

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	Hamilton Memorandum for the Record <del>PCI</del> 1 p. <i>open 9/20/01</i>	3/21/68	<del>A</del>
#1a memo	Rostow to the President, 7 p.m. <del>C</del> 1 p. <i>open 9/20/01</i> [dup. #84, NSF, Memos to the President, "Rostow, Vol. 59," Box 28]	<del>2/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#1b draft	Proposed Message to President Ayub <del>C</del> 1 p. <i>open 9/20/01</i> [dup. #84a, NSF, Memos to the President, "Rostow, Vol. 59," Box 28]	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#1m letter	Benjamin Oehlert to Hamilton <del>S</del> 1 p. <i>open 9/20/01</i>	1/24/68	<del>A</del>
#2b letter	Oehlert to Hamilton <del>S</del> 1 p. <i>open 9/20/01</i>	1/30/68	<del>A</del>
#3 letter	Oehlert to Rostow <del>S</del> 2 pp. <i>open 9/20/01</i>	2/12/68	<del>A</del>
#4 memo	Gaud to the President <del>C</del> 2 pp. <i>open 9/20/01</i>	2/8/68	<del>A</del>
#5a memo	Hamilton to Rostow <del>S</del> 3 pp. <i>open 1-10-03 NLJ 01-295</i>	12/21/67	<del>A</del>
#5c draft	Work copy cable to Rawalpindi <del>S</del> 4 pp. <i>open 9/20/01</i>	12/15/67	<del>A</del>
#5d draft	to Rostow re tanks for Pakistan <del>PCI</del> 2 pp. <i>open 1-10-03 NLJ 01-295</i>	8/29/67	<del>A</del>
#5e cable	Rawalpindi 582 <del>S</del> 3 pp. <i>open 8-10-04 NLJ 01-296</i> [dup. #5f]	8/25/67	<del>A</del>
#5f	duplicate of #5e <i>open 8-10-04 NLJ 01-296</i>		

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Files of Edward K. Hamilton, "Pakistan," Box 3

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, March 21, 1968 -- PM

*Pak India - Gen.*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 9-10-01

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Lunch with Aftab Khan, DCM of the Embassy of Pakistan

I had lunch today with Khan at his request. He indicated earlier on that he had not been requested to make any approach, but merely wanted to talk over topics of mutual concern.

His primary concern was Indian arms policy. He said that:

1. There was a strong feeling in Pakistan that India was escaping the tight restrictions on arms purchases which we were enforcing on Pakistan. Many of the arms India was buying -- e. g. , tanks and submarines -- were clearly designed to fight Pakistan, not China.
2. Even if it is wrong that India is not subject to the same restrictions, it is clear that she is not meeting our restrictions with the same straightforwardness and good cheer which Pakistan has demonstrated. Pindā can only wonder why, despite this, India is rewarded with more aid, why Pakistan is not rewarded with more arms, and why the State Department feels it has to do India's public relations work in Congress and elsewhere to explain her actions.
3. Under pressure, Aftab agreed that there is no real or apprehended ~~standards~~ danger of Indian attack against Pakistan. However, he repeated the standard argument that the balance between Indian and Pakistani ~~standards~~ is a potent political commodity in Pakistan, that no Pak president can ignore it, and that the present situation is producing pressures to look to the Soviets for new arms.
4. Aftab asked me in passing whether there was any consideration of our "making up the 1965 losses of U. S. -made aircraft" in the near future. He did not seem surprised or upset when I went through the problems posed by the Conte Amendment for any aircraft sales -- to say nothing of our firm arms sales policy in South Asia to which we remain committed.

I rebutted each of Khan's points at length, making all of the usual arguments. He took them well.

The only interesting point on another subject was Khan's remark that the problem of succession will be much prominent in the future, particularly in Ayub's mind. He said flatly that the present succession procedure is "impractical". He did not offer any specific notions of what might take its place.

*cc: Handley*

*Ed Hamilton*  
Ed Hamilton

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Wm Hamilton 1a*

Friday, February 2, 1968-7 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith a longer get well message to Ayub. It mentions both the wheat and the tanks you discussed with him at the Karachi airport.

On wheat we are moving ahead with the first 500,000 tons you discussed. We will go ahead with the second 500,000 tons as soon as the first agreement is signed.

On tanks the Paks have approached Belgium --with our blessing-- *to accept* the Belgian offer of reconditioned tanks at a reasonable price. In the meantime, however, the Belgian Foreign Office has caught wind of what their defense ministry is doing and is trying ~~to~~ get the Prime Minister to revoke the offer. If they succeed, the Italians are panting to step into the breach.

However this comes out, it looks as though Pakistan will get the tanks. But I think it would be unwise for you to get very far out on a limb in promising them.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓ *dispatched 2/3/68*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call Me-----

*Fated Pak India*  
*[Signature]*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ERUS 64-68, vol. 25, #482

By jc. NARA, Date 9-10-01

~~Confidential~~

Proposed Message to President Ayub

Dear Mr. President:

I was most distressed when Ben Oehlert informed me that you are ill. I know how frustrating it is to be cooped up in a sick bed when there is important work to be done. Lady Bird joins me in the fervent hope that your recovery will be swift and complete.

I have not forgotten our good talk at the Karachi airport. Ben will be following through with you soon on the wheat. We are also keeping a close eye on your negotiations for tanks in the hope that you will be able to arrange a transaction which will meet your needs.

Get well soon, old friend. The world needs you.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Confidential

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By ja, NARA, Date 9-10-01

Write a longer one. See if we can't say something  
about his tanks--say I am at least working on them.

LBJ:mb  
2-2-68  
4:00p

2/2/68  
Ed Hamilton notified  
rhw

ACTION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

1a

①

Friday, February 2, 1968  
9:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Ayub is reported down -- possibly  
with pneumonia.

A get well message might be in  
order. A possible draft is attached.

*Walt* Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_  
Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
Call me \_\_\_\_\_

10

Message From President Johnson to President Ayub

Dear President Ayub:

Mrs. Johnson and I are distressed to hear that you are ill. We look to your early recovery.

From our good hour's talk at Karachi airport, I know how many constructive projects you have in hand and how deeply you personally are concerned with them.

So get well soon, old friend.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

ACTION

PAK

IF

Friday, February 2, 1968  
9:00 a. m.

Mr. President:

Ayub is reported down -- possibly  
with pneumonia.

A get well message might be in  
order. A possible draft is attached.

Ed Hamilton

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rin

Message From President Johnson to President Ayub

Dear President Ayub:

Mrs. Johnson and I are distressed to hear that you are ill. We look to your early recovery.

From our good hour's talk at Karachi airport, I know how many constructive projects you have in hand and how deeply you personally are concerned with them.

