better and durable method can be found. We believe that it is a serious responsibility of your Government to insure that weapons which you have provided to Cuba are not employed to interfere with this surveillance, which has the full support of the Western Hemisphere. ^{etc.} *It is here*

You will agree the world will agree

Finally, I would like to say a word about my expression of confidence that when we are able to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise. ~~We will indeed~~ be ready to use our influence in this direction if the conditions stated in my letter of October twenty-seventh are carried out, but I should tell you in all frankness that these are ^{*the ability of these*} sovereign countries and that their willingness to give such assurances will be affected by the extent to which they consider that Cuba will cease to be a threat to their security. ^{*but*} _A [The same consideration will face the American people as they frame their attitudes toward Cuba after this immediate crisis is surmounted.] I think we must both recognize that it will be very difficult for any of us in this Hemisphere to look forward to any real improvement in our relations with Cuba if it continues to be a significant military outpost ^{*directly capable of becoming dangerous*} of the Soviet Union. We have limited our action at present to the problem of offensive weapons, but I do think it may be important for you to consider whether a real normalization of the Cuba problem can be envisaged while there remain in Cuba large

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

number of Soviet military technicians, and major weapons systems and communications complexes under Soviet control, all with the recurrent possibility that offensive weapons might be secretly and rapidly reintroduced. In this connection in particular, I hope you

must attach the greatest importance to the personal
understand that we would be bound to regard any move to establish
assurances you have given about the establishment of submarines in Cuba
a submarine base in Cuba just as seriously as we regarded the installa-

tion of missile bases and bombers.

that submarine bases will not be established in Cuba.
In summary, I believe that Cuba can never have normal

relations with the other nations of this Hemisphere unless it ceases to allow its territory to be used militarily by a foreign power from outside the Hemisphere and adopts a peaceful course of non-interference in the affairs of its sister nations. These wider considerations may belong to a later phase of the problem, but I hope that you will give them careful thought.

In the immediate situation, however, I repeat that it is the withdrawal of the missiles and bombers, with their supporting equipment, under adequate verification, and with a proper system for continued

reassurance
reassurance in the future, that is essential. This is the first necessary

to open the door through which we can
step away from the crisis, and unless we take it promptly, I do not

More to restore confidence and to give attention to other problems that
see how renewed action on our side can be avoided.

ought to be resolved in the interest of peace

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

160a

~~SECRET~~

M
Action

Control: 17952
Rec'd: OCTOBER 24, 1962
9:24 PM

010

SS
Info

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1070, OCTOBER 25, 2 AM

EYES ONLY

NI ACT

POLICY

EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State la 3/3/77

By

img

NARS, Date

4/11/77

FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY'S TRANSLATION LETTER FROM KHRUSHCHEV TO PRESIDENT RECEIVED BY MESSENGER FROM FOREIGN OFFICE AT 11:30 PM MOSCOW TIME.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR MR PRESIDENT:

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 23, FAMILIARIZED MYSELF WITH IT AND AM ANSWERING YOU.

IMAGINE, MR PRESIDENT, THAT WE HAD POSED TO YOU THOSE ULTIMATIVE CONDITIONS WHICH YOU HAVE POSED TO US BY YOUR ACTION. HOW WOULD YOU HAVE REACTED TO THIS? I THINK THAT YOU WOULD HAVE BEEN INDIGNANT AT SUCH A STEP ON OUR PART. AND THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN COMPREHENSIBLE TO US.

HAVING POSED THESE CONDITIONS TO US, YOU, MR PRESIDENT, HAVE CHALLENGED US. WHO ASKED YOU TO DO THIS? BY WHAT RIGHT HAVE YOU DONE THIS? OUR RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, LIKE OUR RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES, REGARDLESS OF WHAT SORT OF STATE IT MAY BE, CONCERN ONLY THE TWO COUNTRIES BETWEEN WHICH THOSE RELATIONS EXIST. AND IF ONE IS REALLY GOING TO TALK ABOUT

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 1070, OCTOBER 25, 2 AM FROM MOSCOW

A QUARANTINE, REFERRED TO IN YOUR LETTER, IT CAN BE ESTABLISHED, ACCORDING TO ACCEPTED INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE, ONLY BY THE AGREEMENT OF STATES BETWEEN THEMSELVES, AND NOT BY ANY SORT OF THIRD PARTY, THERE EXIST, FOR EXAMPLE, QUARANTINES ON AGRICULTURAL GOODS AND PRODUCTS. BUT IN THE CASE AT HAND, THE QUESTION IS IN NO WAY ONE OF QUARANTINE, BUT RATHER OF FAR MORE SERIOUS THINGS, AND YOU YOURSELF UNDERSTAND THIS.

YOU, MR PRESIDENT, ARE NOT DECLARING QUARANTINES, BUT ADVANCING AN ULTIMATUM AND THREATENING THAT UNLESS WE SUBORDINATE OURSELVES TO YOUR DEMANDS, YOU WILL USE FORCE. CONSIDER WHAT YOU ARE SAYING! AND YOU WISH TO CONVINCE ME TO AGREE TO THIS! WHAT DOES AGREEMENT WITH SUCH DEMANDS MEAN? THIS WOULD MEAN TO GUIDE ONESELF IN ONE'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES NOT BY REASON BUT TO INDULGE ARBITRARINESS. YOU ARE NO LONGER APPEALING TO REASON, BUT WISH TO INTIMIDATE US.

AND, MR PRESIDENT, I CANNOT AGREE WITH THIS AND THINK THAT IN YOUR HEART YOU RECOGNIZE THAT I AM CORRECT. I AM CONVINCED THAT IN MY PLACE YOU WOULD ACT THE SAME WAY.

REFERENCE TO THE DECISION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES CANNOT IN ANY WAY SUBSTANTIATE THE DEMANDS NOW ADVANCED BY THE UNITED STATES. THIS ORGANIZATION HAS ABSOLUTELY NO AUTHORITY OR BASIS TO MAKE DECISIONS LIKE THAT OF WHICH YOU SPEAK IN YOUR LETTER.

CONSEQUENTLY, WE DO NOT RECOGNIZE THESE DECISIONS. INTERNATIONAL LAW EXISTS, GENERALLY RECOGNIZED NORMS OF CONDUCT EXIST. WE FIRMLY SUPPORT THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, STRICTLY OBSERVE THE NORMS REGULATING NAVIGATION ON THE HIGH SEAS AND IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. WE OBSERVE THESE NORMS AND ENJOY THE RIGHTS RECOGNIZED BY ALL STATES.

YOU WISH TO COMPEL US TO RENOUNCE THE RIGHTS THAT EVERY SOVEREIGN STATE ENJOYS, YOU ARE ATTEMPTING TO LEGISLATE IN QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, YOU ARE TRAMPLING UPON THE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1070, OCTOBER 25, 2 AM FROM MOSCOW

GENERALLY ACCEPTED NORMS OF THIS LAW. AND ALL THIS NOT ONLY OUT OF HATRED FOR THE CUBAN PEOPLE AND ITS GOVERNMENT, BUT ALSO AS A RESULT OF CONSIDERATIONS OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN THE USA. WHAT MORALITY, WHAT LAW CAN JUSTIFY SUCH AN APPROACH BY THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS? YOU CANNOT FIND SUCH A MORALITY AND SUCH A LAW, BECAUSE THE ACTIONS OF THE USA WITH REGARD TO CUBA ARE OUTRIGHT BANDITRY, OR, IF YOU LIKE, THE FOLLY OF DEGENERATE IMPERIALISM. UNFORTUNATELY, THE PEOPLES OF ALL COUNTRIES, AND AT LEAST OF ALL THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, CAN SUFFER GRAVELY FROM SUCH FOLLY, SINCE THE USA HAS FULLY LOST ITS FORMER INACCESSABILITY WITH THE ADVENT OF CONTEMPORARY TYPES OF ARMAMENT.

CONSEQUENTLY, MR. PRESIDENT, IF YOU COOLY WEIGH THE SITUATION WHICH HAS DEVELOPED, NOT GIVING WAY TO PASSIONS, THEN YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT FAIL TO REJECT THE ARBITRARY DEMANDS OF THE USA. WHEN YOU CONFRONT US WITH SUCH CONDITIONS, TRY TO PUT YOURSELF IN OUR SITUATION AND THINK HOW THE USA WOULD REACT TO THESE CONDITIONS. I DO NOT DOUBT THAT IF SOMEONE HAD ATTEMPTED TO DICTATE CONDITIONS OF THIS SORT TO YOU, THE USA, YOU WOULD HAVE REJECTED SUCH AN ATTEMPT. AND WE ALSO SAY -- NO.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THAT VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND INTERNATIONAL AIR SPACE IS AN ACT OF AGGRESSION, PUSHING MANKIND TOWARDS THE ABYSS OF A WORLD MISSILE-NUCLEAR WAR. CONSEQUENTLY, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CANNOT GIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CAPTAINS OF SOVIET VESSELS BOUND FOR CUBA TO OBSERVE THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE AMERICAN NAVAL FORCES BLOCKADING THAT ISLAND. YOUR INSTRUCTIONS TO SOVIET MARINERS ARE STRICTLY TO OBSERVE THE GENERALLY RECOGNIZED NORMS OF NAVIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND NOT TO RETREAT FROM THEM BY EVEN ONE STEP. AND IF THE AMERICAN SIDE VIOLATES THESE RULES, IT MUST REALIZE WHAT SORT OF RESPONSIBILITY WILL REST ON IT IN THAT CASE. OF COURSE, WE SHALL NOT BE SIMPLY OBSERVERS OF PIRATICAL ACTIONS OF

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4- 1070, OCTOBER 25, 2 AM FROM MOSCOW

AMERICAN SHIPS ON THE HIGH SEAS. WE WILL THEN BE FORCED FOR OUR PART TO TAKE THE MEASURES WHICH WE DEEM NECESSARY AND ADEQUATE IN ORDER TO PROTECT OUR RIGHTS. FOR THIS WE HAVE ALL THAT IS NECESSARY.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,

/S/ N. KHRUSHCHEV

KOHLER

GDW

NOTE: RELAYED TO CIA, WHITE HOUSE, SECRETARY MCNAMARA AND CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, TREASURY AND JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 10/24/62 PER SS.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPIES TO SS 10/24/62 CWO-M.

~~SECRET~~

October 25, 1962

161

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have received your letter of October 24, and I regret very much that you still do not appear to understand what it is that has moved us in this matter.

The sequence of events is clear. In August there were reports of important shipments of military equipment and technicians from the Soviet Union to Cuba. In early September I indicated very plainly that the United States would regard any shipment of offensive weapons as presenting the gravest issues. After that time, this Government received the most explicit assurances from your Government and its representatives, both publicly and privately, that no offensive weapons were being sent to Cuba. If you will review the statement issued by Tass in September, you will see how clearly this assurance was given.

In reliance on these solemn assurances I urged restraint upon those in this country who were urging action in this matter at that time. And then I learned beyond doubt what you have not denied -- namely, that all these public assurances were false and that your military people had set out recently to establish a set of missile bases in Cuba. I ask you to recognize clearly, Mr. Chairman, that it was not I who issued the first challenge in this case, and that in the light of this record these activities in Cuba required the responses I have announced.

I repeat my regret that these events should cause a deterioration in our relations. I hope that your Government will take the necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation.

Sincerely yours,

John F. Kennedy

N. S. Khrushchev
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow, USSR

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

[illegible]

This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal blue or grey ruling lines. A vertical margin line is present on the left side. At the bottom of the page, there are some very faint, blurry markings that appear to be bleed-through from the reverse side, possibly containing the words "DRAFT" and "REVISION".

2000

**THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO - L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File**

THIS DOCUMENT
REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

41

Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: Ambassador MOSCOW

NIACT 997

Ref: Embtel 1070

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State ltr 3/3/77

By

Wmg, NARS, Date 4/11/77

EYES ONLY

009

Signed original following message from President to

Khrushchev delivered to ~~EMX~~ Soviet Embassy 1:45 a.m.

October 25

Washington time/ Please deliver to highest ranking ~~EMX~~ Soviet official immediately available.

October 25, 1962

QUOTE Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have received your letter of October 24, and I regret very much that you still do not appear to understand what it is that has moved us in this matter.

The sequence of events is clear. In August there were reports of important shipments of military equipment and technicians from the Soviet Union to Cuba. In early September I indicated very plainly that the United States would regard any shipment of offensive ~~EMX~~ weapons as presenting the gravest issues. After that time, this Government received the most explicit assurances from your

Drafted by:

White House

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

S/S - Mr. Johnson

Clearances:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

DS-322

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Government and its representatives, both publicly and privately, that no offensive weapons were being sent to Cuba. If you will review the statement issued by Tass in September, you will ^{see} ~~how~~ clearly this assurance was given.

In reliance on these ~~XXX~~ solemn assurances I urged restraint upon those in this country who were urging action in this matter at that time. And then I learned beyond doubt what you have not denied -- namely, that all these public ~~XXXXXX~~ assurances were false and that your military people had set out recently to establish a set of ~~XXXX~~ missile ~~XX~~ bases in Cuba. I ask you to recognize clearly, Mr. Chairman, that it was not I who issued the first ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ challenge in this case, and that in the light of this record these activities in Cuba required the responses I have announced.

I repeat my regret that these ~~XXXXX~~ events should cause a deterioration ~~x~~ in our relations. I hope that your Government will take the necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN F. KENNEDY UNQUOTE

Please report time delivery.

Note: Relayed: Sec. McNamara-Defense, Chairman JCS, CIA, Treasury and Justice Depts. 10/25/62, per SS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RUSK

SPECIAL HANDLING

163

Signature Record

[illegible]

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S William H. Erubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

**THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO - L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
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THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12572

163a

OCT 23 6 51 PM '62

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW 985 NIACT

Info

EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By

NARS, Date

You should deliver following letter addressed by the President to Chairman Khrushchev immediately. This replaces message contained Deptel 982.

QUOTE

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have received your letter of October twenty-third. I think you will recognize that the steps which started the current chain of events was the action of your Government in secretly furnishing offensive weapons to Cuba. We will be discussing this matter in the Security Council. In the meantime, I am concerned that we both show prudence and do nothing to allow events to make the situation more difficult to control than it already is.

I hope

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

U:GWBall:hc 10/23/62

classification approved by:

George W. Ball

Clearances:

White House - Mr. Bundy

S/S - Mr. Brubeck

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-18-2011
BY 60322

I hope that you will issue immediately the necessary instructions to your ships to observe the terms of the quarantine, the basis of which was established by the vote of the Organization of American States this afternoon, and which will go into effect at 1400 hours Greenwich time October twenty-four.

Sincerely,

JFK

UNQUOTE

RUSK

CONFIDENTIAL

~~EYES ONLY~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

7

163b

October 23, 1962

Under Secretary of State George Ball
requests your clearance be phoned to his office
before 6:00 p.m. this evening on the attached
cable:

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

~~EYES ONLY~~

DRAFTING OFFICE COPY

163c

Authority State la 3/3/77
By mmg, NARS, Date 4/11/77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Amembassy MOSCOW

DIAGNOSIS

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

Following message from President to Chairman Khrushchev should
and delivered only upon receipt further instructions from
be held/~~no further action to be taken in Washington.~~ Washington.

Begin text.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have received your letter of October twenty-third. I think you will recognize that the step which started the current chain of events was the action of your Government in secretly furnishing long-range missiles to Cuba. We will be discussing this matter in the Security Council. In the meantime, I am concerned that we both show prudence and do nothing to allow events to make the situation more difficult to control than it already is. With this in mind, I hope you will issue instructions to your ships bound for Cuba not to challenge the quarantine legally established by the Organization of American States this afternoon.

End Text.

Under
The/Secretary

U:GWBa11:fj 10/23/62

Wifexhouse

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

O 250220Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO WHITE HOUSE

STATE

~~SECRET~~

164

RECEIVED BY: 32

DATE & TIME RECEIVED 27

ATTN: SECRETARY ID:

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

1070 CC

EYES

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State 3/3/77

By

rmg

NARS, Date

4/11/77

POLICY

FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY'S TRANSLATION LETTER FROM KHRUSHCHEV
TO PRESIDENT RECEIVED BY MESSENGER FROM FOREIGN OFFICE AT
11:30 P. M. MOSCOW TIME.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR MR PRESIDENT:

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 23, FAMILIARIZED MYSELF
WITH IT AND AM ANSWERING YOU.

IMAGINE, MR PRESIDENT, THAT WE HAD POSED TO YOU THOSE ULTIMATIVE
CONDITIONS WHICH YOU HAVE POSED TO US BY YOUR ACTION. HOW

WE HAVE
BEEN INDIGNANT AT

I THINK THAT YOU WOULD HAVE
OUR PART.

BE

OLD HAVE

22 43

RECEIVED

HAVING POSED THE QUESTION TO US, YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, CHALLENGED US. YOU TO DO THIS? BY WHAT AUTHORITY HAVE YOU DONE THIS? OUR RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, LIKE OUR RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES, REGARDLESS OF WHAT SORT OF STATE IT MAY BE, CONCERN ONLY THE TWO COUNTRIES BETWEEN WHICH THOSE RELATIONS EXIST, AND IF ONE IS REALLY GOING TO TALK ABOUT A QUARANTINE, REFERRED TO IN YOUR LETTER, IT CAN BE ESTABLISHED, ACCORDING TO ACCEPTED INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE, ONLY BY THE AGREEMENT OF STATES BETWEEN THEMSELVES, AND NOT BY ANY SORT OF THIRD PARTY, THERE EXIST, FOR EXAMPLE, QUARANTINES ON AGRICULTURAL GOODS AND PRODUCTS. BUT IN THE CASE AT HAND, THE QUESTION IS IN NO WAY ONE OF QUARANTINE, BUT RATHER OF FAR MORE SERIOUS THINGS, AND YOU YOURSELF FIRST AND FOREMOST

YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, ARE NOT DECLARING QUARANTINE, YOU ARE ISSUING AN ULTIMATUM AND THREATENING ME. UNLESS WE SUBORDINATE OURSELVES TO YOUR DEMANDS, YOU WILL USE FORCE. CONSIDER WHAT YOU ARE SAYING! YOU WISH TO CONVINCE ME TO AGREE TO THIS? WHAT DOES AGREEMENT WITH SUCH DEMANDS MEAN? THIS WOULD MEAN TO GUIDE ONESELF IN ONE'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES NOT BY REASON BUT BY FORCE. IT IS NO LONGER APPEALING TO REASON. IT IS IMITATING FORCE. AND, MR. PRESIDENT, I AM SURE THAT IN YOUR HEART YOU KNOW THIS IS NOT THE CORRECT WAY. THAT IN MY PLACE YOU WOULD ACT THE SAME WAY.

