



EMBASSY  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
New Delhi, India

EH  
What do you  
think?  
w/

~~SECRET~~

April 24, 1968

Honorable Walt W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

South Asia  
Gen

Dear Walt:

I am enclosing a memorandum I have just sent to the Secretary on the subject of our military supply policy in South Asia. I believe it is vital to our long-range interests that we re-examine our policy while there is still room for maneuver.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosure

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 7/16/02

11a

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

To: The Secretary of State April 25, 1968

From: Chester Bowles

Subject: U. S. MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY FOR  
INDIA AND PAKISTAN

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I. INTRODUCTION

During recent years this Mission, the State Department and the Pentagon have exchanged dozens of messages concerning U. S. military supply policy for India and Pakistan.

After the Indo-Pak war in 1965 the Department, in consultation with other interested agencies, reassessed our policy and in April 1967 announced the ground rules under which we presently operate. As I have watched our current policy in action I have become increasingly convinced that on balance it does not promote either the short or long-range interests of the United States in Asia.

I recommend, therefore, that we again reassess our military assistance approach while we still have room for maneuver.

This memorandum constitutes our contribution to such a review. In it we shall seek to define our goals in this part of the world, evaluate past and present military assistance programs, examine possible alternatives and offer a series of specific proposals that we feel may lead to a more workable and realistic approach.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 07-6  
By jal, NARA, Date 6-28-07

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II. SUMMARY

- A. Although a formal Indo-Pak rapprochement is not now in the cards, tensions between the two nations have recently diminished; Kosygin's visit to Pakistan and India was probably helpful in this regard.
- B. Neither India nor Pakistan now feels that a military showdown is necessary or desirable.
- C. The main security threat to the subcontinent is that of China to India.
- D. The impression that India and Pakistan are engaged in a skyrocketing arms race is not borne out by the facts.
- E. Our objectives in South Asia are:
- (1) A politically stable and economically viable India and Pakistan with military establishments limited to actual security needs;
  - (2) A lessening of India's military dependence on Russia and Pakistan's on China;
  - (3) The reestablishment in so far as possible of a cooperative USG relationship with the military in both India and Pakistan; and
  - (4) Assistance in countering the growing insurgency campaigns, fostered by the Chinese, on India's eastern borders.
- F. These objectives cannot be achieved either by our current military supply policy or by the various alternatives which have been suggested.
- G. In the present context, the policy which is most likely to serve U.S. interests should include the following ingredients:
- (1) Make every effort to unlink India and Pakistan in our political-military thinking.

- (2) Encourage India's growing emphasis on its relationships with East and Southeast Asia; likewise Pakistan's increasing interest in West Asia.
- (3) Continue to sell spare parts to both countries in order to keep presently-held American equipment in operating condition.
- (4) Refuse to sell, either directly or through third countries, lethal end items.
- (5) Reduce India's military dependence on the USSR and Pakistan's dependence on China by increased emphasis on indigenous defense-development production in both countries.
- (6) Recognize the Chinese threat and assure India and Pakistan that on the basis of the UN Charter we shall come to their assistance should they be threatened by the Chicom.
- (7) Sharply expand U.S. training for subcontinent military personnel.
- (8) Offer to share our hard-won counterinsurgency experience with India and Pakistan.
- (9) Provide the Indian military with the non-lethal equipment and techniques which are required effectively to counter the present Chinese-supported insurgency in Eastern India.
- (10) Continue our efforts to make available our latest cost-effectiveness techniques.
- (11) Reiterate to both countries our interest in their holding their military expenditures to the actual requirements of national security.
- (12) Decide what we feel is a legitimate percentage of GNP that can be allotted to military expenditures in each country without jeopardizing development and privately explain our decision to both.

### III. HISTORICAL SETTING

We cannot deal effectively with our present dilemma in South Asia unless we keep in mind the events which created the dilemma. Consequently, we should begin this reassessment with a review of our South Asian military assistance policies during the last fifteen years.

A. In the mid-1950's the Eisenhower Administration was greatly concerned about the possibility of a Soviet move towards the Persian Gulf or into Afghanistan. As part of its plan to counter such a development the USG provided Pakistan, between 1954 and 1965, with more than \$800 million worth of military equipment, most of it on a grant basis.

As a political price for this decision, we accepted a general deterioration of our relationship with India.

Our public rationale was (1) that India could have the same military relationship with us for the asking and (2) that the arms we gave Pakistan would only be used defensively, and in the U.S. national interest, against Russia or China.

B. Despite our build-up of the Pakistan army and air force, India did not face up to the need for substantially stronger and better equipped armed forces until 1962, when the total inadequacy of the Indian defense system was revealed by the Chinese attack in October of that year.

C. In early 1964 the Indians put together a five-year plan for the modernization of their army and air force and asked the U.S. to become the primary supplier, through grants, sales, and assistance to indigenous production, of the needed equipment. As a quid pro quo India made it clear it would refrain from obtaining any further significant military assistance from within the Communist Bloc.

It was only after the United States Government refused this role in modernizing the Indian defense system that India, in August

1964, reluctantly turned to the Soviet Union as a major supplier of arms. Since then the Soviets have provided or promised to provide India with approximately \$700 million worth of military equipment while we have supplied arms worth only \$47 million to India during the same time period.

D. In 1965 India and Pakistan fought a short but costly war. Although differing convictions exist within the USG as to which nation was primarily responsible, one fact is clear: all of India's casualties and equipment losses were inflicted by American military hardware which we had repeatedly stated would never be used against India.

Although Indo-American ties were severely strained, the damage was curtailed by a series of factors. These included: our mutual commitment to free societies and to democratic institutions; the appreciation of most Indians for our prompt action three years earlier in support of India against China; the close personal relationships between many Indians and Americans working in government, private corporations, and foundations; and the highly effective efforts of USIS over a period of many years to create a bridge of understanding.

E. In 1965, when we placed a moratorium on further arms assistance to both countries, India responded by sharply increasing its then minimal arms relationship with the Soviets, while Pakistan followed a similar course with the Chinese.

F. In 1967 we announced our present military supply policy, which is based on what we accept as valid goals (i.e., discouraging an arms race, diverting all possible resources to economic development, etc.). However, in practice this new policy as it is now administered:

- (1) removes us so far from the role of active supplier that our influence over the military procurement policies of both countries is minimal, and yet

(2) leaves us involved to the extent that our bilateral relationships with both India and Pakistan are continually subjected to irritation and charges of mutual bad faith. The resulting distrust exacerbates Indo-Pak tensions and the relations of each nation with the United States Government.

#### IV. AN EVALUATION

On balance I think it fair to say that the military supply policy of the United States Government to India and Pakistan from 1954 to 1965 was a major political and military failure, while the modified version that we adopted a year ago has failed and will continue to fail in its basic objectives. The following points support this judgment:

- A. Our arming of Pakistan before 1965 compounded the existing mistrust between Pakistan and India and lessened whatever hope there might have been of reaching an agreement on outstanding issues.
- B. In the meantime, the Indians were bitterly disappointed by our refusal to help provide them with the substantially more modern military program which in May 1964 we agreed they needed to cope with another Chinese attack. Our refusal to act led them to believe that they had no alternative but to turn to the Soviets, which they did not begin to do in a significant way until August 1964. Our negative reaction to their request particularly disappointed the Indian military, which had always been strongly pro-West.
- C. When the Indo-Pak war broke out in August 1965 we were faced with a bitter reaction in both countries. Pakistan, disappointed at the failure of their "American ally" to support them against India, turned sharply against the United States, while India felt that we had walked out on our repeated assurances that we would not allow the United States equipment which we had provided to Pakistan to be used against them.

D. Our revised policy of April 1967 has failed to achieve its objectives in both countries. The Indians believe that our decision to provide spare parts greatly favors Pakistan while the Paks charge that we are renegeing on a prior commitment.

#### V. THE PRESENT SITUATION

As I see it, these are the realities now facing us on the subcontinent:

A. Although some progress has been made on secondary issues, the major point of disagreement between India and Pakistan, i.e. Kashmir, is not immediately soluble.

B. India does not expect an armed attack from Pakistan, except possibly in conjunction with an aggressive move by the Chinese. In spite of their public statements, I suspect that responsible Pakistanis realize that India has nothing to gain by an attack on Pakistan and that such an attack is the only conceivable development which could produce a common reaction from the U.S., USSR and China. As this situation becomes better understood we believe there is a reasonable prospect for a gradual improvement in relations between India and Pakistan.

C. The factor which could most easily upset the peace of South Asia is China. The Chinese are now capable of a conventional military attack against India, significantly stronger than that of 1962, through the Himalayan passes and North Burma. Much more likely, however, is a concerted campaign to promote "wars of national liberation" in North Burma, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and Eastern India; indeed, in some areas such an effort is already in its early stages.

D. Against either of these Chinese threats, the Indian armed forces, now and in the foreseeable future, constitute the most effective available counterforce. We should not allow this fact to be obscured by the USSR's "special relationship" as India's primary source of military supplies, a relationship which the Indians did not seek.

E. In our view the widespread impression in Congress and within the Administration that India and Pakistan have already embarked on a "wild arms race" at the expense of their economic development will not stand close analysis.

India's military expenditures in real terms and as a percentage of its GNP are actually less today than four years ago. If the Indian defense budget remains roughly at its present level and a reasonable rate of economic growth is maintained, India's military expenditures as a percentage of its GNP will drop from the present 3.4 per cent to about 2.7 per cent by 1970.

In view of the active Chinese threat which confronts India over a long border, it cannot be persuasively argued under these circumstances that India is now "over-armed."

As for Pakistan, the percentage of GNP now going to military defense, although somewhat higher than that of India, is no more than that of Iran or Turkey and significantly less than several other nations in a similarly exposed position; Pakistan's defense budget in real and absolute terms has also declined.

F. While the U.S. position in both Pakistan and India is still strong it is becoming increasingly vulnerable.

In India, the positive factors that enabled us to salvage our relationship after the 1965 Pak-Indian war are still operative. Yet it would be sheer folly to underestimate the skill and vigor with which the Soviets are working to undermine our position and to expand their influence not only within the government but throughout Indian society.

Unless we can reverse this trend there is a real danger that within a very few years India, with its vast military and economic potential, and with one-seventh of the world's population will to all intents and purposes be a recognized member of the Soviet Bloc.

The leverage provided by India's present dependence on the USSR for military equipment is only one factor in this worrisome trend.

In the information and cultural fields the Soviets outspend us by a large margin; they use the internal Communist Party to erode our credibility and to discredit our developmental aid; they remind Indians of their traditional support on the Kashmir issue within the Security Council; they seize on such developments as the assassination of Martin Luther King, the Vietnam war, and the CIA "revelations" to create public and official resentment against the U.S.

When Kosygin visited India in January 1968 an agreement was reached on a long-range development program that will enable the Soviets greatly to strengthen their position. This agreement added a Soviet guarantee to purchase whatever may be required to keep Soviet-built industrial plants in India operating on a three-shift basis; it also provides for a limited integration of the Indian economic planning apparatus with that of the Soviets.

In this massive effort to undermine the U.S. position in India the Soviets are receiving a major assist from the well-publicized Congressional opposition to foreign assistance, which has been compounded by the uncertain implications of the Conte-Long-Symington Amendments.

Statements in the United States Senate questioning the extent of American commitments abroad have persuaded even many pro-American Indians that the United States would not again come to India's assistance against China. More and more the USSR is being looked upon as the nation most likely to support India in case of a Chinese attack.

#### VI. U.S. OBJECTIVES IN SOUTH ASIA

Before considering various courses of action in regard to military assistance we should define, with due regard to the factors which I have outlined previously, what we are striving to accomplish in South Asia.

- A. Our primary long-range objective in the subcontinent is the continued independence of a politically stable and economically viable India and Pakistan which can ultimately be persuaded to play a more effective role in promoting political stability and economic progress in Asia.
- B. The achievement of this objective requires very substantial U.S. support for economic development in both countries and, on their part, a corresponding restraint on military expenditures that unreasonably divert scarce resources from development.
- C. Although we cannot settle the differences between India and Pakistan, we should avoid as far as possible any action that exacerbates these differences.
- D. Although we cannot at this stage supplant the Soviets as a major supplier of equipment to India, our policies should be designed steadily to lessen India's military dependence on Russia and Pakistan's involvement with Communist China.
- E. By every appropriate means we should attempt to restore our seriously damaged relationships with the military leadership of India, and the politico-military leadership of Pakistan.
- F. We should take every action we can without disturbing the Pakistanis to help India effectively to cope with the only likely military threat to the subcontinent, i.e., Chinese-organized insurgency on the northeast Indian frontier and in the northern areas of Burma which, if successful, might eventually evolve into a conventional military campaign.

## VII. THE ALTERNATIVES

Against this background, let us consider the pros and cons of various military supply policy alternatives.

- A. Continuation of Current Policy: To some extent this policy restrains both Indian and Pakistani military equipment acquisitions from the U.S. and from third countries in which the U.S. has the

right of approval for resale of certain military items.

However, since several other sources of military equipment over which we have no control are available to both countries, our present policy cannot prevent either nation from increasing its military purchases and thereby creating a new imbalance.

In addition, whenever we approve the purchase of military equipment from a third country under our licensing arrangements the onus (often with a covert assist from the third country's representatives in New Delhi and presumably in Rawalpindi) is put squarely on us and consequently is interpreted by the non-recipient as an unfriendly and biased U.S. action.

Pakistan's concern over the U.S. approval of the sale of Hawker-Hunters to India was very real and so is the current Indian reaction in Parliament, the press, and within the Government of India to U.S. concurrence in the sale of M-47 tanks from Italy to Pakistan. These emotional reactions, however unreasonable they may seem to us, militate against a relaxation of tensions in the subcontinent.

Moreover, our ability to deal persuasively with these reactions is strictly limited by security requirements, i.e., we are inhibited from explaining frankly to the non-recipient nation precisely how our case-by-case decision on a particular transaction operates to limit the military expansion of the other side and hence provides additional funds for its development. Even when we are able privately to explain some of the rationale to the non-recipient government, it is necessarily on a confidential basis which does not permit that government to dampen down resentment against us in Parliament and the press.

Our present policy does not reduce Indian military dependence on the Soviet Union; on the contrary, it increases this dependence and further erodes our relationship with the Indian military.

B. Unlimited Cash Sales, Within the Conte-Symington Restrictions, to Both Countries: Such a policy could have a marginal positive effect on our balance of payments position. On the negative side

It would be interpreted by foreign and domestic cynics to mean that we are really not opposed to the diversion of resources from economic development as long as the military equipment is purchased in the United States. It would not lessen Soviet influence, regain the confidence of the Indian military or release us from our present unhealthy position of being held responsible by both countries for whatever military help we provide the other.

C. Credit and/or Cash Arms Sales to Both Countries Within Force Levels Set or Agreed to by US: Such a policy would also allow India and Pakistan to expand their purchases in the U. S. and hence would be similarly interpreted as a U.S. effort to profit from a South Asian arms competition.

Moreover, we would remain squarely in the middle of the conflict over the nature and extent of third country purchases, the equation of one type of armament with another and over appropriate force requirements.

Although the Indians assert their willingness to discuss force levels with the Pakistanis, their respective concepts of each other's defense requirements are so far apart that barring a common Soviet-US appeal, which is not now in the cards, a negotiated agreement on force levels appears to be a dead-end street.

If there is one lesson to be learned from the Conte exercise it is this: So long as we are not the sole supplier of arms (and in the subcontinent we are not and will not be) we cannot realistically shape and even less control either country's defense policy.

#### VIII. A NEW INTEGRATED APPROACH

Having pointed out the weaknesses of the present policy and the alternatives most frequently discussed, let us consider a somewhat different approach which has the very real advantage of falling within the general policy we announced a year ago.

A. As a first step, we should do all we can to unlink India and Pakistan in our minds and in our policy considerations. These two countries have different interests, characteristics, objectives and quite different potential contributions to make to the peace and stability of Asia. As long as we continue to equate them our military supply policy cannot serve our broader purposes in this turbulent part of the world.

Already India is looking more and more to East Asia; to Japan, Australia, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and, closer at hand, to Burma; while Pakistan, looking west, is more interested in Iran, Turkey, and the Middle East. We should, I believe, do everything we can covertly to encourage these trends.

Furthermore, the relationships between India and the USSR and Pakistan and the USSR, and all three with China, will have a far greater impact on the developing situation in Asia as a whole and the subcontinent in particular than the relationship between Pakistan and India.

When circumstances permit we might emphasize the decoupling of Pakistan and India in our policy-making by placing our military concern for India under CINCPAC and not CINCMEAFSA. When the Vietnam conflict is finally behind us we might even consider placing Pakistan in a new West Asian/North African bureau while moving India into the East Asian bureau.

B. Under our proposed new military assistance policy we would continue to sell spare parts to both nations in order to keep all American equipment, lethal and non-lethal, in operating condition. Although this is considerably more helpful to Pakistan than to India, I believe there is a strong case for maintaining the effectiveness of whatever equipment we have already provided under previous agreements.

C. We should, however, resolutely refuse under present circumstances to provide lethal end items to either country, either by direct sale or through third country licensees.

Experience has demonstrated that such transactions build mistrust and suspicion. Moreover, it requires us to involve ourselves with decisions which, no matter how conscientiously arrived at, will always be challenged by one of the two nations, resulting in further erosion of our bilateral relationships. Consequently such a ban is a basic, overriding requirement for a constructive relationship with both countries.

If, because of prior covert commitments to Pakistan with which I am not familiar, such a ban cannot now be instituted, we should be as candid as possible with the non-recipient country concerning the reasons for our "case-by-case" actions. It is essential to our future influence in South Asia to defuse the inevitable suspicion and anger that arises when either India or Pakistan feel that we are permitting the other to gain a real or imagined military advantage.

While it is too early to make a judgment, we should be alive to opportunities further to prevent Soviet penetration of the Indian Navy.

D. An important element in the proposed new policy is assistance to both nations to help them create a solid industrial base which can move them steadily toward military self-sufficiency. Loans for this dual defense-development purpose could be provided through various channels, including the AID program.

At present India is largely self-sufficient for military equipment such as clothing, jeeps, trucks, light weapons, and ammunition. It is nearing self-sufficiency in medium artillery, ammunition for these weapons, and army electronics. It is moving forward at a slower pace in tank and plane production.

Our efforts steadily to increase this capability would be warmly welcomed by the GOI, and particularly by the Indian military, which is uneasy over the fact that their imported equipment can only remain operational if the donor country provides a steady stream of spare parts. I assume that Pakistan would also welcome such assistance.

This program would speed up a process upon which the Indian Government has already embarked. Although we cannot at this late stage replace the USSR as the major arms supplier to India, we can assist India to rely primarily upon itself in the next ten years in regard to defense equipment. It is the only method by which we can limit and finally eliminate India's present military dependence on the USSR.

E. Within the limits set by the Congressional mood we should go as far as we can to assure both India and Pakistan that in accordance with the UN Charter we will strongly support either country which is attacked by the other. We should also go as far as we legally can to assure India and Pakistan of our support through the UN or otherwise if either is attacked by the Chinese. Our recent joint Soviet-US nuclear security guarantee might serve as a model.

If this modified military assistance policy should open the door adequately for informal, private defense discussions, with no commitments, vis-a-vis China we should seize the opportunity.

In this connection a reaffirmation of the Tashkent Declaration that both parties fully accept their pledge under the UN Charter to settle their disputes through peaceful means would have a positive effect.

F. We should sharply expand the training courses available in the U.S. to both Indian and Pakistani military personnel.

G. We should offer to share with India the costly experience which we have gained in fighting the Viet Cong insurgency movement. In many aspects this experience is directly relevant to the problems that India now faces along its whole eastern border. If at any stage Pakistan feels threatened by similar movements, we should provide such training for them.

H. We should also provide the Indian army and air force, on attractive terms, with whatever military equipment is appropriate to its growing insurgency problem. Such assistance need not involve lethal end items. I have in mind helicopters, fixed-wing transport aircraft, modern communications equipment, engineering equipment (roadbuilding machinery, pumps, etc.), medical supplies and techniques, reconnaissance equipment, detection devices, propaganda training and the like.

I. We should continue our efforts to make available to the Indian and Pakistan military establishments our latest techniques in cost effectiveness. The payoff will be positive not only in terms of budget savings but also in the more affirmative attitudes toward the United States of those who accept such training.

J. If our present policies are revised along these lines the basic elements should be frankly and fully explained to the Indian and Pakistan governments. At the same time, we should make it clear that while we have no intention of probing into their security relationships with other nations, we have a legitimate basis for concern in regard to the proportionate amount of national income which goes to defense.

Should we decide that 3 or 3 1/2 per cent of GNP for defense is an appropriate level for India, we should quietly inform the GOI on a private basis and then let them deal with the problem as they see fit.

### IX. CONCLUSION

I believe that a switch to the military supply policy which I have outlined for India would effectively check the present erosion of our relationship and place our political-security dialogue on a much more constructive basis.

It would be particularly effective in improving our relations with the Indian military and in quietly reestablishing the friendly, understanding atmosphere which was formerly so favorable to us.

Although it is a policy designed primarily for India, I can see no reason why it could not effectively be adapted to suit the special requirements of Pakistan.

The cost of such a program would be modest. I doubt if the total cost would run more than \$25-\$35 million annually for both Pakistan and India. However, unless the ominous realities of our present deteriorating position in India are clearly recognized by all interested USG agencies and by the Congress the necessary support will not be provided and the objectives outlined in this memorandum will not be achieved.

In the broader Asian context, an essential element is our recognition of the fact that we cannot "contain" China through a US controlled coalition of such limited powers as Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, New Zealand and Australia. No matter how much blood and money we are prepared to invest in Asia, such a narrowly based US-led effort will almost certainly lead either to an ignominious US withdrawal from Asia or to a bloody, endless war with China.

The only realistic alternative for the United States is to encourage by overt and covert means common developmental, political and even defense cooperation among the major non-Communist Asian powers -- India, Japan, Indonesia, and eventually Pakistan. Such an association, supported but not controlled by us, is our one best hope for a politically stable, economically viable, free Asia with which we can cooperate when such cooperation is appropriate.

With this objective in mind we should recognize the Indian armed forces, which are second in size only to our own among the non-Communist powers, with twelve-year enlistments, high morale and a strong determination to counter Chinese aggression, as a critically important element in the Asian balance of power and consequently a major asset to US interests in Asia.



*File*

*RM for Action 11b*

EMBASSY  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
New Delhi, India

*South Asia -*

April 24, 1968

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*Indo*

Mr. Edward Hamilton  
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MEMORANDUM

To:           The Secretary of State           April 25, 1968

From:         Chester Bowles

Subject:      U. S. MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY FOR  
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D. In 1965 India and Pakistan fought a short but costly war. Although differing convictions exist within the USG as to which nation was primarily responsible, one fact is clear: all of India's casualties and equipment losses were inflicted by American military hardware which we had repeatedly stated would never be used against India.

Although Indo-American ties were severely strained, the damage was curtailed by a series of factors. These included: our mutual commitment to free societies and to democratic institutions; the appreciation of most Indians for our prompt action three years earlier in support of India against China; the close personal relationships between many Indians and Americans working in government, private corporations, and foundations; and the highly effective efforts of USIS over a period of many years to create a bridge of understanding.

E. In 1965, when we placed a moratorium on further arms assistance to both countries, India responded by sharply increasing its then minimal arms relationship with the Soviets, while Pakistan followed a similar course with the Chinese.

F. In 1967 we announced our present military supply policy, which is based on what we accept as valid goals (i.e., discouraging an arms race, diverting all possible resources to economic development, etc.). However, in practice this new policy as it is now administered:

- (1) removes us so far from the role of active supplier that our influence over the military procurement policies of both countries is minimal, and yet

(2) leaves us involved to the extent that our bilateral relationships with both India and Pakistan are continually subjected to irritation and charges of mutual bad faith. The resulting distrust exacerbates Indo-Pak tensions and the relations of each nation with the United States Government.

#### IV. AN EVALUATION

On balance I think it fair to say that the military supply policy of the United States Government to India and Pakistan from 1954 to 1965 was a major political and military failure, while the modified version that we adopted a year ago has failed and will continue to fail in its basic objectives. The following points support this judgment:

- A. Our arming of Pakistan before 1965 compounded the existing mistrust between Pakistan and India and lessened whatever hope there might have been of reaching an agreement on outstanding issues.
- B. In the meantime, the Indians were bitterly disappointed by our refusal to help provide them with the substantially more modern military program which in May 1964 we agreed they needed to cope with another Chinese attack. Our refusal to act led them to believe that they had no alternative but to turn to the Soviets, which they did not begin to do in a significant way until August 1964. Our negative reaction to their request particularly disappointed the Indian military, which had always been strongly pro-West.
- C. When the Indo-Pak war broke out in August 1965 we were faced with a bitter reaction in both countries. Pakistan, disappointed at the failure of their "American ally" to support them against India, turned sharply against the United States, while India felt that we had walked out on our repeated assurances that we would not allow the United States equipment which we had provided to Pakistan to be used against them.

D. Our revised policy of April 1967 has failed to achieve its objectives in both countries. The Indians believe that our decision to provide spare parts greatly favors Pakistan while the Paks charge that we are reneging on a prior commitment.

#### V. THE PRESENT SITUATION

As I see it, these are the realities now facing us on the subcontinent:

A. Although some progress has been made on secondary issues, the major point of disagreement between India and Pakistan, i.e. Kashmir, is not immediately soluble.

B. India does not expect an armed attack from Pakistan, except possibly in conjunction with an aggressive move by the Chinese. In spite of their public statements, I suspect that responsible Pakistanis realize that India has nothing to gain by an attack on Pakistan and that such an attack is the only conceivable development which could produce a common reaction from the U.S., USSR and China. As this situation becomes better understood we believe there is a reasonable prospect for a gradual improvement in relations between India and Pakistan.

C. The factor which could most easily upset the peace of South Asia is China. The Chinese are now capable of a conventional military attack against India, significantly stronger than that of 1962, through the Himalayan passes and North Burma. Much more likely, however, is a concerted campaign to promote "wars of national liberation" in North Burma, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and Eastern India; indeed, in some areas such an effort is already in its early stages.

D. Against either of these Chinese threats, the Indian armed forces, now and in the foreseeable future, constitute the most effective available counterforce. We should not allow this fact to be obscured by the USSR's "special relationship" as India's primary source of military supplies, a relationship which the Indians did not seek.

E. In our view the widespread impression in Congress and within the Administration that India and Pakistan have already embarked on a "wild arms race" at the expense of their economic development will not stand close analysis.

India's military expenditures in real terms and as a percentage of its GNP are actually less today than four years ago. If the Indian defense budget remains roughly at its present level and a reasonable rate of economic growth is maintained, India's military expenditures as a percentage of its GNP will drop from the present 3.4 per cent to about 2.7 per cent by 1970.