So get well soon, old friend.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

WWRostow:ria

1.

Friday, February 2, 1968

Mr. President:

Ben Oehlert cables from Pakistan this morning that President Ayub is ill, apparently with pneumonia. We have no details.

I suggest you approve the attached message, which gives Ben a get-well message from you to deliver when he thinks it appropriate.

W. W. Rostow

Att: dr. cable

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D R A F T C A B L E

FOR AMBASSADOR

SUBJECT: President Ayub's Illness

1. Following is text of message from President to President

Ayub:

QUOTE

Dear Mr. President:

I was most distressed when Ben Oehlert informed me that you ~~are~~ ill. I know how frustrating it is to be cooped up in a sick bed when there is important work to do. Ladybird joins me in wishing you a rapid recovery.

With warm personal regards.

Lyndon B. Johnson

UNQUOTE

2. Presidential message may be delivered whenever in your judgment it clearly appropriate.

3. Would appreciate ASAP any further details of Ayub's condition and prospects.



Pakistan *Mc Hamilton*  
Department of State

TELEGRAM

WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION  
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED

*if*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 194

3

PAGE 01 RAWALP 03131 020733Z

ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00,CCO 00,NSCE 00,MM 01,1031 W

0 020700Z JAN 68  
FM AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3049

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RAWALPINDI 3131

EXDIS

PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE FROM AMBASSADOR

1. PRESIDENT AYUB ILL. WHILE HAVE NO DETAILS, UNDERSTAND IS PNEUMONIA.
2. SUGGEST IT APPROPRIATE AND HELPFUL FOR PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO SEND QUICK RECOVERY MESSAGE.

GP-4. OEHLERT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4  
By fw, NARA, Date 4-12-93

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED  
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



PAKISTAN

EMBASSY  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
Rawalpindi, Pakistan

File

1/31/68

IK

January 31, 1968


Mr. Ed Hamilton  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ed:

Herewith the promised newsreel coverage of the President's visit to Karachi. I am sure you will understand every word of the voice-over.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

  
Benjamin H. Oehlert, Jr.  
Ambassador

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ 12  
from the desk of  
Ben Oehlert

NOTE: The enclosures (2 volumes of  
clippings, and calendar)  
mentioned on page 2 of the  
letter to the President, are  
being sent under separate  
cover.

Registration numbers are  
900185 and 900186.

*File Pak*



EMBASSY  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Rawalpindi, Pakistan

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

January 24, 1968

Mr. Ed Hamilton  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ed:

In line with your suggestions, I am enclosing a direct communication to the President. I'd appreciate it if you would deliver it.

Of course I would expect you and Walt to read it, and to attach to it any caveats of your own.


Life here is not always rosy, but it is never dull.

When the hell are you coming? We get too many visitations we neither seek nor want, but precious few we need and do want.

Bring your red flannels and your pill case. Nearly everyone here has a cold, virus, pneumonia, malaria or the trots. Most of us are ambulatory--but so are the walking dead. We're ready and eager to share our blessings.

See you soon--In'shallah.

Sincerely,

  
Benjamin H. Oehlert, Jr.  
Ambassador

Enclosure:

Letter to the President

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 9-10-01

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

File

2/

March 6, 1968

*London*  
*for*

Mr. Roger P. Morris  
Staff Member  
National Security Council  
Room 389 - Executive Office  
Building  
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Mr. Morris:

Some time ago you asked me to send you information relating to the complaint a friend of yours has concerning the closing of an Air Postal Office (APO) in Asia.

Military post offices are established to provide service for U.S. military personnel, U.S. citizen employees of the Defense Department and the dependents of these personnel. Expansion of privileges to other than these personnel and to other government agencies subjects the Defense Department to greater expense and possible withdrawal of the rights granted by foreign nations under bilateral agreements. A large number of non-military personnel do make use of the facilities in question at considerable expense to the Department of Defense. Considering the small number of Department of Defense people that these APO's serve, the Air Force feels that it can no longer justify the expense involved.

Subject to State Department regulations, most of the people affected by the closing of the APO's will be able to use the State Department diplomatic pouch for their mail. The inconvenience to your friend should, therefore, be very small.

I hope that this answers your question.

Sincerely,

*James Fish*

James Fish  
Budget Examiner



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Rawalpindi, Pakistan

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 10, 1968


Mr. Ed Hamilton  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Ed:

July 1 approaches at a pace, and not having heard anything definite from you about the APO matter about which I wrote you some time ago, I would appreciate hearing whether or not there is any chance of our continuing it on the basis of my letter. If there isn't, we will soon have to send out literally thousands of changes of address notices and I'd like to be forewarned, and in plenty of time. I will be leaving here sometime within the next two to four weeks for Washington consultations and I look forward to seeing you then.

Please give the boss my love.

Sincerely,

  
Benjamin R. Oehlert, Jr.  
Ambassador

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)  
BY fw/dck ON 4-12-93



EMBASSY  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Rawalpindi, Pakistan

~~SECRET~~-EYES ONLY

January 30, 1968

Mr. Ed Hamilton  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ed:


The announced withdrawal by March 1 of the APO facilities here was quite a blow to everyone. It represented one of the few privileges we enjoyed.

Recognizing however the pressures for economies, I had not meant to try to make a case about it to anyone until we had notice over the weekend that the deadline was being extended to June 30, which indicated that there might be some second thoughts taking place back there. Although unquestionably the Defense Department will be able to show noticeable savings by taking civilians off the APO privileges, I am not at all sure that it will be equally apparent, although it will be equally a fact, that most, perhaps all and maybe even more than the total of those savings will be shifted to the Department of State when this and other countries revert to the use of the traditional State Department pouch. Admittedly, the State Department pouch will not take over all of the traffic now being handled by APO because first, no packages from the field to the States will be handled, and second, packages from the States to the field will be sent only by surface and the size and weight of these packages will be somewhat more restricted than by APO. However, the State Department pouch will bear the expense of commercial costs, both surface and air, whereas APO is largely handled by MATs planes with very little cost added by their carrying this cargo.

I am not pleading for any special privileges, Ed, but I am suggesting that a look be taken at both sides of the coin before it is finally determined that there will be any real over-all savings sufficient to justify the great lack of convenience which will result.

With all the best to you personally, I am

Sincerely,

  
Benjamin H. Oehlert, Jr.  
Ambassador

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 9-10-01

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY



EMBASSY  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
Rawalpindi, Pakistan

CC: EH 3/  
URGENT  
P  
W

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

February 12, 1968

The Honorable  
Walt W. Rostow  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Walt:

Enclosed are some clippings from the Pak press over the weekend referring to the Indian-Russian SU-7 deal.