REFERENCE TO THE DECISION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
CANNOT IN ANY WAY SUBSTANTIATE THE DEMANDS NOW ADVANCED BY THE
UNITED STATES. THIS ORGANIZATION HAS ABSOLUTELY NO AUTHORITY OR BASIS TO

MAKE DECISIONS LIKE THAT OF WHICH YOU SPEAK IN YOUR LETTER.

(COMMISSION)

WE DO NOT RECOGNIZE THESE DECISIONS. INTERNATIONAL
LAW EXISTS, GENERALLY RECOGNIZED NORMS OF CONDUCT EXIST.
WE FIRMLY SUPPORT THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, STRICTLY
OBSERVE THE NORMS REGULATING NAVIGATION ON THE HIGH SEAS AND
IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. WE OBSERVE THESE NORMS AND ENJOY
THE RIGHTS RECOGNIZED BY ALL STATES

IN TO C RENOUVATH

IGN TS, YOU ARE ATTEMPT

QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, YOU ARE TRAMPLING

GENERALLY ACCEPTED NORMS OF THIS LAW. AND ALL THIS NOT ONLY

OUT OF HATRED FOR THE CUBAN PEOPLE

(COMMISSION)

T ALSO

AS A RESULT OF CONSIDERATIONS OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN THE
USA. WHAT MORALITY, WHAT LAW CAN JUSTIFY SUCH AN APPROACH

BY THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS? HDV
CANNOT FIND SUCH A MORALITY AND SUCH A LAW, BECAUSE THE ACTIONS
OF THE USA WITH REGARD TO CUBA ARE OUTRIGHT BANDITRY, OWN
-IF YOU LIKE, THE FOLLY OF DEGENERATE IMPERIALISM. UNFORTUNATELY,
THE PEOPLES OF ALL COUNTRIES, AND IN LEAST OF ALL THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE CAN SUFFER GRAVELY FROM SUCH FOLLY, SINCE THE URY
HAS FULLY LOST ITS FORMER INACCESSABILITY WITH THE ADVENT

OF C 30

13.

CONSEQUENTLY, MR. PRESIDENT, IF YOU COOLY WEIGH THE SITUATION WHICH HAS DEVELOPED, NOT GIVING WAY TO PASSIONS, THEN YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT FAIL TO REJECT THE ARBITRARY DEMANDS OF THE USA. WHEN YOU CONFRONT US WITH SUCH CONDITIONS, TRY TO PUT YOURSELF IN OUR SITUATION AND THINK HOW THE USA WOULD REACT TO THESE CONDITIONS. I DO NOT DOUBT THAT IF SOMEONE HAD ATTEMPTED TO DICTATE CONDITIONS OF THIS SORT TO YOU, THE USA, YOU WOULD HAVE REJECTED SUCH AN ATTEMPT. GK! TPX ALSO SAY -- NO.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND INTERNATIONAL AIR SPACE IS AN ACT OF AGGRESSION, PUSHING MANKIND TOWARDS THE ABYSS OF A WORLD MISSILE-NUCLEAR WAR. CONSEQUENTLY, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CANNOT GIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CAPTAINS OF SOVIET VESSELS BOUND FOR CUBA TO OBSERVE THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE AMERICAN NAVAL FORCES VIOLATING THAT ISLAND. YOUR INSTRUCTIONS TO SOVIET MARINERS ARE STRICTLY TO OBSERVE THE GENERALLY RECOGNIZED NORMS ON NAVIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND NOT TO RETREAT FROM THEM BY ONE STEP. AND IF THE AMERICAN SIDE VIOLATES THESE RULES, IT MUST REALIZE WHAT SORT OF RESPONSIBILITY IT RESTS IN THAT CASE. OF COURSE, WE SHALL NOT BE SIMPLY OBSERVERS OF PIRATICAL ACTIONS OF AMERICAN SHIPS ON THE HIGH SEAS. WE WILL THEN BE FORCED FOR OUR PART TO TAKE THE MEASURES WHICH WE DEEM NECESSARY AND ADEQUATE IN ORDER TO PROTECT OUR RIGHTS. FOR THIS WE HAVE ALL THAT IS NECESSARY

RESPECTFULLY YOURS

15/N. KHRUSHCHEV
Signed KOHLER

1. U. N.
2. No Surveillance
3. Capital has hostile ships

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FBIS 53

TEXT OF KHRUSHCHEV MESSAGE

MOSCOW DOMESTIC SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 1405 28 OCT 62 L

(TEXT) ESTEEMED MR. PRESIDENT: I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 27, 1962. I EXPRESS MY SATISFACTION AND GRATITUDE FOR THE SENSE OF PROPORTION AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE RESPONSIBILITY BORNE BY YOU AT PRESENT FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WHICH YOU HAVE SHOWN. I VERY WELL UNDERSTAND YOUR ANX ETY AND THE ANXIETY OF THE UNITED STATES PEOPLE IN CONNECTION WITH THE FACT THAT THE WEAPONS WHICH YOU DESCRIBE AS "OFFENSIVE" ARE, IN FACT, GRIM WEAPONS. BOTH YOU AND I UNDERSTAND WHAT KIND OF WEAPON THEY ARE.

IN ORDER TO COMPLETE WITH GREATER SPEED THE LIQUIDATION OF THE CONFLICT DANGEROUS TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE, TO GIVE CONFIDENCE TO ALL PEOPLE LONGING FOR PEACE, AND TO CALM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, WHO, I AM CERTAIN, WANT PEACE AS MUCH AS THE PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, IN ADDITION TO PREVIOUSLY ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS ON THE CESSATION OF FURTHER WORK AT BUILD NG SITES FOR THE WEAPONS, HAS ISSUED A NEW ORDER ON THE DISMANTLING OF THE WEAPONS WHICH YOU DESCRIBE AS "OFFENSIVE," AND THEIR CRATING AND RETURN TO THE SOVIET UNION.

MR. PRESIDENT, I WOULD LIKE TO REPEAT ONCE MORE WHAT I HAD ALREADY WRITTEN TO YOU IN MY PRECEDING LETTERS--THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS PLACED AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC AID, AS WELL AS ARMS, INASMUCH AS CUBA AND THE CUBAN PEOPLE HAVE CONSTANTLY BEEN UNDER THE CONTINUOUS DANGER OF AN INVASION.

THE SHELLING OF HAVANA TOOK PLACE FROM A PIRATIC SHIP. IT S SAID THAT IRRESPONSIBLE CUBAN EMIGRES DID THE SHOOTING. THIS IS POSSIBLY THE CASE. HOWEVER, THE QUESTION ARISES: FROM WHERE DID THEY FIRE? AFTER ALL, THEY, THESE CUBANS, HAVE NO TERRITORY, THEY HAVE NO PRIVATE MEANS, AND THEY HAVE NO MEANS TO WAGE MILITARY ACTION. THUS SOMEBODY PUT THE ARMS NEEDED TO SHELL HAVANA AND CARRY OUT THEIR PIRATIC ACTIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN--IN CUBAN TERRITORIAL WATERS--IN THEIR HANDS!

IT IS UNTHINKABLE IN OUR TIME NOT TO NOTICE A PIRATE SHIP, PARTICULARLY IF ONE TAKES INTO ACCOUNT SUCH A SATURATION OF AMERICAN SHIPS IN THE CARIBBEAN FROM WHICH ACTUALLY ALL THIS IS WATCHED AND OBSERVED. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, PIRATIC SHIPS ARE FREELY MOVING AROUND CUBA, SHELLING CUBA, AND CARRYING OUT PIRATIC ATTACKS UPON PEACEFUL TRANSPORT VESSELS! IT IS, AFTER ALL, KNOWN THAT THEY EVEN SHELLLED A BRITISH FREIGHTER!

IN SHORT, CUBA HAS BEEN UNDER THE CONSTANT THREAT OF AGGRESSIVE FORCES WHICH DID NOT CONCEAL THEIR INTENTIONS TO INVADE CUBAN TERRITORY.

THE CUBAN PEOPLE WANT TO BUILD THEIR LIFE IN THEIR OWN INTERE T WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM WITHOUT. YOU ARE RIGHT IN THIS, AND ONE CAN NOT BLAME THEM BECAUSE THEY WANT TO BE MASTERS OF THEIR OWN COUNTRY AND DISPOSE OF THE FRUITS OF THEIR LABOR. THE THREAT OF CUBA'S INVASION AND ALL THE OTHER VENTURES AIMED AT BRINGING ABOUT TENSION AROUND CUBA ARE DESIGNED TO ENGENDER UNCERTAINTY IN THE CUBAN PEOPLE, INTIMIDATE THEM, AND HINDER THEM IN BUILDING THEIR NEW LIFE UNDISTURBED.

MR. PRESIDENT, I WANT TO SAY CLEARLY AGAIN THAT WE COULD NOT BE INDIFFERENT TO THIS. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DECIDED TO HELP CUBA WITH MEANS OF DEFENSE AGAINST AGGRESSION--AND ONLY WITH MEAN FOR PURPOSES OF DEFENSE.

(MORE)

28 OCT 1962 HML/HM

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

FIRST ADD 53 (KHRUSHCHEV TEXT)

X X X PURPOSES OF DEFENSE

(CONTINUING TEXT) WE STATIONED DEFENSE MEANS THERE WHICH YOU CALL OFFENSIVE. WE STATIONED THEM THERE IN ORDER THAT NO ATTACK SHOULD BE MADE AGAINST CUBA AND THAT NO RASH ACTION SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO TAKE PLACE.

I REGARD WITH RESPECT AND TRUST YOUR STATEMENT IN YOUR MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 27, 1962 THAT NO ATTACK WILL BE MADE ON CUBA--THAT NO INVASION WILL TAKE PLACE--NOT ONLY BY THE UNITED STATES, BUT ALSO BY OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, AS YOUR MESSAGE POINTED OUT. THEN THE MOTIVES WHICH PROMOTED US TO GIVE AID OF THIS NATURE TO CUBA CEASE. THEY ARE NO LONGER APPLICABLE. HENCE WE HAVE INSTRUCTED OUR OFFICERS--AND THESE MEANS, AS I HAVE ALREADY STATED, ARE IN THE HANDS OF SOVIET OFFICERS--TO TAKE NECESSARY MEASURES FOR STOPPING THE BUILDING OF THE SAID PROJECTS AND THEIR DISMANTLING AND RETURN TO THE SOVIET UNION.

AS I ALREADY TOLD YOU IN MY LETTER OF OCTOBER 27, WE BOTH AGREE TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT THAT UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVES COULD VERIFY THE DISMANTLING OF THESE MEANS.

IN THIS WAY, IF ONE IS TO RELY ON YOUR ASSURANCES WHICH YOU HAVE MADE AND ON OUR ORDERS TO DISMANTLE, THEN ALL NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR LIQUIDATION OF THE CONFLICT WHICH HAS ARISEN APPEAR TO EXIST.

I NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THAT YOU HAVE RESPONDED TO MY WISH THAT THE SAID DANGEROUS SITUATION SHOULD BE LIQUIDATED AND ALSO THAT CONDITIONS SHOULD BE CREATED FOR A MORE THOUGHTFUL APPRAISAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION WHICH IS FRAUGHT WITH GREAT DANGERS IN OUR AGE OF THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS, ROCKET TECHNOLOGY, SPACESHIPS, GLOBAL ROCKETS, AND OTHER LETHAL WEAPONS. ALL PEOPLE ARE INTERESTED IN INSURING PEACE. THEREFORE, WE WHO ARE INVESTED WITH TRUST AND GREAT RESPONSIBILITY MUST NOT PERMIT AN EXACERBATION OF THE SITUATION AND MUST LIQUIDATE THE BREEDING GROUNDS WHERE A DANGEROUS SITUATION HAS BEEN CREATED FRAUGHT WITH SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE. IF WE SUCCEED ALONG WITH YOU AND WITH THE AID OF OTHER PEOPLE OF GOOD WILL IN LIQUIDATING THIS TENSE SITUATION, WE MUST ALSO CONCERN OURSELVES TO SEE THAT OTHER DANGEROUS CONFLICTS DO NOT ARISE WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO A WORLD THERMONUCLEAR CATASTROPHE.

IN CONCLUSION, I WISH TO SPEAK OF THE REGULATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN NATO AND STATES OF THE WARSAW TREATY, WHICH YOU MENTION. WE HAVE LONG AGO SPOKEN OF THIS AND ARE READY TO CONTINUE AN EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS WITH YOU ON THIS QUESTION AND FIND A REASONABLE SOLUTION. I ALSO WISH TO CONTINUE AN EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS ON THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC AND THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS, GENERAL DISARMAMENT, AND OTHER QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE LESSENING OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION.

MR. PRESIDENT, I TRUST YOUR STATEMENT. HOWEVER, ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE ARE RESPONSIBLE PEOPLE WHO WOULD LIKE TO CARRY OUT AN INVASION OF CUBA AT THIS TIME, AND IN SUCH A WAY TO SPARK OFF A WAR. IF WE TAKE PRACTICAL STEPS AND ANNOUNCE THE DISMANTLING AND EVACUATION OF THE APPROPRIATE MEANS FROM CUBA, THEN, DOING THAT, WE WISH TO ESTABLISH AT THE SAME TIME THE CONFIDENCE OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE THAT WE ARE WITH THEM AND ARE NOT DIVESTING OURSELVES OF THE RESPONSIBILITY OF GRANTING HELP TO THEM.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PEOPLE OF ALL COUNTRIES, LIKE YOURSELF, MR. PRESIDENT, WILL UNDERSTAND ME CORRECTLY. WE DO NOT ISSUE THREATS. WE DESIRE ONLY PEACE. OUR COUNTRY IS NOW ON THE UPSURGE. OUR PEOPLE ARE ENJOYING THE FRUITS OF THEIR PEACEFUL LABOR. THEY HAVE ACHIEVED TREMENDOUS SUCCESSES SINCE THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND CREATED SUPREME MATERIAL AND SPIRITUAL-CULTURAL TREASURES. OUR COUNTRY IS MAKING USE OF THESE TREASURES AND WANTS TO DEVELOP ITS SUCCESSES FURTHER AND INSURE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT ON THE ROAD OF PEACE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS BY ITS STEADFAST LABOR.

(MORE)

FBIS 55

SECOND AND LAST ADD 53 (KHRUSHCHEV TEXT)

X X X ITS STEADFAST LABOR

(CONCLUDING TEXT) I SHOULD LIKE, MR. PRESIDENT, TO REMIND YOU THAT MILITARY AIRCRAFT OF A RECONNAISSANCE CHARACTER HAVE VIOLATED THE FRONTIER OF THE SOVIET UNION IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH WE HAD CONFLICTS WITH YOU. AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES TOOK PLACE.

IN 1960, WE SHOT DOWN YOUR U-2 AIRCRAFT, THE RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHT OF WHICH OVER THE USSR LED TO THE WRECKING OF THE MEETING OF THE POWERS IN PARIS. YOU THEN TOOK A CORRECT POSITION IN CONDEMNING THAT CRIMINAL ACTION BY THE FORMER UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, DURING THE PERIOD OF YOUR TENURE OF OFFICE AS PRESIDENT, A SECOND INSTANCE OF THE VIOLATION OF OUR FRONTIER BY AN AMERICAN U-2 AIRCRAFT TOOK PLACE IN THE SAKHALIN AREA. WE WROTE YOU ABOUT THIS VIOLATION ON AUGUST 30. YOU REPLIED THAT THIS VIOLATION HAD TAKEN PLACE AS THE RESULT OF BAD WEATHER AND GAVE AN ASSURANCE THAT IT WOULD NOT BE REPEATED. WE GAVE CREDENCE TO YOUR ASSURANCE BECAUSE THERE WAS INDEED BAD WEATHER IN THAT AREA AT THAT TIME. HOWEVER, IF YOUR AIRCRAFT DID NOT HAVE THE TASK OF FLYING NEAR OUR TERRITORY, THEN EVEN BAD WEATHER COULD NOT CAUSE AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT TO ENTER OUR AIRSPACE.

THE CONCLUSION FOLLOWS FROM THIS THAT IT IS DONE WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE PENTAGON, WHICH TRAMPLES ON INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES AND VIOLATES THE FRONTIERS OF OTHER STATES.

AN EVEN MORE DANGEROUS CASE OCCURRED ON OCTOBER 28 WHEN YOUR RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT INTRUDED INTO THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE NORTH, IN THE AREA OF THE CHUKOTKA PENINSULA, AND FLEW OVER OUR TERRITORY.

ONE ASKS, MR. PRESIDENT, HOW SHOULD WE REGARD THIS? WHAT IS IT? A PROVOCATION? YOUR AIRCRAFT VIOLATES OUR FRONTIER AND AT TIMES AS ANXIOUS AS THOSE WHICH WE ARE NOW EXPERIENCING WHEN EVERYTHING HAS BEEN PLACED IN A STATE OF COMBAT READINESS. FOR AN INTRUDING AMERICAN AIRCRAFT CAN EASILY BE TAKEN FOR A BOMBER WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THIS COULD PUSH US TOWARD A FATAL STEP--ALL THE MORE SO BECAUSE BOTH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND PENTAGON HAVE LONG BEEN SAYING THAT BOMBERS WITH ATOMIC BOMBS ARE CONSTANTLY ON DUTY IN YOUR COUNTRY.

THEFORE, YOU CAN IMAGINE WHAT KIND OF RESPONSIBILITY YOU ASSUME, ESPECIALLY NOW DURING THE ANXIOUS TIMES WE ARE NOW EXPERIENCING.

I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU TO ASSESS THIS CORRECTLY AND TAKE STEPS ACCORDINGLY IN ORDER THAT IT WOULD NOT SERVE AS A PROVOCAT ON FOR UNLEASHING WAR.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO EXPRESS THE FOLLOWING WISH. OF COURSE, IT IS A MATTER FOR THE CUBAN PEOPLE. YOU DO NOT AT PRESENT MAINTAIN ANY DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BUT THROUGH MY OFFICERS ON CUBA I HAVE REPORTS THAT FLIGHTS OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT OVER CUBA ARE BEING CARRIED OUT. WE ARE INTERESTED THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE ANY WAR AT ALL IN THE WORLD, AND THAT THE CUBAN PEOPLE SHOULD LIVE QUIETLY. HOWEVER, MR. PRESIDENT, IT IS NO SECRET THAT WE HAVE OUR PEOPLE ON CUBA. ACCORDING TO THE TREATY WITH THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT, WE HAVE OFFICERS AND INSTRUCTORS THERE WHO ARE TRAINING THE CUBANS. THEY ARE MAINLY ORDINARY PEOPLE--EXPERTS, AGRONOMISTS, ZOOTECHNICIANS, IRRIGATION AND SOIL IMPROVEMENT EXPERTS, ORDINARY WORKERS, TRACTOR DRIVERS, AND OTHERS. WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THEM.

