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ACDA 3047/Final Draft

THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY DURING THE  
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION (U)

## II. POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS

### G. COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

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## COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

### Background<sup>1</sup>

It was impossible to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty in 1963 because of differences between the United States and the Soviet Union on the problem of verifying an underground test ban. The United States considered that a significant number of underground events could not be identified as earthquakes or explosions on the basis of their seismic signals alone. In our view, it would therefore be necessary to conduct a limited number of on-site inspections each year in order to deter or detect violations of an underground test ban. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, claimed that national means of detection were sufficient and that no on-site inspections were needed.

After the Cuban missile crisis (1962), Premier Khrushchev offered President Kennedy two or three on-site inspections a year as a political concession. The Soviet Union also

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<sup>1</sup>See Review of International Negotiations on the Cessation of Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 1962-September 1965 (ACDA pub. 32, 1966).

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offered to agree to three automatic seismic stations on the territory of the nuclear powers. In later negotiations, they refused to budge from these numbers. In a memorandum of April 1, 1963, the United States and the United Kingdom proposed seven automatic seismic stations and an annual quota of seven on-site inspections. They also outlined the procedures they proposed for carrying out inspections. Since no further progress was possible on banning underground tests, they were excluded from the limited test-ban treaty of August 5, 1963, which prohibited tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater.

After the treaty was signed, the Soviet Union withdrew the Khrushchev offer of two or three inspections. It continued to advocate a comprehensive test ban but maintained that it could be verified by national seismic means and that no inspections were needed. The United States also supported a comprehensive test ban on the basis of the April 1 memorandum. President Johnson included the comprehensive test ban in his 1964 program.

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The non-nuclear nations generally continued to advocate a comprehensive test ban. Sweden wished to improve the international exchange of seismic data and suggested a "detection club." In the 1964 negotiations all nonaligned members of the ENDC except Sweden and Ethiopia, expressed support for a "threshold" treaty which would ban all tests above the level - usually estimated at 4.75 seismic magnitude - at which they could be detected and identified by seismic means alone, without on-site inspections. The United States did not comment on the threshold proposal. It continued to oppose various proposals to suspend all underground tests without a formal agreement. This "moratorium" had been unacceptable to the United States since the Soviet Union resumed testing in 1961.<sup>1</sup>

Proposed Approach to Soviet Leaders

In a memorandum of November 23, 1964, to the Committee of Principals, ACDA Director Foster submitted an outline of subjects for discussion with the new Soviet leaders who had recently

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<sup>1</sup>See "The Question of a Moratorium on Nuclear Weapon Tests, 1958-1963" (Disarmament Document Series, Ref 327).

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replaced Khrushchev. He recommended that we renew efforts for a comprehensive test ban and pointed out that achievement of a treaty might force India, Israel, Sweden, and others to decide not to produce nuclear weapons. He advocated early technical discussions with the Soviet Union and a priority review of the American position on verification. In his view, research showed that our verification requirements could "probably be adjusted without jeopardy to our security as the result of improvements in intelligence collection techniques, prospective developments in seismic detection and identification, and reappraisal of the impact on the military balance of possible undetected treaty violations."<sup>1</sup>

After receiving preliminary comments, he circulated a revised paper on December 3 in which he added that our reappraisal should include a provision for dealing with nuclear detonations for peaceful purposes in order to provide assurance that nuclear-weapon tests were not disguised as peaceful explosions.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Foster to Committee of Principals, memorandum, Nov. 24, 1964, ~~Secret~~, with attached paper, "Subjects to be discussed with the U.S.S.R.," Nov. 23, 1964, ~~Secret~~.

<sup>2</sup>Foster to Committee of Principals, memorandum, Dec. 3, 1964, ~~Secret~~, with attached paper, "Subjects to be discussed with the USSR," Dec. 3, 1964, ~~Secret~~.

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AEC Chairman Seaborg wished to participate in the review. Until the review had been made, he considered it prudent to avoid any public indication that we would reduce the number of on-site inspections we had previously proposed.<sup>1</sup> Speaking for the State Department, Ambassador Thompson agreed that a review was desirable but did not see how we could get assurances on peaceful explosions without revealing the technology of our devices.<sup>2</sup>

The JCS commented that they did not oppose a "truly effective" comprehensive test ban with an adequate verification system. But they questioned ACDA reliance on "prospective" developments in detection and identification and took the position that the United States should not indicate that it had given up its reliance on inspection "until these developments are in being and proven."<sup>3</sup> Secretary of Defense

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<sup>1</sup>Seaborg to Foster, ltr., Dec. 10, 1964, ~~Secret~~.

<sup>2</sup>Thompson to Foster, memorandum, Dec. 10, 1964, ~~Secret~~.

<sup>3</sup>JCS to Secretary of Defense, memorandum (JCSM-1031-64), Dec. 11, 1964, ~~Top Secret~~.

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McNamara supported renewed efforts for a comprehensive test ban but did not concur in any policy revisions pending a comprehensive review.<sup>1</sup>

At the December 21 meeting of the Committee of Principals, Secretary McNamara expressed the strong opinion that a comprehensive test ban would be to the advantage of the United States and that we should continue to push it in spite of Soviet opposition to inspection.<sup>2</sup>

At this meeting it was decided that Mr. Foster should seek to have bilateral discussions with Tsarapkin on the topics raised in the revised ACDA paper. On December 29, ACDA circulated to the Principals a draft instruction to Foster. He was to explore the possibilities of the comprehensive test ban without taking any new positions. He was to try to find out what kind of inspection the Soviets would tolerate and what ideas they had on explosions for peaceful purposes.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>McNamara to Foster, ltr., Dec. 19, 1964, ~~Top Secret~~.

<sup>2</sup>Memcon, Dec. 21, 1964, ~~Secret~~.

<sup>3</sup>Foster to Committee of Principals, memorandum, Dec. 29, 1964, ~~Top Secret~~, with attached draft tel., Dec. 29, 1964, ~~Secret~~.

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On February 24, 1965, Mr. Foster sent the Principals a draft Presidential message to the Soviet leaders. This was a modified version of the December 3 proposal. The President would offer to designate Mr. Foster as his representative in bilateral talks on the comprehensive test ban and other disarmament measures.<sup>1</sup> Ambassador Thompson, however, did not believe that we should approach the Soviets on the comprehensive test ban until we had a firm position on the number of on-site inspections.<sup>2</sup>

#### Disarmament Commission

Shortly before the Disarmament Commission met in April 1965, Mr. Foster recommended to the Committee of Principals that we publicly state that we had made technical progress and were flexible on verification methods. He also proposed that the Principals consider whether we should accept a renewed Soviet offer of two or three on-site inspections a year if one were made.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Foster to Committee of Principals, memorandum, Feb. 24, 1965, ~~Secret~~/Nodis, with attached draft message, Feb. 24, 1965, ~~Secret~~/Nodis.

<sup>2</sup>Thompson to Rusk, memorandum, Feb. 26, 1965, ~~Secret~~.

<sup>3</sup>Foster to Committee of Principals, memorandum, Apr. 15, 1965, ~~Secret~~, with attached paper, "U.S. Position on a Program to Inhibit, and Hopefully Stop, Nuclear Proliferation," Apr. 15, 1965, ~~Secret~~.

