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THE OUTLOOK FOR KOREA

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the
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on 7 September 1961. Concurring were The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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THE OUTLOOK FOR KOREA

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the major trends and prospects in South Korea, with particular attention to the impact of North Korea on the south over the next two or three years.

CONCLUSIONS

1. In its push to unify Korea under Communist control, the North Korean regime will continue to depend primarily on subversive tactics and propaganda appealing to nationalistic sentiments and stressing the economic benefits of unification. Although these efforts have had little effect, the Communists probably believe their longer term prospects for a favorable response to its unification appeals are good and improving. In view of this and the automatic involvement of US forces in any resumption of hostilities in Korea, we believe the Communists are not likely to assume the grave risks of armed action against South Korea over the next several years. (*Paras. 12-25, 50-53*)

2. The greatest threat to South Korea, at least in the near term, comes from within South Korea. The country lacks a sense of national purpose and faces both tremendous economic problems and a brittle political situation. The military junta seeks to provide the drive and stability which was lacking in the previous civilian government but is subject to internal factionalism and lacks general public sup-

port in confronting these enormous problems. (*Paras. 28-38, 54*)

3. The prospect for South Korea over the next few years is therefore very cloudy and uncertain. US aid will probably succeed in preventing economic collapse. However, even under the most favorable circumstances, progress will be slow and South Korea will continue to require large-scale foreign aid for the indefinite future if it is to remain an independent nation allied with the West. (*Paras. 39-42, 55*)

4. The political situation is subject to sudden and rapid change. Much depends on future actions of the junta, in particular, on its capacity to establish a sense of forward momentum among the Korean people. If the overall situation in South Korea fails to improve significantly and the people lose hope for national progress, the continued enticements offered by the North Korean regime could lead to some movement in the south toward an accommodation with the north. (*Paras. 23-33, 56*)

DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

5. The 1945 division of the Korean peninsula was made for the administrative convenience of US and Soviet occupation authorities and was not meant, by the US at least, to last beyond the period necessary to organize national elections. In the early years there was a fair degree of movement of persons and trade, but the administrative line at the 38th Parallel soon took on the character of a political division. This was largely owing to the initiative of the USSR in promptly consolidating the Communist position in the north and in refusing to join in holding national elections. On either side, indigenous regimes were set up, each claiming to represent all the Korean people. By mid-1949, all trade between north and south had ceased. The Korean War, and the armistice which followed, reinforced the partition. The demilitarized zone became the de facto boundary between two competing political systems.

6. The economic and political development of the two regions proceeded in widely different fashion. Under the guidance of its Soviet mentors, the regime set out to create a disciplined Communist state, based on the complete domination of the party over all aspects of national life. It was helped enormously in this effort by the advantage the north possessed in having obtained through the partition most of the country's heavy industry and mineral resources. Despite setbacks suffered during the Korean War, the regime has very largely succeeded in imposing its will on the Korean people in the north and in developing the economic potential of the area.

7. Through purges and reorganizations, Premier Kim Il-sung, with the aid of a number of Soviet-trained supporters, has attained virtually complete control of the Korean Labor (i.e., Communist) Party and the government. The so-called "Yenan clique," made up of Koreans who had been associated with Communist China before 1945, has been largely eliminated and the regime probably has no

serious factional problems at present. The Korean Labor Party has expanded to the point that it now claims nearly one and a half million members (out of a population of 10 million). The strength of the party has enabled the regime to enforce strict controls and severe discipline on the North Korean people.

8. Both Kim and the government he heads are essentially the creation of the USSR,¹ and the USSR almost certainly continues to exert predominant influence on the North Korean regime. At the same time, however, there has been increasing competition from Communist China for influence in both the economic and ideological spheres, and North Korea is dependent in considerable degree on Peiping for military support and economic aid. Peiping and Moscow are in agreement, however, on the need to maintain and strengthen North Korea's position vis-a-vis South Korea.

9. The partition left South Korea with two-thirds of the agriculture, two-thirds of the people, and severe problems in establishing a viable economy. The loss of Japanese administrators, skills, and trade had a sharp impact on the economy of the south which was also forced to absorb large numbers of refugees. Syngman Rhee became President of the Republic of Korea in 1948 but, until he consolidated his control during the Korean War, his regime was too weak to cope realistically with

¹ Kim was a junior officer in the Soviet occupation army when he returned to Korea in mid-1945 after 20 years' absence. He still went by his real name of Kim Song-chu and was virtually unknown at that time. The Soviets assigned him to a minor post while they set about laying the groundwork for his emergence as a "national hero." This occurred in late 1945, when he was introduced to the Korean public at a liberation celebration in Pyongyang under his present alias, which was in fact the name of a renowned national hero of Korean resistance against the Japanese. Backed by the Soviets, Kim took over the Korean Communist Party from the local leaders. Upon establishment of the Democratic People's Republic in August 1948, he was placed at the head of the newly formed cabinet as Premier.

the social and economic problems of the south. Moreover, his 33 years of exile had little prepared him for the task, and he was either unwilling or unable to impose the economic discipline South Korea needed to make most effective use of the aid coming from the US. Following the Korean War, the popular base of the Rhee government narrowed, corruption flourished, and public dissatisfaction with official fraud, repression, and lack of leadership grew.

10. The collapse of the Rhee government in April 1960 initiated the present period of political instability in South Korea. The Chang Myon government which followed Rhee had democratic instincts, but its political base was weak and its leadership timid and ineffectual. It failed to end excessive factionalism and politicking in the Assembly. Its record on reforms, and especially on measures against corruption, was extremely disappointing to those Koreans eager for changes that Rhee's downfall seemed to promise. Among these was a small group of disgruntled and ambitious military officers whose stated objectives were to bring discipline into Korean society and politics, honesty to government, and progress to the country. On 16 May 1961, this group executed a military coup d'etat with an efficiency and boldness seldom encountered in South Korea. Political leadership in South Korea passed to the military for the first time since the founding of the Republic. For the new military leadership, all the old economic and social problems remain. In addition, new situations affecting political development, public participation, and national freedoms have been created. At the same time, South Korea must continue to reckon with the threat from the north.

II. THE NORTH KOREAN IMPACT ON SOUTH KOREA

11. In the decade that has passed since the start of the Korean War, the government of North Korea has continued to maintain formidable military forces, but has placed increasing stress on propaganda and subversion as the weapons with which to bring about the

collapse of authority in the south. The shattered North Korean economy has been rebuilt and the regime is seeking to make its industrial achievements known and envied by the people in the south. The political turmoil in South Korea over the past year and a half probably has given the North Korean leaders increased confidence in their approach.

A. The Subversive Threat

12. The North Korean regime has actively engaged in a program of subversion against the people and government in the South since the partition. Prior to the collapse of the Rhee government, this program consisted mostly of infiltrating political action agents and propaganda, primarily aimed at increasing South Korean dissatisfaction with economic malpractices and inaction, selfish political maneuvering, and the continued presence of foreign troops on Korean soil. Following the 1960 revolution in South Korea, the North Korean regime increased its efforts to infiltrate agents, particularly through Japan, and since that time, North Korean agents sent into South Korea have probably numbered about 200 to 250. Some of these were assigned the mission of subverting government officials, college students, and teachers.

13. In general, North Korean efforts to subvert the populace in the south appear to have had limited success. The Korean War left a deep anti-Communist conviction among most people in the south and the Rhee government was highly effective in detecting and arresting North Korean agents and their local accomplices. Although agents have recently been better trained and financed than those in the past, they have faced the same difficult task of blending in with the populace in a country into which there is almost no bona fide immigration or refugee flow. We believe that most of these agents have been seized. Since the May 1961 coup, there has been a lull in agent activity, probably reflecting some North Korean uncertainty regarding the prospects for subversion under the military junta now ruling in South Korea.

B. Propaganda: The Unification Issue

14. The North Korean regime has had more success with its propaganda campaign urging unification of Korea. There is a strong desire for national unification among the Korean people on either side of the demilitarized zone. The North Korean regime exploits this nationalistic sentiment and plays on the desires for the restoration of family relationships and the renewal of traditional cultural and commercial contacts. In addition the regime stresses the opportunities that unification would provide for the integrated development of the country's economy.

15. The North Korean propaganda for unification is coupled with a constant demand for the departure of US and UN forces from Korea and the settlement of the unification problem by the Koreans themselves. According to Pyongyang, there can be no unification as long as there is "foreign interference" in South Korea. The North Korean regime has repeatedly denied the competence of the UN to deal with the Korean question and has rejected the concept of UN-supervised elections in Korea as a step toward unification. North Korea has proposed, at one time or another, all-Korea elections, development of north-south contacts, an international conference on the Korean question, and, most recently, a loose federation of North and South Korea. Under the federation scheme advanced by Kim Il-sung in late 1960, the two governments would retain their separate identities but, as a preliminary step toward unification, would appoint representatives to a Supreme National Committee to supervise expansion of cultural and economic cooperation.