I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, TO BEAR IN MIND THAT A VIOLATION OF CUBAN AIRSPACE BY AMERICAN AIRCRAFT MAY ALSO HAVE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES. IF YOU DO NOT WANT THIS, THEN NO PRETEXT SHOULD BE GIVEN FOR THE CREATION OF A DANGEROUS SITUATION.

WE MUST BE NOW VERY CAUTIOUS AND NOT TAKE SUCH STEPS WHICH W LL BE OF NO USE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT, BUT WHICH ARE LIKELY TO AROUSE ONLY IRRITATION AND EVEN PROVE A PROVOCATION LEADING TO THE BANEFUL STEP. WE MUST, THEREFORE, DISPLAY SOBRIETY AND WISDOM AND REFRAIN FROM STEPS OF THIS SORT.

WE VALUE PEACE, PERHAPS EVEN MORE THAN OTHER PEOPLE, BECAUSE WE EXPERIENCED THE TERRIBLE WAR AGAINST HITLER. HOWEVER, OUR PEOPLE WILL NOT FLINCH IN THE FACE OF ANY ORDEAL. OUR PEOPLE TRUST THEIR GOVERNMENT, AND WE ASSURE OUR PEOPLE AND THE WORLD PUBLIC THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WILL NOT ALLOW ITSELF TO BE PROVOKED.

SHOULD THE PROVOCATEURS UNLEASH A WAR, THEY WOULD NOT ESCAPE THE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A WAR. HOWEVER, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT REASON WILL TRIUMPH. WAR WILL NOT BE UNLEASHED AND THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF PEOPLE WILL BE INSURED!

IN CONNECTION WITH NEGOTIATIONS IN PROGRESS BETWEEN U.N. ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE CUBAN REPUBLIC, THE SOV ET GOVERNMENT HAS SENT TO NEW YORK USSR FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS KUZNETSOV WITH A VIEW TO ASSISTING U THANT IN HIS NOBLE EFFORTS AIMED AT LIQUIDATION OF THE PRESENT DANGEROUS SITUATION.

WITH RESPECT FOR YOU, KHRUSHCHEV. OCTOBER 23, 1962.

(ENDALL)

28 OCT 1962 HML/HM

October 27, 1962

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Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

TEXT OF A LETTER BY THE PRESIDENT
ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
PRESIDIUM OF THE USSR SUPREME
SOVIET, NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV

October 27, 1962

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have read your letter of October 26th with great care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements.

Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my representatives in New York instructions that will permit them to work out this weekend -- in cooperation with the Acting Secretary General and your representative -- an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem along the lines suggested in your letter of October 26th. As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals -- which seem generally acceptable as I understand them -- are as follows:

- 1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.
- 2) We, on our part, would agree -- upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments -- (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

If you will give your representative similar instructions, there is no reason why we should not be able to complete these arrangements and announce them to the world within a couple of days. The effect of such a settlement or easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding "other armaments", as proposed in your second letter which you made public. I would like to say again that the United States is very much interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms race; and if your letter signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals.

But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective international guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security, would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world. For this reason I hope we can quickly agree along the lines outlined in this letter and in your letter of October 26th.

(s) John F. Kennedy

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TEXT OF KHRUSHCHEV MESSAGE TO KENNEDY

MOSCOW DOMESTIC SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 1400 27 OCT 62 L

(TEXT) ESTEEMED MR. PRESIDENT: I HAVE ACQUAINTED MYSELF WITH MUCH SATISFACTION WITH YOUR REPLY TO U THANT TO THE EFFECT THAT STEPS WILL BE TAKEN TO EXCLUDE CONTACT BETWEEN OUR SHIPS AND THUS AVOID IRREMEDABLE FATEFUL CONSEQUENCES. THIS REASONABLE STEP ON YOUR PART STRENGTHENS MY (BELIEF) THAT YOU ARE SHOWING CONCERN TO SAFEGUARD PEACE, AND I NOTE THIS WITH SATISFACTION.

I HAVE ALREADY SAID THAT OUR PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT AND I PERSONALLY, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, ARE CONCERNED SOLELY THAT OUR COUNTRIES SHOULD DEVELOP AND OCCUPY A WORTHY PLACE AMONG PEOPLE OF THE WORLD IN ECONOMIC COMPETITION, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURE AND ARTS, AND THE RAISING OF THE WELL-BEING OF PEOPLE. THIS IS THE MOST NOBLE AND NECESSARY FIELD FOR COMPETITION, AND VICTORS AND VANQUISHED WILL ONLY (WORD INDISTINCT) FROM IT, BECAUSE THIS MEANS PEACE AND INCREASED COMMODITIES FOR THE LIFE AND ENJOYMENT OF MAN.

IN YOUR STATEMENT, YOU SUPPORTED THE OPINION THAT THE MAIN AIM WAS NOT ONLY TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT AND TAKE MEASURES TO PREVENT CONTACT BETWEEN OUR SHIPS--AND THEREFORE THE DEEPENING OF THE CRISIS WHICH MAY AS A RESULT OF SUCH A CONTACT STRIKE THE FIRE OF A MILITARY CONFLICT AFTER WHICH ALL TALKS WOULD BE SUPERFLUOUS, BECAUSE OTHER FORCES AND LAWS WOULD COME INTO FORCE--THE LAWS OF WAR. I AGREE WITH YOU THAT THIS IS ONLY THE FIRST STEP. THE MAIN THING THAT MUST BE DONE IS TO NORMALIZE AND STABILIZE THE STATE OF PEACE AMONG STATES AND PEOPLE.

I UNDERSTAND YOUR CONCERN FOR THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES, MR. PRESIDENT, BECAUSE THIS IS THE FIRST DUTY OF A PRESIDENT. HOWEVER, WE ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE SAME QUESTIONS, AND I BEAR THE SAME OBLIGATIONS AS CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

YOU HAVE BEEN WORRIED CONCERNING THE FACT THAT WE HAVE HELPED CUBA WITH WEAPONS WITH THE AIM OF STRENGTHENING ITS DEFENSIVE CAPACITY--YES, PRECISELY ITS "DEFENSIVE CAPACITY"--BECAUSE NO MATTER WHAT WEAPONS IT POSSESSES, CUBA CANNOT EQUAL YOU. THESE ARE DIFFERENT QUANTITIES, ALL THE MORE SO IF ONE TAKES INTO CONSIDERATION THE MODERN MEANS OF EXTERMINATION.

OUR AIM HAS BEEN AND STILL IS TO HELP CUBA. AND NO ONE CAN DENY THE HUMANENESS OF OUR MOTIVES, WHICH ARE TO ENABLE CUBA TO LIVE IN PEACE AND DEVELOP IN THE WAY ITS PEOPLE DESIRE.

(MORE)

27 OCT 1103A MLH/HM

FIRST ADD 49 (TEXT KHRUSHCHEV MESSAGE TO KENNEDY)

X X X ITS PEOPLE DESIRE

(CONTINUING TEXT) YOU WANT TO MAKE YOUR COUNTRY SAFE. THIS IS UNDERSTANDABLE, BUT CUBA, TOO, WANTS THE SAME THING. ALL COUNTRIES WANT TO MAKE THEMSELVES SAFE.

BUT HOW ARE WE, THE SOVIET UNION AND OUR GOVERNMENT, TO ASSESS YOUR ACTIONS WHICH ARE EXPRESSED IN THE FACT THAT YOU HAVE SURROUNDED THE SOVIET UNION WITH MILITARY BASES, SURROUNDED OUR ALLIES WITH MILITARY BASES, LITERALLY DISPOSED MILITARY BASES AROUND OUR COUNTRY, AND STATIONED YOUR ROCKET ARMAMENTS THERE? THIS IS NOT A SECRET. AMERICAN OFFICIALS ARE DEMONSTRATIVELY SAYING THIS. YOUR ROCKETS ARE SITUATED IN BRITAIN AND ITALY AND AIMED AGAINST US. YOUR ROCKETS ARE SITUATED IN TURKEY.

YOU ARE WORRIED BY CUBA. YOU SAY THAT IT WORRIES YOU BECAUSE IT IS A DISTANCE OF 90 MILES BY SEA FROM THE AMERICAN COAST. HOWEVER, TURKEY IS NEXT TO US. YOUR SENTRIES WALK UP AND DOWN AND LOOK AT EACH OTHER. WHAT DO YOU CONSIDER THEN--THAT YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEMAND SECURITY FOR YOUR OWN COUNTRY AND THE REMOVAL OF THOSE WEAPONS WHICH YOU CALL OFFENSIVE AND DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE SAME RIGHT FOR US?

YOU HAVE PLACED DESTRUCTIVE ROCKET WEAPONS, WHICH YOU CALL OFFENSIVE, IN TURKEY, LITERALLY AT OUR ELBOW. NOW THEN DOES ADMISSION OF OUR EQUAL MILITARY CAPACITIES TALLY WITH SUCH UNEQUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR GREAT STATES? THIS CANNOT BE MADE TO AGREE IN ANY WAY.

IT IS WELL, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT YOU HAVE AGREED TO OUR REPRESENTATIVES MEETING AND BEGINNING TALKS, APPARENTLY THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF U.N. ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT. HENCE HE, TO SOME DEGREE, ASSUMES THE ROLE OF A MEDIATOR, AND WE CONSIDER THAT HE IS ABLE TO COPE WITH THIS RESPONSIBLE MISSION IF, OF COURSE, EACH SIDE WHICH IS DRAWN INTO THIS CONFLICT SHOWS GOOD WILL. I THINK THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO END THE CONFLICT QUICKLY AND NORMALIZE THE SITUATION, AND THEN PEOPLE WOULD BREATHE MORE EASILY, CONSIDERING THAT THE STATESMEN WHO ARE VESTED WITH RESPONSIBILITY, HAVE GOOD SENSE, AN AWARENESS OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE ABILITY TO SOLVE COMPLEX QUESTIONS AND NOT BRING THINGS TO THE CATASTROPHE OF WAR.

I THEREFORE MAKE THIS PROPOSAL. WE AGREE TO REMOVE FROM CUBA THOSE MEANS WHICH YOU REGARD AS OFFENSIVE MEANS. WE AGREE TO CARRY THIS OUT AND DECLARE THIS PLEDGE IN THE UNITED NATIONS. YOUR REPRESENTATIVES WILL MAKE A DECLARATION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE UNITED STATES ON ITS PART, CONSIDERING THE UNEASINESS AND ANXIETY OF THE SOVIET STATE, WILL REMOVE ITS ANALOGOUS MEANS FROM TURKEY.

LET US REACH AGREEMENT AS TO THE SPAN OF TIME NEEDED FOR YOUR AND US TO ACHIEVE THIS. AFTER THIS, PERSONS ENJOYING THE CONFIDENCE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT CHECK ON-THE-SPOT FULFILLMENT OF THE PLEDGES ASSUMED. OF COURSE, THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF CUBA AND TURKEY ARE NECESSARY FOR ENTRY INTO THOSE COUNTRIES OF THESE PLENIPOTENTIARIES AND FOR INSPECTION OF FULFILLMENT OF THE PLEDGE ASSUMED BY EITHER SIDE.

IT WOULD EVIDENTLY BE BETTER IF THESE PLENIPOTENTIARIES WOULD HAVE THE TRUST OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND YOUR TRUST AND MINE--OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION--AS WELL AS OF TURKEY AND CUBA. I THINK IT WILL NOT BE DIFFICULT TO PICK SUCH PEOPLE WHO WOULD ENJOY THE TRUST AND RESPECT OF ALL PARTIES CONCERNED.

(MORE)

27 OCT 1119A 4LN/HM

SECOND AND LAST ADD 49 (TEXT OF KHRUSHCHEV MESSAGE TO KENNEDY)

X X X ALL PARTIES CONCERNED.

(CONCLUDING TEXT) HAVING TAKEN UPON OURSELVES A PLEDGE TO GIVE SATISFACTION TO THE HOPES OF THE PEOPLES OF CUBA AND TURKEY AND STRENGTHEN THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THEIR SECURITY, WE WILL MAKE A STATEMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT MAKES A SOLEMN PROMISE TO RESPECT THE INVIOABILITY OF THE FRONTIERS AND SOVEREIGNTY OF TURKEY, NOT TO INTERFERE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS, NOT TO INVADE TURKEY, NOT TO MAKE ITS TERRITORY AVAILABLE AS A BRIDGEHEAD FOR SUCH AN INVASION, AND WILL ALSO RESTRAIN THOSE WHO CONTEMPLATE PERPETRATING AGGRESSION AGAINST TURKEY BOTH FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND FROM THE TERRITORY OF OTHER NEIGHBOR STATES OF TURKEY.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE A SIMILAR STATEMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN RESPECT TO CUBA. IT WILL DECLARE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL RESPECT THE INVIOABILITY OF THE FRONTIERS OF CUBA AND ITS SOVEREIGNTY, UNDERTAKES NOT TO INTERFERE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS, NOT TO INVADE, AND NOT TO MAKE ITS TERRITORY AVAILABLE AS A BRIDGEHEAD FOR SUCH AN INVASION OF CUBA, AND WILL ALSO RESTRAIN THOSE WHO MIGHT CONTEMPLATE PERPETRATING AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA, BOTH FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES AND FROM THE TERRITORY OF OTHER NEIGHBORING STATES OF CUBA.

OF COURSE, FOR THIS WE WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO SOME KIND OF TIME LIMIT. LET US AGREE TO SOME PERIOD OF TIME, BUT NOT TO DELAY--TWO OR THREE WEEKS; NOT MORE THAN A MONTH.

THE MEANS SITUATED IN CUBA WHICH YOU HAVE STATED ARE PERTURBING YOU ARE IN THE HANDS OF SOVIET OFFICERS. THEREFORE, ANY ACCIDENTAL USE OF THEM TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS EXCLUDED. THESE MEANS ARE SITUATED IN CUBA AT THE REQUEST OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT AND ARE ONLY FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES. THEREFORE IF THERE IS NO INVASION OF CUBA OR ATTACK ON THE SOVIET UNION OR ANY OTHER OF OUR ALLIES, THEN OF COURSE THESE MEANS ARE NOT AND WILL NOT BE A THREAT TO ANYONE, FOR THEY ARE NOT THERE FOR THE PURPOSES OF ATTACK.

IF YOU ARE AGREEABLE, MR. PRESIDENT, TO MY PROPOSAL, THEN WE WOULD SEND OUR REPRESENTATIVES TO NEW YORK, TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AND WOULD GIVE THEM EXHAUSTIVE INSTRUCTIONS IN ORDER TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT QUICKLY. IF YOU ALSO CHOOSE YOUR MEN AND GIVE THEM THE CORRESPONDING INSTRUCTIONS, THEN THIS QUESTION CAN BE SOLVED QUICKLY.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

WHY SHOULD I WANT THIS? BECAUSE THE WHOLE WORLD IS NOW PERTURBED AND EXPECTS SENSIBLE ACTION FROM US.

THE GREATEST JOY FOR ALL PEOPLES WOULD BE ANNOUNCEMENT OF OUR AGREEMENT ON THE RADICAL LIQUIDATION OF THE CONFLICT THAT HAS ARISEN. I ASCRIBE GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS AGREEMENT INSOFAR AS IT COULD SERVE AS A GOOD BEGINNING AND WOULD, IN PARTICULAR, MAKE IT EASIER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON BANNING OF TESTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE QUESTION OF TESTS COULD BE SOLVED IN PARALLEL, WITHOUT CONNECTION ONE WITH THE OTHER, BECAUSE THEY ARE DIFFERENT ISSUES.

HOWEVER, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT AGREEMENT BE REACHED ON BOTH THESE ISSUES TO PRESENT THE PEOPLE A GOOD GIFT, TO PLEASE THEM ALSO WITH THE NEWS THAT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON THE DISCONTINUATION OF NUCLEAR TESTS AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY THE ATMOSPHERE WILL NO LONGER BE POLLUTED. OUR AND YOUR POSITIONS ON THIS ISSUE ARE VERY CLOSE.

ALL THIS COULD POSSIBLY SERVE AS A GOOD IMPETUS TOWARD SEEKING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS ALSO ON OTHER CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES ON WHICH WE ARE EXCHANGING VIEWS. THESE ISSUES HAVE NOT SO FAR BEEN SOLVED, BUT THEY ARE AWAITING URGENT SOLUTION WHICH WOULD CLEAR THE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE. WE ARE READY FOR THIS.

THESE, THEN, ARE MY PROPOSALS, MR. PRESIDENT.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS, KHRUSHCHEV.

TO ACTING U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT:

TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR YOU TO CARRY OUT YOUR MISSION REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE INTERESTED COUNTRIES ON ELIMINATION OF THE DANGEROUS SITUATION CREATED BY THE PIRATICAL ACTIONS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT VIS-A-VIS CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS COME OUT WITH PROPOSALS WHICH IN OUR OPINION CAN BECOME THE BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT WHICH HAS ARISEN. THESE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN SENT TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND A COPY OF THEM IS ATTACHED FOR YOU.

RESPECTFULLY, KHRUSHCHEV.

(E N D A L L)

27 OCT 1143A MLH/RRR

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

Control (8867)

168

Moscow

1077, October 25, 2 P. M.

WLACT.

EYES ONLY.

Department telegram 997.

Copy of letter delivered to MFA at 1:30 P.M. Moscow time today under cover of letter to Gromyko (MFA having been advised to expect and expedite important communication.)

KOHLER

mbk

Note: Passed White House, 10/25/67.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

THE "DREAM SUPER-EXPRESS" IS...
CENTRAL TOKYO TO CENTRAL OSAKA FASTER THAN
CURRENTLY CONVEY THEM FROM ONE CITY AIR TERMINAL

EMP 11:52A

*Hansen report & Discrepancy
proposed text out of*

(1)

227
R68

STATEMENT--TEXT

MOSCOW, OCT. 27-(REUTERS)-FOLLOWING IS THE FULL TEXT OF SOVIET
PREMIER NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY:

ESTEEMED MR. PRESIDENT,

I HAVE LEARNED WITH GREAT PLEASURE OF YOUR REPLY TO MR. TAVANT
TO THE EFFECT THAT STEPS WILL BE TAKEN TO INCLUDE CONTACT BETWEEN
OUR SHIPS AND THUS AVOID IRREDEMIABLE FATEFUL CONSEQUENCES.

THIS REASONABLE STEP ON YOUR PART STRENGTHENS MY BELIEF THAT YOU
ARE SHOWING CONCERN TO SAFEGUARD PEACE AND I NOTE THIS WITH
SATISFACTION.

