

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

14

- b. If Cuba does acquiesce it should be possible to provide an arrangement under the Brazilian Latin American Denuclearized Zone proposal which is now in the General Assembly to establish a system of inspection covering all of Latin America, including Cuba.

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

SPECIAL HANDLING

EYES ONLY

THE VICE PRESIDENT

TO:
FROM: New York
NUMBER: 1606
DATE: 11/2/62 ~~SECRET~~

Signature Record

cy 14

[illegible]

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S - William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

[illegible]

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

**THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO - L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File**

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

25a

VP

~~SECRET~~

Action
SS

Control: 630
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 2, 1962
11:49 AM

Info

FROM: NEW YORK

014

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1606, NOVEMBER 2, 11 AM

DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION S/S

Authority NSC 68 1/11/78
By JL/mg, NARS, Date 1/31/78

VERBATIM TEXT

RE CUBA

FOL IS LETTER SENT MIKOYAN THIS A.M.

"ONE THING THAT MR. MCCLOY AND I NEGLECTED TO DISCUSS WITH YOU LAST NIGHT WAS THE LIST OF ITEMS THAT THE US CONSIDERS IN THE CATEGORY OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE EXCHANGE BETWEEN PRES KENNEDY AND CHMN KHRUSHCHEV. SUCH A LIST IS APPENDED TO THIS LETTER. WE TRUST THAT THE WEAPONS YOU PLAN TO REMOVE INCLUDE ALL THOSE ON THIS LIST.

"WITH THE THANKS OF MR. MCCLOY AND MYSELF FOR OUR DINNER WITH YOU LAST NIGHT AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK WITH YOU, I AM"

ENCLOSURE:

"LIST OF WEAPONS DEEMED OFFENSIVE BY THE US IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN PRES KENNEDY AND CHMN KHRUSHCHEV:

"1. SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES INCLUDING THOSE DESIGNED FOR USE AT SEA AND INCLUDING PROPELLENTS AND CHEMICAL COMPOUNDS CAPABLE OF BEING USED TO POWER MISSILES.

"2. BOMBER AIRCRAFT.

"3. BOMBS, AIR-TO-SURFACE ROCKETS AND GUIDED MISSILES.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

ONLY

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1606, NOVEMBER 2, 11 AM; FROM: NEW YORK

"4. WARHEADS FOR ANY OF THE ABOVE WEAPONS.

"5. MECHANICAL OR ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT TO SUPPORT OR OPERATE THE ABOVE ITEMS SUCH AS COMMUNICATIONS, SUPPLY AND MISSILE LAUNCHING EQUIPMENT INCLUDING KOMAR CLASS MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS."

STEVENSON

JTC

NOTE: Advance copies to SS-O 11/2/62 - CWO-M.

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

0038

26

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Nov 1 8 47 AM '62

6

Origin

ACTION: USUN - NEW YORK 1156 PRIORITY

IO

Info:

INFO: Amembassy MOSCOW 1041

SS

G

SP

L

SAL

ARA

EUR

DAC

P

IOP

INR

RMR

In their contacts with Kuznetsov party and other Russians in New York, all members USDEL should avoid being drawn into discussion of issues which have arisen in the course of present crisis other than immediate and central one of dismantling and removal of offensive weapons from Cuba.

DEPT expects that ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ operating discussions with Soviet GADEL on GA agenda subjects such as nuclear testing and disarmament will continue normally. But any eagerness on their part to pursue wider agenda (which at proper time US will also wish to pursue) should be channelled into efforts to get those weapons ^{removed} ~~disposed~~ from Cuba.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Dec 3/28/77
By nmq, NARS, Date 5/9/77

RUSK

Drafted by:

IO:HCleveland

IO:Waller:np

Clearances:

10/31/62

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

G - Mr. Johnson

S/S - L. Brubeck

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

27

17-48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

Action

Control: 1

Rec'd: November 1, 1962
12:01 a.m.IO
Info

FROM: New York.

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SP.

NO: 1581, October 31, 11 p.m.

SAL

DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE

ARA

EUR

CUBA

DAC

P

LOP

SCA

SCS

INR

RMR

MCCLOY HAD ONE HOUR MTG WITH KUZNETSOV TODAY. AFTER EXCHANGE OF PLEASANTRIES, MCCLOY NOTED U THANT AND HIS ENTIRE PARTY LEAVING HAVANA 4:30 PM TODAY, AND ACCORDING OUR INFO THERE WERE DIFFICULTIES WITH CASTRO. WHILE WE UNDERSTOOD SOV RELUCTANCE ADMIT INSPECTION ON GROUND BEFORE WEAPONS REMOVED, WHICH MIGHT REVEAL SECRET TECHNOLOGY, US WOULD HAVE TO CONTINUE AERIAL SURVEILLANCE STARTING TOMORROW, AND UNTIL VERIFICATION BY UN ARRANGED. MOST DANGEROUS SITUATION WOULD ARISE IF OUR PLANES WERE TO BE SHOT AT OR DOWNED. WE PREPARED TO TURN AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OVER TO UN, BUT SO LONG AS NO ADEQUATE UN VERIFICATION EXISTED US WOULD CONTINUE ITS OWN FLIGHTS. OUR PHOTOGRAPHS OF DAY BEFORE YESTERDAY DID NOT INDICATE ANY MARKED PROGRESS IN DISMANTLING, INDEED INDICATED SOME FURTHER CONSTRUCTION, ALTHOUGH WE REALIZED NOT ALL SITES MAY HAVE RECEIVED APPROPRIATE ORDERS. WE HOPED PHOTOGRAPHS AFTER TOMORROW WOULD SHOW SUCH PROGRESS.

KUZNETSOV OBSERVED ALL ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS WERE IN CUBAN HANDS. MCCLOY SAID WE HAD THOUGHT SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS WERE IN SOVIET HANDS. KUZNETSOV REPEATED ALL ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS WERE IN CUBAN HANDS. MCCLOY REITERATED MOST DANGEROUS SITUATION WOULD ARISE AS RESULT US SURVEILLANCE PLANES BEING SHOT AT OR DOWNED.

KUZNETSOV THEN SAID PRESIDENT AND KHRUSHCHEV HAD COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO CERTAIN STEPS AND IT WAS HIS AND MCCLOY'S JOB SEE THAT ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE FOR CARRYING OUT THOSE STEPS. DISMANTLING OF RELEVANT FACILITIES WOULD BE FINISHED IN COUPLE OF DAYS, PROBABLY BY NOV 2 OR 3, ALTHOUGH HE NOT FAMILIAR WITH DETAILS. MCCLOY ASKED WHAT HE MEANT BY DISMANTLING. DID THIS INCLUDE DESTRUCTION BUILDINGS AND EMPLACEMENTS? KUZNETSOV SAID HE DID NOT KNOW DETAILS. AS TO TIME

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

Authority PAS 61-63, w/ XI #129

jc NARA Date 8-18-05

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY

-2- 1581, October 31, 11 p.m., from New York

REQUIRED FOR REMOVAL OF WHAT US CALLED OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, THAT WOULD DEPEND ON NUMBER OF SHIPS AVAILABLE, WHICH IN TURN DEPENDED ON US POSITION RE QUARANTINE, BECAUSE IF NO SOV SHIPS WERE ABLE GO TO HAVANA, REMOVAL WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE PROTRACTED. MCCLOY OBSERVED HE BELIEVED SOVS WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY GETTING ENOUGH SHIPS TO HAVANA FOR PURPOSE OF REMOVAL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. KUZNETSOV CONTINUED VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE WORKED OUT WITH CASTRO; AS TO USSR, IT PREPARED FULFILL ITS OBLIGATIONS.

KUZNETSOV THEN SAID THAT NUMBER OTHER PROBLEMS MUST BE DISCUSSED SO AS TO CREATE A SITUATION PRECLUDING RECURRENCE OF WHAT HAPPENED THIS TIME. SUGGESTED MCCLOY THINK ABOUT THEM SO AS TO HAVE DISCUSSION THOSE PROBLEMS AT LATER DATE. KUZNETSOV SAID UNDER U THANT PROPOSAL, USSR HAD FULFILLED ITS PART, I.E., IT REFRAINED FROM SENDING SHIPS TO QUARANTINE AREA AND FROM SENDING ARMS TO CUBA. THUS IT HAD ALSO MET US DESIRES. ON OTHER HAND, U THANT'S PROPOSAL ALSO PROVIDED FOR LIFTING QUARANTINE, BUT SO FAR US GOVT HAD AGREED TO SUSPEND QUARANTINE ONLY FOR TWO DAYS. ANOTHER PROBLEM WAS THAT OF ASSURANCES TO CUBA THAT NO INVASION WOULD BE LAUNCHED FROM US OR LATIN-AMERICAN COUNTRIES, THAT NO PREPARATIONS FOR INVASION WOULD TAKE PLACE IN TERRITORY OF US OR LA'S AND THAT NO ORGANIZATION OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES BY REFUGEES AGAINST CUBA WOULD TAKE PLACE IN US OR LA'S. IMPORTANT MAKE CLEAR THAT CUBAN PEOPLE COULD LIVE IN SECURITY AND PEACE. PRESIDENT-KHRUSHCHEV EXCHANGE INDICATED SOME ASSURANCES SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CUBA AGAINST SURVERSION AND INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

MCCLOY RESPONDED HE COULD NOT TELL DEFINITELY US ATTITUDE ON THESE POINTS; HOWEVER, KUZNETSOV'S STATEMENT OF PROBLEMS WELCOME AND WE WOULD EXPRESS OUR VIEWS ON THEM AT APPROPRIATE TIME. PROBLEM OF EXILES TICKLISH, SINCE THEY ANXIOUS MAKE CUBA FREE SO THAT IT COULD DO WHAT IT WANTED DO AND BE FREE OF PRESSURES BY CASTRO. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO CONTROL THEIR THOUGHTS. ORGANIZING REFUGEES INTO UNITS WAS ONE THING, BUT CONTROL OF THEIR THOUGHTS WAS A DIFFERENT MATTER. WE COULD NOT GET INTO A POSITION OF GUARANTEEING SUPPORT FOR CASTRO, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW CUBA NOW CENTER OF INFECTION OF SUBVERSIVE AND SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES AGAINST LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AS DEMONSTRATED BY RECENT EVENTS IN VENEZUELA. MCCLOY THEN STRESSED MAIN PROBLEM AT THIS TIME WAS REMOVAL OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FROM CUBA. WHEN THIS DONE ATMOSPHERE FOR DISCUSSION OTHER PROBLEMS,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

-3- 1581, October 31, 11 p.m., from New York

INCLUDING TEST BAN AND DISARMAMENT, WOULD BE MUCH BETTER. KUZNETSOV AGREED BUT COMMENTED IT DIFFICULT DEFINE DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE WEAPONS SINCE US CALLED ITS WEAPONS AT FOREIGN BASES DEFENSIVE, ALTHOUGH THOSE WEAPONS WERE SAME AS WEAPONS USSR HAD PLACED IN CUBA. SUGGESTED HOWEVER THAT DISCUSSION THIS SUBJECT WOULD SERVE NO USEFUL PURPOSE AT THIS TIME AND THAT MCCLOY AND HE DEAL WITH PRACTICAL MATTERS BEFORE THEM TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE RECURRENCE PRESENT SITUATION.

MCCLOY INQUIRED WHETHER USSR THOUGHT ICRC WOULD ACT AS AGENT OF UN. KUZNETSOV REPLIED DEFINITELY YES. RE KUZNETSOV'S REMARK USSR HAD DONE SOMETHING UNDER U THANT PROPOSAL, MCCLOY POINTED OUT IT HAD BEEN USSR WHO HAD CREATED THIS SITUATION IN FIRST PLACE BY INTRODUCING OFFENSIVE WEAPONS CUBA AND POINTING THEM AT OUR HEARTS. IT IMPOSSIBLE NEGOTIATE WHILE GUN WAS ON TABLE AND THEREFORE REMOVAL THOSE WEAPONS WAS PRIMARY PROBLEM. AS TO DEFINITION OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, US HAD MADE CLEAR WHAT IT MEANT AND SOVS KNEW IT.

KUZNETSOV THEN INQUIRED RE US VIEWS ON WHAT IF ANY UN PRESENCE WOULD BE REQUIRED AFTER REMOVAL OF RELEVANT WEAPONS COMPLETED. PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO KHRUSHCHEV CONTAINED TWO POINTS RELATING TO THIS PROBLEM, WHICH NEEDED CLARIFICATION. MCCLOY REPLIED HE HAD NOT GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT TO WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED AFTER REMOVAL COMPLETED, BUT HE DID NOT THINK THAT ANY INTERMINABLE UN PRESENCE WOULD BE NEEDED. WE WOULD GIVE THIS MATTER FURTHER CONSIDERATION.

KUZNETSOV SUGGESTED THOUGHT BE GIVEN TO PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING CUBAN ITEM IN SECURITY COUNCIL. NOTING USSR HAD NO FIXED VIEWS ON THIS POINT AS YET, WONDERED WHETHER MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE HAVE A JOINT US/USSR STATEMENT OR SEPARATE STATEMENTS BY TWO GOVTS, WITH SECURITY COUNCIL TAKING NOTE OF SUCH STATEMENT OR STATEMENTS AND APPEALING TO ALL STATES TO FACILITATE IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS. MCCLOY RESPONDED HE NO UN EXPERT AND POINTED OUT STEVENSON RATHER THAN HE US REP IN UN. HIS OWN FUNCTION WAS MERELY TO COORDINATE US POLICY ON CUBAN PROBLEM. KUZNETSOV SAID THAT HIS ASSIGNMENT WAS TO ASSIST ACTING SYG IN RESOLVING CUBAN PROBLEM AS SPEEDILY AS POSSIBLE AND ZORIN WAS USSR SPOKESMAN IN UN. MCCLOY EXPRESSED HOPE CASTRO WOULD BE LESS RECALCITRANT AND OBSERVED US AND SOVS MIGHT FIND THEMSELVES UNITED VIS-A-VIS CASTRO. KUZNETSOV SMILED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

-4- 1581, October 31, 11 p.m., from New York

AT ONE POINT EARLY IN CONVERSATION KUZNETSOV SAID MIKOYAN ARRIVING NY TWO OR THREE PM NOV 1 AND LEAVING NY SHORTLY AFTER NOON NOV 2. MIKOYAN WOULD LIKE MEET WITH MCCLOY AND EXTENDED INVITATION TO DINNER NOV 1. MCCLOY SAID HE WOULD OF COURSE MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE FOR MEETING WITH MIKOYAN, BUT NOT QUITE SURE WHETHER HE HAD ANY PRIOR ENGAGEMENT FOR TOMORROW NIGHT. WOULD GIVE DEFINITE REPLY FIRST THING TOMORROW MORNING AFTER CHECKING CALENDAR. SUBSEQUENTLY AFTER TALKING WITH SECRETARY, MCCLOY CONFIRMED HE WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR DINNER.

