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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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November 3, 1967

Mr. W. W. Rostow  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Walt:

At the risk of overburdening your reading load, I am enclosing background memoranda which deal with the two major problems facing India - the modernization of agriculture and the control of population.

I believe these two papers are factually accurate and balanced. I hope that you will have an opportunity to read them.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosures

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Prepared for: Visitors Center  
American Embassy  
New Delhi

Not for Quotation  
or Attribution

Background Memorandum

PROSPECTS FOR INDIAN AGRICULTURE

October 30, 1967

In India, after two years of severe drought, prospects for a record grain harvest are excellent. With normal weather from now until the winter crop is harvested in March production may exceed 95 million tons in comparison to 75 million tons last year.

A major factor in this record production has been an excellent monsoon. Rainfall has been plentiful, widespread and well-timed.

But even more important for the longer haul, this year's bumper harvest reflects the first stages of a revolution in Indian agriculture based on improved seeds, expanded credit, the increased use of fertilizer and pesticides, and better management of irrigation water.

Three or four years ago only a handful of wishful thinkers would have suggested the possibility of India becoming self-sufficient in foodgrains in the foreseeable future. Now there is some basis for hope that, with good rains and the continuing expansion of the present program, this goal may be reached by the early 1970's.

Let us consider the background behind this development. First for the basic logistics:

I. LOGISTICS OF INDIAN AGRICULTURE

At present India has some 368 million acres under cultivation which amounts to approximately 45 per cent of the total land area (only 14 per cent of the land area is cultivated in China).

Twenty-three per cent of the Indian cultivated acreage is planted in rice, 8 per cent in wheat, 28 per cent in coarse grains, 16 per cent in pulses, 2 per cent in sugar cane, 5 per cent in cotton, one per cent in jute, less than one per cent in tea, 16 per cent in oil seeds and miscellaneous crops.

When the British left in 1947, India had 45 million acres or 15 per cent of its cultivated land under irrigation. In the last 20 years this area has grown to 85 million acres with plans for an increase to 111 million by the early 1970's. During the current crop year (April 1967 to April 1968) India expects to produce about 41 million tons of rice, 15 million tons of wheat, 27 million tons of coarse grains and 12 million tons of pulses.

## II. LAGGING FOOD PRODUCTION IN THE 1950's

The story behind the current progress begins in the 1950's. From 1950 to 1961 Indian food grain production increased by roughly 37 per cent while the increase in population was 21.5 per cent. Consequently the daily diet of the average Indian had gradually increased from 1,700 calories to 2,000 calories.

These production increases were made possible not so much by improvements in agricultural techniques but rather because (1) more land was opened up for cultivation, and (2) double cropping in some areas was made possible by the new multi-purpose dams and by additional wells. Output per acre showed but little change.

By the early 1960's the possibility of further extending cultivated acreage had been greatly reduced. The new hybrid seed varieties were not yet available and prices were too low to encourage cultivators to increase their investment in fertilizer and pesticides. Consequently output per acre remained low and foodgrain production leveled off at about 80 million tons annually. In 1963, much of the 200,000 tons of fertilizer (nitrogen) produced in India backed up in the warehouses because of the lack of demand.

Then came an unexpected breakthrough. In 1964 even with an 89 million ton bumper crop, prices rose sharply due to two poor harvests in the preceding years and an increase in deficit financing. Consequently, for the first time since independence Indian cultivators began to receive a significant increase in their incomes. The two severe droughts in 1965 and 1966 raised prices still further.

Although experience the world over has demonstrated that increased prices to farmers invariably leads to increased production, few foresaw the vigor with which Indian farmers would respond. Traditionally cautious, conservative, seemingly indifferent to new methods and techniques, millions of cultivators suddenly came to life.

Demand for fertilizer and pesticides rose by leaps and bounds. New seeds were eagerly sought after. Measures to improve storage facilities and cut down on the rat population were welcomed.

Although the immediate explanation of this revolution in attitudes lies in increased income opportunities for the cultivators, other and less dramatic factors were also involved.

One was the technical assistance rendered by USAID and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. Another is the community development program which now extends throughout India.

The latter program, which was launched in 1952, divided rural India into 5,000 "blocks" with roughly 100 villages in each block. Each Block Development Officer has a staff consisting of experts in agriculture, public health (including malaria control), family planning, education and the like.

Although this program was designed as a broad effort to help introduce modern ways into the rural areas, inevitably its major focus was on increased agricultural production. There is no doubt that this nationwide network of extension workers, under the guidance of dedicated young District and Block Development officials, helped lay the basis for the present revolution in rural India.

### III. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA COMMITS ITSELF

In December 1965 a major decision was made by the Indian Government. With the support of the Cabinet the then Food and Agriculture Minister, Mr. C. Subramaniam, announced that India was determined to become "self-sufficient" in agriculture by 1971, and pledged the Government to provide the resources required to achieve this goal. Following the formation of a new Cabinet in March 1967 the present Minister, Mr. Jagjivan Ram, reaffirmed this commitment.

In keeping with this decision the Union Government of India allocated Rs. 293 crores (\$390 million) in 1966-67 for agriculture programs as against Rs. 219 crores (\$292 million) allocated in 1965-66. In addition the State Governments allocated Rs. 200 crores (\$267 million). With the Rs. 80 crores (\$105.26 million) carried over from projects initiated the previous year the increase in agricultural investment by the Central and State Governments is well over 50 per cent.

This increase in agricultural investment is especially noteworthy since it occurred at a time when total Government investment was being scaled down as a result of the general economic slump following the war with Pakistan, the temporary cut-off of U.S. aid, and the severe droughts of 1965 and 1966. In the next fiscal year a further substantial increase in investment has been indicated.

### IV. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NEW PROGRAM

A. Education. For several years India's 24 agricultural degree colleges and a number of specialized institutes sponsored by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research have been conducting extensive programs of research and experimentation. These programs which are based less and less on theory and more and more on the practical realities faced by cultivators, are now providing India with the tools which are required to make India self-sufficient in food grains.

In the last ten years, 30,000 young Indians have graduated from Indian agricultural schools including the eight new agriculture universities set up with U.S. assistance. These graduates include soil biologists,

agronomists, chemists, botanists, veterinarians and the like.

**B. Fertilizer.** The new Government program announced in 1965, called for a massive expansion of the Indian fertilizer industry and provided generous incentives for new plant construction. The following steps have been taken:

- (1) Removal of geographic constraints on fertilizer marketing and the abolition of the Government's near-monopoly control over fertilizer distribution.
- (2) Decision to allow fertilizer prices to be set by the market demand.
- (3) Provision of adequate foreign exchange to operate fertilizer plants at full capacity.
- (4) Institution of administrative and procedural changes to ease approval and licensing procedures for foreign private investment in new fertilizer plants.
- (5) Provisions of increased credit to farmers regardless of where they buy their fertilizer.
- (6) Abolition of the requirement of government participation in the ownership of private fertilizer plants.

These steps should make possible a continued fast growth in fertilizer production. In the present fiscal year 1967-68 (July-June) India expects to produce about 500,000 tons of nitrogen, which is an 80 per cent increase over last year. By 1970-71 plants now actually under construction are expected to raise India's nitrogen production capacity by another one million tons to a total of 1.5 million tons.

Successful conclusion of negotiations now in progress with American, British, Japanese and Italian interests would provide, if a reasonable percentage of these come through, for the construction of additional plants capable of producing another 0.7 million tons of nitrogen. This would assure total capacity of 2.2 million tons by 1972.

Production of phosphate fertilizers ( $P_2O_5$ ) is planned to increase from 260,000 tons in 1967-68 to 550,000 tons in 1971-72.

To fill the fertilizer gap before India's own production can meet its needs, fertilizer imports have been sharply increased. In the current year 960,000 tons of nitrogen, 400,000 tons of phosphates and 300,000 tons of potash are being imported by India at a cost of Rs. 150 crores (US \$200 million). This is compared with 376,000 tons of nitrogen, 22,000 tons of phosphates and 94,000 tons of potash only two years earlier.

Plans for next crop year call for imports of one million tons of nitrogen and 330,000 tons of phosphates. If India's foreign exchange situation should permit imports to be further increased the added tonnage would be quickly absorbed.

C. Seeds. India's traditional grain varieties have been developed over the centuries by natural selection. Most of those varieties provide slow developing crops which usually limit the cultivator to one crop per season.

Moreover, most of the traditional plants were long stemmed and tended to lodge (fall over) when even limited amounts of fertilizer were applied. Consequently these varieties were unsuitable for the new production techniques which have been made possible by fertilizer, improved water supplies and pest control.

In the early 1960's Indian scientists began to realize these shortcomings and in cooperation with other governments and private foundations launched a massive down to earth effort to develop and introduce seed varieties suitable to the requirements. As a result India now has improved seeds for all five major food grains. An important feature of most of these new varieties is their short growing season. This permits double and even triple-cropping and consequently is giving a major boost to Indian agriculture.

In the early 1960's the Indian Government imported 18,000 tons of a Mexican short-stem variety of wheat (Sonora 64). Experimentation in Indian research centers resulted in selections specifically adapted to

Indian soil and weather requirements. These were quickly multiplied and are now providing almost fantastic yields. One farmer near Delhi recently harvested in a single crop nearly 3 tons of wheat per acre from a 2-1/2 acre plot.

Wheat seed of the improved varieties is now available to all Indian wheat cultivators. Indeed India is now exporting wheat seed to Nepal.

The rice program is not far behind. The most successful seeds are ADT 27, a variety developed in South India, Taichung Native I and Tainan III from Taiwan, and more recently IR 8 developed at the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines. These are all high yielding varieties that mature in 105 to 135 days in contrast to the 180 days often required for traditional varieties; their yield is from two to four times greater.

Equally sensational examples could be cited in the production of corn (maize), milo (jowar), and millets (bajra and ragi). Together these so-called coarse grains represent about 25 per cent of India's total grain and pulse production.

Indian scientists are consistently working, and with good prospects of success, further to extend such improvements. Although there are many problems of taste, disease and insects, the plant breeders are now confident that they can keep ahead of these problems.

Last year India planted a total of 4.8 million acres with these locally produced, high-yielding seeds. For the current year (1967-68) plans call for 15 million acres. This acreage will be more than doubled by 1971.

D. Irrigation. In British India, most of the irrigation was provided by artificial lakes and tanks and by canal systems which drew water from the rivers.

In the early years of Indian independence the major emphasis was switched to multi-purpose dams which provided both electric power and irrigation. One of these, the Bhakra Dam in the Punjab completed in 1963,

is now producing 600,000 kilowatts of electricity and watering some five million acres.

More recently the emphasis has been shifting to tube wells which provide water from depths of up to 300 feet, and dug wells which go down 20 to 40 feet. Most cultivators prefer this well irrigation because it can be locally maintained and managed, while canal irrigation, which is controlled by the government, does not always fit local planting schedules.

The Union and State Governments of India are now embarked on a major effort to expand this system of well irrigation. All States now provide loans to enable the cultivators to dig wells. The cost for a tube well averages Rs. 8000 (U.S. \$1051); for a dug well, Rs. 500 to 1000 (U.S. \$70 to \$130).

In Madras State 265,000 wells are now equipped with electric power. In U.P. more than 100,000 wells were dug in the last two years.

The Gangetic Plain is a particularly fruitful area for such development. Although it has not yet been fully explored, many experts believe that it probably contains the largest underground reservoir in the world.

Major and medium irrigation schemes are also being expanded while efforts are made to utilize existing sources more efficiently. Improved irrigation and drainage practices have the potential of supporting other modern agricultural practices that can double or even triple yields on presently irrigated lands.

Although water supplies are not always reliable, roughly 22 per cent of the arable land in India is now classed as irrigated. The substantial increase now planned will, if realized, be a significant move toward freeing farmers in the better watered and more productive areas from the uncertainties of the monsoon rains.

#### V. IMPACT OF INCREASED FARM PRODUCTION ON INDIA'S ECONOMY

The multiplier effect of increased agricultural production on the economy of India is dramatic. Let us consider, for instance, what the new agri-

cultural technology, with adequate water, can mean to a forwardlooking Indian wheat cultivator.

On his five acres of land he formerly produced an average of 535 pounds of wheat per acre currently valued at Rs. 650 (\$87) or more a ton. By using the new high-yielding seeds, irrigation, chemical fertilizers and pesticides this farmer can now increase his yield five times and his net earnings about six times. From a single crop his comparative budgets will look like this:

	<u>Cost by Traditionally Methods</u>	<u>Cost by New Methods</u>
	(in rupees)	
1. Plant Protection	0	30
2. Seeds	50	100
3. Irrigation, capital charges @ 20% a year gross return	0	300
4. Irrigation, operating charges	0	50
5. Fertilizer	0	1000
6. Labor and bullock power	<u>250</u>	<u>350</u>
	300	1830
Yield	1.5 tons	7.5 tons
Total Value	Rs. 810	Rs. 4875
Net Earnings	Rs. 510 (\$67.10)	Rs. 3045 (\$400.65)

His new tube well enables him to secure a second crop. This will double his annual net profit to more than Rs., 6100. If there are five in this cultivator's family their per capital income will be four times the present Indian average. Moreover, the cultivator using the new technology has not only increased the yield for one growing season; he has also sharply increased the future productivity of his land.

With this increase in income he begins to purchase consumer items which his family had never been able to afford, -- a sewing machine, bricks and roofing tiles, a transistor radio, a bicycle, lanterns, shoes,

cloth, other consumer goods and ultimately a small tractor — many of them may be produced by new factories in the nearby rural towns. As the rural consumer markets are further stimulated by increased demand the impact begins to be felt in far away urban centers and more money is thus invested in additional industrial production.

This agriculture-small rural industry approach to national economic growth is already responsible for spectacular economic gains in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. Now there is reason to hope that the same dynamic process is beginning to work in India with its crucially important one-seventh of the world's population.

## VII. PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS

Although prospects for Indian agriculture are enormously improved in the last few years with the likelihood of still further improvement, several important questions remain unanswered:

1. Will a procurement system be maintained which continues to offer the cultivators the incentives for increased production which have sparked the current surge of new production?

Although consumer food prices are now undoubtedly too high, it is agreed that a sharp drop would reduce production and slow down the present process of growth. The problem is to find a proper balance between prices the non-farm families pay for food and the income the farmers received for growing it. This will require a determination, planning, and bold experimentation.

2. Can a reasonably orderly national foodgrain market be developed and maintained?

At present food distribution in India is based on a system of State zones, with shipment of food across State lines permitted only on a Government account. This program is designed to enable the Government to procure grains more easily from surplus States. However, inevitably it has created sharp differences in price between areas only a few miles apart.

There is now general agreement that with increased production, the zoning system will at some point become not only unnecessary but an impediment to full production. However, the Indian Government will be reluctant to eliminate the zones until it has built up adequate reserve stocks which will enable it to ship supplies to deficit areas and to stabilize prices.

3. Will the present pace of research be maintained?

The development of new seeds is a sensitive and intricate process. New varieties must be developed regularly which are pest-resistant, productive and palatable to the consumers. As new blights develop, these seeds must be replaced at regular intervals with still newer varieties. Consequently any letdown in the present agricultural research program would be dangerous.

4. Will storage facilities be adequate?

At present, the Central Government has storage facilities for 3 million tons of foodgrains with the storage for 2 million additional tons under the control of cooperatives. Eventually India will require a system of pest-proof storage go-downs (warehouses) located in all the 315 districts of India which will cut down transportation problems at harvest time, allow farmers to maintain reasonable prices and prevent losses by rodents.

5. Will the rate of construction of fertilizer plants be maintained and expanded?

The demand for fertilizer in India now greatly exceeds the sharply increased supply. In the next few years, the Indian Government will be hardpressed to meet this growing demand as massive imports cut deeply into India's scarce foreign exchange.

If Indian fertilizer needs are to be met at prices the farmer can pay, present capacity must be expanded. This will require large amounts of foreign exchange which can most easily come from the private sector. To induce this private investment, India must continue to encourage the investors.

6. How will increased farm income affect the political stability of rural areas?

This is a particularly critical problem which is bound to grow in importance in coming years.

At the time of Indian independence, many landholders under the old Zamindari system owned thousands of acres each. India's leaders deserve credit for eliminating this system and establishing land ownership ceilings, terms of tenancy, limits on land rents, etc.

Although the results have been impressive, there are still serious dislocations in many areas. For instance, 38 per cent of the farm land in India is owned by 7 per cent of the farmers; 92 per cent of the farmers who own land own less than 2 acres, and 33 per cent of all the rural people own no land whatsoever.

At this point a word in regard to the optimum size of agricultural landholdings may be in order: Most Americans think of agricultural efficiency in terms of tractors and similar mechanization. However, the largest outputs of foodgrains per acre are achieved not in the United States but in Japan and Taiwan where the size of farms are limited by law to 7 1/2 and 10 acres respectively.

The main role of mechanization is to save labor by reducing the number of men required to operate a single-farm. It has been said that an Indian village could live for a week on the wheat that an American or Canadian harvesting machine leaves behind.