16. The North Korean campaign for unification trades on the relative position of the two economies which are highly complementary. In recognition of this and the greater strength of the North Korean economy, the North Koreans have offered extensive trade relationships as a prelude to unification. Since November 1960, North Korea has elaborated a series of comprehensive proposals to reopen trade, grant economic aid to South Korea, and establish close economic and cultural relations. North Korea has proposed to pro-

vide vast quantities of electric power as well as to construct hydroelectric stations in South Korea; to build metallurgical, cement, machinery, and chemical fertilizer plants; to undertake broad irrigation projects, cancel all farmers' debts to their moneylenders, and to double the South Korean fish catch; to hire all unemployed South Korean college graduates, to enroll 4,000 South Korean college students in North Korean colleges, and to give financial assistance to 3,000 other South Korean students.

C. The Economic Contrast

17. The greater strength of the North Korean economy derives in large degree from the division of resources in the partition of the Korean peninsula in 1945. At that time, the North Korean regime acquired about two-thirds of existing heavy industry, including electric power, mining, and metallurgical industries. Along with these, the Communist authorities in the north fell heir to most of Korea's hydroelectric potential and mineral resources, including most of its iron ore and coal. By contrast, South Korea received about two-thirds of existing light industry and agriculture but almost no mineral resources except tungsten and a little coal.

18. Population factors have also favored North Korean economic growth. The initial imbalance of population, with the north having roughly one-third and the south approximately two-thirds, has been further increased by the pattern of subsequent population growth. The flight of refugees from North Korean oppressive policies held population growth during the period since World War II to less than 10 percent, relieving the difficulties of agricultural growth. During the same period, South Korea's population grew by more than 50 percent, eliminating its agricultural surplus and creating a deficit.

19. The economic policies of the two regimes have differed sharply: North Korea has been guided by an industry-first policy, as distinguished from the consumer-first orientation of South Korea. As a consequence, the rate of advance in North Korea has been much the greater, with its gross national product ap-

proximately doubling since 1949, compared with an estimated increase of only about one-quarter in South Korea. Since 1954, the amount allocated to investment in North Korea has been roughly equivalent to one-third of gross national product whereas in South Korea this amount has been equivalent to less than 15 percent of gross national product.

20. From 1950 to 1960, the amount of economic grants and credits which the Communist Bloc declares it has provided North Korea is equivalent to approximately US \$1.3 billion. The USSR has supplied about 50 percent, Communist China, 30 percent; the remainder has come from the European Satellites. An expanding commercial trade between North Korea and other members of the Bloc has steadily supplanted economic aid. In 1954, North Korean exports financed only about 13 percent of imports (including economic aid), but by 1960 exports financed 45 percent of imports. As a percent of gross national product the grants and credits received by North Korea dropped from a high of 33 percent in 1954 to about 3 percent in 1960. On the other hand, North Korea is completely dependent on imports of coking coal, petroleum, and rubber, and is deficient in raw cotton, machinery, and equipment.

21. In contrast to South Korea where overpopulation and underemployment represent major problems, North Korea has a shortage of labor, particularly skilled labor. To cope with this problem, the regime has made increasing use of female workers, using women in mining and metallurgical industries as well as in agriculture and light industry. In addition, the regime has occasionally employed soldiers to supplement the civilian labor force.

22. Given the great dissimilarities in economic resources and policies, price systems, and consumption patterns, it is difficult to compare the living standards in North and South Korea. Economic conditions are favorable to North Korea in some respects and to South Korea in others. In North Korea grain and housing are strictly rationed, but made available at cheap prices, while clothing and other consumer goods are sold at extremely high

prices; in South Korea, where the prices are determined by the market, grain and housing are more expensive and other goods much cheaper. In South Korea the variety and quality of consumer goods is greater than that in the north, and the extremes between wealth and poverty are also greater. In neither South nor North Korea is the living standard for the bulk of the people significantly above the subsistence level.

D. The Military Threat

23. The North Korean military establishment is an effective, modern organization but given the present balance of forces in Korea it does not in itself pose a severe threat to South Korea. Without outside assistance, the North Korean armed forces are capable only of maintaining internal security and of conducting limited defensive and offensive operations. However, the introduction of Chinese Communist or Soviet forces would greatly increase North Korea's offensive and defensive capabilities.²

24. The North Korean Army, with an overall strength of 329,000, is slightly more than half the size of the combined South Korean Army and Marine Corps strength of 545,000. It is organized into 18 infantry divisions and one tank division. There are no known plans for an increase in the size of the North Korean Army and, as long as the regime continues to push its economic program, any increase is

² In areas near the Korean border, there are approximately 500,000 Chinese Communist troops (34 divisions) and about 100,000 Soviet troops (13 divisions). We estimate that as many as 17 Chinese divisions could be brought into place along the present demilitarized zone within 10 to 12 days. The Chinese Communist air and naval forces have approximately 1,950 aircraft based in the Northern, Northeastern and Eastern Air Defense Districts, including about 1,270 jet fighters and 420 jet light bombers. The Soviet air forces have just over 1,700 aircraft in its Far East and Transbaikalian Military Districts consisting mainly of 850 jet fighters, 265 jet medium bombers (100 assigned to naval aviation), and 55 heavy bombers. In close proximity to Korean waters, the Soviet Far Eastern fleet has 88 submarines, 6 cruisers, and 52 destroyer types. The Chinese Communists have 25 submarines as well as coastal patrol forces.

unlikely. The capabilities of the army have been increased, however, by reorganization and re-equipment with modern weapons. Its logistic capability has been largely restored since the armistice took effect in 1953. The North Korean Army's superiority in artillery and other combat support weapons partly offsets the South Korean Army's numerical superiority.

25. The North Korean Air Force as compared with the South Korean Air Force has fewer total personnel (16,000 as against 22,000), but three times as many pilots (900); it has two times as many aircraft of all types, including nearly three times the number of South Korean jet aircraft. Tactical components total 485 jet aircraft and include three fighter divisions, one attack/fighter division, and a light bomber division. Possessing an extensive air facilities system and a modern and effective radar network, the North Korean Air Force has a fair to good capability for ground attack, air defense, and interdiction. In view of the short distances involved, the North Korean Air Force has a substantial capability for launching a surprise attack on South Korean and UN military and logistic installations. The North Korean Navy, considerably smaller than the South Korean Navy, is little more than an inshore defense force with the mission of coastal patrol. Its most important function since the armistice has been to smuggle agents into South Korea.

E. Relative International Positions

26. Until recently, the North Korean regime was unrecognized outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc. In the past year, however, the regime has been actively seeking diplomatic contacts with non-Bloc countries. So far, three (Cuba, Guinea, and Mali) have recognized the North Korean regime and received North Korean ambassadors. Only Guinea has established a mission in Pyongyang. North Korea has placed trade missions in India and the United Arab Republic and signed trade agreements with Iraq, Yemen, and Austria. During the spring of this year, North Korea signed agreements with Burma and Indonesia for the establishment of consulates.

27. The recent signing of formal defense treaties with the USSR and Communist China probably was intended to give North Korea formal security guarantees and greater status both within and outside the Bloc. In addition, these treaties probably reflect a desire by Bloc leaders to present North Korea as a fully developed and independent state, having an international status comparable to South Korea. Although North Korea's efforts to extend its international ties have not yet had widespread impact, the regime has succeeded in blurring South Korea's claim to be the only legitimate representative of the Korean people. Many countries, particularly the newer ones, hesitate to recognize either Korean regime, whether from indifference or from desire to avoid cold war entanglements. This in turn has adversely affected South Korea's standing with the UN.

III. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR SOUTH KOREA

A. Political Stability

28. *The Situation in the Junta.* The military junta that seized control in May 1961, ousting Chang Myon and bringing the Second Republic to a sudden end, was composed of generals and field grade officers, some of North Korean origin and some from the south. Motivated largely by a sense of disgust and frustration with the corruption and graft in government and the upper ranks of the armed services, the more junior officers were active in the planning and execution of the coup under the leadership of Lt. General Pak Chong-hui. A number of the general officers joined the coup group after much of the initial planning had been completed and were motivated to do so by personal ambition as well as a desire to reform. However, common to the members of the junta was an intensely nationalistic concern over the uncertain direction of the Chang Myon government and its alleged softness toward communism. They regarded the experiment with parliamentary government as a failure and were determined to give South Korea the executive control and impetus missing under Chang Myon. However, there was little consensus on the methods

and extent of reform necessary to achieve these goals.

29. The internal power structure of the junta has altered since May, but a basic problem of control and authority remains. Lt. General Pak Chong-hui is the dominant figure. Colonel Kim Chong-pil, head of the central intelligence bureau, is the second strongest man in the group and has so far worked in concert with Pak. Several members of the original group—most notably its original front man, Lt. General Chang To-yong—have been ousted. The most serious potential source of division in the junta lies in the more radical and extreme outlook of the junta's younger members.

30. Since the coup, this group has pressed the hardest for punitive action against civilians and military officers accused of corruption and has been the least willing to move toward return of the government to civilian control. Its hardnosed attitude has been reflected in its suspicion and distrust of US motives in South Korea and in the initial difficulties in restoring fully the US-Korean military relationships existing before the coup. As Pak has been drawn by South Korea's dependence upon the US toward closer relations with US authorities in Korea, it is possible that some members of the colonels group have become suspicious of his dedication to the objectives of the coup and of his own ultimate ambitions.