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The Principals agreed that we should make a renewed effort for a comprehensive test ban and be willing to reexamine the verification problem in the light of technical developments. If exploration showed that verification requirements could be satisfied "by a different number and type of inspections from those previously proposed," we would take those facts into account.<sup>1</sup>

Ambassador Stevenson made a statement of this kind in his opening speech in the Disarmament Commission (April 26). The Soviet representative rejected the proposal for technical discussions and claimed that the obstacles to agreement were political, not scientific. Some of the Eight continued to express support for a threshold agreement, and some also advocated a moratorium, with or without a threshold. The Swedish "omnibus" resolution, approved by the Disarmament Commission on June 15, condemned continued testing, called for a comprehensive agreement, and asked all states to adhere to the limited test-ban treaty. The United States voted

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<sup>1</sup>Summary of Action, Meeting of the Committee of Principals, Apr. 22, 1965, ~~Secret~~.

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for the resolution but interpreted it as not supporting a moratorium. The Soviet Union abstained because of the implied condemnation of Communist China, when that nation was not present.<sup>1</sup>

New ACDA Approach (July 1965)

On July 16, Mr. Foster sent the Committee of Principals two new test-ban proposals: (1) a proposal for a comprehensive test ban with inspection in connection with the withdrawal process and (2) a threshold treaty banning tests over seismic magnitude 4.5, with no on-site inspections.

The first proposal would take the form of a protocol to the limited test-ban treaty. There would be an international Consultative Committee comprising the original parties (the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR) and other states selected on a rotating basis. The agreement would be monitored by national detection systems, but states could

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<sup>1</sup>See Review of International Negotiations on the Cessation of Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 1962-September 1965, pp. 88-92.

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request information on unidentified events, either bilaterally or through the Consultative Committee. If another party refused to provide adequate reassurance, a state could demand an inspection to prove its charge and withdraw from the agreement if the other state refused to permit inspection. An accused party could vindicate itself by requesting an international inspection.

In advancing this proposal, ACDA argued that our unilateral detection capabilities had improved and that the military balance would not be adversely affected since we still retained the nuclear superiority we had enjoyed when the limited test-ban treaty was signed. A comprehensive test ban would advance non-proliferation by inhibiting the development of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear nations, and it would also make it easier for them to accept a non-proliferation agreement by showing them that the nuclear powers were also willing to accept restrictions.

ACDA acknowledged that our detection capabilities were not perfect, but it thought that any undetected tests "would normally be small and unlikely to have a significant impact

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upon the strategic balance." It considered that the gains to the United States outweighed the risks and that there would also be risks of detection for a violator who embarked on a program of clandestine testing.

The threshold agreement would be monitored by nationally operated seismic stations. Each party would have a standard station that reported to an international data collection center. Each party would make its own findings on seismic magnitude, identification, etc. It would be desirable to require each party to announce any allowed subthreshold shots in advance. ACDA pointed out that a threshold treaty was based on the same approach as the limited test ban, i.e., it would ban all tests that we could unilaterally detect. It was estimated that a seismic system could be implemented which would identify all but about nine events above magnitude 4.5 in an average year and that our improved intelligence techniques could eliminate many unidentified events.

ACDA believed that a threshold treaty would help inhibit proliferation and that the USSR would be unable to carry out a series of tests above the threshold without being detected.

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In the absence of a treaty, the Soviets could, if they chose, catch up with us in developing small thermonuclear warheads. If both sides abided by the agreement, we would keep our lead in that field, while both would be "seriously inhibited" from developing hot X-ray ABM warheads. Although this proposal had some disadvantages for the Soviets, ACDA did not think that these were serious enough to make it non-negotiable.<sup>1</sup>

After receiving informal comments on these papers, Mr. Foster sent the Principals a third paper describing a comprehensive test ban with a quota of on-site inspections. He regarded this proposal as the least negotiable of the three and therefore the least likely to make a significant contribution to the solution of the proliferation problem.

This agreement could either be a new treaty or an amendment or protocol to the limited test-ban treaty. An

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<sup>1</sup>Foster to Committee of Principals, memorandum, July 16, 1965, ~~Secret/Restricted Data~~, with attached papers on comprehensive test ban and threshold treaty, July 16, 1965, ~~Secret/Restricted Data~~.

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International Commission with permanent and non-permanent members would determine when on-site inspections should take place on the territory of non-permanent members (i.e., non-nuclear parties). It would also formulate procedures for explosions for peaceful uses. An International Staff headed by an Executive Officer would assist the commission and provide inspectors. The Verification System would consist of national stations, with large-aperture seismic arrays (LASAs) in the Soviet Union, the United States, and certain other countries. Data would be supplied from the LASAs to the International Commission.

The permanent members - the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union - could inspect each other. Each of them would have an annual quota of inspections it would have to accept if it could not provide satisfactory clarifying evidence when requested. Although the paper did not specify the size of the inspection quota, it noted that three inspections a year would now provide the same detection capability as seven

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in 1963, owing to improved detection techniques. Improvements in unilateral intelligence further increased our capability. The paper outlined inspection modalities and discussed inspection techniques in some detail.<sup>1</sup>

The JCS had recently made a study of the question in which they reached the following conclusions: (1) significant results could be obtained from underground tests below "current and future US detection and identification thresholds," (2) the USSR could test clandestinely with little chance of detection, and (3) clandestine Soviet testing could change the military balance in favor of the USSR. They therefore believed that the military disadvantages of a comprehensive test ban outweighed the military advantages.

While they did not oppose a comprehensive test ban with adequate control, it was clear that they did not consider that observance of an agreement could be verified. They did not think that the addition of a small number of on-

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<sup>1</sup>Foster to Committee of Principals, memorandum, July 19, 1965, ~~Secret/Restricted Data~~, with attached paper, ~~Secret/Restricted Data~~. The proposed procedures on explosions for peaceful uses are described in Foster's memorandum to the Committee of Principals, Aug. 18, 1965, ~~Confidential~~.



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site inspections would make much difference since the tests would be "undetected and unknown" and therefore would provide no reason for requesting inspections. They considered a threshold treaty disadvantageous because the Soviets were ahead in large weapons and could catch up with us if small tests were permitted. There would also be difficulties in measuring the magnitude of seismic events. They questioned the ACDA statement on hot X-rays and called attention to the growing threat of China, which would have a considerable nuclear capability by the early 70s.<sup>1</sup>

Secretary of Defense McNamara took a more optimistic view. He supported the threshold and thought that LASA had greatly improved detection capabilities. He thought that we should publicly say that we would reduce our requirements for a comprehensive test ban. He suggested that the Principals be prepared to meet with the President if the Soviets should show an interest in an agreement with inspections.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>JCS to Secretary of Defense, memorandum (JCSM 601-65), Aug. 5, 1965, ~~Secret~~.

<sup>2</sup>McNamara to Fisher, ltr., Aug. 7, 1965, Secret.

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The political advantages of a comprehensive test ban were summed up in a State Department paper of August 19. It would make a significant contribution to stopping proliferation, improve Soviet-American relations, and exacerbate Sino-Soviet relations "with consequent benefit to the United States." The Department therefore favored a comprehensive test ban unless there were "overriding military considerations" to the contrary. It was not sure whether the Soviet Union would accept a proposal along the lines of the ACDA paper of July 16, but it believed that an agreement of this kind would be acceptable to all five key potential nuclear powers: India, Israel, Sweden, Japan, and the FRG. The UAR and Pakistan would probably also adhere, but Indonesia would not. The Department noted, however, the risk that parties could later withdraw from the treaty and begin testing. It saw less political advantage in a threshold treaty, which might not be accepted by the Soviets and would in any case leave a loophole for testing by Nth countries.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Fisher to Deputies to the Committee of Principals, memoranda, Aug. 19 and 24, 1965, ~~Secret~~, with attached paper, "The Impact of a Comprehensive Test Ban on Proliferation (U), ~~Secret~~.