In most Indian States the ceiling on land owned by a single family is now about 30 acres with a provision for permanent occupancy for tenants and a limitation of 25 per cent of the crop to be paid by the tenant farmer.

In actual practice, however, it is possible for several members of one family to pool landholdings under the management of a single family member. Because records may be outdated or non-existent the rights of tenants to farm the land at a reasonable rent are often circumscribed.

In this politically explosive framework, a substantial number of the Indian farm families are already participants in a rural revolution which is creating brand new social and political pressures, particularly in those villages where the progress is most pronounced.

Landless laborers may accept their wage of two or three rupees a day without much complaint as long as they know that everyone else in their village is poor. However, when they see the landowners' incomes rising rapidly while their own rises much more slowly if at all, they become restless and resentful.

In other words, the dramatic increases in food output which are occurring -- and which should continue to grow in the years ahead -- may lead to sharp disparities in income which in turn may create an expanding sense of economic and social injustice.

We might add, however, that this phenomenon is not peculiar to India. In America as well as in India the solution or partial solution of old problems inevitably creates new ones; this is an inevitable part of the developmental process.

#### VIII. IN CONCLUSION

India has embarked on an agricultural revolution which would have been difficult to visualize only a few years ago. Throughout much of rural India, there is now a brand new confidence, a new sense of opportunity and of hope.

However, a balanced perspective is essential. Progress in the last three years has no doubt been dramatic; yet the challenge to the Indian Government and cultivators to provide the Indian people not only with an adequate diet but also with a balanced one remains formidable.

Thus far the rural breakthrough which we have described has directly affected between 10 and 20 per cent of the village areas of India. Many of the remaining Indian villages are still relatively untouched by modern technology.

Nevertheless a critically important and impressive beginning has been made which may be expected steadily to spread. With a comparable program of family planning (the subject of another paper), there is now a reasonable prospect that India may succeed in striking a balance between population growth and food production which will enable the great majority of citizens to expand steadily both their living standards and their sense of dignity.

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American Embassy  
New Delhi

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Background Memorandum

THE PROSPECTS FOR FAMILY PLANNING IN INDIA

October 30, 1967

The primary economic challenge for India and most other developing countries is the rapid rise in population, due primarily to the declining death rate. In some countries of Asia, Africa and South America the increase is eating up most of the per capita gains of economic development.

If a deterioration in living standards is to be avoided in India, effective family planning as well as improved agricultural production are essential.

In a companion paper we have analyzed the prospects for Indian agriculture. In this memorandum we shall discuss the prospects for India's family planning.

I. POPULATION GROWTH IN INDIA

With only 2.4 per cent of the world's land area, India supports 14 per cent of the world's population. Fifty-five thousand babies are born every day.

Each year there are approximately 21 million births and 8 million deaths. Consequently 13 million people per year are added to the current Indian population of approximately 520 million. In stark terms the problem is how to prevent 13 million births annually.

The immediate target of Indian family planning officials is to reduce the birthrate from its present level of 41 per thousand population to 25 per thousand by 1975. This would cut the growth rate in half. The long-range goal is to stabilize India's total population at around 670 million by 1985.

To achieve these objectives something like half of the 100 million couples in the reproduction age group must be persuaded effectively to practice family planning by 1975 and 75 per cent by 1985.

## II. TECHNIQUES AND METHODS:

The Indian Government -- Union and State -- is striving to reach its objective of a stabilized population by offering a "cafeteria" of techniques from which to choose.

A. Sterilizations. By far the most effective method of preventing births is by sterilization. It has been estimated that the number of births prevented per thousand sterilizations is three times greater than those prevented per thousand loop insertions.

Since 1964 when the program began to get underway, there have been 2.6 million sterilizations. In the last Indian fiscal year 1966-67, 864,237 sterilizations were performed.

About 90 per cent of all sterilizations are male operations (vasectomy) and 10 per cent are female operations (tubectomy). This method is steadily gaining acceptance.

Progress has been notably high in the State of Madras, with significant gains in the States of Kerala, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Mysore, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa. A start has been made in Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Bihar and West Bengal.

B. Intra-uterine Contraceptive Device (IUCD): The "loop" was introduced in India as a new method of contraception in April 1965. By mid-1967, 1.8 million IUCD insertions had been achieved with the Punjab, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Kerala and Mysore accounting for a major fraction.

The number of insertions in the 1966-67 fiscal year was 915,167. The program was slowed down because of side effects (mostly bleeding), adverse propaganda and the difficulty in reaching a significant percentage of the rural population with the limited number of women doctors available. Nevertheless, it is hoped that a total of 2.0 million insertions can be performed in this fiscal year.

C. Condoms: The condom is probably the most practical and effective method of child spacing for the 75 per cent of the male population which is out of touch with clinical facilities.

The private sector in India is gearing up to produce 100 million condoms per year. The largest private plant, in Madras, is expected to reach the capacity of 75 million by April 1968; three others are improving their testing equipment and should soon be adding significantly to the supply.

In addition a new factory in the public sector is now being constructed in Kerala. The initial capacity of this plant when it starts producing in 1969 will be 144 million pieces annually, which will be doubled by the following year.

In the meantime, to help close the immediate gap between supply and demand, condoms are being imported in increasing volume from Japan, South Korea and the United States.

It is anticipated that the use of condoms will climb steeply due to extensive promotion and a subsidized sales price of less than one cent each. Several corporations with large selling organizations such as Liptons, Union Carbide and Levers are being asked to cooperate in a distribution program which will ultimately cover hundreds of thousands of small bazaar shops and tea houses.

By 1970-71, the current program calls for 10 per cent of all Indian married couples of child-bearing age to use 500 million condoms per year.

D. The "Pill:" After a clinical trial of two years, oral contraceptive pills have been approved for private prescription.

When they were first introduced, their cost and the requirement that they be taken regularly 20 days each month made them impractical for all but the higher income groups. Now the cost is down to one rupee (\$0.13) per cycle, and pills are being prescribed by private doctors for some 200,000 women. USAID is providing several million cycles of pills for pilot work to determine their practicality under Indian conditions.

E. Abortions: A committee which was set up to review the question of legalized or liberalized abortions has recently recommended legislation that will permit abortions wherever the mother's health is believed to be endangered. In India, where the maternal mortality rate is 6 per 1,000, this could have a major effect on the birth rate. While it is too soon to judge the potential of this approach here, the record shows that in every country where abortion has been legalized the effect on the birth rate has been significant. In Japan, for instance, it was instrumental in bringing down the annual rate of population increase from 3 per cent in 1950 to less than 1 per cent in 1966.

Legalization of abortion is also important to control unnecessary and harmful abortions by substituting more effective means of family planning. It is estimated that one million of these illegal abortions take place each year.

F. Raising Minimum Legal Age for Marriage: The minimum age for women is now 15 years of age and for men 18 years. A proposal to raise these minimums by law to 21 and 25, respectively, is now being considered. If new legislation eventually passes it is likely to be a compromise between the present level and the current proposal.

### III. THE USE OF INCENTIVES

The Central and State Governments and private industry have begun to offer a variety of incentives to induce married couples to adopt one or the other of these family planning techniques.

One thousand scholarships are offered each year by medical schools for women students. Each student agrees to work in the family planning program after graduation for as long as he or she is under the scholarship. Thus far this has been a highly competitive and popular program.

Special allowances are also being paid to district family planning officers and doctors who participate in the family planning effort. Private medical practitioners are paid special allowances for sterilizations and IUCD insertions. Homeopaths and practitioners of the

indigenous medical sector are also becoming involved. Provisions have been made for providing minor operation theaters for sterilization operations.

In most States husbands and wives who participate in this program are directly compensated by the Government for expenses incurred in traveling and time lost from work.

Industry, too, is encouraging workers to participate in family planning. The Union Government compensates companies for much of the costs to their employees; the balance is an allowable deduction for tax purposes.

Consideration is also being given by the States and Center to a much broader incentive program directly to reach low and middle income families. It is estimated that there are 46 million Indian males of family-bearing age who have not been sterilized and who already have three or more children. In some states direct payments are being offered to those who are willing to have vasectomies.

In three-children families, where the father is unwilling to submit to a vasectomy, wives may be persuaded to accept a loop by a lesser inducement, for example, Rs. 30.

A particularly promising incentive program is now under way in Madras and Maharashtra. A person already sterilized refers as many of his acquaintances as he can convince and is paid Rs. 10 for each referral. In Madras alone this system helped produce 230,000 sterilizations last year.

Several State Governments now permit giving the entire incentive allocation per insertion (Rs. 11) to the private doctor who then uses his own discretion in its dispersion. It is hoped that this will encourage the medical profession to become more actively involved in persuading people to practice family planning.

Uttar Pradesh is experimenting with the restriction of medicine and maternity benefits for governmental and other employees. For example, in June 1967 a directive was issued stating that "non-industrial women

employees of the Central Government will not be eligible for additional maternity leave after April 1, 1968 if they already have three or more children."

#### IV. EDUCATION AND PROMOTION

Approximately Rs. 10 crores (\$13 million) has been allotted by the Union Government during the next four years for mass media programs to promote family planning, of which Rs. 9.6 crores will be spent by the States. Every possible medium to spread awareness of family planning is being exploited or will be exploited. These include the following activities:

1. Radio: Family planning programs are being broadcast on all 33 stations of All India Radio. Special 3-man family planning information teams have been set up at 22 of these stations.
2. Press: Massive amounts of information on the importance of family planning is being disseminated in the daily newspapers via feature stories, commentaries and advertisements.
3. Films: Twelve population control educational films of various lengths and themes have been produced for exhibition in commercial theaters. These are also being shown through the Field Publicity Mobile Vans.

One Family Planning Van for each of the 315 districts has been sanctioned and efforts are being made to put them in the field as fast as possible. The magnitude of this undertaking is underscored by the fact that even when these mobile units are all in operation, it would still take each unit several years to cover each village in its District with one presentation.

4. Outdoor Publicity: Using designs and slogans developed at the Center, the States are now erecting signs and billboards presenting the case for family planning. A simple, easily recognizable symbol, the Red Triangle, has been adopted to help people, mainly those who are illiterate, identify the location of family planning facilities.

In addition there are match box covers, printed materials, wall paintings, indigenous songs, plays and signs in busses. To overcome the barriers of distance, illiteracy and lack of mass media, the Government is even experimenting with the possibility of air dropping simple literature on villages.

Under the guidance of the Ministry of Health and Family Planning, the Posts and Telegraphs Board is cooperating by printing slogans and symbols on envelopes, preparing special postage stamps and cancelling stamps with family planning slogans. It also intends using postmen and stamp vendors to assist in the distribution of contraceptives.

#### V. ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY

To support this vast program, the Central Government has established new nationwide administrative machinery, which is now directed by a number of competent professionals.

In January 1966 the Ministry of Health was redesignated as the Ministry of Health and Family Planning and a separate Department of Family Planning was set up with a Secretary directing the administrative wing and a Commissioner of Family Planning directing the technical wing.

Since the actual implementation of the family planning program is the responsibility of each State, the Central Government is working to stimulate a greater effort on the part of the States by assuring adequate financing and by providing guidelines and consultative services.

Throughout the 315 Administrative Districts of India there are now 4,569 Primary Health Centers, to which a total of 41,122 sub-centers are to be attached by 1971. These constitute the administrative base of the program.

Through this structure a comprehensive training program has been developed in consultation with the States. This program provides for training of 1,500 key personnel at the State and District levels in five central institutions. Of the 46 training centers authorized, 38 have been established, 36 of which are now fully staffed.

The Central Family Planning Field units have already given short-term orientation to 9,108 medical and 69,542 other technical personnel. Over 13,000 auxiliary nurse midwives and 1,700 lady health visitors are now at work, but thousands more will be needed.

The Government has also involved the Rural Community Development Organization in implementing the new program. In five districts the intensive agriculture program has been integrated with family planning. To support this direct extension work in the field, more than 75,000 Community Development workers have been sanctioned to promote the program at the village level, plus 66,200 supervisors and technical assistants at the block, district and state levels.

This massive administrative effort is being backed by greatly increased funds. In the Fourth Plan (1965-71) Rs. 2.3 billion (\$306 million) have been budgeted, which is a ten-fold increase from the Third Plan allocation.

Approximately 96 per cent of this will be allocated by the Central Government to the States. This includes 100 per cent financing of non-recurring expenditures and 90 per cent of recurring expenditures for the next ten years. If more funds are required the Central Government has promised that they will be made available. India, with its vast population, has thus far budgeted more of its own funds for family planning on a per capita basis than any other country.

## VI. ASSISTANCE FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES

Although responsibility for stabilizing the population growth rate has been wholly assumed by the Indian Union and State Governments, private and professional, commercial and philanthropic groups are also making contributions.

One of the most active foreign supporting groups is the Ford Foundation. Since 1959, Ford grants totaling roughly \$6 million have been awarded to private and public organizations for research, training, integrated family planning/health projects and to demonstrate innovations to speed the Family Planning program to success.

Ford's original grant to the Ministry of Health for research related to family planning helped get the program under way. Under this grant Family Planning Communications Research Centers have been set up in Bombay, Luchnow, Trivandrum, Calcutta and Gandhigram.

The Program of the Institute of Rural Health and Family Planning in Gandhigram in Madras State deserves special notice. The main purpose is to implement the family planning program in rural community development blocks through a variety of techniques. The Institute prepares teachers to work in training services, and is responsible for an intensive health and family planning program.

Since 1966 U.S. Agency for International Development has been working with the Indian Government to promote information for planning and management. Specific activities being undertaken are as follows:

Collaboration in the International Demograph Training and Research Institute in Bombay;

Consultation on State evaluation units;

Consultation on the national sample registration and survey schemes;

Condom distribution scheme involving use of commercial channels;

Activities for distribution of birth control information;

A pilot project on oral contraception in 100 blocks distributed through all 17 of the States of India;

Development of manuals of programmed instruction for various family planning efforts;

Development of promotional efforts through the voluntary nurses association;

A Johns Hopkins University Study of intensive rural health and family planning activities focused on the Ludhiana area.

The U. S. Peace Corps has also assigned one group of 50 volunteers to work under the Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh State Family Planning programs. Forty more volunteers are scheduled to work in Bihar beginning in December, 1967. Three hundred other volunteers working in general health related projects are spending about half their efforts on family planning.

The Population Council, Church World Services, the Christian Medical Association, the American Friends Association, UNICEF and the Rockefeller Foundation have also assisted on various facets of the family planning effort.

## VII. PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS

The task of stabilizing India's population at around 670 million by 1985 is staggering, and at this early stage success is by no means assured. However, after years of uncertainty there is no doubt that a massive effort is now being made. The following figures underscore the dimensions of the undertaking:

To achieve the immediate Indian objective, i.e. to lower the birth rate from 41 to 25 per 1,000 by 1975, will require some such "mix" as 3 million sterilizations annually which would eventually prevent 4-1/2 million births, the use of condoms and other contraceptive techniques by some 15 million families to prevent 4 million births, and one million IUCD insertions to prevent 500,000 births.

It is not too much to say that the future of India will be profoundly affected by the answers to the following questions:

1. Will the Indian Government continue to give family planning top priority? The critical importance of family planning has now been accepted by the Central Government and in greater or lesser degrees by all State Governments. Public opinion is favorable; there is no active political or religious opposition. Budgets are expected to continue to rise as the needs expand; the governmental efforts become more effective and public acceptance increases. But with so many competing needs there is always danger of a let down.

2. Can the necessary organization be recruited and trained? A nationwide family planning program of these dimensions is probably the biggest administrative challenge that India or any other developing nation has ever faced. However, it is reassuring to remember that the Indian malaria control program which was put together in less than a decade reduced the incidence of malaria from 100 million cases annually as recently as 1953 to less than 50,000 today.

Although this program included the efforts of some 100,000 trained workers and the massive use of DDT, the logistical requirements of the family planning effort are substantially greater.

3. Can the necessary public support be mustered and maintained? This is a key question. India's task in curbing her population is far more difficult than the problem of becoming self-sufficient in food-grains. If only 20 per cent of Indian cultivators can be persuaded to accept the newly-developed seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and improved irrigation, India's food problem can probably be solved.

However, to achieve India's family planning goal requires the support and cooperation of at least 60 per cent of the entire population. The dimensions of the necessary programs of research, organization, explanation and motivation are staggering.

Although there are no significant cultural or religious barriers against family planning, there is the stark problem of opening the minds of 100 million married couples to a new and revolutionary concept.

Only time can answer these and other relevant questions. All that can be safely said at this stage is that an impressive effort is underway.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

29

10-18-67

For the Record

Talked to Valenti today, 3:45 PM.  
Went through points in Deighing  
memo. Concluded that our view  
is we should do nothing official  
and as little as possible otherwise.  
Jack agreed, though he said that  
he may have to receive Blutto  
himself in his entirely private  
Capacity

E. H. Hamilton

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, October 16, 1967 -- PM

~~SECRET~~  
SENSITIVE

WWR:

SUBJECT: Bhutto Visit to the U. S.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 07-7  
By id, NARA, Date 2-26-09

*Pakistan*  
*EH*  
*Talks to Valenti*

*29a*

Jack Valenti asked you to comment on a trip here by Z. A. Bhutto. Ostensibly, Bhutto would come for a "lecture tour." But he'd also like to chat with Administration officials and the Congress. All this would be to correct past "misunderstandings." (Valenti's memo is attached.)