31. There will probably continue to be factional shifts and maneuvering within the junta as various groups vie for influence and as Pak strives to consolidate and extend his power. As long as political and economic pressures on the junta do not become too great, Pak and the other junta members will probably be able to prevent their internal frictions from breaking out into open conflict. However, if the leadership began to encounter serious public resistance to its policies and public law and order started to disintegrate, the divisive forces within the group would probably cause it to fall apart. At that point, the various faction leaders might appeal to their supporters in the South Korean armed forces for help and armed clashes between different camps could result.

32. The junta has stated that it does not plan to return the government to civilian control until after corrupt and selfish elements have been removed. The time of the transfer is now scheduled for the summer of 1963, following the adoption of a new constitution and general elections earlier in that year. To prepare for the elections, political parties will be allowed to resume activities in early 1963, although "corrupt and evil" politicians will be prohibited from participating. The junta plans to return to the presidential system and unicameral legislature that characterized the Rhee government.

33. The Korean public has reacted to this schedule with disappointment and skepticism. From the junta's point of view, the date is sufficiently far in the future to be easily changed if political or economic developments over the next two years so warrant. We believe it is highly unlikely that the junta would of its own accord advance the date of transfer and the odds are only even that the 1963 schedule will be met. If the junta appeared unlikely to meet this schedule, highly adverse public reaction would probably result. The junta may attempt to avert this difficulty and guarantee its control through such means as forming its own political party and running military or ex-military officers for political office. In any event, 1963 promises to be a critical year, with the possibility of serious turmoil over the formulation of a new constitution and the holding of elections.

34. *The Junta and the People.* The coup initially received some welcome from many Koreans who had grown impatient with the apparent inability of the politicians in Parliament to forego the game of politics and settle down to Korea's urgent economic and political problems. However, public disenchantment with the new regime has appeared in the cities and is spreading in the rural areas, although a favorable attitude can still be found among many farmers. The authoritarianism and resort to police rule have adversely affected the junta's standing among intellectuals and students, many of whom regard the military junta as little better than the Rhee regime they overthrew.

35. The junta has made full use of its powers under martial law to close newspapers, jail politicians, educators, and businessmen, and impose curfews and censorship. The atmosphere of fear and intimidation thus created has so far prevented demonstrations of public opposition to the junta. The junta's actions against potential opposition leaders has greatly reduced the chances for organized resistance. Student groups probably represent the most significant potential opposition to the junta, although there has not yet been any serious effort among the students to organize. A student-led uprising is not likely as long as the junta appears to be unified and determined to suppress antiregime activity.

36. All official proclamations by the junta have stressed the anti-Communist nature of its objectives. As part of its aims, the junta has passed a stringent anti-Communist law under which the government can take rapid and forceful action against those it considers to be Communist or Communist influenced. Moreover, the junta has centralized and strengthened the counterintelligence machinery of the government, under the direction of Colonel Kim Chong-pil, and has demonstrated its readiness to arrest persons, high and low, for "antistate" activities.

37. It is likely that one reason for the junta's exaggerated expressions of concern regarding Communist penetration—which has resulted, for example, in charging ex-Premier Chang Myon, South Korea's leading Catholic layman, with being pro-Communist—is to convince the Korean people that the coup d'état was justified. Generally speaking, the people of South Korea are strongly disposed against communism. Over two million refugees fled from North Korea before and during the Korean War and most adults in South Korea remember their exposure to Communist invasion and occupation. However, if increasingly widespread unemployment were accompanied by mounting inflation, food shortages, and general economic disintegration, the South Koreans would become more vulnerable to unification propaganda which promised material and economic improvement.

38. Over the past year or so, there has been a slight increase in South Korean sentiment favoring a new look at the unification problem. Some of this grew out of the resurgence of Korean nationalism resulting from the nation's experience in overthrowing the Rhee government and the new freedom of political discussion. Elements of younger, educated Korean groups who have matured in the last few years have especially been attracted to the idea that unification, with all its potential benefits, can somehow be achieved in an anti-septic, nonpolitical way. Even the military junta felt called upon to include preparing the south for unification as one of its six announced goals. However, barring complete collapse of organized government and accompanying economic chaos, we do not believe that the South Korean people will give active consideration to unification on Pyongyang's terms or become significantly more susceptible to Communist subversion in the next two or three years.

B. Economic Development

39. South Korea's economic situation at the time of the coup was shaky and it has not improved. Unemployment has increased, the banking system is in turmoil, traditional credit mechanisms in the rural areas have been disrupted, and the business community is fearful of the junta's aims and reluctant to invest in an uncertain future. Many businessmen have been arrested on charges of illegal accumulation of wealth through tax evasion, misuse of bank loans, and political kickbacks. Most of these have been released, but are still subject to confiscatory back payments and penalties. These moves against businessmen and a decree limiting interest rates on loans to 20 percent per year have resulted in industrial, commercial, and financial stagnation. The lowered business activity following the May 1961 coup is much worse than that which came after the April 1960 revolution and may be the most severe since the founding of the Republic. Although the coup and subsequent actions of the military junta are by no means the sole cause of the present economic crisis in South Korea, it is the junta that now must provide the national leadership to deal with it.

40. General Pak and the other leaders of the junta came to power with meager comprehension of the complexity and magnitude of South Korea's economic problems. They have quickly become aware of the political importance of economic progress, however, and are now showing signs of coming to grips with the necessary planning and decisions. Military personnel initially placed in government posts dealing with economic matters are being replaced by more knowledgeable civilians. Civilian ministers have been appointed to head the two key economic ministries. A super-ministry, known as the Office of Economic Planning, has been created under a civilian director holding rank in the government as Vice Premier.

41. The economic problems that the junta faces are the ones that have long plagued South Korea, seriously compounded by two successive years of national turbulence. There is little the military government can do to make up for South Korea's basic shortage of all resources except manpower. Although the economic situation in South Korea is grim, it is not hopeless. The junta is able to pursue its announced program of using outside aid effectively without acceding to the pressures of the legislative and special groups that harassed the previous government. Much depends on the weather and continued good harvests of rice and summer grains. These, plus uninterrupted US economic assistance and some increase in business activity, will probably prevent economic collapse.

42. Even under the most favorable circumstances, progress will be slow. Almost insuperable obstacles will prevent South Korea from achieving a self-supporting economy in the foreseeable future. Unification of the peninsula, permitting a more equitable distribution of the people and utilization of resources, would greatly improve the economic position of the country as a whole, but this also is highly unlikely at any time in the foreseeable future. Korea's economic prospects would undoubtedly improve with a reduction in military forces and a consequent redirection of available resources, but there is little likelihood that the junta will undertake sub-

stantial reductions in the near future.³ Other domestic alternatives available are an austerity program to increase forced savings or a general increase in productivity, or both. However, a marked increase in productivity can be realized only after continued effort and investment combined with a disciplined austerity program over a long period. In sum, the most likely prospect is that South Korea will continue to require large-scale foreign aid into the indefinite future if it is to exist as an independent nation allied with the West.

C. Military Readiness

43. Supported by US military aid, South Korea continues to maintain the world's fifth largest military establishment. The previous government had initiated steps to reduce the army's size somewhat and was planning to invest the funds saved thereby in economic development. The junta has yet to spell out its military policies, but its early actions suggest that it will not proceed with the reductions proposed by the previous administration. The junta has, however, forced the retirement of about 50 flag and general officers, mostly on the basis of ineffectiveness, and has separated more than a thousand junior officers for incompetence or corruption. The combat efficiency of the armed forces may suffer temporarily by the turnover in personnel but morale among those remaining on duty will probably rise as the

³ The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that this paragraph fore-closes too firmly (fourth sentence) the possibility that the junta may consider substantial reductions in military forces in the near future. There is no evidence to date that the junta is committed to retaining its military forces at their present levels, while there is considerable evidence of its commitment to adopt measures that would improve South Korea's economic prospects. Although the question of a reduction of force levels would probably present a difficult conflict of interest for the junta, the Director believes that the junta might undertake reductions if it were convinced that to do so would promise substantial economic benefit without undue jeopardy to South Korea's security. Moreover, the junta has indicated its desire to raise military pay levels; and if additional US aid for this purpose is not forthcoming, reduction in force levels may appear as a possible alternative means to this end.

junta takes advantage of the promotion opportunities it has created.

44. The South Korean armed forces total about 583,000. The army has about 520,000 officers and men organized into 2 field armies, 5 corps, and 18 infantry divisions. Despite logistic shortcomings and inadequate anti-aircraft defenses, the army is well equipped, well trained, and combat ready. The air force, with 22,000 personnel, has 282 aircraft, over half of them F-86 jet fighter-bombers, and about 370 trained pilots. The air force has a good capability for close-support and interdiction but has only a fair capability for air defense under visual flight conditions. The navy has 55 escort, patrol, mine warfare, and amphibious ships. While it maintains a limited mine warfare and amphibious capability, the navy's present primary mission is coastal surveillance and patrol. The marine corps, with about 25,000 men, is trained in the techniques of amphibious assault with a regimental landing team. In addition, UN ground forces in South Korea total 49,000.

45. South Korean armed forces, which have the support of two US Army divisions now in position, could contain a North Korean attack on the northern boundary. In view of North Korea's limited offensive capability, however, we believe that the Communists would supplement North Korean forces with Chinese or Soviet forces in such an attack. In this event South Korea would require prompt and extensive US reinforcement for adequate defense.