I HAVE ALREADY SAID THAT OUR PEOPLE, OUR GOVERNMENT AND I
PERSONALLY, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, ARE CONCERNED
SOLELY THAT OUR COUNTRIES SHOULD DEVELOP AND OCCUPY A WORTHY PLACE
AMONG ALL PEOPLES OF THE WORLD IN ECONOMIC COMPETITION, IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURE AND THE ARTS, IN RAISING THE WELL-
BEING OF THE PEOPLE.

THIS IS THE MOST NOBLE AND NECESSARY FIELD FOR COMPETITION AND
VICTORS AS WELL AS VANQUISHED WILL ONLY GAIN FROM IT BECAUSE IT
MEANS PEACE AND INCREASED COMMODITIES FOR THE LIFE AND ENJOYMENT
OF MAN.

IN YOUR STATEMENT YOU SUPPORTED THE OPINION THAT THE MAIN AIM
WAS NOT ONLY TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT AND TO TAKE MEASURES TO PREVENT
CONTACT BETWEEN OUR SHIPS, AND THEREFORE THE DEEPENING OF
THE CRISIS WHICH MAY AS A RESULT OF SUCH A CONTACT STRIKE THE
FIRE OF A MILITARY CONFLICT, AFTER WHICH ALL TALKS WOULD BE
SUPERFLUOUS, BECAUSE OTHER FORCES AND OTHER LAWS WOULD COME INTO
FORCE, THE LAWS OF WAR.

I AGREE WITH YOU THAT THIS IS ONLY THE FIRST STEP. THE MAIN THING
THAT MUST BE DONE IS TO NORMALIZE AND STABILIZE THE STATE OF
PEACE AMONG STATES, AMONG PEOPLES.

(MORE) EMP

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

ZZZZ

R69

(2)

FIRST ADD MOSCOW STATEMENT--TEXT X X X PEOPLES.

I UNDERSTAND YOUR CONCERN FOR THE SECURITY OF THE US, MR. PRESIDENT, BECAUSE THIS IS THE FIRST DUTY OF A PRESIDENT. BUT WE ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE SAME QUESTIONS: AND I BEAR THE SAME OBLIGATIONS, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR.

YOU HAVE BEEN WORRIED CONCERNING THE FACT THAT WE HAVE HELPED CUBA WITH WEAPONS, WITH THE AIM TO STRENGTHEN ITS DEFENSIVE CAPACITY--YES, PRECISELY ITS "DEFENSIVE CAPACITY," BECAUSE NO MATTER WHAT WEAPONS IT POSSESSES, CUBA CANNOT EQUAL YOU: BECAUSE THESE ARE DIFFERENT QUANTITIES, ALL THE MORE SO IF ONE TAKES INTO CONSIDERATION THE MODERN MEANS OF EXTERMINATION.

OUR AIM HAS BEEN, AND STILL IS, TO HELP CUBA. AND NO ONE CAN DENY THE HUMANENESS OF OUR MOTIVES, WHICH ARE TO ENABLE CUBA TO LIVES IN PEACE AND TO DEVELOP IN THE WAY ITS PEOPLE DESIRES.

YOU WANT TO MAKE YOUR COUNTRY SAFE. THIS IS UNDERSTANDABLE, BUT CUBA TOO WANTS THE SAME THING. ALL COUNTRIES WANT TO MAKE THEMSELVES SAFE.

BUT HOW ARE WE, THE SOVIET UNION, OUR GOVERNMENT, TO ASSESS YOUR ACTIONS WHICH ARE EXPRESSED IN THE FACT THAT YOU HAVE SURROUNDED WITH MILITARY BASES THE SOVIET UNION: SURROUNDED WITH MILITARY BASES OUR ALLIES: HAVE DISPOSED MILITARY BASES LITERALLY ROUND OUR COUNTRY: HAVE STATIONED YOUR ROCKET ARMANENT THERE? THIS IS NO SECRET. AMERICAN OFFICIALS ARE DEMONSTRATIVELY SAYING THIS.

YOUR ROCKETS ARE SITUATED IN BRITAIN. SITUATED IN ITALY, AND ARE AIMED AGAINST US. YOUR ROCKETS ARE SITUATED IN TURKEY.

YOU ARE WORRIED BY CUBA. YOU SAY THAT IT WORRIES YOU BECAUSE IT IS A DISTANCE OF 90 MILES BY SEA FROM THE COAST OF AMERICA. BUT TURKEY IS NEXT TO US. OUR SENTRIES WALK UP AND DOWN AND LOOK AT EACH OTHER.

DO YOU CONSIDER THEN, THAT YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEMAND SECURITY FOR YOUR OWN COUNTRY AND THE REMOVAL OF THOSE WEAPONS WHICH YOU CALL OFFENSIVE AND DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE SAME RIGHT FOR US?

(MORE)

ZZZ
R73

3

THIRD ADD MOSCOW STATEMENT--TEXT (R70) X X X SIDE.

IT WOULD BE BETTER THAT THESE AGENTS SHOULD HAVE THE TRUST OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND YOUR TRUST AND MINE, OF THE U.S.

AND THE SOVIET UNION, AS WELL AS OF TURKEY AND CUBA.

I THINK IT WILL BE NOT DIFFICULT TO PICK PEOPLE WHO WOULD ENJOY THE TRUST AND RESPECT OF ALL PARTIES CONCERNED.

WE, HAVING TAKEN UPON OURSELVES A PLEDGE TO GIVE SATISFACTION TO THE HOPES OF THE PEOPLES OF CUBA AND TURKEY AND STRENGTHEN THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THEIR SECURITY, WILL MAKE A STATEMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT GIVES A SOLEMN PROMISE TO RESPECT THE INVIOABILITY OF THE FRONTIERS AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF TURKEY, NOT TO INTERFERE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS, NOT TO INVAD TURKEY, NOT TO MAKE AVAILABLE ITS TERRITORY AS A BRIDGEHEAD FOR SUCH AN INVASION, AND WILL ALSO RESTRAIN THOSE WHO CONTEMPLATE PERPETRATING AGGRESSION AGAINST TURKEY BOTH FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND FROM THE TERRITORY OF OTHER NEIGHBOING STATES OF TURKEY.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE A SIMILAR STATEMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN RESPECT OF CUBA.

IT WILL DECLARE THAT THE U.S., MOTIVATED BY THE INVIOABILITY OF CUBA'S FRONTIERS AND SOVEREIGNTY, UNDERTAKES NOT TO INTERFERE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS, ITSELF NOT TO INVJE CUBA OR MAKE ITS TERRITORY AVAILABLE AS A BRIDGEHEAD FOR SUCH AN INVASION, AND WILL ALSO RESTRAIN THOSE WHO MIGHT CONTEMPLATE PERPETRATING AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA, BOTH FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE U.S. AND FROM THE TERRITORY OF OTHER NEIGHBORING STATES OF CUBA.

(MORE) EWP 11:21A

ZZZ
R77

FOURTH ADD MOSCOW TEXT (R73) X X X CUBA.

OF COURSE FOR THIS WE WOULD HAVE TO AGREE ON SOME KIND OF TIME LIMIT. LET US AGREE TO SOME PERIOD OF TIME, BUT NOT TO DELAY: TWO OR THREE WEEKS, NOT MORE THAN A MONTH.

THE MEANS SITUATED IN CUBA WHICH YOU SAY AND HAVE STATED ARE PERTURBING YOU, ARE IN THE HANDS OF SOVIET OFFICERS. THEREFORE ANY ACCIDENTAL USE OF THEM TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE U.S. IS EXCLUDED.

THESE MEANS ARE SITUATED IN CUBA AT THE REQUEST OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT AND ONLY FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES. THEREFORE IF THERE IS NO INVASION OF CUBA, OR ATTACK ON THE SOVIET UNION OR ANY OTHER OF OUR ALLIES, THEN OF COURSE THESE MEANS ARE NOT AND WILL NOT BE A THREAT TO ANYONE. FOR THEY ARE NOT FOR THE PURPOSES OF ATTACK.

IF YOU ARE AGREEABLE, MR. PRESIDENT, TO MY PROPOSAL, THEN WE WOULD SEND OUR REPRESENTATIVES TO NEW YORK, TO THE U.N., AND WOULD GIVE THEM EXHAUSTIVE INSTRUCTIONS IN ORDER TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT QUICKLY.

IF YOU ALSO CHOOSE YOUR MEN AND GIVE THEM THE CORRESPONDING INSTRUCTIONS, THEN THIS QUESTION CAN BE SOLVED QUICKLY.

WHY DO I WANT THIS? BECAUSE THE WHOLE WORLD IS NOW PERTURBED AND EXPECTS FROM US SENSIBLE ACTION.

THE GREATEST JOY FOR ALL PEOPLES WOULD BE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF OUR AGREEMENT ON THE RADICAL LIQUIDATION OF THE CONFLICT THAT HAS ARISEN. I ASCRIBE GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS AGREEMENT IN SO FAR AS IT COULD SERVE AS A GOOD BEGINNING AND WOULD IN PARTICULAR MAKE IT EASIER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE BANNING OF THE TESTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THE QUESTION OF THE TESTS COULD BE SOLVED IN PARALLEL WITHOUT CONNECTING ONE WITH THE OTHER BECAUSE THEY ARE DIFFERENT ISSUES.

(MORE) EWP

ZZZ
R78

(T)

IFTH ADD MOSCOW TEXT X X X ISSUES.

HOWEVER, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE REACHED ON BOTH THESE ISSUES SO AS TO GIVE THE PEOPLE A GOOD GIFT, TO PLEASE THEM ALSO WITH THE NEWS THAT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON THE DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR TESTS, AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY THE ATMOSPHERE WILL NO LONGER BE POLLUTED. AND OUR AND YOUR POSITIONS ON THIS ISSUE ARE VERY CLOSE.

ALL THIS COULD POSSIBLY SERVE AS A GOOD IMPETUS TOWARDS THE QUEST FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS ALSO ON OTHER CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES ON WHICH WE ARE EXCHANGING VIEWS. THESE ISSUES HAVE NOT SO FAR BEEN SOLVED, BUT THEY ARE AWAITING THEIR URGENT SOLUTION WHICH WOULD CLEAR UP THE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE. WE ARE READY FOR THIS.

THESE, THEN, ARE MY PROPOSALS, MR. PRESIDENT.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS, KHRUSHCHEV, 27TH OCTOBER, 1962.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

~~SECRET~~

VP

170

32

Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~

Control: 17195

Rec'd: OCTOBER 23, 1962

11:56 AM

015

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1042, OCTOBER 23, 5 PM

NIACT

ELITE

POLICY

EYES ONLY

EMBTel 1041

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State lu 3/3/77

By

rmg

NARS, Date

4/11/77

EMBASSY TRANSLATION FOLLOWS OF KHRUSHCHEV'S LETTER OF OCTOBER 23 TO PRESIDENT. KUZNETSOV INFORMED ME LETTER WOULD NOT BE PUBLISHED "FOR TIME BEING."

BEGIN TEXT. MR. PRESIDENT.

I HAVE JUST RECEIVED YOUR LETTER, AND HAVE ALSO ACQUAINTED MYSELF WITH TEXT OF YOUR SPEECH OF OCTOBER 22 REGARDING CUBA.

I SHOULD SAY FRANKLY THAT MEASURES OUTLINED IN YOUR STATEMENT REPRESENT SERIOUS THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY OF PEOPLES. UNITED STATES HAS OPENLY TAKEN PATH OF GROSS VIOLATION OF CHARTER OF UNITED NATIONS, PATH OF VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION ON HIGH SEAS, PATH OF AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS BOTH AGAINST CUBA AND AGAINST SOVIET UNION.

STATEMENT OF GOVERNMENT OF UNITED STATES AMERICA CANNOT BE EVALUATED IN ANY OTHER WAY THAN AS NAKED INTERFERENCE IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF CUBAN REPUBLIC, SOVIET UNION, AND OTHER STATES. CHARTER OF UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS DO NOT GIVE RIGHT TO

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1042, OCTOBER 23, 5 PM FROM MOSCOW

ANY STATE WHATSOEVER TO ESTABLISH IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS CONTROL OF VESSELS BOUND FOR SHORES OF CUBAN REPUBLIC.

IT IS SELF-UNDERSTOOD THAT WE ALSO CANNOT RECOGNIZE RIGHT OF UNITED STATES TO ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER ARMAMENTS ESSENTIAL TO REPUBLIC OF CUBA FOR STRENGTHENING OF ITS DEFENSIVE CAPACITY.

WE CONFIRM THAT ARMAMENTS NOW ON CUBA, REGARDLESS OF CLASSIFICATION TO WHICH THEY BELONG, ARE DESTINED EXCLUSIVELY FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES, IN ORDER TO SECURE CUBAN REPUBLIC FROM ATTACK OF AGGRESSOR.

I HOPE THAT GOVERNMENT OF UNITED STATES WILL SHOW PRUDENCE AND RENOUNCE ACTIONS PURSUED BY YOU, WHICH COULD LEAD TO CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES FOR PEACE THROUGHOUT WORLD.

VIEWPOINT OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD TO YOUR STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 22 IS SET FORTH IN STATEMENT OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT, WHICH IS BEING CONVEYED TO YOU THROUGH YOUR AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW.

/S/ N. KHRUSHCHEV. END TEXT.

ORIGINAL OF LETTER BEING AIRPOUCHED TODAY.

KOHLER

DT

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 10/23/62 11:05 AM WVC

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

October 28, 1962

171

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I welcome Chairman Khrushchev's statesmanlike decision to stop building bases in Cuba, dismantling offensive weapons and returning them to the Soviet Union under United Nations verification. This is an important and constructive contribution to peace.

We shall be in touch with the Secretary General of the United Nations with respect to reciprocal measures to assure peace in the Caribbean area.

It is my earnest hope that the governments of the world can, with a solution of the Cuban crisis, turn their urgent attention to the compelling necessity for ending the arms race and reducing world tensions. This applies to the military confrontation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries as well as to other situations in other parts of the world where tensions lead to the wasteful diversion of resources to weapons of war.

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE

OCTOBER 27, 1962

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

Several inconsistent and conflicting proposals have been made by the USSR within the last twenty-four hours, including the one just made public in Moscow. The proposal broadcast this morning involves the security of nations outside the Western Hemisphere. But it is the Western Hemisphere countries and they alone that are subject to the threat that has produced the current crisis -- the action of the Soviet Government in secretly introducing offensive weapons into Cuba. Work on these offensive weapons is still proceeding at a rapid pace. The first imperative must be to deal with this immediate threat, under which no sensible negotiation can proceed.

It is therefore the position of the United States that as an urgent preliminary to consideration of any proposals work on the Cuban bases must stop; offensive weapons must be rendered inoperable; and further shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba must cease -- all under effective international verification.

As to proposals concerning the security of nations outside this Hemisphere, the United States and its allies have long taken the lead in seeking properly inspected arms limitation, on both sides. These efforts can continue as soon as the present Soviet-created threat is ended.

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Book
separate
see

U.N.

See

Separate

Book

174



OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

W

Origin

SS

Info:

ACTION: Ambassy PARIS TOPOL 596 PRIORITY

INFO: USUN NEW YORK 1165

020

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION-S/S

In order dispel any NAC concern re subject matter of current talks with Kuznetsov, you should inform PermReps at earliest appropriate opportunity that US Reps in New York have been instructed to avoid being drawn into discussion of any issues other than immediate and central one of dismantling and removal of offensive weapons from Cuba. At same time, we are watching closely to discern significance of any additional topics which Kuznetsov may raise as possible clue to future Soviet intentions in broader East-West context. NAC will be informed soonest of our analysis these intentions. We also are undertaking internal staff work re where we go from here with Soviets and assume that other NATO governments undertaking similar staff work which will contribute to meaningful exchange of views in NAC at early date.

RED

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Bu 3/3/74
By rmg, NARS, Date 4/11/77

Drafted by:

FUR/RPM:GVanHollen:ram 12/1/62

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

FUR-William R. Tyler

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Clearances:

RPM - Mr. Popper

S/S - Mr. Weiner

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Atlantic

Message to the North American Council and
the Governments of all NATO Countries

On October 22, 1962, the President of the United States announced that the presence of offensive weapons in Cuba, which had been secretly placed there by the Soviet Union, made it necessary for the United States, after consultation with the Organization of American States, to take action to protect the security of the Western Hemisphere against the threat posed by these weapons. Accordingly, during the past several days the United States has taken a series of precautionary and protective actions. In the first place, in order to inform itself as to whether the Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba, particularly the medium range ballistic missiles, had reached a stage of operational readiness where they might be launched against the Western Hemisphere, close surveillance was maintained over these missile sites by *unmanned* U. S. military aircraft. Secondly, the United States acted through a limited quarantine to prevent the further shipment of offensive weapons into Cuba. Thirdly, the United States has approached the Soviet Government, both directly and through the good offices of the Acting Secretary General of the United Nations, to suggest that further build-up of the offensive weapons be halted, the weapons already in place be rendered inoperable, and further shipment of such weapons cease, all pending an

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effort to arrive at a peaceful solution of the issues presented. These later proposals have not been responded to by the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the construction on the missile sites has continued, and there is every indication that more of the missiles are becoming operationally ready. Moreover, the ^{missiles} U. S. military aircraft which today were conducting publicly announced surveillance over Cuba were exposed to intensive ground fire, and one of such aircraft was shot down.

In these circumstances, the United States Government, both in its own interests and that of its fellow nations in the Western Hemisphere, is constrained to take whatever military action may be necessary to remove the growing threat to the Hemisphere posed by these operationally ready missiles, the status of which cannot safely be assured any longer through close surveillance. The Soviet Union, in one of a series of inconsistent and conflicting messages, has equated the existence of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey, which were placed there in fulfillment of the Turkish Government's commitment for the defense of NATO, with the missiles and other offensive ^{weapons} ~~missiles~~ which the Soviets have placed in Cuba. Although there is in fact no symmetry between the defense of NATO and peace in the Caribbean, it may be that, if the United States acts in defense of its vital interests and those of its Western Hemisphere

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

allies against the threat in Cuba, the Soviet Government will take military action against the Jupiter missiles in Turkey.

Wishing to minimize the possibility of such an attack upon Turkey, and possibly upon other NATO countries, the United States is willing, if the other members of the NATO alliance so desire, to render the Jupiter missiles in Turkey inoperative by removal of their warheads and to notify the Soviet Government to such an effect prior to moving against the Soviet missiles in Cuba. The United States Government is also willing to take steps to insure that the targets now covered by the Jupiter missiles in Turkey will be permanently assigned to other weapons systems capable of striking such targets. Such steps could include, if the NATO alliance so desires, the positioning of Polaris submarines carrying the equivalent numbers of missiles in the Mediterranean.