STEVENSON

JVC

NOTE: Passed White House, 11/1/62, 12:09 a.m. RNL

Advance copies to S/S and S/SO.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

~~EYES ONLY~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

28

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EYES ONLY

Action IO Control: 7
Rec'd: November 1, 1962
1:16 a.m.

Info FROM: New York

013

SS TO: Secretary of State

G NO: 1584, November 1, 1 a.m.

SP
L
SAL
ARA
EUR
DAC
P

PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State la 3/28/77

By

rmg, NARS, Date 5/9/77

IOP. DEPT PASS TO WHITE HOUSE

INR

RMR CUBA

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

UPON RETURN SYG PARTY TO NEW YORK PLANE MET BY NOYES AND WELLBORN WHO DISCUSSED WITH RIKHYE HIS IMPRESSIONS OF CONFERENCES IN CUBA. ASKED RIKHYE BASIS OF MESSAGE HE HAD SENT THRU NARASIMHAN THAT RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS THURSDAY WOULD RECEIVE WARM RECEPTION. RIKHYE STATED THIS BASED ON CUBAN STATEMENT THAT WOULD RESIST ANY VIOLATION THEIR AIR SPACE. RIKHYE RECOMMENDED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS UNTIL SATURDAY BECAUSE GEN. IGOR STAZENKO, COMMANDER OF SOVIET FORCES IN CUBA, STATED ALL MISSILES AND MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT AT LAUNCHING SITES WOULD BE REMOVED BY FRIDAY. SUGGESTED THAT AT ANY TIME FLIGHTS RESUMED PATTERN OF FLIGHTS SHOULD BE VARIED SINCE CUBANS BELIEVED THEY HAD ESTABLISHED WHAT THEY BELIEVED TO BE THE STANDARD ROUTINE FOR RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS.

RIKHYE OBSERVED HEAVY CONCENTRATION ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY AROUND AIRFIELD AT WHICH SYG PLANE LANDED BUT DID NOT HAVE OPPORTUNITY OBSERVE ELSEWHERE.

HE STATED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CUBANS AND SOVIETS "UNBELIEVABLY BAD" AND THAT CUBANS FELT THAT SOVIETS HAD TAKEN VARIOUS ACTIONS OF CONCERN TO CUBANS WITHOUT CONSULTING OR EVEN INFORMING THEM. HE SAID WHEN SUBJECT OF INSPECTION OF MISSILE SITES RAISED AN UNNAMED CUBAN TOLD HIM UN REPS COULD NOT INSPECT THEM, THAT EVEN THE CUBANS WERE NOT PERMITTED TO DO SO.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

EYES ONLY

EAEZ ONIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

-2- November 1, 1 a.m., from New York

RIKHYE HELD PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH GEN STAZENKO DURING WHICH HE WAS TOLD NONE OF IRBMS HAD BECOME OPERATIONAL BUT THAT SIX OR EIGHT OF MRBM HAD BEEN OPERATIONAL. SAID THAT ALL MISSILES HAD NOT YET ARRIVED IN CUBA BUT NOT SPECIFIC AS TO HOW MANY STILL TO COME. SAID RIKHYE'S INFORMATION ON TOTAL NUMBERS (WHICH BASED ON MAPS AND PHOTOS PROVIDED BY US) WAS ABOUT CORRECT. SAID ABOUT FIVE THOUSAND SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CUBA. CIVILIANS WHO WERE PRINCIPALLY LABORERS BROUGHT TOTAL SOVIET PERSONNEL TO BETWEEN EIGHT AND TEN THOUSAND. STAZENKO INDICATED THAT ALL SOVIETS IN CUBA UNDER HIS CONTROL. HE STATED THAT AFTER MISSILES AND MAJOR COMPONENTS REMOVED FROM SITES, MIGHT BE SOME "BITS AND PIECES" LEFT AT SITES BUT THAT THEY EXPECTED START "BULLDOZING" THEM BY FRIDAY. SOME TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR CRATING MISSILES AND MAJOR EQUIPMENT FOR SHIPMENT. STAZENKO EXPECTED LEAVE CUBA WITH LAST OF HIS EQUIPMENT. STAZENKO SHOWED LITTLE CONCERN ABOUT US RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS. RIKHYE APPEARED CONVINCED OF GOOD FAITH AND RELIABILITY OF STAZENKO.

RIKHYE WOULD NOT SAY CATEGORICALLY WHETHER HE THOUGHT ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS UNDER SOVIET CONTROL WOULD FIRE ON RECONNAISSANCE PLANES BUT WAS EMPHATIC THAT HE EXPECTED THAT THOSE UNDER CUBAN CONTROL WOULD DO SO. UNABLE OBTAIN FROM HIM PRECISE STATEMENT AS TO WHICH WEAPONS UNDER CUBAN AND WHICH UNDER SOVIET CONTROL.

RIKHYE'S FINAL STATEMENT WAS THAT HE WAS "VERY MUCH ENCOURAGED" WHICH SEEMED TO BE BASED ON HIS ESTIMATE OF SOVIET INTENTIONS RATHER THAN CUBAN INTENTIONS.

STEVENSON

JVC

NOTE: Passed White House, 11/1/62, 1:30 a.m. RNL
Advance copy to SS, SS-O and INR (TEM)
Relayed Principle Officers Executive Committee per SS-O

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

EAEZ ONIA

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

29

'8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

Action
IOControl: 10,
Rec'd: November 1, 1962
1:35 a.m.

Info

FROM: New York

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SP

L

SAL

ARA

EUR

DAC

P

IOP

SCA

SCS

INR

RMR

PRIORITY

DEPARTMENT PASS TO WHITE HOUSE

CUBA

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Bu 3/28/11
By rmg, NARS, Date 5/9/11

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF SYG'S PRELIMINARY REPORT OF CUBAN VISIT GIVEN THIS EVENING TO STEVENSON, MCCLOY AND YOST AND ALREADY TELEPHONED TO SECRETARY.

AT FIRST MEETING YESTERDAY SYG FOUND CASTRO IN IMPOSSIBLE AND INTRACTABLE MOOD. HE WAS EXTREMELY BITTER AT SOVIETS, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE KHRUSHCHEV HAD NOT CONSULTED HIM BEFORE DESPATCHING HIS LETTER TO PRESIDENT SUNDAY MORNING. CASTRO MADE HIS FIVE-POINT DECLARATION THREE HOURS LATER IN ORDER TO COMPLICATE SITUATION FOR SOVIETS. SYG FORESEES SHOWDOWN WHEN MIKOYAN ARRIVES. CASTRO DECLARED CATEGORICALLY THAT THERE COULD BE NO INSPECTION OF ANY KIND OR ANY OUTSIDE AGENCY ON CUBAN SOIL. IT WAS ALSO CLEAR THERE ARE NOT AND HAVE NOT BEEN ANY CUBANS ON MISSILE SITES FROM WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN RIGIDLY EXCLUDED. CASTRO SAID UN COULD INSPECT ON HIGH SEAS, BUT NOT IN CUBAN TERRITORY AND WAS FURIOUS WITH KHRUSHCHEV FOR MAKING VERIFICATION COMMITMENT AND MADE IT CLEAR HE WOULD NOT PERMIT EVEN INSPECTION OF WHAT IS LEFT BEHIND AFTER SITES DISMANTLED AND EVACUATED. HE WAS VERY STRONGLY OPPOSED TO AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE, EVEN BY UN, AS VIOLATION CUBAN SOVEREIGNTY.

YESTERDAY SYG ASKED SOVIET AMB WHEN DISMANTLING STARTED AND HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE. AMB REPLIED HE WOULD SEEK ANSWERS FROM MILITARY. HE AND SOVIET GENERAL CALLED ON U THANT THIS AFTERNOON AND REPLIED AS FOLLOWS: INSTRUCTIONS WERE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

EYES ONLY

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1585, November 1, 1 a.m. from New York

RECEIVED FROM KHRUSHCHEV BETWEEN 1 AND 3 PM ON SUNDAY AND DISMANTLING STARTED AT 5 PM. DISMANTLING WILL BE COMPLETED BY TOMORROW NIGHT OR AT LATEST BY FRIDAY. AT THAT TIME ALL EQUIPMENT WILL BE PACKED AND AT THE PORTS. ON FRIDAY SITES INCLUDING PADS WILL BE BULLDOZED. THEY CLAIMED BASES ALREADY DO NOT EXIST. THEY HAVE ASKED FOR SHIPS AND SAID KUZNETSOV WOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE SYG WITH SHIPPING SCHEDULES.

THERE WAS NO SPECIFIC MENTION OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT BUT SYG HAD IMPRESSION THAT THESE WERE ALSO BEING EVACUATED, PARTICULARLY SINCE THEY BELIEVE CUBANS ARE UNABLE TO FLY BEAGLES. IT WAS GENERAL RIKHYE'S BELIEF THAT ANY EQUIPMENT THAT THE SOVIETS MANNED WILL GO AS WELL AS ALL SOVIET MILITARY. HE WAS NOT SURE WHETHER SAM ANTI-AIRCRAFT MANNED BY SOVIETS OR CUBANS ALTHOUGH CASTRO CLAIMS ALL ANTI-AIRCRAFT MANNED BY CUBANS AND THAT THEY SHOT DOWN U-2. RIKHYE PRESUMES THAT IF SAMs ARE MANNED BY CUBANS THEY WILL REMAIN.

REVERTING TO FIRST MEETING WITH CASTRO SYG SAID HE HAD BEEN TERRIBLY TENSE AND NERVOUS AND THAT HE (THANT) HAD NEVER HAD MORE TRYING ENCOUNTER IN ALL HIS EXPERIENCE. CASTRO HAD CONSTANTLY REPEATED US RADIO REPORTS THAT SYG HAD COME NOT TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS BUT TO INSPECT. THANT INTERRUPTED MEETING AFTER TWO AND ONE-QUARTER HOURS.

NEXT MORNING CASTRO, ACCOMPANIED BY DORTICOS AND ROA, WAS A LITTLE BETTER BUT STILL ADAMANT, INSISTING CUBANS WOULD FIGHT TO LAST MAN, THAT NO ONE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO INFRINGE THEIR SOVEREIGNTY, AND THAT IF SECURITY COUNCIL IS TO DISCUSS CUBAN PROBLEM IT MAY DO SO ONLY ON BASIS HIS FIVE POINTS. HE MADE CLEAR HE WAS READY FOR LONG-RANGE PROBLEMS INVOLVING CUBA TO BE DISCUSSED IN UN CONTEST BUT NOT IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF INSPECTION.

ON OTHER HAND, HE WAS CONCILIATORY CONCERNING MAJOR ANDERSON, SAYING THAT HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO RETURN HIM ALIVE IF HE WERE ALIVE BUT THAT HE WILL RETURN HIS BODY UNDER UN AUSPICES.

SYG EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW THAT CONTINUATION US BLOCKADE IS NO LONGER NECESSARY. GENERAL RIKHYE WAS CONFIDENT SOVIETS WILL NOT BRING IN ANY MORE MISSILES. SOVIET MILITARY ARE FED UP AND WANT TO GET OUT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. THERE IS, MOREOVER, NO SHORTAGE OF CONVENTIONAL HARDWARE - ARTILLERY, ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND MACHINE GUNS. WHAT IS NEEDED, IN CUBA IS FOOD NOT HARDWARE. SYG EMPHASIZED PARTICULARLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY

-3- 1585, November 1, 1 a.m., from New York

INCREDIBLY BAD ECONOMIC SITUATION IN HAVANA. HE FELT CONTINUATION OF BLOCKADE WOULD SIMPLY MAKE CUBANS MORE DESPERATE AND MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO CASTRO'S INFLUENCE.

THANT AND LOUTFI BOTH EXPRESSED STRONG CONVICTION THAT ALL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND ALL SOVIET MILITARY WILL DEPART. IN REPLY TO OUR INQUIRIES HE WAS UNABLE MAKE ANY SUGGESTION IN REGARD TO VERIFICATION. HE OBVIOUSLY, HOWEVER, HAD IN MIND AT LEAST SOME US OVERFLIGHTS SINCE HE URGED WE NOT MAKE ANY BEFORE FRIDAY WHEN DISMANTLING WILL PRESUMABLY BE COMPLETE.

NARASIMHAN INQUIRED WHETHER IT IS STILL OUR DESIRE THAT UN PROCEED TO ORGANIZE RED CROSS INSPECTION AND WE INFORMED HIM THAT IT IS. HE WAS INTERESTED TO KNOW HOW THIS WOULD BE FINANCED.

STEVENSON

HC

Note: Passed White House, 11/1/62, 1:49 a.m., RNL

Advance copy to SS, SS-O and INR (TEM)

Relayed Principle Officers Executive Committee per SS-O

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY

The Vice President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SPECIAL HANDLING

30

~~EYES ONLY~~

TO:
FROM: New York
NUMBER: 1604
DATE: 11/2/62, copy 11

Signature Record

Date	Officer	Signature

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to
S/S - William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

CONFIDENTIAL

Q. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2.

REQUIRES SPECIAL H

Sl. No.	Particulars	Amount	Total
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

27309448 RECORD

**THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO - L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File**

Table 1. *Continued*

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

30a

1

Action

SS

Info

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

Control: 433

Rec'd: NOVEMBER 2, 1962
1:52 A.M.

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1604, NOVEMBER 2, 1 A.M.

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS 61-63, vol. XI #133
By NARA, Date 8-18-05

MCCLOY, STEVENSON AND AKALOVSKY MET WITH MIKOYAN, KUZNETSOV, ZORIN, DOBRYNIN, MENSHIKOV AND ZHUKOV FROM 7 TO 11 PM THURSDAY NIGHT. MIKOYAN STARTED IN AGGRESSIVE MOOD, INSISTING ON SUSPENDING QUARANTINE NOW, SAYING THAT WAS U THANT'S INTENTION. WE REPEATED THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS EMBODIED IN THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CHAIRMAN KHRUSCHEV AND PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND LEFT NO UNCERTAINTY THAT THE HAIL AND PASS QUARANTINE COULD NOT BE SUSPENDED UNTIL THE RED CROSS INSPECTION WAS IN EFFECT. THIS SEEMED TO BOTHER MIKOYAN CONSIDERABLY, BUT AFTER SOME FURTHER DISCUSSION HE DROPPED THE MATTER. WHEN ASKED HOW FAR AWAY THE NEAREST SOVIET SHIPS WERE, HE REPLIED FOUR OR FIVE DAYS. WE POINTED OUT THAT IN THAT EVENT, IF RED CROSS INSPECTION WAS ESTABLISHED QUICKLY, FEW IF ANY SOVIET SHIPS WOULD HAVE TO PASS THE PRESENT QUARANTINE. HE SAID THANT HAD AGREED WITH HIM THAT THE US SHOULD SUSPEND QUARANTINE DURING THE INTERVAL.