46. The early actions of the military junta upset relations with the UN Command in Korea and resulted in a considerable compromise of CINCUNC operational authority. The junta has since accepted the principle of the subordination of the South Korean armed forces to the UN Command. However, their willingness to implement fully agreements on the command structure cannot yet be taken for granted. The junta probably intends to maintain a larger degree of independence in its command of South Korean forces, at least in peace time. Moreover, the military type of organization and subordination within the junta and its relationships within the armed

services in effect establishes a chain of command separate from the UN Command. This increases the danger that complete obedience to CINCUNC authority will not occur under all military exigencies.

D. Foreign Relations

47. After an initial period of preoccupation with domestic affairs to the exclusion of international considerations, the military junta has begun to show concern for its image abroad. It has dispatched goodwill teams to some fifty states. It has nominated a new envoy to Japan and indicated its willingness to reopen the negotiations underway before the coup. It has announced its support for the present UN formula on unification. And the junta leadership has begun efforts consciously designed to better its relations with the US.

48. The Chang Myon government was interested in improving relations with Japan but was hampered by the often violent criticism of its steps by anti-Japanese elements in the press and in Parliament. The junta, on the other hand, is less influenced by criticism and has shown a growing understanding of the desirability of coming to terms with Japan. For its part, the Ikeda government is disposed to go slow until the military junta has stabilized its position and established sound relations with the US. Nevertheless, some improvement in Korean-Japanese relations may be forthcoming, particularly if the deteriorating economic situation in South Korea causes the junta to soften previous Korean stands on wartime compensation claims and fishing rights in return for Japanese economic assistance.

49. With the assumption of power by the junta, US relations with South Korea entered a new phase. At least initially, suspicion and distrust marked the attitude of many junta members toward the US. General Pak, however, no longer holds himself apart from US authorities in Seoul and has recently requested and received a personal US advisor on economic matters. The junta leadership is fully aware of Korean dependence upon the US and is seeking a relationship with the US which will not endanger South Korea's major source

of economic, military, and diplomatic support. At the same time, however, the junta leaders probably intend to develop a relationship which reflects their desire for full control of Korean affairs. Although the junta will probably be generally cooperative in matters affecting the economy, it will be less responsive to US advice on political and military matters, particularly if it interprets such advice as incompatible with its immediate interests.

IV. THE OUTLOOK FOR KOREA

50. The North Korean regime of Kim Il-sung is stable, well entrenched, and energetic. It faces no serious internal opposition and is probably accepted, if not enthusiastically supported, by most of the North Korean people. It will probably continue to concentrate, with some success, in building up its economy and may be able to effect a substantial increase in North Korean living standards in the next few years. It will continue to seek ways to undermine governmental authority in South Korea, employing every trick of subversion, propaganda, and political maneuver at its command. Although it probably does not expect to realize its goal of unification in the near future, the regime probably is preparing to exploit a collapse of authority, law, and order in South Korea, if it should occur.

51. North Korea is not likely to resort to armed action against South Korea in the foreseeable future. North Korea almost certainly would not undertake such action without the support of both the USSR and Communist China. We believe that the USSR, recognizing that the reopening of hostilities in Korea would automatically involve US military forces, would be concerned over the difficulty of controlling the risks of such a conflict. At the same time, the Communists probably regard as promising the long-term prospects for fomenting disaffection and spreading subversion among the South Korean people. We therefore believe it unlikely that the Communists will risk reopening hostilities in Korea over the next several years.

52. Over the short term, North Korea's subversive threat as such is probably not great. After more than a decade of operating against

South Korea, Pyongyang still does not possess an effective organization in South Korea. The vigorous anti-Communist measures of South Korean governments have played an important part in this. But more importantly, the people of South Korea have so far proved remarkably impervious to the solicitations and urgings from the north. Although much will hinge on the future development of relations between the junta and the people, we do not anticipate an early change in the attitude of South Koreans toward the Communists.

53. However, the economic accomplishments of the North Korean regime and its propaganda proposals may in time exert considerable influence in the south. With help from the USSR and other members of the Bloc, the North Korean regime probably could in fact make good on most of its offers of economic assistance to South Korea. North Korea has the electricity and is capable of constructing the plants, provided the heavy generating equipment and other machinery were supplied by the Bloc. In particular, the offer to give financial assistance to students and to employ idle college graduates strikes a very sensitive part of South Korean society. If the South Korean Government, together with US aid, can keep the economy going, the impact of the North Korean claims and accomplishments will be blunted. However, the margin of safety probably is small.

54. In sum, the greatest threat to South Korea, at least in the near term, does not come from North Korea. It comes, instead, from within South Korea itself: from the country's shaky economy and its almost perpetual state of crisis; from the unresolved political questions that arise out of the leadership's demand for authority versus the people's desire for self-expression and freedom; from the lack of social cohesion and effective institutions for economic development; and finally, from the people's capacity for revolt once their patience has been pushed to its limit. The South Koreans have so far developed no clear sense of national direction and purpose. It is this lack of national purpose which makes dangerous the variety of Communist appeals for unification on Communist terms and their

offers of economic and cultural cooperation. A strong, cohesive ideology is being matched against a virtual ideological vacuum.


55. The prospect for South Korea over the next few years is therefore very cloudy and uncertain. As serious as the economic situation is, it will probably not be the most significant cause of future difficulties. US aid will probably be able to keep the economy going. It is in the political arena that the greatest danger lies. The present government has not yet gained any great measure of public support. The students have been quiet so far, intimidated by the junta's readiness to show the mailed fist; this quiescence probably will not continue long. The army is not united in its attitude toward the junta and will remain an important potential source of anti-

junta strength. The political situation is brittle and it would probably not take much provocation to precipitate another major crisis in Korea.

56. Such a major crisis, if it occurred, could take any one of a variety of forms, ranging from a drastic change in the membership of the military junta to a new popular uprising. One thing seems fairly clear; both the South Korean people and the leadership face many disappointments, frustrations, and failures in the years ahead. In such a situation, the desire for economic progress and for an end to hopeless temporizing, rising interest in unification, and continued enticements offered by the North Korean regime could lead to some movement in the south toward an accommodation with the north.

KOREA

- International boundary
- National capital
- Railroad
- Road
- Spot height (in feet)



ELEVATION	
10000	30000
8000	24000
6000	18000
4000	12000
2000	6000
1000	3000
500	1500
200	600
100	300
50	150
20	60
10	30
5	15
2	6
1	3

Boundaries are not necessarily those recognized by the U.S. Government

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North Korean Intentions and Capabilities With Respect to South Korea

Submitted by

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

As indicated overleaf
21 September 1967

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WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

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NORTH KOREAN INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH KOREA

CONCLUSIONS

A. We believe that the recent, more vigorous activities of North Korea against the South have several motivations: to create new pressures on the Pak government; to tie down large ROK forces; to strengthen the Communist clandestine apparatus in the South; and to be in a position to exploit any new and major disruption in the ROK. The timing of these tactics has been strongly influenced by the Vietnamese War, for example by such factors as the absence of 50,000 ROK troops in South Vietnam.

B. The North Koreans will almost certainly continue their campaign of military harassment in the DMZ, at current or even increased levels. We believe that North Korea undertook its program of violence of its own volition, not under pressure from either Moscow or Peking, and that this program does not indicate a present Communist intention to invade South Korea. Pyongyang is conscious of the risks inherent in such an action and would be reluctant to accept them. Similarly, there is probably no intention of escalating the DMZ attacks to a point at which open warfare might result. The North might miscalculate, however, and raise the ante along the DMZ until the ROK resolves to strike back in force. A series of actions and reactions might ensue which could lead to open hostilities.

C. North Korea will also continue attempts to infiltrate guerrilla-type teams into rear areas of South Korea. Communist chances of establishing viable bases for guerrilla operations are probably poor, but some teams will be able to carry out short-term terrorist and sabotage missions.

DISCUSSION

1. Since October 1966, there has been a marked increase in North Korean violence against ROK and US forces in Korea's Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Since May 1967, larger teams of more heavily-armed North Korean agents have been landed in rear areas of South Korea with orders to test the guerrilla environment. And since early September, there have been two instances of sabotage against South Korean trains. These developments raise important questions: Why has North Korea, after more than a decade of relative quiet, embarked on a program of violent action against the South? What does Pyongyang hope to achieve? And what are its chances?

I. RECENT NORTH KOREAN ACTIVITIES

2. Captured agents have testified that North Korean plans to subvert South Korea underwent significant changes during the winter of 1965-1966. There was a substantial enlargement of agent training facilities by the ruling Korean Labor Party's *Liaison Bureau*, Pyongyang's primary agency for intelligence and subversive operations in South Korea, and instruction in guerrilla tactics was added to the curriculum. At the same time, the North Korean Army's *Reconnaissance Bureau* set up several new training "bases" and, perhaps more significant, seems to have been assigned at least partial responsibility for covert operations in rear areas of South Korea.¹

3. *The DMZ Area.* From mid-October to early November 1966, there were some 7 small-scale but deliberate North Korean attempts to kill or capture US and ROK personnel in or near the DMZ, including 2 ambushes in which a total of 6 US and 7 ROK soldiers were killed.² Action along the 150-mile-long DMZ subsided as usual over the winter. In mid-March 1967, however, it flared to extraordinary levels. So far this year, some 360 incidents of all types have been reported.³ In comparison: 42 DMZ incidents were reported in 1966, 55 in 1965, and 32 in 1964.