In view of the urgent nature of the decisions involved in these actions, the members of the NATO alliance are asked to consult immediately and advise the United States of their position with respect to the course of action which appears to them to be in the best interests of the alliance.

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

Blackman
Personal Copy

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

V.F.
177

31

Action

Control: 19464

Rec'd: October 28, 1962

10:42 a.m.

SS

Info

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 512, October 28, 3 p.m.

EYES ONLY 018

NIACT

ACTION DEPARTMENT NIACT POLTO 512, INFORMATION USUN POLTO
UNNUMBERED, ALL NATO CAPITALS POLTO UNNUMBERED

POLICY

Reference: Department circular telegrams 744, 778 and
TOPOLs 574, 578.

NAC met today, October 28 at 10 a.m. to consider reference telegrams. Very few permanent representatives had governmental instructions on all points covered, but all permanent representatives supported unanimously four following propositions stating they felt sure their governments positions would be same. I have clear impression there is little chance of any of them being overruled. It was unusual and powerful display of solidarity.

Thus:

1. There was unanimous support for US position concerning Cuba generally;
2. There was unanimous support for proposition that there should be no negotiations until missile threat in Cuba was eliminated;
3. There was unanimous approval of US action in rejecting a trade for elimination missiles in Cuba in exchange for removal

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Authority State Sec 3/3/77
By mmg, NARS, Date 4/11/77

~~SECRET~~

-2- POLTO 512, October 28, 3 p.m. from Paris

removal Jupiters in Turkey;

4. There was strong sentiment that once missiles in Cuba were eliminated and situation there properly stabilized, a vigorous effort on disarmament of various kinds, not only general and complete, but partial disarmaments, should be made, and further that west should seek general negotiation with Soviet Union as to all major problems.

Full report follows by separate telegram.

FINLETTER

DT

~~SECRET~~

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REQUIREMENTS:

[illegible][illegible]

21.000,00

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TO - L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File**

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

41

Origin
SS

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy BONN

1082

EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR

FOR DOWLING FROM THE PRESIDENT

Request you deliver soonest following from the President to Adenauer and personally brief him on Cuban situation drawing on DEPTTEL ^{TO POL 578} to ~~win~~ letter.

Dear Chancellor Adenauer:

I am sending Ambassador Dowling to make sure that you are fully informed of the current situation in Cuba.

~~(The situation is clearly growing more tense and if satisfactory responses are not received from the other side in the next forty-eight hours, the situation is likely to enter a progressively intense military phase.)~~ The situation is clearly growing more tense and if satisfactory responses are not received from the other side in the next forty-eight hours, the situation is likely to enter a progressively intense military phase.

We are trying to make our determination just as clear as our readiness for a proper settlement. It gives me great courage in these days to know that we have your support, ~~as~~ as expressed in your letter.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

G - U. Alexis Johnson/v1

G - U. Alexis Johnson

Clearances:

WH - McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~

Authority

By rmg

NARS, Date

3/3/77
4/11/77

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EYES ONLY

FORM
5-61 DS-322

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

V.P.

180

31

~~SECRET~~

Action

Control: 19438

Rec'd: OCTOBER 28, 1962
8:43 AM

SS

Info

FROM: PARIS

012

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1976, OCTOBER 28, 2 PM

NI ACT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State Sec 3/3/77

EYES ONLY

By

rmg, NARS, Date 4/11/77

EYES ONLY

REF: DEPTTEL 2382 EMBTEL 1975

I CALLED ON COUVE DE MURVILLE AT NOON TODAY AND GAVE HIM THE COPY OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO DE GAULLE. HE TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD TELEPHONE IT TO THE GENERAL IMMEDIATELY.

I ALSO GAVE HIM THE BRIEFING MATERIAL CONTAINED IN TOPOL 578 AS WELL AS THE TEXT OF THE KRUSHCHEV COMMUNICATION OF OCTOBER 26. HE HAD ALREADY HAD THE PUBLIC TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY REFERRING TO BOTH LETTERS. HE HAD NO IMMEDIATE EXPLANATION OF THE SHIFT IN SOVIET POSITION AS SET FORTH IN THE PUBLIC LETTER RAISING THE QUESTION OF THE BASES IN TURKEY. HE DID HOWEVER SAY THAT HE APPROVED OF THE LINE THE PRESIDENT HAD TAKEN IN HIS PUBLIC REPLY AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE SAW LITTLE ADVANTAGE IN ANY ATTEMPT TO LINK NATO QUESTIONS WITH THAT OF CUBA. HE NOTED IN THIS CONNECTION THE SOVIET DISREGARD OF THE INTERESTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN EVEN OFFERING A DEAL OF THIS KIND.

HE ALSO TOLD ME THAT ONE OF THE CHIEF REASONS DE GAULLE WAS NOT DESIROUS OF SEEING ME AT COLOMBEY TODAY IS THAT WHILE IT IS UNLIKELY IF THE REFERENDUM TURNS OUT BADLY DE GAULLE WILL RESIGN AND STAY AT COLOMBEY. HE THEREFORE SAID HE DIDN'T THINK THERE WOULD BE MUCH CHANCE TO GET ANY DEFINITE REACTION FROM DE GAULLE TODAY. ASSUMING THE REFERENDUM IS SATISFACTORY DE GAULLE WILL BE BACK IN PARIS AROUND NOON

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 1976, OCTOBER 28, 2 PM, FROM PARIS

TOMORROW AND COUVE IS CONFIDENT THAT HE WOULD BE GLAD TO SEE ME IF THERE IS ANY PARTICULAR MATTER FOR ME TO TAKE UP.

BOHLEN

REE

~~SECRET~~

VP

181

:OT
 :HOTS
 :HOMINID
 :HUMAN
 :HUMAN

[illegible]

THIS DOCUMENT

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

Vice President

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

EYES ONLY 3603

182

~~SECRET~~

TOPOL 578

Oct 28 12 12 AM '62

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS ~~200-1128~~ 1128 listed page 3
USUN FOR INFO
REPEAT ALL NATO CAPITALS/ EYES ONLY INFO AMBASSADORS.

USRO PASS EMBASSY

011

1. The President desires that your briefing of NATO be essentially factual and reflect clear determination of US Government to press on its present course as reflected in (1) White House statement issued noon Saturday on continuing buildup (2) President's message to Khrushchev released White House Saturday evening, (3) announcement by DOD of continued surveillance, and (4) DOD announcement call up of Air reserves (all contained wireless file).

2. You can report that message from Khrushchev to President received night October 26 (being repeated Finletter, Paris and London only), while full of polemics, seemed to offer real hope solution could be found within framework supervised withdrawal offensive weapons from Cuba in exchange for commitment by United States not invade Cuba. U Thant's conversations in New York and broad hints in Cuban speeches at UN also seemed offer hope settlement along these lines could promptly be reached. Khrushchev's message to U Thant agreeing keep Soviet vessels temporarily outside quarantine area also seemed favorable sign.

These hopes have been diminished by subsequent public letter from Khrushchev to the President linking Cuban settlement ~~now~~ to withdrawal of NATO ~~from~~ Jupiters from Turkey, but we continue to press for solution in Cuban framework alone.

3. The situation as we see it is increasingly serious and time is

Drafted by: W.H.: McGeorge Bundy

Telegraphic transmission and

RE: G:UAJohnson:ges 10/26/62

classification approved by:

G - U. Alexis Johnson

Clearances:

White House - Mr. Bundy
EUR - Mr. Tyler
NEA - Mr. Talbot

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Authority State for 3/3/72
By long, NARS, Date 4/11/77

SECRET

EYES ONLY

growing shorter. The United States remained determined to insure removal of offensive installations in Cuba. We are combining reasonable diplomatic offers and military pressure in even balance to this end.

4. But construction on the missile sites continues and there is every indication that more of the missiles are becoming operationally ready. Moreover, unarmed U.S. military aircraft which today were conducting publicly announced surveillance over Cuba were exposed to intensive ground fire and one of these aircraft is missing.

5. At the same time, Soviet vessels are also continuing to proceed toward the quarantine area in direct violation of Khrushchev's assurances to U Thant, although the Soviet Government was officially informed of the limits of the quarantine area by both U Thant and the United States Government. At the present rate of speed the first vessel ~~will~~ will reach the quarantine area during daylight Sunday and an incident may occur.

6. In these circumstances the United States Government may find it necessary within a very short time in its own interest and that of its fellow nations in the Western Hemisphere to take whatever military action may be necessary to remove this growing threat to the Hemisphere.

7. In the light of the developing possibility of the necessity for action in Cuba, the President has instructed you to bring this matter fully to the attention of the NAC. You should say that while the US holds to the position that this matter should be settled within framework of the public message to President Western Hemisphere, we have taken note of the Soviet ~~message~~ of October 27th in which a connection is made between NATO defenses and Soviet action in

SECRET

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

Cuba. This Soviet position increases the possibility that US military action in Cuba may result in some Soviet moves against NATO. In these circumstances the US feels it essential to inform its allies and to consult with them on the general situation.

8. FYI. It is of the utmost importance that nothing in ~~your~~ your discussion should hint of any readiness to meet Soviet Jupiter exchange proposal, but it is equally important that you should allow free expression of European views, whatever they may be. In stimulating free response, you should strongly press the point that U.S. action in Cuba -- if it becomes essential -- will be directed at a potential threat to the total strategic balance endangering other NATO countries at least as much as the United States. End FYI.

~~END.~~

RUSK

REPEATED INFO NATO CAPITALS:

LONDON	2344
BONN	1081
ROME	878
OTTAWA	529
ANKARA	457
ATHENS	479
LISBON	219
LUXEMBOURG	100
BRUSSELS	693
THE HAGUE	297
OSLO	151
COPENHAGEN	259
REYKJAVIK	137

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

V.P.
13604

184

OCT 20 12 22 AM '62

41

Origin
SS

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS 2382 NIACT

EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR BOHLEN

012

FOR BOHLEN FROM THE PRESIDENT

I think you should go to Colombey Sunday with this letter and briefing material contained in Deptal TOPOL 578 to Finletter.

Dear General deGaulle:

I am asking Ambassador Bohlen to make sure that ~~you~~ you are fully informed of the current situation in Cuba. The situation is clearly growing more tense and if satisfactory responses are not received from the other side in the next forty-eight hours, the situation is likely to enter a progressively intense military phase.

We are trying to make our determination just as clear as our ~~is~~ readiness for a proper settlement. It gives me great courage in these days to know that we have your support, as expressed in your last interview with Ambassador Bohlen, and I should be

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Dec 3/3/77

By mgg, NARS, Date 4/1/77

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

G - U. Alexis Johnson/vl

G - U. Alexis Johnson

Clearances:

WH - McGeroge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

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AM
8-61 DS-322

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

glad to know of any further views you may have.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy

END.

RUSK

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

V.P.

186

W
Action
SS
Info**EYES ONLY**~~SECRET~~Control: 19420
Rec'd: OCTOBER 28, 1962
6:59 AM

011

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1975, OCTOBER 28, NOON

NIACT

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State la 3/3/77
By mg, NARS, Date 4/11/77

EYES ONLY FOR PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY

UPON RECEIPT OF YOUR 2382 I GOT IN TOUCH WITH BURIN DES ROZIER, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ELYSEE, AND INFORMED HIM OF YOUR INSTRUCTIONS THAT I SHOULD GO TO COLOMBEY TODAY TO TAKE YOUR LETTER AND OTHER BRIEFING MATERIALS ON THE CUBAN SITUATION. I POINTED OUT THAT I REALIZED THAT THIS WAS UNUSUAL IN LIGHT OF THE GENERAL'S PRACTICE TO RECEIVE NO ONE IN COLOMBEY BUT THAT THE TIME FACTOR IN THE CUBAN SITUATION WAS SUCH THAT IT WAS CONSIDERED DESIRABLE FOR ME TO SEE HIM. BURIN DES ROZIER SAID THAT HE AGREED AND RECOMMENDED THAT I GO AND SAID THAT HE WOULD TAKE UP THE MATTER BY TELEPHONE WITH THE GENERAL. IN ABOUT AN HOUR HE CALLED BACK AND SAID THAT THE GENERAL WOULD PREFER NOT TO BREAK A LONG-ESTABLISHED RULE THAT WHEN HE WAS AT COLOMBEY HE DID NOT RECEIVE ANY OFFICIAL VISITORS AND SUGGESTED THAT I SHOULD CONVEY TO COUVE DE MURVILLE YOUR LETTER AND THE MATERIAL IN QUESTION.

IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES I HAVE AGREED TO SEE COUVE DE MURVILLE WHO I AM INFORMED WILL BE IN A POSITION TO TELEPHONE TO GENERAL DE GAULLE THE SUBSTANCE OF LETTER AND MATERIAL. THE GENERAL WILL NOT BE BACK TO PARIS UNTIL MONDAY AFTERNOON WHICH WOULD BE THE EARLIEST I COULD SEE HIM. I AM NOT SURPRISED AT DE GAULLE'S REACTION SINCE HE HAS INDEED MADE IT A FIXED RULE TO TRANSACT NO OFFICIAL BUSINESS WHILE HE IS AT COLOMBEY AND I DID NOT FEEL THAT THE CHARACTER OF THE INFORMATION I HAD TO CONVEY WAS SUCH AS TO MAKE A SPECIFIC AND OFFICIAL REQUEST FOR HIM

TO BREAK

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 1975, OCTOBER 28, NOON, FROM PARIS

TO BREAK THIS RULE. IN FACT I BELIEVE THAT BY CONVEYING IT TO COUVE DE MURVILLE IT WILL GET TO DE GAULLE QUICKER SINCE IT IS THREE HOURS DRIVE TO COLOMBEY. DE GAULLE WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO THINK OVER THE SITUATION AND TO LET YOU HAVE HIS VIEWS ON MONDAY IF NOT BEFORE.

BOHLEN

LM

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 10/28/62 PER SS/DO

~~SECRET~~

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Executive Secretary
Department of State
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189

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TO:
FROM:
NUMBER:
DATE:

Signature Record

[illegible]

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S - William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

189a

W

Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~

Control: 19169

Rec'd: OCTOBER 27, 1962

10:59 AM

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1970, OCTOBER 27, 3 PM

NIACT

EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State Bu 3/3/77

By

rmg

NARS, Date

4/11/77

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

IN A BRIEF CONVERSATION AFTER THE PRESENTATION CEREMONIES, DE GAULLE (ACCOMPANIED BY COUVE DE MURVILLE) SAID THAT THE CUBAN AFFAIR WAS US BUSINESS AND THAT FRANCE UNDERSTOOD AND WILL UNDERSTAND WHATEVER ACTIONS WE MIGHT BE FORCED TO TAKE. HE SAID THAT FRANCE WAS NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED, BUT THEY DID NOT "BLAME" US FOR THE ACTIONS WE HAD TAKEN AND WOULD NOT IN THE FUTURE. HE THEN ASKED ME TO TRANSMIT TO MY GOVERNMENT THE ASSURANCE THAT IF DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS AFFAIR SHOULD UNFORTUNATELY LEAD TO WAR, THE US COULD BE SURE THAT FRANCE WITH ITS LIMITED MEANS WOULD BE AT OUR SIDE IN THE WAR. HE ADMITTED THAT WE ALL HOPED THAT A SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND THAT WOULD AVERT WAR AND HE KNEW THAT THIS WAS OUR WISH, BUT HE WISHED TO GIVE US THIS FIRM ASSURANCE IN THE EVENT OF THE WORST. HE EXPRESSED THE STRONG HOPE THAT WE WOULD KEEP FRENCH GOVT FULLY INFORMED OF OUR VIEWS AND INTENTIONS ALTHOUGH REPEATING THAT FRANCE HAD NO INTENTION OF TAKING ANY INITIATIVE IN THIS PURELY AMERICAN AFFAIR.

HE SAID THAT HE HAD READ WITH GREATEST ATTENTION THE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND KHRUSHCHEV FOR WHICH HE WAS GRATEFUL AND WHILE HE NOTED THAT IN KHRUSHCHEV'S SECOND MESSAGE--THE LONGEST--HE HAD REFRAINED FROM INVECTIVE HE HAD OBTAINED AN IMPRESSION OF FIRMNESS ON BOTH SIDES. HE ADDED THAT THE FRENCH FOR CENTURIES HAD LIVED WITH THREATS AND MENACES, FIRST FROM THE GERMANS AND NOW FROM

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 1970, OCTOBER 27, 3 PM FROM PARIS

RUSSIA, BUT HE UNDERSTOOD THE US HAD NOT HAD A COMPARABLE EXPERIENCE.

I REPLIED THAT THIS WAS HISTORICALLY TRUE BUT PARTICULARLY BECAUSE THIS INHERENT NUCLEAR THREAT TO THE US CAME FROM A QUARTER WHERE OUR WARNING AND ALERT SYSTEMS WERE NOT WELL DEVELOPED, WE SAW A VERY REAL AND SPECIAL THREAT TO THE MILITARY POSTURE OF THE US FROM THESE CUBAN BASES. HE SPOKE SLIGHTINGLY OF THE UN BUT SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND THAT OUR "AFFECTION" FOR THIS INSTITUTION HAD LED US TO PUT THE MATTER BEFORE IT. I REPLIED THAT IN ADDITION TO US PUBLIC OPINION, A RECOURSE TO THE UN MIGHT GIVE THE RUSSIANS A PRETEXT FOR LESS DRASTIC ACTION, WITH WHICH HE AGREED.

IN CONCLUSION, HE SAID HE HAD WISHED TO TAKE THIS OCCASION IN CIRCUMSTANCES THE OUTCOME OF WHICH COULD NOT BE FORESEEN, TO GIVE TO THE US THE STRONGEST REAFFIRMATION OF SOLIDARITY AND SUPPORT.

I THANKED THE GENERAL FOR HIS STATEMENT AND PROMISED TO TRANSMIT IT IMMEDIATELY TO MY GOVERNMENT.

DE GAULLE'S STATEMENT WAS DIRECT AND OBVIOUSLY SINCERELY MEANT. I HOPE YOU WILL KEEP ME INFORMED TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE SO THAT I CAN KEEP HIM UP TO DATE.

PRESIDENT DE GAULLE WILL BE AWAY FROM PARIS AT COLOMBES-LES-DEUX-EGLISES FROM NOW UNTIL MONDAY.

DEPARTMENT TO DISTRIBUTE AS DESIRED.

BOHLEN

AJT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

192

DATE: November 7, 1962
TO: The Vice President
FROM: Colonel Burris
RE: Highlights - 10:00 a.m. - November 7

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 77-53 and 89-01
By sig, NARA, Date 4-21-92

Defense Department

1.3
(4)(4)

Communist Bloc

Speeches on the occasion of the celebration of the October revolution have been comparatively moderate. The Berlin issue was brought up again, but no urgency or time schedule was mentioned.