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ACDA also made a new proposal for dealing with peaceful nuclear explosions, which were part of the AEC Plowshare program and were arousing increasing interest in other countries. Owing to Soviet opposition, there was no provision for peaceful nuclear explosions in the limited test-ban treaty. That agreement would therefore have to be amended in order to carry out any nuclear explosions that resulted in the spread of radioactive debris beyond national borders. A comprehensive or even a threshold test ban might make it impossible to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions even if they could be confined to national territory.

There had been no international negotiations on the question of procedures for peaceful nuclear explosions since 1961. The Soviet Union had then insisted that neither side should be allowed to carry out any more explosions than the other. In order to prevent clandestine weapon tests in the guise of peaceful explosions, it also demanded elaborate safeguards, including the right of the nuclear powers to inspect all devices used in peaceful explosions. President Kennedy was willing to seek Congressional consent to amend

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the Atomic Energy Act for this purpose, and the United States and the United Kingdom accepted the Soviet safeguards demands in April 1961.<sup>1</sup>

On March 15, 1965, ACDA proposed that the limited test-ban treaty be amended to permit carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions by the unanimous consent of the three nuclear parties (the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union),<sup>2</sup> Some objected to giving the Soviets a veto.

In a memorandum of August 18 to the Deputies, Mr. Fisher proposed procedures for carrying out peaceful explosions under a comprehensive or threshold treaty without disclosing the devices.<sup>3</sup> This proposal encountered opposition from those who feared that the Soviets might disguise weapon tests as peaceful explosions.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>See Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests: History and Analysis of Negotiations (Department of State pub. 7258, 1961), pp. 130-131, 136-137. Peaceful explosions were covered in art. 13 of the Anglo-American draft treaty of Apr. 18, 1961 (ibid., pp. 492-493).

<sup>2</sup>Foster to Committee of Principals, memorandum, Mar. 15, 1965, ~~Confidential.~~

<sup>3</sup>Fisher to Committee of Principals, memorandum, Aug. 18, 1965, ~~Confidential.~~

<sup>4</sup>See Foster, memorandum to Committee of Principals, June 2, 1966, ~~Confidential.~~

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At the August 25 meeting of the Committee of Principals, Dr. Froetsch (ARPA) described the technical situation and ACDA Assistant Director Scoville summed up our intelligence capabilities. Dr. Scoville and Mr. Fisher estimated that only a very small number of events over magnitudes of 4.0-4.5 would be unidentified. On the other hand, the number of unidentified events below 3.0 magnitude would always be so large that we could probably never be sure that very small clandestine tests were not being conducted in that range.

Dr. Froetsch thought that the Soviets could evade at the 2-kiloton level if they made a sufficient effort, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Both Dr. Seaborg and General Wheeler thought that we should be conservative in using estimates based on projected capabilities. General Wheeler thought that more LASAs would be needed, and Dr. Seaborg doubted that they could be installed in two or three years.

On the political side, Ambassador Thompson doubted that the FRG would sign a comprehensive test ban. Secretary of

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State Rusk thought that the Fanfani proposal would be a better way of dealing with proliferation.<sup>1</sup> Although he did not oppose a review of our test-ban policy, he pointed out that it could hardly be completed during the current ENDC session, which was scheduled to end in two weeks. Vice President Humphrey did not favor any change in our position. We should not include in any treaty things that built distrust, and this would be true of a comprehensive test ban without inspections and the threshold treaty.

The Principals concluded that our present position should not be changed for the time being. We should welcome any indication that the Soviet Union would seriously consider a treaty with adequate verification, and we should be willing to engage in technical discussions with the Soviet Union. We should also be willing to make available to other interested countries information on progress in detection and identification, to the extent that security considerations permitted.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>See above, chapter B.

<sup>2</sup>Meeting of the Committee of Principals, Aug. 25, 1965,  
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The outcome of the August 25 meeting left Mr. Foster with little new to offer at Geneva. He reaffirmed Stevenson's statement<sup>1</sup> and described the LASA system. When Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin accepted the UAR proposals for a threshold treaty accompanied by a voluntary moratorium, Mr. Foster reiterated our opposition to an "unverified moratorium." He did not comment directly on the threshold but observed that "half-measures" could not create "good prospects for a stable agreement." The nonaligned Eight continued to advocate the exchange of scientific and technical information, which the Soviet Union still opposed.<sup>2</sup>

#### 20th General Assembly

There were no important new developments at the 20th General Assembly. The Soviet Union reaffirmed its support for a comprehensive test ban without inspections and for a

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<sup>1</sup>See above, p. 8.

<sup>2</sup>See Review of International Negotiations on the Cessation of Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 1962-September 1965, pp. 93-100.

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threshold treaty with a moratorium. It continued to oppose technical discussions, and it abstained from voting on the General Assembly resolution of December 3 on the ground that a reference to "the improved possibilities for international cooperation in the field of seismic cooperation" might be used to justify the Western demand for international control.<sup>1</sup>

Ninth Session of the ENDC (January 27-May 10, 1966)

The major new development at the ninth session of the ENDC was the introduction by Sweden of a plan for "verification by challenge." Pointing out that the only sanction against violations would be treaty abrogation, Mrs. Myrdal suggested that a nation could be challenged to clear itself by providing data on suspicious events that occurred on its territory. If the data did not satisfy the complaining state, it could take the case to the Security Council, challenge the other nation to invite inspection, and withdraw from the treaty if it

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<sup>1</sup>See Negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban, 1965-1967, pp. 2-4.

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refused or failed to supply convincing evidence that it had not violated the treaty. She also proposed a "detection club," i.e., international arrangements for the regular exchange of seismic data. Mr. Fisher again took the position that obligatory inspections would be necessary to provide assurance that the treaty was being observed.<sup>1</sup>

In private discussions, the Soviets told our delegation that they could not renew their offer of on-site inspections. They said that they understood we knew much about them and had other than seismic means of verification. If we would not take the theoretical risk of one or two clandestine tests, this meant to them that we did not want a test ban.<sup>2</sup> The Soviets showed no interest in pressing the threshold at Geneva and did not take a position on the Swedish "verification by challenge" proposal at this session.

The Soviets had not, however, dropped the threshold and moratorium proposal, and Foreign Minister Gromyko made this

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<sup>1</sup>See Negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban, 1965-1967.

<sup>2</sup>From Geneva, tel. 1898, Apr. 6, 1966, Secret.

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clear to Lord Chalfont when the latter visited Moscow. The British got the impression from this talk that the Soviets might be willing to provide us with some seismic data on a bilateral basis, as they were doing for the International Geophysical Year, but not to join an international data center. Mr. Gromyko implicitly admitted that national seismic means were not perfect but pointed out the advantage we enjoyed in being able to establish seismic stations around the world.<sup>1</sup>

Ambassador Roshchin told Mr. Foster on April-29 that the Soviets were interested in the detection club idea as a basis for a comprehensive treaty, on the understanding that there would be no commitment on inspection. They would also expect the data to be provided on a voluntary basis and evaluated nationally. Mr. Foster welcomed Soviet interest and said that we would cooperate with the detection club if it was set up. He also stressed the need to obtain comparable data and to use such advanced techniques as LASA. He reaffirmed our

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<sup>1</sup>From Geneva, tel. 1874, Apr. 3, 1966, Secret.