In view of the active Chinese threat which confronts India over a long border, it cannot be persuasively argued under these circumstances that India is now "over-armed."

As for Pakistan, the percentage of GNP now going to military defense, although somewhat higher than that of India, is no more than that of Iran or Turkey and significantly less than several other nations in a similarly exposed position; Pakistan's defense budget in real and absolute terms has also declined.

F. While the U.S. position in both Pakistan and India is still strong it is becoming increasingly vulnerable.

In India, the positive factors that enabled us to salvage our relationship after the 1965 Pak-Indian war are still operative. Yet it would be sheer folly to underestimate the skill and vigor with which the Soviets are working to undermine our position and to expand their influence not only within the government but throughout Indian society.

Unless we can reverse this trend there is a real danger that within a very few years India, with its vast military and economic potential, and with one-seventh of the world's population will to all intents and purposes be a recognized member of the Soviet Bloc.

The leverage provided by India's present dependence on the USSR for military equipment is only one factor in this worrisome trend.

In the information and cultural fields the Soviets outspend us by a large margin; they use the internal Communist Party to erode our credibility and to discredit our developmental aid; they remind Indians of their traditional support on the Kashmir issue within the Security Council; they seize on such developments as the assassination of Martin Luther King, the Vietnam war, and the CIA "revelations" to create public and official resentment against the U.S.

When Kosygin visited India in January 1968 an agreement was reached on a long-range development program that will enable the Soviets greatly to strengthen their position. This agreement added a Soviet guarantee to purchase whatever may be required to keep Soviet-built industrial plants in India operating on a three-shift basis; it also provides for a limited integration of the Indian economic planning apparatus with that of the Soviets.

In this massive effort to undermine the U.S. position in India the Soviets are receiving a major assist from the well-publicized Congressional opposition to foreign assistance, which has been compounded by the uncertain implications of the Conte-Long-Symington Amendments.

Statements in the United States Senate questioning the extent of American commitments abroad have persuaded even many pro-American Indians that the United States would not again come to India's assistance against China. More and more the USSR is being looked upon as the nation most likely to support India in case of a Chinese attack.

#### VI. U.S. OBJECTIVES IN SOUTH ASIA

Before considering various courses of action in regard to military assistance we should define, with due regard to the factors which I have outlined previously, what we are striving to accomplish in South Asia.

- A. Our primary long-range objective in the subcontinent is the continued independence of a politically stable and economically viable India and Pakistan which can ultimately be persuaded to play a more effective role in promoting political stability and economic progress in Asia.
- B. The achievement of this objective requires very substantial U.S. support for economic development in both countries and, on their part, a corresponding restraint on military expenditures that unreasonably divert scarce resources from development.
- C. Although we cannot settle the differences between India and Pakistan, we should avoid as far as possible any action that exacerbates these differences.
- D. Although we cannot at this stage supplant the Soviets as a major supplier of equipment to India, our policies should be designed steadily to lessen India's military dependence on Russia and Pakistan's involvement with Communist China.
- E. By every appropriate means we should attempt to restore our seriously damaged relationships with the military leadership of India, and the politico-military leadership of Pakistan.
- F. We should take every action we can without disturbing the Pakistanis to help India effectively to cope with the only likely military threat to the subcontinent, i.e., Chinese-organized insurgency on the northeast Indian frontier and in the northern areas of Burma which, if successful, might eventually evolve into a conventional military campaign.

## VII. THE ALTERNATIVES

Against this background, let us consider the pros and cons of various military supply policy alternatives.

- A. Continuation of Current Policy: To some extent this policy restrains both Indian and Pakistani military equipment acquisitions from the U.S. and from third countries in which the U.S. has the

right of approval for resale of certain military items.

However, since several other sources of military equipment over which we have no control are available to both countries, our present policy cannot prevent either nation from increasing its military purchases and thereby creating a new imbalance.

In addition, whenever we approve the purchase of military equipment from a third country under our licensing arrangements the onus (often with a covert assist from the third country's representatives in New Delhi and presumably in Rawalpindi) is put squarely on us and consequently is interpreted by the non-recipient as an unfriendly and biased U.S. action.

Pakistan's concern over the U.S. approval of the sale of Hawker-Hunters to India was very real and so is the current Indian reaction in Parliament, the press, and within the Government of India to U.S. concurrence in the sale of M-47 tanks from Italy to Pakistan. These emotional reactions, however unreasonable they may seem to us, militate against a relaxation of tensions in the subcontinent.

Moreover, our ability to deal persuasively with these reactions is strictly limited by security requirements, i.e., we are inhibited from explaining frankly to the non-recipient nation precisely how our case-by-case decision on a particular transaction operates to limit the military expansion of the other side and hence provides additional funds for its development. Even when we are able privately to explain some of the rationale to the non-recipient government, it is necessarily on a confidential basis which does not permit that government to dampen down resentment against us in Parliament and the press.

Our present policy does not reduce Indian military dependence on the Soviet Union; on the contrary, it increases this dependence and further erodes our relationship with the Indian military.

B. Unlimited Cash Sales, Within the Conte-Symington Restrictions, to Both Countries: Such a policy could have a marginal positive effect on our balance of payments position. On the negative side

it would be interpreted by foreign and domestic cynics to mean that we are really not opposed to the diversion of resources from economic development as long as the military equipment is purchased in the United States. It would not lessen Soviet influence, regain the confidence of the Indian military or release us from our present unhealthy position of being held responsible by both countries for whatever military help we provide the other.

C. Credit and/or Cash Arms Sales to Both Countries Within Force Levels Set or Agreed to by US: Such a policy would also allow India and Pakistan to expand their purchases in the U. S. and hence would be similarly interpreted as a U.S. effort to profit from a South Asian arms competition.

Moreover, we would remain squarely in the middle of the conflict over the nature and extent of third country purchases, the equation of one type of armament with another and over appropriate force requirements.

Although the Indians assert their willingness to discuss force levels with the Pakistanis, their respective concepts of each other's defense requirements are so far apart that barring a common Soviet-US appeal, which is not now in the cards, a negotiated agreement on force levels appears to be a dead-end street.

If there is one lesson to be learned from the Conte exercise it is this: So long as we are not the sole supplier of arms (and in the subcontinent we are not and will not be) we cannot realistically shape and even less control either country's defense policy.

#### VIII. A NEW INTEGRATED APPROACH

Having pointed out the weaknesses of the present policy and the alternatives most frequently discussed, let us consider a somewhat different approach which has the very real advantage of falling within the general policy we announced a year ago.

A. As a first step, we should do all we can to unlink India and Pakistan in our minds and in our policy considerations. These two countries have different interests, characteristics, objectives and quite different potential contributions to make to the peace and stability of Asia. As long as we continue to equate them our military supply policy cannot serve our broader purposes in this turbulent part of the world.

Already India is looking more and more to East Asia; to Japan, Australia, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and, closer at hand, to Burma; while Pakistan, looking west, is more interested in Iran, Turkey, and the Middle East. We should, I believe, do everything we can covertly to encourage these trends.

Furthermore, the relationships between India and the USSR and Pakistan and the USSR, and all three with China, will have a far greater impact on the developing situation in Asia as a whole and the subcontinent in particular than the relationship between Pakistan and India.

When circumstances permit we might emphasize the decoupling of Pakistan and India in our policy-making by placing our military concern for India under CINCPAC and not CINCMEAFSA. When the Vietnam conflict is finally behind us we might even consider placing Pakistan in a new West Asian/North African bureau while moving India into the East Asian bureau.

B. Under our proposed new military assistance policy we would continue to sell spare parts to both nations in order to keep all American equipment, lethal and non-lethal, in operating condition. Although this is considerably more helpful to Pakistan than to India, I believe there is a strong case for maintaining the effectiveness of whatever equipment we have already provided under previous agreements.

C. We should, however, resolutely refuse under present circumstances to provide lethal end items to either country, either by direct sale or through third country licensees.

Experience has demonstrated that such transactions build mistrust and suspicion. Moreover, it requires us to involve ourselves with decisions which, no matter how conscientiously arrived at, will always be challenged by one of the two nations, resulting in further erosion of our bilateral relationships. Consequently such a ban is a basic, overriding requirement for a constructive relationship with both countries.

If, because of prior covert commitments to Pakistan with which I am not familiar, such a ban cannot now be instituted, we should be as candid as possible with the non-recipient country concerning the reasons for our "case-by-case" actions. It is essential to our future influence in South Asia to defuse the inevitable suspicion and anger that arises when either India or Pakistan feel that we are permitting the other to gain a real or imagined military advantage.

While it is too early to make a judgment, we should be alive to opportunities further to prevent Soviet penetration of the Indian Navy.

D. An important element in the proposed new policy is assistance to both nations to help them create a solid industrial base which can move them steadily toward military self-sufficiency. Loans for this dual defense-development purpose could be provided through various channels, including the AID program.

At present India is largely self-sufficient for military equipment such as clothing, jeeps, trucks, light weapons, and ammunition. It is nearing self-sufficiency in medium artillery, ammunition for these weapons, and army electronics. It is moving forward at a slower pace in tank and plane production.

Our efforts steadily to increase this capability would be warmly welcomed by the GOI, and particularly by the Indian military, which is uneasy over the fact that their imported equipment can only remain operational if the donor country provides a steady stream of spare parts. I assume that Pakistan would also welcome such assistance.

This program would speed up a process upon which the Indian Government has already embarked. Although we cannot at this late stage replace the USSR as the major arms supplier to India, we can assist India to rely primarily upon itself in the next ten years in regard to defense equipment. It is the only method by which we can limit and finally eliminate India's present military dependence on the USSR.

E. Within the limits set by the Congressional mood we should go as far as we can to assure both India and Pakistan that in accordance with the UN Charter we will strongly support either country which is attacked by the other. We should also go as far as we legally can to assure India and Pakistan of our support through the UN or otherwise if either is attacked by the Chinese. Our recent joint Soviet-US nuclear security guarantee might serve as a model.

If this modified military assistance policy should open the door adequately for informal, private defense discussions, with no commitments, vis-a-vis China we should seize the opportunity.

In this connection a reaffirmation of the Tashkent Declaration that both parties fully accept their pledge under the UN Charter to settle their disputes through peaceful means would have a positive effect.

F. We should sharply expand the training courses available in the U.S. to both Indian and Pakistani military personnel.

G. We should offer to share with India the costly experience which we have gained in fighting the Viet Cong insurgency movement. In many aspects this experience is directly relevant to the problems that India now faces along its whole eastern border. If at any stage Pakistan feels threatened by similar movements, we should provide such training for them.

H. We should also provide the Indian army and air force, on attractive terms, with whatever military equipment is appropriate to its growing insurgency problem. Such assistance need not involve lethal end items. I have in mind helicopters, fixed-wing transport aircraft, modern communications equipment, engineering equipment (roadbuilding machinery, pumps, etc.), medical supplies and techniques, reconnaissance equipment, detection devices, propaganda training and the like.

I. We should continue our efforts to make available to the Indian and Pakistan military establishments our latest techniques in cost effectiveness. The payoff will be positive not only in terms of budget savings but also in the more affirmative attitudes toward the United States of those who accept such training.

J. If our present policies are revised along these lines the basic elements should be frankly and fully explained to the Indian and Pakistan governments. At the same time, we should make it clear that while we have no intention of probing into their security relationships with other nations, we have a legitimate basis for concern in regard to the proportionate amount of national income which goes to defense.

Should we decide that 3 or 3 1/2 per cent of GNP for defense is an appropriate level for India, we should quietly inform the GOI on a private basis and then let them deal with the problem as they see fit.

#### IX. CONCLUSION

I believe that a switch to the military supply policy which I have outlined for India would effectively check the present erosion of our relationship and place our political-security dialogue on a much more constructive basis.

It would be particularly effective in improving our relations with the Indian military and in quietly reestablishing the friendly, understanding atmosphere which was formerly so favorable to us.

Although it is a policy designed primarily for India, I can see no reason why it could not effectively be adapted to suit the special requirements of Pakistan.

The cost of such a program would be modest. I doubt if the total cost would run more than \$25-\$35 million annually for both Pakistan and India. However, unless the ominous realities of our present deteriorating position in India are clearly recognized by all interested USG agencies and by the Congress the necessary support will not be provided and the objectives outlined in this memorandum will not be achieved.

In the broader Asian context, an essential element is our recognition of the fact that we cannot "contain" China through a US controlled coalition of such limited powers as Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, New Zealand and Australia. No matter how much blood and money we are prepared to invest in Asia, such a narrowly based US-led effort will almost certainly lead either to an ignominious US withdrawal from Asia or to a bloody, endless war with China.

The only realistic alternative for the United States is to encourage by overt and covert means common developmental, political and even defense cooperation among the major non-Communist Asian powers -- India, Japan, Indonesia, and eventually Pakistan. Such an association, supported but not controlled by us, is our one best hope for a politically stable, economically viable, free Asia with which we can cooperate when such cooperation is appropriate.

With this objective in mind we should recognize the Indian armed forces, which are second in size only to our own among the non-Communist powers, with twelve-year enlistments, high morale and a strong determination to counter Chinese aggression, as a critically important element in the Asian balance of power and consequently a major asset to US interests in Asia.

Hand for EKH ✓  
18/

Minister (Economic)



भारतीय राजदूतावास  
वाशिंगटन, डी० सी०  
EMBASSY OF INDIA  
WASHINGTON, D. C.  
March 28, 1968.

Dear Mr. Hamilton:

I am leaving for India on completion of my tour of duty in the United States. It has been a great pleasure to have known you and to have exchanged ideas on subjects of common interest to both our countries. I thank you warmly for all your kindness and cooperation.

I am taking over as Chairman, Board of Direct Taxes, a post which corresponds somewhat to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service here. It will be a pleasure to meet you again on your next visit to India.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely yours,

(K.S. Sundara Rajan)

Mr. Edward Hamilton  
National Security Council  
Room #361, Executive Office Buildings  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

→ EKH 13

Columbia University in the City of New York | New York, N.Y. 10025

SOUTHERN ASIAN INSTITUTE

622 West 113th Street

March 29, 1968

Mr. Edward Hamilton  
Special Assistant to the President  
National Security Council Staff  
Executive Office Building  
Washington, D.C.

✓  
Indira  
Gandhi

Dear Ed,

My spies tell me that the Madras Chief Minister Anna-  
durai is expected in Washington April 27 and 28. I assume  
that India has relatively low priority on the President's  
agenda these days, and particularly since Annadurai is  
not a chief of state, he therefore is even less likely  
to have a chance to chat with the President.

On the other hand, the President, I think, would want  
to know that Annadurai has been elected as Chief Minister  
of over 40,000,000 people making him substantially more  
successful a politician than perhaps 9/10 of the official  
state visitors he has to see. Moreover, there are large  
numbers of Tamil speakers in other parts of India, in Ceylon,  
Malaysia, Singapore and East Africa so that if he were  
received it would have some resonance quite beyond South  
India.

A further point, is that since Annadurai is fairly  
new to the upper levels of officialdom, being received  
by the President on his first visit to the United States  
would impress him profoundly and would help him to see  
that the interest of his part of the world can be best  
met by continued association with Americans.

I suppose you've gone over all of these arguments but  
I did want to be sure they were at least brought to your  
attention.

Good luck and all the best wishes.

Sincerely,



Howard Wriggins  
Director

HW:ss



EMBASSY  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

New Delhi, India

March 25, 1968

*India  
Food*

*EH*  
*+ see me  
on return*  
*W*  
*14*

W. W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Walt:

I appreciate your thoughtful letter in regard to the need for providing cheap sources of protein to assure more adequately balanced diets in developing countries such as India.

The first requirement, of course, is to grow enough food grains to provide the necessary calories, taking into account not only the increasing population but also rising incomes which further increase the demand. Although this goal in India has not yet been fully achieved, there is no doubt that enormous progress had been made and that within three or four years India should be able to meet its basic foodgrain requirements.

Now that the new hybrid seeds are available in rapidly increasing quantities and the fertilizer production alone is moving ahead, India is still faced with the question of storage problems and the need for procurement prices to provide continuing incentives to cultivators without placing too heavy a burden on the urban consumer. However, this goal of self-sufficiency in foodgrains is by no means the sole answer to the problem.

Even if India had an ample supply of foodgrains there would still be the question, as you point out, of adequately balanced diets. Fortunately, we have had a very able man on our staff here (Alan Berg) who is primarily concerned with this problem and has made a great deal of progress.

In large measure because of his efforts, the problem is now receiving considerable attention in GOI circles. Mrs. Gandhi, Health Minister of State Chandrasekhar, Food Secretary Dias and others have already given the program their enthusiastic support.

Hardly a week passes without a major nutrition pronouncement recognizing the developmental as well as the humanitarian implications of the problem.

Moreover, there is considerable action as well as many things happening which we find most encouraging. Here are some of the results:

The Government has embarked on an ambitious program of fortifying foods, beginning with 100 million loaves of the most potent bread sold anywhere in the world. Tests are underway to fortify everything from rice to salt.

Thousands of tons of a protein-rich food called Bal Ahar are being produced for distribution to children through CARE.

The Indian private sector food industry (such firms as Coca Cola, Lever, Corn Products, Dow, Nestles, and Brooke Bond) have banded together to form a Protein Foods Association, dedicated to facilitate the development and commercialization of low-cost, nutritious foods. More than two dozen Indian and U.S. firms are already testing protein products for India.

The Government has recently developed -- for the first time anywhere -- a comprehensive action plan comparing alternative avenues of meeting nutrient deficiencies and projecting a three-year program designed to meet the largest number of children at the least cost.

One reason I am pleased with these steps is that practically all of them were sparked by U.S. involvement, and much of the receptive climate for nutrition has been initiated by our Mission here. Further, we believe some of the techniques being developed in India will have application in other parts of the world -- including our own low-income areas in the U.S.

Unfortunately, AID's funding constraints apparently have limited the number of such programs elsewhere, in spite of the sense of urgency accorded the matter by the President's Science Advisory Committee Report on the World Food Problem. This is especially ironic in light of what's been accomplished here in India with a U.S. input of less than \$150,000 a year.

Our experience has shown that, properly nurtured, this is an activity with a large payoff for a modest investment. The approach merits White House attention, with an eye toward the obvious political values. We would be happy to provide greater detail if you desire.

Meanwhile, you may enjoy glancing through the enclosures, which give some flavor of the nutritional consciousness which has been developed in India.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,



Chester Bowles

P.S. One of our greatest problems in foreign policy, it seems to me, involves our lack of adequate communications;

half-truths and overstatements develop which when repeated over and over again become facts. For instance, if you asked an audience of 1,000 educated Americans if they thought Asians are eating better today or less well than ten years ago, the overwhelming majority would answer "less well." As a matter of fact, I cannot think of any Asian nation whose people are not better-fed today than ten years ago (with the possible exceptions of Communist China, Indonesia and of course Vietnam).

In the case of India the highest foodgrain production, when I was here on my earlier tour in 1952, was 53 million tons when India's population was 360 million.

This year, with a population of 510 million, India's food-grain production will be slightly less than double the 1953 level. One factor, of course, is that the average Indian works harder than in 1953 and since incomes have grown, the workers are able to buy not only better food but better quality.

The primary problem, of course, is population control. Nations like India must stabilize their populations in the next fifteen to twenty years. Although this will take a lot of doing, we can only hope that successful breakthroughs in contraceptive techniques, etc., such as we have had in food production, will occur.

Enclosures

India - 15  
Gen

March 19, 1968

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William G. Carter  
AAA/PRR 2497 (AID)  
Department of State**

Last week I received P. R. Nayak, the New York Representative of the Indian Investment Center. He left me the attached paper suggesting changes in the balance of payments program as it affects LDCs. I promised we'd look at it, gave him the standard speech on our attitude toward investment in LDCs, and encouraged him to keep after our companies.

I am impressed with him. And I think his paper is more imaginative and tightly reasoned than most. But I doubt that we can move immediately in the directions he suggests.

I do think we should follow up on one point he made, however. He said he knows of three U. S. corporations who had serious plans for fertilizer investment in India before the B/P program was announced, all of which have canceled those plans. The problem seems to be less the direct investment ceiling than the ceiling on bank loans, which made American financing impossible.

I told Nayak that I thought you and he should talk about these specifics. I wonder if you would have time to give him a call in the next day or two to see whether there is anything worth talking about. Even if you don't think anything would be gained by a quiet talk with the corporations involved, it may make sense to give Nayak evidence that we are serious about keeping the B/P restrictions from cutting off U. S. investment in India.

Nayak's New York address is: 708 3rd Avenue; his telephone is TN 7-3390.

If I can help with him -- or if this is a silly enterprise -- please let me know.

Edward K. Hamilton

cc: Mr. Heck

150

**P. R. NAYAK**

**RESIDENT DIRECTOR  
INDIAN INVESTMENT CENTRE**

**708 THIRD AVENUE  
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017  
TELEPHONE: TN 7-3390**

INDIAN INVESTMENT CENTRE

The Indian Investment Centre, being vitally interested in the flow of U. S. private capital to India, has been closely following the evolution and application of the U. S. private foreign investment regulations since the beginning of January 1968. The General Authorisations issued to date by the Office of Foreign Direct Investments have done much to clarify some important points. There are a few policy issues, however, which are of critical importance to India (as to most developing countries) and which deserve special consideration within the framework of U. S. objectives.

1. There is need for investment priority guidelines in the regulations. Over-all ceilings of investment for group 'A' countries may have the effect of perpetuating past trends of U. S. investment in certain industries in which corporations have a 1965-66 investment base. They might also lead to investments in non-essential industries by such corporations or by other new ones who could utilise unused ceilings. While the choice of industries may not be of concern to the U. S. Government, it will have important repercussions in developing countries. For example, India, seeking investments in the fertilizer industry which requires careful pre-investment studies, may find the entire ceiling for Group 'A' countries used up by "base" corporations investing in their own lines of manufacture or by 'non-base' corporations in less essential industries in or outside India. From India's point of view, therefore, the imposition of over-all investment limits might be doubly harmful if not accompanied by suggested priorities of investment.
  
2. The existence of investment ceilings acts as a deterrent to new Corporations which would, in the normal course, investigate investments in group 'A' countries. For India the effect is that there will, in all probability, be a serious reduction in investment feasibility studies within the next year. In particular, important agribusiness industries like pesticides, protein foods, will suffer. Secondly, there may be a complete halt to the investigation of proposals which involve large investments and extended studies - like fertilizer. There is, therefore, a need either:
  - (a) to exempt selected important industries from the regulations or
  - (b) to give an advance assurance to U. S. Corporations that proposals in such industries will not suffer for want of accommodation.

The intention is to put U. S. Corporations in a frame of mind which makes possible continued investigation of high-priority industries in developing countries.

3. While investment of intangibles like know-how, licences and patents in exchange for stock has now been exempted from the regulations, investment in the form of U. S. manufactured capital equipment has not been so exempted. Though it is evident that such investment will improve the U. S. balance of payments in the long-term the counter-arguments may be (a) that it defeats the objective of inducing U. S. Corporations to use a high proportion of foreign funds to generate dollar returns, (b) that it may displace commercial sales of equipment against cash inflow, (c) and simply that it is a capital transfer for the purpose of balance-of-payments accounting which it affects adversely in the short-term. So far as India is concerned, these points are met briefly as under:

- (a) It is the declared policy of the Government of India and also the practice in the private sector to import equipment only when it is inescapable that it cannot yet be manufactured in India. Thus, the maximum utilisation of local funds in Indo-U.S. joint ventures is assured. However, it has to be stressed that the imported equipment is in most cases critical to the success of the entire investment. It is this relatively small investment in U. S. equipment that can provide the U. S. with significant balance of payment returns from a developing country like India.
- (b) It is known that there is enough spare capacity in the U. S. equipment industry to take care of additional orders without compromising export cash sales.
- (c) The effect on the U. S. balance of payments can only be negligible and may, in fact, be offset by the current reduced level of official aid which, in the recent past, formed the major component of U. S. investment.

It is a historical fact that an overwhelming share of U. S. investment in India has been in the form of U. S. manufactured equipment and not in cash. It will not be difficult for India to accept this position as mandatory. There is, therefore, no loss to the U. S. but every benefit to India if U. S. capital equipment is exempted from the regulations.

OUTSTANDING U.S. INVESTMENTS IN INDIA: Mid-1948 to March-1965.

(in million \$ at the current rate of exchange)

Year	Private Direct	Portfolio	Total
Mid-1948 ..	13.6	1.33	14.93
End-1953 ..	36.8	3.33	40.00
End-1955 ..	48.93	3.87	52.80
End-1956 ..	58.53	3.87	62.53
End-1957 ..	72.27	4.00	76.27
End-1958 ..	75.87	4.40	80.27
End-1959 ..	85.73	4.53	90.27
End-1960 ..	91.33	6.00	97.33
End-1961 (revised) ..	101.33	26.53	127.86
End-1962 ..	100.67	44.53	145.20
End March-1963 ..	99.20	Private Portfolio 8.93 Official " <u>43.07</u> 52.00	151.20
March 1964 ..	109.73	Private Portfolio 12.93 Official " <u>83.47</u> 96.40	206.13
March 1965 ..	124.13	Private Portfolio 21.20 Official Portfolio <u>112.27</u> 133.47	257.60

INDIAN INVESTMENT CENTRE

*P. R. Nayak*

*Resident Director*

15c

March 13, 1968


Dear Mr. Hamilton:

It was very considerate of you to have given me and my colleague so much of your time last week to explain our views and give expression to the fears that we entertain in regard to the operation of the U. S. foreign investment regulations so far as they are applicable to India. Much of our anxiety springs from our feeling that an attitude of indifference is likely to be engendered in U. S. Corporations in a restrictive atmosphere. While this attitude could be reversed quickly in relation to Europe if and when the regulations are relaxed, the pipeline to developing countries like India is long and takes years to fill up.

I am grateful that you can find it easy to sympathise with us. I am hopeful that a review by your Government will be possible to accommodate our needs.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

  
P. R. Nayak

PRN:ab

The Honorable  
Edward K. Hamilton  
Room 380, Executive Office Building  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.



~~SECRET~~  
EMBASSY

OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
New Delhi, India

16

*File  
India*

March 5, 1968

Mr. W. W. Rostow  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Walt:

What I would really like you to do is pay a visit to India to see at firsthand some of the encouraging developments which are beginning to take shape here -- as well as the problems.

Since this is unlikely in the near future, I am enclosing a copy of a Memorandum to the Secretary which I earnestly hope you will take time to read.

India is a vast, complex country whose success or failure will have a decisive impact on all of Asia for many years to come. Right now the outcome hangs in the balance. I have reported the situation frankly as I see it.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

*Clit*

Chester Bowles

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 7-16-02

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March 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM

To: The Secretary of State

From: Chester Bowles

Subject: INDIA, MARCH 1968

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Since my memoranda to you in May and September of last year, enough changes have occurred in India to justify an updating of these reports, particularly as they affect the broader interests of the United States in Asia.