MIKOYAN THEN ASKED IF WE WERE WORKING NOW TO FORMALIZE THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN US. WE REPLIED THERE WERE ONLY THREE QUESTIONS: RED CROSS INSPECTION, INSPECTION AND VERIFICATION OF REMOVAL OF WEAPONS, AND THE GUARANTEE TO CUBA; AND SAW ONLY ONE DIFFICULTY IN REACHING AN AGREEMENT, NAMELY CASTRO'S REJECTION OF VERIFICATION. MIKOYAN MADE LONG SPEECH INSISTING ON LINKING CASTRO'S FIVE POINTS WITH SOVIET-US AGREEMENT AND CHARGED US WITH DRAWING ATTENTION TO ONLY "TEMPORARY" QUESTIONS

WHILE

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 1604, NOVEMBER 2, 1 A.M., FROM NEW YORK

WHILE OVERLOOKING "CARDINAL" QUESTIONS. HE SAID WE OBVIOUSLY DID NOT WANT TO HEAR ABOUT INTERESTS OF OTHERS AND WERE ONLY CONCERNED WITH OUR OWN INTERESTS. HE WENT ON TO SUGGEST CERTAIN REPORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO UNITED NATIONS AND THAT A FORMAL DOCUMENT OR PROTOCOL SHOULD BE EXECUTED, AND THAT HE WANTED NEGOTIATIONS TO COMMENCE FORMALLY ON BASIS OF THE LETTERS, INCLUDING CASTRO'S FIVE POINTS, BETWEEN THE US, SOVIET AND U THANT. LATER HE ASKED IF CUBA SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE DISCUSSIONS, REPEATING AGAIN AND AGAIN THAT WE MUST DISCUSS THE GUANTANAMO AND THE OTHER POINTS RELATING TO NORMALIZING THE SITUATION IN THE CARIBBEAN WITH UN PRESENCES IN CUBA, IN THE US AND IN OTHER PARTS OF THE AREA, TO SEE THAT AGREEMENT ADHERED TO. CASTRO, HE SAID, WAS PRIME MINISTER OF INDEPENDENT STATE AND WE CAN'T EVADE ASSURANCES OF NON-AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA, THAT WE WERE WITHDRAWING FROM OUR COMMITMENTS AND MUST DISCUSS EVERYTHING, THAT THEY MUST KNOW THE US POSITION IN ORDER TO TELL CASTRO.

WE REPEATED OVER AND OVER THAT WE MUST STICK TO THIS PROBLEM AND THIS PROBLEM ONLY AND COULD CONSIDER NO OTHER QUESTIONS. WE ADDED THAT CASTRO COULD RAISE ANY QUESTIONS HE PLEASED AND THAT THEY WOULD BE DEALT WITH AT THE RIGHT TIME AND THAT WE WERE CONCERNED WITH ONE QUESTION ONLY AND THAT WAS BETWEEN THE US AND SOVIET UNION. HE WENT BACK AGAIN AND AGAIN TO HIS INSISTENCE THAT WE WERE BY-PASSING THE OTHER SIDE, INCLUDING LIFTING THE BLOCKADE AND NORMALIZING THE SITUATION, THAT THE WHOLE UNDERSTANDING WOULD HAVE TO BE FORMALIZED IN DOCUMENTS REGISTERED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS AND APPROVED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND THAT WE CAN'T DISREGARD THE DEMANDS OF CASTRO. FOLLOWING OUR INSISTENCE THAT WE CAN NEGOTIATE ONLY ONE PROBLEM AND THAT ANY DISCUSSION OF GUANTANAMO IN CONNECTION WITH IT WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION, HE REMARKED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD NEVER RAISED GUANTANAMO, WHICH WAS A CUBA-US PROBLEM, BUT THAT THE US SHOULD DISCUSS THE OTHER FOUR POINTS.

WE EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT WE NEEDED NO DOCUMENTS EXCEPT THE DECLARATIONS OF USSR, US AND SYG BEFORE SECURITY COUNCIL AFTER TRANSACTION COMPLETED. FOR THAT PURPOSE CUBA WAS NOT A NECESSARY PARTY, ESPECIALLY IF IT REFUSED ANY UNITED NATIONS

INSPECTION

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 1604, NOVEMBER 2, 1 A.M., FROM NEW YORK

INSPECTION AS KHRUSHCHEV HAD PROMISED.

WE THEN TURNED TO OTHER FORMS OF INSPECTION AND VERIFICATION, BY AIR RECON AND TABLES OF ORGANIZATION, AND SUGGESTED HE COULD ARGUE WITH CASTRO THAT A UN PRESENCE WOULD BE AN ASSURANCE TO CASTRO AGAINST INVASION IN INTERIM AS WELL AS AN ASSURANCE TO US. MIKOYAN WAS AT PAINS TO SAY THAT THIS MEETING WAS NOT A FINAL NEGOTIATION, BUT MERELY AN EXPLORATION TO SEE WHAT EVERYONE HAD IN MIND. WE SAID THAT WE FELT TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE AND THAT WE COULD AGREE UPON MODALITIES OF THE RED CROSS INSPECTION DIRECTLY OR THROUGH OUR DEPUTIES ALMOST AT ONCE, ON BASIS OF THANT'S PROPOSALS. WE ADDED THAT WE COULD SEE NO NECESSITY FOR DOCUMENTARY AGREEMENT ON AERIAL INSPECTION, BUT WANTED ASSURANCES FROM HIM THAT OUR PLANES WOULD NOT BE FIRED ON IF THAT WAS THE ONLY FORM OF INSPECTION AND VERIFICATION AVAILABLE TO US. THEY REPLIED THEY COULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT THE GUNS WOULD NOT SHOOT, BECAUSE CUBA WAS AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY OVER WHICH THEY HAD NO CONTROL, AND ADVERTED AGAIN TO FACT THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER EVERYTHING, BUT THAT AT LEAST THIS TALK HAD SERVED TO EXPOSE OUR DIFFERENCES. (LATER IN A SUMMARY WE HAD FEELING WE WERE REALLY VERY CLOSE TOGETHER AND THAT IF MIKOYAN WOULD DROP HIS EFFORT TO LINK CASTRO'S FIVE POINTS OUR DIFFERENCES WERE FEW.)

WHEN WE TRIED TO GET DOWN TO DETAILS OF THE RED CROSS AND AERIAL INSPECTION MIKOYAN SAID HE WAS NOT SPECIALIST AND THESE WERE DETAILS, THAT HE HAD BROUGHT A GENERAL AND COLONEL TO HELP KUZNETSOV, REPEATING AGAIN AND AGAIN THAT HE COULD GIVE US NO GUARANTEE REGARDING THE SECURITY OF OUR OVER-FLIGHTS. WE REMINDED HIM KHRUSHCHEV HAD AGREED TO UN INSPECTION AND THAT WE UNDERSTOOD HIS DIFFICULTIES IF CUBA REFUSED, IN VIEW OF ITS INDEPENDENCE, AND WERE TRYING REACH ACCOMMODATION FOR QUICK AND SATISFACTORY RESULTS. HE REVERTED AGAIN TO ARGUMENT THAT IF WE INSISTED ON UN INSPECTION IN CUBA, IT HAD A RIGHT TO INSIST ON INSPECTION OF REFUGEE CAMPS AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES ANYWHERE. HE WAS ASSURED THAT THERE WERE NO SUCH CAMPS ANY LONGER AND THAT US WAS NOT ENGAGED IN SUCH ACTIVITIES. LIKEWISE WE TRIED REASSURE HIM ABOUT TRAINING OF CUBAN CITIZENS IN THE ARMY AND THAT US WANTED TO REGULARIZE RELATIONS IN CARIBBEAN FOR PROTECTION OF OTHERS AS WELL AS CASTRO, BUT THAT THIS WAS A SEPARATE MATTER THAT HAD NOTHING TO DO

WITH THIS

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-4- 1604, NOVEMBER 2, 1 A.M., FROM NEW YORK

WITH THIS QUESTION. MIKOYAN QUICKLY ASKED IF WE WERE REFERRING TO POSSIBLE RESTORATION ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH CUBA, AND WE EXPLAINED REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THIS HEMISPHERE THROUGH OAS AND THAT SUCH MATTERS WERE NOT EXCLUDED FROM FUTURE CONSIDERATION IF OTHER AGGRAVATIONS COULD BE RELIEVED, BUT THAT WE MUST GET THE ONE QUESTION BEFORE US PROMPTLY RESOLVED.

FYI. WITH REGARD TO SAM SITES, WE HAD CLEAR IMPRESSION THEY INTENDED TO LEAVE THEM IN CUBA, AND THEY ALSO SAID THEY HAD GIVEN THESE GUNS TO A NUMBER OF OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING INDONESIA AND UAR.

MEETING BECAME MORE CORDIAL AND FRIENDLY AS IT PROCEEDED AND WAS EXCLUSIVELY DOMINATED BY MIKOYAN. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER HE WAS COMING BACK THROUGH NEW YORK ON WAY HOME, BUT WE HAD IMPRESSION HE INTENDED TO.

THEIR ESTIMATE OF TIME TO COMPLETE REMOVAL WAS TEN TO FIFTEEN DAYS, INCLUDING THE IL-28'S.

AT ONE POINT HE REPEATED KHRUSHCHEV'S STATEMENT THAT WHAT WE CALL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS HAD BEEN GIVEN TO CUBA TO DETER US AGGRESSION, BUT THAT IF NON-AGGRESSION WAS GUARANTEED THEY WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AND THAT THEY WOULD SHIP NO MORE WEAPONS.

IN SUMMARIZING OUR CONCLUSIONS, WE REVIEWED THE PROCEDURE BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THEY SUGGESTED WE EXCHANGE DRAFTS OF DECLARATIONS, WHICH SEEMED TO US TO INDICATE ACCEPTANCE OF THIS PROCEDURE, ON THE WHOLE OUR FEELING WAS THAT WE HAD LEFT NO DOUBT THE FIVE POINTS AND WEAPONS TRANSACTION COULD NOT BE LINKED AND THAT HE WILL MEET CASTRO WITH A CLEAR IMPRESSION OF OUR POSITION, AND UNDERSTAND WE WILL INSIST ON INTERIM INSPECTION BY OUR MEANS IF AN AGREEMENT FOR UN PRESENCE CANNOT BE REACHED. IT IS OUR INTENTION TO PROCEED AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE WITH KUZNETSOV AND HIS DEPUTY MOROZOV TO TRY COMPLETE MODALITIES ON RED CROSS INSPECTION PENDING MIKOYAN'S RETURN.

STEVENSON

SMD
Note: Passed Principle Officers Executive Committee 11/2/62
Advance copies to SS/O and SS/DO

~~TOP SECRET~~

SPECIAL HANDLING

31

TO:

NUMBER: 1595

DATE: 11/1/62, copy 16

Signature Record

[illegible]

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S - William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

lays.

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

**THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO - L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File**

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

312

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

W
Action
SS

EYES ONLY

Control: 402

Rec'd: NOVEMBER 1, 1962
9:18 PM

016

Info

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1595, NOVEMBER 1, 9 PM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Lu 3/28/77

By hong, NARS, Date 5/4/77

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1595, INFORMATION ANKARA 10.

CUBA

STEVENSON CONFIRMED TO KURAL (TURKEY) TODAY THAT KUZNETSOV HAD RAISED SUBJECT OF TURKISH BASES WITH HIM. STEVENSON SAID HE HAD TOLD KUZNETSOV MATTER COULD BE DISCUSSED LATER AFTER CUBAN MISSILE THREAT ELIMINATED BUT THAT PROPER WAY DISCUSS MATTER WAS IN CONTEXT DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS. STEVENSON ADDED IT IMPORTANT RETAIN CERTAIN FLEXIBILITY ON HOW AND WHEN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT TAKE PLACE BUT ASSURED KURAL THAT IF AND WHEN SOVS BRING UP TURKISH BASE PROBLEM, TURKEY AND NATO WILL BE FULLY CONSULTED BEFORE ANY SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS TAKE PLACE. STEVENSON GAVE KURAL FULL BRIEFING ON MOST RECENT ASPECTS VERIFICATION PROBLEM.

KURAL EXPRESSED "UNDER INSTRUCTIONS" THANKS OF HIS GOVT FOR WAY STEVENSON HANDLED TURKISH BASE ISSUE IN SC MEETINGS AS WELL AS HIS OWN ADMIRATION FOR PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S BOLD INITIATIVE. STEVENSON SAID HE WOULD COMMUNICATE LATTER TO PRESIDENT.

STEVENSON

JT/0

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

32

~~EYES ONLY~~

Signature Record

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S - William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

[illegible]

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

**THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO - L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File**

32a

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

00216

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

W
Origin

ACTION: Amembassy RIO DE JANEIRO PRIORITY 1082 Nov 1 8 06 PM '62

SS
Info

EYES ONLY

016

Re urtel 917.

Since Embtel 915 was based on conversation of Monday night and Castro's refusal to accept Brazilian desire that he permit UN inspectors has become much clearer and firmer would have thought Brazil might be willing consider taking stronger position now than it did Monday on this point for which they have all along expressed their strong support. However, leave to your discretion.