The indirect approach through Valenti is not the only one we've had. Leon Dayton (a friend of Foy Kohler, and Vice President of Pan Am hotels) got the same pitch from Bhutto in Beirut a month ago.

State is definitely against any encouragement from us. I agree. The costs would far outweigh the possible (!) benefits:

1. It would hurt our relations with Ayub. Pirzada told Jim Spain that Ayub is very worried about what Bhutto is up to in general. So much so that Pirzada asked that we look into Bhutto's contacts with the Chinese. A memo on this has gone to the Secretary (Pirzada didn't have a suitable moment "alone" with Rusk), and the Agency is digging. Ayub probably fears that Bhutto is out to unseat him -- by fair means or foul -- two years hence. To give Bhutto open doors here would surely damage our standing with Ayub -- and just when we need his help in buying wheat, Peshawar, etc. (By the way, State now gives Bhutto no better than a 1 in 5 chance to knock over Ayub. But those odds would improve after a well-oiled visit to Washington.)

2. Bhutto's not redeemable. State has grave doubts that Bhutto means his plea for understanding. He shows no sign of a reversal before Pak audiences. His last speech (Friday) demanded withdrawal from CENTO and SEATO, closer relations with Peiping, and elimination of "Special foreign bases" (read Peshawar). To give him a "fair hearing" around town wouldn't change this.

We couldn't stop him if he comes under some private sponsorship. State thinks he probably is eligible for a visa. But there should be no hint of encouragement or an official reception of any kind. (We'd still want to reserve final judgment until he's here and shown his spots.)

I vote we keep strictly hands off. If you agree, I'll draft your reply to Jack Valenti along these lines.

*Rm*  
*Tague*  
*EH*

Roger Morris

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT W. ROSTOW

From: Jack Valenti

October 10, 1967

EH  
Urgent  
Check state &  
tell me what  
you advise  
29b  
W

This morning I met with Dr. Manton who heads the Stanley Foundation (founded by a consulting engineer whose interests are large in foreign policy).

He tells me Z. A. Bhutto wants to come to America to speak before academic gatherings at several universities. Bhutto, according to Manton, is concerned over the feeling in the U.S. that he is anti-American and he wants to correct this judgment. Moreover, he is interested in strengthening the UN and has offered to aid U Thant in any way he can, particularly in view of the fact that Bhutto has contacts and friendships in Peking that he believes can be useful in establishing meaningful dialogues.

His question to me: What should Bhutto do in regard to a trip to Washington? Is it possible he might talk to Rostow? Should he seek a rostrum at one of the Washington universities? Should he try to meet off-the-record and chat with senators and congressmen as well as officials within the Administration? Would he have any trouble getting a visa?

Attached is a document detailing the work of the Stanley Foundation -- Brad Morse and Don Fraser, congressmen, are involved in this.

I told Manton I would try to help Bhutto meet with some people in Washington.

What do you think I should do on this, Walt? Would you not see Bhutto off-the-record.

Attachments

JV

29c

# THE STANLEY FOUNDATION

STANLEY BUILDING • MUSCATINE, IOWA 52761 • (319) 264-1500

C. MAXWELL STANLEY  
President

THOMAS B. MANTON  
Executive Director

September 7, 1967

Dear Mr. Valenti:


It was good to talk to you today about the possibility for seeing you on Tuesday in New York. Mr. Z.A. Bhutto has spoken very warmly of you, and I look forward to meeting you.

Enclosed is the final Statement of the Conference which brought Mr. Bhutto and me together in Switzerland in July. I subsequently spent some time with him in both Geneva and London.

I will call your office first thing on Tuesday morning to see when we can get together.

I look forward to meeting you.

Warm regards,



Thomas B. Manton

Mr. Jack Valenti, President  
Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.  
522 Fifth Avenue  
New York, N. Y. 10036

TBM:jd  
Enclosure

*Did you agree to this?*  
*Yes*

RECEIVED  
SEP 11 1967  
IV-DC/12

29d

# THE STANLEY FOUNDATION

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STATEMENT by MEMBERS  
of the  
SECOND CONFERENCE on the UNITED NATIONS OF 1975

Bürgenstock, Switzerland

July 28, 1967

We continue the work begun by the Conference on the United Nations of 1975, held in June 1965, which called for major changes in the United Nations to make it capable of maintaining peace and freedom under law.

This is a time of growing danger and great opportunity. There is a trend toward more centers of power in the world. The threat of nuclear war grows as the armaments race enters a new round and nuclear weapons spread to more nations. Too often the nations fail to use the United Nations to solve international disputes, and rely instead on force and intervention. Painfully slow development and rapid population growth in developing countries lead to increased violence and non-democratic regimes.

The United Nations is caught in a vicious circle. Lack of confidence in the United Nations discourages its use and limits its performance. This makes it difficult to achieve the support of nations for the basic changes in the United Nations which are necessary. Yet only a strengthened United Nations can provide the successful performance which is needed to build confidence.

We propose that this vicious circle be broken by taking specific steps toward a more effective United Nations. These steps will strengthen the ability of the United Nations to achieve its purposes. Speaking solely as individuals, we propose these steps:

CONFERENCE on the UNITED NATIONS OF 1975

Bürgenstock  
July 24-28, 1967

1. In order to make any major progress toward general and complete disarmament, the United Nations security system must be strengthened so that all nations can rely on it, and means for the just settlement of international disputes must be provided and used. The armaments race should be stopped as soon as possible. Specifically, it is in the self-interest of all nations to make realistic agreements (including necessary safeguards) to prohibit all nuclear weapons tests, to limit the quantities of both nuclear and conventional weapons, to require that all transfers of weapons from one nation to another be reported to and published by the United Nations and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
2. In the important field of peacekeeping, the United Nations must be given the capacity to act promptly, rather than having to improvise after trouble begins. All nations should be invited to earmark and train units of their national armed forces and police forces for United Nations duty when needed. United Nations capability should also be strengthened by creating a permanent United Nations staff for peacekeeping operations and by adopting clear but flexible rules for peacekeeping. It is further essential that agreement be reached as soon as possible to create a permanent United Nations peace force, recruited by and for the United Nations and effectively backed by its members. In particular, the United Nations needs without delay its own units to perform specialized tasks such as communications, logistics and police duty.
3. The Security Council has primary responsibility for peacekeeping, but the General Assembly should be able to act when there is no reasonable possibility of Security Council action.
4. A determined effort should be made to implement Chapter VII of the Charter to enable United Nations peace enforcement action by the Security Council. The Military Staff Committee should be reactivated. Member nations should make agreements to provide forces on call of the Security Council. Organization and planning for effective economic sanctions under Article 41 is needed, including creation of a staff to administer economic sanctions.
5. Parallel to the United Nations peacekeeping activities, the United Nations and its members should make more determined and unrelenting efforts to find solutions to international conflicts and to persuade the parties to accept reasonable solutions in conformity with the principles of the Charter. The conflict resolution role of the United Nations is vitally important, and the mediation services of the Secretary-General and his staff should be supported and expanded.

6. All nations should voluntarily accept without reservation the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the kinds of international disputes listed in Article 36 of the Statute. All treaties which do not specify other methods of settlement should provide that disputes arising under the treaty shall be determined by the International Court. The judicial independence of the International Court, free from national or other interference, must be assured by all suitable means. Increased efforts to develop and codify contemporary international law are needed. All these efforts should tend to strengthen the authority of the United Nations to maintain a just peace under law.

7. The critical situation of the developing countries is a growing threat to peace. This great and urgent challenge requires a vastly expanded and dynamic effort under United Nations leadership to attack the problem on many fronts. The developing countries have the primary responsibility for their own development, including the full mobilization of their human and natural resources and the economic, social and structural changes which are necessary for growth. But in order to allow the developing countries to assume full responsibility for their development, it is the duty of the world community to remove obstacles to development and promote an expanding world economy which will benefit all peoples regardless of their present degree of development. Among the measures required are these: increased financial and technical assistance, both bilateral and multilateral, on terms which will encourage development; trade policies, including temporary trade preferences, which will enable the developing countries to build their own economies through increased exports; a serious attack on the population problem, including aid to nations willing to accept it; and better coordination of all United Nations development and trade programs.

8. It is imperative that the United Nations should move toward universal membership. In the opinion of most but not all the participants, the People's Republic of China should promptly be seated. The presence of France and China in disarmament negotiations is essential.

9. A comprehensive study should be made of all factors involved in granting greater authority to the United Nations General Assembly, including the process of decision-making.

10. A start should be made toward giving the United Nations reliable sources of revenue independent of national contributions. For example, the United Nations might be authorized to collect fees for the use of international communications, outer space, and resources in or under the international seas.

Many other steps would be helpful. We stress the need for all member nations to honor their Charter commitments and make greater use of the United Nations to solve international problems. More research is needed on the hard problems of war and peace and on the effectiveness of existing United Nations programs.

The steps listed above can be taken by 1975 if the peoples of the world and their governments will contribute enough leadership, imagination and hard work.

This is a time for realism and boldness. The task of strengthening the United Nations is difficult and demanding.

We must build a more effective United Nations in the interest of survival.

PARTICIPANTS OF THE  
SECOND CONFERENCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS OF 1975

The Honorable Gabriel d'Arboussier of Senegal, Executive Director of United Nations  
Institute for Training and Research

The Honorable Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, former Foreign Minister of Pakistan

Mr. Andrew Boyd of Great Britain, Foreign Affairs Editor of "The Economist"

General E. L. M. Burns, Adviser to the Government of Canada on Disarmament

The Honorable Donald M. Fraser, Foreign Affairs Committee, House of  
Representatives, U. S. A.

The Honorable Per Haekkerup, former Foreign Minister of Denmark

The Honorable Bradford F. Morse, Foreign Affairs Committee, House of  
Representatives, U. S. A.

The Honorable José A. Mayobre of Venezuela, Minister of Mines and Petroleum

His Excellency B. K. Nehru, Ambassador of India to the United States

The Honorable Sivert A. Nielsen, former Ambassador of Norway to the  
United Nations

His Excellency Majid Rahnema, Ambassador of Iran to Switzerland

General Carlos P. Romulo, President University of the Philippines

His Excellency Zenon Rossides, Ambassador of Cyprus to the United Nations

The Honorable Zdenko Stambuk, Chief Editor of "Review of International Affairs",  
Yugoslavia

The Honorable A. Z. N. Swai of Tanzania, Minister of Economic Affairs and  
Development Planning

Mr. C. Maxwell Stanley, Chairman, President of the Stanley Foundation

Mr. David M. Stanley, Rapporteur, Iowa State Senator and Candidate for  
the United States Senate

Dr. Thomas B. Manton, Conference Director, Executive Director of the  
Stanley Foundation


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**SECOND CONFERENCE  
ON THE UNITED NATIONS  
OF 1975** 



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**SECOND CONFERENCE  
ON THE UNITED NATIONS  
OF 1975** 

**July 24-28, 1967  
Bürgenstock, Switzerland**

**Sponsored by the STANLEY FOUNDATION**

## FOREWORD

By C. Maxwell Stanley

The Second CONFERENCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS OF 1975 is a continuation of an examination that was started in San Francisco in 1965. We held a conference there on the eve of the Symbolic Session of the United Nations which commemorated the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Charter. It was called to study the United Nations' Role in the Next Decade.

The 1965 conference came to one specific conclusion and made several general recommendations regarding the United Nations. The primary conclusion was that the United Nations, while rendering many useful and valuable services, was not equipped under its present Charter to deal effectively with the continuing arms race, the spread of nuclear weapons to more nations, the growing danger of accidental war, and the pressures of population and poverty.

The recommendations of the 1965 conference, adopted unanimously, called for changes that could be accomplished only by Charter revision. These changes were major ones, giving the United Nations the ability to achieve complete and enforced disarmament in carefully controlled stages and with effective safeguards, a permanent peace force, changes in the General Assembly and the Security Council so that the United Nations would have legislative capability, a strengthened International Court of Justice with systems of regional courts, a sizeable world development program, a reliable and adequate revenue system, safeguards to prevent abuse of power by such a strengthened United Nations, and eligibility for all nations for membership. (See page 13)

As one looks back over two years and evaluates the proposals of the 1965 conference, one can only say that they were bold and substantial ones. Many people would term them unrealistic. Many would say that the United Nations was not in jeopardy, and the changes proposed were too visionary, too far down the line. Nevertheless, the conference considered that nothing else would succeed.

With each new crisis crowding on the heels of its predecessor, these two years reinforce the major conclusions of the FIRST CONFERENCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS OF 1975: that there is urgency and that the United Nations must be made more effective.

Our concern at the Second Conference was to look at the world's needs, to select the roles the United Nations should discharge in

meeting those needs, to determine its competence to discharge them, and finally to recommend steps which would enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations.

We came forward with proposals to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations. We considered several approaches which the conference of two years ago did not recommend. It centered its attention on Charter revision. We considered also the better use of the United Nations as it is. What capabilities have the Secretariat, the Security Council, the General Assembly or the specialized agencies that are not adequately utilized? What changes can come about by an evolutionary process? Are Certain Charter changes desirable — and possible — perhaps less extensive than those proposed in the 1965 conference? Two Charter changes have been made regarding the membership of the Economic and Social Council.

We considered the attitudes of nations. Is the United Nations to be a major element of foreign policy for more countries, including mine, or is it a crutch to be used when other efforts fail?

We followed a very unique format with an unstructured conference. We were not there to listen to speeches. We were not there to dissect papers. We were not there to vote aye and nay on specific proposals. We met as individuals, not governments. Our mission was to think and brainstorm. We wanted to explore new ideas and exchange views. We confirmed sound concepts with respect to the United Nations, but we proposed some new ones. We were not concerned with complete agreement. Where consensus was evident, the rapporteur so indicated. Otherwise he indicated opposing views. Attribution to individuals was not made in the conference statement.

My charge to the participants was: "As we approach the task, I urge that we be practical, but also visionary; predictive, but also prescriptive; cautious, but with a sense of urgency; and responsible, but bold and courageous. Let us be fully aware of the differences separating nations. Let us be even more aware of the broad interests and needs, the service of which will unite people if given a chance. May we together chart a route to a more effective United Nations. May we issue a challenge to thinking men. Thus hopefully may we contribute to those universal desires of men throughout this world for peace, security, and a fuller life."

*C. Maxwell Stanley*  
President, The Stanley Foundation

**MESSAGE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS TO THE SECOND CONFERENCE  
OF THE UNITED NATIONS OF 1975**

**Bürgenstock, Switzerland  
July 24 - 28, 1967**

I am glad to see that the Stanley Foundation has organized the "Second Conference on the United Nations of 1975." The subject is an important one, and the list of participants includes several distinguished statesmen and students of international affairs. I have no doubt that this Conference will lead to a better understanding of the problems which the United Nations faces and the prospects for peace and progress in the coming years. I wish the Conference every success.

U THANT

Secretary-General of the United Nations

(Delivered personally on the Secretary-General's behalf by the Honorable Gabriel M. d'Arboussier, Executive Director of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, on July 25, 1967.)

**STATEMENT by MEMBERS  
of the  
SECOND CONFERENCE on the UNITED NATIONS OF 1975**

**Bürgenstock, Switzerland**

**July 28, 1967**

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This is a time of growing danger and great opportunity. There is a trend toward more centers of power in the world. The threat of nuclear war grows as the armaments race enters a new round and nuclear weapons spread to more nations. Too often the nations fail to use the United Nations to solve international disputes, and rely instead on force and intervention. Painfully slow development and rapid population growth in developing countries lead to increased violence and non-democratic regimes.

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be reported to and published by the United Nations and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

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
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We must build a more effective United Nations in the interest of survival.



**CONFERENCE on the UNITED NATIONS of 1975 July 24-28, 1967 Bürgenstock, Switzerland**

Left to right: Manton (Director); D. Stanley (Rapporteur); Boyd, Great Britain; Morse, U.S.A.; d'Arbousier, Senegal; Burns, Canada; Bhutto, Pakistan; Swai, Tanzania; Romulo, Philippines; C. M. Stanley (Chairman); Rossides, Cyprus; Fraser, U.S.A.; Haekkerup, Denmark; Nehru, India; Nielsen, Norway; Stambuk, Yugoslavia; Mayobre, Venezuela. Not pictured: Rahnema, Iran.