Some recent developments are encouraging and others are not, but on balance I believe that with good judgment, sensitive handling and adequate resources, there is better than an even chance that our objective of a free and politically viable India, with adequate economic growth, operating in reasonable compatibility with the United States can be achieved. Following are the current highlights:

HIGHLIGHTS

1. A peaceful rural revolution, the beginnings of which I described in my earlier memoranda, continues to gain momentum. The current Indian foodgrain crops are even bigger than we had anticipated.
2. As agriculture becomes increasingly profitable, the disparity between landowner and landless peasant will increase and likely lead to political turbulence.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 07-6  
By isl, NARA, Date 6-28-07

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3. The industrial recession which has held back Indian development in the last three or four years is beginning to ease and the economy is turning the corner.

4. India's recent agricultural success and the urgent need for increased foreign investment are combining with other factors to produce a trend toward decentralization and a more market-oriented economy.

5. The budget for the coming fiscal year announced by Morarji Desai on February 29, followed by the Federal Reserve Bank's cut in the interest rates, will provide an additional push to the whole economy and particularly to the private sector.

6. The concern often expressed by both Indians and foreign observers over the current political disarray, while justified in some regards, fails fully to take into account the extraordinary resiliency of the Indian political system.

7. The Congress Party has made a partial comeback in the northern States, and Mrs. Indira Gandhi through a combination of political astuteness and good luck seems to have gained personal political strength.

8. The Communists remain badly split and so far have failed to capitalize on the bread and butter economic issues from which they would stand to gain their greatest mass support.

9. Sheikh Abdullah has thus far failed to adopt a realistic approach to Kashmir's relationship to India, and the possibility of this first essential step towards a settlement is waning.

10. Although the Indian defense budget continues to decline in real terms and as a percentage of GNP, the Conte and Symington Amendments have raised many problems, the answers to which are not yet clear.

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11. India's preoccupations are increasingly focused on domestic affairs, with more concern for internal security and economic development and less for the remote global issues that claimed India's attention in the age of Nehru.

12. Nevertheless, it has become increasingly apparent that the USSR now views India as its primary target in Asia, and is steadily and skillfully stepping up its efforts here while U.S. influence has slipped.

13. Following our rejection of India's request in 1963 and 1964 for a five-year program to modernize the Indian armed forces the Soviets have emerged as India's primary source of military assistance.

14. The conviction that the Soviet Union, alone among the major powers, is aware of India's security problems vis-a-vis China has steadily grown even among strongly anti-Communist Indians.

15. Indian fears of China have been heightened by reports of increased Chinese activities among the Shans and Kachin tribesmen of northern Burma and near the vulnerable border region of Nagaland.

16. Partly as a consequence, Indian understanding of its potential role in the development and security of East and Southeast Asia has increased.

17. In an agonizing effort to avoid offense to both the Russians and the Americans, the GOI is supporting the concept of a more active role for the ICC in Cambodia, thus far within the limited framework of investigating specific violations.

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18. While most Indians are still warmly friendly to America and deeply appreciative of our assistance, there has been a perceptible decline in the influence of the United States in this part of the world. It is essential that we re-establish our credentials, not as preservers of the status quo, but as a progressive, socially conscious nation, relevant to tomorrow's world.

19. 1968 and 1969 will be the decisive years in determining the success or failure of India's massive efforts to create an adequate rate of economic growth firmly based on a democratic political foundation. This will require substantially expanded assistance from the United States, which will not be possible unless the American Congress and people are given a clearer idea of what our aid and Indian self-help have already accomplished.

### I. ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS

#### A. Agriculture

In September I reported that prospects for a good summer crop were excellent and that there was clear evidence that the comprehensive program which we persuaded the GOI to undertake and which Agriculture Minister Subramaniam announced in December 1965 was moving ahead on schedule.

Since then developments have confirmed our expectations.

The improved seed program is proceeding on schedule with every indication that in this crop year India is hitting its target of 16 million acres planted with the new hybrid seeds and fertilized.

The summer crop (kharif) was even better than we anticipated; the winter crop (rabi), which was a totally unpredictable factor in September, now appears to exceed our highest expectations. We believe that India's foodgrain production for this crop year

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(July to June) will be more than 100 million tons compared to 77 million tons in 1966 and 88 million tons in 1964, the previous high.

This progress suggests the possibility that India may become self-sufficient in foodgrains in the next four or five years. It does not mean that India's food problem will be settled within this brief time span. It will be a long time before the average Indian has an adequate and properly balanced diet. However, the outlook for self-sufficiency in foodgrains, allowing for the extra demand created by increased purchasing power, is reassuring.

#### B. Fertilizer

In 1963 India was unable to persuade its farmers to buy even the 200,000 tons of fertilizer (in terms of nitrogen) which it then produced. This year Indian farmers will apply approximately 1,350,000 tons of fertilizer in terms of nitrogen. Of this amount, 381,000 tons are being produced by nine Indian fertilizer plants already built; the remaining 969,000 tons are imported.

In addition, Indian cultivators will apply about 700,000 tons of phosphatic and potassic fertilizers, most of it imported. The total cost of imported fertilizers this year is \$280 million, most of which has been purchased in the United States.

Looking to the future, seven fertilizer plants with a total capacity of more than a million tons of nitrogen are now under construction in India; negotiations are in progress for the construction of twelve additional plants, eight of which will have equity participation by U. S. firms.

Thus, by 1973 it is expected that at least twenty-eight modern fertilizer plants will be operating in India with a total capacity in terms of nitrogen of 3.5 million tons.

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### C. Water

Progress in water resources development has continued. Although we have not yet secured full support for the all-India water program which we had in mind, progress has been impressive.

For instance, there are now about 127,000 tube wells in operation compared to about 70,000 in 1965. Present plans call for 15 to 20 million additional irrigated acres from all sources by 1972 which will raise the total irrigated area to about 100 million acres.

Inevitably the rapidly growing prosperity of the rural areas will open up major markets for the industrial sector and stimulate sales of consumer goods such as sewing machines, shoes, transistors, flashlights, cloth and processed foods.

### D. Rural Credit

Some progress, but not enough, has been made in regard to a further expansion of rural credit. We are about to present the Department with a proposal for use of US-owned rupees to support a promising credit arrangement.

### E. Family Planning

The population control outlook has not changed materially since my September report, with a half dozen States still doing well, four or five in the doldrums and the rest performing unevenly. However, the present nationwide program did not get underway until April of 1965, and there is a solid basis for hope for faster progress in the future.

It is reassuring that there is still no organized opposition to birth control, either on religious or cultural grounds; indeed, to our knowledge no criticism of the program or its objective has been voiced by any politician or political party.

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At this stage the most important need is to persuade the public of its stake in the success of the program and to supply the necessary organization and drive. Targets for FY 1968 call for 2,057,000 vasectomies and 2,106,000 loop insertions. A start is being made in the production of pills and condoms on a massive scale.

It is impossible to tell at this early stage whether these goals will be reached or not. We feel more confident, however, than a year ago.

#### F. Industry

In the industrial area, we are beginning to see a recovery from the recession which was sparked by two severe droughts.

In the early 1960's industrial production increased by an average of 8.5 per cent annually with a 15 per cent average annual increase in the production of capital goods.

Because of the drop in industrial production from these levels, foreign exchange loans from the Consortium in fiscal 1967 to pay for imports of spare parts and industrial raw materials were not fully utilized, and the pipeline is still full. This means that even with the sharply reduced economic assistance provided by the last Congress the Indian Government can meet its needs for the next six to eight months.

However, if, as we anticipate, industrial production picks up sharply, demand for imported spare parts, industrial raw materials, etc. will increase correspondingly. If the foreign exchange to pay for these essential imports is not available, the impressive economic progress which is now evident will be reversed.

#### G. External Debt

India's foreign exchange crisis is intensified by the fact that it has already accumulated some \$6.8 billion in debt, some of which is on harsh terms (French, German, Italian, Japanese, etc.).

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In the next five years, the present schedule calls for repayment of \$2.1 billion to members of the Consortium. This is a staggering obligation for a developing country with modest foreign exchange resources to meet. If Indian economic progress is to continue at an adequate rate (6 to 7 per cent of GNP annually), some means must be found to postpone the impact of this burden.

#### H. Economic Policy

Indian economic leaders are keenly aware that future growth cannot be assured by a single bumper crop. Past policy shortcomings are increasingly being recognized, including the need for decentralization.

This movement in the direction of greater economic pragmatism has had the effect of releasing more and more economic activity from its former rigid concentration on state enterprise and controls and encouraging a movement toward a freer economy, with more room for initiative and fewer bureaucratic bottlenecks.

The excellent expansion-oriented budget for the next fiscal year announced by Morarji Desai on February 29, followed by the Federal Reserve Bank's announcement of a drop in the interest rates will provide a badly needed push, especially to the private sector.

A particularly difficult developmental problem is presented by the fact that much of the new wealth being created by the rural revolution is beyond the reach of the central tax system. All authority to tax land and agricultural income rests with the States, which operate under heavy pressure from their farm lobbies. Since agriculture produces nearly half of the gross national income, this creates a major dilemma.

This dilemma is compounded by the fact that much of the capital savings which are so urgently needed in industry has gone into

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land speculation, both urban and rural. This is partly because the present tax system favors such speculation over industrial entrepreneurship. The Central Government, recognizing the problem, is seeking ways to create a better balance.

It is fair to say that a new and much more positive chapter in Indian economic life is now steadily unfolding. Although severe shortages in foreign exchange could deal the trend a setback, a growing dynamism and confidence in many parts of the economy are clearly evident. Our AID policies have helped to promote this development, and we should continue to design our assistance with this in mind.

## II. THE POLITICAL SITUATION

### A. The Congress Party and the States

Since my September report, the political situation has continued to develop along the same general lines, but with some important new trends beginning to emerge.

As you will remember, in the national election a year ago, the Congress Party lost control of nine out of the seventeen States, most of which were taken over by United Front coalitions consisting of a wide range of parties from extreme left to extreme right.

Since these parties were united only in their opposition to Congress, it is not surprising that most of them have failed to provide the dynamic State governments so urgently needed.

Madras, Orissa and Kerala are now the only States where non-Congress governments seem firmly established. It would not be surprising if the remainder of the non-Congress States drifted back into the Congress Party fold. Unhappily, right now this drift would be toward the lesser of what most people

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consider two evils and would not reflect the kind of creative take-over by the younger members of the Congress Party which we would like to see.

After a year of political pulling and hauling, the old guard Congress leaders are still largely in charge. Mrs. Gandhi, with a bit of good fortune and an impressive show of political skill, has managed to strengthen her position in the leadership saddle, although it is not always clear precisely where she wants the horse to go.

The election of Nijalingappa, Chief Minister of Mysore, as Congress President adds badly-needed strength and direction to the national party. He is an able administrator and a skilled politician with a progressive outlook and goodwill toward the United States.

The troublesome language problem continues despite the passage of legislation which offers some protection to non-Hindi States through a three-language formula.

Although India will probably continue to overflow with political difficulties and turbulence of one kind or another, the Indian political system has demonstrated a unique capacity for absorbing what for other countries might be mortal blows and somehow developing a working consensus on critical issues.

Three months ago, we were greatly concerned about the difficulties in electing a Congress Party President without splitting the party, the language issue and even a possible Communist-led uprising in Calcutta. In none of these three instances have our fears materialized. The Government has somehow managed to muddle through, although forced to resort to President's Rule to meet the particularly difficult problems of West Bengal.

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### B. Communists - Left and Right

In the last few months the Communist Party has not made significant gains and may indeed have lost some ground. Their efforts to cash in on the political confusion of West Bengal and particularly Calcutta turned out to be less effective than we anticipated.

While they were able successfully to call one-day general strikes, their efforts to stretch the demonstrations over a longer period failed. Something like 20,000 Communists were arrested, many of whom, with no apparent appetite for martyrdom, pledged their future good behavior and were released.

In Kerala, the situation, although relatively tranquil on the surface, is in some ways more disturbing. The able Chief Minister Namboodripad (a Left Communist) has been under fire from extremist party members because of what they consider to be an unduly moderate approach. Yet, behind a facade of reasonableness, a determined and unhappily rather effective effort is being made to establish party control in such key areas as the police, education and rural development.

### C. Political Consequences of the Rural Revolution

One problem which concerns us is the likelihood of growing political turbulence in the rural areas as farming becomes an increasingly profitable enterprise. As the more affluent land owners, joined by retired military and civil servants, attempt to expand their holdings, many smaller farmers, already under a heavy load of indebtedness, will be squeezed out.

A landless laborer in an Indian village earning two or three rupees a day may accept his impoverished condition as long as the whole village is poor. But when he sees some of his fellow villagers

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begin to buy scooters, sewing machines, transistor radios, and tile roofs, a sense of injustice is created out of which political instability is likely to grow.

The Indian land reform program, although a vast improvement over the system in British days, has still not achieved its full objectives and enforcement is often lax.

### III. DEFENSE

An arms race in the subcontinent would be disturbing to all of us. Yet, I believe we must distinguish between (a) genuine military needs and actual procurement and (b) highly exaggerated charges by both India and Pakistan of the alleged "skyrocketing" military budget of the other.

The Government of India fundamentally agrees with us that its national security depends much more heavily on economic and social progress than upon military equipment or postures. The very high percentage of Indian resources devoted to internal development underscores the point.

India's defense budget in terms of percentage of GNP continues to decline. It is now only 3.4 per cent of GNP, and if expenditures in real terms remain stable and a reasonable growth rate is maintained, defense spending should account for only 2.7 per cent of GNP by 1971.

In real terms, also, the Indian military budget is not "skyrocketing," but declining. Defense expenditures adjusted for price rises were Rupees 811 crores (\$1,067,105,263) in 1965-66, Rupees 798 crores (\$1,050,000,000) in 1966-67, and an estimated Rupees 724 crores (\$952,631,578) in 1967-68. This is a decrease of 10 per cent in real terms. The 1968-69 defense budget, 4.6 per cent more than

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last year, when adjusted for the inevitable rise in prices, will show a further real decline. Moreover, three quarters of the 1968-69 increased allocation is earmarked for long overdue raises in pay and allowances, and a large housing program for military personnel.

The Indians are quietly but deeply concerned over evidence of Chinese support for the insurgent Shan and Kachin tribal people of North Burma. They also look upon the troublesome area of Nagaland as a temptation to the Chinese and a grave threat to eastern India. Naga "hostiles" now require the presence of nearly one full division of the Indian Army.

In view of the current instability in Asia, a 5,000 mile border with an aggressive China, and a potentially hostile Pakistan, I do not think we can or should realistically expect India to reduce its defense system.

Even so, our interest in India's continued restraint in defense expenditures and the implications of the Conte-Symington Amendments have been made clear to the GOI. However, their understanding of our mutual problem and their genuine desire to cooperate are complicated by their sensitivity to "foreign pressure" and their inability, because of agreements with the USSR, to divulge certain military information. Had we responded affirmatively to India's request in 1963-64 to assist in the modernization of its armed forces, we would have insisted that they withhold similar classified information.

Meanwhile, India has accepted our offer to provide training for Indian personnel on the latest techniques of cost effectiveness. This will assure that they get the most out of their defense expenditures and is an encouraging development.

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#### IV. INDO-PAK RELATIONS

India continues to express its willingness to talk with Pakistan about a variety of issues, including Kashmir, while Pakistan insists that meaningful progress toward the settlement of the Kashmir problem must come first.

Sheikh Abdullah's release has so far failed to result in any movement toward a Kashmir accommodation. Unless he decides to throw his weight behind a Puerto Rican-type arrangement allowing for a degree of Kashmir autonomy within the Indian Union, it is unlikely that he can make a positive contribution. Indian worries over Sino-Pak and Soviet-Pak relations continue although in somewhat lower key.

#### V. INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS

The recent Aziz Ouloug-Zade defector case demonstrated among other things that the GOI is prepared to resist pressure from the Soviets as well as from the U.S. It also demonstrated once again that the Indian free press, in demanding a forthright response by the Government to Ouloug-Zade's plea to go to the U. K., maintains far more influence than in most developing countries.

Home Minister Chavan's strong statement in the Parliament denouncing the Soviet-concocted "John Smith Revelations" on Radio Peace and Progress also provides evidence of India's determination to restrain, even if it cannot wholly prevent, Soviet meddling in Indian affairs.

From the Soviet point of view the Kosygin visit was successful in obtaining Indian concurrence on several matters of bilateral relations, but it was less satisfying as an attempt to move

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India away from its nonaligned position on third country or multinational matters.

The Indians held firm against vigorous Soviet attempts to include condemnations of the U. S. in the Joint Communique and went no further than their ritualistic request for a halt in the bombing of North Vietnam.

However, Kosygin's offer to buy the surplus production of Soviet-aided manufacturing plants in India, such as 10,000 railroad freight cars a year, was a shrewd move; he ensured the success and presumably the profitability of Soviet-assisted industries by offering them a guaranteed market.

The Soviets even proposed to integrate purchases from India into the next Soviet economic plan. Although many practical problems are likely to arise, this agreement was well-received even among those Indians who are normally anti-Soviet.

#### VI. NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

The prospect of India signing the NPT is uncertain. Although we have a commitment that the draft treaty will be thoroughly studied at the highest level, there is considerable doubt that Mrs. Gandhi's government will exercise the leadership to act affirmatively in the face of adverse public and parliamentary opinion. We have not, however, given up.

#### VII. PEACE CORPS

The Peace Corps has come through some rough situations, especially in the States of Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, in excellent shape. It is an extremely well-administered operation; there are still far more requests for volunteers than can be filled.

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### VIII. THE UNEASY US-INDIAN RELATIONSHIP

Indian attitudes toward the United States Government and Americans in general are complex and increasingly sensitive. On the affirmative side are several important assets:

- A. By and large most Indians genuinely like most Americans; there are few Indians of importance who do not have several American friends and acquaintances. A common language and commitment to free institutions help to strengthen these relationships.
- B. For two decades elements of the United States Government, and particularly the United States Information Service have been successfully creating a positive impression of the U. S. as a liberal democratic force; this effort has been particularly effective among students.
- C. In the last twenty years, nearly 80,000 Indians have traveled to the United States for education or training, and with few exceptions have returned with a highly positive reaction to America and American life.
- D. Almost all Indians are conscious of the economic assistance the U. S. has provided India over the years and are deeply appreciative.

Although we may take pride and cautious comfort in these affirmative features we should not underestimate the negative forces which are now resulting in a decline of American influence in India, a decline which has been accompanied by a significant gain in Soviet influence.

Before I comment further on the implications of this trend, I would like to establish a few personal reference points:

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1. I do not believe that our national security is dependent on our capacity to win a global popularity contest.
2. At the same time I do believe that the future of the world will continue to be shaped primarily by ideas. In almost every major struggle since World War II the victory has gone not to the side which had the greatest military capacity but to those who commanded the loyalty and support of the masses (witness Chiang Kai-shek's defeat in China, the French in Indo-China and Algeria, the Dutch in Indonesia, the British in India, the western colonial powers generally in Africa, etc.).
3. I believe that Communism as an ideology is losing ground, not gaining it. The most important world force today is nationalism.
4. I believe it would be a serious mistake for the United States Government to begrudge Soviet economic assistance to the developing nations. Indeed, until circumstances permit the USSR and the USA to cooperate in both the political and economic fields, I am convinced that anything approaching world stability will remain beyond our grasp.
5. Although such Soviet-US cooperation now appears possible only in some limited areas (India is not yet one of them), we should strive to keep the doors and windows wide open and avoid rigid positions.

Within this framework let us consider the present relationship among the USSR, the USA and India. In India the Soviets operate under some serious handicaps including the language barrier, the difficulty most Russians have in adjusting to life in India, and the mistrust of most Indians for Communist ideology and totalitarian concepts. Nevertheless, the USSR and the East European bloc nations have been gaining steadily in prestige and influence.

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Indeed, the Soviets have somehow achieved a political sleight of hand that is no less than miraculous: i.e., they have emerged in the eyes of many millions of anti-Communist Indians as the most responsible, peace loving, middle-of-the-road force in world affairs, striving under grave difficulties to dampen down the extremist Chinese to the left and the "extremist" United States to the right.

I do not believe that the position the United States once held as the foremost liberalizing influence in world affairs can be restored in the near future. It is essential, however, that, within the policy and resource framework that is now available to us, we realistically consider what positive moves we can make to check the present erosion.

As a starting point I suggest that we frankly recognize that American military policy in South Asia for the last fourteen years simply has not worked. Our present interpretation of this policy is bound to bring us into increasing conflict with both Pakistan and India, generate an atmosphere of mistrust and bitterness and play into the hands not only of the Soviets but also of the Chinese. Although there is no need here to review the record, from Mr. Dulles' decision in 1954 to establish a "special relationship" with Pakistan to the uneasy present, I suggest that our best planning talents should be committed to rethinking our policy.

I accept as a basic premise that the United States Government should not be unduly concerned with Indian opinion unless it affects our fundamental interests. But who can say that our interests are not adversely affected when the strongest South Asian power, with one-seventh of the world's population, anti-Communist, with a deep commitment to democracy, and, with Japan, the only potential Asian counterweight to China, becomes increasingly estranged from U.S. attitudes and policies?

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Most Indians share our concern about Southeast Asia; but what even those most closely identified with the United States cannot understand is the contrast between our overriding fear of China in that area and an apparent lack of concern about the presence of these self-same Chinese along the thousands of miles of vulnerable frontier stretching from Burma to Ladakh, which the Indian Army and Air Force, with no clear commitment of support from the United States, is now firmly committed to defend. In other words, can China reasonably be considered a man-eating tiger in East Asia and a paper tiger in South Asia? Why, they ask, in view of the unpredictable political-military situation throughout Asia, do we look on the second biggest non-Communist army in the world as a liability instead of a major asset.

We should recognize now that if the Indians come to believe that the western Pacific area stretching from Australia to Korea is the outermost projection of America's first line of defense against China they will have no alternative but to place their primary defense reliance on the Soviet Union.

Our military experts seem to agree that if China should attack India across either the northern or eastern (Burmese) border, and if Pakistan should take advantage of India's preoccupation by attacking in the northwest, India, even with its present million man professional army, could not hold its own for more than six months without US and/or Soviet support.

Thus we appear to be saying (1) that India cannot adequately defend itself, (2) that because of Congressional charges of "over-commitment" we cannot promise assistance in case of an attack and (3) that India nevertheless should cut its admittedly inadequate military forces. Even America's best friends in India consider such a position to be untenable.

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### IX. IN CONCLUSION

India is at the crossroads economically, politically and in its relations to the world, particularly in respect to the United States.

Since 1952 we have made an enormous investment in India, without which India probably could not have survived as a viable nation. During the last two or three years we have been particularly successful in persuading India to make some dynamic moves in the economic field.

These include (1) a fundamental switch in Indian planning which now gives Indian agriculture top priority, (2) the successful implementation of a massive new program to increase foodgrain production, (3) a fresh focus on the urgent need of family planning, (4) growing appreciation of the stultifying effects of too many economic controls and (5) an increasing acceptance of the role of the private sector as an essential instrument for rapid development and industrialization.

With an adequate flow of assistance to India in the next five or ten years, coupled with continued good performance by the Indian Government, I am convinced that India can firmly be established as a politically and economically viable nation, solvent in regard to its foreign obligations, and a solid friend, if not ally, of the United States.

Most American leaders concede in theory the decisive importance of an independent, economically viable India to the peace and stability of Asia; almost no one would argue that India is less important strategically than Vietnam.

Yet the positive changes taking place in India and the stake we have in this key country are still inadequately understood at home, both in and out of government. Although this is due to a variety of reasons, the most important single element, in

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my opinion, is the fact that very few key members of the Administration or Congress ever visit India and those who do stay for no more than two or three days, - which normally includes a one-day visit to see the Taj Mahal. No top policy maker from the State Department or Pentagon has been in India for more than four days since I arrived nearly five years ago.

It is, of course, fair to say that it is India's responsibility to convince others of its progress and promise by its own words and deeds. Nevertheless, Indian efforts in this respect will probably continue to be inept; for every step forward some Indian official can be counted upon to put his foot in his mouth.

However, it would be irrational for the United States Government to invest \$30 billion a year and untold American blood in an effort to create a politically viable, independent South Vietnam, while the major South Asian power, a genuine democracy with one-seventh of the world's population, slips into chaos for lack of understanding and adequate support.

For the foregoing reasons I believe that our Government should make a priority effort persuasively to convince the American people, the press and the Congress of what our aid and Indian endeavors have already accomplished and the stake we have in seeing this effort through to a successful conclusion.

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MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 7-16-02

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

17

February 26, 1968

EKH:

The attached letter from Bowles supplements his NPT cable. He repeats the proposal for trilateral talks (and this letter makes clear, much to ACDA's horror, that these conversations would again make ~~it~~ open season on the draft language). The new wrinkle in the letter is a fall-back position. Admitting the talks would probably fail, Bowles thinks the Indians could go ahead and sign the treaty with explicit reservations -- access to nuclear technology, Big Power disarmament, etc.

Bowles sees this, of course, as an escape from our current (and temporary) impasse with the Soviets. I don't think there is much chance the Indians would buy this approach, whatever "reservations" we allow them. I think there is even less chance that we could do this and still hold the line with the Germans and others.

But all this moves me again to toss out -- like the fat little man who retired to his dacha -- another hairbrained scheme. Let's talk about a major Presidential letter to Madame Gandhi. I take as a model the Kennedy/Nehru letter after the seizure of Goa. The letter would come down hard on the need for India to carry forward the moral (sic) leadership practiced by the lady's father. Three themes:

- Responsibility to the world to give the NPT a chance.
- Responsibility to a divided Asia to exercise a genuine and creative neutrality, both in the ICC and in bilateral diplomacy.
- Responsibility to her own people to take the necessary first steps (defense budget) toward an authentic reduction of tension with Pakistan -- freeing resources ~~for~~ domestic development at a crucial period, etc.)

Obviously we would want to say something, as Kennedy did, about the agonies of our own position vis-a-vis India. In 1962 a punitive reduction in foreign aid was only a plausible threat. Today it is an inescapable fact of life, and New Delhi ought to know it.

I'm under no illusions that a letter of this kind will achieve anything. (The Kennedy letter to Nehru struck just the right note, and it's no more than an interesting item for some archive rat in the 21st Century.) But maybe that is the saving virtue of the idea. Indian development still has

- 2 -

a chance, but things are going from bad to worse in our efforts to maintain a stake in it. If I were the President, I'd want to be on the historical record sounding the alarm bell before Congress burned down the house. Now, educate me on this one.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "RM".