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ex 3/28/77
By MBP/CC, NARS, Date 4/22/97

Drafted by:

ARA:EMMartin:lh 10/1/62

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

ARA - Edwin M. Martin

Clearances:

G - Mr. Johnson

S/S - Mr. Weiner

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECIAL HANDLING

33

~~EYES ONLY~~

Signature Record

[illegible]

in 30 days.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

$$\frac{d}{dt} \left(\frac{\partial L}{\partial \dot{x}} \right) = \frac{\partial L}{\partial x}$$

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040 2041 2042 2043 2044 2045 2046 2047 2048 2049 2050 2051 2052 2053 2054 2055 2056 2057 2058 2059 2060 2061 2062 2063 2064 2065 2066 2067 2068 2069 2070 2071 2072 2073 2074 2075 2076 2077 2078 2079 2080 2081 2082 2083 2084 2085 2086 2087 2088 2089 2090 2091 2092 2093 2094 2095 2096 2097 2098 2099 2100 2101 2102 2103 2104 2105 2106 2107 2108 2109 2110 2111 2112 2113 2114 2115 2116 2117 2118 2119 2120 2121 2122 2123 2124 2125 2126 2127 2128 2129 2130 2131 2132 2133 2134 2135 2136 2137 2138 2139 2140 2141 2142 2143 2144 2145 2146 2147 2148 2149 2150 2151 2152 2153 2154 2155 2156 2157 2158 2159 2160 2161 2162 2163 2164 2165 2166 2167 2168 2169 2170 2171 2172 2173 2174 2175 2176 2177 2178 2179 2180 2181 2182 2183 2184 2185 2186 2187 2188 2189 2190 2191 2192 2193 2194 2195 2196 2197 2198 2199 2200 2201 2202 2203 2204 2205 2206 2207 2208 2209 2210 2211 2212 2213 2214 2215 2216 2217 2218 2219 2220 2221 2222 2223 2224 2225 2226 2227 2228 2229 2230 2231 2232 2233 2234 2235 2236 2237 2238 2239 2240 2241 2242 2243 2244 2245 2246 2247 2248 2249 2250 2251 2252 2253 2254 2255 2256 2257 2258 2259 2260 2261 2262 2263 2264 2265 2266 2267 2268 2269 2270 2271 2272 2273 2274 2275 2276 2277 2278 2279 2280 2281 2282 2283 2284 2285 2286 2287 2288 2289 2290 2291 2292 2293 2294 2295 2296 2297 2298 2299 2300 2301 2302 2303 2304 2305 2306 2307 2308 2309 2310 2311 2312 2313 2314 2315 2316 2317 2318 2319 2320 2321 2322 2323 2324 2325 2326 2327 2328 2329 2330 2331 2332 2333 2334 2335 2336 2337 2338 2339 2340 2341 2342 2343 2344 2345 2346 2347 2348 2349 2350 2351 2352 2353 2354 2355 2356 2357 2358 2359 2360 2361 2362 2363 2364 2365 2366 2367 2368 2369 2370 2371 2372 2373 2374 2375 2376 2377 2378 2379 2380 2381 2382 2383 2384 2385 2386 2387 2388 2389 2390 2391 2392 2393 2394 2395 2396 2397 2398 2399 2400 2401 2402 2403 2404 2405 2406 2407 2408 2409 2410 2411 2412 2413 2414 2415 2416 2417 2418 2419 2420 2421 2422 2423 2424 2425 2426 2427 2428 2429 2430 2431 2432 2433 2434 2435 2436 2437 2438 2439 2440 2441 2442 2443 2444 2445 2446 2447 2448 2449 2450 2451 2452 2453 2454 2455 2456 2457 2458 2459 2460 2461 2462 2463 2464 2465 2466 2467 2468 2469 2470 2471 2472 2473 2474 2475 2476 2477 2478 2479 2480 2481 2482 2483 2484 2485 2486 2487 2488 2489 2490 2491 2492 2493 2494 2495 2496 2497 2498 2499 2500 2501 2502 2503 2504 2505 2506 2507 2508 2509 2510 2511 2512 2513 2514 2515 2516 2517 2518 2519 2520 2521 2522 2523 2524 2525 2526 2527 2528 2529 2530 2531 2532 2533 2534 2535 2536 2537 2538 2539 2540 2541 2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547 2548 2549 2550 2551 2552 2553 2554 2555 2556 2557 2558 2559 2560 2561 2562 2563 2564 2565 2566 2567 2568 2569 2570 2571 2572 2573 2574 2575 2576 2577 2578 2579 2580 2581 2582 2583 2584 2585 2586 2587 2588 2589 2590 2591 2592 2593 2594 2595 2596 2597 2598 2599 2600 2601 2602 2603 2604 2605 2606 2607 2608 2609 2610 2611 2612 2613 2614 2615 2616 2617 2618 2619 2620 2621 2622 2623 2624 2625 2626 2627 2628 2629 2630 2631 2632 2633 2634 2635 2636 2637 2638 2639 2640 2641 2642 2643 2644 2645 2646 2647 2648 2649 2650 2651 2652 2653 2654 2655 2656 2657 2658 2659 2660 2661 2662 2663 2664 2665 2666 2667 2668 2669 2670 2671 2672 2673 2674 2675 2676 2677 2678 2679 2680 2681 2682 2683 2684 2685 2686 2687 2688 2689 2690 2691 2692 2693 2694 2695 2696 2697 2698 2699 2700 2701 2702 2703 2704 2705 2706 2707 2708 2709 2710 2711 2712 2713 2714 2715 2716 2717 2718 2719 2720 2721 2722 2723 2724 2725 2726 2727 2728 2729 2730 2731 2732 2733 2734 2735 2736 2737 2738 2739 2740 2741 2742 2743 2744 2745 2746 2747 2748 2749 2750 2751 2752 2753 2754 2755 2756 2757 2758 2759 2760 2761 2762 2763 2764

ВРАЧОВЪ И ПЕВНОСЪ

**THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO - L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File**

1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 26

[illegible]

LT

Action
SS

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~Control: 381
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 1, 1962
7:36 P.M.

Info

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1588, NOVEMBER 1, 7 P.M.

016

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY

CUBA

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Bu 3/21/77
By NMG, NARS, Date 5/9/07

AT MTG STEVENSON, MCCLOY AND YOST WITH SYG THIS AFTERNOON WE REPORTED THAT UNARMED US RECONNAISSANCE PLANES OVERFLEW CUBA AT LOW LEVEL TODAY AND WERE NOT FIRED UPON. SYG COMMENTED THAT EXACTLY WHAT CASTRO HAD SAID TO HIM ON THIS POINT HAD BEEN THAT OVERFLIGHTS OF CUBAN TERRITORY WOULD BE INVASION OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY, THAT HE WOULD NOT LIKE TO SHOOT THEM DOWN BUT THAT "HIS BOYS ARE TRIGGER-HAPPY" AND MIGHT. HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY SAY THAT HE HAD GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO SHOOT.

MCCLOY GAVE SYG OUR ESTIMATES AS TO APPROXIMATE LENGTH OF TIME IT WILL TAKE TO REMOVE WEAPONS FROM CUBA AND NUMBER OF VESSELS LIKELY TO BE INVOLVED.

STEVENSON URGED HE PROCEED PROMPTLY TO SET UP RED CROSS INSPECTION SYSTEM. THIS IS SOVIET-US PROBLEM WHICH DOES NOT REQUIRE CUBAN ASSENT. HE MENTIONED SUGGESTION THAT SOV VESSELS MIGHT BE RUN THROUGH SINGLE "SLOT" WHERE THEY MIGHT BE CHECKED BY RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF RED CROSS INSPECTORS LOCATED ON US, NEUTRAL OR RED CROSS SHIP. WE SAID WE EXPECT FULL INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT TONIGHT. SYG MENTIONED THAT SOVS HAVE NOMINATED MOROZOV TO NEGOTIATE THIS PROBLEM AND HE HAS DESIGNATED NARASIMHAN AND RIKHYE. STEVENSON REPLIED THAT YOST WOULD DEAL WITH THEM.

SYG DECLARED RED CROSS IS READY TO PROCEED AS SOON AS IT RECEIVES FORMAL REQUEST WHICH HE HOPES TO DESPATCH AT ONCE. NARASIMHAN DISPLAYED RELUCTANCE TO DESPATCH FORMAL REQUEST

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1588, NOVEMBER 1, 7 P.M., FROM: NEW YORK

WHICH WOULD SET OPERATION IN MOTION UNTIL FINANCIAL PROBLEM HAD BEEN SETTLED. BOTH HE AND SYG EMPHASIZED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO DRAW ON UN BUDGET FOR THIS PURPOSE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM SC. RED CROSS OF COURSE COULD ASSUME NO FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MUST BE REIMBURSED FOR ALL EXPENSES. THEY BELIEVED THEY SHOULD BE ABLE TO ASSURE RED CROSS THAT THIS WILL BE DONE. (LATER AFTER CONSULTATION WITH BALL, YOST PHONED NARASIMHAN AND TOLD HIM HE MIGHT ASSURE RED CROSS THEY WOULD BE REIMBURSED. NARASIMHAN REPLIED HE IS DOING SO AND IS REQUESTING THEY SEND REP TO NY TOMORROW.) NARASIMHAN ESTIMATED COST OF OPERATION WOULD NOT BE MORE THAN \$100,000 FOR PERIOD 30-45 DAYS. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD TAKE ABOUT ONE WEEK TO DEPLOY RED CROSS INSPECTORS TO CARIBBEAN, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE BROUGHT FIRST TO NEW YORK FOR BRIEFING.

SYG SAID HE HAD BEEN DISCUSSING WITH SC MEMBERS THEIR IDEAS CONCERNING SC MTG. HIS OWN SUGGESTION IS THAT THERE BE MEETING LATTER PART OF NEXT WEEK, IN ANY CASE NOT BEFORE WEDNESDAY. PRIMARY PURPOSE WOULD BE TO ENABLE HIM TO REPORT FULLY TO COUNCIL AND BEFORE DOING SO HE WOULD HOPE TO BE INFORMED OF RESULTS OF MIKOYAN VISIT TO CUBA. EVEN IF SC DOES NOT MEET HE WOULD FEEL OBLIGED TO REPORT TO SC IN WRITING BY THAT TIME. MAIN PROBLEM ARISING IN SC MTG WOULD BE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US AND CUBA AS TO SUBSTANCE OF MTG. US WISHES COUNCIL TO DEAL ONLY WITH IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WHEREAS CASTRO WISHES COUNCIL TO DEAL WITH WHOLE RANGER OF PROBLEMS INVOLVING CUBA. SYG SAID HE DOES NOT KNOW SOV VIEW ON THIS ISSUE. MIKOYAN MAY NOT BE ABLE TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION NOW THOUGH PERHAPS HE CAN AFTER HIS RETURN FROM CUBA. THANT DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER HE WILL PASS THROUGH NEW YORK ON HIS RETURN ROUTE. AS TO SC MTG NEXT WEEK, HE HOPES IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WILL IN FACT BE MORE OR LESS SETTLED BY THAT TIME IN THAT WITHDRAWAL OF WEAPONS FROM SITES WILL HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED, BY US MEANS IF NOT BY INSPECTION ON THE SPOT, AND RED CROSS OPERATION WILL HAVE BEEN SET UP. HOWEVER CUBAN REP WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BRING BEFORE SC BROADER ISSUE, INCLUDING ALL 5 POINTS IN CASTRO'S DECLARATION.

STEVENSON POINTED OUT THAT SC HAS ONLY BEEN SEIZED OF THE IMMEDIATE ISSUE AND HE DOES NOT SEE HOW IT CAN GO INTO THESE OTHER MATTERS. WHEN LOUTFI REMARKED FIRST 4 OF CASTRO'S POINTS ARE RELATIVELY EASY AND ONLY GUANTANAMO CREATES PROBLEMS WE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS IS NOT THE CASE, THAT FIRST POINT RELATES NOT TO QUARANTINE BUT TO ECONOMIC PRESSURES WHICH

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1588, NOVEMBER 1, 7 P.M., FROM: NEW YORK

HAVE BEEN APPLIED OVER LONG PERIOD, THAT OTHER POINTS ALSO INVOLVE EXTRANEIOUS ISSUES AND THAT MANY OF THEM ARE MATTERS WITH WHICH OAS IS DEEPLY CONCERNED. MCCLOY NOTED THAT KUZNETSOV HAD MADE CLEAR THAT SOVS WOULD NOT ASSOCIATE THESE BROADER QUESTIONS WITH REMOVAL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS.

STEVENSON SUGGESTED THAT AT SC MTG, SYG, USSR AND US WOULD EACH REPORT WHAT IT HAS DONE TO CARRY OUT COMMITMENTS IN CORRESPONDENCE AMONG PRESIDENT, KHRUSHCHEV AND THANT. NARASIMHAN AGREED SERIES OF PARALLEL DECLARATIONS, WITH SUMMING UP BY SC PRESIDENT, WOULD PROBABLY BE BEST MEANS OF BUTTONING UP QUESTION, SINCE IT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO GET AGREED RES. HE SUGGESTED THAT IF CUBANS RAISED BROADER QUESTIONS BEFORE COUNCIL WE COULD IN REPLY MERELY STATE OUR POSITION THAT THEY ARE NOT PERTINENT TO ISSUE WITH WHICH COUNCIL IS SEIZED. SYG INDICATED HE IS IN NO PARTICULAR HURRY FOR MTG NOR IS HE UNDER PRESSURE FROM OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS. HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF THERE WERE PRIOR OAS MTG.

LOUTFI NOTED BRAZILIANS IN HAVANA HAD TOLD SYG THEY WOULD BE GETTING IN TOUCH WITH US ON RESULTS OF THEIR VISIT. HE SAID BOTH GEN DE SYLVA AND BRAZILIAN AMB ARE VERY ABLE.

SYG EXPRESSED STRONG DOUBT THAT MIKOYAN WILL BE ABLE TO PERSUADE CASTRO TO PERMIT ANY SORT OF INSPECTION IN CUBA. HE NOTED MIKOYAN IS ACCOMPANIED BY 18 AIDES AND PRESUMED THEY WOULD BE NEGOTIATING INCREASED ECONOMIC AID.

HE ALSO REMARKED THAT, SINCE UN WILL PRESUMABLY BE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED WITH CUBAN QUESTION AT LEAST FOR COUPLE OF MONTHS, HE IS DESIGNATING AN OFFICER UNDER LOUTFI TO OCCUPY HIMSELF EXCLUSIVELY WITH THIS PROBLEM.

STEVENSON

DMJ

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, PRINCIPLE OFFICERS EXCOM, 11-1-62;
CWO-JSW.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SPECIAL HANDLING

34

~~EYES ONLY~~

TO: USUN NEW YORK
FROM:
NUMBER: 1159
DATE: 11/1/62

Signature Record

Copy 19

[illegible]

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S - William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TIME • 1991

World Record

DOCUMENT

— 14 —

**THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO - L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File**

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Vice President
0074
34a
EYES ONLY Nov 1 2 58 PM '62

Origin SS ACTION: USUN NEW YORK 1159 ~~RECEIVED~~ NIACT

Info: EYES ONLY FOR UNDER SECRETARY BALL

019

President believes it essential that in conversation with Mikoyan (and Kuznetsov as appropriate) following points be made with utmost emphasis:

1. Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding based on assumption that Sovs would and could deliver on Khrushchev commitment to remove all offensive weapons systems in Cuba and through UN verification satisfy U. S. and other OAS countries this in fact done and does not recur.

2. Although four days have now passed since understanding reached and U Thant has made best efforts, all we have so far is verbal assurances by Sov reps in NY and Cuba to US and UN without element of verification which in view history of this affair US regards as essential.

3. US has acted expeditiously and in good faith, promptly accepting Soviet proposal that ICRC act as UN agent for inspection incoming vessels. (US believes we should promptly move to put this in effect with or without Cuban agreement. Further instructions on this will come later today). US also promptly responded SYG request suspend quarantine and recon flights during period his Havana visit. Also as Sovs aware USG has close watch to prevent anti-Castro Cubans from any action which would upset execution of

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 11/1/78 agreement

By JK/mg, NARS, Date 1/31/78

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

G:UA Johnson/WH:McG.Bundy:mw 11/1/62

G - U. Alexis Johnson

Clearances:

Cleared w/ White House: McG.Bundy
The Secretary (in substance)
DOD/Mr. Nitze

S/S - Mr. Brubeck

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

agreement, e.g. arrest of group with boat in Florida yesterday.

4. On question verification USG has expressed willingness accept wide range of possible UN arrangements but there does not yet appear likelihood even any one of these can be implemented.

5. President's responsibility for US security demands that in absence UN verification, US undertake whatever steps it can to provide verification. Subordinate to this overriding consideration but nevertheless important is assurance to US and LA public.