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position on inspections.<sup>1</sup>

Tenth Session of the ENDC, June 14-August 25, 1966

Before the ENDC reconvened, the Swedes held a small preliminary conference at Stockholm on seismic detection. This was attended by Canada, India, Japan, Poland, Romania, and others. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union participated. Later, the unofficial Scarborough International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons (June 23-26) suggested that verification "by challenge or invitation" could be tried out for an interim underground test-ban agreement. Although Mr. Fisher attended the Scarborough meeting and concurred in the report, the United States was not committed to it. He told the ENDC that we continued to oppose an "unverified moratorium" but were studying the possibility of applying "verification by challenge" to an interim agreement.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>From Geneva, tel. 2102, Apr. 29, 1968, ~~Secret/Lindis~~.

<sup>2</sup>See "Negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban, 1965-1967."

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Mrs. Myrdal privately expressed doubts that "verification by challenge" would mix with a moratorium on testing.<sup>1</sup>

The Soviets apparently mulled the idea over for some time and then announced that they could not accept on-site inspection in any form. They also reaffirmed support for a threshold agreement with a moratorium on subthreshold testing.<sup>2</sup>

After unsuccessfully attempting to develop a draft treaty, the Eight submitted a joint memorandum in which they summarized their individual suggestions: a threshold treaty and moratorium, improvement of seismic cooperation, "verification by challenge," a U.N. list of impartial inspectors, and a scientific study of the identification problem.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>From Geneva, tel. 486, July 27, 1966, ~~Confidential.~~

<sup>2</sup>"Negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban, 1965-1967."

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

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ACDA Effort for a Threshold Treaty

While these negotiations were taking place, ACDA was making a determined effort to obtain U.S. Government approval of a threshold proposal. On December 17, 1965, Mr. Foster sent the Principals another paper on this question. When the ENDC reconvened, we would offer both a comprehensive and a threshold proposal, as we had done with the comprehensive and limited draft treaties of 1962.<sup>1</sup> We would discuss the problem of verifying a comprehensive treaty with the Soviets and then table a paper on the modalities of on-site inspection. Although we would prefer a comprehensive treaty, we were prepared, if the Soviets would not accept the necessary verification, to extend the limited test ban to cover tests at or above the 4.75 threshold. We would also be willing to lower the threshold whenever scientific developments made this possible or arrangements for effective verification were worked out.

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<sup>1</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II.

ACDA believed that the Soviets would probably insist at first on coupling the threshold with a moratorium but saw some indications that they would eventually accept the threshold without it. All major American allies except France, all the Eight, and such key near-nuclear countries as Israel and Japan would probably adhere to a threshold treaty.

It thought that the problem of seismic fluctuation and accidental crossing of the threshold was less difficult than had been supposed. With systems in being, we could identify all but about eight events each year over 4.75, and our unilateral intelligence could eliminate many unidentified events. Since our identification capability would improve, we should be prepared to lower the threshold when developments warranted.<sup>1</sup>

The JCS now took the position that a comprehensive treaty would prejudice our national security. On the threshold

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<sup>1</sup>Foster to Committee of Principals, memorandum, Dec. 17, 1965, ~~Secret/Restricted Data~~, with attached draft position paper, "Threshold Test Ban," ~~Secret/Restricted Data~~.

proposal, they objected to relying on the atomic energy detection system (AEDS) and unilateral intelligence for verification. Since seismology could identify some seismic events as earthquakes but could not identify events as explosions, they maintained that "a separate means of verification, including on-site inspections, should be established and in operation on the effective date of implementation of any such proposal." Since they believed that there would be inadvertent violations, they felt that a threshold treaty might create more suspicion than it dispelled. They considered that the strategic effects might be enough to justify rejection. To meet the threat of a Soviet ABM system, they believed that we must develop our own ABMs, remove missile vulnerabilities, and develop multiple, independently retargetable vehicles (MIRVs), and this would require testing beyond the threshold level.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>JCS to Secretary of Defense, memorandum (JCSM-28-66), Jan. 13, 1966, ~~Top Secret/Restricted Data~~.

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The JCS also produced a report by an Air Force panel headed by W. G. McMillan. The McMillan group found no evidence that the Soviets were seriously able to compromise our deterrent but thought that even a comprehensive test ban would not prevent them from acquiring this capability. Our means of eliminating vulnerabilities involved underground tests, and it was a particularly disadvantageous time for a comprehensive treaty, which would cause our scientific and technical competence on nuclear weapons design and weapons effects to deteriorate. Although a threshold ban would preclude the development of an optimum ABM warhead, its effects in other areas would be less serious than a comprehensive treaty. A threshold agreement would inhibit the development of sophisticated weapons by an Nth country but would not prevent it from developing primitive though effective fissionable weapons.<sup>1</sup>

Secretary of Defense McNamara still favored a comprehensive test ban but thought that further study of the threshold

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<sup>1</sup>Wheeler to Principals, memorandum (JCSM-78-66), Feb. 3, 1966, ~~Top Secret/Restricted Data~~, with attached report, "Technical Aspects of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals," Jan. 14, 1966, ~~Top Secret/Restricted Data~~.

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proposal was needed before a decision could be made.<sup>1</sup> In reply, Mr. Fisher recommended a Defense study of the impact of the threshold on the Soviet military program and said that ACDA would do a further analysis of verification.<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Foster sent the Principals a revised paper on January 12, 1966. ACDA argued that the advantages of a threshold treaty outweighed the disadvantages even though a potential nuclear power could, if it worked hard enough, make its first test below the threshold. Since potential nuclear powers would have made a public commitment to non-proliferation by signing the treaty, however, they would be more likely to withdraw than to seek to operate within treaty restrictions if they later decided to test.<sup>3</sup>

After discussion by the Deputies, Mr. Foster put the ACDA argument even more strongly in a memorandum of January 17 to the Principals. The advantage to be gained in inhibiting proliferation outweighed any disadvantages from Soviet cheating or handicaps to our ABM program because "most, if

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<sup>1</sup>McNamara to Foster, ltr., Jan. 22, 1966, ~~Top Secret -~~

<sup>2</sup>Fisher to McNamara, ltr., Feb. 11, 1966, ~~Top Secret/~~  
~~Restricted Data.~~

<sup>3</sup>Foster to Committee of Principals, memorandum, Jan. 12, 1966, ~~Secret/Restricted Data~~, with attached draft position paper, "Threshold Test Ban Treaty," ~~Secret/Restricted Data.~~

not all, of the potential nuclear countries of greatest interest would adhere to the treaty, and...the treaty would have the effect of inhibiting any decision by them to develop nuclear weapons." Any country developing a nuclear capability to "meet a perceived national security requirement" would "most likely have testing needs that will carry it beyond the limits allowed by a threshold ban."<sup>1</sup>

AEC Chairman Seaborg felt that the ACDA proposal "would not impose substantial technical inhibitions upon a country considering embarking upon nuclear weapons development, beyond those which the present limited test ban treaty already impose," since a country could simply develop nuclear weapons by testing under the threshold. It would therefore not be necessary for a near-nuclear nation to denounce the treaty, and it would "contribute only marginally to discouraging proliferation." Moreover, it would prevent the development of high-yield, high-altitude ABM warheads by the United States. The Soviets would be able to get away with 4-6 nuclear tests outside established sites. Controversy over the magnitude

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<sup>1</sup>Foster to Committee of Principals, memorandum, Jan. 17, 1966, ~~Secret/Restricted Data~~, with attached draft position paper, "Threshold Test Ban Treaty," Jan. 17, 1966, ~~Secret/Restricted Data~~.

of events could be avoided if an international control system was set up, but he saw no way of avoiding disputes over the nature of events. The omission of on-site inspections, he felt, "would set an unfavorable precedent for a comprehensive treaty."<sup>1</sup>

The JCS remained opposed to a comprehensive treaty and attempted to delete it from the draft of the President's message of January 27 to the ENDC. They were concerned about Soviet ABM developments and thought that we would need a vigorous testing program to meet the Soviet threat. They asserted that there was "no acceptable verification system which would prevent clandestine testing." And they denied that a small number of on-site inspections would provide sufficient deterrence.<sup>2</sup>

At the Principals' meeting of January 21, Secretary of State Rusk said that deletion would reverse a Presidential decision of long standing. He therefore decided that it

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<sup>1</sup>Seaborg to Foster, ltr., Jan. 19, 1966, ~~Secret~~.