Roger Morris



~~SECRET~~

EMBASSY  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
New Delhi, India

EXDIS

17a

3049

February 16, 1968

Honorable Dean Rusk  
The Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dean:

I have just finished dictating a cable (NEW DELHI 10133) covering my discussion on the NPT with Vikram Sarabhai. However, there were several additional aspects of our conversation which, because of their delicate nature, were not touched upon in the cable. I am sending this supplementary postscript to you personally so you can pass it on to the most appropriate people.

In addition to the exchange reported in the cable, I suggested on a personal, unofficial basis a scenario which might enable India to sign the treaty and bring the other fence-sitters along with them. My suggestion was as follows:

1. India should agree to hold direct, highly confidential talks with the U.S. and USSR to explore India's objections to the proposed treaty and, if possible, develop language which could be acceptable to all concerned. Such a session, regardless of the outcome, is an essential first step.

2. Under present circumstances such a discussion will probably fail to produce full agreement. If this is the case the GOI might consider an alternative approach:

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By je, NARA, Date 7/16/02

EXDIS

~~SECRET~~

2

(A) As a gesture of appreciation to the USG and the USSR for their successful efforts to reach agreement on this issue, India agrees to sign the treaty with a qualifying statement pointing out not only India's reservations but also India's awareness of the fact that both the U.S. and USSR are carrying abnormally heavy military burdens because of the Vietnam war. The Indian Government realizes that this limits for the present what either major power can say or do in regard to a step-by-step approach to disarmament.

(B) Express the hope and expectation that once this emergency situation has been eased the Indians and other like-minded nations may be able to negotiate amendments to the treaty that would in a general way meet their objections.

(C) If India determines, after say three to five years, that the USG and the USSR are still unable at least to meet the Indians half-way, the GOI will exercise its right to withdraw under the ninety-day escape clause.

Although the ideal course would be to persuade India to sign the present treaty with no reservations, I believe this is an unrealistic expectation for reasons well known to you and outlined to me by Sarabhai. However, if India agrees to sign now with the above reservations, it could free itself from criticism by the U.S. and USSR and many others and be in a much better position to request reconsideration of its objectives at the end of a trial period of say five years.

In regard to the second point, i.e., clearer assurance of access to nuclear technology for all non-nuclear nations, we would have three or four years to work out an approach to this problem which we and the Soviets could accept and which would help India to get off the hook.

Sarabhai appeared to be greatly taken by the possibility of this two-step approach. Haksar, with whom I briefly discussed the question later in the day, said that he personally would accept

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

~~SECRET~~

3

it and that it might greatly improve the chances for Indian participation.

Obviously, this idea will get nowhere if it were known that it came from us. If and when the idea surfaces it should come from Sarabhai, Mrs. Gandhi, Morarji Desai, Swaran Singh or some other Indian leader. That is why I am writing you on this personal basis.

From our point of view this proposal offers several advantages. For instance, India's willingness to sign the treaty, even with its clearly stated reservations, would assure the support of other fence-sitters. This would enable us, at least for a few years, to hold the ground we have already won in cooperation with the Soviets. By the end of this wait-and-see period, the end of the Vietnam war should create in itself a wholly different framework in which we and the Soviets may find it feasible to alter our present positions.


In sketching out this approach, I was careful to emphasize that it is a totally unofficial and personal analysis and suggestion, and that my colleagues in Washington may disagree either wholly or in part.

However, I am now convinced that only through a gambit of this kind can we secure support from the GOI in an area of critical importance to us all.

I will be grateful for any comments you have to make on this "unofficial" suggestion. In the meantime, the wisest course here will be to let the Indians alone for the next couple of weeks and see what they actually come up with. Through several sources I will be kept informed of their progress or lack of it.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,



Chester Bowles

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Full*  
*Hamilton*

*B*

February 16, 1968

MEMO FOR WALT ROSTOW

Would it be appropriate for someone  
in your shop to meet with Professor  
Sud, or should be send this along to  
State Department for handling?

*W*

Marvin Watson

15

Ba

**WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY**

KALAMAZOO, MICHIGAN 49001

February 13, 1968

RECEIVED  
WHITE HOUSE  
FEB 13 15 28 PM '68

President Lyndon B. Johnson  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

MW

|| Through: Mr. Marvin Watson  
Appointment Secretary

Honorable President Johnson:

From December 22 through February 8, I was in India as a Visiting Professor. On February 7, I had a lengthy conference with the Deputy Prime Minister of India, Mr. Morar Ji Desai, in his office. During this, we discussed a number of problems which were scientific as well as political in scope. As a result of this conference, I feel that there are a few items which I should like to bring to your attention. I would appreciate it greatly if you grant me an interview for that purpose.

I will be glad to come to Washington at any time which is most convenient for you.

The above said request was explained by phone today to Mrs. Reagan, secretary to your Appointment Secretary.

Yours sincerely

*Gian C. Sud*

Gian C. Sud  
Associate Professor

Phone  
- AC 616  
383-1679

GCS/sk

FEB 13 1968  
RECEIVED

WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY

LANSING, MICHIGAN 48906

February 13, 1968

WHITE HOUSE  
MAIL ROOM

FEB 16 12 58 PM '68

President Lyndon B. Johnson  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Through: Mr. Marvin Watson  
Appointment Secretary

Honorable President Johnson:

From December 22 through February 8, I was in India as a Visiting Professor. On February 7, I had a lengthy conference with the Deputy Prime Minister of India, Mr. Morarji Deasai, in his office. During this we discussed a number of problems which were scientific as well as political in scope. As a result of this conference, I feel that there are a few items which I should like to bring to your attention. I would appreciate it greatly if you grant me an interview for that purpose.

I will be glad to come to Washington at any time which is most convenient for you.

The above said request was explained by phone today to Mrs. Beagan, secretary to your Appointment Secretary.

Yours sincerely,

*Handwritten signature: Dan G. ...*

Dan G. ...  
Associate Professor

DCS/vk

1968 FEB 16 PM 1 59

RECEIVED  
W. MARVIN WATSON

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*File*

*18b*

March 9, 1968

MEMO FOR WALT ROSTOW *S*

Our records show that the previous request from Professor Sud was sent to your shop for handling on February 16th.

Will you please have someone check and see what happened to it.

*Marvin Watson*

Marvin Watson

**WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY**

KALAMAZOO, MICHIGAN 49001

March 5, 1968

Mr. Marvin Watson  
Appointment Secretary to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Watson:

I had written to your office on February 13, requesting a brief appointment with the President with the purpose of bringing my conversation with the Deputy Prime Minister of India, Mr. Morar Ji Desai, to his attention. The said conversation took place on February 7, during my recent trip to India as a Visiting Professor for seven weeks. I had explained the matter in detail to Mrs. Regan, your secretary, over the phone on the same day.

I have not heard from your office to date. I thought I should write you again to indicate my continued interest in seeking the above requested appointment.

Thank you for your attention.

Yours sincerely,

*Gian C. Sud*

Gian C. Sud  
Associate Professor

GCS/sk

3/12/68 Roger Morris called  
Prof. Sud.

*Handwritten notes at top of page, possibly a name and date.*

Associate Professor  
Gen. S. 207

*Handwritten signature or initials.*

Associate Professor

Thank you for your attention.

seeking the above indicated appointment.  
I have not heard from your office to date.

RECEIVED  
MARVIN WATSON

only the above on the same day.  
I was  
conferenced with the President with the billboards in  
the White House  
I had written to your office on February 11, 1942

Dear Mr. Watson:

Washington, D. C.  
The White House  
Appointment Secretary to the President  
Mr. Marvin Watson

March 2, 1942

WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY

WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY

*Handwritten notes and signatures at bottom right.*

19


**PURNENDU KUMAR BANERJEE**  
**AMBASSADOR OF INDIA TO COSTA RICA AND**  
**MINISTER, EMBASSY OF INDIA**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

February 12, 1968

My dear *Mr Hamilton,*

May I be permitted to send you  
a copy of 1968 India calendar for your personal  
use, along with my very best wishes and warm  
regards.

Sincerely,

  
(P.K. BANERJEE)

The Honorable  
Mr. Edward K. Hamilton  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.



EMBASSY  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

File

20

New Delhi, India

January 29, 1968

Edward Hamilton, Esquire  
White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Ed:

I am enclosing the complete story of our most recent Russian defector, Aziz Ouloug-Zade. I think you will find it interesting.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosure (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 07-6  
By isl, NARA, Date 6-28-07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20a

New Delhi, India

January 19, 1968

The Honorable Lucius D. Battle  
Assistant Secretary of State for  
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Luke:

As the story of our most recent uninvited guest from the U.S.S.R., Mr. Aziz Ouloug-Zade, drew to a close, preparations for my trip to Cambodia began and I was not able to put together a full report until now.

I found Aziz to be an articulate (but not aggressive), well-informed and pleasant young man of 28. I am not entirely sure why he defected. He had an acceptable position at Moscow University, his father is a prominent Tadjik intellectual and Party leader, and Aziz himself was trusted by the authorities. He had been a Komsomol member until this status automatically ceased on his 28th birthday.

His action may be related to the growing dissatisfaction among young Soviet intellectuals. He told us that he was unwilling to turn his life over to the Party but felt that his academic career would not progress unless he did so. Aziz, however, is not typical of other young intellectuals in the U.S.S.R. largely because he had traveled abroad and lived as a student in India from 1961 to 1963. During this time he was free of most day-to-day Soviet control and had ample opportunity to investigate and discuss life outside the Soviet Union in a democratic country. His defection decision undoubtedly is related to this fairly unique past experience.

The Soviets have suffered a public relations setback in India as a result of the Aziz case. In the short run it will undoubtedly

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 12-222

By 448

NARA, Date 12-20-2014

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

further hamper their cultural and assistance programs here by causing them to triple-check rather than double-check the dossiers of those whom they wish to send to India. But in the long run, I am convinced that the cumulative effect of a number of cases like that of Aziz can only be to give ammunition to those in the Soviet hierarchy who hopefully are already urging a change in their outmoded policy which characterizes all emigrants as traitors.

The British have gained a new subject who can easily be assimilated and profitably employed. And Aziz has secured his freedom.

The Indians have acted responsibly as a free nation governed by the Rule of Law. While the Ministry of External Affairs did not adopt a particularly enlightened public position during the early stages of the affair, the fact remains that when the crunch came India stood up to the U.S.S.R., gave Aziz excellent care and protection, and allowed him to proceed to the United Kingdom in accordance with his wishes. Much credit should go to the Indian free press.

Our own staff performed with the highest standards of effectiveness in a sensitive and difficult situation, and with absolutely perfect teamwork even though representatives of a number of agencies were actively involved. We were able to use a democratic press and public opinion in attaining a desired diplomatic goal. Above all, we have maintained our posture as a government which is prepared to render all appropriate assistance to legitimate applicants who seek help in escaping oppression.

The enclosed memorandum sets forth the story in some detail. I think you will find it interesting.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

cc: Hon. Dean Rusk  
William J. Handley  
L. Douglas Heck  
Richard Helms  
Edward Hamilton

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

206

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

January 19, 1968

TO: Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary of State

FROM: Chester Bowles

SUBJECT: Defection of Aziz Ouloug-Zade

Aziz Ouloug-Zade walked into our Embassy at 1900 hours, December 20, 1967. Within an hour arrangements had been made for his care and I met with my staff to consider how we should handle the matter.

Earlier in the day, Soviet representatives had come to our chancery on two different occasions to inquire whether we knew anything of Aziz's whereabouts. We truthfully told them that we did not. However, we did not tell them that we knew Aziz had approached the British High Commission early on the 20th asking for resettlement. We later learned that the British had asked him to return, giving them time to obtain instructions. He assumed that this meant they were driving him away and he came to us.

After being advised that Aziz had asked our help, I decided that we should avoid being charged with CIA skulduggery and take the initiative in advising both the GOI and Soviets that Aziz was now in our custody. We so informed the Ministry of External Affairs at 2040 hours; the Soviets at 2055 hours, December 20.

The Soviets promptly requested an opportunity to meet with Aziz. We agreed to allow them to do so and set the time for 2130 that same night. After this appointment was fixed we invited the MEA official, with whom we had been in contact, Rikki Jaipal, to be present. He declined, saying he felt it was better for us to deal directly with the Soviets.

Two Soviet officials, Chief Consular Officer Pripisnov, and Third Secretary Nikiforov, arrived at our Embassy at 2130. Before seeing

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority NLSIRAC 07-6  
 By SAK, NARA, Date 2/20/2008

Aziz, however, they wanted to have a discussion with two of our officers who were on hand.

They expressed a desire to see improved Soviet-American relations and referred to my recent article in the American Reporter, calling for just such a step. The best thing we could do was return Aziz to them. They argued that Aziz was a young man who did not really know his own mind, and it was therefore in his own best interest that the U.S. should return him to the Soviet authorities. They were informed of our long tradition of opening the doors of freedom to those who wished to leave their own country; if Aziz really meant what he said we could not turn him away.

They then met Aziz. Two of our Russian-speaking officers were present during this confrontation. Aziz had been told that he should not feel under any obligation to respond to questions put to him if he should not wish to do so. During the next 25 minutes Aziz stoutly stated, and without any apparent show of nervousness, that he had come to his decision after considerable thought and reflection, and that he did not wish to return to the Soviet Union.

At the end of this session, Pripisnov said that he wished to consult with his Ambassador. It was then 2240 hours.

The two Soviet officials came back at 2305 and stated that Ambassador Pegov wished to meet with me immediately. I was called and decided to meet him at 0930 the next morning allowing the situation some time to settle down.

The Soviet officials then asked to meet again with Aziz, and were told that they could do so for a maximum of ten minutes. At the second meeting Aziz was asked if he had thoroughly reflected on the earlier conversation and if he were prepared to return to the Soviet Union. As soon as Aziz replied in the negative, the two Soviet officials left.

The following morning, December 21st, Ambassador Pegov arrived promptly at 0930 hours accompanied by his interpreter, Ivanov. Pegov appeared calm, candid, collected and unruffled throughout our conversation. He made many of the same arguments emphasizing our

"personal friendship" and desire for improved U.S.-Soviet relations, that had been made the previous evening by Pripisnov. After rejecting his appeal I offered him an opportunity personally to meet with Aziz, which he accepted.

Pegov talked in a restrained, fatherly way to Aziz, pointing out the importance of the step that he was taking, how he was relinquishing his fatherland, and could never succeed in acquiring another one, etc. Aziz firmly informed the Soviet Ambassador that he had no intention of changing his earlier decision.

Shortly after noon our Counsellor for Political-External Affairs, Galen Stone, met with the Indian Chief of Protocol, Bikram Shah, and Krishna K. Rao, the Joint Secretary of the Legal and Treaties Division, MEA. The substance of this conversation was reported to the Department. They requested that the Embassy not spirit Aziz out of the country without the knowledge of the GOI (which assurance Stone gave), and secondly that he be turned over to the Indian authorities in order that the GOI could satisfy itself that it was his genuine desire not to return to the Soviet Union.

Stone replied that before releasing the individual to the GOI, it might be easier if the Indians first endeavored to satisfy themselves by interviewing him on American premises. He pointed out that Soviet pressure on the GOI would be substantially increased once Aziz was fully under their control. Krishna Rao rejected this suggestion on the basis that the GOI had to contend with Parliamentary opinion in the matter. Stone thereupon asked that their request for the release of Aziz be submitted to us in writing. Rao agreed.

Meanwhile, we were in touch with the British High Commission. At 2000 hours (still on December 21) Minister-Counselor Herbert Spivak was called to the UK High Commission, where he met with High Commissioner Freeman and other officials. He was told that word from London had been received indicating British willingness to grant Aziz asylum. Discussions were then held as to the manner in which we might manage to transfer control of Aziz to the British with the cooperation and blessings of the GOI.

Throughout the day we were also faced with the problem of handling the press. On a background basis between midnight and one a.m. on December 21, our Press Attache gave the press the facts as we knew them. This resulted in virtually every daily paper running factually accurate accounts of the events that had transpired. The following day, also on a background basis, we confirmed to the press Pegov's call on me and his interview with Aziz and these events were featured in the December 22 press.

The events of December 22 and 23 are reported in detail by cable. The significance of these developments was that the Ministry of External Affairs made a decision on principle that until Aziz came into the custody of the Government of India, they would not give us or the British any assurances regarding what handling his case might receive.

They informed the British that they had no standing even to discuss the case and delivered a note to us formally requesting that we "see that" Aziz leave the premises of our Embassy. I replied that we would not remove Aziz by force, and thus far lacked any convincing arguments to persuade him to leave voluntarily.

Our press and public relations posture remained excellent, however, as we had kept the initiative again in the December 23 dailies which featured the results of a backgrounder by the British announcing that they had completed all formalities on their side to receive Aziz as a resident of the U.K.

External Affairs officers had several times mentioned to us that the Home Ministry was also involved with the Aziz case. Seeking any reasonable foothold to help us out of what had become an impasse, my Deputy, Jerry Greene, paid an unpublicized call on the Home Secretary, L.P. Singh, on December 24. Singh is a highly effective official who I knew would be willing to take a stand when one is called for. He assured Greene that the Home Ministry would have the full responsibility for Aziz once he left our premises. He stated that if Aziz held firm in his desire to go to the U.K. the Indian Government would permit him to do so and would make arrangements with the U.K. authorities for his departure.

Relying on this assurance, I exchanged letters with Aziz explaining the situation. At our suggestion he agreed to have an Indian lawyer available to advise him while he was under the protection of the Indian authorities. These letters, the texts of which we reported, were sent to the External Affairs Ministry with a note which stated that Aziz had indicated that he would leave our chancery at 1800 hours on that day, December 24.

Aziz did in fact leave that evening at about 1845 with no publicity or major hitch in the arrangements. He had selected as his lawyer C.I. Sareen, who assisted in the defense in 1963 of the defecting Soviet sailor Tarasov, whom the Soviet Government had sought unsuccessfully to extradite from India as a criminal. Aziz remembered the Tarasov case, as he had been in Delhi as a student at that time. Also, he had read, while staying with us, a book that Sareen had written on the case. Sareen accompanied Aziz out of our premises and stayed with him until he had been served with an Indian order directing him to "reside" in a place designated by the Home Ministry and not to receive any visitors except in the presence of Ministry officials.

In order further to discourage an Indian retreat under Soviet pressure we promptly advised the press, at a well attended conference, that Aziz had chosen to "place himself under the protection of the Government of India" and released the texts of the letters exchanged between Aziz and me.

Undoubtedly my decision to release the text of my letter to Aziz irritated the Ministry of External Affairs, for it ran counter to their final position that they would not discuss the Aziz case with us until he was in their custody. The Ministry, through background briefings, sought to get their position into the press, ignoring the fact that in the early stages of discussions with us and with the British they had actually discussed what would happen to Aziz, and also ignoring (if they were aware of it) our private assurances from the Home Secretary.

Nevertheless, our release of the letters was in my opinion an essential element in insuring a continued favorable treatment in the press and consequently fair treatment for Aziz. During the period Aziz was in Indian custody the press gave generally excellent coverage from our point of view and most major dailies ran strong editorials urging the government to permit Aziz to proceed to the U.K. without further delay.

The lawyer, Sareen, although he was only permitted to see his client twice during the time he was in custody, also played an important role in influencing the press and in keeping pressure on the Government to act. He had over 20 meetings with Home Ministry officials on various points and although he did not, in accordance with our advice (always with the provision that he must feel he was acting in the best interests of his client), file formal proceedings in court, the knowledge that he was seriously contemplating such action undoubtedly pushed the case along.

Our Embassy took the position that it had no further reason to discuss the Aziz matter with the Government of India once Aziz had voluntarily left us. The British, however, were able to assert an official interest, and were in fact in touch with the Indians until Aziz finally departed.

While Aziz remained under Home Ministry protection the overt Soviet position toward him continued to be one of friendly persuasion. Their Minister was allowed to talk to him in the presence of Indian officials, and letters from his relatives were delivered to him.

We know that the Soviet Embassy was in consultation with a prominent Indian lawyer, and there are indications that they were working on two legal positions: (1) that the Indian Government was legally required to hand Aziz over to the Soviet Embassy because he was their national, and (2) that the Indian Government had absolute discretion under its own law to hand Aziz over to the Soviet Embassy if it took a political decision to do so. The first of these propositions is almost certainly unfounded; the second remains an open question under Indian law, although Sareen felt that there is a good case to be made on the other side.

In any event, the Indian Government, both because of its own attachment to the concept of individual freedom and because of public relations considerations, decided to let Aziz go to the U.K., exactly as L.P. Singh had assured Jerry Greene. The Soviets, who could certainly have compelled Aziz to remain in custody for months had they either brought extradition proceedings or sought a court order compelling Aziz's return to the USSR under Indian law (however ill founded this latter action might have been) chose not to act. This

choice was undoubtedly dictated by considerations of their public image in India and by their bitter memory of the legal and public relations catastrophe which overcame them in their proceedings against Tarasov.

Aziz was well treated in Indian custody and never wavered in his decision. He finally left on New Year's Eve for London on a BCAC plane in the company of a First Secretary from the British High Commission.

The whole episode has many interesting angles, but by all odds the most important is the testimony it provides to the effectiveness of a free press.

MEMORANDUM

*File*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*India - Population*

*21*

January 17, 1968

W. W. R.

SUBJECT: Indian Population Figures

Attached are some of the statistics promised by the Indians during Chandrasekhar's talk with you. These are birth and death rates (per thousand) ~~by state~~ for 1951 - 1960, as against census estimates of births and deaths for 1966-67. You will note two important qualifications:

-- The birth and death rates for 1966-67 are targets, not hard numbers. (These are really only the "medium" estimates for 1966-70 as projected in the Fourth Plan Document, 1964.) I have asked the Indians to come up with their most recent actual numbers.

-- The table leaves us to compute the difference between births and deaths. For each state, of course, there is a net rise in living souls.

You may find the following figures useful bench marks:


Birth Rates per thousand, 1964-65:

USSR	22.4
Japan	17.2
USA	22.4
Hong Kong	29.4
Ceylon	32.6

Official Indian Birth Rate Projections from the Fourth Plan Document

	<u>1966-70</u>	<u>1971-75</u>	<u>1976-85</u>
High	40.5	38.3	32.8
Medium	38.6	35.1	28.7
Low	36.8	31.8	25.0

Also attached are a couple of pamphlets to give you the flavor of Chandrasekhar's propaganda.

  
Ed Hamilton

21a

Birth rates and death rates in different States of  
India estimated by the Census Actuary

State	1951-60		Estimated for 1966/67	
	Birth rate	Death rate	Birth rate	Death rate
1. Andhra Pradesh	39.7	25.2	37.3	16.6
2. Assam	49.3	26.9	47.6	16.8
3. Bihar	43.4	26.1	40.3	16.1
4. Gujarat	45.7	23.5	42.5	15.0
5. Kerala	38.9	16.1	36.6	11.5
6. Madhya Pradesh	43.2	23.2	39.5	14.5
7. Madras	34.9	22.5	32.6	14.9
8. Maharashtra	41.2	19.8	38.0	12.7
9. Mysore	41.6	22.2	39.1	15.1
10. Orissa	40.4	22.9	37.9	14.7
11. Punjab	44.7	18.9	42.1	11.5
12. Rajasthan	42.7	19.4	39.9	11.4
13. Uttar Pradesh	41.5	24.9	38.8	15.9
14. West Bengal	42.9	20.5	40.8	13.4
All India	41.7	22.8	38.6	14.0

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# FACTS

ABOUT POPULATION

AND **FAMILY PLANNING** IN INDIA

**FACTS ABOUT  
POPULATION & FAMILY PLANNING  
IN INDIA**

Introduction	1
Population Explosion	2
Population History	2
Position Today	3
High Growth Rate	4
Fertility Not High	5
Marriage Age	6
Desire for More Children	7
Good Program: Nutrition	8
Target	9
Communication Barriers	10
Development of Programme	11
Conventional Contraceptives	12
Current Position	13
Sterilisation Programme and Loan	14
Training & Research	15
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**MINISTRY OF HEALTH & FAMILY PLANNING**

**DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY PLANNING**

**GOVERNMENT OF INDIA**

**NEW DELHI**

FACTS ABOUT  
POPULATION & FAMILY PLANNING  
IN INDIA



MINISTRY OF HEALTH & FAMILY PLANNING  
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY PLANNING  
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA  
NEW DELHI

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**INTRODUCTION**

The purpose of this booklet is to present facts and figures about population and family planning programme for use by workers throughout the country.

This publication is also designed to provide information about the staffing patterns envisaged at various levels of the programme and the pattern of assistance available for family planning centres started by governments, local bodies, voluntary organisations and industrial concerns.

I hope workers will find this booklet useful.



(S. Chandrasekhar)  
Minister for Health & Family Planning

New Delhi  
September 12, 1967.

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1 hope workers will find this booklet useful.

(a) *[Signature]*  
 Minister for Health & Family Planning

New Delhi  
 September 12, 1967

**POPULATION EXPLOSION**

India, like other developing countries, is experiencing pressure of population explosion.

India has only 2.4% of world's land but 14% of world population.

One of every 7 persons is an Indian.

Year	Population (in millions)	Population Increase (in millions)	Population Increase (%)
1951	351.2	-	-
1961	383.0	31.8	9.1
1971	438.7	55.7	14.6
1981	500.0	61.3	14.1
1991	566.7	66.7	11.8
2001	633.4	66.7	11.8
2011	700.1	66.7	11.8
2021	766.8	66.7	11.8
2031	833.5	66.7	11.8
2041	900.2	66.7	11.8
2051	966.9	66.7	11.8
2061	1033.6	66.7	11.8
2071	1100.3	66.7	11.8
2081	1167.0	66.7	11.8
2091	1233.7	66.7	11.8
2101	1300.4	66.7	11.8

## POPULATION HISTORY

### 1921 WAS A GREAT DIVIDE

**Population**    **Increase**  
(in millions)

1901	238.3	—
1911	252.0	13.7
1921	251.2	-0.8

**Increase in first**    **12.9**  
**20 years**

1921	251.2	—
1931	278.8	27.6
1941	318.5	39.7

**Increase in next**    **67.3**  
**20 years**

**Population**    **Increase**  
(in millions)

1941	318.6	—
1951	360.0	42.3
1961	439.0	78.1

**Increase in next**    **120.4**  
**20 years**

1961	439.0	—
1966	500.0	61.0
		(5 years)

1994	1000.0	500.0
		(28 years)

## POSITION TODAY

Population more than 500 million.

Birth rate - 41 per 1,000 population.

A baby is born every  $1\frac{1}{2}$  seconds; more than 55,000 a day.

21 million every year.

Infant mortality - 109 per thousand.

Maternal mortality - 10.4 per thousand.

Death rate - 16 per thousand; 8 million deaths every year.