I believe it is fair to say that these articles are a good reflection of Pakistan's attitude at the moment and show, for the first time since I have been here, a serious questioning of Russian policy and motives.

It is my considered opinion, Walt, that this would be the ideal time for us to come forward with a few tanks for Pakistan, even if in the interest of timeliness we have to make a direct sale. I make this statement in the context not only of our relationships with Pakistan but also with India, as well as Pakistan's own relations with India, Russia, and the Chicoms.

Speaking of India, it could hardly object at this juncture to some gesture on our part toward Pakistan, and if it did, such objections would have a very hollow ring to us and to the world and even to Indian ears. More importantly, I think that a prompt response by us in the nature of some tanks for Pakistan would be a graphic illustration to India that its continued pursuit of an arms build-up would be pointless in that we would have evidenced our determination to keep an even balance in the subcontinent, thereby signalling India that it could gain no particular advantage by continuing to acquire arms and that the only results of continuing such a policy would be first, further to impoverish itself, and second, to create a dangerous power situation without accomplishing any new advantages.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, such a move on our part would clearly demonstrate our genuine interest in Pakistan and our determination to see to it that the scales are held evenly on the subcontinent. Such a move on our part would be of tremendous value in negotiating the continuation of Peshawar

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 9-10-01

and in all of our relations with Pakistan.

Such an action by us would encourage Pakistan to continue to look with questioning and distrust to Russia, feeling more secure in doing so by the knowledge that our country is indeed Pakistan's friend.

Finally, such action by us would, I think, prevent Pakistan from turning once more toward China which it may feel forced to do under all the circumstances if we cannot find a way to be helpful.

In all of this, time is of the essence. If we don't seize this opportunity at its high tide, it may disappear for a long, long time, if not forever.

With warmest personal regards, I am

Sincerely,



Benjamin H. Oehlert, Jr.  
Ambassador

Enclosure:

Clippings

## INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS—III

**SUPER POWERS' STAKES  
BOLSTER DELHI**

By H.K. Burki

OUR DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT

**I**N the period between the 1962 Indian aggression against China and the 1965 Indian attack on Pakistan, the United States used to reassure us that Delhi's arms build-up was not directed against us. Besides, they were also providing arms aid to us. After the September War, the American position shifted to the extent that Washington let it be known that U.S.-Pakistan relations had undergone a fundamental change. The final result of this was the stoppage of military aid to Pakistan last April.

It is true that as part of this new dispensation, Washington had also stopped military assistance to India. However, bearing in mind that India's major source of aid lay elsewhere and Pakistan was heavily dependent on the United States, Washington's decision put us at a grave disadvantage. The United States was, of course, not oblivious of this and it took the drastic step to actuate a policy which had crystallised in 1965. It had decided to abandon the earlier concept of a balance of power in the Sub-Continent which Selig Harrison has described as "arbitrarily determined," and to allow India "to realise its natural margin of economic and military superiority over Pakistan."

In the post 1965 period, the United States has finally decided that India must be helped to find her "natural" level of power. The British who have a major economic stake in India, were already operating on that assumption.

**SOVIET  
BACKING**

The Soviet Union and some of her East European allies have had close political and economic ties with India since the early Fifties. If Moscow had shown some displeasure with India during last year because of the Right-wing tendencies, it, apparently, has smoothed out its misgivings. The decision to supply SU-7 aircraft to India and Mr. Kosygin's recent official visit to Delhi are indicative of a happy relationship.

The Soviet Union has backed India constantly in the past because of a certain affinity in positions taken on international issues. Moscow bristled at Pakistan because of its defence ties with the West. In the Sixties, Russia has found an additional reason for backing India: its own feud with China coinciding with Delhi's conflict with Peking.

On top of this has now come the British announcement that London would pull out its forces east of Suez. The Russians may not subscribe to the vacuum theory but they must be apprehensive that the British presence might change into an American presence. Thus, it would suit their purpose if India were to become powerful enough to need no American presence in the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet Union and the United States and the 'Mini' Britain, it would appear, are all agreed that India should become the cock of the South Asian walk. Naturally they would also like to retain as great a measure of influence as they can in Pakistan also, if for no other reason than to counter the growth of China's relations with us. But they have all demonstrated by their concentration on India that their relations with Pakistan cannot be allowed to frustrate Delhi's aspirations in the region which they themselves have endorsed and underwritten with enormous economic, military and food assistance.

The United States and the Soviet Union would like to see India emerge a strong regional power. It is conceiv-

able that neither of them want to see India become a world power and, therefore, a potential competitor on the global stage. But India has already the industrial, economic, military and nuclear base, and once she has overcome her present food difficulties, she could move rapidly towards becoming a Big Power, irrespective of what the Super Powers desires may be.

Even if the Super Powers were able to restrict India to the strength of a regional power this would be no comfort to Pakistan. It is Pakistan's bitter experience that the more powerful India becomes the more belligerent its attitude to Pakistan. As it is, Delhi is tightening its stranglehold on Kashmir and trying to brutalise the Kashmiri people into submission and servitude. The acquisition of more military power would tempt Delhi into bullying Pakistan into submission.

Pakistan, as President Ayub has pointed out in his political autobiography, has never had any illusions about its role in the region. Its only concern has been to survive an hostile India and try to prosper as an independent country. Since to the extent Pakistan succeeds in its endeavours it frustrates in that measure India's plans to undo the partition, Delhi's hostility and intransigence towards us increases correspondingly. At the same time, India has been trying to acquire a more decisive military strength to deal Pakistan a mortal blow at a suitable time

As it has been demonstrated for 20 years, no Pakistani would like to see the Kashmiri people deprived for ever of their right to decide their own future, much less become the subjects of a state which is subservient to Hindu India. The Super Powers cannot be unaware of this, but they seem to be working on the assumption that once

India has fully established an overwhelming preponderance of power, Pakistan would be forced to accept its lot as an Indian satellite.

### LINK WITH CHINA

In the past two years, there has been many turns and twists of Big Power politics. Their one constant aim has been to bring about an Indo-Pakistan patch-up on the basis of the 'status quo' and then wean Pakistan away from the People's Republic of China. If Pakistan has refused to fall into this trap it is not because it has some blind love for China. Pakistan's relations with China are friendly because the two countries' basic interests coincide. The Chinese are sympathetic to peoples of all the newly-independent countries who have been victims of colonialism. What is more, they believe that Pakistan's case vis-a-vis India and Kashmir is just, and they have demonstrated their willingness to back this up with concrete steps.

