NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 3

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE		DATE	RESTRICTION
	All discussions per State ltr 3/28/72 unless otherwise noted			
#1a Cable	State No. 1781 from NY to SEC STATE	Top Secret 3 p	11/14/62	A
#2a Cable open 6.26.09	State No. 1646 from NY to SEC STATE	Top Secret Exempt 1 p	11/06/62	A
#3a Cable open 6.26.09	State No. 1660 from NY to SEC STATE	Secret Exempt 4 p	11/07/62	A
#4a Cable	State No. 1643 from NY to SEC STATE	Top Secret 1 p	11/06/62	A
#5a Cable open 6.26.09	State No. 1194 to NY	Top Secret Sanitized, NSC ltr 1/11/78 3 p	11/05/62	A
#6a Cable open 6.26.09	State Deptel 1200 to NY	Top Secret Sanitized, NSC ltr 1/11/78 6 p	11/05/62	A
#7a Cable	State No. 1635 from NY to SEC State	Secret 3 p	11/05/62	A
#8a Cable open 6.26.09	State No. 1642 from NY to SEC STATE	Secret Exempt 4 p	11/06/62	A
#9 Cable open 6.26.09	State No. 1630 from NY to SEC STATE	Top Secret Exempt 8 p	11/05/62	A
#10a Cable open 6.26.09	State No. 1630 from NY to SEC STATE (duplicate of #9)	Top Secret Exempt 8 p	11/05/62	A
#11a Cable	State No. 1625 from NY to SEC STATE	Secret NSC ltr 1/11/78 2 p	11/03/62	A
#12a Cable	State No. 1627 from NY to SEC STATE	Top Secret 2 p	11/03/62	A
#13a Cable	State No. 1629 from NY to SEC STATE	Top Secret 3 p	11/04/62	A
#14 CAble	State Deptel 1191 to NY	Secret 3 p	11/03/62	A
#15 Cable	State No. 1613 from NY to SEC STATE	Conf. NSC ltr 1/11/78 2 p	11/02/62	A

FILE LOCATION

VP Security File, Nations and Regions
UN Cables re Cuba Affair (III)

RESTRICTION CODES

(A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

2 of 3

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE		DATE	RESTRICTION
	All decisions per State ltr 3/28/77 unless otherwise noted			
#16 Cable	State Conf. State ltr 7/8/77			
	No. 1618 from NY to SEC STATE	3 p	11/02/62	A
#17 Cable	State Conf. NSC ltr 1/11/78			
	Deptel 1177 to USUN NY	2 p	11/02/62	A
#18 Cable	State Conf. Exempt			
open 6.26.09	No. 1607 from NY to SEC STATE	2 p	11/02/62	A
#19 Cable	State Conf.			
	No 660 from Brussels	1 p	11/02/62	A
#20 Cable	State Top Secret			
	No. 1608 from NY to SEC STATE	2 p	11/02/62	A
#21a Cable	State Secret			
	Deptel 1193 to USUN NY	3 p	11/04/62	A
#22 Cable	State Top Secret			
	No 1609 from NY to SEC STATE	2 p	11/02/62	A
#23a CAble	State Conf.			
	Deptel 1181 to USUN NY	3 p	11/02/62	A
#24 Cable	State Secret			
	Draft Instruction to USUN	4 p	Undated	A
#25a Cable	State Secret NSC ltr 1/11/78			
	No 1606 from NY to SEC STATE	2 p	11/02/62	A
#26 Cable	State Conf.			
	Deptel 1156 to USUN NY	1 p	10/31/62	A
#27 Cable	State Conf. Exempt			
open 6.26.09	No. 1581 from NY to SEC STATE	4 p	11/01/62	A
#28 Cable	State Conf.			
	No. 1584 from NY to SEC STATE	2 p	11/01/62	A
#29 Cable	State Conf.			
	No. 1585 from NY to SEC STATE	3 p	11/01/62	A
#30a Cable	State Top Secret Exempt			
open 6.26.09	No. 1604 from NY to SEC STATE	4 p	11/02/62	A

FILE LOCATION

VP Security File, Nations and Regions
UN Cables re Cuba Affair (III)

RESTRICTION CODES

(A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

3 of 3

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE			DATE	RESTRICTION
	all decisions per letter 3/8/77 unless otherwise noted				
#31a Cable	State No 1595 from NY to SEC STATE	Conf.	1 p	11/01/62	A
#32a Cable	State Deptel 1082 to Rio de Janeiro	Top Secret	1 p	11/01/62	A
#33a Cable	State No 1588 from NY to SEC STATE	Secret	3 p	11/01/62	A
#34a Cable	STATE Deptel 1159 to USUN NY	Conf. NSC ltr 1/11/78	3 p	11/01/62	A
#35a Cable	STATE No. 1587 from NY to SEC STATE	SECRET	4 p	11/01/62	A
#36a Cable	STATE Deptel 1166 to USUN, NY	Conf.	4 p	11/01/62	A
#37 Cable	State Deptel 1085tto NY	Conf. NSC ltr 1/11/78	2 p	10/25/62	A
#38a Cable Open 6·26·09	State No. 1579 from NY to SEC STATE	Conf. Withdrawn NSC ltr 1/11/78	2 p	10/31/62	A
#39 Cable	State To USUN, NY re: NY's cable 1456	Secret	3 p	Undated	A
#40 Cable	State No 1453 to NY from SEC STATE	Conf.	4 p	10/25/62	A
#42 Cable	State re: UN inspection procedures	Secret NSC ltr 1/11/78	2 p	Undated	A
#43 Cable	State Deptel 1153 to USUN, NY	Secret	4 p	10/31/62	A
#44 Cable	State re: NY negotiations	Secret NSC ltr 1/11/78	10 p	10/31/62	A
#45 Cable	State re: NY negotiations	Secret NSC ltr 1/11/78	7 p	10/31/62	A

FILE LOCATION

VP Security File, Nations and Regions
UN Cables re Cuba Affair (III)

50

RESTRICTION CODES

(A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

Vice President #17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SPECIAL HANDLING

~~EYES ONLY~~

TO:
FROM: New York
NUMBER: 1781
DATE: Nov. 14, 1962

(TOP SECRET)

Signature Record

Date	Officer	Signature

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S - William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO - L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

INCOMING TELEGRAM **Department of State** Vice President

1a

W

Action
SS

Info

TOP SECRET

Control: 5093
Rec'd: November 14, 1962
8:43 p.m.

017

FROM: New York

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1781, November 14, 8 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State ltr 3/28/77
By MBA/RG, NARS, Date 4/22/77

PRIORITY

DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY

CUBA

AT MTG WITH SYG THIS MORNING STEVENSON AND MCCLOY GAVE HIM ACCOUNT OF PRESENT STATUS US-SOV NEGOTS.

SYG RESPONDED BY REPORTING ON HIS RECENT NEGOTS WITH CUBANS AND SOVS ON UN VERIFICATION. THANT SAID HE HAD SOUNDED OUT LECHUGA INFORMALLY NOV 8 ON ACCEPTABILITY FIVE LA AMBS IN CUBA FOR DUAL PURPOSE OF VERIFYING WITHDRAWAL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND OF SERVING AS LIAISON BETWEEN UN AND CUBAN GOVT IN REGARD TO SOLUTION CUBAN CRISIS. ON NOV 11 LECHUGA INFORMED SYG HIS GOVT'S RESPONSE TO FIRST FUNCTION PROPOSED FOR LA AMBS WAS NEGATIVE AND ITS REACTION TO SECOND PROPOSED FUNCTION WAS POSITIVE. WHEN SYG INQUIRED WHETHER CASTRO OBJECTS TO LATIN AMERICANS PERFORMING THESE FUNCTIONS, LECHUGA REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE BUT ADDED THAT HIS GOVT IS UNHAPPY ABOUT ACTION LA COUNTRIES IN OAS ON OCT 23.

CONSEQUENTLY ON NOV 12 SYG MADE FORMAL PROPOSAL IN WRITING TO LECHUGA PROPOSING, IN PLACE LA AMBS, GROUP OF AMBS FROM "NON-ALIGNED" COUNTRIES IN ASIA, AFRICA, EUROPE AND LA TO PERFORM SAME TWO FUNCTIONS, I.E., VERIFICATION AND LIAISON BETWEEN CUBA AND UN. NO REPLY HAS YET BEEN RECEIVED TO THIS SECOND PROPOSAL AND LECHUGA APPEARED TO EXPECT HIS GOVT'S REPLY WOULD BE IDENTICAL WITH ITS REACTION TO FIRST INFORMAL PROPOSAL, THAT IS NEGATIVE ON VERIFICATION AND POSITIVE ON LIAISON.

TOP SECRET

SYG CONTINUED THAT, WHILE HE, LIKE US AND USSR, FEELS SC MTG IS UNDESIRABLE AT THIS STAGE, HE NEVERTHELESS FEELS OBLIGATION TO REPORT TO SC IN NEAR FUTURE SINCE ALMOST THREE WEEKS HAS ELAPSED SINCE HIS APPEAL TO INTERESTED PARTIES IN CUBAN CRISIS. HE WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF WRITTEN REPORT TO SC NOV 16 FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF CASTRO'S REPLY TO HIS PROPOSAL. BOTH US REPS AND HIS OWN COLLEAGUES (BUNCHE AND LOUTFI) DISCOURAGED IDEA OF WRITTEN REPORT TO SC AT THIS POINT WHILE NEGOTS ARE STILL IN FLUID STATE AND SYG APPEARED WILLING TO DELAY.

IN RESPONSE TO QUERY HE EXPLAINED THAT WHAT HE HAD IN MIND IN PROPOSING NON-ALIGNED AMBASSADORIAL GROUP IN HAVANA SERVE AS LIAISON BETWEEN UN AND CASTRO WAS THAT, PARTLY THROUGH THEIR GOOD OFFICES, CASTRO MIGHT BE GRADUALLY PULLED OUT OF ALL BLOCS AND INTO MILITARILY NON-ALIGNED POSITION WHICH HE HAD APPARENTLY ASPIRED TO WHEN HE PARTICIPATED IN BELGRADE CONFERENCE LAST YEAR.

THERE ENSURED CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS DURING WHICH STEVENSON AND MCCLOY ATTEMPTED TO DRAW CLEAR LINE BETWEEN IMMEDIATE VERIFICATION WITHDRAWAL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND LONGER TERM SAFEGUARDS AGAINST REINTRODUCTION SUCH WEAPONS INTO CUBA. SYG EMPHASIZED THAT CASTRO INSISTED ON RECIPROCITY IN REGARD TO ANY MEASURES OF VERIFICATION OR INSPECTION AND THAT HE, THANT, DOUBTED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CARRY OUT EITHER SHORT OR LONG TERM MEASURES OF THIS KIND WITHOUT RECIPROCAL FEATURES. THERE WAS MENTION OF POSSIBLE INSPECTION SOLELY OF CUBAN EXILE CAMPS IN US AND ELSEWHERE AS QUID PRO QUO FOR VERIFICATION WITHDRAWAL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FROM CUBA. US NEGOTIATORS EMPHASIZED IN LATTER CONNECTION THAT MERE INSPECTION OF VACANT MISSILE SITES WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT AND THAT INSPECTORS MUST HAVE FREEDOM TO INVESTIGATE REPORTS OF CONCEALED WEAPONS IN CAVES OR ELSEWHERE. AS TO LONG-TERM SAFEGUARDS NARASIMHAN SUGGESTED THAT UN COMMISSION, CONSTITUTED FROM NON-ALIGNED AMBS OR OTHERWISE, MIGHT BE CHARGED ON THE ONE HAND WITH ASSURING THAT THERE WAS NO REINTRODUCTION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND ON OTHER HAND OF POLICING ASSURANCES AGAINST INVASION OF CUBA BY US AND OTHERS. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION OF THIS PROPOSAL IT WAS AGREED UN SHOULD FORMULATE IT IN WRITING AND SUBMIT IT TO US FOR STUDY. STEVENSON EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO LONG-TERM SAFEGUARDS AND RECALLED THAT THOSE SUGGESTED SO FAR INCLUDE

(1) SOV ASSURANCES OF NON-REINTRODUCTION, (2) CONTINUED US AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE, (3) LA NUCLEAR FREE ZONE WITH APPROPRIATE INSPECTION, AND (4) UN INSPECTION AGAINST REINTRODUCTION AND INVASION AS JUST SUGGESTED BY NARASIMHAN. MCCLOY SUGGESTED UN AERIAL SURVEILLANCE IN CARIBBEAN AS POSSIBLE VARIANT. UN OFFICIALS EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE DOUBT WHETHER NUCLEAR FREE ZONE COULD BE ORGANIZED WITHOUT DELAY OF SEVERAL MONTHS.

IN CONCLUSION THERE WAS BRIEF DISCUSSION OF CONDUCT AND PROCEDURES IN FINAL SC MTG ON CUBA. THANT SAID POSSIBILITIES HE HAD MENTIONED TO SOVS WERE (1) TRADITIONAL SC FORM OF RES, (2) DECLARATIONS BY PARTIES CONCERNED, IN WHICH CASE US STATEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY ENDORSED BY OAS, WHICH MIGHT BE REPORTED TO SC BY CHILE AND VENEZUELA, (3) JOINT PROTOCOL AGREED BEFORE SC MTG, (4) COMBINATION OF RES AND DECLARATIONS WHEREBY RES MIGHT WELCOME SOME POINTS IN DECLARATIONS AND TAKE NOTE OF OTHERS. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION VIEW WAS GENERALLY EXPRESSED THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY BE IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT ON EITHER PROTOCOL OR RES AND THAT JOINT DECLARATIONS WOULD BE SIMPLEST SOLUTION. STEVENSON POINTED OUT THAT US IS OF COURSE NOT IN POSITION TO PREDICT WHAT OAS ACTION MIGHT BE. WE WOULD SUPPOSE OAS MIGHT, AFTER SOVS HAD COMPLIED WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS, REPEAL ITS RES OF OCT 23 BUT WE CANNOT YET KNOW WHAT OTHER ACTION OAS MIGHT TAKE.

STEVENSON

LTR/14

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 11/14/62, 9 PM.

NOTE: Passed Principal Officers Executive Committee Per Mr. Rogers 11/14/CWO-W

"Vice Pres.

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECIAL HANDLING

TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY

2

TO:
FROM: New York
NUMBER: 1646
DATE: 11/6/62

Signature Record

Copy No. 6

Date	Officer	Signature

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S - William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO - L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* U.P.

W
Action
SS

Info

~~TOP SECRET~~

Control: 2Ø77
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 6, 1962
8:Ø1 PM

006

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1646, NOVEMBER 6, 7 PM

ISSUED ONLY

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY - PASS WHITE HOUSE

CUBA

FOLLOWING IS QUICK TRANSLATION OF COMMUNICATION KUZNETSOV SENT STEVENSON NOVEMBER 6:

AS I INFORMED YOU AND MR. MCCLOY YESTERDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1962, THE DESPATCHING FROM CUBA OF SOVIET SHIPS WITH THE ARMS WHICH ARE BEING REMOVED TO THE SOVIET UNION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT ON THIS POINT, REACHED THROUGH THE EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE US, IS COMMENCING ON NOVEMBER 6. ON THIS DAY, THE SOVIET VESSEL "LABINSK" IS SAILING FROM CUBA, AND ON NOVEMBER 7 THE SOVIET VESSELS, "BRATSK", "LENIN KOMSOMOL", "KURCHATOV", "ANOSOV", "DIVNOGORSK", "VOLGOLES", "POLZUNOV, AND "ALAPAEVSK" WILL SET SAIL.

SIMULTANEOUSLY, I AM CONFIRMING THAT WE HAVE NO OBJECTIONS TO THE SETTING IN MOTION BY MR. MCCLOY OF THE PROPOSAL FOR US SHIPS TO OBSERVE AT CLOSER RANGE THE REMOVAL OF THE ROCKETS ON SOVIET VESSELS.

STEVENSON

MRJ
NOTE: RELAYED WHITE HOUSE 11/6/62.

~~TOP SECRET~~

3

CONFIDENTIAL SPECIAL HANDLING

EYES ONLY - THE VICE PRESIDENT

TO:
FROM: New York
NUMBER: 1660
DATE: 7 Nov 62

Signature Record

Copy 5

Date	Officer	Signature

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

CONFIDENTIAL SPECIAL HANDLING

EYES ONLY - THE VICE PRESIDENT

TO:
FROM: New York
NUMBER: 1660
DATE: 7 Nov 62

Copy 5

Signature Record

Date	Officer	Signature

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

3a

3

Action
S/S

Info

~~SECRET~~

Control: 2142
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 7, 1962
1:31 AM

005

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1660, NOVEMBER 7, 1 AM

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY - DEPARTMENT PASS WHITE HOUSE

CUBA

STEVENSON, GILPATRIC AND YOST HAD A FIVE AND HALF HOUR MEETING WITH KUZNETSOV, ZORIN AND MENDELEVICH TODAY. FOL SUMMARY BASED ON UNCLEARED MEMCON.

1. ICRC INSPECTION. STEVENSON INFORMED SOVS US NOT PREPARED AGREE TO EMPLOYMENT SOV SHIP AND PREFERRED UN CHARTERED NEUTRAL SHIP, I.E., SWEDISH VESSEL AVAILABLE IN CARIBBEAN AREA. NOTED ICRC WOULD VERIFY ALL SOV FLAG SHIPS, SOV CHARTERED SHIPS, BLOC SHIPS, AND BLOC CHARTERED SHIPS. KUZNETSOV ARGUED AT LENGTH SOVS COULD SPEAK ONLY FOR THEIR OWN SHIPS AND PERHAPS SOV CHARTERED SHIPS, BUT COULD NOT SPEAK FOR ANY OTHER COUNTRY, SINCE THAT WOULD BE VIOLATION SOVEREIGNTY THOSE COUNTRIES. CLAIMED US APPROACH THIS PROBLEM AT VARIANCE WITH PRES' OCT 23 MESSAGE, WHICH SPOKE OF "YOUR" I.E., SOV SHIPS ONLY. STEVENSON EXPLAINED QUARANTINE AGAINST OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IMPOSED ON ALL SHIPPING TO CUBA REGARDLESS OF NATIONALITY AND US WILLING REPLACE QUARANTINE TEMPORARILY ICRC VERIFICATION. KUZNETSOV CLAIMED QUARANTINE ILLEGAL AND USSR COULD NOT BE EXPECTED ASSIST US IN MAKING ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD BE SUBSTITUTION FOR IT. DISCUSSION THIS SUBJECT CONCLUDED WITH STEVENSON SAYING IF SOVS REFUSED APPLY ICRC VERIFICATION TO ALL VESSELS WITH BLOC CARGOES, US WOULD HAVE TO CONTINUE USE QUARANTINE WITH RESPECT ALL SHIPS OTHER THAN SOV. KUZNETSOV RESPONDED USSR AGREED TO ICRC "OBSERVATION"

SOV

~~SECRET~~

SOV CUBA-BOUND SHIPS AND IF US WISHED USE QUARANTINE FOR OTHER SHIPS, THAT ITS OWN BUSINESS.