Annual addition 13 million (More than the population of Australia).

Growth rate about 2.5 % per annum.

## HIGH GROWTH RATE

The main cause is not excessive births; our victory against death and disease has also resulted in addition to the population.

Death rate declined from 27 per 1,000 in 1951 to 16 in 1966.

Life expectancy at birth rose from 32 years in 1950 to 50 years in 1966.

Communicable diseases like Malaria, Small pox, Cholera brought under control.

## FERTILITY NOT HIGH

Fertility expressed in terms of gross reproduction rate \* in Asian countries is 3.1 to 3.5.

In India it is 2.7.

Though our rate is not high, yet in terms of the large number of couples in reproductive age group (90m) even this rate is too high.

---

\* The gross reproduction rate indicates the average number of girls a woman will have under the fertility conditions prevailing in the various age groups assuming she lives to the end of her reproductive period. It is a measure of fertility eliminating the effects of changes in the age structure of the population.

### MARRIAGE AGE

	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>
Ireland	26.5	31.4
Japan	23.1	25.8
Singapore	21.1	25.8
Israel	21.1	26.4
Philippines	21.0	24.1
Thailand	20.0	23.7
Ceylon	20.1	26.1
Turkey	19.5	23.3
U. A. R.	19.4	25.2
Malaysia	18.2	23.9
India	14.5	20.0

### DESIRE FOR MORE CHILDREN

A study has shown that desire to have more children drops dramatically after the couple have had three children.

No. of Children	Husbands	Wives
0	89 %	89 %
1	50 %	65 %
2	36 %	35 %
3	8 %	9 %
4	4 %	6 %
5	2 %	6 %

## GOOD PROGRESS NULLIFIED

### FOOD

Food production rose from 55 million tonnes in 1951 to 72 million tonnes in 1965;

But per capita food consumption decreased from 12.8 oz. to 12.4 oz. because of addition of about 140 million people.

### UNEMPLOYMENT

Unemployment backlog in 1951-52 was 3.5 million. By end of 1965, 31 million additional jobs created. However, unemployment rose to nearly 10 million because of immediate increase in population and a consequent increase in the labour force.

### EDUCATION

In 1950-51, 23.49 million children went to school. Since 1951 education facilities expanded 300 per cent. Now, 67.5 million children going to school.

However, 63.8 million children still out of school because 18 million children are being added every year.

### ADDITIONAL RESOURCES REQUIRED ANNUALLY

For the 13 million persons added to the population every year, the additional resources needed are :

- 126,500 Schools
- 372,500 School Teachers
- 2,509,000 Houses
- 188,774,000 Meters of Cloth
- 12,545,300 Quintals of Food
- 4,000,000 Jobs

## TARGETS

**We must bring down birth rate from 41 to 25 to avoid the explosion.**

**90 Million couples in reproductive age group must accept small family norm.**

**50% of these couples to be motivated to actively practise family planning in order to bring down the birth rate to 25 per 1,000. Services to be made readily available to the target population.**

**Choice of contraceptives to be offered.**

### COMMUNICATION BARRIERS

- (a) **Large Country** - We have 17 States and 10 Union Territories. These comprise 335 districts divided into 5200 blocks having 560,000 villages. Each State can be considered a country in itself. If Uttar Pradesh was to join United Nations, it would be the 7th largest member of the United Nations (80 million population).
- (b) **Diversity** - Many religious and cultural groups, 14 major languages, more than 200 dialects.
- (c) **Low literacy & Income** - Literacy 25%, much lower in rural areas.  
Per capita income Rs. 325/-
- (d) **Lack of Communication Channels** -  
Newspapers reach about 12% population.  
Films reach about 20%.  
Radio - Community listening sets provided only in  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the 560,000 villages.  
Television - Only one experimental station in New Delhi covering 30 mile radius.

### DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROGRAMME

#### FIRST PLAN:

Rs. 15,00,000 spent  
147 Family Planning Clinics established  
Rhythm Method  
Training  
Education Materials

#### SECOND PLAN:

Rs. 22 million spent  
Number of Clinics rose to 4165  
Sterilization introduced  
Education  
Research

#### THIRD PLAN:

Rs. 248.6 million spent  
Extension Education (1963)  
Mechanical Methods  
Loop introduced (1965)

#### FOURTH PLAN:

Rs. 2,300 million provided  
Mass Education  
All Contraceptive Methods  
Expansion: 1 Primary Health Centre per 80,000 population, 1 Urban Centre per 50,000 population; 1 Field Worker for every 10,000 population.

## CONVENTIONAL CONTRACEPTIVES

Conventional Contraceptives are planned to be distributed in rural areas through:

5400 Rural Family Planning Centres and

13992 Sub-Centres

7384 Other Medical Centres

In urban areas through:

1580 Family Planning Centres

800 Other Medical Centres

In addition, the contraceptives will also be sold at a highly subsidized price through depot holders in rural and urban areas.

Business organisations having large networks of distribution system for their products are also being involved to help us the sale at a subsidized price of the contraceptives throughout the country through their existing channels.

## CONDOM POSITION

Present consumption	50 million pieces
Our requirement	300 million pieces per annum (200 million for actual use; 100 million for inventory)

### 1967-68

Indigenous production	30 million pieces
Quantity to be imported	270 million pieces
Arrangement made for importing	87.5 million pieces

### Gap

182.5 million pieces

Beginning in 1968, Hindustan Latex Ltd. (a Government of India factory at Trivandrum) will be producing 144 million pieces a year.

## STERILIZATION PROGRAMME

Started 1956

2,56,000 sterilized upto 1961

Gained momentum from 1962

2.5 million sterilized by June 1967

90% of sterilization Vasectomies

10% Tubectomies

### LOOP

Introduced July 1965

About 1.8 million by June 1967

#### April 1966 to March 1967

Sterilization = 864,237

Loops = 915,967

#### April 1967 to June 1967

Sterilization = 1,31,396

Loops = 1,10,176

## TOTAL TRAINING LOAD PERSONNEL REQUIREMENT

Sl. No.	Category of Personnel	Total
1.	Zone Director	1
2.	Assistant Director	2
3.	Assistant Director (F)	2
4.	Assistant Director (M)	2
5.	Medical Officers - (including those in charge of sterilization centres)	76
6.	Medical Officers - (including those in charge of sterilization centres)	64
7.	Assistant Surgeons	107,51
8.	Doctors	11,403
9.	Health Education Officers	54
10.	Health Education Officers	10,503
11.	Health Education Officers	10,503
12.	Health Education Officers	10,503
13.	Health Education Officers	10,503
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88.	Health Education Officers	10,503
89.	Health Education Officers	10,503
90.	Health Education Officers	10,503
91.	Health Education Officers	10,503
92.	Health Education Officers	10,503
93.	Health Education Officers	10,503
94.	Health Education Officers	10,503
95.	Health Education Officers	10,503
96.	Health Education Officers	10,503
97.	Health Education Officers	10,503
98.	Health Education Officers	10,503
99.	Health Education Officers	10,503
100.	Health Education Officers	10,503

### TRAINING & RESEARCH

**PERSONNEL REQUIREMENT**

<b>Rural Family Welfare Planning Centres</b>		<b>5,400</b>	
<b><u>Staff of Rural Centres</u></b>			<b><u>Total Staff</u></b>
			<b>(including urban centres)</b>
<b>Doctor</b>	<b>1 *</b>	<b>Doctors</b>	<b>11,083</b>
<b>Educator</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>Extension Educators</b>	<b>10,063</b>
<b>F. P. Assistants (Male)</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>Mass Education Officers</b>	<b>351</b>
<b>Lady Health Visitors</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>F. P. Assistants</b>	<b>22,421</b>
<b>Auxiliary Nurse Midwives</b>	<b>10**</b>	<b>Lady Health Visitors/ Auxiliary Nurse Midwives</b>	<b>11,572</b>
		<b>Auxiliary Nurse Midwives</b>	<b>54,618</b>
		<b>Others</b>	<b>13,092</b>
			<b><u>1,23,200</u></b>

\* In addition to the existing doctor.

\*\* One at headquarters for MCH; one at headquarters for family planning and one for each sub-centre of 10,000 population.

**TOTAL TRAINING LOAD**

<b>Sl. No.</b>	<b>Category of Personnel</b>	<b>Total</b>
1.	Zonal Directors	3
2.	Joint Directors / Deputy Directors	16
3.	Assistant Directors (FP)	25
4.	Officers - in - Charge (Training Centre)	46
5.	District F. P. Medical Officers	336
6.	Medical Officers - Incharge (IUCD)	26
7.	Medical Lect. - Cum - Demonstrators	46
8.	Assistant Surgeons Grade I	10,370
9.	Health Education Officers	26
10.	Health Education Instructors	46
11.	Mass Education & Information Officers	336
12.	District Extension Educators	672
13.	Health Education Extension Officers	184
14.	Social Science Instructors	46
15.	P. H. N. Instructors	46
16.	Administrative Officers	360
17.	Stores Officers	26
18.	Storekeeper - cum - Clerk - cum - Accountants	7,328
19.	Statisticians	72
20.	Statistical Investigators	336
21.	Statistical Assistants	26
22.	Computers	5,617
23.	Extension Educators	9,239
24.	P. H. N. / Lady Health Visitors	11,572
25.	O. T. Nurses	336
26.	F. P. Field Workers - Male (Health Asstt.)	22,421
27.	F. P. Field Workers - Female (Auxiliary Nurse Midwives)	54,618
	<b>Total</b>	<b><u>124,175</u></b>

## TRAINING FACILITIES

5 Central Institutes. Capacity to train 1,500 State and District level personnel.

46 State Centres (27 Established) to train 124,000 peripheral workers.

335 District Cells.

Other Centres include Family Planning in their curricula.

### PERSONNEL TRAINED UP-TO-DATE:

2,680 Doctors

8,845 Other workers

} Long term courses

7,714 Doctors

6,012 Other workers

} Short term courses

## CENTRAL TRAINING INSTITUTES

### 1. Central Family Planning Institute, New Delhi.

Trains State Family Planning Officers, medical lecturers-cum-demonstrators, social science instructors, health education instructors, health education extension officers, statistician and public health nurse instructors.

### 2. All-India Institute of Hygiene & Public Health, Calcutta.

Trains District Family Planning Officers.

### 3. Central Health Education Bureau, New Delhi.

Trains District Extension Educators.

### 4. Family Planning Training & Research Centre, Bombay.

Trains District Extension Educators.

### 5. Institute of Rural Health & Family Planning, Chandigarh.

Trains District Extension Educators.

### STAFFING PATTERN OF CENTRAL FAMILY PLANNING FIELD UNITS

To cope with the work of training of medical, para-medical and non-medical personnel, mobile field units have been provided :

STAFF	SANCTIONED STRENGTH
Family Planning Officer	1
Assistant Surgeon Gr. I	1
Health Educator (Gazetted)	1
Investigator	-
Social Worker	1
Health Educator (Non-Gazetted)	1
Technical Assistant	-
Projectionist/Projectionist-cum-Driver	1
Mechanic	1
Driver	1
Stenographer/steno-typist	1
Upper Division Clerk	1
Lower Division Clerk	1
Peon	1

### LOCATION OF CENTRAL FAMILY PLANNING FIELD UNITS

1. The Regional Director (FP)  
Regional Health Office,  
48/8, Hindustan Park,  
Calcutta.
2. The Family Planning Officer,  
Central Family Planning Field Unit,  
Assam, Shillong.
3. The Family Planning Officer,  
Central Family Planning Field Unit,  
Road No. 13, Rajendra Nagar, Patna-4.
4. The Regional Director (FP)  
Regional Health Office, Jawa Bhawan,  
B-753, Mahanagar, Lucknow.
5. The Regional Director (FP)  
Regional Health Office,  
House No. 91, Sector 2-B, Chandigarh.
6. The Family Planning Officer,  
Central Family Planning Field Unit,  
55, Sarojini Marg, 'C' Scheme,  
Jaipur.

7. The Family Planning Officer,  
Central Family Planning Field Unit,  
C/o Civil Surgeon & Officer-in-charge,  
Civil and Military Dispensary, Rippon Hospital,  
Simla.
8. The Family Planning Officer,  
C/o Director Health Services, J. & K.  
Srinagar.
9. The Regional Director (FP)  
Regional Health Office,  
Banganga Professors Colony,  
Near Vidya Vihar, Bhopal.
10. The Family Planning Officer,  
Central Family Planning Field Unit,  
Gautam Nagar, New Capital,  
Bhubaneswar.
11. The Regional Director (FP),  
Regional Health Office,  
17, Lalit Kunj, Navrangpura,  
Ahmedabad-9.
12. The Family Planning Officer,  
Central Family Planning Field Unit,  
711-A, Shankar Seth Road, Poona.

13. The Regional Director (FP)  
Regional Health Office,  
45, Fair Field Road,  
High Ground, Bangalore.
14. The Family Planning Officer,  
Central Family Planning Field Unit,  
Brindabad, Kunnukuzhi,  
Trivandrum.
15. The Family Planning Officer,  
Central Family Planning Field Unit,  
Radhakunj Panjagutta,  
Hyderabad-4.
16. The Family Planning Officer,  
Central Family Planning Field Unit,  
C/o D. A. D. G., (MS) Medical Store Depot,  
Madras.

**STAFFING PATTERN OF FAMILY PLANNING  
TRAINING CENTRES**

Sl. No.	Designation of the post	No. of posts
1.	Officer-in-charge	1
2.	Medical Lecturer - cum - Demonstrator	1
3.	Health Educator Instructor	1
4.	Social Science Instructor	1
5.	Public Health Nurse Instructor	1
6.	Health Education Extension Officer	1
7.	Statistician	1
8.	Office Superintendent	1
9.	Computer	1
10.	Artist - cum - Draftsman	1
11.	Clerk - cum - Accountant - cum - Storekeeper	1
12.	Clerk - cum - Typist	1
13.	Steno - typist	1
14.	Peon - cum - Daftry	1
15.	Driver - cum - Mechanic	1
16.	Domestic Staff (e. g. Cook, Aya / Attendant / Bearer)	2 or 3

**PATTERN OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR STATE  
FAMILY PLANNING TRAINING CENTRES**

Item of expenditure	Ceiling of expenditure Rs.
<b>Non-Recurring</b>	<b>80,000</b>
One bus and equipment including duplicating machine, projector, typewriter and furniture.	
<b>Recurring (per annum)</b>	
(a) Pay, allowances, etc. of staff (as per pattern given on p. 24.)	1,00,400
(b) Stipends and T. A. to trainees at prescribed rates.	25,000
(c) Contingencies, including cost of petrol and maintenance of vehicles, purchase of education material, free distribution of contraceptives for training, books for the library, etc.	6,000
(d) Rent for training centre and hostel for trainees in case government accommodation is not available.	18,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,49,400</b>
<b>Grand Total (non-recurring &amp; recurring)</b>	<b>2,29,400</b>

**SANCTIONED AND FUNCTIONING STATE  
FAMILY PLANNING TRAINING CENTRES**

Name of State	Sanctioned	Functioning
ANDHRA PRADESH	4	1
ASSAM	1	1
BIHAR	5	1
GUJARAT	2	5
KERALA	2	2
MADHYA PRADESH	3	2
MADRAS	3	3
MAHARASHTRA	4	2
MYSORE	2	2
ORISSA	2	1
PUNJAB	2	2
RAJASTHAN	2	1
WEST BENGAL	4	1
HIMACHAL PRADESH	1	-
UTTAR PRADESH	7	4
JAMMU & KASHMIR	1	-
DELHI	1	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>28</b>

**LOCATION OF STATE TRAINING CENTRES**

Andhra Pradesh	1. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Samajiguda Hyderabad.
Assam	1. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Police Bazar, Shillong.
Bihar	1. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Road No. 2, Rajendra Nagar, Patna-4.
Gujarat	1. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Ranchhodlal Dispensary, Panchkuva, Ahmedabad. 2. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Kolswada Building, Junction Plot, Rajkot.
Haryana	1. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Rohtak.
Kerala	1. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, S. A. T. Hospital, Medical College, Ullor, Trivandrum. 2. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Calicut.

- Madhya Pradesh**
1. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, 29, South Tukoganj, Indore.
  2. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Pachpedi, Jabalpur.
  3. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Bilaspur.
- Madras**
1. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Institute of Obstetrics & Gynaecology, Govt. Hospital for Women & Children, Madras.
  2. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Adyar.
  3. Institute of Rural Health & Family Planning, Gandhigram, District Madurai, Madras.
- Maharashtra**
1. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Poona.
  2. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Nagpur.
  3. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Nasik.
  4. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Aurangabad.
- Mysore**
1. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Ramanagram, Bangalore City.
  2. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Karnatak Medical College, Hubli.

- Orissa**
1. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, S. E. B. Medical College, Cuttack.
- Punjab**
1. State Family Planning Training & Research Centre, Chandigarh.
- Rajasthan**
1. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Bunglow No. 2, Museum Marg, Jaipur.
- West Bengal**
1. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, 154, Bepin Behari Ganguli Street, Calcutta-12.
  2. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Kalyani.
- Uttar Pradesh**
1. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Lucknow.
  2. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Meerut.
  3. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Agra.
  4. Regional Family Planning Training Centre, Jaunpur.

**RESEARCH CENTRES**

Bio - Medical Research Centres	7
Communication - Research Centres	10
Demographic Research Centres	11

Provision of Rs. 53 million for research in the Fourth Plan.

**LOCATION OF BIO-MEDICAL RESEARCH CENTRES**

1. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi.
2. Irwin Hospital, New Delhi.
3. K. G. Medical College, Lucknow.
4. B. J. Medical College, Ahmedabad.
5. Indian Cancer Research Centre, Bombay.
6. Eden Hospital Medical College, Calcutta.
7. Bengal Immunity Research Institute, Calcutta.
8. Institute of Post-graduate Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh.

**LOCATION OF COMMUNICATION-ACTION  
RESEARCH CENTRES**

1. Central Family Planning Institute,  
L-17, Green Park,  
New Delhi-16.
2. Planning Research & Action Institute,  
Uttar Pradesh, Kalakankar House,  
Lucknow.
3. University of Kerala,  
Trivandrum.
4. Shri V. T. K. Institute of Rural Development,  
Post Samiala, M. S. University of Baroda,  
Baroda.
5. Demographic Training & Research Centre,  
Govandi Station Road, Chembur,  
Bombay-71.
6. Indian Statistical Institute,  
203, Barrackpore Trunk Road,  
Calcutta-35.

7. Institute of Rural Health & Family Planning,  
Gandhigram P. O. Ambathurai (Rly. Station),  
Madurai District (Madras State).
8. Indian Institute of Technology,  
Kanpur.
9. Lady Hardinge Medical College & Hospital,  
New Delhi.

**LOCATION OF DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH CENTRES**

1. Patna University,  
Patna.
2. Demographic Research Scheme,  
Statistical Service Unit,  
Faculty of Science,  
M. S. University of Baroda,  
Lokmanya Tilak Road,  
Baroda-2.
3. Institute of Economic Growth,  
University of Delhi,  
University Enclave,  
Delhi-7.
4. Demographic Research Centre,  
Indian Statistical Institute,  
203, Barrackpore Trunk Road,  
Calcutta-35.
5. Gokhale Institute of Politics & Economics,  
Poona-4.
6. Demographic Training & Research Centre,  
Govandi Station Road, Chembur,  
Bombay-71.

7. Demographic Research Centre,  
Institute of Economic Research,  
Vidyagiri, Dharwar-4 (Mysore State)
8. University of Lucknow,  
Lucknow.
9. Institute of Population Studies,  
Gandhinagar, Madras.
10. Demographic Research Centre,  
Bureau of Economics & Statistics,  
Kerala, Trivandrum.

LOCATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH CENTRES


NOTES

1. Demographic Research Centre, Mysore.
2. Institute of Economic Research, Mysore.
3. Vidyalaya, Mysore (Mysore State).
4. University of Lucknow, Lucknow.
5. Institute of Population Studies, Gandhinagar, Madras.
6. Demographic Research Centre, Madras.
7. Bureau of Economic & Statistics, Kerala, Trivandrum.
8. Demographic Training & Research Centre, Ghandi Station Road, Chandigarh.
9. Demographic Research Centre, Lucknow.
10. Institute of Population Studies, Gandhinagar, Madras.

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

FAMILY PLANNING CABINET COMMITTEE  
 MINISTER HEALTH & F.A.  
 SECRETARY HEALTH & F.A.

ORGANISATION



## CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

FAMILY PLANNING CABINET COMMITTEEMINISTER HEALTH & F. P.DY. MINISTER HEALTH & F. P.SECRETARY HEALTH & F. P.DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY PLANNINGSecretariat Wing

Joint Secretary  
Dy. Secretary (2)  
Under Secretary (3)

Technical Wing

Commissioner  
Dy. Commissioner (2)  
Asstt. Commissioner (4)

Establishment    Planning    Budget    Field Operations    Mass Education  
and Media

Committee  
&  
Conference

Grants

Development

Training

Conventional  
Contraceptives

IUCD

Research and  
Evaluation

Sterilization

Maternity &  
Child HealthSupply and  
Transport**REGIONAL ORGANISATION**

To provide consultation to States in the development and implementation of the family planning programme, the country has been divided into six regions. Each region is in the charge of a Regional Director. Their addresses are as follows :-

Address	Region	Headquarters	States covered
Regional Director (FP), Regional Health Office, 48/8 Hindustan Park, Calcutta-29.	Eastern	Calcutta	Bihar, West Bengal, Assam, Manipur, NEFA, Nagaland, Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Regional Director (FP), Regional Health Office, Jawa Bhawan, B-753, Mahanagar Lucknow.	Northern	Lucknow	Uttar Pradesh
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Regional Director (FP), Regional Health Office, House No. 91, Sector 2-B, Chandigarh.	North- Western	Chandigarh	Punjab, Rajasthan, Jammu & Kashmir, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh.
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Regional Director (FP) Central Bhopal Madhya Pradesh  
Regional Health & Orissa.  
Office, Banganga  
Professors Colony,  
Near Vidya Vihar,  
Bhopal.

Regional Director (FP) Western Baroda Maharashtra,  
Regional Health Gujarat &  
Office, 17, Lalita Kunj, Goa.  
Navrangpura,  
Ahmedabad-9.

Regional Director Southern Bangalore Mysore,  
(FP), Regional Madras,  
Health Office, Kerala,  
No. 45, Fair Field Andhra,  
Road, High ground, Pondicherry,  
Bangalore-1. Laccadive,  
Minicoi &  
Aminidive  
Islands.

**FAMILY PLANNING CELL, STATE HEALTH MINISTRY**

1. Under Secretary / Assistant |
2. Upper Division Assistant |
3. Steno-typist |
4. Peon |

The grades of pay and allowances of the above officers have to be according to those prevalent in each state for similar categories of personnel. The Central Government provides 90% subsidy for all recurring and 100% for all non-recurring expenditure.

**STATE FAMILY PLANNING BUREAU**

**Joint Director-I**

**(A) Administration & Stores Division**

<b>Administrative Officer (F. P.)</b>	
<b>Senior Deputy Collector</b>	1
<b>Stores Officer</b>	1
<b>Office Superintendent</b>	1
<b>Stenographer</b>	1
<b>Inspection Officers of Stores</b>	2
<b>Upper Division Assistants (One for store)</b>	3
<b>Senior Accountant</b>	1
<b>Accountants (One for store)</b>	2
<b>Lower Division Clerks</b>	3
<b>Typists</b>	3
<b>Packers</b>	2
<b>Peons</b>	5
<b>Drivers</b>	2
<b>Cleaners</b>	2
<b>Night Guard</b>	1

**(B) Operations Division**

**Assistant Director of Health Services (FP)**

**i) Education & Information**

**Mass Education & Communication Officer** 1

**Education Officer** 1

**Upper Division Clerk** 1

**Assistant Editor** 1

**Artist-cum-Photographer** 1

**Steno-typist** 1

(Other Staff as needed)

**ii) Planning, Field Operation, Evaluation & Training :**

**Medical Officer Incharge (IUCD Programme)** 1

**Statistician** 1

**Statistical Assistant** 1

**Upper Division Clerks** 2

The grades of pay and allowances of all officers in the State Family Planning Bureau have to be according to those prevalent in the state for similar categories of personnel. The Central Government provides subsidy for the purpose at 90% for all recurring expenditure and 100% for non-recurring expenditure.

## ADDRESSES OF STATE F.P. OFFICERS

States

1. Assistant Director of P.H.(FP),  
Dte. of Public Health,  
(A.P.) Sultan Bazaar,  
Hyderabad, Tel. 47173.
2. Jt. Director of Health,  
Planning & Education  
Services (FP), Dte. of  
H.S. (Assam), Shillong.  
Tel. 172, NAGALAND. (Sectt.)
3. Dy. Director of H.S.,  
Dte. of Health Services,  
(Bihar) New Sectt. Patna.
4. Dy. Director of P.H.(FP),  
Health Section, Public  
Health Department,  
Gujarat, Ahmedabad.
5. Asst. Director of H.S.,  
Dte. of Health Services,  
(J&K), Srinagar.
6. Dy. Director of H.S. (FP),  
Dte. of H.S., (Kerala)  
Trivandrum.
7. Dy. Director of H.S.(FP),  
Dte. of H.S.(MP),  
Old Secretariat,  
E-Block,  
Bhopal.
8. State F.P. Officer,  
Dte. of P.H., 31 Mount Rd.,  
Madras-6, Tel. 71055, Res. 72379.
9. Dy. Director (FP),  
Dte. of Public Health (Mah.)  
Connaught House, Poona-1,  
Tel. 22232.
10. Dy. Director of P.H.(FP),  
(State F.P. Bureau),  
Ananda Rao Circle,  
Bangalore, Tel. 26236.
11. Jt. Director of H.S. (FP),  
Dte. of Health Services,  
(Orissa), Bhubaneswar.
12. Dy. Director of H.S.(FP),  
Dte. of Health Services,  
Punjab, Chandigarh.
13. Addl. Director (F.P.),  
Dte. of Medical & H.S.,  
(Raj.) Jaipur, Tel. 3919.
14. Addl. Director of H.S. (FP),  
U.P., 30 Bishesharanath Rd.,  
Lucknow, Tel. 25214. Res. 26169.
15. Dy. Director of H.S.,  
Dte. of H.S., Writer's Bldg.,  
Calcutta, Tel. 22-1681/149.
16. Dy. Director of H.S.,  
Haryana, Chandigarh

## UNION TERRITORIES

1. Chief Medical Officer,  
Family Planning,  
Union Territory of Goa,  
Daman & Diu, Panaji (Goa).
2. Asstt. Director of Health Services,  
(M & CW & Family Planning),  
Directorate of Health Services,  
Himachal Pradesh, Simla.
3. Dy. Director of Medical & Health Services,  
Manipur Administration,  
Imphal.
4. State Family Planning Officer,  
Directorate of Medical Services,  
4, Roman Roland Road,  
Pondicherry.
5. Directorate of Health Services,  
Agartala.
6. Supdtt. of Medical Services and  
Director of Family Planning,  
Delhi Administration,  
2, Battery Lane,  
Rajpur Road, Delhi.