¹ The Reconnaissance Bureau includes a Reconnaissance Brigade, with an estimated strength of about 7,000, containing a 300-man Airborne Reconnaissance Battalion; these elements are trained for behind-the-line operations in the event of war. In addition, there is a Foot Reconnaissance Department, with an estimated strength of 240-320, which has hitherto been concerned only with the acquisition of tactical military information by short-term agents, primarily in the DMZ area.

² Some of these attacks may have been retaliatory. For example, the one in which the US troops were killed occurred one week after ROK forces raided the North Korean sector and killed or wounded about 30 North Koreans.

³ With respect to the DMZ, the word "incident" is used in a broad sense to mean anything from a fire fight between opposing forces to the detonation of a North Korean mine or the discharge of a US or ROK weapon against a presumed intruder. The 1967 incident total includes about 100 fire fights in which 64 US and ROK soldiers have been killed and 190 wounded; known North Korean casualties have been 77 killed and 6 captured.

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4. The increase in DMZ incidents reported this year is comprised of many elements. The increased alertness of US and ROK forces following the attacks in late 1966, improved reporting of DMZ activity by front line units to headquarters, and the availability of new detection equipment probably mean that a greater proportion of infiltrations are being spotted. Nevertheless, infiltration appears to be much higher than in the past. Some 10-20 percent of the incidents appear to be aggressive harassments of the type initiated last fall—e.g., attacks on outposts and ambushes of patrols. Other incidents are attributable to probing and shallow reconnaissance actions by North Korean paramilitary personnel; there is evidence that this has recently become part of their training. As in earlier years, however, many DMZ incidents involve the detection of agents, alone or in small teams, moving in or out of South Korea on intelligence or subversive missions; a difference is that they are evidently better armed and more aggressive than before. The two train sabotage missions of September occurred near the DMZ and may have been the work of agents recently infiltrated from the North.

5. *Rear Areas.* In 1966, the North Koreans may have stepped up sea infiltration of agents into rear areas of South Korea. Since May 1967, there has been a further increase in landings and, more important, the scope of activity has changed. The North Koreans have begun landing larger teams, more heavily armed and including a number of army officers; at least 17 such teams, averaging 7 or 8 men, have landed. Their primary mission has been to see if certain remote highlands could serve as base areas for guerrilla war. They had no orders to initiate violence, other than to engage in small DMZ harassments while exfiltrating. They were to return North before winter.

6. So far in 1967, the teams appear to have had little success in accomplishing their stated mission. ROK security forces—police and military—have reported killing 130 and capturing 43. (ROK losses have been stated as 50 killed and 85 wounded.) South Korean civilians have cooperated by promptly reporting suspicious activities. The Communist agents have proved to be poorly prepared: Almost all were native northerners with speech identifiable as such; many apparently lacked adequate local knowledge; and some teams were so short of supplies that they degenerated into food-gathering expeditions.

7. A relative handful of these men, including some officers, remain at large, and there may be teams which have not been discovered. Any evaluation of the effectiveness of this new North Korean tactic, therefore, must necessarily be tentative. There will be some gains to the Communists in intelligence and operational experience, which can be applied to future training. But it may be that their chief gain from rear-area activity this year will be psychological. The infiltration, coupled with DMZ harassments and bellicose propaganda from Pyongyang, has worried the Pak government and exposed it to domestic criticism. In addition, as many as 15,000 ROK police and military may have become involved to some degree in the detection and pursuit of the infiltration teams.

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II. NORTH KOREAN MOTIVES

8. Pyongyang's recent tactics appear to represent a new style of approach to what we still believe is its long-term objective: the reunification of Korea under Communist rule. The adoption of these tactics seems to be a reaction to two situations: the war in Vietnam and the growing political and economic strength of South Korea vis-a-vis the North. In the course of time, Korean developments alone might have led the frustrated and hard-line Kim Il-song regime to move as it has against the South. But the war in Vietnam probably caused North Korea to act when it did.⁴

A. North versus South

9. *The Economic Situation.* The past few years have not been good ones for North Korea, particularly in the economic sphere. From 1954 to 1960, the regime made excellent progress toward its goals of rapid industrialization and the achievement of a high degree of self-sufficiency. This progress aroused admiration among some South Koreans, particularly students and intellectuals, who were discouraged by their own relatively modest economic advances under Rhee and by the prospect of prolonged dependence on the US. It became a major theme in Communist unification propaganda.

10. In 1961, encouraged by its success and with the promise of substantial Soviet assistance, North Korea launched an ambitious Seven-Year Plan. It was billed as a program to raise living standards while continuing the rapid expansion of heavy industry. Within two or three years, however, it became apparent that the plan had failed, particularly the effort to raise living standards. In part, this was a result of a reduction in Soviet aid when North Korea, in late 1962, aligned itself with Peking in the Sino-Soviet conflict.⁵ The failure was admitted publicly at the Korean Labor Party Conference in early October 1966; fulfillment of the plan was postponed from 1967 to 1970. The major reason adduced for this "readjustment of tempo in the development of the national economy" was the threat of US aggression and the consequent need for strengthening defense capabilities.

11. By contrast, the economy of South Korea began to grow more rapidly in the 1960's and, though its per capita gross national product (GNP) is still lower than that of North Korea, by 1965 the South was surpassing Northern rates of growth in most industrial sectors and probably in agricultural production as well. A sustained rise in living standards was also perceptible. In these circumstances, whatever propaganda appeal North Korean economic achievements once had for the South has been largely dissipated.

⁴ Brig. Gen. Wesley C. Franklin, the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that this sentence overemphasizes the war in Vietnam as a motive for North Korea's recent actions. He believes that while the war in Vietnam has probably confirmed and encouraged North Korea's decision to adopt new tactics against the ROK, North Korean motives were essentially nationalistic.

⁵ Soviet aid rose in mid-1965 after Pyongyang reverted to a position of neutrality or "independence," at least in part for economic reasons.

12. *The Political Scene.* Political developments in the South have been equally frustrating for Pyongyang. The years from 1960 to 1965 were a time of domestic political turmoil in South Korea. Kim Il-song and his associates must have been encouraged as they viewed, in rapid succession: the "student revolution" which toppled Rhee; a year of confused and tolerant parliamentary democracy; the coup by disaffected nationalistic officers; their unpopular repressive measures; and, finally, a bitter military-civilian political struggle for control of the government. Yet today, after two national elections, the firmly anti-Communist General Pak is in a position of unchallenged authority in Seoul and appears to have the support, or at least the acquiescence, of a majority of the population.

13. Certainly, all South Korean political problems have not been solved. The rigging of recent legislative elections has led to considerable dissatisfaction with the regime. And there are other, longer range, problems even more difficult to cope with, including the development of a viable political opposition. Nevertheless, the outlook for political stability in South Korea is good, so long as economic improvement continues and the government exhibits a reasonable degree of sensitivity in handling popular grievances.

14. The apparent inability of North Korea to exploit unrest in the South in 1960-1965 through its usual methods—propaganda and political subversion—has probably been a factor in its decision to adopt violent tactics. Propaganda appeals for unification on Communist terms had some impact in the emotional and permissive atmosphere that accompanied the fall of Rhee, but such proposals were categorically rejected and their advocates suppressed after the military coup of 1961. In any case, pressures for unification seem to have diminished among South Koreans in recent years. Nor has the North Korean campaign of political subversion demonstrated much effectiveness. There are perhaps several hundred clandestine Communist agents in the country (and almost certainly many more Communists and Communist sympathizers), but they seem to have made no significant progress in subverting the population or in penetrating the higher levels of the government and the military.

15. *International Relations.* South Korea has also made gains on the international scene in recent years. Most important was the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan, which opened the way for massive injections of Japanese economic aid. But to the North Korean leadership, the implications of the ROK-Japanese agreement far exceeded the likely economic gains to South Korea. At a minimum, it meant a reduced Japanese interest in mollifying North Korea or assisting its economy.⁶ More important, in the North Korean view, it would lead inevitably to increased Japanese political influence in South Korea

⁶ In 1966, Japan gave notice of its decision not to renew a 1959 agreement with North Korea under which some 86,000 Korean residents of Japan had been helped to migrate to North Korea. During 1966 and 1967, North Korean economic delegations found it increasingly difficult to enter Japan; as a result, at least one important deal, for the sale of an acrylic fiber plant to North Korea, fell through.

and, possibly, to a ROK-Japanese military alignment.⁷ The North has been less fortunate in its international dealings. While it began to achieve some diplomatic recognition by non-Communist states in 1963 and 1964, recent gains of this sort have been few.

B. The Vietnamese War

16. The war in Vietnam is probably the proximate cause of the North Korean shift to tactics of violence against South Korea.⁸ In early 1965, with the beginning of regular US bombing of North Vietnam and the dispatch of 2,000 non-combatant ROK troops to South Vietnam, the conflict there came to occupy a central place in Pyongyang's thinking. In July, about the time that US ground combat troops began to arrive in South Vietnam in force and Seoul announced that it would dispatch a full combat division, Kim Il-song adopted the line that Vietnam had become "the focal point" in the world struggle. At the party conference of October 1966, Kim went further and called upon Communists everywhere to get tough with the US in order to "disperse" its forces. He urged the necessity of destroying, in Vietnam, "illusions" about American strength and reliability. He stated that if this were accomplished, it would constitute a clear setback for the Pak government and a powerful boost for Communist prospects in the South. (Conversely, in Pyongyang's view, if Hanoi did not succeed in unifying Vietnam on Communist terms, prospects for eventual unification of Korea on South Korean terms might be enhanced.)