**PARTICIPANTS**  
**SECOND CONFERENCE on the UNITED NATIONS of 1975**

**Bürgenstock, Switzerland**

**July 24-28, 1967**

**The Honorable Gabriel M. d'Arboussier of Senegal**, Executive Director of United Nations Institute for Training and Research

**The Honorable Zulfikar Ali Bhutto**, former Foreign Minister of Pakistan  
**Mr. Andrew Boyd of Great Britain**, Foreign Affairs Editor of "The Economist"

**General E. L. M. Burns**, Adviser to the Government of Canada on Disarmament

**The Honorable Donald M. Fraser**, Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives, U.S.A.

**The Honorable Per Haekkerup**, Leader of the Social Democratic Party (Government Party) in the Danish Parliament and former Foreign Minister of Denmark

**The Honorable Jose A. Mayobre of Venezuela**, Minister of Mines and Petroleum

**The Honorable F. Bradford Morse**, Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives, U.S.A.

**His Excellency B. K. Nehru**, Ambassador of India to the United States

**The Honorable Sivert A. Nielsen**, President of Bergens Privatbank, former Ambassador of Norway to the United Nations

**His Excellency Dr. Majid Rahnema**, Ambassador of Iran to Switzerland and Vice President of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, 1967

**General Carlos P. Romulo**, President, University of the Philippines, and President of Fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly

**His Excellency Zenon Rossides**, Ambassador of Cyprus to the United Nations

**The Honorable Zdenko Stambuk of Yugoslavia**, Chief Editor of "Review of International Affairs" and Member of the Federal Parliament

**The Honorable A. Z. N. Swai of Tanzania**, Minister of Economic Affairs and Development Planning

**Mr. C. Maxwell Stanley**, Chairman, President of the Stanley Foundation

**Mr. David M. Stanley**, Rapporteur, Iowa State Senator and Candidate for the United States Senate

**Dr. Thomas B. Manton**, Conference Director, Executive Director of the Stanley Foundation

**NOTE ON THE SEMINAR**

In preparation for the Second CONFERENCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS OF 1975, a seminar was held in May. It discussed and refined background papers for the Conference. The subjects and authors of these papers are listed on the following page. These papers, compiled under the title THE UNITED NATIONS OF THE 1970's, were distributed in advance to the Bürgenstock participants.

The participants agreed that study on the United Nations in the 1970's must be made within the framework of a projection of present trends in the international system. These trends indicate a lessening of the dominant position of the two super-powers which have controlled the world scene since World War II. The seminar participants did not agree as to whether this trend was decentralization, polycentrism or multipolarism. They did agree that the trend would create greater need and opportunity for the United Nations to be more useful in coping with international political, economic, and social problems.

The seminar participants judged that future United Nations political operations will be more varied than the past. Pragmatic attempts at solutions will be the pattern in the political field. Growth will not be systematic but sporadic until national interests of the members demand a more ordered development of the United Nations political arena.

In the economic and social areas there seem to be greater prospects for more orderly growth of United Nations involvement. The United Nations is now playing a crucial role in the formulation of development plans in many of the developing countries. The United Nations development program could act as a catalytic agent around which and through which the progressive forces within the developing countries can mobilize their power and influence.

## THE UNITED NATIONS OF THE 1970's

Compiled by Dr. Thomas B. Manton

### Foreword

By C. Maxwell Stanley, President, The Stanley Foundation

### The United Nations and the International System

By Dr. Oran R. Young, Assistant Professor of Politics  
Princeton University

### United Nations Political Action in the 1970's

By Dr. Urban Whitaker, Professor of International Relations  
San Francisco State College

### Arms Control and the United Nations in the 1970's

By Dr. Walter C. Clemens, Jr., Associate Professor of  
Government, Boston University

### Development Assistance and the United Nations

By Mr. William I. Jones, Former Editor of  
DEVELOPMENT DIGEST

### The View from the Third World

By Dr. Noel J. Brown, Political Affairs Officer  
United Nations

### The View from Africa

By Dr. James O. C. Jonah, Political Affairs Officer  
United Nations

### The View from Asia

By Mr. Ejaz Husain, Special Correspondent  
DAWN, Karachi, Pakistan

(These papers are available from The Stanley  
Foundation upon request.)

## Statement by members of FIRST CONFERENCE on the UNITED NATIONS of 1975

June 19, 1965

Twenty years after the signing of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco, we have come together as friends of the United Nations who are deeply concerned about its future. Our conference includes citizens of 13 nations from four continents, who speak solely as individuals.

We have studied the changes in the UN which are needed in the next ten years, rather than concentrate on immediate crises or utopian proposals.

We have unanimously reached the following conclusions, and have also discussed and noted many detailed steps which will be necessary to implement these conclusions.

**Need for a Strengthened United Nations.** The UN is rendering many useful and valuable services. However, under its present Charter the UN is not equipped to deal effectively with the continuing armaments race, the spread of nuclear weapons to more nations, the growing danger of accidental war, and the pressures of population and poverty.

Peace and freedom depend upon law and law enforcement. No city or nation could survive without laws, police, and courts. The UN and the world community cannot survive without enforceable world law, world police, and world courts for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Unless drastic changes are made in the UN Charter, there is grave danger that the UN may not survive the next ten years. Like an individual who delays needed surgery until his condition becomes desperate, the world has delayed the major operation which is essential to save the UN. If the surgery waits too long, the patient will die.

**Necessary Changes in the United Nations.** The UN must be greatly strengthened to provide these essential requirements for peace:

1. Complete and enforced disarmament of all nations, in carefully controlled stages. When the disarmament process is complete, each nation would retain only strictly limited and lightly armed police forces for internal order. Significant progress in disarmament will not be possible without parallel progress toward the provision of international security through the United Nations.

2. A permanent UN peace force to maintain international peace and security; and an effective UN inspection system to supervise disarmament.

3. A General Assembly empowered to adopt binding rules and regulations in respect to the peace-keeping functions of the strengthened UN and implementing the disarmament plan; a revised Security Council, responsible to the General Assembly; and, in the opinion of most but not all of the conferees, a revised voting system appropriate to the strengthened UN, including abolition of the present "veto power" in the Security Council.

4. A strengthened International Court of Justice empowered to interpret the UN Charter and decide all international legal disputes; a system of regional courts; and other tribunals and agencies to settle international disputes which are not capable of decision upon legal principles. Membership in the UN should carry with it the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court in all international disputes.

5. A world development program. As a matter of human survival, the world must use a substantially larger share of its resources to promote the economic and social advancement of the less-developed nations. Expansion and better coordination of existing development programs are urgently needed. A major part of the savings from disarmament should be used for a large-scale development program administered by the UN.

6. A reliable and adequate revenue system for the strengthened UN.

7. Safeguards to prevent abuse of power by the strengthened UN,

and a clear reservation to the member states and their peoples of all powers not granted to the UN under the revised Charter.

8. Eligibility of all nations for membership in the United Nations. Disarmament will not be possible unless all nations are subject to the enforcement system.

**Charter Review Imperative.** Because most of these changes require Charter revision, a United Nations Charter Review Conference must be called at the earliest possible date under Article 109 of the Charter, to adopt the necessary Charter amendments for submission to the member nations.

**Human Rights.** The draft UN covenants on human rights, including necessary implementation provisions, should promptly be adopted by the General Assembly and ratified by all nations.

**Appeal for Action.** We appeal to the peoples and governments of the world to face the present crisis and act while there is still time. Every citizen and every nation should press for a Charter Review Conference until the demand becomes irresistible. The smaller nations now have the opportunity to lead the way. National governments, private organizations, and individuals should immediately begin intensive study of UN Charter revision and formulation of proposed changes.

**Nothing Less Will Succeed.** We confine our recommendations to the minimum essentials for peace. Nothing less than enforceable world law can succeed. The strengthened United Nations which we advocate will not change the nature of man or solve all the world's problems, but it will keep the human race from committing suicide.

**It Must Be Done!** The difficulties of building enforceable world law are great, but the hazards of a world without enforceable law are greater. We have heard all the reasons why it cannot be done, but we know that it must be done. We speak for an idea whose time has come.

---

## THE STANLEY FOUNDATION

The Second CONFERENCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS OF 1975 at Bürgenstock was sponsored by The Stanley Foundation. A primary interest of The Foundation is to further study and research in the field of foreign relations toward the achievement of a secure peace with freedom.

In addition to the First and Second CONFERENCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS OF 1975, The Foundation sponsors annually a discussion on United States foreign policy through the STRATEGY FOR PEACE CONFERENCE. This "Conference to Plan a Strategy for Peace" explores off-the-record and in depth urgent foreign policy concerns of the United States. It brings together over one hundred leaders from the professions, business, universities and government to exchange ideas and make recommendations. The Strategy for Peace Conference attracts individuals from a wide spectrum of opinion and belief.

For three years The Foundation has sponsored the GRENVILLE CLARK EDITORIAL PAGE AWARD, given in "recognition to the publication of vigorous and thought-provoking editorial opinion in articles and cartoons on international affairs as to the effect of law and order on the achievement of a secure peace in freedom." A new and related project is the UNITED NATIONS SEMINAR FOR EDITORS AND EDITORIAL WRITERS to be held in November, 1967, in New York. This Seminar will bring together a limited number of editorial page writers from throughout the United States to learn first-hand about the work of the United Nations.

The Stanley Foundation is a tax exempt organization, and contributions to it are deductible for income tax purposes. The Foundation welcomes contributions to its several programs.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

10/4/67  
30

Mr. Hamilton  
Any acknowledgment  
to Bowles necessary?

India

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

35

300

Monday, October 2, 1967 -- 8:15 PM

Rec'd  
10-3-67  
12:30p

f  
g

Mr. President:

Chet Bowles has sent you some extraordinary photographs taken by the Indians on the Sikkim "border".

They really show the eerie quality of these clashes at the top of the world.



W. A. Rostow



LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
EMBASSY  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
New Delhi, India

306

September 22, 1967

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I thought you might be interested in seeing the enclosed photographs taken by Indian Intelligence just prior to the recent fighting on the Sikkim border. It is, as you can see, a real jaw-to-jaw confrontation.

The barbed wire fence, which the Indians were erecting and which led to an outbreak of fighting when the Chinese tried to tear it down, is clearly evident in some of the photos.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Che Bowles".

Chester Bowles

Enclosures

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

30c



30d



30e



30f



309



30h









16480

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 2, 1967

File India

3757


31

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Proposed Presidential Appointment  
for the Rajmata of Gwalior

In response to Mr. Roger Morris' request of September 26, the Department recommends that the Rajmata of Gwalior's request for an appointment with the President, conveyed through Judge Walter Ely, be tactfully denied.

A suggested reply to Judge Ely for Mr. Sanders' signature is enclosed and the original correspondence is returned for your files.

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Suggested reply
2. Memorandum from Mr. Sanders to you with attached letter from Judge Ely.

OCT 2 11 11 AM '67

RECEIVED


RECEIVED  
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1967 OCT 3 AM 11 07

- 1. suggested reply
- 2. memorandum from Mr. Gardner to you
- with attached letter from Judge Ely.

ENCLOSURES:

Executive Secretary  
Benjamin H. Reed



is returned for your files.  
Signature is enclosed and the original correspondence  
a suggested reply to Judge Ely for Mr. Gardner,

is respectfully denied.  
The President conveyed through Judge Walter Ely,  
Governor of Missouri, a request for an appointment with  
September 26, the Department recommends that the  
in response to Mr. Roger Morris, request of

for the Governor of Missouri.  
Subject: Proposed Presidential Appointment

THE WHITE HOUSE  
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALTER M. ROSTOW

1967

October 3, 1967



WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Handwritten notes and initials*  
3123

31a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Suggested Reply

Dear Walter:

Thank you for your letter of September 6 regarding the proposed visit to the United States of Her Highness the Rajmata of Gwalior and her interest in a call at the White House. The Rajmata is undoubtedly an outstanding woman, but, as I told you the other day, it seemed to me that there might be diplomatic niceties involved.

I have looked into the matter further and must regretfully conclude that it would not be advisable for the President to receive the Maharani at this time.

I hasten to say that this conclusion does not stem from any feeling on our part that the President's doors should be barred to leaders of the Indian opposition parties. We try to encourage him to meet with opposition figures of appropriate stature whenever possible.

My point is that the Maharani, though doubtless a political power in her own Central India bailiwick, does not really have such stature. A meeting between her and the President might well lead to misunderstanding and to misinterpretation by our critics in India.

The Honorable  
Walter Ely  
Judge, United States  
Court of Appeals,  
Ninth Circuit  
Los Angeles, California 90012

It would also encourage many others of similar local importance to seek White House appointments, inevitably leading to bad feelings when such requests were necessarily denied.

I hope you will explain this as tactfully as you can to Princess Usha, As you requested, I am keeping the Rajmata's request confidential, and would hope that you would do the same with this letter.

With best regards,

Sincerely,



10/2  
recd  
Bygones Pouch

~~SECRET~~  
EMBASSY  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
New Delhi, India

for discussion 32

September 27, 1967

Mr. Edward Hamilton  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ed:

The enclosed memorandum to the Secretary of State is my effort to tie the various elements of the Indian situation together and to place them in clearer perspective.

Without an occasional wrap-up of this kind it is easy for impressions to become distorted. All too often the sum total of understanding may be derived from a whole series of cables and messages on a wide variety of subjects which do not always give a balanced result.

I apologize for inflicting this extra bit of reading on you with all you have on your mind. However, in lieu of regular visits to India I hope I can persuade you to take the twenty minutes or so which this will require.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosure

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 7-16-02

Handley

33

Mr Ed Hamilton

October 2, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

May I have your recommendation on the attached.

W. MARVIN WATSON

Ed —

I vote no, but  
you know best what  
the Pres. wants with  
this kind of guy

Rogers

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

370

October 2, 1967

TO: Marvin Watson

FROM: Harry McPherson

Chester Bowles has asked me to  
pass this along.

Attachment

SEP 1 6 11 20  
RECEIVED  
MARVIN WATSON

Attachment

RECEIVED  
W. MARVIN WATSON

1967 SEP 1 PM 4 59

Dear Mr. Jones:

Chester Bowles has asked me to

FROM: HARRY McPHERSON

TO: MARVIN WATSON

October 5, 1967

WASHINGTON  
THE WHITE HOUSE

W/W



SECRET  
EMBASSY  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

New Delhi, India

*EH*  
*Read + let's discuss*  
*[Signature]*

34

September 27, 1967

*I have a copy, RM*

Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Walt:

The enclosed memorandum to the Secretary of State is my effort to tie the various elements of the Indian situation together and to place them in clearer perspective.

Without an occasional wrap-up of this kind it is easy for impressions to become distorted. All too often the sum total of understanding may be derived from a whole series of cables and messages on a wide variety of subjects which do not always give a balanced result.

I apologize for inflicting this extra bit of reading on you with all you have on your mind. However, in lieu of regular visits to India I hope I can persuade you to take the twenty minutes or so which this will require.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

*[Signature]*

Chester Bowles

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

-SECRET-

By *jc*, NARA, Date 7-16-02

35

*India*

Columbia University in the City of New York | New York, N.Y. 10025

SOUTHERN ASIAN INSTITUTE

622 West 113th Street

September 13, 1967

Mr. Edward Hamilton  
National Security Council  
Executive Office Building  
White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Ed,

In going over my papers I found the attached materials on fertilizer investment in India, which were given to me on my recent trip. The handwritten notes attached, given to me by AID's private investment specialist in Delhi, read as follows:

Progress of Indian attempts to attract foreign  
investors into fertilizer:

Last August

- Allied's coal fuel plant dead;
- Phillip's no letter of intent because costs were too high;
- ICI on the fence;
- DCM(?) not finished credit arrangements;
- Mangalore ok;
- Armour working with Birlas;
- GOI adamant about naptha and 3/31 date.

Now

- Allied and Tata plans for importing ammonia receiving good GOI reception;
- Madras under construction;
- Phillip's has letter of intent and in last analysis only avarice stands between it and its license;
- ICI all set;
- DCM under construction;
- Mangalore putting along;
- Armour ironed out trouble with Birla, licensed, and on way to finding contractor.
- / Modi/R & H letter of intent submitted;
- Deramsi & KFC, imported liquid ammonia, serious enough that GOI taking it into consideration in figuring size of Trombay expansion;
- Coops and GOI talking about 1000 TPD plant.

Note: Not a serious potential investor lost. I conclude,

September 13, 1967

therefore, as writer intended me to conclude, that stories of India losing potential foreign investors have been exaggerated. HW)


Needed for Fifth Plan period

If consumption is to rise from 2.4 to 5, need 2.6 of which, say, 1/2 will be in private sector. Logically, this will call for five plants producing about 260,000 tons each per year. But more likely, private plants already in existence will expand, e.g., Coromandel, Madras, Baroda and Goa. Conclusion: may need no more than two to three new investors for the next plan. AID's fertilizer specialist expects this to be not too difficult.

I hope these notes will be of interest. If I find any other information I took with me by mistake which might be useful to you, I will pass it on.

Good luck, Ed, and regards to Annie.

Sincerely,

  
Howard Wriggins  
Director

HW:ss  
Encs.