No Pakistani in his proper senses would want to deliberately provoke hostility with any of the Big Powers. The difficulty lies in that it does not depend on Pakistan alone, as to what kind of relations it has with them. In view of India's abiding hostility towards Pakistan and her ever-growing military power, we may have to re-evaluate our current defence capacity and our long-term needs. At the same time, Pakistan has to be constantly on its guard against political and diplomatic manoeuvres of the Super Powers. Fortunately, they accept, as no less a person than President Ayub himself has told us, Pakistan's policy of balance. But if any of them should ever force us to make a choice between them and China our vital national interests demand that we preserve our links with the People's Republic.

(Concluded)

## MEN AND MATTERS

**WHAT IS FOREIGN POLICY?**

By Z. A. Suleri

Views expressed in this column do not necessarily represent those of The Pakistan Times.

**M**R. Bhutto has markiy — and repeatedly — hinted that he would expose the secrets of the Tashkent Declaration. Why is he holding this Damocles sword over the head of the people, only he knows best. He had however an excellent opportunity of unburdening himself when Khwaja Shahabuddin challenged him to a public debate which he declined. Normally an ex-minister does not exploit the knowledge he acquires during his term of office. And though some one who resigns on a difference of policy may take the public into confidence, the privilege is not open to Mr. Bhutto. He went much after the Summit at Tashkent and not only did he participate in it but also signed the document which he defended and applauded with characteristic aplomb.

There are two different aspects of the Tashkent Declaration. One, whether it was correct to subscribe to it. Two, whether it has issued in a readjustment of Pak-India relations. There can be no hesitation in returning an affirmative answer to the first question. The alternative was either to continue the war or to keep dug in on the fighting fronts. If the one was not possible and practicable the other was futile and dangerous. If therefore normalisation was the obvious objective, it had to be achieved and the Security Council was in no position to do so. That is precisely where the Soviet initiative came in useful. The withdrawal of troops took place according to a strict time table. If we compare our situation with the one in the Middle East, the significance of the achievement is forcefully brought to view.

**INDIA'S DISRESPECT**

That the Indians have not followed the provisions of the Declaration in terms of arriving at a solution of the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan, is undeniable. But where is the surprise? Don't we know our Indians? It is not the first time that they have broken faith. We have 20 years' experience of dealing with them, directly or indirectly. All that it amounts to is that the list of failures has been lengthened by yet another instance of Indian intransigence. That does not however mean that we should not have made the try. But one gain cannot be wiped out. To India's perfidy has been added a powerful witness. We have acquired a new equation with the Soviet Union in this respect.

However treacherously India may behave, it is not the end of the matter. The field of effort has not been closed to us. Moreover the people of Kashmir and Jammu will never rest content with their present lot. The state is no bed of roses for the Indian tyrant and reports from Srinagar indicate that the struggle for freedom is daily increasing in intensity.

The real point is where do we go from here? Now, although salvation of Kashmir is the most cherished goal of our foreign policy, it can only be sought within its scope. And the reach of this scope depends on Pakistan's position in world affairs generally. As the lesson should have been burnt into our hearts during the last two decades, the pull and direction of a country, cannot be circumscribed by and dovetailed to the strait-jacket of any final and per-

manent definition. Whether the country moves within the larger context of alliances or narrower precincts of detachment, the governing criterion is the advancement of national interests. What course of action do they dictate?

The line which so emerges defies all pre-conceptions of attitudinisation. The post-war period started on grandiloquent enunciations of ideological confrontation. The East and West were polarised. The rest of the world was called upon to choose between one side or other. "Neutralism is immoral" was the Dullesian edict. But the fierceness of the cold war which appeared to have the proportions of an eternal conflict did not last even 10 years. National interests supervened either way. While on the one hand the prospects of peaceful co-existence opened up for the U.S. and USSR, on the other a split tore asunder the brotherly bonds between the Soviet Union and China. Our own ideological assumptions towards forging Muslim unity came to grief. We might have extricated RCD out of the ruins but it has no teeth.

#### AMERICA'S BEST GAMBIT

More than that. Not only must a foreign policy be free from ideological entanglements were it to reflect national interests truly, it must be for most part expedient. Pakistan's pacts with the United States and membership of the Baghdad Pact—later CENTO—lost all point after the Russian-American detente even though we clung to the illusion of their reality—hence our protestations. Britain decided on withdrawal from Singapore and the Persian Gulf despite solemn commitment to the East of Suez position. America plumped for a climb-down in the "Pueblo" affair (President Johnson had declared the seizure to be an act of war) to an extent that its ally in South Korea has felt let down. The news put out by Viet Cong about American feelers for a coalition government in Saigon cannot be dismissed out of hand despite official contradiction. The "Times" Correspondent there affirmed that it was current even before it was broadcast and it makes sense from Washington's point of view. Reduced to their present strait, dividing the NLF from Hanoi is America's best

gambit. Foreign policy is cruelly amoral and cynical.

The smaller countries' elbow room for manoeuvrability is severely constricted by the pervading yet changing interests of the super-powers. The circumstances are especially agonising for Pakistan. Let us face the facts that international trends are against it. However friendly the U.S. and USSR may be to us, their global strategy favours India because it is on the same wave-length with them against China. The Arab debacle in the Middle East has accentuated the value of India's presence in the Indian Ocean. If strengthening of its air force is purposive in one direction, augmenting its naval force is addressed to the other direction. And if Indian enmity to Pakistan is implacable—as we believe it to be—then these developments cannot be lost upon us. We are truly at bay.

What kind of posture do these circumstances allow us? It is not merely the compulsion of our geopolitical position that we befriend the three Powers, the U.S., USSR and China, it is also necessary that while on the one hand we maintain a rapport with Washington and Moscow in the hope of exerting some restraint on them against adopting an extreme policy of support to India, on the other our relations with Peking are calculated not to allow Delhi a free and upper hand in this region. The attitude cannot however be rigid. It must not pin us down to fixed points. Rather we should behave as if we have demarcated for ourselves an area within whose bounds we can freely move. Inclination to one side in the event of pressure from the other is inevitable.

#### TACKLING OF DETAILS

But when all is said and done, it is not the general concepts, however lucidly enunciated, which will determine the outcome. The nub of success lies in a successful tackling of details which arise in the humdrum of daily routine. The matter must ultimately rest with the functionaries. With what insight a line on a certain issue is defined at home, with what conviction it is carried out abroad. It is their calibre for vigilance and comprehension which is most crucially involved. Mr. Bhutto was Foreign Minister for a sufficiently long time to understand the delicacy and intricacy of conducting a foreign policy. Should he not be more circumspect than others in his utterances on the subject?

# Kosygin's visit still uncertain

Pakistan Times, February 11, 1968

## JETS FOR INDIA PLANNED STEP

From H. K. BURKI  
OUR DIPLOMATIC  
CORRESPONDENT

ISLAMABAD, Feb. 10:  
So far there is no indication if and when the Soviet leaders will visit Pakistan.