AFTER FURTHER EXCHANGE RE NATIONALITY SHIP TO CARRY ICRC TEAM, KUZNETSOV ADMITTED SOV ORIGINAL PROPOSAL HAD BEEN TO USE EITHER SOV OR NEUTRAL SHIP. FINALLY INDICATED NEUTRAL SHIP WOULD PROBABLY BE SATISFACTORY AND AGREED GIVE USUN FINAL WORD SHORTLY. (SUBSEQUENTLY PHONED TO CONFIRM SWEDISH VESSEL OK AND ASK NAME AND LOCATION.)

2. INSPECTION PROCEDURE OUTGOING SOV SHIPS. STEVENSON SUGGESTED SOVS GIVE US SCHEDULE SHIPMENT 42 MISSILES KUZNETSOV HAD TOLD HAD BEEN OR WERE IN CUBA, AS WELL AS TIME AND PLACE FOR RENDEZVOUS WITH US NAVY SHIPS FOR VERIFICATION PURPOSES. HE OUTLINED VERIFICATION PROCEDURE AS FOLLOWS: DEPENDING UPON OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS, PRESENCE OF MISSILES ON BOARD SOV SHIPS WOULD BE VERIFIED EITHER FROM US VESSEL OR UNARMED HELICOPTER THROUGH VISUAL OBSERVATION AND PHOTOGRAPHY; ONE OR TWO MISSILES SHOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY EXPOSED SO AS TO IDENTIFY THEM AS SUCH BUT WITHOUT REVEALING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. PHOTOGRAPHY NECESSARY FOR PURPOSE OF VERIFYING NUMBER OUTGOING MISSILES. KUZNETSOV REFERRED TO LIST OUTGOING SOV SHIPS HE HAD GIVEN STEVENSON YESTERDAY AND SAID HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THOSE SHIPS WERE CARRYING WHAT US CALLED OFFENSIVE ARMS, INCLUDING MISSILES. HAD NO INFORMATION RE SHIPS AND CARGOES AFTER NOV 7. NOTED PROMPT ACTION REQUIRED SINCE ONE SHIP ALREADY LEFT HAVANA. RE USE OF HELICOPTERS, OBSERVED THIS NEW POINT BUT SAID IT WOULD BE COMMUNICATED TO SOV GOVT. PROMISED PROMPT REPLY. GILPATRIC AND KUZNETSOV AGREED EXCHANGE CALL SIGNALS BOTH SOV SHIPS AND US NAVY VESSELS CONCERNED, AND MASTERS WOULD ARRANGE BETWEEN THEMSELVES TIME AND PLACE RENDEZVOUS.

3. REMOVAL OF WARHEADS. STEVENSON SUGGESTED SOVS FURNISH NUMBER OF WARHEADS AND SCHEDULE THEIR REMOVAL, FOLLOWING PATTERN ENVISAGED FOR MISSILES. SAID VERIFICATION PROCEDURE FOR MISSILES COULD BE APPLIED TO WARHEADS AS WELL, WITH ONE DIFFERENCE, I.E., GEIGER COUNTERS SHOULD BE PLACED CLOSE ENOUGH TO WARHEAD CONTAINERS TO DETECT RADIO ACTIVE MATERIAL THEREIN. GILPATRIC NOTED WE ASSUMED WARHEADS WOULD BE

TRANSPORTED

TRANSPORTED IN SUCH CONTAINERS AS WOULD NOT REVEAL NATURE OF THEIR CONTENTS, AND WE DID NOT ASK THAT THEY BE OPENED.

KUZNETSOV REPLIED HE COULD ONLY REPEAT WHAT HE HAD SAID YESTERDAY ON SUBJECT OF WARHEADS, AND WENT ON REHASHING ARGUMENTS HE HAD ADVANCED YESTERDAY, STRESSING THAT US COMPLICATING MATTERS BY RAISING ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS WHILE USSR HONESTLY CONDUCTING NEGOTS AND INTENDED SCRUPULOUSLY FULFILL ITS OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT REMOVAL WHAT PRES CALLED OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND ALL EQUIPMENT RELATED THERETO. IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER PRESSING BY STEVENSON AND GILPATRIC, KUZNETSOV SAID HE REGRETTED SAY SOV AND US VIEWS ON QUESTION WARHEADS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT. STEVENSON AND GILPATRIC STRESSED VITAL IMPORTANCE QUESTION REMOVAL WARHEADS, WHICH ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, AND NEED REVERT TO IT AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY.

4. ACTIVATION OF SAM SITES. STEVENSON SAID ANOTHER VERY SERIOUS SITUATION HAD ARISEN IN CONNECTION WITH ACTIVATION SAM SITES IN CUBA THIS AM. PROTESTED SUCH INTERFERENCE WITH CONDUCT OUR AERIAL SURVEILLANCE, WHICH WE OBLIGED CONDUCT IN ABSENCE GROUND VERIFICATION TO MONITOR REMOVAL OF WEAPONS. REQUESTED SOVS ENSURE NON-RECURRENCE SUCH INTERFERENCE DURING COMPLETION OF AGREEMENTS. GILPATRIC NOTED THIS VERY IMPORTANT MATTER AND IF SAM SITES CONTINUED BE UNACTIVATED AS THEY HAD BEEN DURING PAST TEN DAYS, THAT WOULD AVOID NEED FOR US TAKING OTHER MEASURES TO MAKE ITS AERIAL SURVEILLANCE EFFECTIVE.

KUZNETSOV AGREED THIS MAJOR QUESTION, BUT CLAIMED IT MERELY DEMONSTRATED US PURSUING POLICY OF GROSS VIOLATION SOVEREIGNTY OTHER STATES. REITERATED THIS AND SIMILAR ARGUMENTS WHICH HE HAD USED IN CONVERSATION ON THIS SUBJECT WITH MCCLOY LAST WEEK. SUGGESTED US STOP OVER-FLIGHTS NOW BECAUSE "SO-CALLED" OFFENSIVE WEAPONS NOW REMOVED AND WOULD BE SHIPPED OUT IN COUPLE OF DAYS; THUS NO NEED FOR OVER-FLIGHTS EXISTED. REFUSED ACCEPT US STATEMENT USSR MUST TAKE STEPS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE, ON GROUNDS CUBA SOVEREIGN STATE. SUGGESTED BEST WAY RESOLVE THIS QUESTION AND IMPROVE US-CUBAN RELATIONS WAS TO FORMALIZE GUARANTEES TO CUBA TO BE SUBMITTED TO UN AND TO INCLUDE ASSURANCES RE: (A) NON-AGGRESSION BY US, (B) US STEPS TO PREVENT ITS ALLIES IN WESTERN HEMISPHERE FROM COMMITTING AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA, (C) NON-SUPPORT BY US OF REFUGEE ATTACKS AGAINST CUBA, AND

(D) CESSATION

(D) CESSATION SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES FROM US TERRITORY. ALSO SAID WISHES CUBAN PEOPLE RE GUANTANAMO SHOULD BE SATISFIED. CLAIMED THAT ALL THIS WOULD PROMOTE FRIENDLY US-CUBAN RELATIONS AND PREVENT ANOTHER CRISIS. SAID IF SUCH OBLIGATIONS WERE ASSUMED, UN PRESENCE IN CARIBBEAN, INCLUDING TERRITORY OF US, CUBA AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, SHOULD BE INSTITUTED AS PROPOSED BY U THANT, FOR PURPOSE OF VERIFYING COMPLIANCE. STEVENSON AND GILPATRIC REVERTED TO QUESTION OVER-FLIGHTS AND EMPHASIZED EXTREME GRAVITY WITH WHICH US REGARD ANY INTERFERENCE OVER-FLIGHTS AND THAT WE WOULD HOLD USSR ACCOUNTABLE FOR WHATEVER OCCURRED. KUZNETSOV REPLIED USSR COULD NOT TAKE ANY RESPONSIBILITY; US WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE.

5. IL-28 AIRCRAFT. STEVENSON RECALLED YESTERDAY'S CONVERSATION THIS SUBJECT AND QUOTED RELEVANT PORTIONS PRES' AND OWN STATEMENTS TO PROVE JET BOMBERS HAD ALWAYS BEEN INCLUDED IN CATEGORY OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. STATED QUESTION IL-28 AIRCRAFT WAS BEING TAKEN UP BY PRES WITH KHRUSHCHEV TODAY. NOTED ALL OTHER MATTERS ON WHICH SOVS NEGATIVE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE TAKEN UP IN MOSCOW UNLESS THEY COULD BE RESOLVED HERE. KUZNETSOV DENIED PRES-KHRUSHCHEV CORRESPONDENCE REFERRED TO IL-28 AIRCRAFT AND CONTENDED US AND USSR HAD BEEN TALKING ABOUT IRBMS AND MRBMS. WHILE US HAD MADE CERTAIN DECLARATIONS AND SUBMITTED LISTS OF ITEMS, THEY WERE UNILATERAL DOCUMENTS AND COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS PART OF AGREEMENT. REITERATED ARGUMENTS RE OBSOLESCENCE AND NON-OFFENSIVE NATURE IL-28, AND CONTENDED ONLY REASON WHY US RAISING THESE ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS WAS TO COMPLICATE MATTERS AND PROTRACT SITUATION OF CRISIS. APPEALED US BE REASONABLE AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT FACT STEPS TAKEN BY USSR CLEARLY SHOWED IT WISHED IMPLEMENT AGREEMENT. STEVENSON AND GILPATRIC ASKED SOVS REFLECT ON UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS SO THAT THEY COULD BE SETTLED; OTHERWISE SHARP, PROFOUND AND GRAVE DISAGREEMENT WOULD EXIST WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE REFERRED TO HIGHER AUTHORITY. KUZNETSOV CONCLUDED BY STATING USSR'S MOST SINCERE DESIRE WAS NOT TO SHARPEN US-USSR RELATIONS BUT TO TAKE ANY POSSIBLE MEASURES TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS AND ELIMINATE TENSIONS. REGRETTED HE HAD FAILED CONVINCE STEVENSON AND GILPATRIC SOV POSITION CORRECT AND EXPRESSED HOPE THEY WOULD CONSIDER SOV VIEWS SO AS TO FIND SUCH SOLUTIONS AS WERE IN INTERESTS BOTH SIDES.

STEVENSON

UT **Advance copy to SS-O**

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, 11/7/62 RRC
Passed Principle Officers Executive Committee per SS-O.

THE VICE PRESIDENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SPECIAL HANDLING

~~EYES ONLY~~

4

TO:
FROM: New York
NUMBER: 1643
DATE: 11/6/63

Signature Record

copy 14

Date	Officer	Signature

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S - William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO - L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~TOP SECRET~~

:1
Action
SS

Info

Control: 1950
Rec'd: November 6, 1962
1:36 p.m.

FROM: New York

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1643, November 6, 1 p.m.

PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT PASS WHITE HOUSE

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State ltr 3/28/77
By MBA/RG, NARS, Date 4/22/77

RE: CUBA

Narasimhan confirmed to Yost this morning that he does not feel UN should proceed to charter neutral vessel for ICRC inspection system until he has talked with ICRC representatives arriving New York this afternoon and assured himself they will pose no major obstacle to establishing system. He is still somewhat worried that they may insist upon explicit agreement from Cuban Government rather than mere indications of "no objection" given to SYG by Castro and implied in Castro's speech November 1.

If all goes well Narasimhan hopes UN might proceed with charter arrangements tomorrow afternoon.

STEVENSON

JGG

Note: Passed White House 11/6/62, 1:50 p.m. WFG

NOTE: Advance copies SS 11/6/62 - MG.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SPECIAL HANDLING

~~EYES ONLY~~

5

TO:
FROM:
NUMBER:
DATE:

Signature Record

Date	Officer	Signature

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S - William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Top Secret~~

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO - L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

5a

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

804
Nov 5 3 20 PM 62

~~TOP SECRET~~

Origin SS

ACTION: USUN NEW YORK 1194 NIACT 1194

Info:

EYES ONLY STEVENSON AND MCCLOY FROM PRESIDENT

011

Your conversation with Kuznetsov shows progress on one important point but raises a number of questions on which I wish to comment.

If we can see and count for ourselves departing missiles and associated equipment, that will be an important forward step and we see promise in the procedures Kuznetsov proposed as long as it is clear that reliable observation, not Soviet photography alone, is essential.

One serious gap in Kuznetsov's proposal respecting missiles is the absence of any reference to nuclear warheads. Our interest in their absence is intense, and you should emphasize to all Soviets that since Khrushchev spoke to Knox of the presence of such warheads in Cuba, we need assurances on warheads as much as on missiles themselves. Moreover, we need to know about possible warheads for IL28's and even MIG 21's.

This warhead problem highlights the general importance of

Drafted by: White House: McG. Bundy

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Under Secretary

Clearances:

~~TOP SECRET~~

FORM 5-61 DS-322

post-removal verification in Cuba itself. Forty-two missiles is a plausible number and not inconsistent with our own reports, but Soviet figures, while genuinely useful, are not a wholly reliable basis for action. In this connection you should not hesitate to press home with Kuznetsov the fact that past Soviet deception remains a major element in our reaction to this whole episode. It may be true, as Kuznetsov argues, that the Soviets had no obligation to tell us exactly what they were doing in a country like Cuba, but what actually happened in this case was that they repeatedly gave us assurances of what they were not doing. These assurances came from highest levels, and proved absolutely false.

Your insistence on the removal of IL28's, the unacceptability of any submarine support facility, and obvious Soviet involvement in SAM complex are all correct and worth repeating insistently. You are also right to resist guarantees on subversion and to keep Guantanamo out of it.

With respect to U.S. guarantees, we are not yet ready to give you more detailed instructions, but these three general points may be helpful:

(1) No long-term arrangements can be settled until after we have reached clear understanding on verified removal of offensive weapons systems, including IL28's.

(2) OAS-approved right of surveillance will be kept intact and is important to both sides as last week's flights showed. In this connection you should report to Kuznetsov that today one of our low-level flights was harassed by MIG's apparently manned by Soviets. No damage was done, and it is not clear that MIG's fired, but episode provides good basis for you to drive home our view of critical importance of unimpeded surveillance unless and until better arrangements can be made. You should remind Kuznetsov that surveillance must and will continue, and that further interference will be sure to bring prompt reaction including armed action if necessary.

(3) We do not wholly exclude some form of international inspection involving Caribbean areas outside Cuba, at a later stage. Ours is an open society, and the principle of reciprocal inspection is one of high value to us if it can be established in the right circumstances. You should emphasize that such reciprocal inspection can only be considered in return for permanently verified absence of any significant Soviet military presence in Cuba. You might try out the notion of removal of SAM sites in this connection.

END

Note-Passed Principle Officers Executive Committee per Mr. Little SS

6

CONFIDENTIAL SPECIAL HANDLING

EYES ONLY

THE VICE PRESIDENT

TO: USUN New York
FROM:
NUMBER: 1200
DATE: 11/5/62 TOP SECRET

Signature Record

CY #3

Date	Officer	Signature

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S - William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO - L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

0973

VP 6a

~~TOP SECRET~~

48

Nov 5 10 59 PM '62

Origin S/S

Info: Executive Committee Distribution.

ACTION: USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1200

EYES ONLY FOR STEVENSON AND MCCLOY

EYES ONLY

003

As indicated in Deptel 1194, we want to be able to see and count for ourselves departing missiles and associated equipment and there is promise in procedures suggested by Kuznetsov provided it is clear that reliable observation, not Soviet photography alone, is essential. In this connection, following is guidance, as followup suggestions by Kuznetsov, indicating kind of inspection procedure we believe would be necessary to check outgoing cargoes. Procedures worked out by inter-agency panel. We would strongly prefer QTE on board UNQTE procedure but prepared to accept QTE along side UNQTE procedure if necessary provided equipment is on top of deck. In discussing these procedures with Kuznetsov you should make clear our continued insistence on UN on-site inspection in Cuba to guard against hiding or reintroduction of offensive weapons.

1. Problem

EYES ONLY

Drafted by: 11/5/62 | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: IO - Harlan Cleveland

DEFENSE: Capt Zumwalt IO:UNP:JJSisco:mek

Clearances:

G - Mr. Johnson (draft)

S/S - Mr. Grant

Defense _ Mr. Nitze (subs)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Form 5-61 DS-322

1. Problem. Recommend a procedure which will provide adequate verification that the USSR has in fact removed offensive equipment from Cuba.

2. Background. Kuznetsov has communicated to McCloy the willingness of the Soviet Government to work out a verification procedure as follows:

a. If Castro should give his consent to an on-site inspection verification of shipments might be made at the docks in Cuba;

b. In the event that this procedure cannot be worked out, inspection at sea or other eventualities would have to be planned for;

c. The USSR is prepared to give U.S. photographs of the sites in dismantled form;

d. USSR is prepared to give the U.S. its schedule of removal of missiles to the ports and its shipping schedules;

e. USSR is prepared to permit U.S. vessels to come along side Soviet ships, the missiles loaded in such a way as to enable the U.S. to see and count the missiles;

f. USSR is further prepared to give the U.S. photographs of 42 missiles on the way out.

3. Frame of Reference

a. The USSR is expected to have complied fully with the commitments undertaken in paragraphs c, d, and f above.

b. In addition, it is expected that the USSR will have complied ~~completed~~

complied with the position of the U.S. Government that IL28s are also to be removed from Cuba as offensive equipment.

c. The commitment to remove missiles is considered to include the removal of such associated items as appear on the list at the end of this message. ~~such as launching pads, tracked power movers for transporting missile transporters, trucks, missile erectors, missile fuels and oxidizers, fuel tank trailers, wheeled power movers for fuel vehicles, oxidizer tank trailers, checkout cars, launch stands, power generators, electronic vans, theodolites on pedestals.~~

d. Photos of weapon crates or empty missile sites can be falsified as to time or location and therefore, although of value, are not foolproof.

e. The U.S. Government ~~must~~ needs to determine how Soviets propose to demonstrate no nuclear warheads or bombs remain in Cuba.

f. The question of fighter-bombers, KOMAR motor torpedo boats and missile fuel has not been answered.

4. Required Verification in Cuban Ports

a. Inspection of equipment prior to loading is much to be preferred over inspection after loading on board ship.

b. Although from the standpoint of verification it is preferable that inspection of all components should take place prior to crating, nevertheless, reasonable assurance of removal (which gives consideration to the concern of the USSR re espionage) can be achieved without inspection before crating.

c. Sufficient

c. Sufficient uncrating should be accomplished to permit inspection to the end that reasonable verification of the contents may be ascertained. This should include physical access and photography.