6. Thus, although much less satisfactory than UN verification on the ground and from the air with cooperation Sovs and Cuba, US must in elemental interests of safety continue aerial surveillance. This surveillance is being carried out in as unprovocative a manner and on as limited a scale as possible by unarmed aircraft. While US accepts that some conventional anti-aircraft guns may be under Cuban control, it cannot accept that sophisticated weapons and control systems, including SAM's, do not require participation of Sov technicians and thus are not or could not be made subject to Soviet control. If US reconnaissance aircraft fired on or destroyed, serious question appropriate means protect US aircraft will arise. We might thus face a cycle of action and reaction which would put us back where we were last week. Thus of utmost importance Sovs immediately take measures to assure reconnaissance aircraft not fired on.

7. Second sentence of President's letter to Chairman Khrushchev of October 27
QUOTE
is clear in covering/ all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use UNQT.
This covers not only systems under Soviet control but also those allegedly under Cuban control. The President considers Khrushchev's reply of October 28 as clear.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

acceptance that all of these arms are to be dismantled, crated and returned to Sov Union (or destroyed). You should seek to elicit a clear confirmation that the II28's are included and are being dismantled for removal from Cuba.

8. In addition, you should point out that if Sov missiles and bombers are being removed, there seems no need for Soviets to leave in Cuba equipment and military technicians brought to Cuba primarily to protect the offensive weapons. (note that SAM's use missile fuel which is ^{proscribed} ~~proscribed~~ under quarantine regulations). President's undertaking against invasion is ~~an~~ adequate assurance that these weapons are not needed.

9. The President ~~particularly~~ particularly desires that there should be no RPT no discussion of wider issues from our side until the offensive weapons in Cuba are clearly on their way home. You must therefore avoid any exploration of tempting fields like Berlin and disarmament, making it plain that while we look forward to such discussion later, we cannot get anywhere on anything else until we have successfully put in operation the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement on this present matter.

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHRYSLER BANK

SPECIAL HANDLING

35

EYES ONLY

TO:
FROM: New York
NUMBER: 1587
DATE: 11/1/62, copy 16

Signature Record

[illegible]

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S - William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

[illegible]

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

**THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO - L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File**

W

ation
SS**EYES ONLY**~~SECRET~~

Control: 376

Rec'd: November 1, 1962

6:40 p.m.

Info

FROM: New York

TO: Secretary of State

016

NO: 1587, November 1, 6 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State for 3/28/77By mmg, NARS, Date 5/9/77**EYES ONLY**

1587 NOV 1, 5:40 PM FROM USUN NEWYORK SIGNED STEVENSON

PLEASE. PASS WHITE HOUSE AND DOD

EYES ONLY SECRETARY

FROM BALL AND GILPATRIC

BALL AND GILPATRIC MET THIS MORNING WITH GENERAL RIKHYE FOR FIRST HAND REPORT ON HIS IMPRESSIONS OF CUBAN TRIP. THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION RIKHYE WAS FORTHRIGHT, CANDID AND VERY HELPFUL.

1. SAMS: RIKHYE SAID THAT CASTRO RANTED AND RAVED ABOUT OVERFLIGHTS TO SUCH AN EXTENT AS TO SUGGEST THAT SAMS WERE ACTUALLY IN CUBAN HANDS AND OPERATED BY CUBANS. RIKHYE FIRST STATED THAT IN HIS OPINION IT WAS "PROBABLE" THAT CUBANS DO HAVE SAMS. LATER IN CONVERSATION HE MODIFIED THIS VIEW STATING THAT CASTRO MAY HAVE BEEN BOASTING AND PERHAPS THE MOST LIKELY ASSUMPTION WAS THAT THE SAMS WERE CONTROLLED BY THE RUSSIANS BUT WITH SOME CUBANS IN THE CREWS. CASTRO HAD SAID THAT CUBANS HAD SHOT DOWN THE U-2 LAST WEEK BUT RIKHYE FELT THAT THIS WAS MORE LIKELY RHETORIC THAN THE ASSERTION OF AN ACTUAL FACT.

2. IL-28'S: RIKHYE SAID THAT THERE WAS NO DEFINITIVE DISCUSSION AS TO WHETHER THE IL-28'S WERE INCLUDED IN SOVIET REMOVAL PLANS. HOWEVER, HE DID FEEL THAT THE CUBANS HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF MANNING THEM, EVEN THOUGH IT IS HIS IMPRESSION THAT AT THE MOMENT THERE IS NO CUBAN OPERATIONAL UNIT ORGANIZED TO MAN SUCH PLANES. HE WAS STRUCK BY FACT THAT HE SAW NO AIRFORCE PERSONNEL AMONG THE MILITARY THEY SAW IN HAVANA AND THAT THE CUBAN AIRFORCE IS NOT VERY SUBSTANTIAL.

EYES ONLY~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1587, November 1, 6 p.m. from New York

RIKHYE FEELS THAT IF THE IL-28'S WERE LEFT BEHIND THERE WOULD BE NO NUCLEAR WAR-HEADS LEFT WITH THEM. HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS REPEATED TO THE UN PARTY MANY TIMES THAT THEY WERE DETERMINED TO TAKE OUT ALL EQUIPMENT WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAS REGARDED AS OFFENSIVE AND THIS WOULD INCLUDE THE IL-28'S.

3. MAJOR ANDERSON: CASTRO AGREED RETURN THE BODY OF MAJOR ANDERSON THROUGH THE UN. THE UN PARTY BELIEVES THIS IS BEST HANDLED BY THE SWISS. THE GENERAL SAID THAT THE SWISS COULD MOVE THE BODY TO THE VICINITY OF GUANTANAMO WHERE IT COULD BE PICKED UP BY THE AMERICANS AND FLOWN FROM THAT BASE TO THE UNITED STATES. WE RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT IMMEDIATELY SET IN TRAIN STEPS TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE.

4. DISMANTLING: GENERAL STAZENKO, THE SOVIET GENERAL COMMANDING THE CUBAN OPERATION, TOLD THE UN PARTY THAT HIS MEN HAD BEEN WORKING DAY AND NIGHT SINCE SUNDAY AFTERNOON TO DISMANTLE THE MISSILES. THE RUSSIANS ASSERTED THAT THE MISSILES ARE ALREADY IN SEAPORTS. ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT WILL BE AT THE SEAPORTS BY TONIGHT. THE REMAINDER, WHICH THE RUSSIANS CALLED "ODD AND SODS" WILL BE BROUGHT IN BY FRIDAY. THE RUSSIANS WILL THEN DESTROY ALL SITES BULLDOZING ALL CONCRETE STRUCTURES AND PLATFORMS. IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THERE WERE ACTUALLY ANY ATOMIC WAR-HEADS IN CUBA, THE GENERAL SAID THE MATTER HAD NOT BEEN RAISED WITH THE RUSSIANS.

5. CHINESE INFLUENCE: THE UN PARTY RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION THROUGH SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS THAT THE CHINESE HAD GIVEN THE CUBANS FAR MORE ECONOMIC HELP THAN THE RUSSIANS. THE CUBANS, HE SAID, HAD ACCEPTED THE MISSILES WITHOUT APPARENTLY REALIZING THAT THEY WOULD BE RETAINED UNDER RUSSIAN CONTROL AND WOULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO THEM. THE CHINESE, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD PROVIDED FOOD AND CLOTHING. RIKHYE SAID THAT THE DIPLOMATS IN HAVANA ANTICIPATE THAT THE CHINESE INFLUENCE WILL INCREASE IN THE FUTURE.

6. UN PRESENCE: THE SYG ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN THE AGREEMENT OF CASTRO TO MEASURES FOR UN VERIFICATION. WHEN CASTRO VIOLENTLY REJECTED ALL FORMS OF GROUND INSPECTION THE SYG TURNED THE DISCUSSION TO STATIONING OF UN PRESENCE IN

EAEZ DWT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1587, November 1, 6 p.m. from New York

CUBA FOR GENERAL PURPOSES OF PEACE KEEPING. CASTRO LISTENED WITH INCREASING INTEREST TO THE SYG'S DESCRIPTION OF "UN PRESENCE" AND HOW IT OPERATED. HE INDICATED AN APPARENT WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT SUCH A UN PRESENCE.

THE SYG THEN POINTED OUT THAT A UN PRESENCE WOULD OPERATE NOT MERELY TO PROTECT CASTRO FROM INVASION BUT ALSO TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON HIS UTILIZING CUBA AS A BASE FOR SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE ELSEWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA. CASTRO REPLIED THAT WHATEVER SUBVERSION HE HAD CONDUCTED HAD BEEN PURELY FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES AND THAT IF CUBA WERE SECURE FROM INVASION HE WOULD HAVE NO FURTHER INTEREST IN TRYING TO SUBVERT OTHER LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS. THE CUBAN REVOLUTION WAS STRICTLY FOR CUBANS AND NOT FOR EXPORT. CASTRO SUGGESTED HOWEVER THAT IF THERE WERE TO BE UN REPRESENTATIVES STATIONED IN CUBA HE WOULD INSIST ON UN REPRESENTATIVES BEING LOCATED IN REFUGEE CAMPS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CERTAIN OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES SUCH AS GUATEMALA.

7. OVERFLIGHTS: THE QUESTION WAS ASKED AS TO WHY THE GENERAL HAD INDICATED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO DELAY OVER FLIGHTS UNTIL FRIDAY. HE ANSWERED THAT THERE WERE TWO REASONS FOR THE SUGGESTION. THE FIRST WAS THAT THE CUBANS SHOULD BE CALMER ON FRIDAY THAN ON THURSDAY AND THEREFORE LESS LIKELY TO FIRE AT US AIRCRAFT. THE SECOND WAS THAT THE US WOULD BE ABLE TO GET MUCH MORE DEFINITIVE PROOF OF COMPLETION OF THE DISMANTLING OF THE BASES BY FRIDAY THAN BY THURSDAY. THE GENERAL DID SUGGEST THAT IF WE UNDERTOOK OVERFLIGHTS WE SHOULD CHANGE THE FLIGHT PATTERN SO THAT THE CUBANS WOULD NOT BE READY WITH THEIR RESPONSE. HE ALSO NOTED THAT WE WOULD PROBABLY MEET SUBSTANTIAL OPPOSITION AROUND THE SEAPORTS WHERE THE CUBANS HAVE MASSED A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF CONVENTIONAL AA WEAPONS.

8. MISCELLANEOUS:

A) THE RUSSIANS HAD TOLD THE UN PARTY THAT SO FAR AS THEY WERE CONCERNED THE UN COULD INSPECT THE SITES AND ALL INCOMING SHIPMENTS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4- 1587, November 1, 6 p.m. from New York

B) HE NOTED THAT CASTRO WOULD MAKE A VIOLENTLY ANTI-RUSSIAN TV SPEECH TONIGHT. HE ALSO TOLD US IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE THAT THE SYG HAD PERSUADED CASTRO TO DELETE TWO VERY OFFENSIVE SENTENCES FROM THE SPEECH WHICH, IF RETAINED, WOULD ONLY TEND TO EXACERBATE THE SITUATION.

C) THE GENERAL HAD THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT MILITARY TECHNICIANS WOULD LEAVE WITH THE EQUIPMENT. THIS WAS IMPLIED BY A COMMENT OF GENERAL STAZENKO.

D) GENERAL STAZENKO IS YOUNG - IN HIS EARLY 40'S - AND SPEAKS ONLY RUSSIAN. HE APPEARED NAIVE AND NOT USED TO DEALING WITH DIPLOMATS. HE HAD BEEN IN CUBA ONLY A "FEW MONTHS". STAZENKO HAD STATED THE SOVIET MISSILE STATIONS WERE BUILT AND MANNED ENTIRELY BY RUSSIANS AND THAT THE CUBANS HAD HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THEM. STAZENKO SEEMED VERY FRANK. HE HAD APPARENTLY BEEN ORDERED BY MOSCOW TO BE CANDID WITH UN PARTY.

E) GENERAL RIKHYE SAW TWO KOMARS PATROLLING OFF THE COAST. THE CUBANS REFERRED TO THE KOMARS AS QUOTE THEIRS UNQUOTE. HE ASSUMES THAT THEY WILL BE LEFT WITH THE CUBANS.

STEVENSON

LTR/14

NOTE: RELAYED TO WHITE HOUSE 11/1/62.

~~SECRET~~

34

TO: USIN, NEW YORK

Signature Record

[illegible]

in 30 days.

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

**THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO - L. D. Battle
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File**

0 0 2 4 6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Nov 1 11 39 PM '62

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

013

on high seas ~~intentional~~
~~submarine warfare~~ ~~intentional~~

one or more

From 1961 to 1963, the following data were obtained from the study of the effect of the concentration of the solution of the polymer on the rate of polymerization:

since

FYI

END FYI

IO - Harlan Cleveland

~~/XXXXX Mr. Alexander Dobson (XXXX XXXXX)~~

SCA - A. Schwartz

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
Stacy 3/28/77

By mmg, NARE, Date 5/19/11

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FYI. We recognize that it may not be possible to get agreement to use of American bottoms, although we would seek to minimize any political difficulty by offering ships which are not under US military jurisdiction, i.e., Coast Guard, merchant or Geodetic Survey ships. At same time, we are exploring on priority basis possible availability in or close to Caribbean area of neutral ships which might be used for purposes. ~~It is possible that we could use a number of ships which are not under US military jurisdiction, i.e., Coast Guard, merchant or Geodetic Survey ships. At same time, we are exploring on priority basis possible availability in or close to Caribbean area of neutral ships which might be used for purposes.~~ However, you should not initially indicate this either to Morozov or Narasimhan.

Re financing UN inspection operation, as indicated Deptel 1147, we prefer that if UN is to foot bill, financing be provided under Section 1(a) of 1961 General Assembly Resolution authorizing SYG make commitments not exceeding 2 million dollars as he certifies related to maintenance peace and security.

Narasimhan's suggestion ICRC assess its members not feasible because ICRC does not have membership which it can ~~work~~ assess, but comprises committee of Swiss ~~businessmen~~ nationals. Normally ICRC expenses are advanced or ~~taken care of by the Swiss government or the Swiss Red Cross Society.~~ ~~ICRC expenses are advanced or taken care of by the Swiss government or the Swiss Red Cross Society.~~ reimbursed by interested parties who seek their services for special projects. Soviets are familiar with ICRC financing. Therefore, particularly since they suggested ICRC participation, see no reason why they should object contribute towards ICRC expenses.

As to costs of vessels, US would be prepared to make appropriate US ships available on non-reimbursable basis.