Russian sources take the line that dates of such a visit have to be suggested by Pakistan. Actually, it is up to the Russians themselves to indicate when they would or would not like to come, and this, unlike last year, they have not done.

In a way, recent developments may have undermined the chances of a Soviet visit to Pakistan in the near future. After all, the agreement to supply India the SU-7 fighter-bombers has not exactly thrilled Pakistan.

It is not known whether or not Pakistan has protested to the Soviet Union. Even if it does, Moscow is not going to cancel the deal with India. The Russians agreed to provide India new means of aggression with open eyes, for they knew well enough what its effect on Pakistan would be. Apart from all the diplomatic representations and public statements, President Ayub, during his visit to Moscow last September, had personally conveyed to the Soviet leaders Pakistan's apprehensions regarding the growing military imbalance in the sub-continent.

Clearly the Soviet decision regarding the SU-7 planes forms part of a meticulously-conceived and finely calculated policy towards the sub-continent. For this decision was no isolated step.

Quite apart from Mr. Kosygin's six-day official visit, a high-level Russian naval mission has arrived in Delhi. The conclusion may be drawn from this that there has been some major new understanding between Moscow and Delhi.

In achieving an understanding with India, the Soviet Union has been taking steps which seemed to fit in a pattern. In this respect, Moscow has been fairly consistent since at least the Tashkent Declaration.

During her visit to Washington in 1966, Mrs. Indira Gandhi made some remarks in

Continued on back page, col. 7

## RUSSIAN POLICY OBJECTIVES

(Continued from page 1)  
approval of President Johnson's Vietnam policy and also accepted certain modifications in her economic policies.

The Russians were, naturally, offended. So, before they received Mrs. Gandhi in Moscow, the Russians invited a defence mission from Pakistan on a tour. Thus, they were able to extract from Mrs. Gandhi a joint communique statement on Vietnam more in keeping with their own point of view.

Last year, the elections in India revealed a marked right-wing trend not only among the Opposition but also within the Congress itself. Mrs. Indira Gandhi herself and the progressives in the Congress generally seemed in danger of an ouster. Then the Russians invited Foreign Minister Sharifuddin Pirzada which led to President Ayub's own tour of Moscow.

The concrete outcome of the Ayub-Kosygin talks was the Russian pledge of economic assistance till 1975. However, there were also some talks on the possibility of the sale of Soviet weapons. So Mrs. Gandhi rushed to the 50th Anniversary celebrations in Moscow.

All this Russian cat-and-mouse game finally culminat-

ing in some new understanding with India does not mean that the Soviet Union has turned hostile to Pakistan. It means that Moscow has been successful in pursuing its own policy objectives. For the Russians have all along been emphasising to Pakistan that instead of acquiring weapons and insisting on a solution of the Kashmir dispute, it should devote its efforts and energies to economic development.

### GOOD REASON

If this Russian advice to Pakistan sounds remarkably like the American recipe, there is a good reason for it. For example, when President Ayub went to Washington in December 1965, President Johnson's Press Secretary had told correspondents that the United States fully supported the Russian initiative in calling the Tashkent Conference.

Then again, the American policy announcement, last April, about the termination of military aid to Pakistan was immediately followed by a postponement of Soviet leaders' visit to Pakistan. The Russians had known that the question of arms supply would be raised by Pakistan as indeed it was during President Ayub's visit to Moscow later in the year.

PRESERVATION COPY

# SU-7 deal will increase imbalance

## PAKISTAN TO REMAIN VIGILANT, SAYS PIRZADA

KARACHI, Feb. 10: The Foreign Minister, Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, said here today that the supply of Soviet bombers to India will further widen the military imbalance and accentuate arms race between Pakistan and India.

In a statement the Foreign Minister said that the acquisition of more than 100 SU-7 supersonic jet fighter bombers and sophisticated equipment by India has caused widespread concern in Pakistan.

He said that the feverish pace at which India had been building up her arms strength through procurement of military hardware from abroad and the increase of its indigenous production capacity was already well known.

### DETRIMENTAL

The Foreign Minister expressed the hope that the leaders of the Soviet Union and other "interested Powers would realise that accretion of India's military strength could only work to the detriment of establishing friendly relations between India and Pakistan."

Mr. Pirzada said: "Pakistan continues to be and will always remain vigilant about its security, defence, and territorial integrity. The Government will take whatever steps were considered necessary."

The following is the text of the statement: "The acquisition of more than 100 SU-7 supersonic jet fighter bombers

### PIRZADA

(Continued from page 1)

and other sophisticated equipment by India has caused widespread concern in Pakistan. The feverish pace at which India has been building up her arms strength through procurement of military hardware from abroad and the increase of its indigenous production capacity is already well known.

"This will further widen the military imbalance between India and Pakistan and thereby contribute to threatening the arms race between them to the detriment of their economic development.

The Soviet Union is known to be deeply interested in the settlement of outstanding disputes through peaceful means and the establishment of friendly relations between the two countries. We hope the leaders of the Soviet Union as well as of other interested Powers would realise that accretion to India's military strength could only work to the detriment of this objective.

Pakistan continues to be and will always remain vigilant about its security, defence and territorial integrity. The Government will take whatever steps are considered necessary."—APP.

February 6, 1968

Mr. Hamilton

Ed. -- Mr. Rostow said "we have to get Ayub some tanks or he won't get well."

LN

*1 - Pakistan  
Tanks*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

PAK - 4  
FEB 8 1968

OFFICE OF  
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Pakistan - PL 480 Agreement - Symington Amendment

On December 28, 1967, you authorized us to accept the PL 480 proposal of the Government of Pakistan comprising 100,000 metric tons of wheat under CCC credit and 400,000 metric tons under Title I. You also authorized Ambassador Oehlert to try to negotiate another 500,000 metric tons arrangement along the same lines. The Ambassador is now seeking the appropriate moment to begin discussions on the second deal. Meanwhile, we are proceeding with the first package which will provide Pakistan's grain requirements for stock building. Before negotiating this agreement it was necessary to conduct a review on the applicability of the Symington Amendment (Section 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act). On the basis of available information, our conclusion is that we are not required to determine that Pakistan is diverting its resources to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which would materially affect its development. A brief statement on this subject is enclosed. We are, however, continuing our review of the possible applicability of the Symington Amendment to Pakistan in the future, and also of the Conte-Long Amendment (Section 119 of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act) which does not directly affect PL 480. Procedures for administering our development assistance and PL 480 sales assistance assure that this assistance will not be diverted to military expenditures.