## STAFFING PATTERN OF DISTRICT FAMILY PLANNING BUREAUX

### I. District Family Planning Officer (Class I Officer)

### II. Administrative Division :

Administrative Officer (Sub-Deputy Collector/Tehsildar)	1
Upper Division Clerk	1
Assistant Accountant	1
Cashier	1
Upper Division Clerk (Stores)	1
Lower Division Clerk-cum-Typist	1
Steno-typist	1
Peons	2

### III. Education & Information Division :

Mass Education & Information Officer	
District Extension Educators (one male and one female) ,	2
Artist - cum - Photographer	1
Projectionist	1
Driver-cum-Mechanic	1
Cleaner	1

### IV. Field Operation and Evaluation Division

Statistical Investigator	1
Family Planning Field Evaluation Workers (one male and one female)	2

#### (a) Sterilization Unit Mobile (one for District Bureau)

Assistant Surgeon Grade I	1
Operation Theatre Nurse	1
Operation Theatre Attendant	1
Driver-cum-Mechanic	1
Cleaner	1

#### (b) I. U. C. D. Unit (Mobile) one for 5 to 7.5 lakh population :

Assistant Surgeon Grade I (preferably a Lady Doctor)	1
Auxiliary Nurse Midwife	1
Attendants (one male and one female)	2
Driver-cum-Mechanic	1

The grades of pay and allowances for all officers in the District Family Planning Bureau have to be according to those prevalent for similar categories of personnel. The Central Government provides subsidy at 90% for recurring and 100% for non-recurring expenditure.

### PATTERN OF ASSISTANCE FOR DISTRICT FAMILY PLANNING BUREAU

Non-recurring :	Amount (Rupees)
(a) Transport (i) Vehicles for Mobile units each vehicle	25,000 for
(ii) Auto-cycle. I	2,000
(b) Furniture and Equipment (Sterilization, IUCD Cauterie Sets, Microscope, etc.)	48,000
 <b>Recurring :</b>	
(a) Staff for the Distt. Family Planning Bureau as per pattern (P. 46 & 47)	
(b) * Contraceptives	7,500
(c) (i) Contingencies including expenditure on Family Planning Day, Children's Day celebration, training, conferences, etc.	5,000
(ii) General contingent expenditure @ 2.5% of pay and allowances of the staff	2,500
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>90,000/-</b>

\* The amount shown against contraceptives indicates only the initial allotment of funds and not the maximum ceilings. Funds would be provided on "as required" basis to meet the actual expenditure.

### RURAL FAMILY PLANNING CENTRES AND SUB-CENTRES

#### 1. Main Centre at the Primary Health Centre

Assistant Surgeon Grade I	1 *
Extension Educator Family Planning	1
Computer	1
Storekeeper-cum-Clerk-cum-Accountant	1
Auxiliary Nurse Midwives	2 **
Voluntary Worker	1

#### 2. Sub-Centres (one for 10,000 population)

Auxiliary Nurse Midwife	1
Voluntary worker (to act as female attendant)	1
Male Family Planning Field Worker (Family Planning Health Assistant)	1 for two Sub-centres
Lady Health Visitor	1 for 40,000 population

The grades of pay and allowances for all officers will be according to those prevalent for similar categories of personnel. The Central Government gives full subsidy for the purpose.

\* In addition to existing doctor.

\*\* One for MCH and one for family planning.

**NOTES**

One for MCH and one for family planning.  
 \* In addition to existing doctor.  
 \*\* One for MCH and one for family planning.

...the number of pay and allowances for all officers will  
 be according to those provided for similar categories in  
 the existing pay scales. The Central Government gives full subsidy for  
 the salaries of all staff in the health centres and for the running  
 expenses of the centres.

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...the number of pay and allowances for all officers will  
 be according to those provided for similar categories in  
 the existing pay scales. The Central Government gives full subsidy for  
 the salaries of all staff in the health centres and for the running  
 expenses of the centres.

**MUNICIPALITIES & PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS**

**MUNICIPALITIES, URBAN BODIES  
 AND  
 PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS**

Cash Awards	100
Service Advance	200
Contingency	300
Contractives (on a regular basis)	1,000
Family Planning Field Worker - I	1,500
Medical Officer (part-time)	1,200
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,870</b>

...the number of pay and allowances for all officers will  
 be according to those provided for similar categories in  
 the existing pay scales. The Central Government gives full subsidy for  
 the salaries of all staff in the health centres and for the running  
 expenses of the centres.

### MUNICIPALITIES & PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS

Municipalities and public sector undertakings catering to population upto 10,000 are entitled to the following pattern of assistance:

Non-recurring:	Rupees
Educational aids, furniture, etc.	1,000
<b>Recurring:</b>	
Medical Officer (part-time) - I	1,200*
Family Planning Field Worker - I	1,620
Contraceptives (on 'as required' basis)	1,000
Contingencies	300
Service Advance	500
Cash Awards	250
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,870</b>

\* Rupees 100 per month for 6 hours of work per week (two hours work for three days). Flexibility of working hours may be allowed but total working hours should not be less than six hours per week.

Municipalities and public sector undertakings where family planning programmes cater to a population ranging from 10,000 to 25,000 get the following assistance for staff and services:

Non-recurring:	Rupees
Furniture, etc.	2,000
<b>Recurring:</b>	
Part-time Doctors - Two (1 male, 1 female)	2,400 *
Family Planning Workers (1 male, 1 female)	3,240
Contingencies	500
Contraceptives (on 'as required' basis)	1,500
Service Advance	1,000
Cash Awards	500
<b>Total</b>	<b>11,140</b>

\* Rs. 100 p. m. for 6 hours of work in a week (2 hours work for 3 days). Flexibility of working hours may be allowed, but total working hours should not be less than 6 hours per week.

**Urban bodies \* and public sector undertakings\*\*** where family planning programmes serve population ranging from 25,000 to 40,000 are entitled to the assistance for non-recurring and recurring expenditure as per the pattern given on next page:

\* The scale of pay and allowances for the staff should normally not exceed that sanctioned for the corresponding staff of the State Government.

\*\* The scales of pay applicable to the staff appointed under the Family Planning Programme should conform to those for similar posts in the undertaking. For posts which do not exist under the undertaking, Central Government scales of pay may be adopted.

This pattern provides flexibility for incurring expenditure within the overall ceilings fixed. If Medical Officers are already employed by Public Sector Undertakings and no additional doctors have to be appointed, a part of the savings should be utilised for additional promotional efforts. For this purpose, proposals may be sent to the Department of Family Planning, Ministry of Health & Family Planning for approval.

**Non-recurring : Rupees**

Equipment, furniture, building  
repairs and education aids, etc. 3,000

**Recurring :**

Part-time doctors- 2 (1 male, 1 female)	2,400
F. P. Extension Educator- 1	2,880
F. P. Welfare Workers- 2 (1 male, 1 female)	3,240
Attendant	1,080
Contingencies	1,000
Contraceptives (on 'as required' basis)	1,500 *
Service Advance	2,000
Cash Awards	1,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>18,100</b>

\* The amounts shown against contraceptives indicate initial allotment of funds and NOT maximum ceilings. 100% central assistance will be admissible for the actual expenditure incurred for distribution of contraceptives.

Urban Family Planning Centres\* and public sector undertakings\*\* where family Planning programmes cater to needs of population more than 40,000 and upto 50,000 get assistance according to the pattern given on the next page:

\* The scale of pay and allowances for the staff should normally not exceed that sanctioned for the corresponding staff of the State Government.

\*\* The scales of pay applicable to the staff appointed under the Family Planning Programme should conform to those for similar posts in the undertaking. For posts which do not exist under the undertaking, Central Government scales of pay may be adopted.

This pattern provides flexibility for incurring expenditure within the overall ceilings fixed. If Medical Officers are already employed by Public Sector Undertakings and no additional doctors have to be appointed, a part of the savings should be utilised for additional promotional efforts. For this purpose, proposals may be sent to the Department of Family Planning, Ministry of Health & Family Planning for approval.

Non-recurring:	Rupees
Equipment, furniture, building repairs and education aids.	3,000
<b>Recurring (Annual):</b>	
Full-time/part-time Medical Officers (1 male and 1 female)	2 5,400
Family Planning Extension Educator (Female)	1 2,880
Family Planning Extension Educator (Male)	1 2,800
Family Planning Welfare Workers (1 male and 1 female)	2 3,240
Storkeeper-cum-clerk-cum-Accountant	1 1,800
Attendant	1 1,080
Contingencies: (includes expenditure on Family Planning Day, special meetings, education and publicity material, etc.)	1,000
Contraceptives	1,500 *
Service Advance	3,500
Cash Awards	1,500
<b>Total:</b>	<b>27,700</b>

\* The amounts shown against contraceptives indicate initial allotment of funds and NOT maximum ceilings. 100% central assistance will be admissible for the actual expenditure incurred for distribution of contraceptives.

NOTES

Non-recurring: Equipment, furniture, building repairs and education aids. 3,000

Recurring (Annual): Full-time part-time Medical Officers 400.00 Family Planning Extension Educator (Female) 1,880 Family Planning Extension Educator (Male) 2,800 Family Planning Welfare Workers (Male and Female) 2,140 Clerk-typist-Accountant 1,800 Attendant 1,880

Contractives (includes expenditure on: Family Planning Day special meetings, education and publicity material, etc.) 1,000 Service Advance 3,200

Total: 27,700

\* The amount shown against contractives indicates initial allotment of funds and NOT maximum ceiling. 100% central assistance will be admissible for the actual expenditure incurred for distribution of contractives.

CITY FAMILY PLANNING BUREAU

In cities with population between 2-4 lakhs urban centers are established for every 20,000 population. To coordinate the work of these centers, City Family Planning Bureaux are established. There are three patterns of assistance according to population as follows:

Type I: For population between 2-3 lakhs

Non-recurring: Furniture, education aids, etc. 10,000

Recurring: Family Planning Medical Officers 7,200 City-cum-typist 1,500 Contractives (on the required basis) 1,000

Contingencies (including expenditure on Family Planning Day, Child Day, Day celebration & Welfare Activities) 3,750

Preparation of educational material 500

Rent for the accommodation (Rs. 250 per month) 2,400

Conveyance allowance for supervisory staff (Rs. 25/- per month) 300

Car allowance for Extension Educator (Rs. 2/- per month) 60

Total: 30,750

The top scales of staff should not exceed the scales for similar categories of personnel sanctioned by the respective State Governments.

### CITY FAMILY PLANNING BUREAUX

In cities with population between 2-5 lakhs urban centres are established for every 50,000 population. To coordinate the work of these centres, City Family Planning Bureaux are established. There are three patterns of assistance according to population as follows :

#### Type I : For Population between 2 to 5 lakhs

	<i>Rupees</i>
<b>Non-Recurring :</b>	
Furniture, education aids, etc.	10,000
<b>Recurring : *</b>	
Family Planning Medical Officer	1      7,200
Extension Educator	1      4,200
Clerk-cum-typist	1      1,800
Contraceptives (on 'as required' basis)	1,000
Contingencies (including expenditure on Family Planning Day, Children's Day celebration & welfare activities, preparation of educational material)	3,790
Rent for the accommodation (@ Rs. 200 per month)	2,400
Conveyance allowance for supervisory Officer (@ Rs. 25/- per month)	300
Cycle allowance for Extension Educator (@ Rs. 5/- per month)	60
<b>Total</b>	<b>30,750</b>

\* The pay scales of staff should not exceed the scales for similar categories of personnel sanctioned by the respective State Governments.

#### Type II : For Population between 5—7.5 lakhs

	<i>Rupees</i>
<b>Non-recurring :</b>	
Equipment, furniture & educational aids, jeep with trailer.	35,000
<b>Recurring : *</b>	
Family Planning Medical Officer	1      7,200
Extension Educator	1      4,200
Clerk-cum-typist	1      1,800
Projectionist	1      1,560
Contraceptives (on 'as required' basis)	1,500
Contingencies (including expenditure on Family Planning Day/Children's Day celebration & welfare activities, preparation of educational material, training, conferences, etc.)	5,690
Rent for the accommodation (@ Rs. 200/- per month)	2,400
Conveyance allowance for supervisory Officer (@ Rs. 25/- per month)	300
Cycle allowance for Extension Educator (@ Rs. 5/- per month)	60
<b>Total</b>	<b>59,710</b>

\* The pay scales of staff should not exceed the scales for similar categories of personnel sanctioned by the respective State Governments.

Type III : For population of more than 7.5 lakhs  
but less than 10 lakhs.

Non-recurring :	Rupees
Equipment, furniture, building repairs, educational aids, one station wagon.	50,000
<b>Recurring : *</b>	
Family Planning Medical Officer	7,200
Assistant Surgeon Grade I (Female)	5,300
Extension Educators (One male and one female) 2	8,400
Statistical Assistant	2,520
Upper Division Clerk-cum-typist. cum-Storekeeper	2,280
O. T. Attendant	1,500
Projectionist	1,560
Driver-cum-Mechanic-cum-Cleaner	1,320
Contraceptives (on 'as required' basis**)	1,500
Contingencies (including expenditure on Family Planning Day Children's Day celebration, welfare activities, preparation of educational materials, training, conferences, maintenance of vehicles cost of petrol, etc.)	7,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>88,580</b>

\* The pay scales of staff should not exceed the scales for similar categories of personnel sanctioned by the respective State Governments.

\*\* The amount shown against contraceptives is not a ceiling. It is only initial allotment. Funds equal to actual amount of contraceptives distributed will be made available.

## PATTERN OF ASSISTANCE FOR UNITS OF CENTRAL SOCIAL WELFARE BOARD AND BHARTIYA GRAMEEN MAHILA SANGH

**PATTERN OF ASSISTANCE FOR UNITS OF  
CENTRAL SOCIAL WELFARE BOARD AND  
BHARTIYA GRAMEEN MAHILA SANGH**

<b>Non-recurring :</b>	<b>Ceiling of expenditure per centre</b>
	<b>Rupees</b>
Construction of accommodation for a Family Planning Welfare Centre and residential accommodation for Central Family Planning Welfare Worker, equipments and furniture.	7,500
<b>Recurring :</b>	
For one Family Planning Welfare Worker for each centre.	3,000
Contraceptives : *	500 *

The accommodation as provided under non-recurring expenditure above may, subject to the cost of Rs. 7000, include:

- (a) a living room, kitchen, bath room, lavatory and a verandah for residence of the Family Planning Welfare Worker.
- (b) two rooms for the Welfare Centre, a store and pantry, sanitary annexe and a room for group meetings.

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\* Supplementary grant will be provided on 'as required' basis for contraceptives.

A grant of Rs. 6,500/- will also be given to the State Social Welfare Advisory Board to meet the expenditure on pay, T. A. and D. A. of a clerk - cum - accountant and a social worker for supervision and guidance of the rural centres. This grant to the State Welfare Board will be released on the recommendations of the Central Social Welfare Board.

<b>Recurring</b>	<b>Ceiling of expenditure per centre</b>
Population exceeding 10,000	Rupees. 3,000 (as for other voluntary organisations).

Grants - in - aid under category II will be sanctioned on merits of each proposal provided the work load and working are satisfactory in every case.

**PATTERN OF ASSISTANCE FOR UNITS IN  
INDUSTRY, TEA GARDENS**

The following is the pattern of assistance for family planning programmes undertaken by tea estates and industries not covered by the Employees State Insurance Corporation:

<b>Category I</b>	<b>Assistance</b>
Population less than 10,000	Grants for Contraceptives on 'as required' basis.
<b>Category II</b>	<b>Rupees</b>
<b>Non-recurring :</b>	
Population 10,000 to 50,000	Equipment, furniture, education aid 3,000
<b>Recurring :</b>	
	One Health Visitor or Auxiliary Nurse Midwife or F.P. Welfare Workers or P.H. Nurse.
	Contraceptives and Contingencies. 2,500
<b>Category III</b>	
<b>Non-recurring :</b>	
As for full-fledged clinic viz. 50,000 and above.	Equipment, furniture, building, repairs and education aids. 3,000

**Category III**

**Recurring :**

Full - time / Part - time Medical Officer (1 male and 1 female)	2
Extension Educators (FP) (1 male and 1 female)	2
Welfare Workers (FP) (1 male and 1 female)	2
Store - keeper - cum - Clerk - cum - Accountant	1
Attendant	1
Contingencies including expenditure on F. P. Day, special meetings and publicity materials, etc.	Rs. 1,000
Contraceptives (on 'as required' basis)	Rs. 1,500

As far as possible part-time doctors should be appointed. The number of part-time doctors will depend on work load.

**NOTES**

Category III

Recruiting... (1 male and 1 female)

Extension Educators (EP) (1 male and 1 female)

Welfare Workers (FW) (1 male and 1 female)

Store-keeper - cum - Clerk - cum - Accountant (1 male and 1 female)

Contingencies including expenditure on P. D. special meetings and publicity material, etc. Rs. 1,000

Contractives Rs. 1,200

As far as possible part-time doctors should be appointed. The number of part-time doctors will depend on work-load per unit.

**HONORARY EDUCATION LEADERS**

III. District Education Leader

One Education Leader per District appointed by the Government of India on the recommendation of the Regional Director (R. P.) and the State E. P. Bureau.

A grant-in-aid of Rs. 2,000 per year, in two equal half-yearly instalments, paid to meet incidental expenses.

IV. Honorary Education Leaders

These include leaders of groups like Doctors, Lawyers, Municipal Councils, Teachers, Labour and Industrial Leaders, Representatives of Social Welfare Organizations of all India character, and Presidents of the three different States Welfare Organizations.

Appointment is made by the Government of India.

A grant-in-aid of Rs. 2,000 per annum for incidental expenses, released in two equal half-yearly instalments, is made to meet the incidental expenses.

## **HONORARY EDUCATION LEADERS**

### **I. Institutional Leaders :**

These include leaders of groups like Doctors, Lawyers, Municipal Councillors, Teachers, Labour and Industrial Leaders, Representatives of Social Welfare Organisations of all-India character and Presidents of the three different Services Welfare Organisations.

Appointment is made by the Government of India which gives grant-in-aid of Rs. 4,000 per annum. This is released in two equal half-yearly instalments.

### **II. State Education Leaders :**

One for each State and Union Territory. The appointment is made by the Government of India. A grant-in-aid of Rs. 4,000 per annum for incidental expenses, released in two equal half-yearly instalments.

### **III. District Education Leaders :**

One Education Leader per District appointed by the Government of India on the recommendation of the Regional Director (F. P.) and the State F. P. Bureau. A grant-in-aid of Rs. 2,000 per year, in two equal half-yearly instalments, paid to meet incidental expenses.

### **IV. Block Education Leaders :**

One Education Leader per Block with provision for appointment of more leaders in intensive areas. Appointment made by the District Collector on the recommendation of the District Family Planning Officer and District Education Leader.

A grant-in-aid of Rs. 600 per annum paid by the District Family Planning Officer through the Block F. P. Officer.

### **V. Group Education Leaders :**


One Group Education Leader per Community Development Block, (two in case of intensive Districts) appointed by the District Collector on the recommendation of the District F. P. Officer and the District Honorary Education Leader.

An amount of Rs. 50 per month paid by the Block Family Planning Officer with authority from District Family Planning Bureau.





21c



**POPULATION PROBLEM  
OF  
INDIA**

## INTRODUCTION

This publication presents the population problem in simple charts and diagrams. I am sure that this graphic presentation will enable readers to get a candid picture of the problem and provide them food for thought as to the ways in which it can be solved.


*S. Chandrasekhar*

(Dr. S. Chandrasekhar)

Minister of State for Health,  
Family Planning  
& Urban Development.


Nov. 30, 1967

Here you see the map of India in relation to the map of the world. India, with only 2.4 per cent of the world's land maintains 14 per cent of the world's population.



**1 OF EVERY 7 PERSONS IS AN INDIAN**

In our country a baby is born every  $1\frac{1}{2}$  seconds.  
55,000 babies are born every day and 21 million a year.



## **BIRTHS**


**A BABY**

**IS BORN**

**EVERY**

**1½ SECONDS.**

**21 MILLION EVERY YEAR.**



We have 21 million births and 8 million deaths annually. Thus, we add 13 million people — more than the population of Australia — to our fold every year.

**BIRTHS PER YEAR**    **21** MILLION

**— DEATHS**    **8** MILLION

---

**= ADDITION TO  
POPULATION**    **13** MILLION

This is the population explosion.


It took several thousand years (5,000 given here for the sake of convenience) for our population to reach its present level of 500 million. But at the present rate of growth, it will take only 27 years from now to reach 1,000 million.



Our birth rate in 1921 was 49 per thousand and the death rate was 48. So the increase was 1 per 1,000 per year. Today the birth rate is 41 and the death rate is 16. Therefore, the rate of increase is 25 per 1,000.


With the expansion of public health facilities, the death rate will further decline. Reducing the birth rate, therefore, is the only solution to the problem.

## THE PROBLEM




The increase in population has outstepped much of our developmental gains. Our food production has increased by 17 million tonnes during the fifteen years from 1951, but the per capita food availability has dropped from 12.8 ounces to 12.4 ounces. While the unemployed numbered only 3 million in 1951, their number rose to 10 million in 1965-66 in spite of an additional 31 million jobs created.

This is because the population increased by about 140 million during this period.



Thirteen million is going to be this year's addition to our population. What this means in terms of additional resources required to meet the needs of these 13 millions is shown here.


## INDIA 1967 ADDITION TO POPULATION 13 MILLION ADDITIONAL RESOURCES REQUIRED



In this you notice a fall in the population between 1911 and 1921. This was due to famines and epidemics. With the control of several dreadful diseases, our population began to grow very rapidly. Since independence this growth has been even more rapid.


## POPULATION OF INDIA

MILL. PERSONS



To control our population, we must take the message of family planning to the 100 million couples in the reproductive age group.

Two-fifths of our population, or about 200 million, are children below 15 years.



TARGET POPULATION  
100 MILLION  
COUPLES



Our target is to reduce the birth rate from 41 to 25 per 1,000 population.

This can be done only if the majority of the 100 million couples practise family planning.



200 MILLION TOTAL

**TARGET :**

**TO REDUCE BIRTH RATE  
FROM 41 TO 25 PER 1000 POP.  
IN TEN YEARS.**


If every couple in our country decided to have:

only one child, then the birth rate will come down to 9

only two children, then the birth rate will be 17


only three children, then the birth rate will be 25.

## WHY 2 OR 3 CHILDREN ?



These are the communication barriers which make it difficult to reach the 100 million couples:

- (a) Sheer vastness of the country — 5,60,000 villages and 3,000 towns and cities.
- (b) Low literacy — 25 per cent overall but much lower in the villages.
- (c) Diversity of languages and customs — we have to communicate in 14 languages and over 200 dialects.
- (d) Traditional resistance to change or acceptance of anything new.
- (e) Low income — per capita income is only Rs. 422 per year.



COMMUNICATION  
BARRIERS

POPULATION  
SEX  
LITERACY



LOW INCOME

3,50,000  
VILLAGES


LACK OF  
MEDICINE

Designed and produced by the Directorate of Advertising & Visual Publicity, Ministry of I. & B.,  
Government of India for the Ministry of Health, Family Planning and Urban Development  
and printed at The Statesman Press, Connaught Circus, New Delhi-1.

7/11/67 PP-III

Nov. 1967

English 10,000



January 17, 1968

W. W. R.

**SUBJECT: Indian Population Figures**

Attached are some of the statistics promised by the Indians during Chandrasekhar's talk with you. These are birth and death rates (per thousand) by state, for 1951 - 1960, as against census estimates of births and deaths for 1966-67. You will note two important qualifications:

-- The birth and death rates for 1966-67 are targets, not hard numbers. (These are really only the "medium" estimates for 1966-70 as projected in the Fourth Plan Document, 1964.) I have asked the Indians to come up with their most recent actual numbers.)

-- The table leaves us to compute the difference between births and deaths. For each state, of course, there is a net rise in living souls.

You may find the following figures useful bench marks:

Birth Rates per thousand, 1964-65:

USSR	22.4
Japan	17.2
USA	22.4
Hong Kong	29.4
Ceylon	32.6

Official Indian Birth Rate Projections from the Fourth Plan Document

	<u>1966-70</u>	<u>1971-75</u>	<u>1976-85</u>
High	40.5	38.3	32.8
Medium	38.6	35.1	28.7
Low	36.8	31.8	25.0

Also attached are a couple of pamphlets to give you the flavor of Chandrasekhar's propaganda.

Ed Hamilton

Minister (Economic)



22a  
भारतीय राजदूतावास  
वाशिंगटन, डी० सी०  
EMBASSY OF INDIA  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 16, 1968

Dear Mr. Hamilton,

During the meeting last Friday between Dr. Chandrasekhar and Mr. Walt Rostow, the latter expressed a desire to see the statewise figures relating to the trends in birth rates. I am enclosing herewith a statement showing the birth and death rates for the decade 1951-60 and the birth and death rates as estimated by the Census Actuary. You will notice that there is a marked fall in the birth rates in all the states. Madras has the lowest birth rate at 32.6 per thousand and Kerala's birth rate is 36.6. Orissa, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh come closely thereafter.

2. I am also enclosing herewith a copy each of the following documents which you may find to be of interest.

- (i) "Facts about Population and Family Planning in India"
- (ii) "A Danger Signal"
- (iii) "Population Problem of India"
- (iv) An article written by me on "Family Planning in India" - pages 250-259 of the Fund and Bank Review "Finance and Development" December 1967

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

K. S. Sundara Rajan

Encls:

Mr. Edward K. Hamilton  
National Security Council  
#380 Executive Office Building  
17th & Pennsylvania Avenue NW  
Washington DC

22b

Birth rates and death rates in different States of  
India estimated by the Census Actuary

State	1951-60		Estimated for 1966/67	
	Birth rate	Death rate	Birth rate	Death rate
1. Andhra Pradesh	39.7	25.2	37.3	16.6
2. Assam	49.3	26.9	47.6	16.8
3. Bihar	43.4	26.1	40.3	16.1
4. Gujarat	45.7	23.5	42.5	15.0
5. Kerala	38.9	16.1	36.6	11.5
6. Madhya Pradesh	43.2	23.2	39.5	14.5
7. Madras	34.9	22.5	32.6	14.9
8. Maharashtra	41.2	19.8	38.0	12.7
9. Mysore	41.6	22.2	39.1	15.1
10. Orissa	40.4	22.9	37.9	14.7
11. Punjab	44.7	18.9	42.1	11.5
12. Rajasthan	42.7	19.4	39.9	11.4
13. Uttar Pradesh	41.5	24.9	38.8	15.9
14. West Bengal	42.9	20.5	40.8	13.4
All India	41.7	22.8	38.6	14.0

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

January 16, 1968

22c

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Call by Indian Family Planning  
Minister Sripati Chandrasekhar

Recommendation:

That you receive Indian Family Planning Minister Sripati Chandrasekhar, who wishes to call on you January 19 or 20.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

Sripati Chandrasekhar, Indian Minister for Family Planning, an American-trained (Columbia, New York University) demographer, has been a dynamic force in energizing the Indian Government's family planning program since Mrs. Gandhi brought him into her Ministry in March. Articulate and imaginative, he is, at 49, one of the more outstanding younger members of Mrs. Gandhi's team.