17. Pyongyang has also been apprehensive that the conflict in Southeast Asia might spread to China and thence ultimately to Korea. In 1950, the North enjoyed the relatively unstinted support of both Moscow and Peking. In 1967, though it still has security pacts with both, Pyongyang has become less certain what their response would be in the event of a wider war involving Korea. It would count on help from the USSR and China if North Korea were invaded. But it sees Moscow, as in Cuba and Vietnam, unwilling to confront the US directly or, indeed, to sacrifice what Pyongyang considers a policy of Soviet detente with the West. It is concerned over the failure of Communist China and the USSR to close ranks in support of Hanoi. And it must regard China, in the throes of the Cultural Revolution, as something short of a wholly reliable ally. These considerations may underlie North Korea's adoption during 1966 of policies emphasizing self-reliance, including a military strategy of "protracted" guerrilla warfare which requires among other things a buildup in local militia forces.

⁷ Concern on this count is heightened by such political developments as Japan's decision in 1966 to join the South Korean-sponsored, anti-Communist Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC); and by the talks in Seoul between high-level representatives of the US, Japan, the GRC, and the ROK on the occasion of President Pak's inauguration in July 1967.

⁸ Brig. Gen. Wesley C. Franklin, the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that this sentence overemphasizes the war in Vietnam as a cause for increased North Korean violence against the South. He also believes that the sentence is misleading in that it indicates a North Korean *shift* to tactics of violence when in fact they have used violent tactics along the DMZ since 1953.

18. The North Korean regime is also disturbed at the thought that tens of thousands of ROK troops are gaining combat experience in South Vietnam. It is aware of the increased military aid which the ROK is receiving from the US as a consequence of its service in Vietnam. And it is conscious of the prestige accruing to the Pak government at home and abroad as a result of the good performance of the South Korean expeditionary force. The tone and content of Kim's speech in October 1966, coupled with other official and private North Korean statements in 1966, make it apparent that the leadership of the regime is embarrassed by its failure to forestall the dispatch of ROK troops to South Vietnam and its inability to provide substantial material assistance to Hanoi.⁹

19. We believe that North Korea undertook its program of violence of its own volition, not under pressure from either Moscow or Peking. Whether or not Peking would like to become involved in Korean affairs at this moment, its influence with the Pyongyang regime is severely limited. Moscow is probably content to accept Pyongyang's initiatives, with the understanding that North Korea will move cautiously, avoiding acts likely to trigger major retaliatory attacks. The Soviets probably have no desire to risk a major conflict on their Far Eastern borders.

III. CAPABILITIES AND PROSPECTS

A. Capabilities

20. *For Conventional Operations.* We do not believe that North Korea's new tactics indicate a present intention to invade the South. The North Korean armed forces could not mount a sustained attack against the South without a large volume of material help from outside, including substantial troop reinforcements (presumably from China). Under present circumstances, neither Peking nor Moscow is likely to provide the sort of support which would be required. Moreover, so long as Pyongyang believes that the US will defend South Korea, including retaliatory air attacks on the North, it would be extremely reluctant to attack.¹⁰

21. *For Infiltration.* For the short term, the number of trained North Korean personnel immediately available for infiltration into the South depends principally on two factors: the length of the training cycle at the new bases and camps, and of more immediate significance, the extent to which regular military units, particularly the Reconnaissance Brigade, could be tapped for experienced per-

⁹ Material assistance from North Korea to Hanoi has been modest. There have been some shipments of small arms, transport and construction equipment, and probably some medical supplies, clothing, and rice. Some machinery and tools may also have been provided along with a number of technicians. Without publicity, it has provided about 40 North Korean jet fighter pilots for defensive patrols (and on-the-job training) in the Hanoi area. There are probably also some North Korean military advisers and instructors in North Vietnam, and there may be some in South Vietnam.

¹⁰ Annex A is a brief evaluation of North Korean military capabilities with respect to South Korea.

sonnel. But regardless of the number of trained personnel available, the primary problem in the conduct of North Korean guerrilla operations in the South would be provision for their sustenance and survival within South Korea.

22. The physical environment in South Korea provides some advantages for guerrillas. One of them is the 1,500-mile-long coastline with its thousands of small islands, many uninhabited. This makes infiltration and supply by sea relatively easy. Another potential guerrilla asset is the predominance of rugged terrain. On the other hand, vegetation in these highlands is generally sparse and concealment difficult in winter when freezing weather makes even survival a problem. During the warmer seasons, vegetation is dense only in the most inaccessible mountains; elsewhere, ground movement is comparatively easy to observe from the air. Such physical factors contributed to the failure of Communist guerrilla movements in South Korea in 1949 and 1951-1952.

23. In its operations against infiltration teams, the South Korean Government has other advantages. The Communists can count on assistance from established agents (including radio communicators), Communist sympathizers, and in some cases, relatives. But the overwhelming majority of South Koreans are unlikely to assist the Communists in any way. There is widespread dislike of communism and Communists, based on bitter memories of the Korean War. In addition, there are broad anti-Communist laws, rigidly enforced; even suspicions must be reported. Another major ROK asset is the long and apparently successful experience of its intelligence and security forces in countering Communist subversion.

24. Government security forces were alerted at least a year ago to the implications of the planned changes in Communist tactics. In late 1966, a Combined Command Center (CCC) was established in Seoul under the leadership of the ROK Central Intelligence Agency to improve coordination between military and police forces in operations against Communist agents in rear areas. Provincial subcenters were established. The CCC also became a clearinghouse for intelligence on all forms of infiltration.

25. In 1966, too, the Korean National Police (KNP) force was increased in size to about 40,000, and counter guerrilla training was instituted in certain areas. Special nine-man police "sweep teams" were created, trained, and equipped to cover potential guerrilla areas in their home districts. ROK Army Special Forces units were designated to back up the police effort. Additional boats were assigned to the KNP's coastal patrol force, and a few new coastal radars were provided. Several new patrol craft were added to the ROK Navy. The ability of military aircraft to detect infiltration by sea was enhanced. Along the DMZ there was a higher state of alert, and detection was improved by various new warning and surveillance devices, and by the construction of a complex barrier system in some sectors.

26. Despite these and other improvements, there are still important deficiencies in ROK counter guerrilla capabilities. In recent operations, the police required heavy support from the army for manpower, weapons, and transport and communication facilities. This has caused serious government concern, not only

about the consequences of diverting a substantial portion of its conventional military strength to internal security operations, but with the problem of coordinating these forces. There is a history of police-army rivalry to overcome, and it is by no means clear that the newly established CCC mechanism is doing the job. Infiltration by sea continues, in part because available patrol craft are generally not as fast nor as well armed as the boats North Korea has assigned to its sea infiltration units. There are also deficiencies, particularly among the police, in several types of communications equipment, ground and air transport, and automatic weapons.

B. Prospects

27. North Korea will almost certainly continue its campaign of military harassment in the DMZ area at current or even increased levels. The costs of these operations, both in lives and materiel, are small. Whether the actions are successful or not, they engender fear and apprehension among the South Korean people, and thus put certain pressures on the ROK Government, particularly in connection with its participation in the Vietnamese war.

28. Communist losses along the DMZ will probably increase as US and ROK training is improved and new detection and other protective devices are installed. Nonetheless, it will probably not be possible to prevent substantial casualties on the US/ROK side if the Communists remain willing to accept their losses, however high.

29. This is not to say that the Communist commitment to DMZ harassment tactics is open-ended. Just as we consider it unlikely that North Korea intends to start another Korean War, we believe it unlikely that it plans at present to escalate its DMZ attacks to a point at which open warfare might result. The North might miscalculate, however, and raise the ante along the DMZ until the ROK resolves to strike back in force. A series of actions and reactions might ensue which could lead to open hostilities.

30. Rear area infiltration of guerrilla-type teams could become a more serious problem in 1968, almost regardless of the outcome of this year's reconnaissance effort. The most vigilant naval patrol and the most efficient radar network would probably not be able to eliminate a determined effort to infiltrate teams by sea.

31. Even so, Communist prospects for establishing a base of operations for guerrilla activity are probably poor. Under present circumstances, prospects for recruitment inside South Korea are also poor. At best, the teams may survive by carrying adequate food and other supplies, and moving quickly from one temporary haven to another through remote and sparsely settled districts. While doing so, some teams will be able to carry out acts of terror and sabotage. Soon afterward, however, they could expect to become the object of intensive security operations. We do not believe, therefore, that in 1967 or 1968 North Korean teams will be able to organize guerrilla operations on a scale sufficient to undermine existing local authority.

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32. Moreover, even if the North Korean effort were to cause some local disruption, the current alternative at the national level is an opposition party whose leaders are even more vocally anti-Communist than the present government. Hence, successful political manipulation by the North of any unrest which might be generated by their activities in the South seems unlikely at this time.