5. Required Verification at Sea

a. Loading of Soviet ships will be carried out in such fashion that visual inspection of each crate is feasible. As an alternative, there could be partial unloading at another designated port to allow visual inspection. In either event a loading plan for each outgoing vessel will be provided to facilitate inspection. This is to be a detailed plan giving location and identify of offensive weapons components.

b. Soviet ships will be instructed to rendezvous with U.S. inspection vessels and to have completed appropriate uncrating in advance of rendezvous. In the event weather makes such uncrating infeasible, a delay in time or change of rendezvous will be signalled by the inspecting ship.

c. Inspection on Board

1. This form of inspection is much to be preferred over inspection from along side and should be requested.

2. If the USSR has located any of its offensive equipment below deck, on board access to these ships will be mandatory in order to obtain adequate verification.

(3) Inspection will require sufficient uncrating to permit inspection to the end that reasonable verification of the contents may be ascertained. This should include physical access and photography. (There must also be sufficient uncreating of IL 28's to reveal what components, by type and number, are contained therein.) [redacted]

d. Inspection from Along Side

(1) It will not be possible to eliminate all possibility of spoofing without physical inspection on board. However, reasonable assurance can be obtained by alongside inspection, when coupled with other indications; to permit the USG to accept the mode as a fall back position.

(2) If the US is limited to inspection from along side a vessel, all items of offensive equipment must be located on or above main deck.

(3) Inspection will require sufficient uncrating to permit photographs and visual viewing, in order to identify from among the components listed on the attached inventory, the specific component involved. (There must also be sufficient uncrating of IL 28's to reveal what components, by type and number, are contained therein).

(4) Hovering helicopters above the inspected vessel must be authorized in order to permit more comprehensive visual and photographic coverage.

6. Expertise. Each inspecting US Navy ship and boarding party will contain experts able to identify components of offensive equipment.

TOP SECRET

A LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT SPECIAL MISSILE EQUIPMENT

TO BE USED IN MAKING UP A CHECK-OFF LIST

1. Missiles and missile transporter
2. Tracked prime mover for transporter
3. Erector vehicles
4. Fuel tank trailers
5. Wheeled prime movers for fuel vehicles
6. Oxydizer tank trailers
7. Tracked prime movers for oxydizer trailers
8. Launch stands
9. Power generators
10. Electronics vans
11. Theodolites on Pedistals

RUSK

END

Note: Passed to Principle Officers Executive Committee

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL SPECIAL HANDLING

EYES ONLY THE VICE PRESIDENT

TO:
FROM: New York
NUMBER: 1635
DATE: 11/5/62 SECRET

Signature Record

cy 13

Date	Officer	Signature

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S - William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO - ~~L. D. Battle~~
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

7a

VP

~~SECRET~~

W
Action
SS

Control: 1664
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 5, 1962
9:ØØ PM

Info

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: **Secretary of State**

NO: 1635, NOVEMBER 5, 8 PM

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State ltr 3/25/77
By nrg, NARS, Date 5/9/77

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY

DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY

CUBA

NARASIMHAN AND LOUTFI INFORMED YOST AND WELLBORN THAT EARLIER THIS AFTERNOON THEY MET WITH MOROZOV ON RED CROSS INSPECTION SYSTEM AND HE MADE FOL POINTS:

UN SAID SOVS HAVE SHIP AVAILABLE IN HAVANA WHICH COULD BE PLACED AT DISPOSAL OF RED CROSS TOMORROW MORNING. THEY REFUSED TO HAVE US VESSEL USED FOR THIS PURPOSE.

MOROZOV SAID THAT DISMANTLING WILL BE COMPLETED AND ALL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS WILL HAVE BEEN SHIPPED OUT OF CUBA BY NOV 12. SOME OF NECESSARY SOV SHIPS ARE ALREADY IN CUBA AND REMAINDER WILL ARRIVE DURING CURRENT WEEK. THERE IS THEREFORE NO REASON FOR CONTINUING RED CROSS SYSTEM MORE THAN TEN DAYS FROM TODAY. MOREOVER HE SAID THAT INCOMING SHIPS NOT ONLY HAVE NO SO-CALLED OFFENSIVE WEAPONS BUT HAVE NOT EVEN SINGLE RIFLE OR BULLET ABOARD. THAT BEING CASE ONLY 2-4 INSPECTORS WILL BE REQUIRED. FURTHERMORE ALL SOV VESSELS WILL BE GOING TO HAVANA SO THAT ONLY SINGLE CHECKPOINT AND SINGLE INSPECTION VESSEL ARE NECESSARY.

SOVS WILL PAY COST OF ANY VESSEL THEY MAY PROVIDE FOR THIS PURPOSE BUT OTHER COSTS OF OPERATION MUST BE BORNE EITHER BY US, UN OR RED CROSS. IT APPEARED SOVS WOULD NOT OBJECT TO UN BEARING COST.

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

RESPONSE WE MADE IT CLEAR THAT SOV VESSEL WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE AND THAT UN SHOULD PROCEED AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE WITH NEUTRAL VESSEL, PRESUMABLY ONE OR MORE SWEDISH VESSELS IN CARIBBEAN AREA. NARASIMHAN SAID UN WOULD ITSELF CHARTER WHATEVER VESSELS PROVED NECESSARY.

WE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT NO SPECIFIC DATE FOR TERMINATION OF RED CROSS SYSTEM COULD BE FIXED AT THIS TIME. RED CROSS INSPECTION IS TEMPORARY SUBSTITUTE FOR US QUARANTINE WHICH PRESIDENT HAD AGREED WOULD BE LIFTED WHEN SOVS HAD WITHDRAWN OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, THIS WITHDRAWAL HAD BEEN VERIFIED AND SATISFACTORY ASSURANCES HAD BEEN GIVEN AGAINST REINTRODUCTION SUCH WEAPONS. IT WOULD BE IN OUR VIEW AT CONCLUSION OF THIS WHOLE TRANSACTION THAT ICRC INSPECTION, AS PARTIAL SUBSTITUTE FOR OUR BLOCKADE, WOULD BE TERMINATED. WE THOUGHT MAXIMUM OF ONE MONTH WOULD PROBABLY BE SUFFICIENT, BUT THAT WOULD DEPEND ENTIRELY ON WHETHER SATISFACTORY SOLUTION OF ABOVE POINTS COULD BE REACHED BY THAT TIME.

NARASIMHAN AND LOUTFI SAID THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT FURTHER WITH KUZNETSOV ON THIS POINT SINCE MOROZOV HAD MADE CLEAR THAT, IF PROPOSALS HE WAS PUTTING FORWARD WERE NOT ACCEPTED, PARTICULARLY THAT OF DURATION OF ICRC OPERATION, OBJECTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN UP AT HIGHER LEVEL.

WE ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT WE ARE SATISFIED WITH ASSURANCES AGAINST INTRODUCTION OF WEAPONS WHICH OUR QUARANTINE GIVES US AND THAT WE ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER ICRC PROPOSAL, WHICH WAS PUT FORWARD BY SOVS, ONLY WITH A VIEW TO LOWERING TEMPERATURE.

IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER BRIEF MTG WAS HELD AT WHICH STEVENSON, MCCLOY AND SYG WERE PRESENT AND SOME OF ABOVE POINTS WERE REVIEWED AGAIN.

IN ADDITION SYG MENTIONED THAT KUZNETSOV HAD TOLD HIM THIS MORNING OF ALTERNATIVE TO ON-SITE INSPECTION WHICH HE HAD PROPOSED TO MCCLOY YESTERDAY AND INQUIRED WHETHER THIS WOULD

BE SATISFACTORY TO US. MCCLOY SAID THAT WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE ON-SITE INSPECTION, TO WHICH WE UNDERSTOOD KHRUSHCHEV HAD COMMITTED HIMSELF, TO BE OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE. HE CITED NUMEROUS STORIES OF WEAPONS BEING HID IN CAVES AND ALLUDED TO EASE WITH WHICH WARHEADS COULD BE HIDDEN. HE POINTED OUT KUZNETSOV'S PROPOSALS MERELY ENABLES CHECK ON REMOVAL OF WEAPONS WHICH SOVS SAID THEY HAD BROUGHT IN.

THANT ALSO SAID HE HAD RAISED WITH KUZNETSOV THIS MORNING QUESTION OF IL28'S. KUZNETSOV HAD REPLIED THAT THIS WAS NEW ISSUE, THAT IT WAS NOT COVERED IN KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV CORRESPONDENCE AND THAT IT CONSTITUTES NEW PROBLEM. US SIDE DESCRIBED AT SOME LENGTH EXACTLY HOW IT WAS COVERED IN CORRESPONDENCE AND EMPHASIZED NOT ONLY THAT IT IS NOT NEW PROBLEM BUT THAT ITS SATISFACTORY SOLUTION IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL.

SYG EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW THAT SOVS ARE ENDEAVORING TO CLEAR UP THIS OPERATION AND TO SATISFY US. IF IL28'S ARE STILL UNDER THEIR CONTROL HE BELIEVES THEY WILL BE RAPIDLY WITHDRAWN. IF HOWEVER THEY HAD BEEN ALREADY TURNED OVER TO CASTRO THEIR WITHDRAWAL MAY CONSTITUTE VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM.

WHILE NO ONE PRESENT HAD ANY DEFINITE INFORMATION AS TO WHETHER MIKOYAN IS MAKING ANY PROGRESS IN PERSUADING CASTRO TO ACCEPT ON-SITE INSPECTION, UN OFFICIALS WERE PESSIMISTIC ON THIS POINT. BUNCHE DECLARED THAT WHAT IS BEING ASKED OF CUBA ON VERIFICATION HAS NEVER BEEN GRANTED BY ANY SOVEREIGN COUNTRY AND HE DOUBTED CASTRO WOULD ACCEPT. STEVENSON REPORTED FROM THIS AFTERNOON'S MTG OF LA AMBS THAT THERE IS VERY WIDE INSISTENCE AMONG THEM ON SOME FORM OF ON-GROUND INSPECTION.

STEVENSON

MRJ

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 9 PM 11/5/62.

CONFIDENTIAL SPECIAL HANDLING 8

EYES ONLY - THE VICE PRESIDENT

TO:
FROM: New York
NUMBER: 1642
DATE: Nov 6, 62

Signature Record

Copy 14

Date	Officer	Signature

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO -

Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

8a

8
Action
S/S
Info

SECRET

Control: 1717
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 6, 1962
1:50 AM

014

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1642, NOVEMBER 6, 1 AM

DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY

CUBA

STEVENSON AND MCCLOY HAD A THREE-AND-A-HALF HOUR MEETING WITH KUZNETSOV, ZORIN, AND MENDELEVICH TODAY. FOLLOWING SUMMARY BASED ON UNCLEARED MEMCON.

1. STEVENSON AND MCCLOY REFERRED TO KUZNETSOV'S CONVERSATION WITH MCCLOY YESTERDAY, IN WHICH FORMER EXPRESSED MISGIVINGS RE INCLUSION IL-28 AIRCRAFT IN ARMAMENTS SUBJECT TO REMOVAL. KUZNETSOV, FREQUENTLY DRAWING UPON PREPARED TEXT, STATED FOLLOWING:

A. SOV GOVT DISPLEASED WITH STEVENSON'S NOV 2 LETTER TO MIKOYAN;

B. SOVS SURPRISED IL-28 AIRCRAFT REGARDED BY US AS OFFENSIVE, BECAUSE THEY BASICALLY OBSOLETE IN VIEW THEIR LOW CEILING AND LOW SPEED. THESE AIRCRAFT, WHICH 15 YEARS OLD, BELONG TO COASTAL DEFENSES AND CANNOT BE USED IN COMBAT OVER ENEMY TERRITORY;

C. US DEMANDS THIS RESPECT CAN BE REGARDED ONLY AS ATTEMPT DELAY SOLUTION OF PROBLEM AND CONTINUE TENSE RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND USSR;

D. USSR CONDUCTING PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH AND

SECRET

WISHES SPEEDY AGREEMENT AND NORMALIZATION SITUATION IN CARIBBEAN; IF US ALSO HONEST IN ITS PLEDGE RE NON-INVASION, IT SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED BY EXISTENCE IL-28 AIRCRAFT IN CUBAN HANDS, SINCE THEY DEFENSIVE AND SUBSIDIARY ARMS;

E. CUBA SOVEREIGN STATE AND CAN DETERMINE ITSELF ITS DEFENSIVE NEEDS; NO OFFENSIVE WEAPONS EXIST IN CUBA;

F. NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD CENTER ON MAIN PROBLEM AT HAND AND RAISING ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS CAN ONLY COMPLICATE MATTERS.

STEVENSON AND MCCLOY STRESSED QUESTION IL-28 AIRCRAFT NOW NEW, SINCE PRESIDENT'S OCTOBER 22 STATEMENT, QUARANTINE PROCLAMATION, AS WELL AS OCTOBER 28 LETTER CONTAINED EITHER SPECIFIC OR GENERAL REFERENCE TO OFFENSIVE WEAPONS OTHER THAN MISSILES. POINTED OUT JET BOMBERS CAPABLE OF CARRYING NUCLEAR WARHEADS COULD HARDLY BE QUALIFIED AS OBSOLETE. NOTED SUCH ARMAMENTS IN HANDS OF MAN LIKE CASTRO COULD CREATE GRAVEST SITUATION, AND LA COUNTRIES DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THIS. DENIED KUZNETSOV'S INSINUATION US SEEKING OBSTRUCT NEGOTIATIONS BY RAISING THIS VERY IMPORTANT QUESTION. AFTER PROLONGED EXCHANGE, IN COURSE OF WHICH STEVENSON AND MCCLOY CONTINUED PRESS FOR REMOVAL IL-28 AIRCRAFT AND KUZNETSOV REITERATED ESSENTIALLY SAME POINTS AS LISTED ABOVE, KUZNETSOV CONTENDED NEGOTIATIONS MUST NOT DEPART FROM PRESIDENT-KHRUSHCHEV AGREEMENT, SUBSTANCE OF WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:

A. US IS TO GIVE ASSURANCES AGAINST INVASION OF CUBA EITHER BY US OR BY ITS ALLIES, OR BY ANY STATE IN WESTERN HEMISPHERE; KUZNETSOV COMMENTED US TRYING EVADE THIS SUBJECT;

B. AS EVIDENT FROM KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE, USSR WILL REMOVE MISSILES WHICH PRESIDENT REGARDS AS OFFENSIVE. HE COMMENTED THERE NO QUESTION THAT MISSILES HAD BEEN SUBJECT PRESIDENT-KHRUSHCHEV EXCHANGE, SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE, AND CURRENT TALKS.

IN RESPONSE

IN RESPONSE TO DIRECT QUESTION WHETHER USSR WOULD INCLUDE IL-28'S IN ARMS TO BE REMOVED, KUZNETSOV REPLIED IN NEGATIVE, STATING THEY NOT OFFENSIVE ARMS AND SOVGOV WOULD ACT ACCORDINGLY. SUGGESTED BOTH SIDES REPORT PROBLEM TO THEIR GOVTS.

2. KUZNETSOV REFERRED TO SCHEDULE OF REMOVAL, SAYING FIRST SOVIET VESSEL, LABINSK, DUE TO LEAVE NOVEMBER 6, WITH EIGHT OTHER SHIPS, BRATSK, LENINSKIY KOMSOMOL, KURCHATOV, ASOSOV, DIVNOGORSK, VOLGOLES, POLZUNOV, ALAPAYEVSK, TO LEAVE NOVEMBER 7. SAID HE HAD NO INFORMATION WHETHER THIS WOULD COMPLETE REMOVAL OPERATION.

3. KUZNETSOV SAID USSR HAD DECIDED MAKE SOV VESSEL ALMATA AVAILABLE FOR VERIFICATION INBOUND SHIPS BY ICRC. DETAILS RE SIGNALS AND IDENTIFICATION WOULD HAVE BE WORKED OUT AND APPROPRIATE INFORMATION HAD BEEN GIVEN TO MEMBER UN SECRETARIAT. THIS VESSEL WOULD BE STATIONED NORTH OF CUBA AND ALL SOV SHIPS BOUND FOR CUBA WOULD USE ONLY NORTHERN ROUTE, ALTHOUGH SOUTHERN ROUTE MIGHT BE USED AFTER NOVEMBER 12.

MCCLOY AND STEVENSON POINTED OUT NO COMMITMENT HAD BEEN MADE RE US WILLINGNESS ACCEPT SOVIET SHIP, AND NOTED NEUTRAL, I.E., SWEDISH, SHIP COULD ALSO BE USED. KUZNETSOV PROFESSED SURPRISE, CLAIMING US HAD NOT OBJECTED TO SOVIET SHIP. MCCLOY REITERATED HE HAD EXPRESSLY STATED HE COULD NOT COMMIT US GOVT RE USE OF SOVIET SHIP.

4. MCCLOY THEN RAISED SUBJECT OF REMOVAL OF WARHEADS, POINTING OUT THIS VERY IMPORTANT MATTER, AND WONDERED HOW USSR COULD SATISFY US RE THEIR REMOVAL. KUZNETSOV ASSERTED THIS QUESTION OF DETAIL; USSR'S ACTIONS CLEARLY INDICATE THAT ALL EQUIPMENT RELATED TO WHAT US CALLS OFFENSIVE MISSILES WILL BE REMOVED. THUS, THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT RE WARHEADS, IF WARHEADS ARE INDEED IN CUBA. USSR INTENDS FULFILL ALL THESE COMMITMENTS IN GOOD FAITH, BUT US RAISING THESE QUESTIONS

IN ORDER

IN ORDER POSTPONE FINAL SOLUTION OF PROBLEM. STEVENSON AND MCCLOY STRESSED IMPORTANCE REMOVAL WARHEADS, POINTING OUT THAT WITH SOME MODIFICATION THEY COULD ALSO BE USED ON BOMBERS. SUGGESTED VERIFICATION REMOVAL OF WARHEADS COULD PERHAPS BE DONE ON SEE-AND-COUNT BASIS AS KUZNETSOV HAD SUGGESTED FOR MISSILES. STEVENSON NOTED PROBLEM OF WARHEADS HIGHLIGHTED IMPORTANCE GROUND INSPECTION, AND WONDERED WHAT PROGRESS MIKOYAN HAD MADE IN HAVANA. ASKED WHEN MIKOYAN RETURNING. KUZNETSOV REPLIED HE DID NOT KNOW. MCCLOY SAID PRESIDENT REGARDED MCCLOY-KUZNETSOV CONVERSATION YESTERDAY AS USEFUL AND INDICATING PROGRESS, TO WHICH KUZNETSOV REPLIED HE GRATIFIED HEAR THIS AND OBSERVED SUCH APPRAISAL FULLY JUSTIFIED, PARTICULARLY SINCE USSR DOING EVERYTHING NECESSARY TO RESOLVE PROBLEM ASAP. REITERATED THAT AS TO WARHEADS, USSR WOULD REMOVE FROM CUBA EVERYTHING RELATED TO "SO-CALLED" OFFENSIVE MISSILES, BUT NOTED HE COULD NOT SAY ANYTHING BEYOND THAT.