We will ask Ambassador Oehlert in connection with the signing of the PL 480 agreement, to seek assurances at the appropriate policy level that it is and will continue to be GOP's policy (as Ayub has earlier assured us) to devote increasing proportions of the total GOP budget to economic and social investment and other non-military purposes barring a major change in Pak security situation.

*William S. Gaud*  
William S. Gaud

Enclosure:

1. Detailed review

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines, AIO guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 9-10-01

Review of Proposed PL 480 Agreement for Pakistan  
Section 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act as Amended

Pakistan's defense expenditures are high, representing 21.3 per cent of government expenditures in the FY 1968 budget and 3.5 per cent of the Gross National Product. The defense budget, however, has been on a downward trend during the past three years. Pakistan's primary security concern is what it considers a continuing and credible threat from India. As a result of the Chinese incursion India's defense allocation went from \$996 million in FY 1963 to \$1,695 million in FY 1964 (a 70 per cent increase), and since that time has increased slightly. Despite Pakistan's concern, during FY 1964 and 1965 it only increased military expenditures from \$216 million to \$282 million. In reaction to the conflict with India in 1965 and the termination of the U.S. Military Assistance Program, Pakistan raised defense expenditures sharply. In FY 1966 the defense budget escalated to \$617 million and accounted for 32.7 per cent of central government spending. In FY 1967, however, defense expenditures were reduced by 20 per cent and in FY 1968 by another 3% to the present budget level of \$475 million. Thus, while Pakistan is not attempting to achieve military parity with India, it does believe that it must maintain an adequate defense posture.

As in the case of overall defense levels, foreign exchange outlays have decreased over the past three years. Rising to a high of approximately \$140 million in FY 1966, they were reduced to about \$100 million in FY 1967 and will be around \$85 million in FY 1968. At this level the actual cost of defense imports is approximately the same as between 1961 and 1965 when an average of \$45 million annually was provided under the U.S. Military Assistance Program and Pakistan spent up to \$30 million for defense from its own foreign exchange.

Part of the defense expenditures, particularly the foreign exchange component, could clearly be used for development. Nonetheless Pakistan has been able to restore a high priority to development spending. Annual fixed investment, consisting of government financed development projects and private investment, fell from \$2 billion in FY 1965 to \$1.87 billion in FY 1966. In FY 1968 fixed investment will be up to \$2.3 billion and represent 16.1% of the GNP.

Even prior to the enactment of the recent legislation on defense expenditures of aid recipients, we made it clear to the Governments of Pakistan and India that if defense expenditures remain at such a high level it will become increasingly difficult for the U.S. to support their development programs. The IBRD consortium has also urged limitation of defense expenditures. Despite the public emotions generated by the war with India, President Ayub has assumed the political risk of cutting the defense budget back toward the level of FY 1965. While we are not fully satisfied with the situation on the South Asian Subcontinent, we believe that Pakistan has been responsive to our representations and once again is devoting its primary attention to development.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

*Hold for Rostow  
5a*

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, December 21, 1967 -- PM

WWR:

SUBJECT: Tanks for Pakistan

As you review the wreckage wrought during your absence, you should include the fact that we have had another round with Ayub on the question of U. S. permission for him to buy 100 U. S. -made tanks from some third country.

You will recall that we gave Ayub the go-ahead a couple of months ago to sound out possible sellers. He did so and came up with quasi-offers from Italy, Belgium and Iran. There are important differences in the details of the offers, but only two points worth your time:

1. The Italian deal would be largely -- and perhaps entirely -- comprised of German M-47's sold to Italy especially for resale to the Paks. As a matter of principle, we aren't overjoyed to see three-cornered arrangements of this kind because of the precedent. And you will recall the flurry last spring when the Germans found it politically necessary to back off on an earlier tank deal with Pakistan when it became publicly known that a sale was being arranged.
2. The Iranian offer runs athwart our efforts to get the Shah not to replace his fleet of M-47's as quickly and expensively as he would prefer. We are also unhappy at the prospect of Iran as a source because it reinforces the Indian view (upon which they based much of their policy in the Middle East) that Pakistan and Iran are one anti-entity for military purposes, and anything done for either strengthens the threat against India.

The Paks have given us a rundown of these offers and we have checked with the other <sup>end</sup> and found their reports accurate with minor exceptions. They have asked us whether we are prepared to proceed, noting that their preference order among suppliers is Iran, Belgium and Italy.

We face three issues: (1) Should we agree to the sale? (2) If we agree, what is the best timing? (3) Do we have any strong preference among suppliers?

Should we allow the sale? The Paks have agreed to all the conditions -- principally that the new tanks be for replacement only -- required to make this sale fall legitimately within our military supply policy for South Asia. Oehlert believes, probably rightly, that U. S. failure to agree to this bargain would undercut all the objectives

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 01-295  
By *is* NARA, Date 1-6-03

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

at which that policy is aimed -- from restraining influence on Pakistani defense spending to keeping the Paks from becoming solely dependent on the Soviets and the Chinese for arms. It is also clear that our response will have some bearing on renewal of our lease on the critical Peshawar intelligence facility which must be negotiated in 1968. The Paks have already given us some broad hints on this score. We are being careful to reject them as a matter of diplomatic form, but there is no question that the renewal of Peshawar is a counter in this game.

Obviously, the arguments on the other side start with the Congress and its attitude toward arms sales. Everybody knows who the Paks think they need tanks to defend themselves against, and nobody is anxious to fuel the glowing embers in South Asia. This proposal may also involve the domestic and foreign policy problems associated with a Presidential determination under the Conte amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act that this tank purchase is vital to U.S. security. Although Pakistan still has friends on the Hill -- and tanks aren't as incendiary as jet aircraft -- the transaction could cause some trouble for the Aid Bill.

On balance, the consensus in State, up to and including Katzenbach, is that we should allow the sale. I support that conclusion. I think the only way to make our military supply policy work is to follow it, and this proposal is clearly consistent with that policy.

What about timing? This tank request has been in the works for more than a year. (In fact, the actual request is for 200 tanks, but we have steadfastly maintained that we can only talk about 100 now.) Ayub is trying to place the order in the West. He can probably get newer, more sophisticated and more expensive tanks from the British and the French, and has already had several conversations with Vickers. If he doesn't get an answer soon, he will probably have to go to the Chinese. Our period of decision is probably no more than three months at best, and Ayub is anxious for an immediate judgment.

Thus, the question reduces to whether we do it in the next month or after the Congress returns. All hands are agreed that it is better to do it sooner than later.

Which supplier do we prefer? We would clearly prefer either of the European suppliers over Iran. The Italian offer is better than the Belgian in terms of price and type of equipment, but it has the complication that the tanks would really come from Germany -- a fact which undoubtedly would become known to interested journalists. The Belgian price is high and the time of refitting for Pakistan is uncertain. (The latter is no problem for us, but it is a considerable problem for Ayub.)