33. It may be that Pyongyang itself has little expectation of achieving much success in this rear area effort. The North Koreans are aware of the odds against them in the South, the heavy investment in manpower and materiel required to initiate a "peoples' war," and the risk to their own territory should Communist guerrillas show evidence of success. It seems likely, therefore, that Pyongyang envisages rear area operations as yet another method of upsetting the political equilibrium in the South, with the added virtue of tying down large ROK forces. The North Koreans probably hope that, in time, rear area operations will yield additional dividends in the form of increased support and recruits for their existing clandestine apparatus. By thus increasing subversive capabilities, they would hope to be in a better position to exploit any new and major upset in South Korean political life.

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ANNEX

NORTH KOREAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH KOREA

1. The North Korean Army, with a strength of about 344,000, is much smaller than that of South Korea. The North Korean Navy is essentially a coastal patrol and inshore defense force. Its main offensive strength includes at least 2 "W" class submarines, 4 "KOMAR" class guided missile boats, and 39 other motor torpedo boats. There are also at least 2 cruise missile coastal defense complexes. The 4 "KOMARs" were probably provided by the USSR during 1966 under the terms of an arms pact negotiated in mid-1965.

2. The North Korean Air Force is superior to that of South Korea. It has 80 jet light bombers—IL-28/Beagles—and some 483 jet fighters—80 Mig-15/Fagots, 375 Mig-17/Frescos, and a modern aircraft inventory which probably includes 7 Mig-19/Farmers and 21 Mig-21/Fishbeds. About half of the Mig-19s and Mig-21s have probably been delivered during the past year. Since mid-1965, the number of surface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites has increased from 2 to 11, of which about half are occupied.

3. North Korea will probably continue to receive limited amounts of modern air and sea defense equipment from the USSR so long as Pyongyang remains reasonably neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict. We do not know to what extent the Soviets are replacing or augmenting North Korean heavy ground equipment—e.g., artillery and armored vehicles. It is unlikely, however, that Soviet military shipments will be large enough over the next few years to permit a significant shift in the current balance of military forces in the Korean peninsula.

4. ROK ground forces in Korea now number some 535,000; in addition, there are 2 army divisions, a marine brigade, and supporting elements—a total of almost 50,000 men—in South Vietnam. Despite the numerical advantage of the ROK ground forces, we do not believe that they or the North Koreans would enjoy superiority in the unlikely contingency of a war fought without external support for either side. The ROK Army is well trained, but much of its equipment is old and its purely indigenous logistic back-up is probably less well developed than that in the North. US logistic support would be essential to sustain ROK combat capabilities in any situation in which North Korean forces were receiving supplies from external sources.

5. The effectiveness of the ROK Air Force is limited; there is a predominance of F-86 fighters, and aircraft control and warning systems are inadequate and obsolescent. F-5 supersonic fighters are being introduced, but in the event of


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hostilities, ROK air defense would probably require augmentation by US Air Force units. The ROK Navy is primarily a coastal patrol force of about 60 ships, including 4 destroyer types, 6 fast attack transports, 10 minesweepers, 20 patrol ships, and 20 amphibious ships. There is also a marine force of about 25,000. The capabilities and confidence of ROK forces are bolstered by the presence of approximately 48,000 US military personnel, including 2 US infantry divisions.



**KOREA
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SNIE 14.2-67
29 February 1968

Cy 11 2 To Gordon

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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 14.2-67

North Korean Intentions and Capabilities
With Respect to South Korea

Submitted by

Richard Helms

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by the

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

As indicated overleaf

29 February 1968

Authenticated:

James A. Layton
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OSIB

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 93-507, NLJ 00-278, NLJ/RAC 01-84
By *SJ*, NARA, Date 11-8-01

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Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, the Director, National Security Agency

Abstaining:

Mr. Howard C. Brown, the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission and Mr. William O. Cregar, for the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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NORTH KOREAN INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH KOREA, dated 21 September 1967

1. Events since last September tend to confirm the conclusions of SNIE 14.2-67, that North Korean activities will include a campaign of military harassment in the DMZ area, continued attempts to infiltrate guerrilla teams, and the dispatch of terrorist and sabotage missions. The raid on the Blue House represents the most dramatic and flagrant manifestation of the campaign begun in late 1966 to disrupt political order in South Korea, to tie down large ROK forces, and to encourage insurgency in the South. North Korean handling of the *Pueblo* crisis reflects an intention to heighten tensions and exploit US preoccupations with Vietnam. Kim Il-song's recent speeches indicate he is still determined to maintain a bellicose posture.

2. These developments have hardened Seoul's attitude and increased the likelihood of a major ROK reaction to North Korean harassments. The North Koreans probably believe that the US will impose restraints on the ROK and will be reluctant to escalate its own responses in Korea. The North Koreans now probably see great and continuing opportunities to exacerbate relations between Seoul and Washington.

3. We continue to believe that Pyongyang realizes that an intensification of incidents and attacks could escalate to the point of open warfare. We still estimate, however, that North Korea does not plan to invade South Korea and will not deliberately provoke hostilities on a scale which would amount to a resumption of the war.

4. Nevertheless, the general situation in Korea is more dangerous than it was last fall, since the possibilities of miscalculation are greater. The North Korean attitude is more openly truculent than at any time since 1953. The raid against the Presidential residence indicates that the North Koreans are willing to run high risks; they must have been aware that assassination of President Pak would have provoked a major ROK retaliation. They may be counting heavily on US preoccupation with Vietnam, and on the deterrent value of their own mutual defense treaties with China and the Soviet Union.

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5. We believe that North Korea is pursuing an independent policy. Pyongyang probably does not consult with Moscow and Peking on the tactical development of its policy against the ROK and the US. North Korea's relations with China are cool, and thus Peking's influence is quite limited. In any event, we believe Peking does not want to be involved in a new Korean War at this juncture. As for the USSR, recent events have probably forced it to pay somewhat more attention to developments in Korea. We believe that the USSR does not want a major war in the area. In the event of a crisis in Korea, the Soviets would probably be reluctant to apply immediate pressures on Pyongyang, lest they jeopardize the position they have built up there. And in any case their influence would not necessarily be decisive. However, we believe that if major hostilities seemed imminent the USSR would try to exert some restraint over North Korea.

6. Additional evidence since our last estimate suggests that North Korea will continue its efforts to establish guerrilla bases in the South. But we believe that their prospects for success in this endeavor remain poor.

7. We now believe that the North Korean Navy has at least four "W"-class submarines, at least seven "KOMAR"-class guided missile boats and associated Styx missiles, and two "SHERSHEN"-class fast patrol boats. Eighteen surface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites, 14 of which are occupied, have been identified. Otherwise, the general level of equipment and strength of the North Korean forces is as described in Annex I of SNIE 14.2-67.

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SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 14.2-68

The Likelihood of Major Hostilities in Korea

Submitted by

Richard Helms

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by the

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

As indicated overleaf

16 May 1968

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James D. Layton
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USIB

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Concurring:

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Mr. George C. Denney, Jr., for the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

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Abstaining:

Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, for the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission and Mr. William O. Cregar, for the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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THE LIKELIHOOD OF MAJOR HOSTILITIES IN KOREA

CONCLUSIONS

A. We believe that, under present circumstances, Pyongyang does not intend to invade South Korea. Nor do we believe that, at least for the next year or so, Pyongyang will take actions that it considers involve high risk of provoking a new Korean War.

B. We do believe, however, that Pyongyang is engaged in a determined effort to apply its own version of the doctrine of "peoples' war": to provoke incidents along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and to carry out terrorist attacks throughout the South in hopes of creating a situation which would, in time, shake the ROK Government's control of the nation.

C. Pyongyang might be tempted to go well beyond incidents along the DMZ; e.g., it might attempt to seize and hold a piece of territory south of the DMZ or stage a raid into South Korea with fairly large forces. In general, however, we believe that Pyongyang would consider such moves too risky, especially any attempt to hold South Korean territory.

D. Hence, in the short term, the principal danger is that of miscalculation; i.e., that the North Koreans will press so hard that Seoul will order large-scale retaliation. In this case, Pyongyang would be likely to respond with commensurate force, and there would be an increasing chance of escalation into major hostilities.

DISCUSSION

1. The seizure of the *Pueblo* and the attack on the presidential mansion in Seoul, both in late January 1968, were followed by a period of relative quiet. Since mid-April, however, North Korean harassment and infiltration in the area of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) has intensified, and it appears that saboteurs have again been active in Seoul. With the advent of favorable weather, we expect guerrilla teams to begin moving down the coasts of South Korea in a

renewed effort to establish bases in the mountainous hinterland. On the propaganda front, the bellicose line adopted by North Korean Premier Kim Il-song at the October 1966 Korean Labor Party Conference has been maintained, with somewhat greater truculence since the *Pueblo* incident. It is apparent, therefore, that we are entering another cycle of North Korea's campaign of violence and intimidation against the ROK.