100 tons per day

35a

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>OWNER</u>	<u>CAPACITY</u>		<u>COMPLETION YEAR</u>	<u>FULL CAPACITY</u>
		<u>N</u>	<u>P<sub>2</sub>O<sub>5</sub></u>		
<b>IN OPERATION:</b>					
Miscellaneous	Various	75	200	COMPLETED	AT CAPACITY
<b>UNDER CONSTRUCTION:</b>					
Vizag	Chevron(25%) International Minerals & Chem(22%) Parry(6%) Public(47%)	80	85	1967	1969
Madras	American Oil Co(49%) G.O.I.(51%)	200	85	1969	1971
Kota	Delhi Cloth Mills(100%)	<u>120</u>	<u>-</u>	1969	1971
<b>TOTAL</b>		<u>400</u>	<u>170</u>		
<b>PLANNED:</b>					
Goa	Armour(27%) Birla(15%) IFC(21%) Edge Act Corp(17%) Public(20%)	160	90	1971	1973
Kanpur	Imperial Chemical Industry(51%) G.O.I(13%) IFC(10%) Public(26%)	200	-	1970	1972
Haldia	Phillips(51%) Indian Public(37%) IFC(12%)	125	90	1971	1973
Mangalore	I.D.I.C. Nassau(30%) Girdler Corp(20%) Indian (50%)	250	100	1971	1973
Delhi	Rohm & Haas(40%) Modi(30%) U.P. Govt (20%) Public (10%)	160	100	1972	1971
*Bombay	Dharamsi Mararji(?) Kuwait Fertilizer(?)	90	230	1969	1971
*Kandla	Indian Co-Operatives (100%) (AID Financing)	<u>270</u>	<u>-</u>	1972	1974
<b>TOTAL</b>		<u>1255</u>	<u>510</u>		
<b>TOTAL PRIVATE SECTOR</b>		<u>1730</u>	<u>880</u>		
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>		<u>3218</u>	<u>1140</u>		

\* Projects to which letter of commitment has not been issued.

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>OWNER</u>	<u>CAPACITY</u>		<u>COMPLETION</u>	<u>FULL</u>
		<u>N</u>	<u>P<sub>2</sub>O<sub>5</sub></u>	<u>YEAR</u>	<u>CAPACITY</u>
<u>PUBLIC SECTOR</u>					
IN OPERATION:					
Sindri	F.C.I.	117	-	Completed	1968
Nangal	F.C.I.	80	-	Completed	At Capacity
Trombay	F.C.I.	90	45	Completed	1968
Rourkela	F.C.I.	120	-	Completed	1969
Always	F.A.C.T.	70	-	Completed	1968
Neyveli	Ministry of Mines	<u>70</u>	<u>35</u>	Completed	1968
TOTAL		<u>547</u>	<u>80</u>		
UNDER CONSTRUCTION:					
Gorakhpur	F.C.I.	80	-	1967	1969
Namrup	F.C.I.	45	-	1967	1969
Baroda	Gujarat State	96	60	1967	1969
Cochin	F.A.C.T.	160	-	1970	1972
Durgapur	F.C.I.	<u>160</u>	<u>-</u>	1970	1972
TOTAL		<u>461</u>	<u>60</u>		
PLANNED:					
Barauni	F.C.I.	160	-	1970	1972
Namrup(Expansion)	F.C.I.	160	-	1970	1972
Trombay(Expansion)	F.C.I.	<u>160</u>	<u>120</u>	1970	1972
TOTAL		<u>480</u>	<u>120</u>		
TOTAL PUBLIC SECTOR		<u>1488</u>	<u>260</u>		

36

India

July 18, 1967

Dear Mr. Manoff:

Many thanks for your letter and the elegant volume by Patwant Singh. I will send you some of my thoughts on the book when I get a chance.

At the time of our lunch conversation I was not free to tell you that I would soon be taking over staff work on south Asian affairs here in the White House. That transfer will take place next week. Thus, my interest in things Indian is considerable, and I will be grateful for whatever ideas you will care to share with me.

With best regards.

Sincerely,

Edward K. Hamilton

Mr. Richard K. Manoff  
Richard K. Manoff, Inc.  
845 Third Avenue  
New York, New York 10022

36a

RICHARD K. MANOFF INC.

*Advertising*

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845 THIRD AVENUE • NEW YORK, N. Y. 10022 • (212) 350-9200

June 12, 1967

Mr. Edward K. Hamilton  
Executive Office Building  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hamilton:

It was extremely pleasant to share luncheon with you and the President at the White House last Thursday. I enjoyed our discussion very much and hope that we will have opportunities in the future to cross ideas.

I am sending you under separate cover a copy of the book I promised you, "India and the Future of Asia" by Patwant Singh. As I told you, Patwant is a publisher of several magazines in India and is increasingly becoming a more powerful voice. He's very close to important members of the Indian government, and as you will be able to ascertain from his book, a very good friend of the United States and United States policy in southeast Asia.

After you have read it, I agree with you that Howard Wriggins, who has southeast Asia within his area of concern, would probably enjoy seeing the book, if he hasn't already done so. I would be very happy to send him an additional copy of the book, if you wanted to keep yours. And I would also enjoy knowing what your reaction to the book is.

It was nice to meet you. It would be nicer still to renew the acquaintance.

My regards.

Sincerely,

  
Richard K. Manoff

Ed Hamilton

India 5

37

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


July 17, 1967

WALT -

G. L. Mehta, Head of the India Investment Center in New York, is now in Washington negotiating with the Bank, after a recent trip to India.

The Indian Embassy has asked whether you would be interested in having a chat. I said, of course you would be interested but time was a problem.

You might find it worth your while to hear him, since he has only a quasi-official position and is likely to be more outspoken than Embassy staff members can be.

  
Howard Wriggins

Yes, have Lois fix a time \_\_\_\_\_

No, no time, have Ed Hamilton see him

6:45

Mr Rostow decided he does not have time to see this one, plus all the others



To Hamilton 38

CONSULATE GENERAL  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
Madras-2

*ed / This is interesting - it should be arranged to go with WWR.*  
June 22, 1967  
*H*

Mr. W. Howard Wriggins  
9 East Lenox Street  
Chevy Chase, Maryland 20015

Dear Mr. Wriggins:

Enclosed is a paper, Bulk Grain Handling, prepared by Mr. Olen W. Salisbury, AID consultant to the Food Corporation here in Madras. At Dr. Franklin's request, I am forwarding this copy to you.

*Very interesting  
send to govt  
WWR  
Hamilton/Salisbury*

Sincerely,

*Ann M. Dudas*  
Ann M. Dudas

Encl: Paper on Bulk Grain Handling

36a

## BULK GRAIN HANDLING

At the moment virtually all developing countries are preoccupied with the problem of increasing agricultural production and building reserve stocks of food grains as a means of stabilizing the price levels and avoiding periods of critical shortages of foodstuffs. Almost all are also preoccupied with a change to bulk grain storage as a means of conserving the grains produced and making limited supplies serve the maximum number of people. Unfortunately there are many indications that the system of handling and storing grains in bulk in the more advanced economies of the world and the techniques involved in this operation are imperfectly understood in relation to the place this technique occupies in the general economic scheme of those countries and why and how this system came into being.

To evaluate the system properly it is necessary to place it in proper perspective within the total economic picture, understand the economic factors which combined to produce the system and above all comprehend the nature of and need for other conditions which must exist in support of bulk grain handling and storage. Only when this has been done is it possible to consider in a rational manner the point in local economic time at which bulk handling and storage can or should be introduced. Toward that end it is the purpose of this discussion to review the development of bulk grain handling, define its nature, list its restrictive counteractions and identify the environment that must exist in support of this system.

It is essential in this discussion to first resolve the ambiguities that can arise from the degree of socialism that has been or is likely to be introduced into a particular nation's basic food economy and marketing structure. To that end it is assumed that cost is cost without regard to whether it is a factor in a private enterprise venture for profit or a budgetary factor in a nationalized operation where it is possible to hide some or all of the cost. On the basis of this assumption that no matter where or how the cost factor appears and whether or not it is directly attached to the price of food in the market it is in fact a cost that must be borne by the total economy therefore no effort will be made to differentiate between individual enterprise and public operation.

Handling and storing grains in bulk is the end result of an evolutionary process not an independent determination that this system had inherent advantages that made it desirable to impose it upon the previously existing structure. With a few exceptions mechanization in the agricultural sector reflected the pressures of labor cost and labor availability rather than a deliberate change for the sake of machinery use in lieu of hand labor. Thus within the cycle; the Cradle replaced the Sickle, the Thresher replaced the Flail, the Binder replaced the Cradle and ultimately the Combine replaced both the Binder and the Thresher.

With each modification of the harvesting process the pressure of volume flow from the fields on available labor supply and cost created the demand for a change in the system of handling the produce. The obvious ~~area~~ area where time and cost economies could be effected was the elimination of containers and the substitution of vehicles and structures which while in basic nature were large scale temporary containers provided means of reducing manhours and were by greater durability capable of reuse many more times than small containers. In addition the vehicles and to some extent the storage structures served multiple purposes.

A corollary of increased mechanization was the need to harvest all fields in the same general time period so that the selective process possible with hand labor of allowing each individual field to ripen before harvest was no longer possible when confronted with the need to utilize the machine when it was available. This reaction led to harvesting grain of a moisture content too high for safe storage over extended periods of time and established the necessity for drying by exposure to ambient air or artificially heated air. Because grain in small containers is much more difficult to dry than grain loose or in bulk this in turn added to the pressures to devise means for bulk handling and storage of grain.

Now the ~~evolution~~ of bulk grain handling and storage has been traced it is desirable to consider the nature of the handling and storage activity. The broad concept of the marketing function is, all actions related to the movement of a commodity from the point of production through the processing phase to the end consumer. Within this broad concept it becomes readily apparent that handling and storage is a facet of the transportation phase of the marketing process. Without regard to the magnitude of the capital investment, the location at which it takes place, the element of profit or loss for the operators involved, or the fact that such operators may otherwise be totally divorced from the general concept of transportation the conclusion is unavoidable that handling and storage is in fact a part of the effort in moving a commodity from the point where it is produced to that point where it has a market.

During the evolution of the bulk handling and storage function it became apparent that for it to be fully effective it must provide a means for multiple ownership of the common mass to be satisfied in its claims at any point between the point of commingling and the most distant market for any of the multiple owners. This demand resulted in the establishment of uniform standards for grade determinations which would permit the original depositor or any successor to his interest to require the delivery of a comparable quantity of like quality from the stored mass. These standards in most of the countries that utilize the mechanics of bulk handling and storage in the marketing process were established by law and after consultation with representative groups having an interest in the problem, thus they represent a common judgment and a group acceptance of the standards and the means devised to insure fair and equitable determinations of grade pursuant to such standards.

With this means, of making bulk grain a fungible commodity, in force there was now no barrier to large scale commingling and moreover a means was established which permitted the owner to hypothecate his portion of the common mass as security for loans pending the final marketing of the commodity. This desire to establish liquidity of assets in turn led to the development of secured storage that could issue negotiable warehouse acceptable to financial institutions as collateral for loans.

Concurrently with these developments farmers and manufacturers of farm equipment modified existing equipment and designed new equipment to accept grain in bulk in the field and convey it to the first point of receipt and storage. Rail and highway transport companies also modified old and designed new equipment for the transport of bulk grain without excessive loss or damage.

The same type of economic forces which had brought about the developments in the field of bulk handling and storage wrought revolutionary changes in the pattern of farm family life and customs. The practice of family grinding of grain or consumption as whole grain gradually diminished and eventually disappeared. The result was that all the food grain produced by farm families found its way to the open market with the farmers repurchasing as finished products that portion which his family needed. This is important to this discussion because it materially increased the total volume moved off the farm and thus the total demand on the facilities for bulk handling and storage. Even in the case of grains grown primarily for animal food roughly 40% move in the channels of commerce as many farms specialize in growing the feed grains and feed few or no animals of their own.

During this evolution the patterns of construction and ownership appeared in slightly varying manner in different countries. Generally the pattern was one of local entrepreneurs or cooperative associations of producers who built the facilities and installed the machinery for the facilities in the rural areas. At the marketing centers or processing points the field is usually divided between those entrepreneurs who specialize in the storage business and processors who established storage capacities in excess of their own needs and utilized the excess for the operation of a public storage enterprise as a subsidiary of their principal business. The end result was that in each of these countries is found a comprehensive network of rail and highway service fed by the flow of bulk grain from the farms through the local storage facility enroute to the markets.

From the consideration of the evolution of bulk grain handling and storage there emerges a recognition of basic situations that must exist before the changes could or would take place. First the farm economy must be such as to make it profitable to pay for a service rather than perform it. Second the payment must permit a profitable operation for the storage owner. Third facilities must exist to move in bulk to and from the storage point. Fourth means must have been provided to make the bulk grain truly fungible. Fifth since the storage operator must inevitably suffer some shrinkage and storage losses and has a liability to deliver in full he must have at hand a market from which he can purchase the quantity required or establish the true market value of the shortage for the purpose of cash settlement in lieu of delivery. Sixth the total volume must be large enough to justify the capital expenditure and still maintain a reasonable level of fees for the service performed.

Can it be concluded from the foregoing that bulk handling and storage of grains has such inherent advantages that it justifies imposition upon the relatively primitive economies of the rural sector of developing nations? Can it be concluded that the developing nations offer the supporting circumstances which have been shown to be essential to the establishment and maintenance of a bulk handling and storage system? To answer these two questions it is necessary to consider the six situations enumerated in the preceding paragraph.

First: Is the farm economy such as to make it profitable for the farmer to pay for a service rather than render it for himself? Not if the pressure of population in the rural area is such that labor costs are at or below subsistence levels or the farmers own family can not be more profitably employed.

Second: Would the level of fees the farmer could pay permit a profitable operation for the labor and capital involved in a bulk storage and handling plant? Not at the present level of commodity prices in most developing countries.

Third: Do facilities exist for the bulk movement of grain from the field to and from the storage points? Not in many of the developing countries does this condition exist. In most the rail and highway service both in coverage and equipment is grossly inadequate.

Fourth: Have means been provided or are they likely to be provided in the near future to make bulk grains truly fungible? Few if any developing nations have as yet taken any positive steps to establish legal grain standards or enforce them if they were established.

Fifth: Would the storage operator have a market at hand from which he could replace his operational shortages or rely upon for price quotations to use in cash settlements? In the climate of scarcity which prevails in most developing countries this condition does not exist.

Sixth: Is the total volume of grain leaving the rural area for the market adequate to justify the required capital investment at fees that would not be prohibitive? So long as 75% of the total production is consumed within the area of production and without moving into the open market this condition can not be said to exist.

When these questions must be answered in the negative the only possible conclusion is that bulk handling and storage of grain is not economically feasible and as a general principle cannot be imposed successfully upon the economy. The only possible justification for such an imposition would be the possible saving in the total food supply of the nation. If 25% or less of production is all that would be handled by the bulk facilities the greater part of the losses, if any, now occurring would continue and the conservation that would be possible would be at a prohibitive cost. It is also highly questionable that present transport facilities especially equipment would support a bulk storage effort.

Should it be concluded that in the developing nations nothing can be done to hasten this evolution? No, this is not necessarily true, there are several actions that can be taken in both the short term and long term range to speed this change.

In the short term there are three possible steps: 1. Install bulk facilities at rice and flour mills to effect immediate saving and to serve as examples of the possibilities; 2. Provide bulk handling facilities for the grains that are imported to supplement the nations food supply; 3. Work at the rural level to improve present storage practices pending the time when the evolution will occur.

For the long term the approach should be more or less indirect in that it should be directed to creating the economic climate which will lead to a bulk grain system: 1. Improve the rail and highway system so that it will support a bulk grain operation; 2. Establish uniform grain standards and methods of implementation that will make the bulk grain truly fungible; 3. Raise the rural economic level by industry dispersion and other means to the point where the evolutionary process will begin.

39

April 5, 1967

WALT -

Subject: L. K. Jha's Visit and the NPT

Despite the fact that L. K. Jha knows the President and Secretary Rusk will be out of town from April 10th to 15th, Jha will be in Washington from the 12th through 19th of April. He will be bringing a letter to the President from Mrs. Gandhi, and at a minimum, you must see him. A Read to Restew memo will be asking for an appointment with you, and also, hopefully, with the President. When it arrives, we can discuss how to proceed.

He will also have appointments lined up with Battle, McNamara, ACDA, and Henry Owen. The Secretary's appointment will be scheduled for April 18.

Our preliminary posture will be: (a) to hear him out; and (b) to see if the "security assurances" they require need to be real, or can simply be window dressing for their own domestic consumption.

Tomorrow Heck will be calling a meeting of those who worked on the India non-proliferation NSAM papers. I will attend and report.

Howard Wiggins

President will not be <sup>39a</sup>  
here April ~~11-12~~ <sup>10-14 (or 15d)</sup>  
neither will Sec Rusk

Rusk: April 7-15 action completed?