<sup>2</sup>JCS to Secretary of Defense, memorandum (JCSM-49-66), Jan. 21, 1966, ~~Top Secret/Restricted Data~~.

should remain.<sup>1</sup> The President reaffirmed support for a comprehensive test ban but made no change in our position on inspection.<sup>2</sup>

On May 26, Mr. Foster sent the Principals a draft position paper on the threshold proposal. He again maintained that its advantages outweighed its disadvantages. It would contribute to curbing nuclear proliferation, "especially in India where the problem has become serious, if not critical." The constraints on American military development would be less than on the USSR. While Defense studies showed that the threshold test ban would prevent the development of warheads of optimum design for an ABM system, this problem could be dealt with by redesigning at greater cost. The constraints on the Soviet Union would be at least as great. Recent AFTAC developments showed that only about one earthquake a year over the threshold would remain unidentified.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Meeting of Committee of Principals, Jan. 21, 1966, ~~Secret/Limdis.~~

<sup>2</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1966, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup>Foster to Committee of Principals, memorandum, May 26, 1966, Secret, with attached draft position paper, "Threshold Test Ban (TTB) Treaty," May 26, 1966, ~~Secret.~~



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The JCS did not agree that a threshold treaty could be verified without on-site inspections. They argued that a determined invader could spoof the verification system by faking an earthquake or masking a short in the aftershock of an earthquake. There was thus no "absolute assurance" of verifying Soviet compliance. They were not impressed by the risk the Soviets would run by cheating, since the result of exposure "would be no more than an unprovable accusation." The AEDS stations were classified and should not be compromised by relying on them for verification. They still maintained that tests were needed for ABM development. Some improvements could be made under a threshold treaty, but they would be more costly and "cause delays in a program for which time is already crucial."<sup>1</sup>

On June 2, Mr. Foster sent the Principals a paper on peaceful nuclear explosions. ACDA pointed out that AEC was

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<sup>1</sup>JCS to Secretary of Defense, memorandum (JCSM-379-66), June 8, 1966, ~~Top Secret/Restricted Data.~~

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no longer willing to permit disclosure of devices, since this would either reveal advanced weapon design or require the use of obsolete devices. It argued for the nuclear party veto on the grounds that this was necessary if any agreement was to be negotiable and that the nuclear parties were the only nations able to judge the military implications. Moreover, since the Soviets were showing some interest in peaceful explosions, it did not appear likely that they would abuse their veto. Under this ACDA proposal, the nuclear parties would undertake to make peaceful explosion services available at cost when they became practicable.<sup>1</sup>

The threshold position paper was again revised on June 9. The new edition retained most of the features of the original version. It stated that we could not be sure what the Soviet position would be. They might originally insist on a moratorium but might later drop this demand if they came under pressure from other countries to do this. Although there would be pressures from some of the Eight to include a moratorium,

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<sup>1</sup>Foster to Committee of Principals, memorandum, June 2, 1966, ~~Confidential~~. For background, see above, pp. 17-18.

"these would be offset by evidence of serious US interest in negotiating a TTB without one."<sup>1</sup>

AEC Chairman Seaborg endorsed the opinion of the weapons laboratories [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and that the threshold would also foreclose other options on future weapon developments and vulnerability studies. Since ACDA no longer proposed an international seismic network, there would be controversies on the magnitude of events. He believed that AEC would have to keep its tests substantially below the 30 KT. level.<sup>2</sup>

On June 14, Mr. Fisher sent the Principals a draft memorandum to the President in which he reviewed the arguments for the threshold proposal. He believed that the proposal was in the interest of the United States and should be made, preferably in the form of a Presidential speech.

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<sup>1</sup>Foster to Committee of Principals, memorandum, June 9, 1966, Secret/Restricted Data, with attached draft position paper, "Threshold Test Ban (TTB) Treaty), June 9, 1966, ~~Secret/Restricted Data~~.

<sup>2</sup>Seaborg to Fisher, ltr., June 16, 1966, ~~Secret/Restricted Data~~, with enclosed comments by weapons laboratories.

Since there were varying views, he proposed that the Principals discuss the proposal with the President.<sup>1</sup>

Admiral Raborn (CIA) said that evidence on the extent of Soviet ABM progress remained skimpy. He did not think that the threshold would have much effect in stopping proliferation and doubted that either a threshold or a non-proliferation treaty "would deter a country from going nuclear if it felt that its vital interests were threatened." On verification, it was one thing to convince ourselves that a violation had occurred and another to prove it to others. He felt that convincing proof could come only from on-site inspection.<sup>2</sup>

At the Principals meeting of June 17, Mr. Fisher noted that the AFTAC report showed that seismic identification was excellent for events above 4.75 magnitude, indicating that a threshold agreement could be verified without on-site inspection.

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<sup>1</sup>Fisher to Committee of Principals, memorandum, June 14, 1966, Secret, with attached draft memorandum for the President, "Proposed U.S. Initiative on a Threshold Test Ban,"

~~Secret~~

<sup>2</sup>Raborn to Rusk, ltr., June 17, 1966, ~~Top Secret~~.

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He stressed the need to keep the non-proliferation discussions going and said that the threshold seemed to be the only way. He hoped that the Principals would agree to submit the issues to the President. While he was aware of the JCS and the AEC objections and knew that considerable political effort would be necessary to obtain Congressional acceptance, ACDA felt that it was in the U.S. interest and would inhibit the non-nuclear powers, both technically and politically, from going nuclear.

On the question of Soviet cheating, Admiral Raborn thought that the Soviets might get by with two or so clandestine tests if there were no inspections. Mr. Fisher said that the AFTAC study showed that there would be an average of one unidentified event a year and that nearly all would occur in the Kamchatka area, where coupling conditions were poor. ACDA Assistant Director Scoville added that we could focus on all suspicious events with our intelligence resources.

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Admiral Raborn replied that we could not publicly prove our conclusions with intelligence data. He added that the intelligence community considered that a threshold treaty would have little effect in halting proliferation. Mr. Fisher questioned this assessment. He also pointed out that the new verification data would not remain unknown for long. When they became available, we would either have to endorse a threshold or change our position of favoring a ban on all testing that could be verified.

Secretary of State Rusk was still somewhat concerned about possible cheating. He decided to review the issues himself and then draft a memorandum for the President.<sup>1</sup>

On June 23, Secretary Rusk sent the Principals a revised draft memorandum. He proposed to inform the President that they had been unable to reach a consensus and to suggest that he might wish to discuss the question with them personally. All agreed that a non-nuclear country could conduct its first

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<sup>1</sup>Meeting of Committee of Principals, June 17, 1966,  
~~Secret.~~

test below the threshold, but it would be more difficult for it to do so and it would gain less political prestige from a small five-kiloton explosion than from a larger test. Both State and ACDA believed that the constraints of a threshold treaty would be a "significant factor" in preventing a decision by key countries to go nuclear. On balance we should gain by making the proposal even if the Soviets insisted on linking the threshold with a moratorium, which we could not accept.