We anticipate that Chandrasekhar will want to discuss with you the progress India has made in the family planning field and, more specifically, to talk about United States assistance to the Indian family planning program. The progress of the family planning effort will determine in important measure how successful India is in achieving a better life for its people and I strongly urge that you give Dr. Chandrasekhar a hearing.



Dean Rusk

RECEIVED  
RUSTOW'S OFFICE  
1968 JAN 17 AM 9 23

DEAN KANE  
*[Handwritten Signature]*

I am pleased to have your letter of January 15, 1968, regarding the  
request for information concerning the activities of the various  
groups and individuals who are active in the area of  
international relations. The information requested is being  
provided to you as soon as possible.

Enclosed are two copies of the report of the  
Committee on International Relations, which was  
submitted to the House of Representatives on January 10, 1968.  
The report contains information regarding the activities of  
various groups and individuals who are active in the area of  
international relations.

Respectfully,  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Dean Kane

Yours truly,  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Dean Kane

Very truly yours,  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Dean Kane

Respectfully,  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Dean Kane

Very truly yours,  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Dean Kane

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT



WASHINGTON  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

JAN 17 1968

229

OFFICERS

POPULATION CRISIS COMMITTEE

DIRECTORS

\*WILLIAM H. DRAPER, JR.  
NATIONAL CHAIRMAN  
\*HUGH MOORE  
VICE CHAIRMAN AND  
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\*ELMO ROPER  
VICE CHAIRMAN  
JUSTIN BLACKWELDER  
SECRETARY  
MRS. PHYLLIS PIOTROW  
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

1730 K STREET, N. W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006  
TELEPHONE (202) 659-1833 CABLE: CRISIS

CASS CANFIELD  
MRS. JOHN L. LOEB  
MRS. CORDELIA S. MAY  
JAMES S. McDONNELL  
WILLIAM E. MORAN, JR.  
ROCKEFELLER PRENTICE  
ADOLPH W. SCHMIDT

January 2, 1968

Mr. Edward Hamilton  
Executive Office of the President  
White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hamilton:

The Population Crisis Committee will be holding a luncheon on Friday, January 12th, to honor and hear Dr. Sripati Chandrasekhar, Minister of Health and Family Planning for the Government of India. The reception and luncheon will be held at 12 Noon in the Dolley Madison Room of The Madison Hotel, 15th and M Streets, N.W., in Washington, D. C. We hope very much that you will be able to join us for this occasion.

Dr. Chandrasekhar has headed this important Indian Ministry since March 1967. He took over this critical responsibility after many years of writing and lecturing about India's population and economic problems.

Under Dr. Chandrasekhar's leadership, India's nationwide Family Planning organization is being gradually built up to eventually provide all types of family planning facilities for all of India's 100 million fertile couples.

Dr. Chandrasekhar will review the entire population program, its achievements so far, and his planning and hopes for the future. The luncheon discussion should be a most interesting one since India's population and food problems are undoubtedly among the most serious world problems today.

I sincerely trust that you will be our guest for this luncheon. Please return the enclosed postcard so that we may know whether we can expect you.

Sincerely yours,

*William H. Draper, Jr.*  
William H. Draper, Jr.

WHD:bz  
encl.

*India*

January 15, 1968

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

At long last the photographic mill has ground out the pictures you requested -- the President with L. K. Jha, as well as a couple of shots from the Glassboro summit.

Best regards,

Edward K. Hamilton

The Honorable  
Chester Bowles  
United States Ambassador to India  
In care of the American Embassy  
New Delhi

MEMORANDUM

23a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Geissinger  
The White House

SUBJECT: Photographs of Glassboro; the President/L. K. Jha (India)

This is to renew a couple of earlier requests which may have been misplaced in the mill. The first was the subject of a written request on September 28th; the second I discussed with you by phone a few days ago:

- (1) a photograph of the President with L. K. Jha of India (meeting took place on April 19, copy of original request attached);
- (2) miscellaneous photographs of the President and Prime Minister Kosygin at Glassboro -- requested by Ambassador Bowles (India) (copy of Bowles' request attached).

*RM*

Roger Morris

attachments: 2

September 28, 1967

236

India

FOR MR. OKAMOTO

Okie --

Ambassador Bowles has written me to ask whether it is possible to send him a print of one of the pictures you took of the President with L. K. Jha -- then Secretary to Indian Prime Minister Gandhi -- when he called on the President on April 19 of this year. Of course he would rather have a signed picture to give to Jha, but he would be delighted with an unsigned one.

Can you let me know whether this is possible? (I know Jha and can identify him if it is a question of sifting through your masses of proofs.)

Many thanks.

Ed Hamilton



EMBASSY  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
New Delhi, India

Ed — 234  
Didn't you call  
Oke about this —  
If not, I will —  
Ken

October 24, 1967

Mr. Edward Hamilton  
Special Assistant to the President  
White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ed:

During my recent trip to Rawalpindi I noticed some extraordinarily good pictures of the President and Kosygin at Glassboro . They were hanging in Ben Oehlert's office as I recall.

I wonder whether it would be possible to receive copies of these pictures . I am sure the new Russian Ambassador in Delhi, Mr. Pegov, would appreciate having them.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

~~SECRET~~

24

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. Hamilton

DATE: December 29, 1967

FROM : NEA/INC - Douglas Heck

SUBJECT: India's Defense Spending

In the context of our discussions concerning India's defense spending, I thought you might be interested in a copy of a letter just received from Chet Bowles which deals with this problem.

The letter is a good summary of the efforts relevant to India's efforts to buildup its Air Force and is an excellent rationale of the Indian views on the subject. Some of these points may be useful to you in your discussions with the Ranch. I suspect we will be hearing some of these points when we start talking to the Indians.

From the point of view of the history of our security relationships with India since 1962, the Indians have a point. Unfortunately, the ground rules have changed and it's a different ball game, as we have pointed out in our recent message. And this is what we will have to tell Chet.

Enclosure:

Cy of ltr to Dean Rusk fm  
Amb Bowles

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By je, NARA, Date 7-16-02

~~SECRET~~



24a

New Delhi, India

December 22, 1967

The Honorable  
Dean Rusk  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dean:

The purpose of this letter is not to reopen the basic question of our arms assistance policy in South Asia (on which I was voted down). Nor do I imply that we should slacken our efforts here, in Pindi and in Washington to keep the defense budgets in India and Pakistan at present levels or lower.

However, in view of the new Congressional restrictions on the purchase of sophisticated weapons by aid-receiving countries and our exasperation over the manner in which the SU-7 episode unfolded here, I am concerned that we may lose sight of the central issue in regard to Indian defense planning.

In this context it is important to divide the problem created by the SU-7's into two parts: (A) India's failure to be frank with us when we discussed the situation last June, and (B) the quite separate question of whether or not the purchase of the SU-7's by the Indians is out of line with their legitimate defense needs and with the agreement reached with us in 1964.

On the first point, there can be no disagreement. India's handling of our inquiries about the SU-7's last June is indefensible.

In regard to the second point, it is important for us to keep past developments as well as future plans clearly in mind.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 07-6  
By isl, NARA, Date 6-29-07

XEROX MADE FROM QUICK COPY

As you will remember, in 1963 and 1964 we came very close to a five-year military assistance agreement with India which would have established the United States Government as India's major military supplier. In return India was ready to agree (a) henceforth to purchase only token military items from the Communist bloc, (b) to make a genuine effort to reach an agreement with Pakistan in regard to force levels, and (c) to consult with us on a forthcoming basis in regard to the political problems of Southeast Asia, particularly in reference to China.

Just before President Kennedy's death in late November 1963 we were on the verge of an agreement with the GOI on such a relationship. Again in late May of the following year, a decision to go ahead with a sizeable five-year program (\$50 million in grants and \$50 million in loans annually) was tentatively reached within the Administration.

This understanding included the phasing out of the Indian Air Force obsolescent Toofanis, Mysteres and Vampire planes with India assuming or at least hoping that we were prepared to fill the resulting gap with U.S. F-5's or F-104's.

At this point Nehru died and we decided to hold this new program in abeyance until we could see more clearly how the new Shastri Government would develop.

In view of this hold-up and the inability of the British to take up the slack, the Indians came to the conclusion that the next best way to modernize the Indian Air Force and to phase out their most obsolete planes was sharply to step up the effort to develop their own fighter-bombers (HF-24) in Bangalore. Another possibility that was discussed as an alternative was the setting up by the United States of an F-5 assembly line. When the GOI asked for our assistance in this effort we again took a negative position.

In other words it was only after we and the British had made it clear that we were not prepared to provide replacement planes or to help the Indian effort to produce

its own that they turned to the Soviets for the SU-7's. On many occasions since then good friends of the U.S. such as Air Marshal Arjan Singh have expressed with considerable feeling their regrets that we gave them no alternative but to go to the Russians which they did not want to do.

Under these circumstances, three and one half years after our discussions of May 1964, the Indians are still hanging on to their obsolete Toofanis, Vampires and Mysteres and stretching out the foreign purchases which they contemplated in the 1964 agreement from five years to seven years. As far as we know, no-SU-7's have thus far been delivered; we understand that they will come in gradually over the next three years.

The percentage of Indian GNP now being spent on the military establishment is between 3.9 and 4.2 per cent with a significantly smaller fraction devoted to foreign exchange than we or they anticipated.

As a result the Indian military budget is still below the totals we accepted in May 1964, which was before the Pak attack in August 1965 and the abortive Chinese 72-hour ultimatum in early October of that year.

We should also take into account that a large part of the increase in the Indian defense budget is directly attributable to inflation. Taking a two-year period (Indian fiscal year 1965-66 to the current fiscal year 1967-68), the Indian defense budget has risen only 10 per cent compared to an inflationary rise of about 30 per cent in the cost of living index over the same period.

I am told that the slice of India's national income now going to defense is roughly similar to that of most countries of South America. If the northern half of South America

~~SECRET~~

4

were occupied by an expansionist China I believe the Latin American military budgets would be significantly higher, and I for one would not consider it unreasonable.

As for the future, India's military planning, like our own, must take into account the direction and strength of the most likely threat, the assistance that may be expected from friendly foreign forces, and the like.

Right now the Indian Government almost totally discounts the possibility of Pakistan attacking India. If an attack should come, they believe it will be spearheaded by the Chinese and joined later by Pakistan.

The current estimate is that with the present Indian defense capabilities India could hold off a combined attack from Pakistan and China for about six months, after which help from some source would be required. Three years ago the GOI was much more confident of U.S. help in such a contingency than they are now.

I hope that these observations may be useful to you in the discussions going on in Washington, within the Administration and on the Hill. Let me say once again that my purpose is not to excuse the Indians for their lack of frankness last spring, to reopen the basic policy question or to relax in our efforts to reduce defense expenditures, but rather to place the current Indian effort to strengthen their largely obsolescent air force equipment in clearer perspective.

With warmest regards,

cc: AMB/P, MIN, MINPE, PE/EX, ODRI, DAO  
CRU-2, AMB-4

dd: Hon. Robert S. McNamara

Hon. William Gaud

Hon. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Hon. Eugene Rostow

Hon. Lucius D. Battle

Hon. William Handley

Thomas Hughes, Esquire

L. Douglas Heck, Esquire

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

~~SECRET~~

24b

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : White House - Mr. Hamilton

DATE: December 26, 1967

FROM : NEA/INC - Douglas Heck

SUBJECT: Defense Talks with GOI

This is the draft message regarding next steps in defense talks with the GOI that I mentioned to you during our luncheon last week. The only clearance pending, that of DOD.

Given the urgency of the matter because of the Conte Amendment, our thought is to start talks with the Indians even though we have not as yet worked out a US Government position on the exact perimeter of these talks. We are proceeding with that task but I do not think we should delay opening the dialogue until we have a firm position. We can start off by registering our interest in defense cutbacks and our concern about the acquisition of sophisticated military equipment.

Any thoughts you have on the strategy and tactics and terms of reference would be most welcome.

Enclosure:  
As stated.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

NEA/INC:DHeck:msg 12/26/67

By ja, NARA, Date 7-16-02

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GROUP 3: Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.



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FOR OC/T USE ONLY

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
CHARGE TO

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Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI

Info:

INFO: Amembassy RAWALPINDI  
Amembassy LONDON  
CINCSTRIKE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines, DOD guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 7-16-02

STATE

LIMDIS

STATE/AID/DOD Message

Ref : State

Defense Talks with GOI

1. Final passage of aid legislation with resolution House-Senate differences close to lower House levels has underscored importance of obtaining better understanding with Indians than we have been able to achieve to date regarding where they are planning to go over next several years in their defense spending and military force levels. As indicated last para State 80797 we need have some ~~much~~ such understanding in hand when we discuss crucially important FY '69 aid bill with Congress. FYI Inclusion of Conte Amendment in FY '68 aid bill has added to importance of achieving such understanding, as indicated below. End FYI

Drafted by:

NEA/INC:CSCoon:j11 12/21/67

Tel. Ext.

3728

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA - Mr. Battle

Clearances:

NEA - Mr. Handley

DOD/ISA - Col. Black

NEA/INC - Mr. Heck

G/PM - Mr. Wolf

NEA/PAF - Mr. Spain

H - Miss Folger

AID/NESA - Mr. Rees

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S/S -

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2. It is clearly sense of Congress that US economic aid resources shall not be used to support regional arms races, directly or indirectly. Congressional attitudes toward our economic aid program are thus directly influenced by degree to which such arms races are in fact taking place. As major developing country and largest aid recipient, manner in which ~~Indian~~ India handles its Congressional constituency here regarding its defense spending can have important bearing on Congressional attitude toward aid as a whole. At present Congress is disturbed by reports of Indian re-equipment on extensive scale and is far from convinced that pace-setter India is genuinely anxious to hold down defense spending and avoid arms spiral with Pakistan. Evidence of Indian restraint could thus prove critical factor influencing FY '69 aid bill.

3. Meanwhile we have immediate question of applicability of Conte Amendment to current aid to India. Amendment contains many ambiguities which will take some time to resolve. Despite these ambiguities it already abundantly clear that we will soon be talking to Congress about current and proposed Indian acquisitions of sophisticated military equipment from abroad in more detail than ever before. Whatever Indians may think about Conte Amendment we

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Page 3 of telegram to Amembassy NEW DELHI

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Classification

hope they will at least privately recognize it is in their interest that when we go to Hill we are familiar with Indian plans and rationale.

4. In light foregoing we believe ~~LEM~~ Embassy should take early occasion get talks started with Indians. Fact that GOI officials have already expressed interest in such talks (reftel) should provide useful opening wedge. We believe Country Team has ~~adequate~~ adequate manpower resources for type of talks we envision and Washington or Cincstrike deputation unnecessary, but willing reconsider if you disagree.

5. Believe we should recognize both among ourselves and with GOI that main purpose of talks will be to help prepare us for next round of aid legislation and that this should determine character and subject matter of discussions. We would thus hope that talks would give us better understanding of rationale behind current GOI defense spending levels and provide us better basis for balanced independent judgement which we could support with Congress as to degree of restraint Indians showing in total defense spending. To extent it should become clear GOI intends under currently foreseeable circumstances to hold line on defense ~~budgets~~ budgets for next

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Page 4 of telegram to Amembassy NEW DELHI~~SECRET~~*Classification*

several years, so much the better. We would also hope GOI could give us reasonably detailed picture of planned acquisitions of individual major items of sophisticated equipment, foreign exchange costs of such acquisitions including estimated foreign exchange equivalent of rupee ~~payments~~ payments to ~~Blocky~~ Bloc, and, most important, rationale for their acquisition. Inevitably this will involve some discussion of threat estimates and force levels as well as budgetary data but we do not foresee anything comparable in ~~detail~~ detail and comprehensiveness to exercise preceding 1964 memo of understanding. (Incidentally it would be helpful if Indians would come to share our sense that 1965 war completely changed the rules of the game, that questions we are interested in now relate to general trends in defense spending and to how specific planned acquisitions relate to current and prospective threat, not rpt not to whether current and planned budgets and acquisitions are consistent with a five-year plan formed in another/<sup>era</sup>~~max~~.)

6. We recognize and sympathize with Embassy New Delhi's reluctance engage in discussions with GOI regarding I<sub>n</sub>dian force levels vis-a-vis Pakistan, particularly to extent this involves estimates of Pak threat. Unfortunately we fail to see how we can examine only half

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a defense ~~xxx~~ establishment in a sufficiently coherent way to enable us to form the kinds of judgements we are seeking here. We hope that by laying our cards on table with GOI at outset of talks we can arrive at the kinds of understandings we need without excessive diversions into blind alleys of debate regarding Pakistani intentions, capabilities, etc.

7. Recognize you may have further thoughts regarding strategy, tactics, and terms of reference. Hope we can work these out soonest and get talks started by mid-January. Timewise, fuse on Capitol Hill is likely prove short.

GP-3

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : Mr. Hamilton

DATE: December 19, 1967

FROM : NEA/INC - Douglas Heck 

SUBJECT: Report of Deliberations, Embassies Delhi and Pindi

As you know, Jim Spain and I have been promoting several new approaches to our respective clients. These include disengagement of the U.S. from some of the Indo-Pakistan quarrels including Kashmir, improving our bilateral relations with each country and being ready to urge reconciliation if and when appropriate. Against this background, you might be interested in reading the attached report in which Jerry Greene summarizes recent deliberations of Embassies Delhi and Pindi. There is a lot in this report that makes sense.

Attachment:  
As stated.



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*Mr. Heck*

*250*

*NSA*

New Delhi, India

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

December 8, 1967

*Recd 12/18*

The Honorable  
William J. Handley  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State  
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Bill:

Messrs. Schneider, Kontos and Stull of Embassy/AID Pakistan visited New Delhi on December 5 and 6. Under Chat's chairmanship, we had good, intensive discussions of our respective problems and operations, as identified in the enclosed Agenda. Since there were new faces on both sides of the table, and we had not previously had the advantage of this kind of exchange, we approached the exercise in the spirit of mutual enlightenment, designed to identify respective environmental compulsions and imperatives; we did not seek to break new ground by way of agreements, where differences of approach or opinion emerged.

Generally speaking, what each Country Team had to say about the situation in its respective country, and the attitudes of each country toward the other, has previously been fully reported to Washington. One thing that emerged clearly was the degree of difference between India and Pakistan--a difference which, of course, originally led to Partition, and the continuing demonstration of which remains a powerful motivation in both countries. We concluded, as, for example, State 33331 had previously concluded, that U.S. relations with each country should start with this premise of their separateness and difference; indeed, our capacity to influence events in each depends on the confidence each has in our acceptance of their difference.

- AMB/X-2
- DCM - 2
- AMB/B
- MINAID
- USIS
- ODRI
- ADMIN
- PC
- DATT
- PRESS
- ConGens
- 2- NEA/INC-
- Mr. Heck
- 2- NEA/PAF-
- Mr. Spain
- 3- PINDI-
- Mr. Schneider

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date 7-16-02

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We also recognized that the two countries do not exist in total isolation of each other; nor can they afford forever to exist in confrontation. With respect to Kashmir we agreed that while the issue remains dynamic and persistent, there is no current possibility of effective action to promote its resolution. It was noted that Pakistan has in effect given up the use of force as a means of resolving the problem. In India preoccupation with political problems in other states has resulted in less attention being given to Kashmir as a special problem.

While Kashmir stands in the way of a general improvement of Indo-Pak relations some modest progress in resolving lesser differences seems possible. In time economic opportunities may prove sufficiently attractive for India and Pakistan to seize them. In our review of such opportunities for cooperation in various economic fields, we differentiated between three different situations: (a) where both sides see a net political or economic advantage in the solution of a problem arising from the 1965 hostilities (telecommunications, air services, trade and travel), (b) where there is some possibility of resolving an existing problem in a way which would emphasize the independence of the two parties (Eastern Waters), (c) joint projects envisaging an interdependence between the two countries.

Given the facts that some progress has already been made in settling telecommunications and that both sides are now actively considering the resumption of air services and Indo-Afghan transit trade, we agreed that it was neither necessary nor prudent at this time to involve either ourselves or a third party in any new initiative to resolve these problems. We did not rule out the possibility of asking some third party to keep the process going should the current momentum be lost.

For the foreseeable future, we saw no possibility of any agreement on joint projects in view of the existing reluctance and caution of both sides in relation to projects which implied a real interdependence upon one another.

On the Eastern Waters question two problems were discussed: (1) the effect of the Farakka Barrage upon the flow of the Ganges waters and (2) the utilization and division of the waters of the Ganges-Brahmaputra

Rivers. Regarding the former we agreed that it is desirable that India and Pakistan resume technical talks with the objective of determining the effects of diversion of Ganges waters at the Farakka Barrage.

With regard to the broad question of the Eastern Waters, Embassy Rawalpindi representatives emphasized the need for a beginning of studies supported by India and Pakistan regarding their utilization, designed to lead to eventual agreement on their use. Dr. Revelle's success in getting the Government of Pakistan to seize itself of the Eastern Waters issue and to agree to its being taken up with India represented an important step forward in dealing with a potentially serious issue between India and Pakistan.

Embassy Delhi representatives emphasized the great complexity and cost of any plan for Eastern waters development; the need for extensive data; GOI sensitivity about disclosure of hydrographical data to others; and the difficulty in determining the development/cost characteristics of such development and the very great cost in terms of alternative development projects.

With the objective of improving the prospects for Indian agreement to support a study of Eastern Waters utilization, we agreed that Embassy Delhi will alert Dr. Revelle to the tactical problems he will face with the Government of India.

The discussion of determinants of military policy led to the conclusion that each country has adopted a defensive, deterrent strategy with regard to the other. In addition, India must provide for a defense against China. It was noted that India has the capability and confidence to deal with a Pakistani or Chinese attack separately but is concerned at the prospect of a combined Sino-Pak threat.

We agreed that it is particularly important at this time for the United States to press in both countries for military budget restraint. The prospects in each country are believed to be dependent largely upon what the other does; while some Indian leaders might accept Indo-Pak military-manpower ratios, force levels are thought extremely difficult to discuss in India, and the budgetary approach is believed most appropriate. In


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Pakistan, discussion of force levels as well as the budget are effective in promoting military restraint.

Ambassadors Bowles and Oehlert have concurred in the foregoing summary of our talks.

Sincerely,

  
Joseph M. Greene, Jr.  
Minister

Enclosure

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENDA FOR DELHI/RAWALPINDI COUNTRY TEAM MEETING

December 5: 1500-1730 - Review of Situation in India and Pakistan

- 1500: Introductory remarks by the Ambassador
- 1515: Internal Political Developments in India: PE/IN; AMB/B
- 1545: AID, Peace Corps and PL-480 Projects: MINAID; MINPE; PC
- 1615: The Indian Military: ODRI; DAO
- 1630: Rawalpindi Presentation: Messrs. Schneider, Stull and Kontos

December 6: 0930-1100 - Indo-Pak Political and Economic Relations

1. Kashmir
2. Trade
3. Transportation (Air, Road and River)
4. Telecommunications
5. Exchange of Journalists
6. Joint Industrial Projects
7. Eastern Waters

1115-1300 - Military Policy in the Subcontinent

1. Determinants of Military Policy in
  - a. India
  - b. Pakistan
2. Sources of Military Supply

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25b

For:

Ed Hamilton

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SECRET

June 17, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a letter from Chester Bowles, enclosing a long memorandum which recommends a new look at our India-Pak policy. He fears failure to come to grips now with the forces shaping events there will result in the same kind of loss we suffered in China in the 1940s.

We offer it without prejudice and with the following brief summary of his main points. Bowles argues that the situation in the subcontinent has changed 180 degrees since we launched our present policy in the mid-1950s. Then, in the post-Korea climate, the Soviet military threat to South Asia seemed paramount. China seemed dangerous only as a potentially attractive economic and ideological model. Now the post-Stalin Soviet shift to penetration through economic and military aid, and China's 1962 attack on India, have reversed the picture.

Against this new backdrop, Bowles thinks that our economic policy still makes sense but that our military policy has become "irrelevant." Whereas we once looked to Pakistan as the one sure holdout against Communism in the subcontinent, he argues that now "India's domestic objective of a viable democratic state and her foreign policy objective of resisting Chinese aggression coincide more closely with our own interests than do those of any other major emerging nation."

Continued Free World economic aid to both Indians and Paks is still justified because it alone can produce the economic and political systems needed to build the strong counter-weight to China we want. Both are using our aid effectively, and he foresees a chance for a major breakthrough to a sustained high rate of Indian growth in the next 5-7 years, provided aid continues.

But we ought to ease out of our Pak alliance (which is an empty one) and gear our military aid more frankly to our chief strategic objective in Asia--containing China. We should give both India and Pakistan only the weapons they'd need against China. We'd get out of the box we're in now by now guaranteeing to protect one against the other and by trying gradually to draw the two together in joint defense. Bowles doesn't see any serious risk of driving Ayub into Peiping's arms.

Dave Bell will send you shortly a memo on the second subject Bowles raises in his covering letter--our mounting hoard of surplus rupees.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 7-16-02

*R. W. Komer*

R. W. Komer

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June 17, 1965

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 7-16-02

R. W. Komer

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Mr. President:

I have not asked directly to see you during my brief visit to Washington because I know that you are heavily burdened and because I shall be back in Washington following my home leave in New England. However, in the interval, there are two matters to which I should like to direct your attention.

1. I am asking Bob Komer to send you a memorandum to the Secretary which underscores what I believe to be the irrelevance of some of our present military assistance programs in South Asia. Although I do not suggest that my proposals are the final answer, I believe that our present policy which originated in a totally different era under different conditions is becoming increasingly ineffective, contradictory, and potentially dangerous.

I earnestly hope that before my return to Washington a survey of this situation can be conducted at a high level in our Government. Some timely moves now could not only save us a much more serious situation in the future but also help to create the basis for a major political success story in an area which I believe will be decisive in respect to Asia as a whole.