Cuba

Orders have gone out to the Cuban armed forces removing the state of alert. Certain Reserves which were called up are to be released.

Laos

The Soviet airlift which has been conducted into Laos on almost a permanent basis has been abruptly halted. The reason is not clear. It could portend utilization of the aircraft elsewhere in the area; the beginning of a new phase of Communist activity with regard to Laos itself; or it may be a temporary device designed to halt on an apparently quid pro quo basis the American airlift into Laos through Air America.

Guatemala

The November 4 elections for the Mayor of Guatemala City resulted in a narrow victory for a man of extreme leftist leanings. The openly supported Communist candidate came in fourth. The results are disquieting, coming as they do immediately following the Cuban expose.

Costa Rica

The Foreign Minister issued an unusually stern statement in which he stated that the United States should have taken a harder line in Cuba from the beginning and should have backed OAS action to remove Castro. On a more recent issue, he stated that the United States should have rejected the Soviet proposal to utilize the Red Cross in the proposed role. He expressed the belief that Castro must be wiped out at all costs because all of Latin America will suffer from the failure to do so.

Yugoslavia and Guinea

Tito and Toure have begun to pursue a new line on Castro, partly perhaps for reasons of manifesting personal power and leadership. The idea is to portray Castro more as a moderate man and essentially one whose views and activities could be related to those of today's neutrals. Contributing to this move appears to have been the partial, at least, abandonment of Castro by the Soviets in the face of strong U.S. opposition, as well as Castro's inability or unwillingness to re-establish relations with the U.S. In other words, he has to go somewhere and the neutralists are willing to accept him. This could also be a cleverly inspired Soviet scheme (as was U Thant's proposal) to portray Castro as a reasonable man, retain him in power and make him more acceptable to leaders of the western hemisphere. State has asked the U.S. Ambassador in Guinea to remind Toure about the real Castro and also of the fact that his own Ambassadors are fully aware of the facts. At the moment, no response to Tito is contemplated.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

193

DATE: November 6, 1962

TO: The Vice President

FROM: Colonel Burris

RE: Cuban Situation - 10:00 a.m.

Yesterday afternoon the President sent a message to Stevenson and McCloy outlining the points brought up in yesterday morning's NSC meeting. The most controversial of those points appears to be the removal of the IL-28's from Cuba.

Later in the day, Stevenson and McCloy held a 3 1/2 hour meeting with Kuznetsov and Zorin. It is clear from this meeting that the Soviet line and position are hardening rapidly. After this morning's briefing at State, Mr. Rostow commented on this fact and observed that, "We will have to get the word to them."

Kuznetsov took the general line that all Soviet commitments are being completed, but that the U.S. is failing to live up to its obligations. He said that negotiations must not depart from the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement which he described essentially as a non-invasion pledge from the U.S. and a removal of missiles by the USSR which the President regarded as offensive. An impasse has apparently been reached on the subject of withdrawal of the IL-28's and the Soviets now charge this issue as a U.S. attempt to delay a final solution. An argument over whether or not the IL-28 is defensive and whether they are under Soviet control or in Cuban hands failed to contribute to resolution of the issue of withdrawal of the aircraft. In summary, the remaining issues are the removal of the IL-28's, verification of removal of warheads, and the lesser issue of the nationality of the inspection ship.

Communist Bloc propaganda carries the central theme that U.S. aggression continues to exist and cites as evidence the continuation of the quarantine and reconnaissance, and the failure to honor the no invasion pledge. The Soviet Union is given credit for great moral and political victory when it compelled the United States to declare that it would not invade Cuba. This declaration served as the basis for Soviet withdrawal of the missiles.

Yesterday's reconnaissance reflects continuation of the withdrawal of missiles. Nine missile transporters appeared on the decks of Soviet ships in a harbor. Although ships specifically modified to transport the oversized missiles are apparently enroute to Cuba, the Soviets seem to have decided not

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Authority NLJ-037-008-6-2
By chm/jc, NARA, Date 4-1-09

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

to wait for them. There is no evidence that preparations are being made for withdrawal of the IL-28's. The encounter between reconnaissance aircraft and MIG fighters has not yet been fully explained. Although an actual engagement did not occur, it is possible that preparations are being made for interception of reconnaissance aircraft.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
MEMORANDUM

194

DATE: November 6, 1962

TO: The Vice President

FROM: Colonel Burris

RE: World Highlights - 6 November

USSR

The French Ambassador in Moscow reports that a reliable source has informed him that the first letter from Khrushchev to the President was written and dispatched personally by Khrushchev. Later when he discussed his reply and the issues involved with senior officials, violent objections were voiced and the second letter containing the Turkish base proposal was dispatched. The same source reported that during the consideration to withdraw the missiles from Cuba, Marshal Malenovsky vigorously opposed withdrawal but was overridden by Khrushchev. The source, however, did not specify which element of the Soviet hierarchy -- political or military -- initiated and sustained the proposal for the Cuban adventure.

Yemen

The anticipated Soviet support of Nasser in his activities with the revolutionary forces in Yemen has begun. An airlift to Egypt is underway and urgent requests to Moscow for additional equipment have been given. Requests have gone out for chartering of commercial transport for urgently required military equipment.

Pakistan

The U.S. Ambassador in Karachi failed to persuade Ayub to declare that he would not take advantage of India's preoccupation with the Chinese. Ayub stated that he basically opposes arms aid of any kind to India. He stated, however, that he would welcome serious negotiations with India. In effect, therefore, he demands that India offer to negotiate the Kashmir question as the condition for his cooperation in the present struggle with the Chinese Communists.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
Bvcbw/jc, NARA, Date 3-5-09

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Indonesia

An intelligence research team has produced an extremely interesting analysis of the build-up in Indonesia which is strikingly similar to that which occurred in Cuba. The sudden arrival of Soviet technicians, the installation of air defense and other installations, carried out in great haste and secrecy, resemble very closely the Cuban pattern. Air reconnaissance has not yet confirmed the scheme. IRBM's could be established in the eastern and western portions of Indonesia which would cover Australia, Philippines, Okinawa, Southeast Asia, and all of India. Such installations could, therefore, in effect, bring the India area under Soviet domination. However, the importance can in no way be related to the Cuban situation since these missiles would have had the capability to destroy more than half of the free world's nuclear deterrent power.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

195

DATE: November 5, 1962

TO: The Vice President

FROM: Colonel Burris

RE: New York Times Review of Events in the Cuban Crisis

You requested that I analyze the Times review which appeared on Saturday, November 3. I have done so by relating the events to the extent they are reported to that which actually occurred.

Generally speaking, the report relates more to the movement of personalities and to the original secrecy involved than it does to the specific decisions and who contributed to them. Mention is first made of your knowledge of the crisis when you attended the NSC meeting at 11:45 a.m. on Tuesday, October 16th. Additional references are made to meetings of the Executive Committee of the Security Council, but no information is given on attendance or of issues and points of view presented. It might be said that a characteristic of the review is the absence of detected or revealed divergencies from practically unanimous opinion. Note is taken of your October 6th statement by quoting (out of context) that you warned that "stopping a Russian ship was an act of war". Later on, the following manifestation of unanimity is presented in conjunction with the President's decision to institute the quarantine:

"This was not a solomonic decision by the President. He was not choosing between sharply conflicting views. He was approving a view that his advisers had reached after exhausting exploration of every possibility. The process was not a series of conflicts but an exchange of ideas developing a rolling consensus."

In the future, certain historical reference and significance may be attached to this apparently authentic review. It is interesting and accurate as a scenario, but it is lacking greatly in some very important substance.

~~SECRET~~
MEMORANDUM

196

DATE: November 6, 1962
TO: The Vice President
FROM: Colonel Burris
RE: Cuban Situation - 5:00 p. m.

There is no new information nor major changes in the situation since this morning's report. There is one report, however, from Mexico City, which is of interest. A Western European diplomat in Havana has reported heavy blastings and explosions in an area not too far removed from the Guanajay missile sites. Trucks were seen driving to the area where the underground construction was started and is still in progress. The trucks carried construction materials to an area where a tunnel is known to exist. During U Thant's visit to Havana and while aerial surveillance was halted, activity was exceptionally heavy.

The Soviets are still working in secrecy at various points, giving rise to the general feeling in Cuba that while the bases are being dismantled, deception and camouflage are being practiced.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State 3-7-78, NSC 6-6-78
By isp 10-3-79

~~SECRET~~
MEMORANDUM

197

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By abm/jc, NARA, Date 3-5-09

DATE: November 5, 1962

TO: The Vice President

FROM: Colonel Burris

RE: Highlights of World Activities and Situations

Soviet Union

The Cuban crisis is expected to produce strains on Soviet leadership. Khrushchev has previously been criticized for his ventures and in straying from the traditional Stalinist line, but any effort to remove him or subjugate him would not be an easy undertaking. During his years in office he has been careful to build up an effective control of the party, the armed forces and the secret police. The one who chose to challenge him directly would probably encounter violent and effective resistance. At the same time, it does not appear that it will be necessary for Khrushchev to embark upon a new adventure in order to get back on the winning side. He may, however, find it necessary to look for a scapegoat or two, and sooner or later one of his principal military advisers may be the victim or it might even be Gromyko, who misjudged the United States, and who probably is not one of Khrushchev's favorites. Quite possibly there may be no violent reaction in the Kremlin, and the Cuban adventure will simply be written off as a gamble of a fast and inexpensive way to vastly improve Russian strategic military potential while gaining a formidable political weapon of blackmail.

Iran

Shortly after your visit to Iran, the Soviets renewed their pressures on the Shah for a non-aggression pact and for assurance against the establishment of missile bases in Iran. The Iranians rejected the pact, but issued a declaration on the missile bases. The Soviets immediately began a program "to improve relations". They offered to furnish professors for Iranian Universities, carry out irrigation and power projects, negotiate an airline agreement, construct silos and increase trade. The Iranians rejected the professors and the airline agreement, but expressed a willingness to discuss the irrigation and power projects as well as the silo construction. The Iranians are willing to increase trade with the Russians provided arrangements are made for payments instead of the barter agreement suggested by the Russians. In summary, therefore, the Russians have renewed their efforts to improve relations with the Iranians and to bring them into the Soviet camp. The Iranians remain traditionally wary but are willing to go along with the proposal to a degree intended to avoid the Soviet charge of western domination.

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Germany

Chancellor Adenauer finds himself in the center of a storm of controversy over the Spiegel affair. This magazine which is the German equivalent of Life published an article on German defense efforts and purportedly it was based on highly classified NATO and Defense Ministry documents. Authenticity of the presentation has never been denied. Two principal issues are involved, both of which affect Adenauer's delicate position at the head of the coalition which keeps him in power. One is the abrupt manner in which the magazine officials were jailed and held; the other was the coldly revealing facts and assessment of the effectiveness of German armed forces. Both issues shocked the German people, and additionally considerable concern exists as to world reaction to these exposures. Adenauer may placate his principal opposition and survive by firing two or three officials concerned principally with the first issue, but his position may be permanently damaged unless he can somehow establish an image of effectiveness of German armed forces greater than that indicated by the NATO documents.

NATO

The Cuban crisis provided a unique opportunity for a display of support and solidarity. As in the councils of our own government, basic elements of character and attitudes were also revealed. The strongest support of U.S. actions came from the long-standing advocates of a hard line toward the Soviet Union, particularly Germany, France and Turkey. The smaller countries in Europe, Denmark and Norway, took the softest line, perhaps principally because of their vulnerable positions. The performance of Canada was quite weak. Great Britain, Italy, Belgium and Greece took a moderate position. The British did so only in the final analysis because of concern about the reliability of evidence and the fear that the U.S. was moving impulsively and too rapidly. All nations were kept up to date through the medium of briefings by Finletter in the North Atlantic Council. Interest soon waned, however, and the crisis simply magnified the principal talking points of recent years: prior consultation, multilateral forces and actions, etc.

India

There has been a comparative lull in the fighting on the northern border during which supplies in considerable quantity are arriving in Calcutta aboard U.S. jets from Germany. In the meantime efforts are being made to induce Ayub in the first place not to take advantage of India's preoccupation, principally in the northeast. In the second place attempts are being made to pave the way for better Indian-Pakistan relations and possible settlement of the Kashmir question, using the firing of Menon and the common threat of the Chinese Communists as reasons why such accord should be possible. For today's meeting between the

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Ambassador and Ayub in Karachi, Galbraith provided an assessment of the military situation at the Chinese border. While the conflict presently is comparatively minor in scale, it could erupt into one of major proportions. Recalling your statement last week about military assessment of that conflict, I all the more agree that it would be certainly appropriate and worthwhile to have a seasoned U.S. military observer in the area or nearby, incognito or otherwise.

Yemen

The United States still has not recognized the revolutionary regime in Yemen which is supported by several thousand troops, planes and logistics from Egypt. The Soviet Union recognized the revolutionary regime almost immediately and our failure to do so has irritated Nasser. On the other hand, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in attempting to protect their own monarchies are attempting to support the deposed regime in Yemen. The Government of Saudi Arabia has been shaky and fears of a coup have been prevalent in that country. Hussein of Jordan proposes to send troops to the assistance of the Saudis but he can ill afford to do so. In summary, revolutionary forces have made considerable progress in this vitally important area. Nasser can be expected to continue the fight against his arch enemies Saud and Hussein. He will use his Soviet supplied equipment until it is exhausted and can perhaps rely upon Russia for more for this particular mission. Nasser's ambition to be leader of the Arab world is an issue to be reckoned with, but it in no way compares to the economic prize of Middle Eastern oil for Nasser or for the Communists.

Soviet Union

Efforts are being made to persuade NATO nations not to supply large diameter pipe to the Soviet Union. Approximately 2 1/2 million tons of 40-inch pipe is required by the Soviets for their expansion of facilities and distribution of petroleum products. The pipeline program will permit expansion of heavy industry, integration of satellite economies, and support military actions in Europe. The British have firmly opposed embargo on sale of this pipe on the grounds that it would constitute an act of economic warfare. The principal supplier, West Germany, can perhaps be induced to institute an embargo but the British action is nevertheless discouraging.

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MEMORANDUM

DATE: October 21, 1962
TO: The Vice President
FROM: Colonel Burris
SUBJECT: Cuba

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 89-01
By isg, NARA, Date 12-11-91

Discussions on the Cuban situation have been carried on around the clock by State, Defense, CIA, USIA and the White House. The President has been limited to a choice of essentially three courses of action in the following order of magnitude: (1) imposition of a blockade, (2) air strike against all missile installations and air bases, (3) utilization of the full spectrum of armed forces to completely eliminate the Castro regime. The President has made the decision to pursue the first course of action -- and under certain limitations.

The blockade is to be called a quarantine and will be designed to restrict the importation of offensive weapons into Cuba. At a later date the blockade may be extended to include petroleum supplies and certain other items. It suffices to say that the selected course of action is the mildest which might be taken even when consideration is given to related political actions, such as presenting the case to the U.N., seeking action by the OAS, NATO, etc.

Even this decision was apparently arrived at in a painful fashion. On the other hand, the military leaders called for more positive action, but apparently received little support from anyone other than the Attorney General. However, Mr. Stevenson at one point even supported the idea of military action against the bases. Nevertheless, the most modest course was chosen and the President will explain the basis for his action in a nationwide television address tomorrow evening. In the meantime, emissaries have departed for London, Paris and Bonn to give those heads of Government a report on the military situation in Cuba, and to inform them in advance of the President's decision. This action seems to be the response, and perhaps a logical one, to the plea of State that further attempts be made through a Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting, through the U.N. and all other similar meetings, to further discuss the impasse.

The present course of action, therefore, constitutes the continuation of the basic problem of Cuba, as well as the manifestation of a new degree of tolerance of Soviet activities in this hemisphere. While the precise details of the blockade are now being worked out, it is clear that this course of action will result in

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very limited objectives. It is in no way related to the elimination of the existing threat which hopefully will be resolved through political action. In the meantime considerable alarm has been created in the minds of those concerned with the damage which might be inflicted upon SAC bases and cities.

There is general agreement as to possible Soviet reactions to each of the U.S. courses of action. Briefly, if the U.S. takes no action at all, the build-up in Cuba will continue and the Soviet experiment will have been achieved with impunity. Having succeeded here, the Communists can be expected to take equally bold actions elsewhere in the world. Since the blockade is imposed in a limited and somewhat timid fashion, the Soviet Union is expected to retaliate perhaps with a limited blockade in Berlin. If the blockade is combined with attacks on air bases and missile sites, it is expected that there might be a delay in Soviet reaction because of the anticipation of occupation of the island by ground forces or the overt support of Cuban liberation forces. After a period of time, however, it is expected that this partial action would invoke renewed and rather severe Soviet activity in Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America, with emphasis being placed upon political and economic subversion because of manifest U.S. opposition to the military build-up. Finally, if total elimination of the Castro regime is accomplished, the Soviets will be expected to conclude that their arrogant experiment in the western hemisphere was a miscalculation. In any case, there is no element of opinion which holds that the Soviet Union will resort to nuclear war over Cuba. There are varying degrees of opinion as to whether or not the Soviets will knock out U.S. bases in Turkey and Jupiter missile installations in Italy in retaliation for the partial U.S. action against Cuban air bases and missile sites. Consideration has also been given to the possible loss of lives of the Soviet technicians in Cuba. In both these cases Soviet reactions range from improbable to acceptable.

In view of the strong recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am not certain of the various elements, conditions or individuals which suggested to the President that he further tolerate the situation in Cuba unless he has come to the fundamental decision that there has been no infringement upon hemisphere policy and that this nation is willing to accept this form of Communist effrontery. To be sure, the risks involved in eliminating the situation are grave. Yet as time goes on, not only the risks but the magnitude and number of them are certain to increase. No amount of discussion in any form, General Assembly or summit meeting, is going to moderate these unpleasant realities. In a recent press conference about the Cuban situation, the President said generally that the Cubans possessed no offensive capability and indicated that the U.S. would continue its actions (passive). It could have been logically interpreted that an offensive Cuban capability would invoke reaction from the U.S. When the

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latest information inevitably reaches the American public in the next few days, coming as it does in further progression of the Cuban fiasco, domestic political reaction will be violent. Latin American leaders will become more apprehensive and less responsive to this country. European allies will be more suspect of U. S. will and intentions. The Soviets will become more arrogant and adventurous. The President may succeed in avoiding some of these situations through his television address and related actions, but the basic problem is in no way resolved and -- as one Pentagon official put it -- we are simply tapping a hornets' nest with a short stick.