While there would be few unidentified events above the threshold, the Principals disagreed on the adequacy of inspection:

... Some feel that even a single Soviet nuclear test above the threshold could have a significant effect on U.S. security and that either the low natural false alarm rate could be used as a cover for such a test or that the United States would not choose to denounce a violation and abrogate the treaty based only on seismic evidence supported by unilateral intelligence. They believe that some type of on-site inspections would be required as well in order to provide demonstrable proof to the world. Others believe that this verification capability would provide the United States the ability to satisfy itself that a violation had

occurred and that the United State could take the necessary international actions if it felt its security were affected.

There was also some disagreement on the military effects of a threshold treaty. AEC did not agree with the Defense study on development of ABM warheads<sup>1</sup> but thought that certain nuclear tests could be made along this line during the coming year. It was believed that the USSR was somewhat behind us - - in warheads of yield ranges that would be affected by the threshold.

The 4.75 threshold might permit the United States and the USSR to test up to 30 KT and key non-nuclear nations to 5 KT, but the AEC felt that we would have to test at lower yields in order to avoid inadvertent violations. Consideration had been given to raising the threshold to 5.0, which would eliminate the possibility of false alarms from earthquakes in the USSR and facilitate some ABM warheads development, but this would reduce the effectiveness of the threshold as a non-proliferation

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<sup>1</sup>See above, p.



measure and be difficult to justify to other countries in the light of current detection and identification capabilities at 4.75.

Finally, the question of peaceful nuclear explosions remained unresolved, and AEC did not think that we should make any threshold proposals until it was settled.<sup>1</sup>

Several changes were made in the final version of this memorandum, which was sent to the President on July 26. It was now stated that the threshold "would prevent the development of an advanced military nuclear capability" by Nth countries. A possible theoretical loophole in verification was noted:

Deliberate spoofing by successive detonations at short time intervals might possibly diminish the impact of the recent improvements made in seismic detection and identification. The feasibility of such a technique and the yield range over which it might be applicable have not been investigated.

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<sup>1</sup>Rusk to Committee of Principals, memorandum, June 23, 1966, ~~Secret~~, with attached draft memorandum for the President, "Proposed U.S. Initiative on Threshold Test Ban," ~~Secret~~.

Moreover, there were few standard stations capable of determining the magnitude of seismic events in the United States, the Soviet Union, India, and Israel. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Without them there would be no internationally accepted data base for determining magnitudes and the way would be left open to controversy.

The AEC spelled out its position on peaceful uses more explicitly:

... The Atomic Energy Commission believes that the United States should not make any proposals on a threshold test ban until an agreed position is reached within the Government concerning the extent to which nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes would be permitted under such a treaty, and the specific treaty provisions relevant to such purposes which would be acceptable to the United States.<sup>1</sup>

The Defense Department neither concurred nor responded.<sup>2</sup>


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<sup>1</sup>Foster to Committee of Principals, memorandum, Aug. 3, 1966, ~~Secret~~, with attached memorandum from Rusk to the President, "Proposed U.S. Initiative on Threshold Test Ban (U)," July 26, 1966, ~~Top Secret/Restricted Data~~.

<sup>2</sup>Barber to Fisher, memorandum, Aug. 17, 1966, ~~Confidential~~.

AEC Chairman Seaborg later informed ACDA that further study showed that a substantial Plowshare program could be conducted under a threshold treaty if suitable international arrangements could be worked out for handling the nuclear explosives.<sup>1</sup>

In Dr. Scoville's opinion, the enormous improvements in detection and identification were bringing a comprehensive treaty with little or no on-site inspection into the realm of the possible. On October 3, he recommended to Mr. Fisher a new approach, involving either spoof-proof seismic stations on Soviet territory or some on-site inspection provision along the lines of the Swedish "challenge" proposal.

 Since it would be difficult for the Soviets to spoof their seismic data, our

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<sup>1</sup>Seaborg to Fisher, ltr., Sept. 2, 1966, ~~Secret/~~  
~~Restricted Data~~

confidence in them was "likely to be fairly high although not absolute." Even with the spoof-proof stations there could be a few ambiguous events in the next five or ten years, but isolated events were "quite unlikely to be of significant military importance."<sup>1</sup>

21st General Assembly

Since none of the ACDA initiatives were approved within the U.S. Government, we had nothing new to offer at the 21st General Assembly. In fact, our position was to remain frozen for the next two years. A position paper of October 7 stated that a comprehensive test ban remained a major objective of U.S. policy. National capabilities were not adequate to verify it, and we still believed that on-site inspections were necessary. We would, however, require "only that number and kind of on-sites which modern science shows to be necessary." We welcomed the Swedish "detection club" proposal and were willing to have talks with the Soviets on the bilateral exchange of data. We

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<sup>1</sup>Scoville to Fisher, memorandum, Oct. 3, 1966, ~~Secret/~~  
~~Restricted Data.~~

were firmly opposed to an "unverified moratorium," with or without a threshold agreement. Our position on the threshold agreement was under study. We had "serious reservations" on "verification by challenge" but were studying the question of applying it on a trial basis.<sup>1</sup>

In the First Committee, Mr. Foster reaffirmed our previous position on on-site inspections and our opposition to an "unverified moratorium." He also favored the exchange of scientific data. There was no change in the Soviet position. Ambassador Roshchin endorsed the "detection club" proposal, provided that seismic data were provided on a voluntary basis and each state made its own assessment of the facts.

A General Assembly resolution of December 5 urged all states to adhere to the limited test-ban treaty, called for the suspension of tests in all environments, expressed the hope that states would contribute to the effective exchange

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<sup>1</sup>Position paper, "Comprehensive Test Ban," Oct. 7, 1966,  
~~Confidential.~~

of seismic data, and requested the ENDC to elaborate an underground test-ban treaty "without any further delay." This resolution was approved by a vote of 100 to 1, with 2 abstentions. Albania voted against it, and Cuba and France abstained.<sup>1</sup>

Roshchin's favorable comments on the "detection club" did not mean that the Soviets were actually ready for serious technical talks. While the General Assembly was still in session, the British attempted to arrange tripartite scientific discussions in London. Although Soviet scientists appeared to be willing to participate, Foreign Minister Gromyko told Foreign Secretary Brown that the Soviet Government did not favor such talks. The British Foreign Office concluded that the Soviets were not then interested in a comprehensive test ban because they wished to continue testing.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>"Negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban, 1965-1967".

<sup>2</sup>From London, tels. 3598, Nov. 1, 1966, and 4350, Nov. 25, 1966, ~~Secret/Lindis~~; from New York, tel. 2876, Dec. 2, 1966, ~~Secret/Lindis~~; from London, agm. A-1351, Dec. 8, 1966, ~~Secret/Lindis~~.

New JCS Objections

The existing U.S. position now became objectionable to the JCS. In a memorandum of February 27, 1967, they expressed concern that our position did not take into account the impact on our strategic posture. Since they thought that there might well be an even chance that the Soviets had a medium hot X-ray warhead and were prepared to exploit it, they considered that any further limitations on the U.S. development effort could jeopardize national security. Specifically, extension of the limited test-ban treaty could keep us from testing leading to:

- a. ABM warhead development.
- b. Advanced reentry vehicle/warhead development.
- c. Weapons effect information that is essential to overall system cost and design.

They therefore concluded that continued testing without further restriction was essential to maintain the deterrent and recommended that the Committee of Principals develop a "co-ordinated position ... to curtail further efforts to achieve a comprehensive treaty, a threshold treaty, or any extension

of the present limitations."<sup>1</sup> Since the Soviets had shown no recent interest in the question, Secretary of Defense McNamara did not believe it necessary for the Principals to address the issue, and Secretary of State Rusk agreed.<sup>2</sup>

ENDC Negotiations (1967)

- In the 1967 ENDC negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union were so busy with the non-proliferation treaty that months passed without either of them mentioning the comprehensive test ban. Mrs. Myrdal asked them on June 29, 1967, if they were really ready to stop testing or whether they had national security or other reasons for not doing so. Both Mr. Foster and Ambassador Roshchin said that they favored a test ban and reaffirmed their previous positions.