5. IN SUMMING UP CONVERSATION STEVENSON LISTED FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AS REMAINING OPEN: REMOVAL IL-28 AIRCRAFT, NATIONALITY INSPECTION SHIP, AND VERIFICATION REMOVAL OF WARHEADS, ALTHOUGH KUZNETSOV HAD GIVEN ASSURANCES WARHEADS WOULD BE REMOVED. KUZNETSOV DISAGREED, SAYING THERE NO OPEN QUESTION FROM SOV STANDPOINT. CONCLUDED US SHOULD CONSIDER SOVIET DEEDS AND RESPOND IN KIND.

STEVENSON

LM

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, 11/6/63

Advance copy to SS-O

Handed to U.P. at NSC - 1000 5 NOV.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

48

TOP SECRET

Action S/S

Control: 1289
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 5, 1962
1:37 A.M.

004

Info

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 163Ø, NOVEMBER 4, MIDNIGHT

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS 61-63 vol. XI #142
By JC, NARA, Date 8-18-05

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY

MEETING BETWEEN MCCLOY AND KUZNETSOV, SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 4.

KUZNETSOV CAME TO LUNCH AT MCCLOY'S HOME AT STAMFORD. EN FAMILLE, MOST INFORMAL, NO OTHER OFFICIALS OR ANY TRANSLATOR PRESENT. AFTER LUNCH TOOK A LONG WALK DURING THE COURSE OF WHICH TALK WAS CONDUCTED LASTING UNTIL ABOUT 5:ØØ PM. MCCLOY STARTED OUT WITH A RESUME OF OUR AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OF YESTERDAY OF CUBA AGAIN EXPRESSING GREAT CONCERN OVER THE EVIDENCE OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE IL-28'S. THE BUILDUP OF THESE PLANES WAS IN SHARP CONTRAST TO THE DISMANTLING OF THE SITES AND LARGELY NULLIFIED THE GOOD IMPRESSION WE WERE GETTING FROM THE RAPIDITY WITH WHICH THE MISSILE SITES WERE BEING DISMANTLED. KUZNETSOV SAID THAT THIS HAD BEEN SOMETHING OF A NEW SUBJECT TO HIM AND HAD BEEN RECENTLY NOTIFIED OF IT. HE SAID HE HAD NOTIFIED MOSCOW OF THE IMPORTANCE WE PLACED ON IT AND THAT HE HAD DOUBTED THAT THESE WERE PROPERLY CLASSIFIED AS OFFENSIVE WEAPONS BUT THIS WAS ONLY HIS OPINION. KUZNETSOV WOULD REPORT MOSCOW ATTITUDE AS SOON AS HE RECEIVED IT.

MCCLOY TOLD HIM THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD REFRAINED FROM PUBLICLY REFERRING TO THE BUILDUP OF THE IL-28'S AS HE WAS SURE THERE WOULD BE A SHARP REACTION IF IT WERE MADE PUBLIC. MCCLOY ALSO STATED THAT THERE COULD BE NO DOUBT OF THE INCLUSION OF THESE BOMBERS IN THE LIST OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND IF ANY DOCUMENTATION WERE NEEDED IT WOULD BE EASY TO PROVIDE

TOP SECRET

EASY TO PROVIDE. MCCLOY GAVE HIM OUR POSITION ON VERIFICATION FOLLOWING THE LINES OF 1189 STATING WE HAD BEEN DECEIVED BY ASSURANCES GIVEN OUR OFFICIALS IN RESPECT TO THE WEAPONS INTRODUCED IN CUBA AND IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR US NOW TO ACT MERELY ON A GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT. MCCLOY SAID HE WAS SERIOUSLY TROUBLED BY THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION AS IT SEEMED AS IF THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE GOOD ON THEIR CHAIRMAN'S COMMITMENT FOR UN OBSERVATION OF DISMANTLING AND REMOVAL ALTHOUGH MCCLOY FELT CERTAIN THAT THEY COULD GET FIDEL'S COMPLIANCE IF THEY REALLY SET ABOUT IT. KUZNETSOV SAID THIS WAS NOT BY ANY MEANS CERTAIN. MCCLOY REPEATED WE COULD NOT BE SATISFIED WITH OUR RECONNAISSANCE ALONE (TO WHICH INCIDENTALLY THEY STILL CONTINUE TO OBJECT) AND WE WOULD NOT BE SATISFIED WITH THE MERE INSPECTION OF THE ABANDONED MISSILE SITES. WE HAD TO HAVE EVIDENCE OF THE DISPOSITION AND THE REMOVAL OF THE WEAPONS. MCCLOY REFERRED TO THE STORIES ABOUT WEAPONS IN CAVES AND SAID SUCH STORIES WERE BOUND TO ARISE IF WE DID NOT HAVE OPPORTUNITY FOR INSPECTION ON THE GROUND. WE HAD TO HAVE EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD CONVINCE US AS PRACTICAL MEN THAT THE COMMITMENTS TO REMOVE THESE WEAPONS HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT. KUZNETSOV SAID THEY HAD BEEN GIVING THOUGHT TO THIS MATTER AND THE CHAIRMAN HIMSELF HAD BEEN PRE-OCCUPIED WITH IT AS HE WAS FULLY AWARE OF HIS COMMITMENTS AND HE WISHED TO NEGOTIATE THIS THING HONESTLY BOTH IN WHAT HE CALLED THE SHORT RUN AND THE LONG RUN. KUZNETSOV REFERRED TO A SUGGESTION THAT MCCLOY HAD MADE REGARDING MANIFESTS THAT THEY HAD FOLLOWED UP. HE SAID MANIFESTS OF WHAT WAS GOING OUT WOULD NOT BE ANY GOOD UNLESS IT WAS KNOWN WHAT HAD COME IN, BUT IN ORDER TO GIVE US REASONABLE AND PRACTICAL ASSURANCE OF THEIR DETERMINATION TO FULFILL THEIR COMMITMENT AND ON INSTRUCTIONS DIRECTLY FROM THE CHAIRMAN HE WANTED TO SUBMIT THE FIGURES.

THERE WAS AS OF OCTOBER 22, 24 COMPLETED SITES AND 16 IN INCOMPLETE FORM, OR A TOTAL OF 40, AND THEY HAD INTRODUCED

A TOTAL OF

A TOTAL OF 42 MISSILES INTO CUBA. ALL OF THESE SITES HAD BEEN DISMANTLED AND RENDERED INOPERABLE BY NOVEMBER 2. THEY WERE PREPARED TO FIND REASONABLE MEANS TO CONVINCE US THAT THESE MISSILES HAD BEEN REMOVED AND THEIR SUGGESTION WAS AS FOLLOWS: (1) THEY WOULD GIVE US PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE SITES IN DISMANTLED FORM. (2) THEY WOULD GIVE US THEIR SCHEDULE OF REMOVAL TO THE PORTS AND SHIPPING SCHEDULES. HE SAID THAT WE COULD BRING OUR OWN VESSELS ALONG SIDE THE SOVIET SHIPS WHICH WERE TAKING THE MISSILES OUT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ENABLE US TO SEE AND COUNT THE MISSILES. THEY WOULD ALSO GIVE US PHOTOGRAPHS OF 42 MISSILES ON THE WAY OUT. MCCLOY POINTED OUT THAT THE COMMITMENT TO REMOVE THE MISSILES WOULD INCLUDE LAUNCHING PADS, TRUCKS AND OTHER PARAPHERNALIA THAT GOES WITH THE MISSILE AND KUZNETSOV SAID THAT HE WOULD ASSUME THIS TO BE SO. KUZNETSOV SAID IF WE DID NOT RAISE TOO MANY QUESTIONS, INSIST ON LOOKING INTO EVERY BOX AND OTHERWISE RAISE OBJECTIONS WHICH WOULD CONVINCE THEM THAT WE WERE MERELY TRYING TO FIND OBSTACLES TO THE FULFILLMENT OF OUR OWN GUARANTIES, HE WAS CERTAIN WE WOULD BE ABLE TO WORK OUT REASONABLE DETAILS INVOLVED IN THIS VERIFICATION PROCESS WITHOUT FRICTION.

MCCLOY ASKED HIM WHETHER AS AN ALTERNATIVE THEY WOULD PERMIT INSPECTION IN SOVIET PORTS OF THE OFF-LOADING. KUZNETSOV THOUGHT THIS MIGHT INVOLVE COMPLICATIONS AND FROM ALL POINTS OF VIEW IT SEEMED BETTER TO DO IT AT SEA WHERE WE COULD BE SURE THE SHIPS HAD JUST COME FROM CUBA. HE WANTED US TO KNOW THAT WHAT THEY HAD DONE AND WHAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO DO WAS NOT A RESULT OF WEAKNESS--SIMPLY A DESIRE TO DO ALL POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN AND CONSOLIDATE THE PEACE. THE BALANCE WOULD REMAIN THE SAME AS IT WAS BEFORE BUT HE REPEATED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WANTS HONESTLY TO NEGOTIATE THIS MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF THE WEAPONS AT ONCE. THEY WANT TO NORMALIZE THE SITUATION VERY PROMPTLY. THEY WANT THE QUARANTINE LIFTED AS IT IS A WARTIME RATHER THAN A PEACE TIME MEASURE. THEY WANT TO REMOVE THE ATMOSPHERE OF WAR.

OF WAR. KUZNETSOV GAVE MCCLOY A ROUGH TRANSLATION OF A MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIRMAN TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SOVIET UNION SERIOUSLY AND SINCERELY SOUGHT TO FIND A SOLUTION AND MAKE AN EFFORT TO SOLVE ALL THE QUESTIONS QUICKLY ON A BASIS OF MUTUAL CONCILIATION AND ON THE CONDITIONS WHICH WERE STATED IN THE LETTERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE CHAIRMAN; AND THE SOVIET UNION EXPECTED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL COOPERATE COMPLETELY AND PROMPTLY AND LIFT THE QUARANTINE. THE US SHOULD NOT DOUBT THE FULL SINCERITY OF THE SOVIET'S STATEMENT REGARDING THE DISMANTLING AND SHIPPING OUT OF THE OFFENSIVE WEAPONS.

KUZNETSOV INDICATED THAT IF CASTRO GAVE HIS CONSENT TO AN ON-SITE INSPECTION THEY MIGHT BE WILLING TO ACCEPT VERIFICATION OF THE SHIPMENTS AT THE DOCKS IN CUBA, BUT HE SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO PLAN FOR OTHER EVENTUALITIES. HE REPEATED THAT THE WHOLE JOB OF DISMANTLING AND PREPARATION FOR REMOVAL COULD BE EFFECTED BY NOVEMBER 10 AND PRESUMABLY THE SHIPPING SCHEDULE WOULD BEGIN THEN.

THERE WERE OTHER QUESTIONS IN ADDITION TO THIS MATTER OF VERIFICATION, PARTICULARLY THE ONE AS TO THE FORM OF THE PROTOCOL OR THE DECLARATION GIVING THE UNITED STATES GUARANTIES. THOSE GUARANTIES WOULD HAVE TO BE CLEARLY EXPRESSED AGAINST INVASION BY THE UNITED STATES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER OR PERMITTING THE MOUNTING OF AN ATTACK FROM THE SOIL OF THE UNITED STATES TOGETHER WITH THE USE OF THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE UNITED STATES TO INDUCE OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO ADOPT THE SAME ATTITUDE. KUZNETSOV SAID THERE SHOULD ALSO BE SOME GUARANTIES GIVEN AGAINST SUBVERSION ACTIVITIES AGAINST CUBA, AT WHICH POINT MCCLOY INTERPOSED THAT THIS WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT INDEED TO COMPLY WITH INASMUCH AS CUBA WAS A HOTBED OF SUBVERSION ITSELF AND THAT WE WOULD AND COULD DO NOTHING WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS SUPPORT OF CASTRO OR HIS REGIME.

Pres power [illegible]. Russ can't legislate on subversion

KUZNETSOV ALSO

KUZNETSOV ALSO MENTIONED GUANTANAMO AND MCCLOY TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD PERMIT GUANTANAMO TO BE IN ANY WAY RELATED TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT CUBAN PROBLEM. KUZNETSOV RATHER PRESSED FOR A COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF THE US TO BE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT AT SOMETIME IN THE FUTURE BUT MCCLOY TOLD HIM THAT NO JOINING OF THE GUANTANAMO QUESTION WITH THIS INCIDENT WAS FEASIBLE. AS TO THE FORM OF THE US GUARANTY, KUZNETSOV SAID HE WAS NOT PARTICULARLY CONCERNED AS TO WHETHER IT WAS BY PROTOCOL OR BY DECLARATION ALTHOUGH ZORIN FELT VERY STRONGLY ABOUT THIS. MCCLOY BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF SUBMARINES AND POSSIBLE SUBMARINE BASES AND KUZNETSOV SAID THAT THAT THIS WAS SOMETHING HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH AND HE FELT SURE, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE CHAIRMAN HIMSELF HAD GIVEN ASSURANCES ON THIS SUBJECT, THAT THE PORT WAS PRESENTLY A FISHING PORT WITH NO INTENTION OF MAKING IT A SUBMARINE PORT. MCCLOY REFERRED TO THE PRESENCE OF SUBMARINES IN THE AREA AND STATED THAT WE WERE QUITE CONCERNED ABOUT THIS AS THEY SEEMED TO BE APPEARING IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE WHOLE WEAPONS BUILDUP. MCCLOY SAID HE MUST REALIZE WHAT WE OBJECT TO IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOVIET MILITARY BASE IN CUBA--THAT DEFENSIVE WEAPONS CAN BE SUPPLIED TO THE CUBANS IF THEY WANT TO BUT THEY MUST BE IN THE HANDS OF CUBANS AND NOT SOVIET TROOPS OR TECHNICIANS. KUZNETSOV SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS POINT OF VIEW--AND HOW ABOUT TURKEY. AT THIS POINT KUZNETSOV MADE QUITE AN ARGUMENT ABOUT OUR CHARACTERIZATION OF WEAPONS IN TURKEY AS DEFENSIVE THAT WE WERE CALLING OFFENSIVE IN CUBA. MCCLOY SAID THAT WE WOULD BE GLAD TO TALK TO HIM ABOUT OUR BASES ABROAD AT SOME OTHER TIME.

MCCLOY ALSO REFERRED TO THE SAM SITES AND REPEATED THAT WE COULD NOT GIVE ANY CREDIT TO THE STATEMENT THAT THIS WEAPONS SYSTEM WAS MANNED AND OPERATED BY CUBANS RATHER THAN SOVIET TECHNICIANS. MCCLOY STATED THE EVIDENCE WAS CONCLUSIVE OF SOVIET OPERATIONS AND THAT IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE WHOLE

COMPLEX WAS PART

COMPLEX WAS PART AND PARCEL OF THE BUILDUP OF THE MISSILE SITES. KUZNETSOV DID NOT RESPOND TO THIS.

IN REGARD TO THE PRESIDENT'S REQUIREMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME SAFEGUARDS AGAINST THE RE-INTRODUCTION OF THESE WEAPONS BEYOND A MERE UNDERTAKING BY THE SOVIET UNION, HE MADE REFERENCE TO U THANT'S IDEA OF A UN PRESENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS WHICH SHOULD INCLUDE UN OBSERVERS IN SOME SECTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES. MCCLOY TOLD HIM THAT HE THOUGHT THIS WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION. WHAT THEN SHOULD BE THE FORM OF THE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST THE RE-INTRODUCTION OF WEAPONS? MCCLOY TOLD HIM THAT HE HADN'T COME TO ANY CONCLUSIONS IN THIS REGARD ALTHOUGH THIS MIGHT BE DEALT WITH IN SOME WAY BY A DECLARATION OF NUCLEAR FREE ZONES A THOUGHT TO WHICH KUZNETSOV HAD PREVIOUSLY REFERRED. KUZNETSOV AGAIN CAME BACK TO THE QUESTION OF SUBVERSION AND A GUARANTY AGAINST SUBVERSION. MCCLOY AGAIN REPEATED THAT WE COULD NOT TAKE ANY STEPS WHICH WOULD MEAN SUPPORT OF CASTRO OR ESTABLISHMENT OF A SAFE HAVEN FOR CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE REST OF THE HEMISPHERE. MCCLOY ALSO TOLD HIM THAT HIS REPRESENTATIVE, MOROZOV, IN WORKING OUT THE RED CROSS DEAL SEEMED TO BE RATHER STICKY IN REGARD TO SHIPS FROM WHICH RED CROSS PERSONNEL COULD INSPECT INCOMING VESSELS AS WELL AS IN SOME OTHER MATTERS. MCCLOY TOLD HIM THAT KUZNETSOV SHOULD BE PREPARED TO INDUCE THE BLOC SHIPS TO AGREE TO THE SAME PROCEDURES THAT THE SOVIET SHIPS WOULD AGREE TO. TALK THEN TURNED TO THE TYPE OF SHIP WHICH WOULD BE USED BY THE RED CROSS PERSONNEL. MCCLOY URGED HIM TO ACCEPT A US SHIP RATHER THAN A NEUTRAL SHIP AS A US SHIP WOULD COST LESS AND COULD BE PUT INTO OPERATION MORE EXPEDITIOUSLY. KUZNETSOV IMMEDIATELY COUNTERED WITH A SOVIET SHIP STATING THAT ONE COULD PROBABLY BE MADE AVAILABLE JUST AS RAPIDLY FROM HAVANA AS ANY US SHIP. MCCLOY TOLD HIM THAT HE COULD NOT TELL HIM A SOVIET SHIP WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE AND ARGUED IN FAVOR OF A US SHIP SUCH AS A HOSPITAL SHIP OR ANY OTHER US

SHIP UTILIZING

SHIP UTILIZING A TENDER BEARING A RED CROSS OR UN FLAG WHICH TENDER WOULD ACTUALLY SERVE AS THE MEANS BY WHICH INCOMING SHIPS WERE BOARDED.

KUZNETSOV THEN BROUGHT UP THE HAIL AND PASS FORMULA AND SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT ALL THE RED CROSS WOULD DO WOULD BE TO HAIL AND PASS. MCCLOY DISABUSED HIM OF THIS AND SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SENSE OF HAVING RED CROSS PERSONNEL IF THIS WERE ALL THAT WAS TO BE DONE. THE HAIL AND PASS FORMULA HAD BEEN INTENDED AS A TEMPORARY MEASURE TO PERMIT SOVIET SHIPS FOR A BRIEF INTERVAL TO ENTER CUBAN PORTS CARRYING FOOD OR OTHER INNOCENT CARGO UNTIL THE RED CROSS OPERATION COULD BE PUT INTO EFFECT PROVIDED THIS COULD BE DONE REASONABLY PROMPTLY. KUZNETSOV SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS.