396

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


SECRET

March 28, 1967

Walt:

Banerjee called, having received a personal message from L. K. Jha that he would like to come to the United States and discuss the NPT problem. He would be bringing a personal letter from Mrs. Gandhi to the President on this matter.

Brom Smith feels that we should not put the President in this position but I feel this may be the price we have to pay for ACDA's lethargy in getting someone to New Delhi. I have put the memo in the form of an approval from LBJ to see Jha which I understand is being recommended by State, but an option is to let Jha come for consultation without committing LBJ in advance.

  
Howard Wriggins

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 7-16-02

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MEMORANDUM

39C

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: India and the Non-Proliferation Treaty--Prime Minister  
Gandhi's Special Envoy L. K. Jha

New Delhi--and the Indian Embassy--report that Prime Minister Gandhi would like to send a personal message to you through her Principal Secretary L. K. Jha regarding India's problems with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. India wants to be sure that any NPT treaty takes account of her security needs against China's growing nuclear capability and that sacrifices on behalf of the NPT are not made by emerging countries alone. He will be visiting London and Paris, has already been to Moscow, and would like to come the 11th or 12th of April. While here he would very much hope to see you.

In view of the important role of India in any NPT Agreement, I recommend we say "Yes" to his coming to consult. But you may not want to commit yourself to receiving him until we know the contents of Mrs. Gandhi's letter.

*Not send LBJ,  
but WWR said  
OK to arrange him to  
come, without committing LBJ,  
Mar 28, '67*

W. W. Rostow

Yes, I will see L. K. Jha on the 11th or 12th \_\_\_\_\_

I won't see him, but Secretary Rusk and others can \_\_\_\_\_

Have him come, but I can't commit myself to see him now \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 7-16-02

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SECRET

March 28, 1967

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By jc, NARA, Date 7-16-02

SECRET

39e

Please return to  
Howard Wriggins,  
Rm. 372-a EOB,  
when signed.

March 28, 1967

SECRET

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By jc, NARA, Date 7-16-02

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BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.


16 March, 1967.

Dear Howard,

India and Non-Proliferation

Following on our conversation after dinner the other evening, I enclose an excerpt from a letter sent by Freeman to the Commonwealth Office at the end of February, reporting a conversation with L.K.Jha. I gave copies of this yesterday evening to Bill Handley.

You may also like to know in this context that in a conversation with our Ambassador in Moscow the Indian Ambassador had said that in speaking to Mr. Jha the Soviet leaders (Kosygin and Gromyko) had recognised India's dilemma but had urged the obligation on India to adhere to a treaty. As regards the potential threat to non-nuclear powers, the answer lay through the United Nations. Mr. Jha had said that this was indeed the official view also of the Indian Government. But India could not accept a position in which she might be under immediate nuclear threat and the Security Council got involved in interminable discussion about what action to take. The best solution could well be a collective nuclear guarantee under the aegis of the United Nations. But a sine qua non was the working out of acceptable procedures for the urgent implementation of such a guarantee in the event of a non-nuclear power coming under immediate nuclear threat. When Sir Geoffrey Harrison commented that a collective guarantee of this kind might take a very long time to work out and asked whether any question of a bilateral guarantee had arisen, Mr. Singh said emphatically that a bilateral guarantee from any of the nuclear powers would, in view of India's special position, be unacceptable and the only solution was a collective guarantee to all non-nuclear powers under the United Nations.

Yours sincerely,  
  
(N.C.C.Trench)

Mr. Howard Wriggins,  
National Security Council,  
Executive Offices,  
Washington, D.C.

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 7/16/02

He had indeed raised this matter in Moscow last week, having had long talks with both Kosygin and Gromyko. He had asked the Russians whether they would be prepared to join in giving, or to give bilaterally, some convincing form of guarantee or assurance. The Russian response had been 'much less negative than he had expected.' They replied that this was a matter which they were ready to discuss bilaterally with India. They might be able to agree on an acceptable formula. They would not be able to agree to any clause covering this point in the non-proliferation treaty itself or to accept any form of words which contained a pledge to use Soviet nuclear weapons in response to what might appear to be a nuclear threat against India. But on the basis that the Indians were seeking an assurance of 'all practicable help' (or some such form of words) the Russians were prepared to pursue the matter further with G.O.I.

I observed to Jha at this stage that this tentative Russian formula sounded to me very much like the proposal that President Johnson had already proposed publicly. Jha agreed that this was his impression. He also observed (though it is not absolutely clear to me whether he said this to the Russians) that from the Indian point of view an assurance in such general terms would be politically more helpful to G.O.I. if it could be given specifically to India and not merely take the form of a declaration, say, at the U.N. which had only incidental relation to India. In other words, the more general the assurance, the more specific should be the party assured. He added, however, that this implied no reluctance on the part of India to see other non-nuclear powers similarly assured.

I asked Jha whether he had concluded that the Soviet preference for bilateral discussions on this matter implied a reluctance in principle to see the U.S., or even ourselves and France, give similar assurances. Jha replied that he had reached no such conclusion. His impression was that the Soviet authorities had not yet considered in any detail a problem which carried great implications and that understandably they were proceeding with great caution.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

3/14/67 HW  
Can you take this up with Nick - or should I?  
41  
W

~~SECRET~~

March 13, 1967

TO: W. W. Rostow

FROM: Howard Wriggins

SUBJECT: NPT - Thoughts on next steps vis-a-vis India

Attached is a memorandum reporting my actions late last week on NPT in India. The following actions would materially help:

1. Select from among the scientists familiar with the thought and tactics regarding the NPT, to go to Delhi with one of the senior ACDA officials and possibly Country Director Heck or Handley.
2. Their mission would be (a) to reassure the Indian scientific community that the provisions of the NPT, including the extensive preamble, would permit continued scientific exploration of all aspects of nuclear development except that leading to explosions; (b) to make clear to the scientific community finally that there is little distinction between nuclear weapons and nuclear explosions for things like "Plowshare", and that we ourselves are far from having perfected and adequately refined nuclear technology to deal with Plowshare safely; (c) to explore with Indian political and external affairs leaders the implication of Sarabai's "contingent alliance". (Gathright's S/P paper deals with this in a highly sophisticated way and suggests preliminary steps for detailed consultations with the Indians to give them a more realistic appreciation of the strategic limitations of a limited nuclear capability.)

Before this mission goes to New Delhi, we should first once more consider at the top of the U. S. Government the proposition that if we really want a NPT, we've got to pay for it in some way. In the Indian case, we've probably got to provide something more explicit in the way of assurances to the Indian Government.

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 7-16-02

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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~~SECRET~~

March 13, 1967

TO: W. W. Rostow

FROM: Howard Wriggins *Howard*

SUBJECT: NPT and India

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.6  
NJ/RAC 07-7  
By *id*, NARA, Date 5-13-08

1. At the end of last week I became increasingly concerned about the growing India/Japanese and other non-nuclear opposition to the NPT.

2. On March 7, for instance, Geneva reported that Sarabai did not think the present text of the NPT draft was a "saleable commodity" with the Indians because (1) the superpowers were keeping their weapons and not halting production; (2) the 5-year review was subject to weapons power veto; and (3) the safeguards did not apply to peaceful nuclear facilities of the weapons states. The Indians were also fearful because Pakistan was on the Board of IAEA. Sarabai mentioned a concept of "contingent alliance" as a form of security assurance. He held that such a "contingent alliance" would not destroy India's non-aligned status.

3. Late last week I discussed a "contingent alliance" with NEA and urged S/P to use this hint from the Indians as a hook on which to hang a new discussion of S/P's excellent January study of security assurances to India. Henry Owen found this a good idea, and I thought he was going to take action on it. I also shared with Henry my concern that there had been insufficient discussions with the Indians on the whole NPT question.

4. I also talked to Larry Weiler of ACDA. After listening to his description of the relatively intense conversations they have had with the Germans and indirectly with the Japanese, it was clear that the non-nuclear power nearest to the nuclear capability and most subject (apart from Japan) to direct threat of nuclear blackmail by a non-signing nuclear power -- the Indians -- had been held away from participating in discussions until the last minute. It was no wonder therefore that they were browned off. I urged Weiler to crank up a small but highly senior commission to New Delhi on grounds that (a) the Indian Government is diffuse and they are not nearly as likely to find acceptable answers to difficult questions if these are provided through only one cable channel from Geneva as they are if a number of their senior officials and

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political leaders could sit down with leading Americans for protracted examination of a problem; (b) this is particularly the case if they have been excluded from earlier negotiations in which the Europeans have been the main participants.

5. Weiler described to me how overstretched are Foster, Fisher, and a handful of ACDA people who have been responsible for these negotiations. It's as if in order to be sure there was adequate security on the delicate negotiations with the Soviet Union, sufficient staff were not provided to undertake the delicate discussions with other governments. The usual Euro-centered emphasis of the Department was also clear. He was about to enter a staff meeting where, he said, he would pick up my suggestion.

6. Today Weiler reported ACDA agrees to make the text available to the Indians (without #3), but there is no one to spare for consultations in New Delhi. I reiterated my view that we stand little chance of the Indians accepting the NPT unless a serious and high-level effort is made in New Delhi by knowledgeable and name people to reassure the Indians on the scientific and security implications of this treaty.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

101  
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SECRET/LIMDIS

S/S 574

January 11, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Indian Nuclear Working Group's Security  
Assurances Study: NSAM 355

NSAM 355 requested a study of the question of possible US security assurances to India on the use or threat of use against her of nuclear weapons by Communist China. The requested report is enclosed.

All agencies represented in the Indian Nuclear Working Group established to implement NSAM 355 - the Departments of State and Defense, USIA, CIA, and ACDA - concur in this staff study at the level of the Working Group.

*John P. Walsh*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

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Authority State letter Oct. 1979  
By jc/iep NARA. Date 7-16-02

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON



SECRET/LINDIS

January 11, 1967

s/s 274

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*John H. Read*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

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Authority: State letter Oct. 1979  
Ref: NARA. Date: 3-11-09

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THE INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROBLEM:  
SECURITY ASPECTS  
A REPORT UNDER NSAM NO. 355

January, 1967

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 12-240  
By UC12 NARA, Date 02-04-2014

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THE INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROBLEM:  
SECURITY ASPECTS  
A REPORT UNDER NSAM NO. 355  
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THE INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROBLEM:  
SECURITY ASPECTS  
A REPORT UNDER NSAM NO. 355

BACKGROUND

1. In response to NSAM No. 331, the Secretary of State forwarded to the President on July 25, 1966, a report concerning the Indian nuclear weapons problem.

2. With respect to the sources of the problem, the report stated:

"The problem arises in part from political and prestige concerns to which a nuclear capability may be pertinent. These concerns relate importantly to India's future position vis-a-vis Communist China in Asia, and to whether an effort to 'go it alone' militarily (including nuclearly) will come to be regarded as essential to exerting independent political influence.

"The problem also stems in part from security concerns -- the need to deter or counter future Communist Chinese nuclear blackmail or attack."

3. Recommendation B(4) of the report called for further study of the second of these sources of the problem -- India's security concerns. The present report has been prepared in response to NSAM No. 355 which, inter alia, approved this recommendation for further study of security aspects.

4. In considering these aspects, it should be recalled that the initial report noted that: "Because the problem has more than a single root, no single action we might take can be expected to provide a full answer." The initial report also noted that "we cannot now describe a 'permanent solution.'" These basic considerations continue to be pertinent with respect to both the relationship of security to other aspects of the problem, and actions which might be taken in the security field.

5.

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5. The present staff study consists of two parts:

-- Part I presents "Conclusions" to the staff study agreed to at the level of the inter-agency Working Group which has been charged with implementation of NSAM No. 355.

-- Part II presents an analysis supporting the "Conclusions." The analysis generally reflects the views of the Working Group; however, no effort has been made to reach full agreement on all details covered in the analysis.

PART I: CONCLUSIONS

1. We cannot accurately predict when India's leaders will conclude that steps must be taken toward resolving the question of India's future nuclear security vis-a-vis Communist China. The issue could be precipitated in a few months -- or within a few years -- depending on the inter-play of such factors as the following:

- U.S.-Soviet agreement on a non-proliferation treaty;
- Further developments in Communist China's nuclear weapons program;
- Changes in the character of U.S.-Soviet, Soviet-ChiCom, and ChiCom-Pak relations;
- India's assessment of political and economic risks of "going nuclear" versus the strength of its security concerns.

2.

2. No progress has yet been made toward a UN resolution or other international understanding which might afford a measure of assurance for countries which refrain from seeking nuclear weapons. In the Indian case, such an international approach might serve two functions:

- That of providing an improved basis, which would be public and consistent with India's policy of non-alignment, for India's leaders to continue to resist domestic pressures to "go nuclear"; and
- That of serving as an "umbrella" for more substantial private security understandings.

3. We should continue efforts to develop an international approach which would serve such purposes as the foregoing. However, the Soviet Union has thus far rejected the concept of a positive public assurance for non-nuclear countries and has shown no interest in offering a private security assurance to India. Moreover, many non-nuclear countries have been decidedly cool to the idea of positive assurance of aid because it would promise assistance only after an attack with nuclear weapons, in contrast to the present Soviet approach requiring promises of non-use of nuclear weapons, despite the illusoriness of the latter, especially with Chinese Communist abstention from agreement. Whether or when these attitudes may change is problematical.

4. We are, then, confronted with two major uncertainties:

- One related to when the security issue will press itself on the attention of India's leaders;
- The other related to the availability of a suitable international approach.

5.

5. In view of these uncertainties, we should proceed to develop an approach to the security issue which might be used in private bilateral discussions with India's leaders if and as the situation requires. The objective of such a private approach would not be to influence Indian public opinion, but rather to convince India's leaders that they can, without undue risk to their country's security, continue to adhere to their policy against seeking a national nuclear weapons capability.

6. We have examined four courses:

Course A. We might limit ourselves to reiterating privately to India's leaders our publicly announced policy of supporting countries threatened by ChiCom "nuclear blackmail."

Course B. Without unilaterally offering a guarantee of India's nuclear security, we might seek specific understandings with India's leaders concerning ways of implementing our policy against "nuclear blackmail" with a view to maximizing its deterrent effect on Communist China.

Course C. We might privately offer India's leaders a unilateral guarantee of India's security against ChiCom nuclear aggression.

Course D. We might explore with India's leaders ways in which India might play a nuclear role without seeking a national nuclear weapons capability.

7. Our conclusions with respect to these courses are as follows:

Course A. We do not believe that merely reiterating our promise of support against "nuclear blackmail" would be adequate to influence the decisions which will confront India's leaders.

Course B.

Course B. An effort to give substance to our policy against nuclear blackmail probably would not provide the basis for a long-term "solution." However, such an effort would represent a logical step, and might help clarify the issue. It would not, in our view, be counterproductive in terms of our relations with India. Accordingly, the principal elements of such an approach are presented in the attachment at Tab A;\* in summary, that approach envisions our telling India's leaders that we would be prepared to enter into: (1) advance consultation regarding contingencies in which Communist China might make threats of "nuclear blackmail" against India, and (2) arrangements to ensure further prompt consultation if specific situations involving such threats should arise. The approach outlined in Tab A would be implemented if and when it is determined to be necessary and useful to do so in the light of overall U.S. relations with India as well as the status of the Indian nuclear weapons problem.

Course C. The central element of a private unilateral guarantee of India's nuclear security would be a commitment that we would regard ChiCom nuclear aggression against India as aggression against ourselves. In view of the varying circumstances which might affect the manner (demonstrative, tactical, strategic) and scale of the use of nuclear weapons by Communist China against India, such a guarantee would not commit us to a single response under any and all circumstances. The relationship between our guarantee and possible responses could be clarified through joint U.S.-Indian contingency planning with respect to nuclear contingencies, and by ensuring in our own planning that necessary military capabilities would be available. Going

down

\*See pages 7-10

down this road would present major issues for both the U.S. and India, and although it is not a foregone conclusion that India's leaders would reject such an offer, the chance that they would accept it is probably considerably less than even. The need for further consideration of Course C should be determined in the light of the outcome of Course B.

Course D. We cannot now foresee the development of a political basis for offering India a "nuclear role." However, we should continue to examine various possibilities ranging from formal arrangements for consultation on nuclear matters to arrangements under which India might procure appropriate nuclear delivery vehicles to be supplied with nuclear weapons by the U.S. under agreed circumstances. We should exclude from examination arrangements contrary to the terms of a non-proliferation treaty if such a treaty is achieved.

8. The principal quid pro quo on India's part in connection with the courses outlined above would be refraining from seeking a national nuclear weapons capability. However, consideration should be given to whether we might also seek, for example, more active Indian cooperation in helping meet possible USG security requirements bearing on the Subcontinent as they arise.

9. It should be noted that if the U.S. deploys an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, the question of the availability of ABM defenses for India is likely to arise. An examination of problems and possibilities in this regard should be included within the scope of U.S. studies of the ABM question.