Mrs. Myrdal also asserted that the scientific and technological difficulties in monitoring an underground test ban had been greatly reduced. She believed that the use of

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<sup>1</sup>Wheeler to McNamara, memorandum (JCSM-109-67), Feb. 27, 1967, ~~Top Secret/Restricted Data~~, with attached paper, "Feasibility of Test Acceleration (U)," ~~Top Secret/Restricted Data~~

<sup>2</sup>McNamara to Foster, ltr., Mar. 18, 1967, ~~Secret~~; Rusk to McNamara, Mar. 27, 1967, ~~Secret~~.



"complexity" identification criteria would provide sufficient deterrence with only one inspection in two years. By cross-checking data from national and regional stations, she thought that "earthquakes would be mistaken for explosions only once in 15 or 20 years."

Mr. Foster questioned the Swedish conclusions. If the "complexity" criteria were applied to Novaya Zemlya, a known Soviet testing ground, they would misidentify the Soviet tests as earthquakes. Our data did not support her "15 or 20 years" statement. He also raised the question of the quality and reliability of regional stations.

Mrs. Myrdal still felt that the data justified a more optimistic assessment. She argued that a seismic event in an aseismic area like Novaya Zemlya would be suspicious per se. She admitted, however, that there could be some misidentification without on-site inspection. Without excluding obligatory inspections, she renewed her previous proposal for "verification by challenge."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>"Negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban, 1965-1967."

Weapons Program Requirements

The requirements of our expanded weapons program constituted a new obstacle to a comprehensive test ban. In a letter of August 4 to Rusk, AEC Chairman Seaborg said that it would be necessary to continue testing through 1970 to develop a new generation of weapons for the strategic offensive forces [REDACTED]

He regretted that the program could not be completed earlier.

"I realize the advantages of taking steps beyond the limited test ban treaty as soon as it is feasible," he wrote, "and I continue to be hopeful that we can reach some broader agreements with the Soviets."<sup>1</sup> After consulting Rusk, Mr. Fisher informed the Principals that the Secretary did not believe there was any need for a Principals meeting.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Seaborg to Rusk, ltr., Aug. 4, 1967, ~~Secret~~

<sup>2</sup>Fisher to Committee of Principals, memorandum, Aug. 21, 1967, ~~Secret~~.

22d General Assembly (1967)

In view of the Seaborg letter, Mr. Foster decided not to seek clearance for a new position paper for the 22d General Assembly.<sup>1</sup> There were no new developments at this session. The United States, the Soviet Union, and Sweden reaffirmed their previous positions. On December 19 the General Assembly approved a resolution similar to the 1966 resolution by a vote of 103 to 1, with 7 abstentions. Both the United States and the Soviet Union voted for the resolution.<sup>2</sup>

Recent Developments

Owing to the requirements of the weapons program and the opposition of the JCS, it now became a moot question whether we could publicly endorse a comprehensive test ban. When Mrs. Myrdal, with support from other nonaligned representatives, proposed to add a preambular paragraph to the draft non-proliferation treaty reaffirming the endorsement of a comprehensive

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<sup>1</sup>Record of ACDA Staff Meeting, Sept. 22, 1967, ~~Confidential.~~

<sup>2</sup>"Negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban, 1965-1967".

test ban expressed in the limited test-ban treaty, the AEC reluctantly concurred in the ACDA recommendation to accept the Swedish amendment. At the same time, Dr. Seaborg informed Mr. Fisher that AEC agreement on this point "should not be considered as prejudicing the outcome" of the Principals' review he had earlier proposed. He also hoped that we would not engage in any discussions at Geneva compromising any position we might have to take on continued underground testing.<sup>1</sup>

Although Mr. Foster shared the AEC concern that the weapon development plans called for continued testing, while our announced position favored a comprehensive test ban with adequate verification, he pointed out to Seaborg that "any public retraction of our test ban position would seriously - - jeopardize our chances of persuading countries to sign and ratify the non-proliferation treaty."<sup>2</sup> ACDA therefore proposed to reaffirm our previous position at the 1968 ENDC session while trying to focus attention on the fissionable materials production

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<sup>1</sup>Seaborg to Fisher, ltr., Feb. 13, 1968, ~~Secret.~~

<sup>2</sup>Foster to Seaborg, ltr., May 20, 1968, ~~Secret.~~

cutoff, demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons, and sea-bed arms control in order to deflect attention from the comprehensive test ban.<sup>1</sup>

ACDA later proposed that the President send a message to the ENDC reaffirming our position on the comprehensive test ban. The proposal immediately encountered severe opposition from the AEC and the JCS. The JCS stated that continued testing without further restriction was essential to the maintenance of our deterrent and that any further restriction would be "contrary to the national interest." They took the position that any efforts for further restrictions "should be halted so that the United States will not be confronted by a Soviet acceptance of such a proposal at a most disadvantageous time for the United States."<sup>2</sup> AEC Chairman Seaborg felt that it would be unrealistic to reaffirm our support for a comprehensive test ban "in view of the absolute necessity for underground testing in order to meet our announced commitments in the field of strategic offensive weapons such as Poseidon and Minute Man, and strategic defensive weapons such as the

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<sup>1</sup>ACDA draft memorandum for the Secretary of State, "Comprehensive Test Ban: Action Memorandum (U)," ~~Secret~~.

<sup>2</sup>Johnson (Jt. Staff) to Secretary of Defense, memorandum (DJSM-859-68), July 12, 1968, ~~Secret~~.

Sentinel (ABM)."<sup>1</sup> Both AEC and the JCS also opposed mentioning the fissionable materials production cutoff.

ACDA made a further effort to get the existing position reaffirmed. On July 22, Mr. Fisher sent Rusk a draft memorandum for the President recommending this action. The draft noted that it was not clear whether a comprehensive test ban would be in our interest without an American-Soviet agreement to limit strategic weapons systems. On the other hand, however, a retreat from our previous position could well have a disastrous effect on getting the non-nuclear-weapon countries to adhere to the non-proliferation treaty, since most of them felt that a comprehensive test ban should be the next step.<sup>2</sup>

ACDA believed that it would be possible to defend our position on the need for on-site inspections and that pressure from other countries to reach agreement could "probably be kept within manageable proportions" if the Soviet position

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<sup>1</sup>Seaborg to the President, ltr., July 13, 1968, ~~Confidential~~

<sup>2</sup>Fisher to Rusk, memorandum, July 22, 1968, with attached memorandum for the President, July 22, 1968, ~~Secret~~.

remained unchanged. Different tactics would be required if the Soviets accepted inspections:

If the Soviets ever do agree to on-site inspections of some sort, this would be a major change in their policy requiring careful consideration by the U.S. We would have to enter into negotiations, but these negotiations would inevitably be quite protracted. Meanwhile, those underground tests designed to satisfy priority security requirements should be carried out as early as possible in the knowledge that at some future time overall policy considerations may well make the cessation of all nuclear weapon explosions in the net U.S. interest.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>"Proposed Tactics for Comprehensive Test Ban, ENDC - July-August 1968", ~~Secret.~~

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THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY DURING THE  
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION (U)

II. POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS

H. ARMS CONTROL AND THE SEA BED

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ARMS CONTROL FOR THE SEA-BED

ACDA first became interested in arms control prospects for the sea-bed in 1966. While first considerations centered on a suggestion from senior members of the Department of State that the United States propose to demilitarize the sea-bed, all serious consideration halted abruptly when Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze informed Under Secretary of State Katzenbach of the absolute necessity to maintain our SOSUS (Sound Surveillance Undersea System) acoustical anti-submarine surveillance capability. Beginning in April 1967, the first Agency study in support of an arms control measure to prohibit the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed was proposed and favorably received within the Agency.<sup>1/</sup>

Thereafter followed extensive inter-agency consultations and intra-agency discussions principally among ACDA, State, and Defense, and study of several problems raised by the draft proposal. Among these problems the following were found to be particularly difficult: (1) the effect of the proposal on the

<sup>1/</sup> ACDA General Counsel to Deputy Director and Bureau Heads, memorandum, "Arms Control Arrangements Affecting the Sea-bed," Apr. 11, 1967, Top Secret.