FINALLY KUZNETSOV REGISTERED AN OBJECTION TO OUR CONSTANT REFERENCE TO THE DECEPTION THAT THE OFFICIALS OF THIS COUNTRY HAD BEEN EXPOSED. THERE HAD BEEN NO OBLIGATION TO TELL US OF THE CHARACTER OF WEAPONS THEY WERE INTRODUCING INTO THE ISLAND OF CUBA. MCCLOY SAID THAT THIS WAS PROBABLY SO BUT THERE WAS AN OBLIGATION AMONG THE FRIENDLY COUNTRIES TO RESPOND TRUTHFULLY TO AN INQUIRY WHEN SO MUCH WAS AT STAKE.

AT THE END KUZNETSOV ASKED MCCLOY WHAT HIS REACTION WAS TO THE PROPOSAL TO WHICH MCCLOY REPLIED THAT IT SHOWED EVIDENCE OF THEIR EFFORT TO TRY TO MEET THE PROBLEM OF THEIR INABILITY TO OBTAIN THE ON-THE-GROUND INSPECTION TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN COMMITTED, BUT HE COULD NOT SAY MORE UNTIL AFTER MCCLOY AGAIN HAD CONSULTED HIS GOVERNMENT.

KUZNETSOV SAID WE MUST TAKE THIS AS THE BASIS FOR OTHER LONG RANGE NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE IT IS CLEAR WE SHOULD NOT RISK THE DANGER INVOLVED IN ANOTHER SUCH CONFRONTATION. MCCLOY REFRAINED FROM ASKING WHAT THESE LONG RANGE NEGOTIATIONS

MIGHT COVER FOR

MIGHT COVER FOR FEAR OF HAVING THEM COMPLICATE THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM, BUT HE AGREED AS TO THE NECESSITY OF EVENTUAL LONG RANGE DISCUSSIONS AND HOPED THAT THE CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT DIFFICULTY WOULD LEAD TO THEM.

STEVENSON

RNL

Note: Advance copies to SS-DO

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

Vice President

SPECIAL HANDLING

10

TO: The Secretary
FROM: New York - Stevenson
NUMBER: 163
DATE: Nov. 4, Midnight

Copy 20

Signature Record

Date	Officer	Signature

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S - William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO - L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

10a

-8

TOP SECRET

Action
S/S

Control: 1289
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 5, 1962
1:37 A.M.

021

Info

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 163Ø, NOVEMBER 4, MIDNIGHT

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY

MEETING BETWEEN MCCLOY AND KUZNETSOV, SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 4.

KUZNETSOV CAME TO LUNCH AT MCCLOY'S HOME AT STAMFORD. EN FAMILLE, MOST INFORMAL, NO OTHER OFFICIALS OR ANY TRANSLATOR PRESENT. AFTER LUNCH TOOK A LONG WALK DURING THE COURSE OF WHICH TALK WAS CONDUCTED LASTING UNTIL ABOUT 5:ØØ PM. MCCLOY STARTED OUT WITH A RESUME OF OUR AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OF YESTERDAY OF CUBA AGAIN EXPRESSING GREAT CONCERN OVER THE EVIDENCE OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE IL-28'S. THE BUILDUP OF THESE PLANES WAS IN SHARP CONTRAST TO THE DISMANTLING OF THE SITES AND LARGELY NULLIFIED THE GOOD IMPRESSION WE WERE GETTING FROM THE RAPIDITY WITH WHICH THE MISSILE SITES WERE BEING DISMANTLED. KUZNETSOV SAID THAT THIS HAD BEEN SOMETHING OF A NEW SUBJECT TO HIM AND HAD BEEN RECENTLY NOTIFIED OF IT. HE SAID HE HAD NOTIFIED MOSCOW OF THE IMPORTANCE WE PLACED ON IT AND THAT HE HAD DOUBTED THAT THESE WERE PROPERLY CLASSIFIED AS OFFENSIVE WEAPONS BUT THIS WAS ONLY HIS OPINION. KUZNETSOV WOULD REPORT MOSCOW ATTITUDE AS SOON AS HE RECEIVED IT.

MCCLOY TOLD HIM THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD REFRAINED FROM PUBLICLY REFERRING TO THE BUILDUP OF THE IL-28'S AS HE WAS SURE THERE WOULD BE A SHARP REACTION IF IT WERE MADE PUBLIC. MCCLOY ALSO STATED THAT THERE COULD BE NO DOUBT OF THE INCLUSION OF THESE BOMBERS IN THE LIST OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND IF ANY DOCUMENTATION WERE NEEDED IT WOULD BE EASY TO PROVIDE

EASY TO PROVIDE. MCCLOY GAVE HIM OUR POSITION ON VERIFICATION FOLLOWING THE LINES OF 1189 STATING WE HAD BEEN DECEIVED BY ASSURANCES GIVEN OUR OFFICIALS IN RESPECT TO THE WEAPONS INTRODUCED IN CUBA AND IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR US NOW TO ACT MERELY ON A GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT. MCCLOY SAID HE WAS SERIOUSLY TROUBLED BY THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION AS IT SEEMED AS IF THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE GOOD ON THEIR CHAIRMAN'S COMMITMENT FOR UN OBSERVATION OF DISMANTLING AND REMOVAL ALTHOUGH MCCLOY FELT CERTAIN THAT THEY COULD GET FIDEL'S COMPLIANCE IF THEY REALLY SET ABOUT IT. KUZNETSOV SAID THIS WAS NOT BY ANY MEANS CERTAIN. MCCLOY REPEATED WE COULD NOT BE SATISFIED WITH OUR RECONNAISSANCE ALONE (TO WHICH INCIDENTALLY THEY STILL CONTINUE TO OBJECT) AND WE WOULD NOT BE SATISFIED WITH THE MERE INSPECTION OF THE ABANDONED MISSILE SITES. WE HAD TO HAVE EVIDENCE OF THE DISPOSITION AND THE REMOVAL OF THE WEAPONS. MCCLOY REFERRED TO THE STORIES ABOUT WEAPONS IN CAVES AND SAID SUCH STORIES WERE BOUND TO ARISE IF WE DID NOT HAVE OPPORTUNITY FOR INSPECTION ON THE GROUND. WE HAD TO HAVE EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD CONVINCE US AS PRACTICAL MEN THAT THE COMMITMENTS TO REMOVE THESE WEAPONS HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT. KUZNETSOV SAID THEY HAD BEEN GIVING THOUGHT TO THIS MATTER AND THE CHAIRMAN HIMSELF HAD BEEN PRE-OCCUPIED WITH IT AS HE WAS FULLY AWARE OF HIS COMMITMENTS AND HE WISHED TO NEGOTIATE THIS THING HONESTLY BOTH IN WHAT HE CALLED THE SHORT RUN AND THE LONG RUN. KUZNETSOV REFERRED TO A SUGGESTION THAT MCCLOY HAD MADE REGARDING MANIFESTS THAT THEY HAD FOLLOWED UP. HE SAID MANIFESTS OF WHAT WAS GOING OUT WOULD NOT BE ANY GOOD UNLESS IT WAS KNOWN WHAT HAD COME IN, BUT IN ORDER TO GIVE US REASONABLE AND PRACTICAL ASSURANCE OF THEIR DETERMINATION TO FULFILL THEIR COMMITMENT AND ON INSTRUCTIONS DIRECTLY FROM THE CHAIRMAN HE WANTED TO SUBMIT THE FIGURES.

THERE WAS AS OF OCTOBER 22, 24 COMPLETED SITES AND 16 IN INCOMPLETE FORM, OR A TOTAL OF 40, AND THEY HAD INTRODUCED

A TOTAL OF

A TOTAL OF 42 MISSILES INTO CUBA. ALL OF THESE SITES HAD BEEN DISMANTLED AND RENDERED INOPERABLE BY NOVEMBER 2. THEY WERE PREPARED TO FIND REASONABLE MEANS TO CONVINCE US THAT THESE MISSILES HAD BEEN REMOVED AND THEIR SUGGESTION WAS AS FOLLOWS: (1) THEY WOULD GIVE US PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE SITES IN DISMANTLED FORM. (2) THEY WOULD GIVE US THEIR SCHEDULE OF REMOVAL TO THE PORTS AND SHIPPING SCHEDULES. HE SAID THAT WE COULD BRING OUR OWN VESSELS ALONG SIDE THE SOVIET SHIPS WHICH WERE TAKING THE MISSILES OUT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ENABLE US TO SEE AND COUNT THE MISSILES. THEY WOULD ALSO GIVE US PHOTOGRAPHS OF 42 MISSILES ON THE WAY OUT. MCCLOY POINTED OUT THAT THE COMMITMENT TO REMOVE THE MISSILES WOULD INCLUDE LAUNCHING PADS, TRUCKS AND OTHER PARAPHERNALIA THAT GOES WITH THE MISSILE AND KUZNETSOV SAID THAT HE WOULD ASSUME THIS TO BE SO. KUZNETSOV SAID IF WE DID NOT RAISE TOO MANY QUESTIONS, INSIST ON LOOKING INTO EVERY BOX AND OTHERWISE RAISE OBJECTIONS WHICH WOULD CONVINCE THEM THAT WE WERE MERELY TRYING TO FIND OBSTACLES TO THE FULFILLMENT OF OUR OWN GUARANTIES, HE WAS CERTAIN WE WOULD BE ABLE TO WORK OUT REASONABLE DETAILS INVOLVED IN THIS VERIFICATION PROCESS WITHOUT FRICTION.

MCCLOY ASKED HIM WHETHER AS AN ALTERNATIVE THEY WOULD PERMIT INSPECTION IN SOVIET PORTS OF THE OFF-LOADING. KUZNETSOV THOUGHT THIS MIGHT INVOLVE COMPLICATIONS AND FROM ALL POINTS OF VIEW IT SEEMED BETTER TO DO IT AT SEA WHERE WE COULD BE SURE THE SHIPS HAD JUST COME FROM CUBA. HE WANTED US TO KNOW THAT WHAT THEY HAD DONE AND WHAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO DO WAS NOT A RESULT OF WEAKNESS--SIMPLY A DESIRE TO DO ALL POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN AND CONSOLIDATE THE PEACE. THE BALANCE WOULD REMAIN THE SAME AS IT WAS BEFORE BUT HE REPEATED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WANTS HONESTLY TO NEGOTIATE THIS MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF THE WEAPONS AT ONCE. THEY WANT TO NORMALIZE THE SITUATION VERY PROMPTLY. THEY WANT THE QUARANTINE LIFTED AS IT IS A WARTIME RATHER THAN A PEACE TIME MEASURE. THEY WANT TO REMOVE THE ATMOSPHERE OF WAR.

OF WAR. KUZNETSOV GAVE MCCLOY A ROUGH TRANSLATION OF A MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIRMAN TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SOVIET UNION SERIOUSLY AND SINCERELY SOUGHT TO FIND A SOLUTION AND MAKE AN EFFORT TO SOLVE ALL THE QUESTIONS QUICKLY ON A BASIS OF MUTUAL CONCILIATION AND ON THE CONDITIONS WHICH WERE STATED IN THE LETTERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE CHAIRMAN; AND THE SOVIET UNION EXPECTED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL COOPERATE COMPLETELY AND PROMPTLY AND LIFT THE QUARANTINE. THE US SHOULD NOT DOUBT THE FULL SINCERITY OF THE SOVIET'S STATEMENT REGARDING THE DISMANTLING AND SHIPPING OUT OF THE OFFENSIVE WEAPONS.

KUZNETSOV INDICATED THAT IF CASTRO GAVE HIS CONSENT TO AN ON-SITE INSPECTION THEY MIGHT BE WILLING TO ACCEPT VERIFICATION OF THE SHIPMENTS AT THE DOCKS IN CUBA, BUT HE SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO PLAN FOR OTHER EVENTUALITIES. HE REPEATED THAT THE WHOLE JOB OF DISMANTLING AND PREPARATION FOR REMOVAL COULD BE EFFECTED BY NOVEMBER 1Ø AND PRESUMABLY THE SHIPPING SCHEDULE WOULD BEGIN THEN.

THERE WERE OTHER QUESTIONS IN ADDITION TO THIS MATTER OF VERIFICATION, PARTICULARLY THE ONE AS TO THE FORM OF THE PROTOCOL OR THE DECLARATION GIVING THE UNITED STATES GUARANTIES. THOSE GUARANTIES WOULD HAVE TO BE CLEARLY EXPRESSED AGAINST INVASION BY THE UNITED STATES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER OR PERMITTING THE MOUNTING OF AN ATTACK FROM THE SOIL OF THE UNITED STATES TOGETHER WITH THE USE OF THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE UNITED STATES TO INDUCE OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO ADOPT THE SAME ATTITUDE. KUZNETSOV SAID THERE SHOULD ALSO BE SOME GUARANTIES GIVEN AGAINST SUBVERSION ACTIVITIES AGAINST CUBA, AT WHICH POINT MCCLOY INTERPOSED THAT THIS WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT INDEED TO COMPLY WITH INASMUCH AS CUBA WAS A HOTBED OF SUBVERSION ITSELF AND THAT WE WOULD AND COULD DO NOTHING WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS SUPPORT OF CASTRO OR HIS REGIME.

KUZNETSOV ALSO

KUZNETSOV ALSO MENTIONED GUANTANAMO AND MCCLOY TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD PERMIT GUANTANAMO TO BE IN ANY WAY RELATED TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT CUBAN PROBLEM. KUZNETSOV RATHER PRESSED FOR A COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF THE US TO BE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT AT SOMETIME IN THE FUTURE BUT MCCLOY TOLD HIM THAT NO JOINING OF THE GUANTANAMO QUESTION WITH THIS INCIDENT WAS FEASIBLE. AS TO THE FORM OF THE US GUARANTY, KUZNETSOV SAID HE WAS NOT PARTICULARLY CONCERNED AS TO WHETHER IT WAS BY PROTOCOL OR BY DECLARATION ALTHOUGH ZORIN FELT VERY STRONGLY ABOUT THIS. MCCLOY BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF SUBMARINES AND POSSIBLE SUBMARINE BASES AND KUZNETSOV SAID THAT THAT THIS WAS SOMETHING HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH AND HE FELT SURE, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE CHAIRMAN HIMSELF HAD GIVEN ASSURANCES ON THIS SUBJECT, THAT THE PORT WAS PRESENTLY A FISHING PORT WITH NO INTENTION OF MAKING IT A SUBMARINE PORT. MCCLOY REFERRED TO THE PRESENCE OF SUBMARINES IN THE AREA AND STATED THAT WE WERE QUITE CONCERNED ABOUT THIS AS THEY SEEMED TO BE APPEARING IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE WHOLE WEAPONS BUILDUP. MCCLOY SAID HE MUST REALIZE WHAT WE OBJECT TO IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOVIET MILITARY BASE IN CUBA--THAT DEFENSIVE WEAPONS CAN BE SUPPLIED TO THE CUBANS IF THEY WANT TO BUT THEY MUST BE IN THE HANDS OF CUBANS AND NOT SOVIET TROOPS OR TECHNICIANS. KUZNETSOV SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS POINT OF VIEW--AND HOW ABOUT TURKEY. AT THIS POINT KUZNETSOV MADE QUITE AN ARGUMENT ABOUT OUR CHARACTERIZATION OF WEAPONS IN TURKEY AS DEFENSIVE THAT WE WERE CALLING OFFENSIVE IN CUBA. MCCLOY SAID THAT WE WOULD BE GLAD TO TALK TO HIM ABOUT OUR BASES ABROAD AT SOME OTHER TIME.

MCCLOY ALSO REFERRED TO THE SAM SITES AND REPEATED THAT WE COULD NOT GIVE ANY CREDIT TO THE STATEMENT THAT THIS WEAPONS SYSTEM WAS MANNED AND OPERATED BY CUBANS RATHER THAN SOVIET TECHNICIANS. MCCLOY STATED THE EVIDENCE WAS CONCLUSIVE OF SOVIET OPERATIONS AND THAT IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE WHOLE

COMPLEX WAS PART

COMPLEX WAS PART AND PARCEL OF THE BUILDUP OF THE MISSILE SITES. KUZNETSOV DID NOT RESPOND TO THIS.

IN REGARD TO THE PRESIDENT'S REQUIREMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME SAFEGUARDS AGAINST THE RE-INTRODUCTION OF THESE WEAPONS BEYOND A MERE UNDERTAKING BY THE SOVIET UNION, HE MADE REFERENCE TO U THANT'S IDEA OF A UN PRESENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS WHICH SHOULD INCLUDE UN OBSERVERS IN SOME SECTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES. MCCLOY TOLD HIM THAT HE THOUGHT THIS WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION. WHAT THEN SHOULD BE THE FORM OF THE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST THE RE-INTRODUCTION OF WEAPONS? MCCLOY TOLD HIM THAT HE HADN'T COME TO ANY CONCLUSIONS IN THIS REGARD ALTHOUGH THIS MIGHT BE DEALT WITH IN SOME WAY BY A DECLARATION OF NUCLEAR FREE ZONES A THOUGHT TO WHICH KUZNETSOV HAD PREVIOUSLY REFERRED. KUZNETSOV AGAIN CAME BACK TO THE QUESTION OF SUBVERSION AND A GUARANTY AGAINST SUBVERSION. MCCLOY AGAIN REPEATED THAT WE COULD NOT TAKE ANY STEPS WHICH WOULD MEAN SUPPORT OF CASTRO OR ESTABLISHMENT OF A SAFE HAVEN FOR CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE REST OF THE HEMISPHERE. MCCLOY ALSO TOLD HIM THAT HIS REPRESENTATIVE, MOROZOV, IN WORKING OUT THE RED CROSS DEAL SEEMED TO BE RATHER STICKY IN REGARD TO SHIPS FROM WHICH RED CROSS PERSONNEL COULD INSPECT INCOMING VESSELS AS WELL AS IN SOME OTHER MATTERS. MCCLOY TOLD HIM THAT KUZNETSOV SHOULD BE PREPARED TO INDUCE THE BLOC SHIPS TO AGREE TO THE SAME PROCEDURES THAT THE SOVIET SHIPS WOULD AGREE TO. TALK THEN TURNED TO THE TYPE OF SHIP WHICH WOULD BE USED BY THE RED CROSS PERSONNEL. MCCLOY URGED HIM TO ACCEPT A US SHIP RATHER THAN A NEUTRAL SHIP AS A US SHIP WOULD COST LESS AND COULD BE PUT INTO OPERATION MORE EXPEDITIOUSLY. KUZNETSOV IMMEDIATELY COUNTERED WITH A SOVIET SHIP STATING THAT ONE COULD PROBABLY BE MADE AVAILABLE JUST AS RAPIDLY FROM HAVANA AS ANY US SHIP. MCCLOY TOLD HIM THAT HE COULD NOT TELL HIM A SOVIET SHIP WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE AND ARGUED IN FAVOR OF A US SHIP SUCH AS A HOSPITAL SHIP OR ANY OTHER US

Soviet Inspired

SHIP UTILIZING

SHIP UTILIZING A TENDER BEARING A RED CROSS OR UN FLAG WHICH TENDER WOULD ACTUALLY SERVE AS THE MEANS BY WHICH INCOMING SHIPS WERE BOARDED.