2. My second problem involves our steadily increasing rupee reserves. When I saw you six months ago, these reserves amounted to over \$500 million. Since then they have grown by \$50 million, and they will grow by \$100 million more in the coming year. As you know, our use of these rupees is severely restricted by present legislation. As a result, we find ourselves faced with a situation which the normal taxpayer would find difficult to understand, i.e., while the Soviets

proceed to

The President,  
The White House.

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By jc, NARA, Date 7-16-02

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with SECRET Enclosure

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proceed to expand their informational and educational propaganda programs to the point where they are now three times greater than our own, we are inhibited from meeting the challenge by restrictions which, I am sure, are a result of a Congressional misunderstanding of the situation we face.

I should hate to see another legislative year drift by without some effective action. I would be deeply grateful for whatever you can do.

With my warmest good wishes for all that you are striving to accomplish,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Chester Bowles".

Chester Bowles

CONFIDENTIAL

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MEMORANDUM

TO : Secretary Dean Rusk DATE: May 20, 1965  
FROM : Chester Bowles CB  
SUBJECT: The Urgent Need for a Review

of United States Policy in South Asia

Recent developments in India and Pakistan indicate that our decade-old posture on the subcontinent is ill-adjusted to the present political and military realities and that some fresh thinking is required.

Ten years ago when our present policies took shape the possibility of a Soviet military thrust into the Middle East or even through Afghanistan into the subcontinent seemed very real, while Soviet political and economic influence in the subcontinent, unsupported by economic assistance or even an effective diplomacy, appeared to be negligible.

In contrast, China heavily occupied behind the Himalayas with its recent take-over of Tibet and its massive internal problems, was not considered a military threat. Our primary concern in this case was with the steady flow of economic and political missions between Delhi and Peking, and the feeling among many Indian intellectuals and planners that the Chinese experiment, tailored to fit the Indian

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**SANITIZED**  
Authority NLSIRAC 07-6  
By Sab, NARA, Date 2/20/2008

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scene might become increasingly relevant to India's own development.

In the last few years this strategic situation has been turned upside down. While Chinese political and economic influence in India has sagged to the disappearing point, the Indian army along the 2200 mile border to the north now faces a formidable array of Chinese divisions supported by a vast network of newly constructed roads.

Although the possibility of Soviet armies moving through the Hindu Kush or thrusting south towards the Persian Gulf now seems remote the Soviets in South Asia have come to represent a formidable and growing economic and political challenge.

In the face of these changes, our long-established commitment to the economic development and political stability of the subcontinent remains of crucial importance. However, in view of the drastic switch in the nature of the overall challenge our military-political policies have become increasingly questionable.

The purpose of this confidential memorandum is to explore the implications of this changing situation and to propose a course of

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action to fit it. It deals specifically with five questions:

First, US objectives on the subcontinent within the current framework;

Second, India's political and military relevance to these objectives;

Third, the prospect for India's internal political and economic development as it bears on our objectives;

Fourth, the shortcomings of our present policy in South Asia as underscored by recent events;

Fifth, the steps which we believe necessary if the United States Government is to deal with this situation realistically, effectively, and in time.

I

U.S. Objectives on the Indian Subcontinent

Under current circumstances United States objectives on the Indian subcontinent are fourfold:

1. To secure the subcontinent against Chinese penetration.

Most immediately this calls for the development of South Asian military forces adequate to deter or if necessary to defeat a

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Chinese thrust into South Asia with moderate forces (a massive Chinese attack would require outside assistance).

For the longer haul it calls for the presence of a viable, friendly and militarily effective India on the flank of any Chinese aggression into Southeast Asia, and ultimately the creation of a strictly Asian defense and development organization in cooperation with Japan and perhaps Australia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand to assume broader economic, political and military responsibilities.

2. To contain Soviet political, economic and military influence in the subcontinent.

It is important that the Soviets be denied a revolutionary role in any future economic or military emergency in the subcontinent. Consequently the USSR should be kept as far as possible from the South Asian political control levers.

If possible this should be accomplished in a way that will leave the door open for a shift in basic Soviet policy that might ultimately permit some degree of cooperation toward shared objectives (e.g., containing Chinese aggression in Asia).

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In the meantime we should not be overly concerned about Soviet economic assistance in itself. As long as it comes without political obligations it will contribute to our primary objective--a viable and independent India. If strings become evident we should promptly review our position.

3. To achieve dynamic and sustained economic growth in India and Pakistan.

The long-term political stability of the subcontinent will depend in large measure on the degree of economic growth and the manner in which the added production is achieved and shared.

In addition to providing substantial economic assistance we should use our leverage insofar as possible to maintain a reasonable balance in each nation between development and military defense.

4. To reduce tensions between India and Pakistan to the maximum extent possible.

The present embittered confrontation diverts the attention of both nations away from their primary objective of rapid economic growth and consequently threatens their political stability. US policy should be so conceived that it dampens rather than exacerbates Indo-Pakistani tensions.

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II

India's Relevance to US Objectives in Asia

The National Policy Paper for India (October 1964) stressed the critical importance of India to the national interests of the United States in the following terms:

"India is the only non-Communist country on the Asian mainland which by its size and resources may eventually add a substantial independent weight to the Asian power balance. Its loss to Communism would tilt the strategic balance of Asia sharply, if not decisively, against us.

"India shares a disputed 1500 mile frontier with Communist China and, like the United States, it sees China as a long-run security threat.

"India is the largest non-Communist country in Asia. Its 450 million people are more numerous than all Latin Americans and Africans together.

"India's industrial potential is great, while its position at the core of South Asia may give it increased future leverage on Asian politics."

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This statement of America's stake in a free and effective India as a fulcrum for our broader objectives between the Mediterranean and the Pacific is reflected in the substantial and remarkably effective investment in India's economic development we have been making here over the past decade.

The emergence of Communist China as an aggressive military force and our massive commitment to the defense of Southeast Asia further underscores the key importance of India.

### III

#### The Prospects for a Viable, Independent India

It is the opinion of this Mission that India's economic and political progress and prospects are by and large favorable, and that India's policies, domestic and foreign, although often frustrating in their daily manifestations, have been moving in the right direction.

This considered judgment is shared by representatives of the World Bank, the Foundations, the United Kingdom and others.

A. The Indian economy is beginning to move ahead impressively. In the fiscal year ending March 31 the incentives to Indian

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cultivators provided by long overdue price rises plus a good monsoon resulted in a 9.8 percent increase in India's total foodgrain production over the previous all-time high.

The adoption of vigorous new agricultural policies long advocated by our Mission plus the extremely capable leadership of the Agriculture Minister promise to push production steadily higher.

The increase in India's gross national product for the recently completed fiscal year appears to be just under seven percent in real terms.

The prospect for increased private capital investment and a reduction of controls also seems favorable. Standard Oil of Indiana is undertaking a major fertilizer investment (\$60 million) in Madras. Although the proposed agreement between the Bechtel fertilizer consortium and the Indian Government has run into heavy weather the Indians are now pressing for a series of large U.S. built plants in the private sector.

Right now every American economist I know in India (including representatives of the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, World Bank, etc.) is convinced that with adequate foreign exchange

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support the Indian economy in the next five to seven years is capable of a major breakthrough to a sustained high rate of growth.

The record is particularly reassuring in view of the fact that India is one of a half dozen countries in the emerging world which are committed to democratic development and by all odds the largest and most important.

B. The Government of India now appears committed to a massive birth control program. With the development of a simple intrauterine device plus a new sense of urgency the matter of population control is beginning to receive the top priority which we have long advocated.

C. The Government of India has been pursuing a foreign policy aimed at blocking the spread of Chinese power or influence and resolving those problems from which the Chinese might stand to gain.

At the recent Belgrade meeting the Indians were instrumental in shaping a resolution on Vietnam that coincided with the United States interests. The Radhakrishnan proposal which also reflects in a general way the American position has been given official GOI sanction as the basis for a negotiated settlement.

At present the Indians are working closely with the Japanese

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on measures to check China's influence at the Algiers conference in late June, including support for the credentials of Malaysia, encouragement of the presence of South Vietnam, and a vigorous effort to promote a moderate, constructive outcome.

D. The Government of India continues thus far to refrain from building an Indian nuclear arsenal. In view of China's second nuclear explosion and India's current sense of insecurity, the situation is admittedly fragile. Nevertheless India in spite of persistent political pressures to build its own bomb is still committed to a search for an effective way to prevent the proliferation of nuclear powers.

This is not to suggest that India's economic success and political orientation are assured, nor that some serious deviations from America's views of the world are not apparent. But we are convinced that the situation in India is generally favorable to our interests. With appropriate policies, a sensitive diplomacy and a reasonable commitment of resources the United States can go far towards assuring India's economic success and influencing Indian policy in Asia toward a moderate and constructive course.

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IV

The Relevance of Present U.S. Policy

Right now we are confronted with a disturbing paradox. India's domestic objective of a viable democratic state and her foreign policy objective of resisting Chinese aggression coincide more closely with our own interests than do those of any other major emerging nation.

This mutuality of interest is reflected in our National Policy Paper and in our past record of contributions to Indian national development.

Yet in spite of these advantages the fact remains that we have been losing influence in India to an extent that may soon begin to jeopardize our fundamental interests not only here but throughout Asia.

In the last few weeks even those Indian leaders who have most consistently favored a close relationship with the United States have been caught up in a national wave of insecurity, frustration and uncertainty. This disturbing new mood is compounded of several elements which had been lying just under the surface. If US policy is to deal effectively with India it is

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essential that we seek to understand them.

To some extent India's present insecurity is the emotional inheritance of two hundred years of subservience to the colonial rule of a white western power. Another factor is the psychological impact of the sudden Chinese attack in 1962.

After India's long, patient effort to cultivate a friendly relationship with China the attack itself was an embarrassing testimony to the misjudgment of India's leaders; the fact that the ill-prepared Indian Army was routed added a sense of national humiliation. Two years later the successful Chinese nuclear test rubbed salt into the wound.

On top of this came the episode of the Rann of Kutch which reinforced India's sense of insecurity and opened the door further to a whole series of illogical fears, suspicions and resentments.

This reaction can best be understood in its psychological setting. Night after night in a period of deep national uncertainty the Pakistan radio in Lahore beamed to north Indian audiences, which included most members of Parliament, stories of "another crushing Indian military defeat", of 350 Indians killed (in fact

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only fifteen), of Indian troops "running like rabbits", and of Pakistani officers boasting, "We could have advanced all the way to Bombay."

Added to this emotional mixture of frustration and resentment was the widespread charge that this "great Pakistani victory" was made possible by tanks and other military equipment provided by Pakistan's ally, the United States.

For several years Indian fears of the implication of the US-Pakistan alliance have been fed by three factors:

1. The knowledge that the weapons we have given to Pakistan are better suited to a mechanized drive across the plains of the Punjab toward Delhi than to countering a Chinese or Soviet attack in the mountain passes to the North.

2. The frank assertions of many Pakistanis that their alliance with the United States is in fact aimed at India are typified by the assertion that in return for Pakistan's support for America against its enemy Russia, the United States had agreed to support Pakistan against its enemy India.

3. Our inability for security reasons to explain to the Indians

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the importance of

In this context the Pakistani admission of the use of United States equipment in Kutch and our reluctance publicly to criticize their use for fear of upsetting the British cease-fire negotiations was skillfully exploited by the articulate left in India to demonstrate that Pakistan's frank interpretation of the United States-Pakistan agreement was essentially correct.

Now even the most moderate Indian newspapers editorialize that the assurances of John Foster Dulles and President Eisenhower (assurances which had been repeated again and again by every American Ambassador, including myself) have been tested and proved empty.

Thus the use of United States equipment by the Pakistanis to win the "crushing victory over the Indian forces" which was vividly described by the Pakistan radio has called into serious question both American intentions in this part of the world and our ability to pursue those intentions effectively.

At the same time, India's focus has shifted from China, which a few weeks ago four out of five Indians (like most Americans) viewed as their most dangerous threat, to Pakistan with which the

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United States seeks to maintain a friendly relationship.

It is essential, however, that we not lose our perspective. Although India's tense and unreasonable reaction to recent events is disturbing, the results of our labors in India over the last ten years will not easily be washed away. The United States retains a massive reservoir of respect throughout India; with careful handling this can become the basis for a close and constructive future relationship.

Moreover, most thoughtful Indians are deeply uncertain about the future of Soviet policy in Asia; glowing Indian press accounts of Shastri's visit to Moscow may lessen this uncertainty but they will not eliminate it. Nor is there any particular sympathy for the authoritarian Soviet political system.

Most Indians recognize that there is a ceiling on the amount and kind of economic development assistance that the Communist nations can supply. They also know that Soviet interest in India is heavily contingent upon Sino-Soviet relations and that as long as the Russians continue to dream of a future rapprochement with the Chinese they cannot undertake an unrestrained political, economic and military commitment to India.

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Consequently the most prevalent attitude in India seems to be a compulsive desire for self-sufficiency in everything, and especially in defense. This is accompanied by the realization that commitments between nations are meaningless unless they are rooted in immediate mutual interests that are recognized by both parties.

At this stage no one can accurately predict how the situation will develop. If we fall prey to our frustrations and fail to mend our fences and if the Soviets act with boldness and skill, events in the subcontinent could turn even more sharply to our disadvantage. If, however, we recognize the basis of our dilemma and focus our attention on the many interests which we and the Indians have in common I believe we can almost certainly recover the lost ground and move ahead to a much more solid relationship.

The outcome in any event is not a distant matter. India is approaching a political and economic watershed of the most decisive importance. Within three to five years the shape of things to come will, I believe, begin to become evident.

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IV

A Suggested New Approach

In dealing with the situation which I have described we have a choice of four courses of action. Although none is easy, three of them, it seems to me, are impossible; the fourth, while requiring some difficult adjustments in our present posture, would enable us to bring our policies in the subcontinent into line with our basic objectives in Asia.

Here are the four choices:

1. We can continue to adhere to our present policies in both Pakistan and India doing the best we can to sweep the recurring conflicts under the rug and to ride out the inevitable storms. This, as experience demonstrates, will result in the continuing erosion of our position on both sides of the border.
2. We can abandon all United States aid to the subcontinent or cut it to a dribble. This would be to abdicate to the Soviets and/or to China our position in this critical nation and to render our present massive efforts in Southeast Asia meaningless.
3. We could maintain economic aid to Pakistan and India while cutting off military assistance to both countries. This

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
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
would open the door for the Soviets to fill the military equipment gap in India as they have previously done in Indonesia, the UAR and elsewhere. This in turn would enable the Soviets to develop a key political position in the Indian military, and create an even greater military imbalance between India and Pakistan. Ultimately it could maneuver us into supporting the weaker of the two countries against the Soviet-armed stronger power.

In this connection, it is now clear that even during the last two years the United States has consistently underestimated the Soviet willingness to help India militarily.

In April 1963, during the review of our military assistance program just before my return to India, the possibility of Soviet assistance was largely discounted.



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4. We can separate economic from military aid and establish criteria which apply to both countries equally. The following interrelated steps designed to carry out the fourth approach will, I believe, give us a less contradictory and hence stronger position on the subcontinent and enable us to pursue our major objectives in Asia more effectively.

a. Military Assistance

i. We should allow no basis for compromise in regard to the paramount strategic objective of the United States in Asia: the containment of China until such time as China chooses to live peacefully with its neighbors.

As long as India and/or Pakistan is genuinely committed to the defense of the subcontinent against China and has the capacity to play a meaningful role we should provide appropriate United States military support. Such assistance need not exceed existing budget

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levels under present conditions.

However, a nation failing to subscribe to this objective and to cooperate in achieving it should receive none.

A clear statement of United States policy along these lines will give both India and Pakistan a solid reference point against which each can formulate its own policies and predict the consequences of its own actions.

It will place both nations on the same footing and subject them to the same United States judgments. It will exert pressure on the Pakistanis to abandon their flirtation with China, and to join in the defense of the subcontinent. In regard to India it will give us the advantages of a joint understanding against China without entangling us in defensive alliances and depriving us of the initiative.

ii. The type of weapons which we provide henceforth should be geared solely to the logistical and tactical requirements of a war against China in the northern mountains or on the eastern approaches.

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iii. While recognizing the right of the recipient country to use United States arms in self-defense we would naturally retain the right to cancel any or all future assistance if in our judgment our arms have been used aggressively.

The present problem of policing the use of United States equipment would remain, although it would be considerably reduced by the more clear-cut diplomatic posture which I have suggested, and hopefully by an effective effort to reduce Indo-Pak tensions.

However, for two reasons it is difficult to implement any sort of assurance that US equipment will not be used improperly by either party. First, there is usually some doubt as to precisely how the trouble started; and second the application of US sanctions, which the aggrieved party had assumed would follow automatically, may appear to us unwise in a particular instance such as the Rann of Kutch.

Consequently we should offer neither India nor Pakistan further guarantees against the use of US arms by the other, but confine ourselves to a commitment to support either in a case of clear aggression through the UN or unilaterally if

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need be.

If Pakistan is prepared to forego its present political gambit with China and join seriously in the defense of the subcontinent it should be welcomed as a recipient of military assistance, tailored however as in the case of India to defensive action in the mountains of the north, not on the plains of the south.

B. Economic Assistance

We should continue our economic assistance efforts in both countries.

In both Pakistan and India our aid is being used effectively. With continuing support there is every reason to anticipate an increasing rate of growth which will lay a firm basis for political stability.

If increased US funds are clearly needed to speed self-sufficiency, and if the recipient country is prepared to take the steps to assure its own effective performance I believe we should provide them.

The primary purpose of our economic assistance in India and Pakistan is to achieve self-sustaining growth as

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quickly as possible and ultimately to participate as free nations in the world economy. Our aid, however, constitutes an important lever in both countries. While India at least might go to the Soviet Union for military equipment, as have the UAR and Indonesia, the major inputs of foreign exchange which are essential for economic development in Pakistan and India can only come from the West.

C. The US Alliance with Pakistan

Recent events have demonstrated that our present military alliance with Pakistan has become irrelevant to the present situation in Asia. It seriously weakens our position in India and tempts Pakistan into a whole gamut of diplomatic adventures which undercut United States interests vis-a-vis both China and Russia.

When we give military assistance to India for defense against China we infuriate our so-called ally; when Pakistani pressures cause us to refuse India the tanks and fighter planes that we have already given Pakistan a frustrated India turns to the Soviet Union for the help which the United States has denied her. (India has thus far secured no military equipment

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from the USSR which has not first been requested from the US.)

United States policy toward each nation should henceforth clearly reflect our national objectives and imply no favoritism or special status except that which may be earned by a common approach to a common danger and the effective use of our assistance in respect to that danger.

History cannot be made to run uphill. It is no more possible for us to underwrite a military power balance between Pakistan and India than it would have been for the European powers to underwrite such a balance between Mexico and the United States at a comparable stage in their development. And just as it would have been folly for Mexico to attempt to hold back the development of the United States, so it is folly for Pakistan to assume it can dampen down the development of India.

Although it may be argued that this approach to military assistance may drive Pakistan into the arms of China, I do not believe the risk is significant.

United States economic aid and PL 480 shipments are

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the backbone of Pakistan's successful development effort and right now China cannot provide even for her own minimal requirements. Nor could Pakistan conceivably persuade the USSR to switch its support from India with its vast potential to a country one fifth its size.

Some may also be concerned that the proposed policy change may jeopardize [REDACTED] [REDACTED] However, a decisive stand by the US Government, backed by the massive leverage of our existing economic assistance programs, should insure the continued cooperation of Pakistan [REDACTED] But even if the risk were far greater than I believe it to be the failure of our present policies and the implications of further erosion of the US position in this crucially important nation would require us to face it.

Admittedly the process of establishing the proposed new relationships may involve us in some painful exchanges. But I believe that the end result will be the creation of a far sounder and more realistic American relationship with

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both Pakistan and India which with skilled handling may eventually lead to the easing of tensions between the two.

Certainly the effect here in India would be greatly to strengthen our influence. And as India's confidence in the United States increases, this influence can effectively be used to moderate India's relationship to Pakistan.

Indeed the proposed new criteria in regard to military aid could be discreetly conditioned on India's willingness to work towards a reconciliation with Pakistan. Our economic assistance in both countries can also be used as a carrot to draw them into mutually beneficial cooperative economic ventures.

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This memorandum addresses itself to one of the most complex and politically costly situations currently facing the US Government. Although it leaves many questions unanswered and possibilities unexplored I hope it may stimulate an urgently needed inquiry into a situation which will refuse to stand still.

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I am deeply fearful that the US position in South Asia is now being steadily eroded by policies which, however valid in the mid 1950's, no longer address themselves to the political, economic and military realities.

In the 1930's and 1940's those who were close to the situation in China watched the deterioration of our position there with similar forebodings. If America's China policy had been able to come to grips with the forces which were then shaping events in the most important nation in Asia we might presently be living in a different world.

In the coming years we cannot permit ourselves to slide into a similar debacle in the one Asian nation that is potentially capable of providing a counterweight to the challenge that China now poses.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Friday, December 8, 1967

*Chern*  
*E.H. 26*  
*What's come of this?*  
*Has anyone followed through?*

WWR:

SUBJECT: Wise men to India

I know you saw the attached message in which Bowles renewed his proposal that the President send a small group of independent observers to India to certify economic conditions and opportunities. He suggests this might be useful on the Hill because the doubters have ceased to believe the reports from the "India lovers" in Delhi. You may recall that Bowles raised this with the President in person last summer. The President did not respond.

I would not recommend that we try to put together the team that Bowles suggests. I don't think many people will be impressed or any Congressional votes changed by a pro-India report from the likes of Walter Heller and Douglas Dillon. They are excellent people, but their positions on this range of issues are well known. In the election year maelstrom that kind of report will carry little or no weight.

However, I think it would make excellent sense to try to put together a small delegation of interested senators and congressmen -- the more prestigious the better -- to make a personal inspection tour. I am absolutely confident that such a trip would convince the travellers that enough aid in FY '69 is more important -- and more likely to be dramatically fruitful -- than any year since Indian independence. I would be more than willing to recommend that we take our chances that a Congressional delegation would help us after such a trip.

Henry Owen is writing a memorandum to the Secretary pushing this idea. I think we should give him all the support we can.

Ed Hamilton

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 7-16-02

CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State

RECEIVED  
N. S. C.

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**TELEGRAM**  
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Dec 1 1 17 PM '67

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INFO SS 20, GPM 03, SP 02, L 03, H 02, P 04, USIA 12, MSC 10, INR 07, CIA 04,  
NSAE 00, RSC 01, TRSY 08, COM 08, E 15, FRB 02, XMB 06, AID 30, RSR 01,  
STR 08, MM 01, /162 W

R 301314Z NOV 67  
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1731

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ NEW DELHI 6526

1. WE ARE ALL KEENLY AWARE OF CURRENT DIFFICULTIES WITH CONGRESS OVER ADEQUATE FOREIGN AID BUDGETS WITH PROSPECTS AT LEAST EQUALLY DIFFICULT IN 1969. YET, IF OUR INPUTS OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE ARE INADEQUATE THE PRESENT PROSPECTS FOR A DRAMATIC INDIAN SUCCESS WILL GO DOWN THE DRAIN.

2. IT OCCURRED TO ME ONE WAY TO DRAMATIZE OPPORTUNITY WITH PRESS AND CONGRESS WOULD BE TO APPOINT TEAM OF THREE QUOTE WISE MEN UNQUOTE TO VISIT IN NEXT SIXTY DAYS FOR THOROUGH EXAMINATION OF INDIAN ECONOMICS, EFFECT OF OUR PRESENT AID PROGRAM AND FUTURE REQUIREMENTS, TO ENABLE GOI TO ACHIEVE SELF-SUFFICIENCY WITHIN REASONABLE TIME SPAN. WELL-PUBLICIZED VISIT, AFFIRMATIVE REPORT TO

- ~~BOWDLER~~
  - ~~BUDGET~~
  - ~~DAVIS~~
  - ~~FRIED~~
  - ~~GINSBURGH~~
  - ~~HAMILTON~~
  - ~~JESSUP~~
  - ~~JOHNSON~~
  - ~~JORDEN~~
  - ~~KEENE P~~
  - ~~LEONHART~~
  - ~~ROCHE~~
  - ~~SAUNDERS~~
  - ~~TAYLOR~~
- VP

PAGE 2 RUSBAE 6526 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~  
CONGRESS AND PRESIDENT, AND TESTIMONY BEFORE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE COULD HAVE DECISIVE EFFECT. DOUGLAS DILLON, WALTER HELLER, ROS GILPATRIC, GOHEEN OF PRINCETON, GEORGE HARRAR OF ROCKEFELLER ARE OBVIOUS POSSIBILITIES.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By J NARA, Date 7-16-02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

**TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NEW DE 06526 301648Z

3. WE WILL ALSO WELCOME ALL MEMBERS OF HOUSE AND SENATE YOU CAN PERSUADE TO VISIT INDIA. I AM SURE THEY WILL FIND SITUATION HERE FAR MORE ENCOURAGING THAN THEY NOW ASSUME.

4. PLEASE PASS THIS CABLE TO WALT ROSTOW,  
WHITE HOUSE.  
BOWLES  
BT

...

CONFIDENTIAL

27

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Monday, December 4, 1967

FOR MR. JIM JONES

Subj: Attached telegram fm Garnet K. Kimble

The sender of the attached telegram is unknown to State, to White House central files and to me. It looks like a crank telegram to me; I suggest we ignore it. If he does show, I'll be glad to hear him out on the phone.



Ed Hamilton



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Mr. Smith,

Central Files has been checked---they have nothing on Mr. Kimble.

A.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

270

November 30, 1967

For: Bromley Smith

From: Jim Jones



Will you please handle the attached.

Hamilton for action

B. K. Smith

12/1/67

*Who is this  
# sent it around*

21740  
ZAC  
↑

The White House  
Washington

1967 NOV 30 AM 10 43

WA033 PD

INDIANAPOLIS IND 30 847A EST

SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WILL BE IN WASHINGTON DC ON BUSINESS, IF WEATHER PERMITS,

NEXT WEEK, DECEMBER 4 AND 5. WOULD APPRECIATE A SPECIFIC

APPOINTMENT TIME TO TALK WITH YOU CONCERNING INDIA RELATIONS.

PLEASE WIRE CONFIRMATION DATE OR PHONE BEFORE DECEMBER 2 IF POSSIBLE.

SINCERELY

GARNET K KIMBLE RR 1 ECHO LANE MOORESVILLE INDIANA 831-3635.

PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, U. S. A.

27d

**Monday, December 4, 1967**

**FOR MR. JIM JONES**

**Subj: Attached telegram fm Garnet K. Kimble**

**The sender of the attached telegram is unknown to State, to White House central files and to me. It looks like a crank telegram to me; I suggest we ignore it. If he does show, I'll be glad to hear him out on the phone.**

**Ed Hamilton**

^