Defense

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Defense has ^{developed} ~~suggested~~ following verification procedures:

1. There would be established on the high seas two check stations:
 - a. One station ship in the vicinity of Havana;
 - b. One station ship in the vicinity of the windward passage.
2. With respect to the above-mentioned ships, the Soviet Government would give UN Headquarters in New York timely notice of those enroute to Cuba, together with a description of their cargoes.
3. All such ships would be instructed by the Soviet Union to establish communications with ~~the~~ appropriate station ship on 500 KC when within 500 miles of ~~the~~ check station. When communications are established, ~~the~~ incoming ship would give its name, position, course, speed, estimated time of arrival at check station, and port of destination. The incoming ships would maintain communications with the UN station ship on a radio watch schedule and frequency arranged with that station ship.
4. Rendezvous time and position would be signaled to ~~the~~ incoming ship by ~~the~~ UN inspector on board ~~the~~ station ship.
5. The incoming ship would be prepared to receive UN inspectors on arrival at ~~the~~ rendezvous. ~~The~~ Incoming ship would facilitate such inspection of ~~the~~ vessel and cargo as ~~the~~ inspectors consider necessary by opening hatches, holds, and spaces, and by having all papers readily available.
Each
6. ~~The~~ UN inspection team would consist of approximately eight persons, who would be ICRC personnel.
7. ~~The~~ UN would request all nations carrying cargo to Cuba from bloc ports to comply with the above procedures.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8. If any ship is found to be carrying offensive weapons, as listed in the Presidential Proclamation of October 23, 1962, the UN inspectors would immediately notify SYG, who we would expect to notify us of this fact.

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

URGENT TELEGRAM Department of State

12903

37

COLLECT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

Oct 25 2 00 AM '62

Oct 25 2

ACTION: USUN, New York

PRIORITY 1085

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 75C/11/78

By JK/10/78, NARS, Date 1/31/78

FOR STEVENSON FROM SECRETARY

Following for delivery for urgent comment is President's reply to SYG appeal:

"I deeply appreciate the spirit which prompted your message of yesterday.

We will be glad to have our representatives meet with you to discuss measures to remove the existing threat to the security of the western hemisphere and the peace of the world. I understand that in your statement to the Security Council preliminary talks on last night, you suggested/~~xxxxx~~ arrangements by which any effective agreement could become/~~xxxxxx~~ I am asking Ambassador Stevenson to take up these matters with you immediately. Meanwhile, it might be helpful if I were to restate the essence of the problem as we see it.

Monday,

As we made clear in the Security ~~xxx~~ Council ~~xxxxxx~~ the existing ~~xxxx~~/~~xxxx~~ threat was created by the secret introduction of offensive

Drafted by:

IO:HCleveland:TL 10/25/62

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

U - George Ball *GB*

S/S-Mr. Johnson *J*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

DS-322

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classification~~

offensive weapons into Cuba. The first task should be to assure the nations of the western hemisphere against that threat. These nations, the Organization of American States, authorized the quarantine as an essential step in the achievement of that purpose.

Surely no one could fail to understand their insistence upon effective guarantees since the present crisis was produced by secret action taken contrary to the most explicit assurances. Such guarantees should cover the further introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, the ~~dis~~ discontinuance of development work on existing sites, and UN observers to ensure that offensive weapons are not operational.

We do not believe there should be insuperable difficulties in reaching a * peaceful resolution of the problem if those responsible for the threat are prepared to remove it.

~~I am asking Ambassador Stevenson to take up this matter with you immediately~~

END

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classification~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SPECIAL HANDLING

38

~~EYES ONLY~~

THE VICE PRESIDENT

TO:
FROM: New York
NUMBER: 1579
DATE: 10/31/62 -CONF

Signature Record

cy15

[illegible]

The attached item with this signature record must be returned to S/S - William H. Brubeck, Room 7224, within 30 days.

CONFIDENTIAL

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

[illegible]

Strophomena **new**

THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED
TO ~~L. D. Borne~~ *W H Burbeck*
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Room 7224 NS/E
Do Not File

THIS DOCUMENT

REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

✓P

52

Action
SS

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control: 20937
Rec'd: OCTOBER 31, 1962
10:59 PM

Info

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1579, OCTOBER 31, 10 PM

EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ERMS 61-63, vol. 31 #128

By *jc* NARA Date 8-18-05

FOR SECRETARY FROM MCCLOY

DEPARTMENT PASS WHITE HOUSE

IMMEDIATELY AFTER I RECEIVED FROM YOU PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS, AKALOVSKY AT MY REQUEST INFORMED KUZNETSOV ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

1. IN ABSENCE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION PERSONNEL, SUCH AS ICRC, US PREPARED MAKE GESTURE RE QUARANTINE. WHILE QUARANTINE IN FULL WILL START TOMORROW, WE PREPARED LET SHIPS PASS ON HAIL-AND-PASS BASIS, AS IN CASE SOV TANKER BUCHAREST, I.E., NO INSPECTION ON BOARD VESSELS WOULD BE INVOLVED. WE PREPARED USE THIS PROCEDURE FOR A FEW DAYS UNTIL MORE SOLID BASIS FOR INSPECTION OF SHIPS IS DEVELOPED.

2. RE AERIAL SURVEILLANCE, US BELIEVES IT WOULD BE GOOD FOR EVERYBODY IF EVIDENCE WERE OBTAINED THAT DISMANTLING OF RELEVANT FACILITIES HAS STARTED, I.E., IF WE COULD SHOW TO WORLD PICTURES ATTESTING TO THAT FACT. WE HOPE USSR WOULD DO EVERYTHING TO AVOID INCIDENTS IN CONNECTION OUR OVERFLIGHTS, BECAUSE ANY SUCH INCIDENT WOULD CREATE GRAVEST SITUATION AND WOULD AGAIN PUT US FACE TO FACE.

KUZNETSOV APPRECIATED INFORMATION, BUT WITH RESPECT TO SECOND POINT STATED USSR COULD NOT DO ANYTHING BECAUSE ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE WAS IN CUBAN HANDS. US WAS FACING KUZNETSOV WITH PROBLEM WHERE HE COULD DO NOTHING BECAUSE PROBLEM RELATED TO CUBAN TERRITORY AND SOVEREIGNTY. AKALOVSKY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1579, OCTOBER 31, 10 PM FROM NEW YORK

OBSERVED USSR COULD USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH CUBA IN ORDER
PREVENT INCIDENTS FRAUGHT WITH GRAVEST DANGER. KUZNETSOV
REPLIED HE COULD NOT ADD ANYTHING TO WHAT HE HAD ALREADY SAID.

STEVENSON

JT/Ø

Note: Passed Principle Officers Executive Committee
per S/S duty officer. 10/31/CWO-JRL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT TELEGRAM

This document consists of 3 pages;
Copy #9 of 30 copies; Series A.~~SECRET~~

ACTION: USUN, New York

Re: New York's 1456.

Believe Brazilian proposal offers possibilities helpful in current Cuban situation. It appears to Department that of various alternatives open for disposal problem created by build-up Soviet offensive arms in Cuba, this perhaps most attractive and feasible for following reasons.

(a) Assuming Communists will be willing abandon use of Cuba as a nuclear base in face our pressures without requiring quid pro quo from us, which is our present negotiating position, proposal for LA denuclearized zone would offer attractive face-saving way out for Communist camp; this particularly true since present proposal is bona fide LA initiative, and Cuba could accept on grounds they deferring to wishes of LA neighbors to make entire area nuclear free zone to which they wish contribute as gesture desire to return to more normal situation in area (latter concept espoused in UAR-Ghana draft resolution). Since such arrangement would constitute voluntary Cuban association with LA initiative, Cubans could play positive response as completely divorced from US pressure. Moreover, USSR itself in this way could be removed one step from process and would not be required abandon Cuba as missile base except in terms of response to requests from Cuban Government.

(b) This approach avoids need for us to enter direct negotiations with the Communists in which we would confront them with categorical demand for

DECLASSIFIED

/dismantling

Authority State Dec 3/28/77
By rmg, NARS, Date 5/9/77

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

dismantling missile installations in Cuba.

(c) Such outcome has chance of being widely regarded in world opinion as positive development (to which our action on Cuba would clearly have contributed) in an aspect of disarmament which is extremely attractive to large part of world. Such outcome would appear positive and constructive solution, not only in eyes foreign public opinion, but should be seen domestically as acceptable outcome of Cuban crisis since our fundamental objective would have been achieved.

(d) Denuclearization arrangements in Africa and Latin America consistent with long-term national security interests of US. FYI. We see some tactical advantage in treating questions African and LA zones together for time being, since enthusiasm for one will assist in building support for other. However, for US, acceptability of one would not need be dependent upon both being put into effect. END FYI.

US Del should be guided by following points in any discussions with Brazilians re resolution contained reftel:

1. US would in principle favor denuclearized arrangements both in Africa and Latin America if such arrangements worked out and agreed to by the states in those areas. We believe, as Brazilians do, that arrangements should include adequate verification to assure all states in area of compliance. FYI. The US, of course, assumes and desires that other Latin American countries would agree to form such a zone only if effective Cuban participation were assured. END FYI.

2. US believes any arrangements for denuclearized zones should be

/determined

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

determined by the countries of the region. We would therefore not support action by Security Council or GA which appeared to impose such arrangements or to dictate their character. US hopes Brazilians would agree with this concept and consider alterations in their draft. Resolution contained reftel places SC in position of calling upon member states in effect to treat continents as denuclearized in absence agreement on part states concerned rather than to cooperate with arrangements reached. Furthermore, it places SC in position of imposing committee to deal with suggestion on states concerned.

3. US would be prepared to declare its willingness to cooperate with arrangements worked out by all the states in the areas concerned.

We do not believe we should get into any detailed discussions in precise language of Brazilian text. However, US Del might say that we would vote in favor of any resolution consistent with above points. We would be prepared to vote for resolution which endorsed establishment committee agreed by states concerned, and we would also be prepared to support call upon SYG to lend his good offices on request of states concerned.

You should also indicate we would like move ahead rapidly on this front. At same time, we have several major problems with language in present text and hope Brazil will rework draft quickly to meet basic points described above and discuss with us again soonest.

END

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

40

46-48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Control:

17984

Rec'd:

OCTOBER 25, 1962

1:02 AM

IO

FROM: NEW YORK

Info

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SP

NO: 1453, OCTOBER 24, MIDNIGHT

L

SAL

ARA

EUR

P

IOP

INR

PRIORITY

FOR PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY.

RMR

POLICY.

RE CUBA (SYG APPEAL)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State Sec 3/28/77

By RMG

NARS, Date

5/4/77

FOLLOWING ARE THREE POSSIBLE VERSIONS OF TYPE OF REPLY I WOULD LIKE TO QUOTE FROM YOU TO U THANT APPEALS TOMORROW AFTERNOON. IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT US NOT APPEAR BEFORE WORLD OPINION AS REJECTING OR APPEARING TO REJECT U THANT PROPOSAL.

SENTENCE IN STATEMENT READING "I BELIEVE IT WOULD ALSO CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO THE SAME END IF THE CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF MAJOR MILITARY FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS IN CUBA COULD BE SUSPENDED DURING THE PERIOD OF NEGOTIATIONS." WAS INCLUDED AT MY SPECIFIC REQUEST. I THINK THIS CHANGES HIS ORIGINAL APPEAL TO YOU TO POINT WHERE IT IS FAVORABLE TO OUR INTERESTS.

I WILL HAVE FURTHER COMMENTS FOR YOU IN THE MORNING.

VERSION I

QUOTE.

I DEEPLY APPRECIATE THE SPIRIT WHICH PROMPTED YOUR MESSAGE OF TODAY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AS WE MADE
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 1453, OCTOBER 24, MIDNIGHT FROM NEW YORK

AS WE MADE CLEAR IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL YESTERDAY THE EXISTING THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND THE PEACE OF THE WORLD WAS CREATED BY THE SECRET INTRODUCTION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS INTO CUBA. THE FIRST TASK SHOULD BE TO ASSURE THE NATIONS OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE THAT THAT THREAT HAS BEEN REMOVED.

PROVIDED THAT THE USSR SUSPENDS ITS ARMS SHIPMENTS AND THE ERECTION OF MISSILES AND CONSTRUCTION OF SITES IN CUBA AND THAT SATISFACTORY UNITED NATIONS GUARANTEES OF COMPLIANCE ARE PUT INTO EFFECT, I WOULD BE WILLING TO SUSPEND THE QUARANTINE DURING THE PERIOD OF NEGOTIATIONS THAT YOU SUGGEST.

I AM ASKING AMBASSADOR STEVENSON TO BE PREPARED TO MEET WITH YOU AT ANY TIME IN ORDER TO WORK OUT THE MODALITIES UNDER WHICH IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THESE SUSPENSIONS TO TAKE PLACE.

UNQUOTE.

VERSION II

QUOTE.

1. I DEEPLY APPRECIATE THE SPIRIT WHICH PROMPTED YOUR MESSAGE OF TODAY AND I WELCOME YOUR GOOD OFFICES.

2. AS WE MADE CLEAR IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL YESTERDAY, THIS THREAT WAS CREATED BY THE SECRET INTRODUCTION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS INTO CUBA. THE FIRST TASK SHOULD BE TO ASSURE THE NATIONS OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE AGAINST THAT THREAT. IN YOUR TELEGRAM YOU REFER TO THE VOLUNTARY SUSPENSION OF ALL ARMS SHIPMENTS TO CUBA AND THE VOLUNTARY SUSPENSION OF THE QUARANTINE MEASURES FOR TWO OR THREE WEEKS TO GIVE TIME TO THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO MEET AND DISCUSS WITH A VIEW TO FINDING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. IN YOUR STATEMENT

BEFORE THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- 1453, OCTOBER 24, MIDNIGHT FROM NEW YORK

BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL YOU ALSO REFERRED TO THE SUSPENSION OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF MAJOR MILITARY FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS IN CUBA DURING THE SAME PERIOD.

3. I AM PREPARED TO ACCEPT THESE SUGGESTIONS, PROVIDED THE SOVIET UNION DOES THE SAME. I HAVE INSTRUCTED AMBASSADOR STEVENSON TO BE AVAILABLE AT ANY TIME TO DISCUSS, AS YOU SUGGEST, THE MODALITIES UNDER WHICH SUCH SUSPENSIONS COULD BE BROUGHT ABOUT. THESE MODALITIES MUST INCLUDE UN GUARANTEES OF COMPLIANCE.

UNQUOTE.

VERSION III

QUOTE.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL:

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR COMMUNICATION OF OCTOBER 24, AND WELCOME YOUR CONCERN AND INTEREST IN MOVING TO RESOLVE THE GRAVE PROBLEM WHICH HAS BEEN BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE LAST THREE DAYS. I HAVE CONSIDERED CAREFULLY YOUR STATEMENT OF LAST NIGHT TO THE COUNCIL, IN WHICH YOU SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING:

- (1) IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS;
- (2) VOLUNTARY SUSPENSION OF ALL ARMS SHIPMENTS TO CUBA;
- (3) VOLUNTARY SUSPENSION OF THE QUARANTINE MEASURES INVOLVING THE SEARCHING OF SHIPS BOUND FOR CUBA;
- (4) SUSPENSION OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF MAJOR MILITARY FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS DURING THE PERIOD OF NEGOTIATIONS.

ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES, I AM GLAD TO ACCEPT THE OFFER

YOU HAVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4- 1453, OCTOBER 24, MIDNIGHT FROM NEW YORK

YOU HAVE MADE OF YOUR OWN SERVICES IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISCUSSIONS YOU HAVE PROPOSED, BEGINNING WITH A DISCUSSION OF MODALITIES. I AM ASKING AMBASSADOR STEVENSON TO CONFER WITH YOU IMMEDIATELY, WITH A VIEW TO COMMENCING THE NECESSARY TALKS.