KUZNETSOV THEN BROUGHT UP THE HAIL AND PASS FORMULA AND SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT ALL THE RED CROSS WOULD DO WOULD BE TO HAIL AND PASS. MCCLOY DISABUSED HIM OF THIS AND SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SENSE OF HAVING RED CROSS PERSONNEL IF THIS WERE ALL THAT WAS TO BE DONE. THE HAIL AND PASS FORMULA HAD BEEN INTENDED AS A TEMPORARY MEASURE TO PERMIT SOVIET SHIPS FOR A BRIEF INTERVAL TO ENTER CUBAN PORTS CARRYING FOOD OR OTHER INNOCENT CARGO UNTIL THE RED CROSS OPERATION COULD BE PUT INTO EFFECT PROVIDED THIS COULD BE DONE REASONABLY PROMPTLY. KUZNETSOV SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS.

FINALLY KUZNETSOV REGISTERED AN OBJECTION TO OUR CONSTANT REFERENCE TO THE DECEPTION THAT THE OFFICIALS OF THIS COUNTRY HAD BEEN EXPOSED. THERE HAD BEEN NO OBLIGATION TO TELL US OF THE CHARACTER OF WEAPONS THEY WERE INTRODUCING INTO THE ISLAND OF CUBA. MCCLOY SAID THAT THIS WAS PROBABLY SO BUT THERE WAS AN OBLIGATION AMONG THE FRIENDLY COUNTRIES TO RESPOND TRUTHFULLY TO AN INQUIRY WHEN SO MUCH WAS AT STAKE.

AT THE END KUZNETSOV ASKED MCCLOY WHAT HIS REACTION WAS TO THE PROPOSAL TO WHICH MCCLOY REPLIED THAT IT SHOWED EVIDENCE OF THEIR EFFORT TO TRY TO MEET THE PROBLEM OF THEIR INABILITY TO OBTAIN THE ON-THE-GROUND INSPECTION TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN COMMITTED, BUT HE COULD NOT SAY MORE UNTIL AFTER MCCLOY AGAIN HAD CONSULTED HIS GOVERNMENT.

KUZNETSOV SAID WE MUST TAKE THIS AS THE BASIS FOR OTHER LONG RANGE NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE IT IS CLEAR WE SHOULD NOT RISK THE DANGER INVOLVED IN ANOTHER SUCH CONFRONTATION. MCCLOY REFRAINED FROM ASKING WHAT THESE LONG RANGE NEGOTIATIONS

MIGHT COVER FOR

MIGHT COVER FOR FEAR OF HAVING THEM COMPLICATE THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM, BUT HE AGREED AS TO THE NECESSITY OF EVENTUAL LONG RANGE DISCUSSIONS AND HOPED THAT THE CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT DIFFICULTY WOULD LEAD TO THEM.

STEVENSON

RNL

Note: Advance copies to SS-DO

The Vice President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SPECIAL HANDLING

~~EYES ONLY~~

11

TO:
FROM: New York
NUMBER: 1625
DATE: 11/3/62

Signature Record

Copy # 4

Date	Officer	Signature

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S - William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO - L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

1

Action

SS

Info

~~SECRET~~

Control: 1092
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 3, 1962
1:15 PM

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1625, NOVEMBER 3, 1 PM

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC ltr 1/11/78
By JK Lang, NARS, Date 1/31/78

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY

FOL IS LETTER SENT TO KUZNETSOV THIS MORNING:

VERBATIM TEXT:

"IN VIEW OF THE INABILITY THUS FAR TO IMPLEMENT THE GROUND INSPECTION BY AN INTERNATIONAL AGENCY IN CUBA TO VERIFY THE DISMANTLING AND REMOVAL OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FROM CUBA IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREEMENTS REACHED BY CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV AND THE PRESIDENT, I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO GIVE YOU A BRIEF RESUME FROM TIME TO TIME OF OUR AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OF CUBA. YOU MAY BE ABLE TO SUPPLEMENT OUR INFORMATION ABOUT THE REMOVAL, AT LEAST PENDING SUCH TIME AS AN INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION ON THE GROUND CAN TAKE PLACE.

"ACCORDINGLY, I AM ENCLOSING A BRIEF MEMORANDUM OF THE RESULTS OF OUR SURVEY OF YESTERDAY. I CALL PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE DISTURBING EVIDENCE OF THE CONTINUED ASSEMBLY OF THE IL-28 BOMBERS, IN CONTRAST WITH THE AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE THAT WE HAVE IN RESPECT OF THE DISMANTLING OF THE MISSILE SITES.

"IN VIEW OF THE DIFFICULTY OF FINDING ANY ADEQUATE ALTERNATIVE TO VERIFICATION ON THE GROUND IN ACCORDANCE WITH CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV'S LETTER, WE TAKE THE LIBERTY OF SUGGESTING THAT YOU COMMUNICATE TO MR. MIKOYAN THE URGENT IMPORTANCE OF DR. CASTRO'S AGREEMENT TO PERMIT THOROUGH INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1625, NOVEMBER 3,1 PM; FROM NEW YORK

ON THE GROUND THAT THE REMOVAL HAS BEEN COMPLETED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV'S AGREEMENT." (SIGNED) ADLAI E. STEVENSON

"MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KUZNETSOV

"THE ANALYSES OF THE PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE CONDUCTED BY US YESTERDAY OVER THE CUBAN MISSILE SITES SHOWS DEFINITIVE EVIDENCE OF DISMANTLING OF THE SITES AND REMOVAL OF MISSILES AND RELATED EQUIPMENT FROM THE AREA. DESTINATION OF THE EQUIPMENT IS AS YET NOT APPARENT.

"ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS CLEAR EVIDENCE OF PROGRESSIVE WORK ON THE DECRATING AND ASSEMBLING OF THE IL-28'S."

END VERBATIM TEXT

STEVENSON

JTC
NOTE: Advance copies to SS, 1/3/CWO-M

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL SPECIAL HANDLING

EYES ONLY

TO:
FROM: New York
NUMBER: 1627
DATE: 11/3/62

Signature Record

Date	Officer	Signature

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S - William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO - L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

I

Action
SS

Info

~~TOP SECRET~~

Control: 1102
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 3, 1962
2:02 PM

014

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1627, NOVEMBER 3, 2 PM

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State ltr 3/28/77
By mba/RE, NARS, Date 4/22/77

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY

RE: CUBA

NARASIMHAN INFORMED YOST THIS MORNING RESULTS HIS CONVERSATION WITH MOROZOV JUST CONCLUDED ON ICRC SHIP INSPECTION.

MOROZOV HAD STATED CATEGORICALLY USE OF U.S. VESSELS BY ICRC FOR THIS PURPOSE UNACCEPTABLE TO SOVIET UNION AS KUZNETSOV HAD INFORMED SYG SOME DAYS AGO. ONLY SOV OR NEUTRAL VESSELS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. WHEN NARASIMHAN INQUIRED WHETHER SUITABLE SOV VESSELS AVAILABLE FOR THIS PURPOSE MOROZOV SAID HE WOULD INQUIRE. HE EMPHASIZED HOWEVER NEUTRAL VESSELS ENTIRELY ACCEPTABLE THOUGH, IN RESPONSE NARASIMHAN'S QUERY, HE EXCLUDED LA VESSELS BECAUSE OF OAS INVOLVEMENT IN CUBAN ISSUE. HE SUGGESTED SWEDISH VESSELS. WHEN NARASIMHAN POINTED OUT IT WOULD PROBABLY TAKE SOME TIME TO OBTAIN SUITABLE SWEDISH VESSELS AND LIFTING U.S. QUARANTINE WOULD THEREBY BE DELAYED, MOROZOV EVINCED NO PARTICULAR CONCERN.

HE WENT ON HOWEVER TO INDICATE HIS BELIEF THAT ICRC INSPECTION WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR NO MORE THAN TEN DAYS. HE REFERRED TO SYG'S ORIGINAL APPEAL FOR 2-3 WEEK INTERIM PERIOD FOR NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT CUBAN PROBLEM. THIS IS NOT QUESTION OF MONEY INVOLVED, WHICH WILL PRESUMABLY BE SMALL, BUT OF PRINCIPLE. WERE U.S. TO PAY WHOLE COST OF OPERATION IT MIGHT APPEAR THAT U.S. IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROBLEM CREATED BY INTRODUCTION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS INTO CUBA.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ONLY

IF ANY SINGLE NATION SHOULD PAY THE BILL IT SHOULD OBVIOUSLY BE USSR. NARASIMHAN REPLIED THAT IT HAS BEEN STRONG VIEW OF SYG THAT ICRC OPERATION COULD NOT BE PAID FOR OUT OF UN FUNDS WITHOUT SPECIAL AUTHORIZATION SC OR GA BUT THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS THIS QUESTION WITH HIM AGAIN AS WELL AS WITH STAVROPOULOS AND WITH UN COMPTROLLER.

IN REPLY TO YOST QUESTION WHETHER HE HAD RAISED WITH MOROZOV QUESTION OF ICRC INSPECTION OF OTHER THAN SOV SHIPS IN ACCORDANCE PARA 7 OF MEMO LEFT WITH HIM YESTERDAY, NARASIMHAN REPLIED IN NEGATIVE BUT SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED MATTER WITH STAVROPOULOS WHO HAD EXPRESSED FIRM OPINION THAT ICRC WOULD NEVER AGREE TO INSPECT VESSELS OF OTHER STATES UNLESS GOVTS OF EACH OF THOSE STATES HAD PREVIOUSLY GIVEN CONSENT IN WRITING TO THIS INSPECTION. STAVROPOULOS POINTED OUT PROCESS OF OBTAINING SUCH CONSENT FROM GOVTS OF MARITIME STATES INVOLVED WOULD BE VERY PROLONGED.

FINALLY NARASIMHAN SAID THAT ICRC REP RUEGGER, WHOM WE HAD REPORTED YESTERDAY AS BEING EN ROUTE TO NEW YORK, HAD NEVER SHOWN UP. ACCORDING REPORT FROM SPINELLI, UN REP IN GENEVA HE HAD INFORMED ICRC YESTERDAY THAT CUBA HAS NO OBJECTION TO INSPECTION AT SEA AND ICRC HAD THEREUPON INDICATED THEY WOULD SEND REP PROMPTLY TO NEW YORK AND WOULD INFORM SPINELLI OF DETAILS. NO FURTHER REPORT FROM SPINELLI HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY NOON TODAY.

STEVENSON

REE

Note: Advance copies to SS 11-3-62 CWO-M.
Passed Principle Officers Executive Committee per SS.

VP

13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SPECIAL HANDLING

~~EYES ONLY~~

TO:
FROM:
NUMBER:
DATE:

Signature Record

Date	Officer	Signature

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S - William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO - L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

M
Action
SS

Info

~~TOP SECRET~~

Control: 1246
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 4, 1962
2:21 PM

013

EYES ONLY

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: **Secretary of State**

NO: 1629, NOVEMBER 4, 2 PM

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State ltr 3/28/77
By MBA/RG, NARS, Date 4/22/77

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY

YOST SAW NARASIMHAN AND LOUTFI THIS MORNING CONCERNING ICRC INSPECTION PROCEDURES. HE EMPHASIZED MOOD OF FIRMNESS AND DETERMINATION REFLECTED IN WASHINGTON YESTERDAY THAT, HAVING IN MIND RECENT OUTRAGEOUS SOVIET DECEPTION ON MATTER OF GRAVEST CONSEQUENCE TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY, THOROUGHLY ADEQUATE AND CONVINCING INSPECTION PROCEDURES BE ESTABLISHED TO INSURE THAT SOVIET OFFENSIVE WEAPONS HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM CUBA AND THAT NO MORE SUCH WEAPONS WERE INTRODUCED.

NARASIMHAN RECOMMENDED THAT, IN VIEW RIGID POSITIONS ADOPTED YESTERDAY BY MOROZOV ON CERTAIN ICRC PROCEDURES, MCCLOY RAISE THESE POINTS WITH KUZENTZOV IN HOPE OF MOVING SOVIET POSITION HERE:

1. USE OF U.S. RATHER THAN NEUTRAL VESSELS BECAUSE OF CONVENIENCE AND SAVING OF EXPENSE, WITH FURTHER SUGGESTION THAT IF SOVIET INSIST TENDERS OR LAUNCHES UTILIZED BOARDING SOVIET VESSELS WOULD FLY NEUTRAL FLAG;

2. FACT THAT U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF "HAIL AND PASS" PROCEDURE IS LIMITED TO CURRENT FEW DAYS AND IS NOT ACCEPTABLE FOR ICRC INSPECTION SYSTEM;

3. DURATION ICRC SYSTEM MUST BE UNTIL VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF REMOVAL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FROM CUBA PERMITS LIFTING U.S. QUARANTINE, RAHER THAN AS SUGGESTED BY MOROZOV FOR 10 DAYS REMAINING OF TWO OR THREE WEEKS INTERIM PERIOD PROPOSED IN

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

SYG'S APPEAL.

YOST PHONED THESE RECOMMENDATIONS TO MCCLOY WHO AGREED TO TAKE THEM UP WITH KUZNETZOV TODAY AS WELL AS FURTHER POINT THAT SOVIETS SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT VESSELS OF THEIR BLOC ALLIES ALSO COMPLY WITH ICRC INSPECTION SYSTEM.

YOST INFORMED NARASIMHAN AND LOUTFI OF NEUTRAL VESSELS "SEA SEARCH", "SEVEN SKIES", "EAGLE" AND "ARNETA" WHICH WOULD PROBABLY BE QUICKLY AVAILABLE FOR CHARTER IF U.S. VESSELS CANNOT BE USED. NARASIMHAN SAID SOVIETS WOULD PRESUMABLY, IF THEY MAINTAINED PRESENT POSITION, REJECT TWO VESSELS OF PANAMANIAN REGISTRY BUT PROBABLY WOULD ACCEPT SWEDISH AND FINNISH VESSELS.

UN OFFICIALS REPORTED THEIR LEGAL OFFICERS CONTINUE TO BELIEVE IT IS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY THAT ICRC WILL AGREE TO INSPECT ANY VESSEL FLAG GOVERNMENT OF WHICH HAS NOT GIVEN PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT TO SUCH INSPECTION. THEY ALSO EXPRESS DOUBT WHETHER IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR UN EVEN TO NOTIFY OFFICIALLY OTHER MARITIME GOVERNMENTS OF INSPECTION PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED AT REQUEST AND FOR BENEFIT OF ONE OR TWO SUCH GOVERNMENTS. YOST POINTED OUT THAT WE FEEL SOVIETS SHOULD OBTAIN COMPLIANCE BY THEIR BLOC ALLIES AND THAT IN ANY CASE SUSPENSION OF OUR QUARANTINE AFTER INSTITUTION ICRC SYSTEM WOULD PRESUMABLY APPLY ONLY TO SUCH VESSELS COMING FROM BLOC PORTS AS WERE WILLING TO SUBJECT THEMSELVES TO THIS SYSTEM. UN OFFICIALS SUGGESTED U.S. MIGHT TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INFORMING ALL MARTIME GOVERNMENTS OF INSTITUTION OF NEW SYSTEM AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO OUR QUARANTINE.

UN OFFICIALS ALSO REPORTED THAT THEIR LEGAL COUNSEL CONTINUES TO ADVISE SYG THAT HE DOES NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO COVER EXPENSES ICRC OPERATION FROM $2 MILLION PEACE-KEEPING FUND WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM SC OR GA. HIS ARGUMENT IS THAT, IN ABSENCE ANY MANDATE WHATSOEVER FROM SC AND IN VIEW OF FACT [illegible], SOVIETS MAY REFUSE TO APPROVE AUTHORIZATION FOR THIS

OPERATION WHICH WOULD INVOLVE CONTRIBUTION BY THEMSELVES, SYG WOULD BE UNWISE HIMSELF AUTHORIZE ANY SUBSTANTIAL EXPENDITURE. YOST REITERATED OUR ARGUMENT WHY USE OF UN PEACE-KEEPING FUND FOR THIS PURPOSE IS ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE. IT WAS AGREED THAT WE WOULD ARRANGE MEETING BETWEEN U.S. AND UN LAWYERS ON THIS POINT TOMORROW. NARASIMHAN POINTED OUT IT MIGHT VERY WELL BE POSSIBLE TO INCLUDE AUTHORIZATION FOR UN EXPENDITURE FOR THIS PURPOSE IN FINAL ACTION BY SC ON CUBAN ISSUE. HOWEVER, IT IS NECESSARY ASSURE ICRC PROMPTLY THAT IT WILL BE REIMBURSED FOR ANY EXPENDITURES ARISING FROM THIS OPERATION AND HE IS DOING SO ON BASIS U.S. AGREEMENT REIMBURSEMENT WILL BE FORTHCOMING IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER.

FINALLY, NARASIMHAN REPORTED THAT HIS LATEST INFORMATION IS THAT ICRC REPRESENTATIVE RUEGGER WILL NOT ARRIVE IN NEW YORK UNTIL NOVEMBER 6.