There is one additional development which should be brought to your attention, but I am not sure how this fits in with the course of action which has been chosen. The Defense Department has been pouring military supplies into Florida around the clock for the past week. These supplies, troop transport and air support for the total operation are being organized. I have been unable to determine whether highest level consideration is being given to implementation of the total plan, but certainly when knowledge of Cuban offensive capability become known, as well as the extent of the U. S. build-up in Florida, and no action is then taken, the image of timidity and irresoluteness of the worst order is inevitable.

The Cuban problem will not disappear and it will not be negotiated away except perhaps for a deal in Europe which is unacceptable. While the image of the United States will suffer in the eyes of many when overt action is taken, it must be admitted and recognized that serious damage is being done every day Castro exists, to say nothing of the actual military threat. I suggest that you attempt to persuade the President to adopt the firmer course of action and do so before there is further deterioration.

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MEMORANDUM

October 24, 1962

TO: THE VICE PRESIDENT
FROM: HB.
SUBJECT: A SUMMIT CONFERENCE WITH KHRUSHCHEV

A Summit Conference between the President and Khrushchev is probably inevitable. In terms of American public opinion, however, such a conference is inescapably dangerous -- to the public trust of the Administration, to public support of the Democratic Party, and to public responsiveness to the national leadership.

The seriousness of this should be kept before all concerned.

If at all avoidable, no announcement of a conference should be made prior to the November 6 elections.

Any conference, at this stage, freshens the public memory of Munich and, much more importantly, Yalta. This is not to be discounted. Virtually the sole impetus to McCarthyism in the '50s was American suspicion of Yalta. Today this same kind of latent suspicion -- a fear of "rights," "honor," et al, being traded away in secret -- is the core of the irresponsible far right and of the responsible conservatism. For a Democratic President to accept a conference at this point is to play with very, very dangerous fire.

It is almost impossible for a Free World leader to "win" a conference. This was demonstrated by Chamberlain. He had to come out of his confrontation with Hitler with something to show. Had he not done so, war would have seemed immediate and inevitable -- and he would have been unseated by an irate electorate. The same dilemma would rest on the President: to confer and acknowledge no agreement would preclude alternatives to war, and to confere and reach agreement would -- regardless of what was agreed -- lead the public to assume (1) appeasement or (2) irresponsible reliance on the "word" of a leader whose Ambassador has just been portrayed as a willful liar.

The prospect of a Kennedy-Khrushchev conference offers the very real danger that in seeking to win the respect of world opinion -- which is a more necessary factor than many military minds accept -- the Administration would come to the brink of losing the respect of domestic opinion -- which is a far more necessary factor than many diplomatists remember.

Reaction to the President's course has been highly favorable. Many have commented -- e.g., Senator Humphrey -- that the public feels a sense of "relief." In other words, action -- at last; not words. This national mood is not to be toyed with by a return, too soon, to words.

Objectively, it is not extreme to suggest that the very existence of the Democratic Party as a party of national leadership in the United States would be jeopardized by public reaction to a Kennedy-Khrushchev conference, short of an incredible Khrushchev capitulation.

It should be kept in mind that the greatest hazard of a Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting is the fact that once such a meeting is held, virtually all room for maneuver and delay is eliminated, just as it was eliminated after the Munich conference in 1938. Constructively, it seems most desirable that every effort be made to maintain a posture of willingness to talk while employing every rational device to postpone the actual conference. Among such devices which might be used are these:

1. A US posture demanding in effect that Khrushchev "purge" himself or his government of falsehood before coming to Washington. The President's speech Monday night was explicit in charges of Soviet falsehood. This probably made one of the deepest imprints of anything in the speech because of the parallel to American minds with the Japanese envoys who were meeting with and lying to Hull at the very hour of Pearl Harbor. At minimum, American public opinion will require that Kennedy's conduct in advance of a meeting with Khrushchev plainly reflect administration distrust and disbelief of whatever he comes to say.

2. The administration can, perhaps constructively and probably with safety, carry on a dialogue with Khrushchev at arms length by means of special intermediaries conferring with Khrushchev as representatives of the President. Unfortunately, this administration does not have a Harry Hopkins. However, such intermediaries should be outside positions of administrative authority and responsibility. For example, it would be inappropriate to employ the Secretary of State, the Vice President, or even the Attorney General as a special emissary to Moscow. It might be appropriate, however, to make use of someone such as Bundy.

3. As a factor in the strategies involved, the administration should weigh carefully the desirability of keeping Khrushchev away from the United Nations. The same also applies to Castro. The use of this forum by Khrushchev for any kind of anti-American denunciation will only serve to harden excessively American public opinion and American political pressure upon administration policies. It is most undesirable for administration initiative to be sacrificed for such a reason. American policy makers have considerable to gain by exchanging American travel to Moscow for Khrushchev travel to New York. If special emissaries from this administration to Moscow can keep Khrushchev there, then by all means use should be made of this technique.

Bureau
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MEMORANDUM

October 24, 1962

TO: The Vice President

FROM: HB

SUBJECT: Southwest Oil and the Cuban Crisis

The Cuban developments permit -- and even demand -- Administration action relative to U. S. oil readiness. If initiated within the next ten days, such actions could have constructive residual benefits, e.g., political (in California, Pennsylvania, Texas, Colorado, etc.), on support of the 1963-64 tax program, on the Administration's Middle East policies, etc.

I.

Cuba requires a review -- and, perhaps, a considerable reassessment -- of our national strategy in relation to oil. The elementary factors involved are these:

1. The Cuban developments carry the potential of a very rapid escalation of demand for U. S. petroleum, both crude and refined. Proximity of the Cuban threat to the continental United States, east of the Rockies, specifically increases the demand for a substantial margin of safety in our above ground, ready-to-use supplies.

2. If there is no escalation to armed conflict, the nature of military activity required by present policy -- e.g., intensified sea duty for the fleet, intensified air alert, intensified movement of ground forces, etc. -- will accelerate consumption of petroleum products beyond previous cold war standards.

3. The proximity factor also necessitates adequate provision of above-ground products to supply conceivable civilian necessities.

4. Missiles presently operational in Cuba expose to attack oil fields -- in Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Kansas, Colorado, Arkansas, Mississippi, etc. -- representing considerably more than 50 percent of our domestic petroleum reserves and domestic production capacity.

5. The same missile strike capacity exposes an even greater percentage of the refining capacity serving the industrial North and East of the U. S.

6. Also, the gathering systems for 90 percent of the interstate natural gas pipe lines which supply major metropolitan areas are exposed, making it feasible for the enemy to eliminate at the source natural gas required for both residential and industrial use by more than 75 percent of the nation's natural gas utility customers.

Until medium range missiles become operational in Cuba, the U. S. petroleum industry is -- of all basic U. S. industries -- presently subject to the greatest degree of exposure: i.e., the oil industry's operational effectiveness is nearest to being 100 percent vulnerable to enemy action.

II.

National security requires immediate intensive attention to these implications. The value of importing oil, as a safety factor is considerably diminished because the site of possible naval actions -- under present policy -- straddles the principal sea lanes from both Latin America and the Middle East. As a matter of urgent prudence, the United States must act with dispatch -- and risk erring on the side of excess supplies -- to assure petroleum adequacy domestically.

III.

On this basis, therefore, it is suggested that certain actions described below would represent manifestations of prudence and responsibility:

1. Summon to the White House the Chairman of the Texas Railroad Commission.

This, of course, follows Roosevelt's pre-World War II pattern. There are several reasons why direct consultations between the President and the Chairman of the Texas Railroad Commission would be of greatest benefit to the Administration. The Chairman of that Commission is the public official in the United States with the greatest direct power over the supply of domestically produced oil. A conference with a public official signifies to all segments of the industry responsible Administration action while, at the same time, avoiding intra-industry concern over recognition or non-recognition of competitive industry segments. The Interstate Oil Compact represents more states, of course, but it is powerless. Its chairmanship is political, and conferences with Compact officials would be least constructive either as a symbol or as a transmission ^{built} ~~built~~ to the oil industry or to business in general.

Any such discussions between the President and the Texas Railroad Commission Chairman should center on (1) adequacy of above ground stocks, (2) adequacy of production levels relative to the dimensions of possible national needs and (3) security measures to assure maintenance of operations in the event of hostile attack. It would seem likely that any such conferences could result in the Texas Chairman announcing the likelihood that the Commission would have to increase the number of producing days for Texas oil fields in the national interest. The residual benefits of such an announcement, if made prior to November 3, are obvious.

2. Call a White House Conference of Major Refining and Marketing Company Executives.

Since the refining capacity of the nation, owned by private companies, is exposed to enemy action, a conference at the White House would be desirable from many standpoints -- not least of which would be the benefit in communicating to the public and especially to the business community generally the Administration's sense of urgency and its instinct for responsibility of the highest order.

3. Consider Appointment by Executive Order of an Oil "Czar."

The present structure of the Federal Government relative to oil and gas has no focus comparable to that which World War II proved necessary. There is an Assistant Secretary of Interior, an Oil Imports Administrator, the Federal Power Commission, the U. S. Bureau of Mines, etc. The industry will not respond either to this structure or to personalities presently occupying the key positions. One individual, operating under delegation of Presidential authority, could accomplish much in establishing greater harmony between the Administration and the industry and also permit the Administration to dispose of many presently troublesome problems in this field.

4. Consider Comparable Actions Relative to Coal.

To a limited -- but much less urgent -- extent, what is suggested here for petroleum is needed also in relation to coal. Between 1940 and 1962, petroleum and coal have reversed positions in importance as suppliers of U. S. energy requirements. Quite likely, coal can benefit -- and the economies of the coal-producing states can benefit -- by prudent federal decisions to increase the above-ground reserves of coal during this period of emergency. This should be explored. However, more is to be lost than gained by intermingling the oil industry and the coal industry in conferences with the Administration. Each should be kept separate, even if treated equally.

IV.

As a purely practical matter, the present Cuban crisis makes irrelevant further discussion of changes in the present oil import program, at least insofar as reducing quotas is concerned. Assurances made privately of such an attitude by the Administration would probably serve constructive ends. At the same time, however, there is one element of the import program which may specifically deserve review in light of the Cuban development: i.e., the status of the so-called inland refineries.

At present, a substantial percentage of U. S. refinery capacity is going unused because refinery owners are selling their import quotas to major refineries and are maintaining only the most necessary minimum refinery operations at their own small installations. The implication of this to national security is adverse. U. S. refining operations are centralized and concentrated in a very limited number of refineries. The dispersal which is possible is not being utilized because of an unintended economic incentive for non-use of the small inland refineries. This, of course, is one of the most vexing aspects of the Eisenhower import program which this Administration has continued unchanged. If desired, the present Cuban situation probably permits a change in the program aimed at a "use it or lose it" policy for the small refineries. If such refineries were required to refine the oil imported under their quotas, it would mean an increase in employment in many communities as well as getting the Administration past a problem which has the potential of becoming some day a national scandal.

A change of this kind cannot be accomplished precipitately. However, there is considerable political dynamite involved in the present program, if any sort of national petroleum shortage should materialize. Too many independent refiners are showing profits under the imports program when their refinery facilities are not even in use. This could be bad for everybody if our stock of refined products proves to be inadequate at any time during the next several months.

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MEMORANDUM

201

DATE: October 30, 1962
TO: The Vice President
FROM: Colonel Burris
RE: Cuban Refugees

Depression and gloom characterize the reactions of the Cuban refugees in Florida. There is considerable apprehension that the Soviet Union will extract a guarantee or commitment in some form that the refugees will not be permitted to invade Cuba or that no support will be given their activities. It is essential that U.S. agreements and commitments with the USSR avoid this specific question. While it does not follow that the U.S. should presently contemplate support of future action by this group, it should not, at the same time, permit even the assumption that the return of these individuals to their homeland is inhibited by an agreement or understanding of two other nations. While the impact upon the refugees themselves would be incalculable, it would, at the same time, be very great indeed among all Latin American nations. The best solution to the problem appears to be to ignore the Soviet demand and to resist similar overtures which might come from some segments of the U.N. In the meantime, efforts should be intensified toward persuading the refugees to be calm and patient during this critical period.

An ultimate solution of the refugee problem within the framework of the Organization of American States appears the most feasible. Such a course takes advantage of this recent awakening of Latin America and of this new stimulation toward mutual support, concern and cohesion for problems and peoples of the hemisphere. It diffuses the refugee problem (but does not necessarily diminish or discount it) by sharing the concern and effort for a solution with the various nations. It reduces the image that Cuba and the refugee problem are the creation and sole concern of the United States. It offers a vehicle for Latin American nations to manifest their concern, efforts and interest in resolving the problem, and by doing so, contributes to closer relations in the area. It is suggested that State create a study group to work confidentially with the OAS on the problem of refugees. Various forms of assistance could be devised, and a possible resettlement could be worked out for eventual return or repatriation if contemplated. Elements of the OAS should appropriately plan the operation and support. Planning

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Authority State 3/27/79 re NLT-77-2
By MFE NARS, Date 4/6/79

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for the disposition of the refugees would give hope to these individuals, provided specific action is envisioned in the relatively near future. It would also emasculate Soviet charges that the U.S. will sustain this nucleus of people as the basis for an invasion of Cuba.

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MEMORANDUM

202

DATE: October 30, 1962

TO: The Vice President

FROM: Colonel Burris

RE: Reconnaissance Activities in Cuba

Instructions have gone out to CINCLANT to suspend quarantine only during the period of U Thant's visit to Cuba which is expected to end Wednesday evening. Reconnaissance flights, as you know, have also been suspended during this period. However, there is apprehension in the Defense Department that the U.S. might submit to Soviet demands that inspection be carried out upon completion of the dismantling process and that U.S. quarantine and reconnaissance be terminated. The traditional Soviet scheme invoked in disarmament discussions is that inspections may be carried out only upon completion of a particular phase. This has never been an acceptable condition, and Defense feels strongly that it should not be accepted in this particular case because of the possibility of compromise and perhaps Soviet duplicity.

The air reconnaissance, therefore, should be resumed immediately upon the departure of U Thant if the Soviets contend that U.N. observers may inspect only the completion of the task. The requirement to continue the reconnaissance becomes more imperative if the Soviets maintain their insistence upon Red Cross personnel who, in the first place, might lack certain qualifications to make desired technical inspections, and, in the second place, would in a sense be an extra-U.N. body carrying out U.N. functions.

It is essential, therefore, that reconnaissance be resumed upon the departure of U Thant and that the Soviets be made fully aware of U.S. intentions to carry out these measures until operating on-site inspections are effective. Further, the U.S. should insist that representatives of the United Nations itself, rather than an unrelated body like the Red Cross, be responsible for supervising the dismantling and withdrawal of the missiles.

Since the subject of disarmament is bound to receive increasing attention in forthcoming months, it would be well to use this occasion to challenge this traditional Soviet roadblock on inspection. Such a challenge, in all probability, will not affect the current phase of the Cuban operation in the final analysis.

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Authority State 3-7-78, OSD 5-19-78, NSC
By isg, NAB, Date 10-3-79

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PRESIDENT'S SPEECH - PROCLAMATION

TCS - 3rd Draft
10/21/62

Good evening, my fellow citizens:

This Government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military build-up on the island of Cuba. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive nuclear missile sites is now in preparation on that unhappy island. Until ~~last night~~ ^{Tuesday morning}, no reliable information of this nature had been received. Having now completed its evaluation and our determination upon a course of action, this Government feels obliged to report this information to you in full detail.

For example, five of these sites, containing 4 launchers each, are medium range Ballistic Missile sites, with two missiles to be loaded on each launcher. Each of these 32 missiles would be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1000 nautical miles. Each of these 32 missiles, in short, is capable of striking Washington, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico City, or any other city in the Southern States of the United States, in Central America or in the Caribbean.

Two missile sites not yet completed appear to be designed for sixteen intermediate range Ballistic Missiles -- capable of travelling more than twice as far and thus capable of striking any city in the Western Hemisphere as far north as Hudson's Bay, Canada and as far south as Lima, Peru. In addition, medium range jet bombers, capable of

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(President suggest expansion)

Change to eliminate reference to number

carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated on Cuba, while appropriate air bases are being prepared.

This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base -- by the presence of these large, long-range and clearly offensive weapons of sudden destruction -- constitutes an open threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in ^{manifest} ~~overt~~ and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this nation and Hemisphere, the Joint Resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own public warnings to the Soviets on September 4 and 13. This action also contradicts the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately delivered, that the arms build-up in Cuba would retain its original defensive character, and that Soviet missiles would never be stationed on the territory of any other nation.

The size of this undertaking makes clear that it had been planned some months ago. Yet only last month, after I had made clear the distinction between any introduction of ground-to-ground missiles and defensive anti-aircraft missiles, the Soviet Government publicly stated that "the armaments and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive purposes", that "there is no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons . . . for a retaliatory blow to any other country, for instance Cuba", and that "the Soviet Union has so powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union." That statement was

patently false, and misleading.

Only last Thursday, as this rapid offensive build-up continued, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko told me in my office that he was instructed to make it clear once again, as he said the Soviet Government had already done, that Soviet assistance to Cuba "pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba", that "training by Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals in handling defensive armaments was by no means offensive", and that "if it were otherwise, the Soviet Government would have never become involved in rendering such assistance." That statement also was ^{false} ~~dishonest and dishonorable~~.

Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute an ^{breach of maximum peril} ~~armed attack~~ under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Nuclear weapons are so destructive, and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any ~~substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden~~ ^{deployment upsets the delicate balance that had prevailed.} change in the nature of their threat may well require an act of self-defense.

State Dept.
suggestion.)

For many years, both the Soviet Union and the United States -- recognizing this fact -- have deployed nuclear weapons with great care, never upsetting the precarious status quo which ensured that these weapons would not be used in the absence of some vital challenge. Our ^{strategic missiles} ~~own weapons systems~~ have never been secretly transferred to the territory

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(Pres says key word - develop concept further)

of any other nation; and our history -- unlike that of the Soviets since World War II -- demonstrates that we have no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation or impose our system upon its people. Nevertheless, American citizens have become adjusted to living daily on the bull's eye of Soviet missiles located inside the USSR or in submarines. In that sense, missiles in Cuba simply add to an already clear and present danger -- although, it should be noted, the nations of Latin America have never previously been ~~included as~~ ^{under a potential nuclear threat.} ~~communist nuclear targets.~~

But this secret, swift and extraordinary build-up of communist missiles in an area well-known to have a special and historical relationship to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere -- in violation of Soviet assurances, in suddenly stationing strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil, in defiance of American and Hemispheric policy -- is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country, if our courage and our commitments are ever to be believed again by either friend or foe.