I don't think we should waste much capital trying to tell Ayub which European we prefer. The important points are (1) we would rather not see a deal made with Iran, and (2) any parties to a three-cornered bargain should understand that, if asked later, we would have to acknowledge that we knew that the first tank transfer


~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

(Germany to Italy) was for the express purpose of resale to Pakistan, however unpleasant it may be for the Germans to have that said out loud.

Action Taken: I cleared off today on the message at Tab A which reflects the above conclusions. It does not convey a final decision to approve a deal. But it does instruct Oehlert to suggest that the Paks work out a bargain with a single, hopefully European, supplier.

The President will have a final shot at this question when we are faced with the decision of whether to approve a specific proposition put to us by one of the suppliers.



Ed Hamilton

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

4772

5b

December 20, 1967  
Date

Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
The White House

*Adm. Sec. Helen Brown  
12/21 10:25 am*

The enclosed is for White House  
clearance prior to transmission.

*[Signature]*  
for Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:  
Tel to RAWALPINDI re Military Supply,  
M-47 Tanks, and Peshawar

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION

*OK for clearance  
[Signature]  
12-21-67*

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY ju ON 4-12-93

4772  
+ Hamilton  
2-Ret  
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Ambassy RAWALPINDI IMMEDIATE

INFO: Embassy TEHRAN  
ROME  
CINCOSITRE  
CINCEUR  
Ambassy BRUSSELS  
BONN

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25 # 473  
By jc NARA, Date 9-10-01

STATE \_\_\_\_\_

EXDIS

REF (NOTAL): (a) Rawalpindi 1269; (b) State 61581; (c) Karachi 807;  
(d) Rawalpindi 1724; (e) Rome 3061; (f) Teheran 2471  
(g) Rawalpindi 2279; (h) Teheran 2502; (i) Bonn 6251  
(j) Rawalpindi 2019 (k) Teheran 2563

SUBJECT: Military Supply, M-47 Tanks, and Peshawar

1. While some loose ends remain, principal pieces involved in Pak tank problem now seem on table. We wish to (a) move to decision ASAP and (b) avoid possibility of misunderstanding among several parties involved in complicated procedure.

US position must rest on following basic points, which Embassy Rawalpindi authorized convey (except as noted FYI). to COP.

2. We are prepared in first instance to act only on up to 100 tanks and request to us from any seller country should be so presented. ~~When contractual agreements are completed for the first 100 tanks, we would be willing to consider other requests including second 100 tanks~~ ~~When contractual agreements are completed for the first 100 tanks, we would be willing to consider other requests including second 100 tanks~~ ~~When contractual agreements are completed for the first 100 tanks, we would be willing to consider other requests including second 100 tanks~~ This is as responsive as we can be at this time.

NEA/PAP:JWSpain:atm  
G/PM:LDJunior 12/15/67 6671

NEA/INC - Mr. Heck  
NEA/ISA - Mr. Eliot  
G/PM - Mr. Wolf (draft)  
NEA - Mr. Rockwell  
EUR/GEN - Mr. Crowley  
EUR/AIS - Mr. Stabler  
EUR/FBK - Mr. Beigel  
NEA - Mr. Battle

The Under Secretary  
DOD/ISA - Gen. Newcomer (draft)  
DOD/ISA - ~~XXXXXX~~ Maj. Wix (draft)  
AID/NEA - Mr. Williams  
S/S  
WHITE HOUSE



~~SECRET~~

commitments because of Congressional action. In our efforts to persuade ~~commitments because of Congressional action. In our efforts to persuade the GOI to~~  
 the GOI to reduce the scale ~~of its military program, we believe we have been successful in~~  
 persuading the Shah at least tentatively to avoid heavy expenditures for new tanks  
 by rehabilitating older M-47s. We cannot, therefore, approve Iranian tank sales to  
 Pakistan and an Iranian request would be extremely embarrassing to us at this time. /  
 EHO FYI

7. Information we have to date on European sources, costs, condition of tanks and  
 delivery times is as yet incomplete and in part contradictory. Subject to closer  
 look when more facts are in, terms offered to date do not seem preclude our approval  
 of sale.

8. Should GOP wish us act on Italian proposal, it will be necessary clarify dis-  
 crepancies between ref f, para 2, in which first 50 tanks are said to be Italian  
 owned with remainder to be procured from Germany and ref e, para 1b, which indicates  
 all tanks to be from surplus stocks in Germany. We do not exclude possibility of  
 Italy acquiring and rehabilitating up to 100 German tanks for GOP, but all parties  
 concerned should understand before the event that if later pressed we will have to  
 indicate we knew and agreed that tanks sold by FRG to Italy were to facilitate Italian  
 sale to Pakistan

9. FYI: Re possible FRG role, we note (ref i) that FCNOFF now considering whether  
 Cabinet and Bundestag might agree to direct sale tanks to Pakistan. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~  
 We would appreciate  
~~XX~~ Embassy Bonn's  
 prognosis. EHO FYI

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RAWALPINDI

10. Paks stated second preference as M-47 source, Belgium, might be most acceptable from all points of view. If GOP seriously interested it should stimulate Belgian request to USG, complete with info on costs, condition of tanks, and projected delivery schedule. FYI: If current negotiations with Italians for cooperative logistics agreement are successful, we might prefer Italians as best source. END FYI

11. In sum, if GOP wants ~~immediate~~ action on tanks, it should: (a) promptly ~~and~~ unequivocally confirm assurances paras 3 and 4 above; (b) cast request in terms of 100 M-47s; (c) select optimum supply source, hopefully giving full weight to foregoing considerations; and (d) get source government to submit request to USG for approval to sell to GOP, such request to be accompanied by data on costs, condition of tanks, financing terms and delivery schedules to permit our ~~prompt~~ response. FYI: We would prefer not to be faced at the same time with active requests from more than one country. END FYI

President Ayub or

12. FYI: We assure you will probably wish make above points to ~~Mr~~ Khan who has represented GOP in bulk of discussion this subject. We expect, however, to be filling in Pak Embassy here as well and wonder if it would not be good idea for you to touch base with MPA (perhaps Pirzada himself) in Rawalpindi also. Our views re connection between military supply and Peshawar which has appeared in discussions with Admiral Khan (refs a and f) follow in septel which should be read with this message as guidance for further handling that matter. END FYI

GP-1

END

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August 29, 1967

WWR

SUBJECT: Tanks for Pakistan

You asked for a status report on Oehlert's recommendation that we agree to let the Paks buy 100 tanks.