STEVENSON

JTC

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT ☐ CHARGE TO

SMITH-BUNDY
BELK
BURRIS
DAVIS
DUNCAN
FELDMAN
HORSCH
JOHNSON
KAYSEN
KILDUFF
KOMER
LEGERE
PASCOTT
PETERSEN
SAUNDERS

14

~~SECRET~~

RETAIN OR DESTROY

034

ACTION: USUN NEW YORK 1191

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - S/S

CUBA

Confirming Washington discussion November [illegible] following is present policy on action in the Security Council and the OAS:

I. Security Council

a. We do not want to have a Security Council Meeting this next week, before there is an indication that the Cubans are prepared to work with some form of UN presence.

b. We will need a Security Council Meeting at the end of Phase Two, to confirm all of the mutual undertakings and receive and accept the report of the Secretary General that he has verified the removal of offensive weapons from Cube.

c. There is a question whether we need a Security Council Meeting at any time before the end of Phase Two. If the Cubans are prepared to cooperate with a UN presence and the Soviets agree, there would be some advantage in strengthening the Secretary General's hand by getting him an explicit Security Council mandate for the establishment of a UN presence in Cuba for the verification operation. But if the Cubans

Drafted by: IO:HCleveland:lj 11-3-62

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: G - U. Alexis Johnson

Clearances: L - Mr. Meeker; ARA - Mr. Martin (in draft); S - Amb. Thompson (in draft); S/S-Mr. Weiner

~~SECRET~~

DS-322

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State ltr 3/28/77
By rmg, NARA, Date 5/9/77

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

have not yet agreed to an acceptable form of UN presence, it would be a mistake to have a Security Council Meeting. The Cubans (and perhaps the Soviets) would use it to inject such issues as premature insistence on non-invasion guarantees, Guantanamo, violation of Cuban air space and the rest of Castro's five points.

d. We note that Secretary General has assumed a Security Council Meeting would be required to enable him to spend UN funds on this peace-and-security operation. US view is that he has ample authority under General Assembly Resolution 1735 (XVI) of December 20, 1961 to make "such commitments, not exceeding a total of US $2 million, as the Secretary General certifies relate to the maintenance of peace and security". We recognize that his desire to go to Security Council is more a matter of political self-protection than of law, but in our view danger of a premature Security Council triggering a new round of acrimonious debate and thus interfering with the conclusion of reasonable arrangements to implement Kennedy-Khrushchev exchanges far outweigh advantages to Secretary General of having more explicit mandate at this stage.

2. OAS

2. OAS

a. For the present at least, we do not expect to ask for any new OAS action on aerial surveillance of Cuba. The surveillance we are now conducting is action taken under the OAS Resolution of October 23. We do not want to call into question the legitimacy of these current actions by asking for more explicit authority to do under OAS auspices what we are already doing under OAS auspices.

b. It would be useful, prior to the Security Council Meeting at which we exchange assurances and commitments, to have an OAS resolution which binds the whole Hemisphere to a non-invasion guarantee but explicitly states the condition (international arrangements to prevent reintroduction of offensive weapons into Cuba and to prevent use of Cuba as Soviet military base) under which the non-invasion guarantee will remain valid. But this will probably not be needed for a couple of weeks or more; the timing of this OAS action should be shortly before the eventual Security Council Meeting which will signal the end of Phase Two.

End

RUSK

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

W
Action
SS
Info

Control: 870
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 2, 1962
7:36 PM

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1613, NOVEMBER 2, 7 PM

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

CUBA - LA VIEWS ON NEXT STEP

LA DELS AWAITING WITH GREAT ANTICIPATION AND NATURALLY DISPLAY EQUAL CURIOSITY TOWARD OUTCOME U THANT CONVERSATIONS IN CUBA.

MEANING OF RUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL, US GUARANTEES AGAINST INVASION AND UN PARTICIPATION IN CUBAN CRISIS ARE RAISING INTERESTING DIVERGENCES OF SPECULATIVE VIEWS. ONE VIEW IS THAT SITUATION MAY NOW BE REGARDED AS SIMILAR TO THAT JUST PRIOR TO INFORMAL MFM WASH THAT WE MUST BEGIN ALL OVER AGAIN; THAT CASTRO HAS ACTUALLY GAINED BY OBTAINING GUARANTEES AGAINST INVASION AND CAN NOW DEVOTE TO ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION OF CUBAN RESOURCES PREVIOUSLY DEVOTED TO MILITARY DEFENSE. SECOND GROUP BELIEVES CASTRO HAS LOST GREATLY IN PRESTIGE OWING TO RUSSIAN APPARENT DISREGARD HIS OPINIONS. WHOLE INCIDENT REVEALING CASTRO PURELY AS PUPPET.

WIDE FEELING NEVERTHELESS THAT CUBAN PROBLEM REMAINS WITH US EVEN THOUGH INCIDENT OF MISSILE THREAT HAS BEEN REMOVED.

DIVERGENCE OF OPINION EXISTS AS TO WHETHER THIS THE TIME TO CRACK DOWN ON CASTRO AND ASSURE HIS OVERTHROW OR WHETHER PERSONAL POPULARITY OF CASTRO WILL SURVIVE EVEN THIS BLOW AND THAT PERHAPS WHILE HE IS "DOWN AND OUT" VIS-A-VIS RUSSIA SUPPORT ATTEMPTS SHOULD BE MADE TO REFORM HIM AND GET LOST SHEEP BACK INTO FOLD WITH CONSEQUENT REPARTICIPATION OF CUBA IN OAS. / IDEAS CANNOT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IDEAS CANNOT YET BE SAID TO HAVE JELLED BUT NEXT STEP IN CUBA AND MEANING OF UN ACTION FOR OAS SYSTEM SUBJECT OF WIDE AND SEARCHING INFORMAL INQUIRES BY LA DELS.

IN ANY EVENT NOTICEABLE INTEREST LATINOS SEEK OUT AND HEAR US VIEWS THIS AND RELATED SUBJECT. URUGUAYAN REP STATED US PRESTIGE NEVER HIGHER. THESE ATTITUDES IF ANYTHING HOWEVER INCREASE STAKES AND IMPORTANCE MAKING RIGHT DECISION ON NEXT STEP COVERING WHOLE SCOPE OF OUR POST-MISSILE DISMANTLING CUBAN RELATIONSHIPS.

STEVENSON

COT

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

16

W
Action
SS

Info

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 906
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 2, 1962
10:33 PM

056

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1618, NOVEMBER 2, 10 PM

PRIORITY

POLICY

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION S/S

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State ltr 7/8/77
By hmg, NARS, Date 11/25/77

CUBA

FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CUBAN INSPECTION

PEDERSEN WAS INFORMED THAT U THANT, IN CONVERSATION WITH YOST, INDICATED DOUBT ABOUT HIS LEGAL AUTHORITY TO PAY COSTS OF INSPECTORS OF INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS WITHOUT SC AUTHORIZATION. AT PEDERSEN'S INSTRUCTION, SCHWEBEL SUBSEQUENTLY SAW STAVROPOULOS (SECRETARIAT) AND POINTED OUT SYG'S AUTHORITY RESPECTING UN-FORESEEN EXPENSES. STAVROPOULOS AGREED THERE IS NO LEGAL DIFFICULTY WHATSOEVER, AND SAID HE WOULD SO ADVISE SYG AND CONTROLLER. SUBSEQUENTLY, STAVROPOULOS TELEPHONED THAT HE HAD MET WITH U THANT, NARASIMHAN, AND CONTROLLER, WHO ACCEDED TO HIS VIEW THAT THERE IS NO LEGAL BARRIER TO SYG AUTHORIZING UN PAYMENT OF INSPECTORS. STAVROPOULOS WAS ASKED TO PREPARE LEGAL MEMORANDUM TO THAT EFFECT.

HOWEVER, STAVROPOULOS SAID HE BELIEVED BATTLE WAS "ALREADY ALMOST LOST" NOT ON LEGAL BUT ON POLITICAL GROUNDS. "THE OTHERS", STAVROPOULOS SAID (PERHAPS ALLUDING TO NARASIMHAN AND LOUTFI), HAD ALREADY PERSUADED SYG THAT SMALLER MEMBERS MIGHT RAISE OUTCRY OVER EXPENDITURE WHEN SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES CAME BEFORE ASSEMBLY LATER. STAVROPOULOS INDICATED THAT U THANT ACCORDINGLY APPEARED PERSUADED THAT US SHOULD PAY ALL OF COSTS OF INSPECTORATE. SCHWEBEL RESPONDED THAT UN PAYMENT OBVIOUSLY WOULD BE LEGAL AND WHOLLY APPROPRIATE, AND THAT POLITICAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POLITICAL IMPLICATION OF US BEING CHARGED WITH WHOLE BILL WOULD BE VIEWED BY WASHINGTON AS UNACCEPTABLE. STAVROPOULOS SAID THAT WAS PUTTING IT MILDLY; THAT RUSSIANS MIGHT WELL PUT UAR UP TO SAYING IN GA THAT AGGRESSOR HAD PAID OR SHOULD PAY IN CUBAN CASE AS AGGRESSORS SHOULD HAVE PAID IN SUEZ. STAVROPOULOS SAID HE HAD TOLD SYG THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF ANY MEMBER BEING FOUND AGGRESSOR, IN CUBAN CASE AS MATTER OF LAW, AND THAT IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FOR UN NOT TO MEET EXPENSES OF INSPECTORS. MOREOVER, HE HAD SAID, HE DID NOT BELIEVE THERE WOULD BE OBJECTION IN GA; MORE LIKELY SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES WOULD SLIP BY "ALMOST UNNOTICED". BUT STAVROPOULOS ADVISED HE DID NOT BELIEVE HIS ARGUMENTS WOULD CARRY. HE SUGGESTED USG MIGHT WISH TO MAKE HIGH LEVEL APPROACH TO U THANT INSISTING THAT EXPENSES BE MET BY UN. STAVROPOULOS SAID THE ESTIMATES WERE TRIVIAL, PERHAPS AS LITTLE AS $30-40,000. SYG IS MEETING WITH RUSSIANS NOVEMBER 3, STAVROPOULOS BELIEVED AT 11:00 AM, TO DISCUSS FINANCING, AND HE COUNSELED US TO MAKE REPRESENTATION TO SYG BEFORE. IF SUCH DEMARCHE FAILED, STAVROPOULOS SUGGESTED AS LAST RESORT USG MIGHT ENDEAVOR TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIANS FOR UN MEETING EXPENSES, IMPLYING THAT, WITH SUCH AGREEMENT, U THANT WOULD ALTER HIS VIEW.

COMMENT: THIS LAST STATEMENT OF STAVROPOULOS UNCLEAR; POSSIBLY STAVROPOULOS MEANT USG SHOULD ENDEAVOR TO ARRIVE AT SHARING OF COSTS WITH USSR, ALONG LINE OF NEW GUINEA PRECEDENT.

EARLIER IN AFTERNOON, CLEVELAND ADVISED USUN ITEM THIS SIZE SHOULD BE PART OF REGULAR BUDGET. KLUTZNICK IN FULL AGREEMENT.

MISSION BELIEVES IT SHOULD VIGOROUSLY SUGGEST TO U THANT THAT LEGALLY THERE ARE NO DIFFICULTIES IN WAY OF SYG'S AUTHORIZING EXPENDITURE AND POLITICALLY THIS HIGHLY DESIRABLE, BOTH IN TERMS OF IMMEDIATE ISSUE AND UN PRECEDENT. OBVIOUSLY, SUCH EXPENSES MUST BE MET; US WILL PAY ITS SHARE; AND WILL SUPPORT SYG IN GA IF ANY QUESTION RAISED. SYG MIGHT NAIL DOWN HIS AUTHORITY, WHICH IN ANY CASE WHOLLY ADEQUATE, BY REPORTING TO EVENTUAL MEETING OF SC WHAT FINANCIAL MEASURES HE HAS TAKEN. PRESIDENT OF SC MIGHT NOTE SYG'S REPORT IN HIS SUMMING UP.

UNLESS

UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY, AND IF INQUIRY NOVEMBER 3 OF WHAT U THANT HAS BEEN TOLD BY USG DOES NOT REQUIRE OTHERWISE, MISSION PLANS TO MAKE APPROACH ALONG FOREGOING LINES.

STAVROPOULOS ALSO STATED, IN RESPECT OF WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS EIGHT-PARAGRAPH PROPOSAL OF USG ENTITLED "VERIFICATION PROCEDURES" THAT PARAGRAPH SEVEN, WHICH PROVIDES THAT UN WOULD REQUEST ALL SHIPS TO ADMIT RED CROSS INSPECTORS, RAISES PROBLEMS. WHAT DOES USG MEAN BY "UNITED NATIONS"? STAVROPOULOS SAID CERTAINLY SYG HAS NO AUTHORITY TO MAKE SUCH REQUEST OF SHIPS OF ALL FLAGS. FOR SUCH REQUEST, IN HIS VIEW, SC MEETING NECESSARY, AND, STAVROPOULOS ADDED "I DO NOT THINK THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL VOTE TO THAT EFFECT". IT WAS ONE THING FOR INSPECTORS TO INSPECT RUSSIAN SHIPS WITH RUSSIAN PERMISSION, HE SAID; INSPECTION OF SHIPS OF OTHER FLAGS DIFFICULT, PERHAPS EVEN OF SHIPS CHARTERED BY USSR. RED CROSS ALREADY HAD INDICATED SENSITIVITY TO CASTRO'S OBJECTIONS. STAVROPOULOS REQUESTED MISSION TO STUDY DRAFT AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY DIFFICULTIES RAISED BY PARAGRAPH SEVEN. (NEITHER PEDERSEN NOR SCHWEBEL HAVE SEEN SUCH DOCUMENT.)

EFFORTS MADE BEFORE DISPATCH THIS CABLE TO CONTACT STEVENSON, MCCLOY AND YOST UNAVAILING, BUT KLUTZNICK AND PEDERSEN HAVE AUTHORIZED DISPATCH.

STEVENSON

DMJ

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

U470

17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

Origin SS

Info:

ACTION: USUN PRIORITY 1177

NOV 27 19 PM '62

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC ltr 1/11/78
By IKlung, NARS, Date 1/31/78

013

EYES ONLY STEVENSON AND McCLOY.

Re: DepTel 1159 and USUN 1604.

The President considers it important that following questions be clarified soonest in further conversations with Soviets:

1. We must, as set forth para 7 DepTel 1159, tie down Soviets to inclusion of IL-28s among offensive weapons to be removed. Your letter to Mikoyan (USUN 1606) was good move this regard. FYI As you know, yesterday's reconnaissance was inconclusive on whether Sovs taking any steps disassemble and crate IL-28s. END FYI.

2. President considers Khrushchev's commitment to UN verification on the ground as binding and integral part of understanding on which it is Soviet responsibility to deliver or provide substitute acceptable to US. If Soviets not able carry out this commitment for UN inspection on ground, a less satisfactory but possible alternative might be their making available to ICRC manifests of weapons together with sufficient ICRC inspection of outbound vessels n to permit ICRC certify accuracy of such manifests.

Excom Dist.

3. Soviets should understand that, while we are sufficiently satisfied as to character of cargos Soviet vessels now in vicinity quarantine

Drafted by: G:UAJohnson:ges/nlh 11/2/62

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: G - U. Alexis Johnson

Clearances: W.H. - Mr. Bundy; DOD - Mr. Gilpatric; U - Mr. Ball; S - The Secretary; S/S - Mr. Weiner

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORM 5-61 DS-322

EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

area and therefore willing to permit them to pass under hail procedures of which you have informed Kuznetsov, it would be impossible for us to continue such a procedure for vessels of type that have in past carried offensive weapons and will presumably be required to remove such weapons. Therefore, such vessels should not seek enter quarantine area until ICRC procedures are in effect unless they are prepared to accept US inspection.

4. President also very much has in mind that his exchange of letters with Khrushchev contemplates that, after completion removal present weapons, continuing arrangements will be required to assure against reintroduction of such weapons into Cuba (see President's letter of October 27 to Khrushchev). If the ICRC arrangement is not kept in place and the Cubans will not cooperate, some other measures will have to be devised. [redacted] Such measures particularly necessary in view domestic problem [redacted]. USG is prepared to face with respect its undertakings on invasion. Further instructions will be sent you in this regard.

END.

NOTE: Passed Principal Officers Executive Committee by DCT

RUSK

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

51

Action

SS

Info

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 805
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 2, 1962
5:22 PM

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1607, NOVEMBER 2, 5 PM
PRIORITY

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY SECRETARY

RE CUBA

I HAD LUNCH TODAY WITH ZHUKOV (SOV MIN OF CULTURE) WHO REPORTED THAT MIKOYAN WAS PROFOUNDLY AGITATED BY PRESS REPORTS THIS AM THAT HE WAS GOING TO CUBA TO PLACATE CASTRO, FEELING THIS WOULD INEVITABLY COMPLICATE HIS TASK, ETC. ZHUKOV SEEMED TO BE AS IMPATIENT AS WE ARE TO COMPLETE TRANSACTION, AND URGED ME TO RESUME TALKS ON ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF INSPECTION OF MISSILE REMOVAL WITH KUZNETSOV WHILE TALKS ARE PROCEEDING BETWEEN MOROZOV, YOST AND SYG ON IMPLEMENTATION OF RED CROSS SEA INSPECTION. ZHUKOV INDICATED THAT SHIP MANIFESTS MIGHT BE AVAILABLE.

I AM ASKING MCCLOY TO TALK WITH KUZNETSOV AT ONCE. HE ASKED ME WHAT YESTERDAY'S AIR RECONNAISSANCE REVEALED AND SEEMED IMMENSELY GRATIFIED THAT WE NOW HAD SOME HARD EVIDENCE OF SOV COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR PROMISE TO REMOVE WEAPONS AT ONCE. HE SEEMED LITTLE CONFUSED ABOUT REMOVAL OF IL-28S AND DESCRIBED THEM AS AN OBSOLETE AIRPLANE NO LONGER USED BY SOV UNION AND WITH LITTLE MILITARY VALUE. HE ASSURED ME THAT MOST IF NOT ALL OF 12 SHIPS THAT CHANGED COURSE IN FIRST DAYS WERE CARRYING HARMLESS CARGOES AND COULD RETURN TO CUBA ON SHORT NOTICE. ON WHOLE, HE WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT EARLY SETTLEMENT, AND AS NEWSPAPER MAN SEEMED TO HAVE SOME UNDERSTANDING OF OUR DIFFICULTIES WITH PRESS.

ATMOSPHERE WAS EXTREMELY CORDIAL AND CONVERSATION CONCLUDED WITH INVITATION TO ME FROM MIKOYAN TO VISIT SOVIET UNION AGAIN. ZHUKOV IS LEAVING SUNDAY FOR PARIS AND TOLD ME THAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1607, NOVEMBER 2, 5 PM, FROM: NEW YORK

HE THOUGHT MIKOYAN WOULD RETURN BY WAY OF US, WITH HOPE OF SEEING "YOUR PRESIDENT AND YOU AS WELL AS U THANT". I GAVE HIM NO ASSURANCES AS TO SEEING PRES, BUT ASSURED HIM THAT I WOULD BE AVAILABLE AT ANY TIME.

STEVENSON

MRJ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

19

818
November 2, 1962
5:27 p.m.

Brussels

660, November 2, 6 p.m.

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 660, INFORMATION MOSCOW 14, BELGRADE 2, RIO DE JANEIRO 4, USUN 220.

Cuba

Rothschild showed me telegram from Belgian Ambassador Cuba which stated Yugoslav Ambassador has seen Castro and pressed him hard to agree to UN verification withdrawal missiles and dismantlement bases. Rothschild doubts Yugoslavia would take this initiative if Soviets had not consented.