UNQUOTE.

STEVENSON

SJR

NOTE: RELAYED TO WHITE HOUSE 10/25/62 - 1:40 AM PER SS DUTY OFFICER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

41

UNCLASSIFIED

CORRECTION ISSUED:

10/24/62 8:30 PM GDW

53

Action

Control:

17891

Rec'd:

OCTOBER 24, 1962

6:49 PM

IO

Info

FROM: NEW YORK - CORRECTED COPY

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SP

NO: 1443, OCTOBER 24.

L

ARA

EUR

NI ACT

P

TOP

POLICY

INR

RMR

DEPARTMENT PASS WHITE HOUSE

FOL IS TEXT MESSAGE FROM SYG TO PRESIDENT SENT TO STEVENSON
FOR TRANSMITTAL:

"I SHALL BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WILL BE SO GOOD AS TO CONVEY
URGENTLY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: 'I HAVE BEEN ASKED BY THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVES OF A LARGE NUMBER OF MEMBER GOVERNMENTS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS TO ADDRESS AN URGENT APPEAL TO YOU IN THE PRESENT
CRITICAL SITUATION. THESE REPRESENTATIVES FEEL THAT IN THE
INTEREST OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY ALL CONCERNED
SHOULD REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION WHICH MAY AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION
AND BRING WITH IT THE RISK OF WAR. IN THEIR VIEW IT IS IMPORTANT
THAT TIME SHOULD BE GIVEN TO ENABLE THE PARTIES CONCERNED
TO GET TOGETHER WITH A VIEW TO RESOLVING THE PRESENT CRISIS
PEACEFULLY AND NORMALIZING THE SITUATION IN THE CARIBBEAN.
THIS INVOLVES ON THE ONE HAND THE VOLUNTARY SUSPENSION OF ALL
ARMS SHIPMENTS TO CUBA, AND ALSO THE VOLUNTARY SUSPENSION OF THE
QUARANTINE MEASURES INVOLVING THE SEARCHING OF SHIPS BOUND FOR
CUBA. I BELIEVE THAT SUCH VOLUNTARY SUSPENSION FOR A PERIOD
OF TWO TO THREE WEEKS WILL GREATLY EASE THE SITUATION AND GIVE
TIME TO THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO MEET AND DISCUSS WITH A VIEW
TO FINDING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. IN THIS CONTEXT I
SHALL GLADLY MAKE MYSELF AVAILABLE TO ALL PARTIES FOR WHATEVER

UNCLASSIFIED

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

UNCLASSIFIED

-2- 1443, OCTOBER 24 FROM NEW YORK

SERVICES I MAY BE ABLE TO PERFORM. I URGENTLY APPEAL TO YOUR EXCELLENCY TO GIVE IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION TO THIS MESSAGE. I HAVE SENT AN IDENTICAL MESSAGE TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE SOVIET UNION. U THANT ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL."

GDW

NOTE: RELAYED WHITE HOUSE 10/24/62 7:05 PM

NOTE: CORRECTION RELAYED WHITE HOUSE 10/24/62.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

42

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 68 1/11/78
By JLM/mg, NARS, Date 1/31/78



SUBJECT: State Message to USUN (30 October 1962) regarding UN Inspection Procedures

1. What measures in this plan will prevent, or even restrict the normal and expected Communist tactic of systematic delay in carrying out substantive measures of inspection?
2. What assurance will the U.S. have as to the technical competence of the inspectors to be used? We can expect the Communists to press for the inclusion of non-technical personnel from the less-developed countries. The U.S. will find it difficult to refuse many of these people without offending their governments. Is not some statement regarding U.S. satisfaction regarding the technical competence of the inspection personnel a requirement?
3. Does the phrase on page 2, "some" aerial reconnaissance constitute a needless limitation upon our aerial surveillance? Does the remark that we should have access to photos of UN reconnaissance mean all photos?
4. Is the reference to the Brazilian resolution in this message in our best interests? Why can this not be excluded and attention directed specifically to the Cuban matter? In addition, mention of the Security Council as an executive agent appears to leave the door open to inclusion of the Security Council in the Cuban inspection.
5. Is surveillance and inspection to be limited to missile weapons systems only?
6. Would inspection cover only "Cargoes" or do we mean, as we should, that all items entering and leaving Cuba will be subject to inspection if desired?
7. Are we talking of inspecting ship cargoes, or will we have provisions to inspect Air Cargoes?
8. Is the inspection scheme based on the principle that there must be 100% assurance that no nuclear delivery capability remains in Cuba? It appears that the cable provides for only loose verification of what the Soviets/Cubans desire to ship in or out? Other materiel can be hidden.
9. What offensive actions can be taken if inspection is conducted in part and a disagreement and/or impasse results? Are we not inhibited to an undesirable degree?

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

10. If inspection at sea, how will inspectors determine the contents of crates or containers in the bottom of the hold? Are U.N. teams prepared to off-load cargoes onto barges in the open sea?
11. How will inspectors verify the contents of sealed containers? Will they take the Soviets' word, or will they break the seals and physically inspect?
12. Is U.N. prepared to continue such inspection procedures indefinitely?
13. American shipping firms have stated that almost anything can be concealed aboard ship if adequate time is available and proper planning is accomplished. Are UN inspection teams equipped to cope with professional "smugglers"?
14. Can inspectors distinguish between offensive weapon components and other non-offensive weapon components (SAMs, jet fighter engines, etc.)?
15. What action is contemplated in the event offensive weapons are discovered on an inbound ship?
16. What assurance do we have that Red Cross can furnish technically competent people?
17. What practical limits will we accept on right to open all boxes?
18. Why depend on Soviet inventory?
19. Even if Soviets furnish inventory, shouldn't UN inspection force verify by physical check?
20. Shouldn't US continue surveillance/reconnaissance until comparison of UN reconnaissance photos shows their coverage as good as US?
21. Will the use of T-11s fill the requirement to detect hidden and/or camouflaged materiel? Will not infra-red and radar equipment be required for night and weather operations when clandestine work can be expected?
22. If the number and qualifications of the inspectors are limited could they not be overwhelmed by work, does the number proposed take into account the possibility of being deceived by false rumors and other deception measures?
23. On what day from the present will we know that no missile can be fired, no aircraft can be launched? Dismantling may take a month, disarming could take a day.

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

14419

43

For DCT use only.

~~SECRET~~

Classification

OCT 31 11 09 PM '62

Origin

IO

Info

SS

SR

G

SP

L

SAL

ARA

EUR

DAC

P

IOP

SCA

SCS

INR

RMR

ACTION: USUN, NEW YORK

INFO: AMEMBASSY, MOSCOW

SUBJECT: Cuba: New York Negotiations

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State la 3/2/77

By pmg, NARS, Date 5/1/77 021

Confirming telcon ~~xxxxxx~~, following ~~xx~~ record, ~~xx/xxxxxx~~

Instructions communicated DEPTTEL 1147 ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~.

1. ~~xx~~ Section No. 3 should now begin as follows:

INITIAL TWO-PHASE PROGRAM

The US envisages multiple phases in the UN verification program, each requiring specific control measures.

2. Insert at end of Section No. 3 QUOTE Arrangements for the third and final phase relating to commitment of the Soviets not to reintroduce offensive weapons will be covered in subsequent instructions UNQUOTE.

3. Insert in Section No. 4 as new third sentence QUOTE One possibility might be aircraft manned by nationals, presumably ~~xx~~ impartial, designated by UN. Another possibility might be reconnaissance using crews consisting of ~~a~~ representatives of the US, Soviet Union, Cuba and UN representatives under UN aegis. UNQUOTE

4. In Section No. 4, second paragraph, insert ~~xxxxxx~~ QUOTE would be prepared UNQUOTE in lieu of QUOTE will ~~xxxxxx~~ UNQUOTE.

5. In Section No. 4 paragraph 4 insert QUOTE in phase 1 UNQUOTE before QUOTE visual monitoring ~~xxx~~ UNQUOTE.

Drafted by: IO:UNP:WBB:um/wrw 10/31/62

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

IO - Harlan Cleveland

Clearances:

~~SECRET~~

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

~~SECRET~~

Classification

second sentence,

6. In Section No. 4 paragraph 5 ~~insert~~ after QUOTE accept UNQUOTE add at end of sentence QUOTE not only because SYG will probably not regard Canadians as sufficiently neutral but also because RF-101 is a military aircraft. UNQUOTE

7. In following sentence same paragraph, replace words QUOTE two week period trained UNQUOTE by QUOTE two to six week period could check out already trained multi-engine UNQUOTE.

8. In same paragraph insert new penultimate sentence QUOTE Australia may therefore also have some capability UNQUOTE.

9. Entire following paragraph, i.e., Section No. 4 paragraph 6, should be removed and replaced by following:

QUOTE A reasonably satisfactory substitute would be the F-27 which could be modified to provide the necessary high and low photographic capability. Crews experienced with F-27s might be obtained from a ^{number} ~~number~~ of countries, including Ireland, Switzerland and Luxembourg. Modification to incorporate the necessary photographic equipment could be completed in ten days after a decision to employ them. UNQUOTE

10. ~~Section~~ Section No. 5 QUOTE Incoming Cargoes UNQUOTE should be replaced entirely by following:

QUOTE As indicated Deptel 1136, we prepared accept ICRC inspections incoming cargoes on all ships of whatever flag embarked from bloc ports. According to our projection, the USSR will need to schedule a total of about 100 ships shortly to arrive in Cuba during the next 3-4 weeks in order to accomplish removal of dismantled equipment. (In addition to 60 ships normally used for offensive equipment,

~~SECRET~~

Classification

~~SECRET~~Classification

equipment, USSR would have to adapt about 40 others for purpose). Number Red Cross inspectors required to do job will be about equal whether inspection on sea or shore. At sea less inspectors required per ship because cargo holds cannot be penetrated and surreptitious off-loading not possible but more inspectors in transit shuttling between vessels at sea. In port, transit time eliminated but more inspectors required to watch for surreptitious off-loading and to examine in detail cargo coming out of holds. Because port inspection much more comprehensive, every effort should be made to obtain authorization to inspect in port. Estimate ten personnel needed for each ship entering each port per day. Personnel should be of adequate technical competence to recognize offensive equipment.

We expect thorough inspection, including at least selective examination of cargoes aboard to assure that no weapons we consider offensive will enter Cuba. Inspection should provide for masters of incoming ships to notify their cargoes to UN inspectors well in advance of arrival at port. This would expedite checking and clearance and help make entire inspection process more effective.

We believe inspection of incoming cargoes should continue until entire verification process completed (i.e., through end of Phase Two), in order to give us assurance all offensive weapons withdrawn and related facilities dismantled. During this period, enforcement of quarantine would be suspended, but US ships would remain on duty stations. Incoming ships would not be stopped or searched by US, but we would keep a watching brief on all traffic, noting outbound missile-carrying ships and assisting UN inspectors in assuring they informed of all incoming traffic. US would thus be in position to renew immediately

~~SECRET~~Classification

~~SECRET~~Classification

immediately the enforcement of the quarantine if circumstances required such action. UNQUOTE

11. In Section No. 6 paragraph (a) first sentence insert QUOTE including storage facilities ~~RE~~ UNQUOTE after QUOTE any other area UNQUOTE.

12. In Section No. 6 paragraph (b) sentence 4 insert after QUOTE 60 men ~~RE~~ UNQUOTE add (QUOTE in addition to airport personnel) equipped UNQUOTE.

13. Paragraph No. 6 (c) first sentence after QUOTE nations UNQUOTE ~~replace QUOTE who UNQUOTE by QUOTE which UNQUOTE~~
may be
replace QUOTE who UNQUOTE by QUOTE which UNQUOTE.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~Classification

~~SECRET~~

October 31, 1962
4:00 p.m.

44

ACTION: USUN, New York

SUBJECT: CUBA: New York Negotiations

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NSC 68 1/11/78

By

JK/eng, NARS, Date 1/31/78

1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Please be guided by the following in your New York negotiations whose entire purpose is to reach final solution, in framework of exchanges of letters between President and Khrushchev, of problem created by introduction by USSR of offensive weapons into Cuba. In spite of Kuznetsov's eagerness to discuss disarmament, bases, and other broader questions (USUN's 1547) the present negotiation should not include issues beyond immediate objective, which is verified dismantling and removal of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba at earliest possible date.

Your purpose will be to reach straightforward realistic solutions to practical problems along lines indicated below. We assume that in line with established Soviet doctrine, Kuznetsov's insistence on no physical inspection of dismantling and removal Soviet weapons is essentially non-negotiable. It is probable, therefore, that we shall have to rely on aerial surveillance and post-removal inspection to satisfy ourselves that missile bases are dismantled and weapons are removed from Cuba or destroyed.

While you should strive for as much pre-removal ground inspection as possible, the formula of post-removal ground inspection together with high and low aerial surveillance during both the dismantling period and the post evacuation period should, if efficiently carried out, provide adequate evidence of removal and destruction and so could be accepted.

~~SECRET~~

2. DEFINITION

2. DEFINITION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

The offensive weapons which the United States insists be removed from Cuba and not be further imported into Cuba are those enumerated in the Presidential Proclamation 3504 of October 23. The list is as follows: Surface-to-surface missiles; bomber aircraft; bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the above items. Also, pursuant to authority granted in the Proclamation, the Secretary of Defense, in Special Warning (Notice to Mariners) No. 31, stated that the prohibition of surface-to-surface missiles covers a prohibition of missile propellants and chemical compounds capable of being used to power missiles.

Note that the definition includes short-range surface-to-surface missiles and surface-to-surface missiles designed for use at sea. Notice also that mechanical and electronic equipment to operate surface-to-surface missiles includes a wide variety of communications, supply and missile-launching equipment, including Komar class motor torpedo boats.

Suggest you start with wider definition, including supplement to Presidential Proclamation. Fall back position, on which we would insist, would be categories enumerated in Proclamation.

Not included in formal definition are Soviet troops and technicians. However, we should assume on basis Khrushchev letter of October 26 that "the necessity for the presence of Soviet military specialists in Cuba would disappear" along with the offensive weapons they are manning and protecting.

Also not included within the definition are fighter aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles. Also not included are storage sites or any petroleum products other than missile propellants. It would be desirable to have these items destroyed or removed as well, but the USG is not willing to pay a price to have them destroyed or removed.

3. INITIAL TWO-PHASE PROGRAM.

The US envisages multiple phases in the UN verification program, each requiring specific control measures:

(a) First Phase - This phase should begin immediately and would cover the period up to the Soviet report to the SC that they have dismantled and withdrawn proscribed weapons. Since the Communists will undoubtedly prove chary of UN observation of weapons withdrawal, as Kuznetsov has already indicated, we assume they are unlikely to accept on-site inspection during the period when weapons are being withdrawn. Therefore we probably will need to rely in practice, during the first stage, on (i) US and UN aerial reconnaissance and (ii) UN/ICRC inspection of incoming shipments.