Taking Pakistan alone, the merits of this proposal are pretty clear. Our general posture on Indo-Pakistani arms is (1) to sell nothing directly except spare parts, (2) to oppose any move which unreasonably diverts money from development, (3) to avoid upsetting the balance between the two countries. Therefore, this is not a proposal that we furnish the tanks ourselves; it is that we authorize the Paks to purchase American-built tanks somewhere else.

Moreover, it is pretty clear that these tanks are in fact for replacement purposes, that they would not effect the balance of Indian-Pakistani forces and that they are reasonable military expenditures rather than diversion from development. In any case, it is crystal clear that the Paks will buy elsewhere if American tanks are not available. For all these reasons, there is no dissent -- even in Delhi -- from the proposition that the tank purchase would be a good idea.

This is the second round. The Paks first made the request in May and State worked hard on getting the Germans to agree to make the sale. Just when things looked set, however, it leaked to the press and the Germans felt compelled to issue a public denial which effectively queered the deal.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 01-295  
By is, NARA, Date 1-6-03

Early in August, the Paks upped the ante to 200 tanks. Oehlert is specifically reserving judgment on the extra 100. But the effect of increasing the request is to accent the urgency the Paks attach to it and the likelihood that they will conclude they will have to deal with the Russians or Chinese. In my judgment, even that would not be grounds for suicide -- particularly if we are about to lose our authority to sell arms on credit terms, but Oehlert feels strongly that it would cut him off at the knees in terms of influence with Ayub.

There are two simple problems:

- when to play this card with the Paks.
- how to handle the Congress.

#### When to play this card

Aside from the usual AID problems, UN issues, etc., the major negotiation with Pakistan coming up next year is renewal of the agreement underlying the big U.S. intelligence facility at Pshawar. The current agreement expires in June. One could play the tank deal in two ways: do it very soon, ostentatiously not connecting it directly with Pshawar but counting on it to include the atmosphere; or make the tank part clearly dependent on the outcome of Pshawar by holding it up until spring. Oehlert was biased before he went to Pakistan, was to hold the tanks as long as possible (he even asked for and received the President's permission to follow that line.) Having arrived, he was apparently directed that (1) the tank deal is chicken feed when compared with Pshawar, and (2) it is better to play Ayub in subtler negotiating terms than to try to hit him over the head with a particular club.

The consensus here -- which I share -- is that Oehlert's new perception of the problem is probably right. This does not mean that he has to make the bargain within the next two weeks or even the next two months. It does mean that he probably should not hold off beyond winter.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

EH - What is  
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8/28/67

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**SUMMARY**

new?  
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PAGE 01 RAWALP 00582 251742Z

53  
ACTION NEA 19

INFO EUR 25, EA 19, GPM 03, SC 01, PSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, NSAE 00,  
L 03, INR 07, P 04, CIA 04, DOD 01, SP 02, SS 35, ACDA 17, AID 30, MC 01,  
GDP 01, IO 21, RSR 01, /219 W

P R 251330Z AUG 67  
FM AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2215  
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN 30  
CINCSLTIKE USCINCPACAFSA  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 73  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 342  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 108  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 688

~~SECRET~~ RAWALPINDI 0582

SUBJECT: PAK TANK PURCHASE REQUEST

1. MY INITIAL REVIEW OF PROBLEMS AN OPPORTUNITIES FOR US  
IN PAKISTAN INDICATES THE MOST IMMEDIATE AND PRESSING MATTER  
TO BE PENDING GOP REQUEST FOR US AUTHORIZATION TO PURCHASE  
US MODEL M 47/48 TANKS FROM WHATEVER SOURCE USG MAY INDICATE.  
I HAVE EXAMINED THIS REQUEST AGAINST BACKGROUND OF BEST  
AVAILABLE DATA ON PAK AND INDIAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND  
SUPPLY PROSPECTS AND IN LIGHT OF US MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY.  
I AM SATISFIED THAT ACQUISITION BY PAKISTAN OF 100 M 47/48  
TANKS WOULD MEET LEGITIMATE PAK DEFENSE REQUIREMENT AND BE IN  
US INTEREST. I LEAVE OPEN MY JUDGMENT ON EXPRESS GOP DESIRE  
FOR MORE THAN 100 SUCH TANKS. I DO, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT  
EXPEDITIOUS AND FAVORABLE USG ACTION ON 100 TANKS IS HIGHLY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 01-296

By cbm, NARA, Date 8-10-04

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 RAWALP 00582 251742Z

PAGE 2 RUQVGM 0582 ~~SECRET~~  
DESIRABLE.

2. IT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IF I WERE ABLE TO INDICATE SUCH A DECISION TO PRESIDENT AYUB AT THE MEETING I PLAN TO REQUEST WITH HIM THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 11, PURSUANT TO STATE 23712 AND BEFORE HIS VISIT TO THE USSR BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 25.

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PAGE 3 RUQVGM 0582 ~~SECRET~~

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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SUMMARY

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ACTION NEA 19

INFO EUR 25, EA 19, GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, NSAE 00,  
L 03, INR 07, P 04, CIA 04, DOD 01, SP 02, SS 35, ACDA 17, AID 30, MC 01,  
GDP 01, IO 21, RSR 01, /219 W

- BATOR
- BOWDLER
- BUDGET
- DAVIS
- GINSBURGH
- HAMILTON
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- JORDAN
- KEENEY

P R 251330Z AUG 67  
FM AMEMPASSY RAWALPINDI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2215  
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN 50  
CINCSLTIKE USCINCPACAFSA  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 73  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 342  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 108  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 688

~~SECRET~~ RAWALPINDI 0582

SUBJECT: PAK TANK PURCHASE REQUEST

1. MY INITIAL REVIEW OF PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR US IN PAKISTAN INDICATES THE MOST IMMEDIATE AND PRESSING MATTER TO BE PENDING GOP REQUEST FOR US AUTHORIZATION TO PURCHASE US MODEL M 47/48 TANKS FROM WHATEVER SOURCE USG MAY INDICATE. I HAVE EXAMINED THIS REQUEST AGAINST BACKGROUND OF BEST AVAILABLE DATA ON PAK AND INDIAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND SUPPLY PROSPECTS AND IN LIGHT OF US MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY. I AM SATISFIED THAT ACQUISITION BY PAKISTAN OF 100 M 47/48 TANKS WOULD MEET LEGITIMATE PAK DEFENSE REQUIREMENT AND BE IN US INTEREST. I LEAVE OPEN MY JUDGMENT ON EXPRESS GOP DESIRE FOR MORE THAN 100 SUCH TANKS. I DO, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT EXPEDITIOUS AND FAVORABLE USG ACTION ON 100 TANKS IS HIGHLY

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By cbm, NARA, Date 8-10-04



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