2. We have reviewed the available evidence and concluded once again that, under present circumstances, Pyongyang does not intend to invade South Korea. Nor do we believe that, at least for the next year or so, Pyongyang will take actions that it considers involve high risk of provoking a new Korean War. This judgment rests in part on our view of how North Korea would assess its prospects in a new war. Despite the emphasis on modernizing its armed forces, on training reserves and increasing local militia, and on the protection of key installations against air attack, Pyongyang almost certainly would not expect to overrun South Korea or to escape serious damage in the North. The ROK Army is superior in numbers; Pyongyang would almost certainly consider that the presence of US forces virtually assured their participation and their reinforcement if necessary; and North Korea itself would require material support, and probably manpower, from China or the USSR.¹ Thus, any plans for a deliberate attack leading to a renewal of the Korean War would require the assurance of support from the USSR, China, or both. Under present circumstances, it is extremely doubtful that Pyongyang would receive any assurances in advance from either Communist power that the support required for a large-scale conflict in South Korea would be available.

3. More directly, we do not see indications of preparations of the nature and scope we would expect to see if North Korea were planning war or expected it in the near future. There is, for example, no evidence—in this nation of chronic shortages—of unusually large imports of food or medicines, or other unusual international transactions. There have been rumors of increased draft calls, mobilization of reserves, unusual troop movements and deployments, and the buildup of stockpiles near the DMZ, but none of these or similar indicators of impending large-scale action are supported by reliable evidence. The “war is coming” tone of letters from North Korea to Japan appears to reflect official propaganda; such letters almost certainly suit the regime's purposes since all outgoing mail is carefully censored. Finally, if North Korea were planning a surprise attack, it would seem unwise to foment tension and keep the ROK and the US on the alert.

4. Nor do we believe that the North Koreans are trying to provoke the ROK into a resumption of major hostilities. Pyongyang might hope thus to activate its defense treaties with China and the USSR, and also to avoid condemnation by world opinion. But we do not believe that the North Korean leaders would expect either the USSR or Communist China to cooperate in a “counterattack” that could overrun the South.

¹ See Annex: North and South Korean Forces.

5. We do believe, however, that Pyongyang is engaged in a determined effort to create the conditions for a "peoples' war" in South Korea. We also believe that Pyongyang currently rates the risks of this enterprise as not very high. The North Koreans probably view the US involvement in Vietnam and the resultant discord in the US as limiting the military capabilities and the will of the US to support any serious ROK retaliatory ventures against the North. US restraint in the *Pueblo* affair probably strengthened this view, and North Korean intelligence probably has a reasonably accurate picture of Washington's pressures on the ROK to forgo strong retaliatory measures in the Blue House and other affairs.

6. Thus, Pyongyang probably feels reasonably safe in creating incidents along the DMZ and in carrying out terrorist attacks throughout South Korea. These serve to give some credence at home to its claims of "imperialist aggression" and a developing resistance movement in the South. Pyongyang also intends them to embarrass and distract the ROK Government and to cause a loss of confidence in its leaders which could, in time, loosen their control of the nation. Meanwhile, these actions have caused some misunderstanding and strains between the ROK and the US.

7. Pyongyang might be tempted to go well beyond incidents along the DMZ. It might, for example, attempt to seize and hold a piece of territory south of the DMZ or stage a raid into South Korea with fairly large forces. We do not entirely rule out such actions. They would depend on how Pyongyang judged the probable reactions of the US and ROK. In general, however, we believe that Pyongyang would consider such moves as too risky, especially any attempt to hold South Korean territory.

8. Kim's present course of action vis-a-vis South Korea dates from 1966, although some indications of long-range preparations for intensified action were visible earlier. After several years of economic difficulty at home and consistent failure to capitalize on political unrest in the South, the frustrated Kim attempted to inject some dynamism into his regime by securing tighter control over the government and driving the population to greater efforts in its behalf. He seems to have succeeded in pruning much of what he considered deadwood from the government, the party, the military, and the economy; a series of low-keyed purges has reduced his leadership group to a handful of trusted comrades; and Kim has demanded and is receiving personal adulation on an unprecedented scale.

9. Public participation in the regime's many new programs has been fostered (along with acceptance of hardships) by nationalistic exhortations to prepare for "the foremost revolutionary task"—i.e., a Communist takeover of the South and reunification on Pyongyang's terms. In Kim's doctrine, the success of the revolutionary struggle in the South requires parallel efforts to build up the revolutionary base in the North, to improve its economy so that it will impress the southerners, and to strengthen its defense against the day when reactionary forces in the South, in desperation, strike northward. It is apparent that to make this line credible requires, at a minimum, some evidence of revolutionary struggle in the South and a demonstrably aggressive enemy along the DMZ. War tensions

apparently prevailing among the northerners are evidence that the regime has achieved some degree of success in its indoctrination program.

10. This does not mean that North Korea will be satisfied with the mere semblance of a revolution in the South. Pyongyang's violent actions in 1967, coupled with its longstanding campaign of political subversion in South Korea, attest to the seriousness of its purpose. But Pyongyang probably has little expectation of developing a revolutionary movement in the South in the near term. North Korean theoreticians tend to emphasize the inadequate basis for revolutionary action in the South and the time and energy required to develop one. Thus, the leadership probably views its current efforts as part of a long-term campaign to upset the political equilibrium in the South, meanwhile strengthening in some measure the existing Communist clandestine apparatus there.

11. It is possible that North Korean leaders have persuaded themselves that political and military conditions in the US and in Korea, as well as in Vietnam, make this year the best time for a radical intensification of this revolutionary strategy. In our view, however, North Korea is not committed to any particular sequence of moves nor to any firm timetable. Pyongyang's propaganda, in contrast to the statements of captured North Korean infiltrators, has invariably been vague on timing; the phrase most frequently used is "within our generation." The North Korean plan of action appears similarly flexible; ROK and US defense measures and other responses, and the demonstrated effectiveness of various types of North Korean operations are the prime considerations. At any rate, to serve Pyongyang's current strategy, the campaign of violence need only continue; there seems to be no requirement for escalation to the level of major hostilities.

12. In this situation, the principal danger in the short term is one of miscalculation—i.e., that North Korea, in the process of probing ROK and US resolve, will overplay its hand and that an increasingly exasperated President Pak will order large-scale retaliation. Pyongyang's response in this situation would be difficult to predict with any degree of confidence. On the one hand, the North Koreans might feel that they had to accept the ROK retaliation because, at this juncture, the risk of major hostilities would seem too high. It seems more likely, however, that they would feel compelled to respond with commensurate force. Though North Korea would probably stop short of actions certain to provoke a full-scale war, the proximity of hostile armies would make the situation highly volatile and war could result.

13. In such a crisis, decisions in Pyongyang and Seoul on any further moves would probably be affected, and perhaps decisively, by the attitudes and advice of their major allies. In our view, neither the USSR nor Communist China would consider a war in Korea to be in its interest. Without flatly refusing Pyongyang all military support, they would probably encourage North Korea to limit hostilities.

14. *The Longer Term.* In any case, a tense and risky situation is likely to continue in Korea well beyond the one year period of this estimate. Kim Il-song

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is a relatively young man; he appears to be in firm control in the North; and his hard-line views are likely to hold sway there for many years. Of critical importance will be the ability of the ROK people over the years to stand united against Communist subversion, and the ability of ROK forces to cope effectively with North Korean harassments. ROK confidence in the face of these long-term threats will depend heavily on the US posture in the Far East.

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ANNEX

NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN FORCES

1. The North Korean Army has a strength of about 345,000. It is probably at full strength, with a larger proportion in combat units than US/ROK forces have. North Korean troops are disciplined, highly trained, and alert. By their standards they are probably combat-ready. We do not know to what extent, if any, their heavy ground equipment is currently being replaced or augmented by the Soviets. With the exception of assault rifles and some new rockets, Soviet-designed weapons of World War II continue to predominate. Present stockpiles appear sufficient to support offensive action for at least a month.

2. The South Korean Army has some 532,000 personnel and the marine force numbers about 31,500. Of the total forces, some 50,000 are in Vietnam. ROK units are limited by old equipment, shortages of spare parts, and very austere supply levels. The two US divisions in Korea are under strength and not rated as having attained combat-ready status.

3. On balance, we estimate that neither side has the ability to conduct a sustained attack (i.e., for six months) or achieve a decisive advantage without substantial outside logistical support.

4. The North Korean Air Force could provide a strong defense against air attack. It has some 450 jet fighters—380 Mig-15/17s, 7 Mig-19s, and at least 60 Mig-21s. Almost all of the Mig-21s have probably been delivered over the past two years. Over the past three years, the number of surface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites has increased from 2 to 20. There are also 80 IL-28 jet light bombers, which, with its fighters, provide North Korea an offensive capability unmatched by the ROK Air Force. The ROKs have about 200 fighter aircraft, predominantly F-86s, but about 60 F-5 supersonic fighters have been introduced. The ROK Air Force has been heavily reinforced since the *Pueblo* incident by the basing of some 150 US supersonic jet fighters in South Korea.

5. The North Korean Navy is essentially a coastal patrol and inshore defense force. Its main offensive strength includes at least 4 "W"-class submarines, at least 7 "Komar"-class guided missile boats and associated Styx missiles, and 3 "Shershen"-class fast patrol boats. The "Komars" and "Shershens" have probably been provided by the USSR over the past two years or so. North Korea also has 39 other motor torpedo boats, and there are at least 2 cruise missile coastal defense complexes. The ROK Navy is also primarily a coastal patrol force; it has about 60 ships, including 4 destroyer types, 6 fast attack transports, 10 minesweepers, 20 patrol ships, and 20 amphibious ships.

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