According to message, Brazilian Ambassador Havana has also made similar demarche re UN verification withdrawal of missiles and dismantlement bases.

MACARTHUR

JT/4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

51
Action
SS

Info

~~TOP SECRET~~

Control: 822
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 2, 1962
5:40 PM

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1608, NOVEMBER 2, 5 PM

EYES ONLY

019

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY

FOR THE SECRETARY

RE CUBA

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State ltr 3/28/77
By NBD/RG, NARS, Date 4/22/77

PURSUANT DEPTEL 1166 YOST AND WELLBORN MET THIS MORNING WITH NARASIMHAN, LOUTFI AND RIKHYE ON MODALITIES OF ICRC INSPECTION.

IN REGARD TO VESSELS TO BE USED BY INSPECTORS WE FIRST SUGGESTED US COAST GUARD BUT UN SIDE OBJECTED ON GROUNDS THESE ARE ARMED. THEY WERE HOWEVER WILLING TO ACCEPT US NAVAL TRANSPORTS WHICH WOULD BE UNARMED AND OPERATED BY CIVILIAN CREWS UNDER UN CONTROL AND WOULD PRESUMABLY FLY RED CROSS FLAG. THEY POINTED OUT HOWEVER SOVS MIGHT INSIST ON EITHER SOV OR NEUTRAL VESSELS. WE POINTED OUT IT WOULD DELAY OPERATION SERIOUSLY TO ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN SUITABLE SOV VESSELS AND THAT, SINCE SOVS ANXIOUS THAT OUR QUARANTINE BE LIFTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, THIS ARGUMENT COULD BE USED WITH THEM. WE ALSO POINTED OUT THERE WOULD BE SOME DELAY IN OBTAINING AND EQUIPPING SUITABLE NEUTRAL VESSELS. UN SIDE POINTED OUT VESSELS WOULD HAVE TO BE EQUIPPED WITH LAUNCHES SUITABLE FOR ACCOSTING.

THEY ALSO ASKED THAT WE PROVIDE THEM WITH MATERIAL FOR BRIEFING RED CROSS INSPECTORS ON WHERE TO LOOK AND WHAT TO LOOK FOR.

/ NARASIMHAN

~~TOP SECRET~~

NARASIMHAN SAID THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS PERSONNEL NEEDS WITH RUEGGER IMMEDIATELY UPON HIS ARRIVAL. IT WAS AGREED TWO TEAMS OF EIGHT EACH ON EACH OF TWO VESSELS WOULD PROBABLY BE SUFFICIENT. UN HAS ALREADY INDICATED TO ICRC THAT APPROXIMATELY 30 PERSONS WOULD BE WANTED AND ICRC HAS RESPONDED RECRUITMENT IS NO PROBLEM. UN WOULD HOPE THEY MIGHT BE RECRUITED AND ARRIVE HERE EARLY NEXT WEEK.

WE GAVE UN MEMO LISTING EIGHT POINTS AT CONCLUSION DEPTEL 1166. ONLY PARA THEY QUESTIONED WAS NR. SEVEN WHICH REFERS TO INSPECTION ALL SHIPS CARRYING CARGO TO CUBA FROM BLOC PORTS. NARASIMHAN POINTED OUT SOVS ABLE TO MAKE COMMITMENTS ONLY CONCERNING THEIR OWN SHIPS, KUZNETSOV HAVING DECLARED THEY COULD NOT EVEN DO SO IN REGARD TO SHIPS CHARTERED TO THEM. KUZNETSOV HAD ADDED HOWEVER THAT IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THEY WOULD NOT SHIP THIS SORT OF WEAPON ON CHARTER VESSELS. NARASIMHAN SAID IT WOULD OF COURSE BE POSSIBLE FOR THE UN TO REQUEST, AND TO ASK IMCO TO NOTIFY, ALL NATIONS WHOSE SHIPS ARE CARRYING CARGO TO CUBA FROM BLOC PORTS TO COMPLY WITH ICRC INSPECTION PROCEDURES. THEY COULD NOT HOWEVER COMPEL COMPLIANCE.

IN REGARD TO FINANCING NARASIMHAN CONTINUED TO ARGUE THAT UN COULD NOT FINANCE THIS OPERATION FROM TWO MILLION DOLLAR PEACE-KEEPING FUND AUTHORIZED BY 1961 GA RES WITHOUT SPECIFIC SC OR GA MANDATE TO DO SO. WHEN WE PRESSED POINT, HOWEVER, HE SAID HE WOULD CONSULT FURTHER WITH UN COMPTROLLER. HE ALSO PUT FORWARD AGAIN ALTERNATIVE OF JOINT FINANCING BY SOVS AND US, PARTICULARLY SINCE SOVS HAD SUGGESTED OPERATION BY ICRC RATHER THAN BY UN. NARASIMHAN SAID HE WOULD PRESENT THIS TO SOVS BUT FELT SURE THEY WOULD INSIST US SHOULD PAY SINCE THIS INSPECTION IS US, NOT SOV, REQUIREMENT.

NARASIMHAN CONCLUDED THAT HE WOULD MEET WITH MOROZOV THIS AFTERNOON AND LET US KNOW PROMPTLY RESULT OF THIS MEETING.

STEVENSON

VP

21

CONFIDENTIAL — SPECIAL HANDLING

EYES ONLY

TO:
FROM:
NUMBER:
DATE:

Signature Record

Date	Officer	Signature

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S - William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO - L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

2/a

0738

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

W

~~SECRET~~

Origin SS

Info:

ACTION: USUN, NEW YORK 1193

EYES ONLY

INFO: Amembassy, MOSCOW 1057
Amembassy, LONDON 2446
USMission, GENEVA 742
Amembassy, BERN 199

EYES ONLY

14

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State ltr 3/28/77
By mmg, NARS, Date 5/9/77

REF USUN's 1627.

Following is roundup of arrangements we would foresee for inspection of incoming vessels.

1. ICRC will operate as agent of the Acting Secretary General.

2. Neutral vessels will be chartered directly by the UN, and ICRC inspectors will operate from them. ~~(If necessary and if UN thinks appropriate, the Military Sea Transport Service could act as administrative and fiscal agent of UN in making detailed arrangements in this highly technical field in which UN Secretariat has had no previous experience.)~~

3. Incoming vessels to be inspected are "all ships of whatever flag embarked from Bloc ports" (DEPTEL 1147). Soviets should arrange to instruct Masters of all USSR and other Soviet Bloc vessels to come through designated "slots" for inspection by ICRC.

DC/T pass electrically to Excom members

4. For non-Bloc vessels embarking from Bloc ports, we envisage procedure as follows:

a/...

Drafted by: | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: U - Mr. Johnson

Clearances: ~~IO:HCleveland:MHB 11/4/62~~
S/S - Mr. Greely

L - Mr. Hoeker

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

FORM 5-61 DS-322

a. UN and we can readily accept ICRC's insistence that they will inspect only vessels of nations which have voluntarily agreed to be inspected.

b. UN SYG should send message through diplomatic channels to each member of UN and Specialized Agencies, drawing attention to fact that a UN peace-and-security operation is being established in the Caribbean to help settle Cuba crisis, in agreement with parties to a dangerous conflict, and urge cooperation of their flag vessels by coming through designated "slots" for inspection of cargoes emanating from Bloc ports. (While ships of only relatively few non-Bloc nations will in practice be involved during next few weeks, it would be less invidious for SYG to send this message to all members of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies. US can then assist in following up with those nations -- UK, Scandinavians, Lebanon, Greece, Panama, etc. -- most likely to be involved.)

c. This same SYG message will specify nature of proscribed cargoes, using definitions of offensive weapons in DEPTEL 1147.

d. U.S. can make it clear to non-Bloc governments that alternative to acceptance of ICRC inspection will be inspection by U.S. Navy under quarantine proclamation, which will still be in effect.

5./...

~~SECRET~~

5. During period of ICRC inspection, we will suspend enforcement of quarantine for all ships embarked from Bloc ports that are passing through designated "slots" for ICRC inspection. U.S. Navy quarantine ships will remain on station, ready to catch any vessels from Bloc ports attempting to escape inspection.

6. These arrangements will continue until full verification of dismantling and removal of offensive weapons systems from Cuba and establishment of suitable safeguards to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems in Cuba.

END RUSK

The Vice President

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

51

Action

SS

Info

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

Control: 850
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 2, 1962
6:27 PM

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1609, NOVEMBER 2, 6 PM

PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State ltr 3/28/77
By MBA/RG, NARS, Date 4/22/77

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY

RE: CUBA

AT MEETING WITH U THANT THIS MORNING STEVENSON AND MCCLOY REPORTED GIST OF THEIR CONVERSATION WITH MIKOYAN LAST EVENING.

STEVENSON ALSO GAVE GIST OF BERN'S 210, STRESSING PARTICULARLY THAT ICRC WOULD AGREE TO CARRY OUT INSPECTION ONLY "IF US, USSR AND CUBA ALL THREE, AS PARTNERS IN GOOD FAITH, ASKED ICRC TO SERVE". NARASIMHAN READ MESSAGE FROM SPINELLI REPORTING THAT ICRC WOULD NOT INSIST ON CUBAN APPROVAL BUT MUST BE SURE CUBANS WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION. NARASIMHAN NOTED CUBANS HAD INFORMED SYG IN HAVANA THEY DID NOT OBJECT TO INSPECTION AT SEA. HE ALSO READ FOLLOWING EXCERPT FROM REPORT OF CASTRO'S SPEECH LAST EVENING "CASTRO OBJECTED TO RED CROSS INSPECTION IN CUBAN PORTS, ESPECIALLY AS SOVS HAD AGREED TO INSPECTION ON HIGH SEAS".

RETURNING TO DISCUSSION OF MIKOYAN CONVERSATION SYG SAID HE HAD TOLD MIKOYAN CUBANS WISHED TO LINK IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WITH LONG-TERM PROBLEMS BUT THAT THIS COULD BE DONE ONLY IF PARTIES AGREED. STEVENSON STRESSED WE HAD MADE CLEAR TO MIKOYAN THESE TWO COULD NOT BE LINKED. WITH REFERENCE TO UN PRESENCE ELSEWHERE THAN IN CUBA SYG SAID IF THERE WERE PROPOSAL FOR LONG-TERM UN PRESENCE IN CUBA, CASTRO WOULD CERTAINLY INSIST ON COMPENSATORY UN PRESENCE IN US AND ELSEWHERE IN CARIBBEAN. SYG HOWEVER HAD MADE CLEAR TO CASTRO

EYES ONLY ~~TOP SECRET~~

CASTRO THAT US WILL NOT ACCEPT LINKING OF IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM PROBLEM. HOWEVER CASTRO HAD NEVERTHELESS CONTINUED TO INSIST TWO MUST BE LINKED. STEVENSON REPEATED THAT MIKOYAN WISHED US QUARANTINE LIFTED BEFORE ICRC INSPECTION ESTABLISHED AND HAD CLAIMED SYG AGREED. WE MADE CLEAR TO MIKOYAN THAT THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE BUT CONSIDER ISSUE SOMEWHAT THEORETICAL SINCE THERE WILL BE FEW SOV SHIPS REACHING OUR BLOCKADE LINE WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS AND THEY WILL BE ACCOSTED BUT NOT SEARCHED. HOWEVER IT IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO EXPEDITE ESTABLISHMENT ICRC INSPECTION.

STEVENSON POINTED OUT MIKOYAN WAS SPEAKING OF PRESENTATION TO SC OF PROTOCOL EMBODYING UNDERTAKINGS AGREED IN PRESIDENT-KHRUSHCHEV LETTERS AND ALSO CASTRO'S FIVE POINTS. STEVENSON AGAIN EMPHASIZED THAT WE COULD NOT AT THIS STAGE DEAL WITH CASTRO'S FIVE POINTS NOR EVEN FIRST FOUR OF THEM. MOREOVER HE SAW NO NEED OF PROTOCOL BUT MERELY PARALLEL DECLARATIONS. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF WHETHER IMMEDIATE SC MANDATE FOR ICRC INSPECTION WAS REQUIRED. IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS IS NOT NECESSARY AND THAT MANDATE COULD BE PROVIDED BY EXCHANGE OF LETTERS AMONG SYG, US AND SOVS OR EVEN BY JOINTLY INITIALED SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS. QUESTION WAS RAISED AS TO HOW LONG ICRC INSPECTION WOULD LAST AND VIEW WAS EXPRESSED IT SHOULD ONLY BE UNTIL WITHDRAWAL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FROM CUBA HAD BEEN COMPLETED AND CERTIFIED.

SYG MENTIONED THAT HE HAD SUGGESTED TO MIKOYAN HE RETURN VIA NY BUT LATTER HAD NOT COMMITTED HIMSELF TO DO SO.

STEVENSON

KEA

CONFIDENTIAL

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - S/S

23

TO:
FROM:
NUMBER:
DATE:

Signature Record

Date	Officer	Signature

This item with Signature Record attached should be returned to S/S Room 7241P within 30 days. If longer retention is necessary, the original Signature Record must be returned to Room 7241P within 30 days and the item covered with a new Signature Record.

CONFIDENTIAL

23a

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State ltr 3/28/77
By rmg, NARS, Date 5/9/77

0548

W
Origin

SS
Info:

ACTION: USUN PRIORITY 1181
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

051

POL draft has been worked out by State and Defense DEPTS as basis for agreement with UN for furnishing of ships to be used by UN-inspection of ships bound for Cuba.

QUOTE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

The following procedures have been agreed to by representatives of the United States and of the United Nations:

1. The United States agrees to assist the United Nations, at its request, by providing logistic support for inspection by the United Nations of ships bound for Cuba.

2. The United States agrees to furnish an adequate number of ships, together with crews and necessary supplies, to the United Nations, to be used by the Acting Secretary-General for the duration of this agreement for the mission described in paragraph 1.

3. Ships provided to the United Nations pursuant to this agreement may be changed from time to time. Masters [or Commanding officers] of the ships shall maintain operational control of the ships [and United States Coast Guard personnel aboard will remain

Drafted by: L:AFLevenfeld/ejs 11/2/68

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: IO -- Woodruff Wallner

Clearances:

L Mr. Meeker UNP Mr. Sisco OSD-Mr. McNaughton

S/S-Mr. Weiner

G-Mr. Johnson (Substance)

FORM 5-61 DS-322

under United States Coast Guard authority]. The Masters [or Commanding officers] shall comply with instructions from the Acting Secretary General, or his representative on board, with respect to functions of the ship essential to the execution of the mission described in paragraph 1.

4. The United States undertakes to pay all expenses, including salaries, in connection with the ships furnished pursuant to this agreement. The United Nations undertakes to reimburse the United States for all services provided pursuant to this agreement.

5. Ships furnished pxu pursuant to this agreement shall, while on active service in performance of their mission, fly the flag of the United Nations along with the flag of the United States.

6. The Acting Secretary General may designate personnel to serve on board the ships furnished pursuant to this agreement. Such personnel shall serve under his orders for the execution of the inspection function. Such personnel may be military or civilian and will be considered to be United Nations personnel.

7. This agreement may be terminated at the request of either party. END QUOTE

Bracketed portions of paragraph 3 are to be used in the event

Coast Guard, rather than MSTS ships are used. DOD prefers Coast Guard ships, but both are available and could be on station within 4 or 5 days. MSTS ships would initially be Navy owned transport ships, but subsequently MSTS could charter smaller privately owned vessels.

Separate instructions cover questions of which vessels would be inspected and suggested manner of inspection.

End

RUSK

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

DRAFT INSTRUCTION TO USUN
FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

CUBA: INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS

We do not yet know whether Cuba will be willing voluntarily to have international inspection on his soil, either to verify dismantling and removal of offensive weapons or to assure such weapons do not later reappear. However, Mikoyan visit could conceivably soften Cuban policy on this point. Moreover, door is not necessarily closed to some agreed form of inspection provided it is not limited to Cuba but covers a broader area. We understand SYG had impression Castro found interesting SYG's argument that UN presence in Cuba in itself constituted deterrent to invasion of Cuba.

On these assumptions, following are procedures that are being considered after general review of the matter here.

1. PHASE I (now).

Hopefully we can quickly implement ICRC arrangement operating from vessels outside three-mile limit. This inspection of incoming vessels would make possible suspension of enforcement of quarantine, but U.S. ships would stay on station. ICRC, operating as agent of SYG , would continue until full verification of dismantling and removal made it possible for U.S. to lift quarantine altogether. At that point, ICRC arrangement presumably would lapse.

2. PHASE II (beginning when Soviets say the offensive weapons are out of Cuba and ending with Security Council confirmation.) There are two alternatives for inspection, depending on whether Cuba acquiesces in inspection procedures or not.

a. If

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

a. If Cuba does not acquiesce, we would:

(1) Call a meeting of the council of the Organization of American States, acting as its Organ of Consultation, to pass a resolution explicitly recommending to OAS members that "pending the establishment of adequate arrangements for surveillance and inspection under the auspices of the United Nations . . . there be undertaken such aerial and other appropriate surveillance of Cuba as may be necessary to assure that all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability are dismantled and withdrawn from Cuba and that such weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba." This would provide an OAS umbrella for the comprehensive air reconnaissance which will be required in absence ground inspection to give OAS members, including U.S., some reasonable assurance that Soviets have in fact removed weapons from Cuba and also give a sanction for continued air surveillance if no other measures are devised to give continued assurance against their reintroduction.

(2) Upon completion of removal of the weapons, the Secretary General would make a report to the Security Council, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. make declarations on what has been done to carry out commitments contained in the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of letters, and the Security Council President would sum up what has been said in a consensus statement. This procedure and the statements would of course have to be negotiated in advance with the Soviet Union. This procedure would not involve any Security Council Resolution.

b. If

b. If Cuba does acquiesce:

(1) UNSYG would, with Security Council authorization, place in Cuba a UN presence to conduct ground inspection along lines of general negotiating instructions (paragraph 6 of Department's 1147). As indicated in those instructions, systematic aerial reconnaissance would be necessary part of process in this period, and we should encourage SYG to develop capability to do all or part of necessary aerial surveillance.

(2) Upon satisfactory completion of such UN inspection, there would be a meeting of the Security Council at which the Council would take note of the SYG's report that offensive weapons had been removed from Cuba, and the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would make complementary declarations. It would probably be necessary that the U.S. declaration make reference to a prior OAS action with respect to "invasion".

3. PHASE III. (This phase would begin with the completion of Security Council action confirming the removal of the weapons from Cuba and would continue through whatever period Cuba may be dominated by a Communist Government.) There appear to be two alternatives for continued inspection during this period to assure that the weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba:

a. If Cuba does not acquiesce it would be possible under the OAS resolution mentioned in paragraph 2 to continue the aerial surveillance program.

b.