A

CONCLUSIONS - TAB A

ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING  
U.S. POLICY AGAINST  
CHICOM "NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL"

1. The Secretary of State or his representative would inform India's leaders:

a. That we would be prepared to enter into: (i) advance consultation regarding contingencies in which Communist China might make threats of "nuclear blackmail" against India; and (ii) arrangements to ensure further prompt consultation if specific situations involving such threats should arise. He would indicate to the Indians that we consider such consultative arrangements to be consistent with India's non-alignment policy and with present Indo-U.S. relations.

b. That the objective would be to identify approaches which would, under various circumstances, offer the most effective and appropriate means of deterring the use of nuclear weapons by Communist China against India.

c. That consideration would also be given to how specific approaches to the problem might best be carried out, e.g., separately by the U.S. or India, or jointly with others.

d. That consultation would normally be through diplomatic channels. We would be prepared to consider military consultation if required in connection with particular courses of action.

e.

e. That the privacy of the arrangement and of consultations pursuant to the arrangement would be maintained by both countries.

2. The following related arrangements would be proposed:

a. Periodic joint examination of the ChiCom nuclear threat to India, including strategic implications of changes in the character of ChiCom nuclear capabilities.

b. A reliable communications link ("hot line") between India and the U.S. (we would make clear that we would not object to India's seeking comparable arrangements with the Soviet Union.)

3. The following considerations would be advanced during discussion of the foregoing approach with India's leaders.

a. The U.S. has a basic continuing interest in the future security and stability of the Asian-Pacific region. The nuclear security and stability of the sub-continent are a key part of this overall problem.

b. Neither our own interests nor those of free non-nuclear countries of the region would be served by the further spread of national nuclear weapons capabilities or by permitting Communist China to believe that its nuclear weapons program can be exploited at the expense of others.

c. Our policy against "nuclear blackmail" offers a flexible framework for deterring the use of nuclear weapons by Communist China. Flexibility is required since nuclear threats might be made under a variety of circumstances. It is not practical to determine or specify in advance a single response that would be appropriate in all possible situations.

d.

d. Depending on the circumstances, various degrees of pressure might be required. If the situation warranted, the forms of pressure considered could include counterthreats and, possibly, related demonstrative military moves designed to make clear to Communist China the seriousness of the situation.

e. If Communist China were to make nuclear threats against India, the interests of many nations would be involved. Thus, although the Soviet Union is not likely to agree to any specific steps in advance, we have no reason to suppose the Soviets would wish to see Communist Chinese "nuclear blackmail" tactics against India succeed.

f. The steps that can be taken within the framework of our policy against ChiCom "nuclear blackmail" would be likely to prove a more convincing deterrent in Communist China's eyes than an Indian national nuclear weapons capability.

(1) One reason is that, as Communist China is aware, U.S. nuclear capabilities are sufficiently flexible and accurate to permit measured retaliation which would destroy Communist China's nuclear delivery, support and production capabilities.

(2) On the other hand, a minimally useful Indian capability would take years to develop. Moreover, any foreseeable Indian capability, if it could survive ChiCom attack, could at best threaten only Communist China's cities and might, therefore, invite a ChiCom strike against Indian cities. Under such circumstances, an Indian threat of retaliation might well not prove credible from Communist China's standpoint.

(3)

(3) In addition, if India were to seek a national nuclear weapons capability, it would not be able to count on support which had been intended for non-nuclear countries. The objective should be to increase Communist China's dilemmas rather than to relieve it of the need to weigh most carefully the risks entailed in any use of its nuclear weapons.

g. In summary, our policy against "nuclear blackmail" is designed to influence Communist China's leaders by building on risks they already recognize. One of these risks is that of creating a united opposition to any efforts to exploit "nuclear blackmail" tactics. Another is the risk of direct confrontation with U.S. nuclear power. A rational weighing of such risks should lead to the conclusion that any gains expected from the use of nuclear weapons would be far outweighed by possible losses. This is the best route to effective deterrence of Communist China.

PART II: ANALYSIS

A. The ChiCom Nuclear Threat to India

1. Nuclear Weapons and Communist China's Indian Policy

a. Communist China's principal objectives vis-a-vis India appear to be as follows:

(1) To confirm the Chinese version of disputed boundaries;

(2) To ensure that the border states (Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim) will at least provide a not unfavorably disposed buffer zone insulating Tibet; and possibly to dominate these states in order to have a strategic outpost overlooking the Subcontinent;

(3) To keep the Subcontinent itself off balance with a view to preventing the emergence of India as a potential competitor for Asian leadership;

(4) To undercut U.S. and Soviet influence and support of India;

(5) To promote the establishment of an anti-U.S./pro-Peking, if not Communist, Indian Government.

b. For the most part, these objectives can be pursued relatively effectively (perhaps most effectively) through political pressures and manipulation. In general, they do not require the application of substantial military force. They do not, in particular, require the actual use of nuclear weapons. However, nuclear weapons are likely to prove useful as a "silent partner" of political pressure, and of conventional military force if conflict should occur.

c.

c. Without resorting to explicit threats of "nuclear blackmail" and without taking the drastic step of mounting a nuclear attack, Communist China may find that the "silent partner" role of nuclear weapons can serve perhaps four functions:

(1) Intimidating India in political bargaining or conventional conflict concerning disputed boundaries;

(2) Convincing the border states that power resides in the north and that their security cannot be safeguarded by India;

(3) Promoting turmoil in the Subcontinent by encouraging Pakistan to believe that it has a powerful guarantor at its side; and

(4) Discouraging India from taking political or military initiatives adverse to Communist China's interests, and perhaps weakening India's confidence that others would come to its assistance in the event of future Sino-Indian conflict. With respect to the latter point, a major ChiCom concern is that the use of its conventional forces might be countered by U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. Communist China probably regards a major function of its own nuclear weapons program as that of providing its own nuclear umbrella under which political pressures and conventional military pressures might be employed with less risk of U.S. nuclear intervention. This "counter deterrent" function of Communist China's nuclear weapons program may eventually figure in the context of ChiCom-Indian-U.S. relations as well as elsewhere.

d.

d. Explicit nuclear threats could, of course, come into play in specific situations where the "silent partner" role of nuclear weapons proved inadequate to the task at hand. Although the credibility and effectiveness of such threats would depend in part on the possibility that they might be implemented, they represent essentially a political use of nuclear force and would not necessarily constitute a commitment to employ nuclear weapons. This has certainly been the case to date with Soviet "nuclear blackmail" attempts.

e. If nuclear weapons should actually be used by Communist China against India, it is less likely to be the result of following-through on threats of "nuclear blackmail" than the by-product of an on-going conventional conflict. However, although the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used under such circumstances cannot be excluded, Communist China would need to weigh any assumed advantage of their use against two basic considerations:

(1) The risk that the U.S. would come to India's assistance; and

(2) The risk of creating widespread international opposition, including that of the Soviet Union.

It is difficult at this juncture to identify specific ChiCom military requirements that could be met only by using nuclear weapons against India and which would outweigh this liability and risk.

f. Although nuclear weapons could come to figure in Communist China's Indian policy in the foregoing ways, we do not know what relative priority Communist China has assigned to its objectives vis-a-vis India or to the eventual deployment of nuclear weapons in support of these objectives.

Whatever

Whatever the case may be during the period when Communist China's nuclear weapons stockpile is limited, its capabilities will grow. India cannot escape the need to examine its own situation in the light of this changeable and changing threat.

2. India's Security Concerns

a. Thus far, India has assigned military priority to meeting the threat of conventional conflict with Communist China, the threat of further conflict with Pakistan, and the possibility of a two-front war involving both. Imbalances still affect specific types of capabilities, but certain of the shortcomings revealed in 1962 have been lessened. India's military self-confidence, clearly deficient after the autumn of 1962, has also been bolstered as a result of the 1965 conflict with Pakistan.

b. Now, however, India must weigh the implications of Communist China's emerging nuclear capability. In the background, there are doubtless nagging recollections that in 1962 concern about Communist Chinese air strikes against its cities inhibited India from making the most effective use of its own "air power." Looking to the future, India is probably going to be subject to increasing self-doubts respecting the confidence with which it might engage in conventional conflict with a nuclear-armed Communist China. As these considerations suggest, India is likely to view itself as a prime target for "nuclear blackmail" in future political and military confrontations with Communist China; it is likely to feel intimidated by Communist China's nuclear weapons even if explicit threats are not made, and even if there is small chance that nuclear weapons would be used.

c. However, India's problem cannot be dismissed as entirely psychological. The fact that Communist China will have nuclear weapons presents a military problem for the U.S.

and

and will have to be factored into our own military plans and operations. There is no reason to expect India to discount a threat we ourselves must take seriously.

d. None of these considerations means that India would necessarily find the best solution to its security concerns in a national nuclear weapons capability. However, if India refrains from seeking such a capability, it will not be the result of writing-off the ChiCom nuclear threat. Such a decision could only be based on the assumption that India could turn to the U.S., and possibly the Soviet Union as well, in the event of future contingencies.

B. Contingencies and Possible U.S. Responses

1. "Nuclear Blackmail" and the Use of Nuclear Force

a. Three types of contingencies need to be considered:

(1) "Nuclear blackmail" is viewed here as a specific effort to achieve political or military objectives through explicit threats to use nuclear force. Such threats might conceivably be made in the context of political confrontations as well as under conditions of imminent or on-going conventional conflict. Threats could be offensive (to advance Communist China's own objectives), or defensive (to force India to halt some military action which it had initiated).

(2) If information or circumstances suggested that Communist China were about to employ nuclear weapons, the contingency would be dominated by a real threat of imminent nuclear attack.

(3) The actual use of nuclear weapons could be demonstrative (for psychological effect), tactical (against Indian forces actually engaged in conflict or

against

against forward reserves), or strategic (against key military targets, civilian areas, or both). Their use might support a conventional military action initiated by Communist China, or assist in repelling an action initiated by India.

b. Several considerations need to be kept in view in considering these hypothetical contingencies.

(1) If they should arise at all, they will not necessarily arise sequentially; that is, there is no necessary or orderly progression from "nuclear blackmail," through threat of imminent nuclear attack, to the actual use of nuclear weapons.

(2) The circumstances (both as to the origin and character of the contingency) might be either clear or highly ambiguous. The latter would likely be the case where, say, a border dispute was involved.

(3) Both the opportunity to respond and the character of appropriate responses could vary considerably.

## 2. U.S. Reaction to ChiCom "Nuclear Blackmail."

a. Our present policy of providing support against ChiCom "nuclear blackmail" does not commit us to any particular course of action. The range of circumstances in which the issue might arise is broad, and no single course of action suggests itself. Depending on the circumstances, the main possibilities appear to be as follows:

(1) If the threat arose in the context of a political confrontation between India and Communist China and did not carry the implication of an immediate attack,

we

we might seek to apply political pressure alone or jointly with others. This pressure might take the form of condemnation of Communist China's tactics without necessarily advancing a counterthreat.

(2) In the event of conventional conflict, it is probable that efforts to halt the conflict would already be underway. If a nuclear threat seemed to presage eventual escalation, efforts to bring the conflict to a halt might be intensified, and counterthreats and perhaps demonstrative measures might be employed to discourage escalation.

(3) At some stage, consideration might be given to steps supporting India's conventional capabilities. However, halting the conflict might well be given higher priority.

(4) If nuclear attack appeared imminent, a forceful counterthreat might be called for, and the possibility of a disarming strike might be considered, although the inhibitions against such a course would be substantial.

b. Whether the Soviet Union would associate itself with us in any of the foregoing actions is uncertain. It has not as yet been prepared to accept the concept of positive action in support of non-nuclear countries presumably because such a policy would be transparently directed against another Communist state--Communist China. If an actual situation should arise which the Soviets could not ignore, they might still prefer to act separately rather than jointly with us. The thrust of Soviet political action might be in the same direction as our own, and it is likely that we might share an interest in bringing conventional conflict to a halt. Under foreseeable circumstances, it is far less likely that the Soviets would either join or support public counterthreats against Communist China.

c.

c. These considerations suggest that support against "nuclear blackmail" might not in the event prove to be of a kind which would take India's special interests into account. This would be especially true if "halting the conflict" became an end in itself.

3. U.S. Reaction to ChiCom Nuclear Attack

a. As noted above, the use of nuclear weapons by Communist China might conceivably take any of several forms: demonstrative, tactical, strategic. The scale might be limited or large. The circumstances leading to the use of nuclear weapons might be clear or ambiguous. These basic uncertainties make hazardous any effort to predict how we would in fact react.

b. Taking these uncertainties into account, the principal factors which now appear to have a bearing on our reactions can be summarized as follows:

(1) If the use of nuclear weapons by Communist China represented the first use that any country had made of them since the Second World War, the event would clearly signal Communist China's intention not to follow what others have come to view as the "rules of the game." It is in fact highly unlikely that Communist China would consider the breaking of the "rules of the game" to be in its interest. However, if it should take this step, the question for the U.S. and others would be whether to accept the risk of further ChiCom violations, or to seek to enforce the "rules" through political and/or military action.

(2) The most effective political action available would probably be to threaten to retaliate against any further use of nuclear weapons by Communist China.

But

But would we limit ourselves to threats if Communist China had actually attacked one or several of India's large cities? How would other Asian countries react if this were our only response?

(3) We might, on the other hand, choose to strike Communist China's nuclear delivery, support and production capabilities following the initial incident in which nuclear weapons were employed. But would we do so if, for example, Communist China had employed only one or a few weapons for demonstrative or psychological purposes? Would others feel that we were justified in retaliating on such a scale?

(4) In considering these alternatives, we would, of course, need to consider the attitude of the Soviet Union. Under present and foreseeable circumstances, it would clearly not be in the Soviet Union's interest to precipitate a general nuclear war in response to a measured U.S. nuclear attack against military capabilities in Communist China (which might in fact represent a potential threat to the Soviet Union itself). To reduce the risk, we might notify the Soviet Union of our intentions (or if substantial improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations had occurred, we might seek to enlist their support or cooperation). Soviet attitudes would, however, be a factor that would have to be weighed at the time.

(5) Finally, we could not disregard the possibility of a ChiCom response--a thrusting outward of its conventional military forces; or, eventually, the employment of intercontinental capabilities against us if we had not been able to destroy all such capabilities. Either of these reactions would be foolhardy in the sense that

they

they might call forth additional U.S. nuclear action, and to deter such responses, we might, indeed, make clear in advance what further action we would take. But how much risk would remain? How much risk would we be prepared to accept?

c. If the foregoing represents a reasonable approximation of the main factors that would have to be considered, the uncertainties involved argue strongly against assuming that we would automatically retaliate nuclearly against any Communist Chinese use of nuclear weapons against India. But these uncertainties must be considered in the light of others:

(1) Whether the risk that Communist China might use nuclear weapons against India would be increased if there were evident uncertainty concerning our own reaction;

(2) Whether India's uncertainty as to our intentions would increase the chance of its going nuclear; and

(3) How these aspects of the future nuclear security of the entire Asian-Pacific region inter-act with other aspects of regional security.

C. An Approach Based on U.S. Policy Against "Nuclear Blackmail."

1. A U.S.-Indian Consultative Arrangement

a. Because of uncertainties inherent in predicting the circumstances under which our policy against ChiCom "nuclear blackmail" might be called into play, we will need to retain a high degree of flexibility. However, two questions arise:

(1)

(1) Whether we can retain full flexibility and still use our policy against "nuclear blackmail" as a means of influencing India's leaders in their consideration of questions bearing on their country's future nuclear security.

(2) Whether, without losing essential flexibility, we might be able to build on our present policy in a way that might be meaningful to India's leaders.

b. The answer to the first of these questions is clearly negative. To retain full flexibility, we would, in effect, have to avoid any elaboration of our present policy. But unless an effort is made to structure that policy in a way that is understood by India's leaders, it is likely to appear lacking in substance and to be viewed as a well intentioned gesture rather than a meaningful tool.

c. On the other hand, it should be possible to build on our present policy in ways that would retain needed flexibility. What might be done in this regard could still prove far from providing a full answer to India's nuclear security problem especially over the longer-term. However, a dialogue with India's leaders concerning ways of implementing our policy against "nuclear blackmail" would offer a logical next step.

d. The basis for such a dialogue might be a twofold U.S. offer which would be presented privately to India's leaders as a means of maximizing the deterrent effect of our present policy:

(1) An offer to enter into advance consultations concerning contingencies which might involve ChiCom "nuclear blackmail" threats against India, and concerning the range of responses that might, depending on the circumstances, offer the most appropriate and effective ways of countering such threats.

(2)

(2) An offer to enter into an arrangement for prompt joint consultation on specific courses of action in the event such contingencies should arise.

e. The only commitment would be the commitment to consult. In this respect, the arrangement would be similar to our 1963 agreement to consult with India, in the event of Communist Chinese attack on India, regarding possible U.S. assistance in strengthening India's air defenses. However, in the present case, provision would be made for advance consultation. The objective would not be "contingency planning" in a formal sense but rather preliminary clarification of a range of possible contingencies and responses. Decisions regarding courses of action would only be arrived at on the basis of further consultation in the light of specific circumstances.

f. There are some hazards in such an approach.