The 1930's taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to grow unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war. This nation is opposed to war. We are also true to our word. Our unswerving objective, therefore, must be to ^{prevent the} ~~take whatever steps are~~ necessary to prevent the use of these missiles against this or any other country, and to secure their withdrawal or elimination from the Western Hemisphere. ~~For so informing Soviet Chairman Khrushchev and~~

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~~President Derticos of Cuba by separate messages already dispatched.~~

Our policy has been one of patience and restraint, as befits a peaceful and powerful nation. We had no wish to be diverted from our central efforts by mere irritants and fanatics. But further action is now required and underway; and these actions may only be the beginning. We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of world-wide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our ^{Months} hands -- but neither will we shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced.

Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and that of the entire Western Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution as endorsed by the Resolution of the Congress, I have directed that the following initial steps be taken immediately:

1) First: to halt this offensive build-up, ~~there is to be initiated~~ ^{strict guarantee} ~~a blockade on all~~ ^{offensive} military equipment under shipment to Cuba. ^{is being initiated.} [Such a blockade can clearly be authorized both by the requirements of U. S. self-defense and by the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American States, acting under Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty and this year's Punta del Este Resolution.] All ships bound for Cuba, from whatever nation or port, will, if found to contain cargoes of ^{offensive} weapons, be turned back. ^{this guarantee} Such a blockade will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers. ~~In short, it will not only prevent completion~~

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

~~of the current offensive build-up on Cuba. It will also require the Soviet Union to choose between fighting the U. S. Navy in American waters or abandoning its build-up on Cuba. And it will require Cuba to choose between pursuing the interests of her own people or subjecting them to great dangers in the interests of a distant power.~~

2) Second: I have directed the continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba and its military build-up. The Foreign Ministers of the OAS in their communique of October 6 rejected secrecy on such matters in this Hemisphere. Should offensive military preparations continue, thus increasing the threat to the Hemisphere, ^{further} ~~appropriate~~ action will be undertaken ~~in a timely and in a manner of our own determination.~~ I have directed the armed forces to prepare for ^{any} ~~such~~ eventualities, ~~including~~ ~~the targeting of these bases by our strategic forces,~~ and I trust that both the Cuban people and the Soviet technicians at these sites will recognize ~~in time~~ our inability to tolerate this threat.

3) Third: It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.

4) Fourth: We shall urge the UN and the OAS to demand removal of these offensive weapons, and the prompt dispatch of an international inspection team to make certain that this is done.

5) Fifth: As a necessary military precaution, I have reinforced

NOTE: ←
Combine
this with
Par. 6 and
pro
OAS meeting
before UN meeting.

our base at Guantanamo, evacuated the dependents of our personnel there and ordered additional military units to stand by on an alert basis.

6) Sixth: Our allies in both NATO and the OAS have been alerted; the call for the OAS meeting to which I referred has already gone out; our case against this serious threat to peace will be presented, as required by the Charter, to which we subscribe, to an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council; and we shall, in addition, convene immediately a meeting of countries in the Caribbean area to work out cooperative means of halting the clandestine movement of subversive agents and materials between Cuba and Latin America.

7) Seventh: I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations. I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination, and to join with me and others in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and transform the history of man. ~~[By his action last week the world has moved a step closer to the brink of that dark and awful abyss of destruction. It is time for both sides to step back from that brink to refrain from any action which will widen or deepen the present crisis and to resume the search for peaceful and permanent solutions.]~~

This nation ~~is prepared to~~ ^{will} present its case against this threat to peace and our own proposals for a peaceful world at any time, in any forum, to any figure -- in the OAS, in the United Nations, ~~and to Chairman Khrushchev~~ ^{or any other appropriate place.}

(To be combined with
Apr. 4)

Tentative
deletion -
"duo in brink"
etc.

~~in person~~ We have in the past made strenuous efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. We have proposed the elimination of all arms and overseas bases in a fair and effective disarmament treaty. We are prepared to discuss new proposals for the removal of tensions on both sides -- including the possibilities of a genuinely independent Cuba, free to determine its own destiny. ~~We have only recently supported the announcement by the Iranian Government that it would not permit the establishment of foreign missile bases upon its territory.~~ We have no wish to war with the Soviet Union; for we are a peaceful people who desire to live in peace with all other peoples.

But we cannot settle these problems under threats ~~negotiation~~ ~~yes, intimidation never.~~ That is why this latest Soviet threat -- or any other threat which is made either independently or in response to our ~~actions~~ ~~blockade~~ -- must and will be met with determination. ~~And that is why,~~ Should any talks develop, our forces all over the world will be alert -- and the ~~blockade~~ ^{quarantine} will remain. Any ~~Soviet show of force~~ ^{hostile actions} anywhere in the world against the safety and freedom of peoples to whom we are committed, -- ~~including the brave people of West Berlin~~ -- will be met by whatever action is needed; ~~and we are ready, if tensions are increased over Berlin, to send additional ground and air forces to Europe.~~

8) Finally, I have directed the United States Information Agency to

use all available resources in making clear our position to the captive

This entire par. to be re-written "up" changed more in the Cuban people. The Pres. will sign off on the general tone of language suggested by the A.G.

people of Cuba. My words tonight are being carried directly to them -- and I want to tell them this. Do not permit yourselves to become involved in the grim confrontation of nuclear weapons. Do not become the first Latin American country to have these weapons on your soil. Do not become the first Latin American country to be a necessary target for massive destruction. These weapons cannot contribute to the security of Cuba; they can only undermine it. They can contribute nothing to your peace and well being.

This nation has no quarrel with the Cuban people, only sympathy and hope. We know you did not consent to the transformation of your island into a target for nuclear war. We know your lives and land are being used as pawns by those who deny you freedom. We have no wish to cause you to suffer or to impose any system upon you.

Our objective, on the contrary, is to give back to the Cuban people the dream of their own revolution -- the dream of "liberty and justice for all" which Fidel Castro repudiated when he sold you out to the Soviets. Many times in the past, the Cuban people have risen to throw out tyrants -- foreign and domestic -- who destroyed their liberty. And I have no doubt that the vast majority of Cubans today looks forward to the time when they will once again be free -- free to choose their own leaders, free to select their own system, free to own their own land, to speak and write and worship without fear or degradation. And when foreign domination is

ended, and the use of Cuba as a base of subversion and aggression has ceased, we shall gladly welcome her back to the society of free nations and to the associations of this Hemisphere. For the basic objective of the United States in the world today is peace and freedom -- and that includes the peace and freedom of the Cuban people.

* * *

My fellow citizens: let no one doubt that this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take or what costs or casualties will be incurred. Many months of sacrifice and self-discipline lie ahead -- months in which both our will and our patience will be tested by those who would have us do more and those who would have us do less. But the path we have chosen for the present is consistent with our character and courage as a nation, and our commitments around the world. The cost of freedom is always high -- but Americans have always paid it. One path we shall never choose -- the path of surrender or submission.

Our goal is not the victory of might but the vindication of right -- not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace and freedom, here in this Hemisphere, and, we hope, around the world. God willing, that goal will be achieved.

TCS - 3rd Draft
10/21/62

Good evening, my fellow citizens:

This Government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military build-up on the island of Cuba. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive nuclear missile sites is now in preparation on that unhappy island. Until less than a week ago, no reliable information of this nature had been received -- but, having now completed its evaluation and our determination upon a course of action, this Government feels obliged to report this new crisis to you in full detail.

Four and possibly five of these sites, containing 4 launchers each, are Medium Range Ballistic Missile sites, with two missiles to be loaded on each launcher. Each of these 32 missiles would be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1000 nautical miles. Each of these 32 missiles, in short, is capable of striking Washington, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico City, or any other city in the Southeastern part of the United States, in Central America or in the Caribbean area.

Two additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles -- capable of travelling more than twice as far and thus capable of striking almost any city in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far north as Hudson's Bay, Canada and as far south as Lima, Peru. In addition, medium range jet bombers, capable of

carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated on Cuba, while appropriate air bases are being prepared.

This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base -- by the presence of these large, long-range and clearly offensive weapons of sudden destruction -- constitutes an open threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in naked and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this nation and Hemisphere, the Joint Resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own public warnings to the Soviets on September 4 and 13. This action also contradicts the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately delivered, that the arms build-up in Cuba would retain its original defensive character, and that Soviet missiles would never be stationed on the territory of any other nation.

The size of this undertaking makes clear that it had been planned some months ago. Yet only last month, after I had made clear the distinction between any introduction of ground-to-ground missiles and defensive anti-aircraft missiles, the Soviet Government publicly stated that "the armaments and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive purposes", that "there is no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons . . . for a retaliatory blow to any other country, for instance Cuba", and that "the Soviet Union has so powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union." That statement was

patently false and misleading.

Only last Thursday, as this rapid offensive build-up continued, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko told me in my office that he was instructed to make it clear once again, as he said the Soviet Government had already done, that Soviet assistance to Cuba "pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba", that "training by Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals in handling defensive armaments was by no means offensive", and that "if it were otherwise, the Soviet Government would have never become involved in rendering such assistance." That statement also was dishonest and dishonorable.

Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute an "armed attack" under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Nuclear weapons are so destructive, and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in the nature of their threat may well require an act of self-defense.

For many years, both the Soviet Union and the United States -- recognizing this fact -- have deployed nuclear weapons with great care, never upsetting the precarious status quo which ensured that these weapons would not be used in the absence of some vital challenge. Our own weapons systems have never been secretly transferred to the territory

of any other nation; and our history -- unlike that of the Soviets since World War II -- demonstrates that we have no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation or impose our system upon its people. Nevertheless, American citizens have become adjusted to living daily on the bull's eye of Soviet missiles located inside the USSR or in submarines. In that sense, missiles in Cuba simply add to an already clear and present danger -- although, it should be noted, the nations of Latin America have never previously been included as communist nuclear targets.

But this secret, swift and extraordinary build-up of communist missiles in an area well-known to have a special and historical relationship to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere -- in violation of Soviet assurances, in suddenly stationing strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil, in defiance of American and Hemispheric policy -- is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country, if our courage and our commitments are ever to be believed again by either friend or foe.

The 1930's taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to grow unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war. This nation is opposed to war. We are also true to our word. Our unswerving objective, therefore, must be to take whatever steps are necessary to prevent the use of these missiles against this or any other country, and to secure their withdrawal or elimination from the Western Hemisphere. I am so informing Soviet Chairman Khrushchev and

President Dorticos of Cuba by separate messages already dispatched.

Our policy has been one of patience and restraint, as befits a peaceful and powerful nation. We had no wish to be diverted from our central efforts by mere irritants and fanatics. But further action is now required and underway; and these actions may only be the beginning. We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of world-wide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our hands -- but neither will we shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced.

Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and that of the entire Western Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution as endorsed by the Resolution of the Congress, I have directed that the following initial steps be taken immediately:

1) First: to halt this offensive build-up, there is to be initiated a blockade on all military equipment under shipment to Cuba. Such a blockade can clearly be authorized both by the requirements of U. S. self-defense and by the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American States, acting under Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty and this year's Punta del Este Resolution. All ships bound for Cuba, from whatever nation or port, will, if found to contain cargoes of weapons, be turned back. Such a blockade will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers. In short, it will not only prevent completion

of the current offensive build-up on Cuba. It will also require the Soviet Union to choose between fighting the U. S. Navy in American waters or abandoning its build-up on Cuba. And it will require Cuba to choose between pursuing the interests of her own people or subjecting them to great dangers in the interests of a distant power.

2) Second: I have directed the continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba and its military build-up. The Foreign Ministers of the OAS in their communique of October 6 rejected secrecy on such matters in this Hemisphere. Should offensive military preparations continue, thus increasing the threat to the Hemisphere, appropriate action will be undertaken at a time and in a manner of our own determination. I have directed the armed forces to prepare for such eventualities, including the targeting of these bases by our strategic forces; and I trust that both the Cuban people and the Soviet technicians at these sites will recognize in time our inability to tolerate this threat.

3) Third: It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.

4) Fourth: We shall urge the UN and the OAS to demand removal of these offensive weapons, and the prompt dispatch of an international inspection team to make certain that this is done.

5) Fifth: As a necessary military precaution, I have reinforced

our base at Guantanamo, evacuated the dependents of our personnel there and ordered additional military units to stand by on an alert basis.

6) Sixth: Our allies in both NATO and the OAS have been alerted; the call for the OAS meeting to which I referred has already gone out; our case against this serious threat to peace will be presented, as required by the Charter, to which we subscribe, to an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council; and we shall, in addition, convene immediately a meeting of countries in the Caribbean area to work out cooperative means of halting the clandestine movement of subversive agents and materials between Cuba and Latin America.

7) Seventh: I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations. I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination, and to join with me and others in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and transform the history of man. By his action last week the world has moved a step closer to the brink of that dark and awful abyss of destruction. It is time for both sides to step back from that brink -- to refrain from any action which will widen or deepen the present crisis -- and to resume the search for peaceful and permanent solutions.

This nation is prepared to present its case against this threat to peace and our own proposals for a peaceful world at any time, in any forum, to any figure -- in the OAS, in the United Nations, and to Chairman Khrushchev

in person. We have in the past made strenuous efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. We have proposed the elimination of all arms and overseas bases in a fair and effective disarmament treaty. We are prepared to discuss new proposals for the removal of tensions on both sides -- including the possibilities of a genuinely independent Cuba, free to determine its own destiny. ~~We have only recently supported the~~ announcement by the Iranian Government that it would not permit the ~~establishment of foreign missile bases upon its territory.~~ *out* We have no wish to war with the Soviet Union; for we are a peaceful people who desire to live in peace with all other peoples.

But we cannot settle these problems under threats -- negotiation yes, intimidation never. That is why this latest Soviet threat -- or any other threat which is made either independently or in response to our blockade -- must and will be met with determination. And that is why, should any talks develop, our forces all over the world will be alert -- and the blockade will remain. Any Soviet show of force anywhere in the world against the safety and freedom of peoples to whom we are committed -- including the brave people of West Berlin -- will be met by whatever action is needed; and we are ready, if tensions are increased over Berlin, to send additional ground and air forces to Europe.

8) Finally, I have directed the United States Information Agency to use all available resources in making clear our position to the captive

people of Cuba. My words tonight are being carried directly to them -- and I want to tell them this. Do not permit yourselves to become involved in the grim confrontation of nuclear weapons. Do not become the first Latin American country to have these weapons on your soil. Do not become the first Latin American country to be a necessary target for massive destruction. These weapons cannot contribute to the security of Cuba; they can only undermine it. They can contribute nothing to your peace and well being.

This nation has no quarrel with the Cuban people, only sympathy and hope. We know you did not consent to the transformation of your island into a target for nuclear war. We know your lives and land are being used as pawns by those who deny you freedom. We have no wish to cause you to suffer or to impose any system upon you.

Our objective, on the contrary, is to give back to the Cuban people the dream of their own revolution -- the dream of "liberty and justice for all" which Fidel Castro repudiated when he sold you out to the Soviets. Many times in the past, the Cuban people have risen to throw out tyrants -- foreign and domestic -- who destroyed their liberty. And I have no doubt that the vast majority of Cubans today looks forward to the time when they will once again be free -- free to choose their own leaders, free to select their own system, free to own their own land, to speak and write and worship without fear or degradation. And when foreign domination is

ended, and the use of Cuba as a base of subversion and aggression has ceased, we shall gladly welcome her back to the society of free nations and to the associations of this Hemisphere. For the basic objective of the United States in the world today is peace and freedom -- and that includes the peace and freedom of the Cuban people.

* * *

My fellow citizens: let no one doubt that this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take or what costs or casualties will be incurred. Many months of sacrifice and self-discipline lie ahead -- months in which both our will and our patience will be tested by those who would have us do more and those who would have us do less. But the path we have chosen for the present is consistent with our character and courage as a nation, and our commitments around the world. The cost of freedom is always high -- but Americans have always paid it. One path we shall never choose -- the path of surrender or submission.

Our goal is not the victory of might but the vindication of right -- not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace and freedom, here in this Hemisphere, and, we hope, around the world. God willing, that goal will be achieved.

INTERDICTION OF THE DELIVERY OF OFFENSIVE
WEAPONS TO CUBA

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS the peace of the world and the security of the United States and of all American States are endangered by reason of the establishment by the Sino-Soviet powers of an offensive military capability in Cuba, including bases for ballistic missiles with a potential range covering most of North and South America;

WHEREAS by a Joint Resolution passed by the Congress of the United States and approved on October 3, 1962, it was declared that the United States is determined to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere, and to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States; and

WHEREAS the Organ of Consultation of the American Republics meeting in Washington on October 23, 1962, recommended that the Member States, in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American

Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, in accordance with the aforementioned resolutions of the United States Congress and of the Organ of Consultation of the American Republics, and to defend the security of the United States, do hereby proclaim that the forces under my command are ordered, beginning at 2:00 P. M. Greenwich time October 24, 1962, to interdict, subject to the instructions herein contained, the delivery of offensive weapons and associated materiel to Cuba.

For the purposes of this Proclamation, the following are declared to be prohibited materiel:

Patrol craft, motor torpedo boats or other craft with armament provisions, and their armament, including surface-to-surface missiles and torpedoes;

~~land-based~~ surface-to-surface missiles; bomber and ~~fighter-bomber~~ aircraft; bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the above items; and any other classes of materiel hereafter designated by the Secretary of Defense for the purpose of effectuating this Proclamation.

To enforce this order, the Secretary of Defense shall take appropriate measures to prevent the delivery of prohibited materiel to Cuba, employing the land, sea, and air forces of the United States in cooperation with any forces that may be made available by other American States.

The Secretary of Defense may make such regulations and issue such directives as he deems necessary to ensure the effectiveness of this order, including the designation, within a reasonable distance of Cuba, of prohibited or restricted zones and of prescribed routes.

Any vessel or craft which may be proceeding toward Cuba may be intercepted and may be directed to identify itself, its cargo, equipment and stores and its ports of call, to stop, to lie to, to submit to visit and search, or to proceed as directed. Any vessel or craft which fails or refuses to respond to or comply with directions shall be subject to being taken into custody. Any vessel or craft which it is believed is en route to Cuba and may be carrying prohibited materiel

or may itself constitute such materiel shall, wherever possible, be directed to proceed to another destination of its own choice and shall ~~not~~ be taken into custody ^{if} ~~unless~~ it fails or refuses to obey such directions. All vessels or craft taken into custody shall be sent into a port of the United States for appropriate disposition.

In carrying out this order, force shall not be used except in case of failure or refusal to comply with directions, or with regulations or directives of the Secretary of Defense issued hereunder, after reasonable efforts have been made to communicate them to the vessel or craft, or in case of self-defense. In any case, force shall be used only to the extent necessary.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done in the City of Washington this twenty-third day of October
in the year of our Lord, nineteen
hundred and sixty-two, and of the
Independence of the United States
of America the one hundred and
eighty-seventh.

By the President:

Secretary of State