(b) Second Phase - This phase would begin when the SC convened to receive the Soviet report on compliance and to authorize establishment of a UN on-site inspection system. During this period, verification of compliance would be accomplished through: (i) continued aerial reconnaissance; (ii) continued inspection incoming cargoes; and (iii) ground inspection. This phase would end when the SC has accepted the report of the SYG that offensive weapons have been removed from Cuba.

Arrangements for the third and final phase relating to commitment of the Soviets not to reintroduce offensive weapons will be covered in subsequent instructions.

4. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE.

Systematic high and low aerial reconnaissance is essential. This is so particularly if surface inspection is limited or non-existent. The reconnaissance, or any aspect of it, can be done either by the US or by the UN. One possibility might be aircraft manned by nations, presumably impartial, designated by UN. Another possibility might be reconnaissance using cruises consisting of representatives of the US, Soviet Union, Cuba, and the UN. Our only insistence is that a job be done which is adequate to provide the USG with information sufficient to convince US that compliance is taking place.

We recognize that (unlike US) UN would be prepared to overfly Cuba only after explicit clearance by Cuban authorities.

US would of course need access to photos resulting from UN reconnaissance.

Two types of air surveillance should be considered -- photographic (high and low) and, in phase 1, visual monitoring by holding the aircraft in a pattern so as to maintain continuous air surveillance of missile transport movements.

The Canadian government has offered to have Canadian pilots fly Canadian supplied RF-101 aircraft. USG endorses use of Canadians and RF-101s but recognizes that SIG will be reluctant to accept not only because SIG will probably not regard Canadians as sufficiently neutral but also because RF-101 is a military aircraft. Alternatively we could make available C-130s

~~SECRET~~

-5-

and within two to six week period could check out already trained multi-engine air crews from one of the following: Mexico, Argentina, Chile or Colombia. Canada (4 crews) and Indonesia (10 crews) already have competent C-130 crews which would take only/brief period to check out. There are four C-130 aircraft with the UN markings and high quality photographic equipment in Georgia now available to UN on request. In addition, we have sold C-130 aircraft to Australia and are currently in the midst of completing negotiation on providing C-130 aircraft to Argentina and Chile. Australia may therefore also have some capability. The USG is prepared to provide rapid (jet) transportation for C-130 crews politically acceptable to the UN from anywhere in the world.

~~Entire paragraph removed and replaced by following:~~
(Entire/paragraph removed and replaced by following:)

A reasonable/satisfactory substitute would be the F-27 which could be modified to provide the necessary high and low photographic capability. Crews experienced/with F-27s might be obtained from a number of countries, including Ireland, Switzerland and Luxembourg. Modification to incorporate the necessary photographic equipment could be completed in ten days after a decision to employ them.

Processing unit with US equipment could be readily provided to operate in Havana or at whatever place UN would wish to use as base of operations.

You should therefore reaffirm all this to SYG, strongly urging him to develop a UN reconnaissance capability. Support of UN surveillance, however, should not (repeat not) be tied to US cessation of surveillance. Statements that QTE The United States will reconsider its surveillance requirements

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-6-

based upon the effectiveness of UN operations UNQTE can be made, but we should do nothing to suggest that US determination to conduct air surveillance is necessarily limited by UN operations.

It should go without saying that to the extent no adequate substitute has been developed by the US, the US high and low surveillance will continue throughout entire dismantling and withdrawal operation and as long thereafter as necessary to satisfy us that offensive weapons have been fully removed from Cuba.

5. INCOMING CARGOES.

N.B. Entire parenthetical paragraph omitted and replaced by the following:

As indicated Deptel 1136, we prepared accept ICRC inspections incoming flag cargoes on all ships of whatever/embarked from bloc ports. According to our projection, the USSR will need to schedule a total of about 100 ships shortly to arrive in Cuba during the next 3-4 weeks in order to accomplish removal of dismantled equipment. (In addition to 60 ships normally used for offensive equipment, USSR would have to adapt about 40 others for purpose). Number Red Cross inspectors required to do job will be about equal whether inspection on sea or shore. At sea less inspectors required per ship because cargo holds cannot be penetrated and surreptitious off-loading not possible but more inspectors in transit shuttling between vessels at sea. In port, transit time eliminated but more inspectors required to watch for surreptitious off-loading and to examine in detail cargo coming out of holds. Because port inspection much more comprehensive, every effort should be made to obtain authorization to inspect in port. Estimate ten personnel needed for each

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-7-

ship entering each port per day. Personnel should be of adequate technical competence to recognize offensive equipment.

We expect thorough inspection, including at least selective examination of cargoes aboard to assure that no weapons we consider offensive will enter Cuba. Inspection should provide for masters of incoming ships to notify their cargoes to UN inspectors well in advance of arrival at port. This would expedite checking and clearance and help make entire inspection process more effective.

We believe inspection of incoming cargoes should continue until entire verification process completed (i.e., through end of Phase Two), in order to give us assurance all offensive weapons withdrawn and related facilities dismantled. During this period, enforcement of quarantine would be suspended, but US ships would remain on duty stations. Incoming ships would not be stopped or searched by US, but we would keep a watching brief on all traffic, noting outbound missile-carrying ships and assisting UN inspectors in assuring they informed of all incoming traffic. US would thus be in position to renew immediately the enforcement of the quarantine if circumstances required such action.

6. VERIFICATION OF REMOVAL OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

When Soviets prepared to say they have removed from Cuba the "weapons US considers offensive", a Security Council meeting would be called to authorize the Acting Secretary General to establish arrangements for verification. Executive organization operating in Cuba for this purpose is here referred to as UN/Cuba.

~~SECRET~~

(a) Terms of Reference: UN/Cuba

UN teams should inspect on spot, after dismantling, those sites which identified by US as missile bases as well as any Cuban airport which could accommodate bombers and any other area, including storage facilities, where we have reason to believe there may have been concealment of offensive weapons. Such teams should have unrestricted confidential communication facilities with their headquarters units, and free access to areas required for the performance of their duties. US will furnish to UN comprehensive list of locations to be covered.

(b) Number of Observers

The number of observers required to do job satisfactorily will depend on length of time permitted to accomplish task and on the extent of mobility. US would prefer to see such verification accomplished quickly. Assuming for political reasons Communists would prefer keep number UN inspectors relatively small, suggest UN consider possibility utilizing number of helicopters or small planes (which US prepared make available) to permit rapid transit inspection teams maximum number sites in minimum time. It appears to us that team of 50 or 60 men (in addition to air transport personnel) equipped with adequate air transport could accomplish verification job within a week or two. Moreover, any UN aerial observers should participate in verification process.

~~SECRET~~

-9-

(c) Composition

While we assume that probably only citizens of certain types of countries will be acceptable to Communists as sources of UN ground observers, it is important from our standpoint that eligibility be restricted to technically trained personnel of genuinely reliable nations which have demonstrated a reasonable objectivity during crisis. For example, we would wish to exclude UAR and Ghana citizens in light of distinctly "unneutral" statements made by their Delegates in Security Council meetings on Cuba. On criteria indicated, we would prefer nationals from Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, India and Ireland. When it comes to UN air reconnaissance, it is probably not so important to have neutral personnel; Canadians and Argentines, for example, might prove acceptable.

7. ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE

(a) (a) We greatly prefer that any and all of the UN operations that may be created (air reconnaissance group, port inspectors, ground inspection teams) should operate under executive direction of SYG. To the extent the International Committee of the Red Cross is involved, it should (as indicated DEPTEL 1136) operate as executive agent of SYG. We understand ICRC has operated in similar capacity at UN request in checking compliance with Geneva Convention in US POW camps in Korea. ICRC has acted also as executive agent for High Commissioner for Refugees in Congo.

(b) We believe financing all verification measures should come under \$2,000,000 provision in regular UN budget for small-scale peace and security operations. If total cost likely to exceed one million dollars,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-10-

financing problem will need to be reviewed in the light of the then
U.S. position on financing UN peace-and-security operations.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Authority

NSC 68 1/11/78

REV. 1

By

SK/mmg

NARS, Date

1/3/78

October 31, 1962

ACTION: USUN, New York

45

SUBJECT: CUBA: New York Negotiations

destruction or removal

'Post removal inspection of storage sites -'

1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Please be guided by the following in your New York negotiations whose entire purpose is to reach final solution, in framework of exchanges of letters between President and Khrushchev, of problem created by introduction by USSR of offensive weapons into Cuba. In spite of Kuznetsov's eagerness to discuss disarmament, bases, and other broader questions (USUN's 1547) the present negotiation should not include issues beyond immediate objective, which is verified dismantling and removal of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba at earliest possible date.

Your purpose will be to reach straightforward realistic solutions to practical problems along lines indicated below. We assume that in line with established Soviet doctrine, Kuznetsov's insistence on no physical inspection of dismantling and removal Soviet weapons is essentially non-negotiable. It is probable, therefore, that we shall have to rely on aerial surveillance and post-removal inspection to satisfy ourselves that missile bases are dismantled and weapons are removed from Cuba or destroyed.

While you should strive for as much pre-removal ground inspection as possible, the formula of post-removal ground inspection together with high and low aerial surveillance during both the dismantling period and the post-evacuation period should, if efficiently carried out, provide adequate evidence of removal and destruction and so could be accepted.

~~SECRET~~2. DEFINITION

2. DEFINITION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

The offensive weapons which the United States insists be removed from Cuba and not be further imported into Cuba are those enumerated in the Presidential Proclamation 3504 of October 23. The list is as follows: Surface-to-surface missiles; bomber aircraft; bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the above items. Also, pursuant to authority granted in the Proclamation, the Secretary of Defense, in Special Warning (Notice to Mariners) No. 31, stated that the prohibition of surface-to-surface missiles covers a prohibition of missile propellants and chemical compounds capable of being used to power missiles.

Note that the definition includes short-range surface-to-surface missiles and surface-to-surface missiles designed for use at sea. Notice also that mechanical and electronic equipment to operate surface-to-surface missiles includes a wide variety of communications, supply and missile-launching equipment [including Komar class motor torpedo boats].

Suggest you start with wider definition, including supplement to Presidential Proclamation. Fall back position, on which we would insist, would be categories enumerated in Proclamation.

Not included in formal definition are Soviet troops and technicians. However, we should assume on basis Khrushchev letter of October 26 that "the necessity for the presence of

~~SECRET~~

3-

[Soviet/military specialists in Cuba would disappear" along with the offensive weapons they are manning and protecting.

Also not included within the definition are fighter aircraft, Komar class motor torpedo boats and surface-to-air missiles. Also not included are storage sites or any petroleum products other than missile propellants. It would be desirable to have these items destroyed or removed as well, but the USG is not willing to pay a price to have them destroyed or removed.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

3. TWO-PHASE PROGRAM.

The US envisages two phases in the UN verification program, each requiring specific control measures:

(a) First Phase - This phase should begin immediately and would cover the period up to the Soviet report to the SC that they have dismantled and withdrawn proscribed weapons. Since the Communists will undoubtedly prove chary of UN observation of weapons withdrawal, as Ruznetzov has already indicated, we assume they are unlikely to accept on-site inspection during the period when weapons are being withdrawn. Therefore we probably will need to rely in practice, during the first stage, on (i) US and UN aerial reconnaissance and (ii) UN/ICRC inspection of incoming shipments.

(b) Second Phase - This phase would begin when the SC convened to receive the Soviet report on compliance and to authorize establishment of a UN on-site inspection system. During this period, verification of compliance would be accomplished through: (i) continued aerial reconnaissance; (ii) continued inspection incoming cargoes; and (iii) ground inspection.

This phase would end when the SC has accepted the report of the SYG that offensive weapons have been removed from Cuba.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 5 -

4. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE.

Systematic high and low aerial reconnaissance is essential. This is so particularly if surface inspection is limited or non-existent. The reconnaissance, or any aspect of it, can be done either by the US or by the UN. Our only insistence is that a job be done which is adequate to provide the USG with information sufficient to convince US that compliance is taking place.

We recognize that (unlike US) UN will wish to overfly Cuba only after explicit clearance by Cuban authorities.

US would of course need access to photos resulting from UN reconnaissance.

Two types of air surveillance should be considered -- photographic (high and low) and visual monitoring by holding the aircraft in a pattern so as to maintain continuous air surveillance of missile transport movements.

The Canadian government has offered to have Canadian pilots fly ~~US~~ ^{Canadian} supplied RF-101 aircraft. USG endorses use of Canadians and RF-101s but recognizes that SYG will be reluctant to accept. Alternatively we could make available C-130s and within two-week period train air crews from one of the following: Mexico, Argentina, Chile or Colombia. Canada (4 crews) and Indonesia (10 crews) already have competent crews which would take only brief period to check out. There are four C-130 aircraft with the UN markings and high quality photographic equipment in Georgia now available to UN on request. In addition, we have sold C-130 aircraft to Australia and are currently in the midst of completing

~~SECRET~~

- 9 -

US will furnish to UN comprehensive list of locations to be covered.

(b) Number of Observers

The number of observers required to do job satisfactorily will depend on length of time permitted to accomplish task and on the extent of mobility. US would prefer to see such verification accomplished quickly. Assuming for political reasons Communists would prefer keep number UN inspectors relatively small, suggest UN consider possibility utilizing number of helicopters or small planes (which US prepared make available) to permit rapid transit inspection teams maximum number sites in minimum time. It appears to us that team of 50 or 60 men with adequate air transport could accomplish verification job within a week or two. Moreover, any UN aerial observers should participate in verification process.

(c) Composition

While we assume that probably only citizens of certain types of countries will be acceptable to Communists as sources of UN ground observers, it is important from our standpoint that eligibility be restricted to ^{technically trained personnel of} genuinely reliable ^{nations} ~~members~~ ^{who} have demonstrated a reasonable objectivity during crisis. For example, we would wish to exclude UAR and Ghana citizens in light of distinctly "unneutral" statements made by their

Delegates

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 10 -

Delegates in Security Council meetings on Cuba. On criteria indicated, we would prefer nationals from Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Nigeria, India and Ireland. When it comes to UN air reconnaissance, it is probably not so important to have neutral personnel; Canadians and Argentines, for example, might prove acceptable.

7. ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE

(a) We greatly prefer that any and all of the UN operations that may be created (air reconnaissance group, port inspectors, ground inspection teams) should operate under executive direction of SYG. To the extent the International Committee of the Red Cross is involved, it should (as indicated DEPTTEL 1136) operate as executive agent of SYG. We understand ICRC has operated in similar capacity at UN request in checking compliance with Geneva Convention in US POW camps in Korea. ICRC has acted also as executive agent for High Commissioner for Refugees in Congo.

(b) We believe financing all verification measures should come under \$2,000,000 provision in regular UN budget for small-scale peace and security operations. If total cost likely to exceed one million dollars, financing problem will need to be reviewed in the light of the then U.S. position on financing UN peace-and-security operations.

~~SECRET~~