(1) Although the only commitment would be to consult, there would be an implied commitment that we would undertake some action in India's behalf if need should arise. However, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that our present policy already carries such an implication.

(2) A dialogue concerning contingencies and responses would inevitably raise a number of "what if" questions. However, India's leaders will be grappling with such questions in any case. If a dialogue could aid in keeping matters in perspective, we should gain rather than lose. The fact that we would not be able to offer simple solutions may be less important under present circumstances than the opportunity to make the case that an Indian national nuclear weapons capability would not itself offer a simple solution and that other approaches offer greater promise.

(3)

(3) Finally, "crisis consultation" might not in the event produce an agreed course of action. This limitation is to some extent inherent in any consultative arrangement, including those with allies. Despite this limitation, a firm commitment to consult might make our policy against "nuclear blackmail" more directly relevant to India's concerns than is now the case.

g. Consultative arrangements of the type contemplated here could, of course, involve countries other than the U.S. and India. Any offer along these lines would represent an assurance of our willingness to consult bilaterally rather than a barrier to broader consultative arrangements if such should materialize.

## 2. Supporting Measures

a. The basic arrangement described above could be supported by either or both of two measures.

(1) The first would be related to the process of advance consultation. Assessment of Communist China's nuclear capabilities and their strategic implications would to an extent be involved in any examination of contingencies. However, special provision might be made for periodic joint assessments to ensure that the contingency review process kept pace with significant changes. Such assessments would not be limited to appropriate exchanges of intelligence data but would seek to place such data in strategic perspective.

(2) The second supporting measure would be concerned with ensuring the practicability of "crisis consultation." A reliable communications link ("hot line", possibly via satellite) between New Delhi and Washington might serve this purpose. In addition, such a link, if publicly revealed, might have some deterrent value. It should be possible to develop an acceptable

public

public justification for the link which would not highlight its basic purpose. Moreover, India could be assured that we would not object to her seeking a similar link with Moscow, if the Indians believed this would be more consonant with non-alignment or otherwise desirable.

b. These two measures would be well within the framework of the basic consultative arrangement and might help underwrite its utility, and possibly its credibility from the standpoint of India's leaders. However, these supporting measures are not indispensable and should be put forward as possible but not essential ingredients of the package.

D. The Question of a U.S. Nuclear Guarantee for India

1. Characteristics and Limitations

a. Exploration of the consultative arrangement described above would represent a logical step and might help clarify the nuclear security issue as it is viewed by India's leaders. We could take this step without incurring any obligation to go further. Conversely, we should probably not try to arrive at a decision concerning the need or desirability of going further until a "reconnaissance" of this type has been carried out. However, it may become important for us to weigh the question of offering India a unilateral U.S. guarantee of its nuclear security.

b. The principal characteristics and limitations of such a guarantee would be as follows:

(1) We would, in effect, affirm that we would regard ChiCom nuclear aggression against India as aggression against ourselves. This would commit us to act only: (a) in the event of unprovoked ChiCom nuclear attack against India; or (b) in a case where some ChiCom reaction might have been provoked but where the employment of nuclear weapons by Communist China was unwarranted.

(2)

(2) In view of uncertainties concerning the manner and scale of the possible use of nuclear weapons by Communist China against India, we should not commit ourselves to a nuclear response or to a single response of any type under any and all circumstances. However, we could make clear that depending on the circumstances, we might undertake a variety of responses including -- but not limited to -- the demonstrative use of nuclear weapons, and measured nuclear retaliation against Communist China's nuclear delivery, support, and production capabilities.

(3) We would not undertake any commitment concerning a pre-emptive disarming strike against Communist China's nuclear capabilities (although such a strike might be considered in an extreme and escalating conflict situation).

(4) We would not commit ourselves to engage our non-nuclear forces in support of a conventional conflict between India and Communist China. However, in addition to our present agreement to consult on air defense, it might be useful to provide for joint U.S.-Indian consultation, in the event of ChiCom conventional aggression against India, in order to determine whether the provision of conventional arms or equipment by the U.S. to India would aid in holding the conflict to conventional levels and in terminating it rapidly.

c. Some level of joint U.S.-Indian military contingency planning would probably be required in support of an arrangement along the foregoing lines.

## 2. Deterrent Effect and Steps to Bolster Credibility

a. The question of whether the U.S. should consider offering a guarantee of this character to a non-ally is raised in the following section. If such a guarantee were offered under foreseeable circumstances, the offer would

have

have to be made privately and the purpose of the offer would be to influence India's leaders, not to affect Indian public opinion. In this regard, the function of the guarantee would not be to solve India's domestic political problems but to enable India's leaders to conclude that a decision to continue opposing pressures to "go nuclear" would not entail undue risks to their country's security.

b. The deterrent effect on Communist China would not derive directly from this private guarantee but from our past record of willingness to come to India's assistance, our continuing interest in India, and our evident intent to prevent Communist China itself from capitalizing on the use of its nuclear weapons. In addition, although any joint U.S.-Indian military contingency planning would be conducted privately, the fact that such planning was taking place might intentionally be made known to Communist China in order to bolster deterrence.

c. Further steps to bolster the credibility of a U.S. guarantee might well become necessary. These would need to be calculated in terms of their effect on either or both of the two leadership groups involved--India's leaders and those of Communist China. Without attempting here to specify particular steps, the range of possibilities would include the following:

(1) Apart from the character of U.S. relations with India, on the one hand, and Communist China, on the other, the state of U.S.-Soviet and Soviet-ChiCom relations would affect the credibility of a U.S. guarantee. Steps which would facilitate favorable evolution in U.S.-Soviet relations and/or ensure against a Soviet-ChiCom rapprochement would, as a general matter, help sustain credibility.

(2) A second factor influencing credibility would be the relative nuclear strength of the U.S.

and

and Communist China. Development and demonstration of an inter-continental nuclear delivery system (presumably an ICBM) by Communist China will inevitably raise questions from India's standpoint even though Communist China might not achieve a significant operational force until some years following an initial test. We have not ourselves arrived at firm conclusions concerning how best to meet this eventual threat. Without pre-judging such conclusions here, it seems clear that in order to sustain the credibility of a U.S. guarantee in the eyes of India's leaders, we would need to explain why deterrence does not necessarily work in both directions between major and minor nuclear powers, and why our superior and more flexible nuclear force would continue to provide an effective basis for a guarantee of India's nuclear security. Strategic argumentation supporting these propositions could be advanced whether or not the U.S. had decided to deploy anti-ballistic missiles (ABM's); however, the character of such argumentation would, of course, be affected by such a decision.

(3) If circumstances within the Subcontinent should permit U.S. assistance in remedying imbalances in arms and equipment available to India for conventional defense against Communist China, steps in this direction might favorably affect both India's and Communist China's view of the degree of our interest in India's security.

(4) If substantial progress could be made in improving Indian-Pak relations, the possibility of a potential U.S. "conflict of interest" (in India's eyes) would be lessened, and the credibility of a U.S. nuclear guarantee would be increased.

### 3. The Problem of Acceptability

a. It is not a foregone conclusion that India's leaders would reject a U.S. nuclear guarantee. A decision

to

to "go nuclear" is not itself a clearcut alternative, and India's leaders might wish to buy time rather than trouble. Nonetheless, the chance that they would accept is probably less than even.

b. Even if a reasonably credible arrangement might be developed, other issues would be involved from India's standpoint. Indeed, the basic issues might not be either credibility or the bending of India's policy of non-alignment. Rather, the basic issues could be nationalism and the desire to escape dependence on others if and as it becomes possible to do so. India has already made clear its desire to achieve independence in production of conventional arms and munitions since it has not found wholly satisfactory external sources of supply and since dependence in such matters tends to limit political independence. To remain dependent on the U.S. or others for nuclear support could present a pressing dilemma in India's eyes.

c. Security is not, in any event, the only issue in the Indian debate over the "bomb." We cannot predict that political and psychological attractions of a nuclear role will diminish in general or from India's standpoint in particular. We can be sure that India's present decision not to "go nuclear," will in any case remain subject to continuing reassessment.

d. A nuclear guarantee for India would also raise serious issues from our own standpoint. India is not our ally and does not wish to enter into an alliance with us. Moreover, we are already heavily committed in support of other defensive arrangements. An arrangement with India would clearly involve many uncertainties.

e. However, an Indian pro-nuclear decision would also generate problems and uncertainties. And it may become important for us to weigh the question of whether our net interest in the future security and stability of the Sub-continent and the Asian-Pacific region would be served by offering

offering India a nuclear guarantee as an alternative to an Indian national nuclear weapons capability. For the same reasons, it may also become necessary to consider whether the kind of alternative we might offer could eventually come to include a nuclear role for India.

E. Approaches to a Nuclear Role for India

1. Political Alternatives and Their Limitations

a. In theory, a number of functional alternatives (discussed in the following section) might offer routes to a larger nuclear role for India while stopping short of the independent ability to control nuclear weapons that is the distinguishing mark of a national nuclear weapons capability. Since the basic motivation for such a capability stems from political or security advantages which are believed to go along with control, no alternative may suffice. Under any of the alternatives discussed below, India would, in effect, be an associate member rather than a full member of the "nuclear club"; its dependence on U.S. nuclear forces and on U.S. decisions concerning the application of such forces would not be lessened in any fundamental way.

b. One functional alternative -- joint ownership of nuclear warheads -- has been excluded from consideration in the following review on political grounds. The first reason is that a non-proliferation agreement, if achieved, would almost certainly prohibit this alternative. A second reason is that even if joint warhead ownership were not otherwise ruled out, the inter-play of U.S. interests in Europe and Asia would appear to preclude such ownership arrangements with Asian nations unless or until the similar question bearing on our relations with European Allies had been definitively resolved. Finally, while posing difficult questions of control, joint warhead ownership would not in and of itself relieve the political difficulties entailed in any close U.S.-India nuclear relationship. If these difficulties could be overcome at all, other functional alternatives might suffice.

c.

c. Each of the several functional alternatives considered below could, again in theory, be packaged in different political forms:

- (1) Bilateral U.S.-Indian arrangements (with parallel arrangements offered to Pakistan);
- (2) Trilateral arrangements associating the U.S. with India and Pakistan in the defense of the Subcontinent;
- (3) Multilateral arrangements involving other Asian countries subject to the ChiCom nuclear threat.

d. No adequate political basis exists today for any of these approaches to the packaging of nuclear arrangements. Each would involve difficult adjustments in the relations of the U.S., India, and others (including most importantly U.S. allies), and there is small likelihood that such adjustments could be effected during the years immediately ahead. However, if serious consideration is to be given to coupling one of these approaches to any of the functional alternatives below, the Indian question should not be considered in isolation. There are two reasons:

- (1) The problem involves both our non-proliferation objectives and our objectives for security of the Asian-Pacific region. "Solutions" for the Indian case must be consistent with both sets of objectives.

- (2) It is not necessarily the case that the narrower the approach, the fewer the difficulties.

- (a) A bilateral arrangement would focus most sharply on the necessarily changing character of U.S.-Indian relations, impose the need for offering comparable arrangements to Pakistan, require explanations and possible off-setting actions in the case of other U.S. allies, and be subject to instability if other Asian nations (for example, Japan) should subsequently "go nuclear."

(b)

(b) Any trilateral U.S.-Indian-Pak arrangement for defense of the Subcontinent would require a merging of Indian-Pak interests and a submerging of differences to a degree not now foreseeable. If this should prove possible in time, the resulting arrangement would probably fit more readily into any emerging pattern of regional defense arrangements, but we cannot now assume that such arrangements will in fact emerge.

(c) A broader multilateral arrangement (in effect, as Asian league for nuclear deterrence with the U.S. standing as guarantor) could not emerge unless and until present differences in experience and outlook came to be outweighed by common concern respecting the ChiCom nuclear threat, coupled with common concern about the destabilizing effects in the region of additional national nuclear weapons capabilities. Such an approach would, however, shift the focus away from a direct U.S.-Indian relationship, and would provide a larger framework for submerging Indian-Pak differences (provided Pakistan had altered its view of the advantages of being manipulated by Communist China).

(3) The reaction of Japan would be of special significance. The Japanese have already made clear that their own view of the nuclear weapons question will be influenced by developments in India. This is likely to be the case whether, on the one hand, India should seek a national nuclear weapons capability or whether on the other hand, we should seek to develop a nuclear role for India which stopped short of such a capability.

e. No clear political course can now be charted. This should be kept in view in considering the several functional alternatives outlined below.

## 2. Functional Approaches

- a. Four principal alternatives might be considered as  
opening

opening the way to a progressively larger nuclear role for India.

(1) Consultative arrangements similar to those being established with our principal European allies would afford direct participation in nuclear planning, that is, in planning related to the disposition and targeting of U.S. nuclear forces and the circumstances under which they might be employed. Such consultation would presumably be limited to considerations bearing on India's nuclear security, and would not extend to considerations bearing on over-all U.S. nuclear capabilities.

(2) Preparatory Steps for Joint Action in Contingencies. Without requiring Indian procurement of hardware, a binding arrangement might be made: (a) to train Indians in nuclear delivery techniques (or in the operation of strategic defenses -- ABM's), and (b) to agree to supply hardware and warheads for India's use under mutually understood circumstances.

(3) A Deterrent "Nuclear Sharing" Arrangement. A binding arrangement might be made involving: (a) Indian procurement, installation, and manning of a nuclear delivery system (probably a missile delivery system); and (b) U.S. provision of compatible nuclear warheads, which would remain under U.S. custody (probably not on Indian soil) except under agreed circumstances when they would be released to India.

(4) A Defensive "Nuclear Sharing" Arrangement. Should the U.S. produce and deploy ABM's and should an effective defense prove feasible for India, a binding defensive arrangement might be made. The character of this arrangement would vary as between land-based and sea-based ABM systems. An arrangement involving land-based ABM's might involve: (a) Indian procurement, installation, and manning of radars and

defensive

defensive missiles; and (b) U.S. provision of warheads which would remain under U.S. custody and which might be brought to India by U.S. personnel in time of crisis or conflict. An arrangement involving sea-based ABM's would probably involve procurement, installation, and manning of land-based radars by India, but defensive missiles, together with their warheads, would be located on U.S. ships off-shore (presumably with Indian liaison personnel aboard).

b. Major considerations bearing on these alternatives are as follows:

(1) Each of these alternatives, as outlined here, would be primarily concerned with strategic nuclear issues. None would automatically offer an approach to the question of deterring or responding to the possible demonstrative or tactical use of nuclear weapons by Communist China.

(2) Each alternative would require a high degree of mutual confidence. From the U.S. standpoint, not the least of the issues would be that of maintaining the security of information passed to India.

(3) Hardware solutions of either type would be expensive. Whether India could bear the cost or whether we would wish to do so would present a major problem. It should be noted that, with the exception of radar procurement associated with a sea-based ABM system, the cost of hardware solutions could be almost as large as that of an Indian national nuclear capability.

(4) An approach involving ABM's would clearly be a long-term approach. The question of India's security in the interim would need to be answered through other arrangements. Moreover, unless a very high-confidence ABM deployment could be designed, a defensive hardware  
solution

solution would not necessarily relieve Indian pressures for a deterrent role of some sort, or for a national nuclear weapons capability.

(5) Approaches involving training and hardware would provide a "leg-up" toward an Indian national nuclear weapons capability should India decide to abrogate an arrangement with the U.S.

(6) Inherent in each of the alternatives is the question of whether, or under what circumstances, the U.S. might be prepared to undertake a disarming strike against Communist China's nuclear delivery capabilities if it appeared that deterrence was about to fail.

c. If there are compelling political reasons why the Indian case cannot be considered in isolation, there are compelling strategic reasons as well. The nuclear security of the Asian-Pacific region may not be indivisible, as in the case with that of Western Europe. However, the character of some of the foregoing issues strongly suggests that efforts to resolve part of the problem must increasingly be evaluated in terms of the whole.



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EMBASSY  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
New Delhi, India

*Indi*  
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*PA*

December 13, 1966

Mr. Howard Wriggins  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Howard:

I am enclosing a brief outline of the present political and economic situation in India which we prepared for Secretary Rusk's visit. I think you may find it of interest.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosure:

As Stated.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *7-16-02*

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By yc, NARA, Date 7-16-02



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Director and Chairman  
Policy Planning Council  
Washington

SECRET

July 28, 1966

Walt:

Attached is the draft NSAM you asked for on the Indian nuclear weapons problem. George Ball suggested I send it to you direct.

The draft covers all recommendations in the NSAM 351 report, which was transmitted by Secretary Rusk's memorandum of July 25 for the President. It is a simplified and generalized version of the paper's recommendations.

An alternative way of handling this would be to append the full text of the report's recommendations to a brief covering NSAM, which would state that the President had reviewed and approved the recommendations and had directed that they be implemented by the Secretary of State together with the interested agencies.

The attached draft has been cleared by Alex Johnson and the Country Director for India.

<sup>W</sup>  
Henry Owen

*Secret /  
India*

SECRET

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 7-16-02