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law of the sea, (2) United States capability to detect by national means the existence of violations if the proposal were enacted into a treaty obligation, and (3) the desirability of preserving the strategic option of emplacing weapons on the sea-bed.

In late August 1967, Ambassador Pardo of Malta requested that the General Assembly inscribe on its agenda the examination of the question of the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in the interests of mankind. The question was extensively discussed in the First Committee and resulted in passage by the General Assembly of Resolution 2340 (XXII) on December 18, 1967, by a vote of 99-0-0 which established an Ad Hoc Committee to study the peaceful uses of the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction.<sup>1/</sup>

The Department of State, as lead department of a broadly inclusive committee of executive departments and agencies, had chaired a continuing study of possible principles which could be used in the development of a regime to regulate the exploration

<sup>1/</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 727-729.

and exploitation of the sea-bed beyond the outer limits of the continental shelf. The principles, when developed, were aired at the working session of the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee (June 1968).

During the intervening period, ACDA had been continuing its studies and consultations, particularly with State and Defense, all of which resulted in a memorandum to the Committee of Principals under date of April 12, 1968. This memorandum had formally presented, for approval, a proposal that "the United States attempt to negotiate in the ENDC a treaty, or the relevant provisions for a more general treaty, in which each state undertakes not to station or fix nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on, within, beneath or to the sea-bed beyond 12 nautical miles from its coast and up to the coast of any other state." This memorandum also contained proposals for verification of such an undertaking.<sup>1/</sup>

On May 14, 1968, the Committee of Principals met to consider the ACDA proposal and remanded the entire matter to the Deputies.<sup>2/</sup>

<sup>1/</sup> ACDA Memorandum to the Committee of Principals re Arms Control on the Sea-bed, Apr. 12, 1968, Top Secret.

<sup>2/</sup> Minutes of Meeting of Principals re Seabed dated May 14, 1968, Secret

Thereafter, there followed several meetings of the Deputies and of their Principals<sup>1/</sup> from which came a memorandum dated June 8, to the President. The memorandum included the following recommendation representing the majority view of the Principals, but Defense and the JCS took exception to it:

That, on or about June 17, at U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on the Sea-bed, the statement of the U.S. Representative include the following:

The United States is prepared to enter into serious discussion at an international forum such as the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in order to achieve an appropriate international agreement pursuant to which each party would agree not to emplace or fix nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, on, within, beneath or to the seabed beyond a narrow band along its coast and up to the coast of any other state. The width of this narrow band would be determined by negotiation. The prohibition on emplacement or fixing should be aimed not only at the weapons themselves, but also at launching platforms and delivery systems for such weapons.<sup>2/</sup>

Because of the dissent of the Secretary of Defense and of the JCS, principally on the grounds that the United States should retain the option to emplace nuclear weapons on the sea-bed for

<sup>1/</sup> Minutes of Meeting of Deputies to Committee of Principals dated May 27, 1968, Top Secret; memorandum to Committee of Principals dated June 3, 1968, Top Secret.

<sup>2/</sup> ACDA memorandum to Secretary of State June 8, 1968, with enclosed memorandum to the President, Secret.

possible future use and that it would be difficult to detect violations of any such treaty, the President did not approve the recommendation and decided to refrain from approving any proposal until the agencies reconciled their views.

There followed a series of further meetings and discussions within the Government. By this time, the working meetings of the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee had begun and Messrs. Popper and Meeker sent a memo and ACDA officials made representations to Acting Secretary Katzenbach stressing the necessity of reaching a U.S. position on this subject in order to counter the growing isolation of the United States within the Committee.

Three basic arms control and disarmament proposals had been advanced in the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee, which convened on June 17, 1968. Basically these involved:

1. Demilitarization of the sea-bed
2. Reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes
3. Denuclearization

The Soviet Delegation submitted a resolution which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2340 (XXII) in which it referred to the importance of preserving the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, from actions and uses which might be detrimental to the common interests of mankind, and recognized that the exploration and use of those areas should be conducted in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and for the benefit of all mankind,

Recognizing the need to take steps to prevent the arms race from spreading to the sea-bed and the ocean floor,

1. Solemnly calls upon all States to use the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of the territorial waters of coastal States exclusively for peaceful purposes;

2. Requests the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to consider, as an urgent matter, the question of prohibiting the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of the territorial waters of coastal States.<sup>1/</sup>

As a result of discussions among Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach, ACDA Director Foster, Secretary of Defense Clifford, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze, the President approved on June 25 the statement made to the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee by Mr. Meeker on the following day and reported as follows:

<sup>1/</sup> General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-third Session, "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee To Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction" (A/7230), p. 52.

The United States proposed that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament be asked to take up the question of arms control on the sea-bed and ocean floor with a view to defining those factors vital to a workable, verifiable and effective international agreement which would prevent the use of this new environment for the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction. . . .<sup>1/</sup>

In order to develop a basis for the U.S. position in subsequent ENDC and General Assembly discussions, the Deputies of the Committee of Principals decided on June 28, 1968, to request a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) to study the technical capabilities and incentives for the USSR to deploy weapons of mass destruction and associated delivery systems on the sea-bed, and the corresponding capabilities of the United States to detect and identify such deployment. The SNIE itself was issued under date of August 15, and was consistent with the proposal presented to the Committee of Principals on June 8. While the SNIE noted limitations in US capabilities for detection and verification of a violation, its conclusions as to our capabilities and as to the probability of deployment of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed in violation of an agreement did not suggest that verification of such a proposal would pose a significant national security problem.<sup>2/</sup>

<sup>1/</sup> A/AC.135/WG.1/SR.6.

<sup>2/</sup> SNIE 11-12-68, August 15, 1968 (TS 186083) entitled "Emplacement of Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed" (Limited Distribution).



The U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on peaceful uses of sea-beds concluded its work at a conference in Rio de Janeiro which convened on August 19 and adjourned on August 30, 1968. Significant progress was achieved in several areas of major concern to the United States. With respect to the military aspects of uses of the sea-bed, the following developments occurred.

Utilizing the formula agreed on August 16 between Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense Clifford, the United States was able to join all members in affirming the principle that the sea-bed and ocean floor should be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The United States, Canada, most of its Western European friends and Australia, as well as the USSR and its allies, urged that the question of banning military uses of the sea-bed and ocean floor be referred to the ENDC for study and action. France and Japan did not endorse referral of this question to the ENDC. Among the Latin American and Afro-Asian states, however, sentiment ran high in favor of retaining jurisdiction over military aspects of uses of the sea-bed and ocean floor in order to maintain integrity of jurisdiction, and to bring mass pressure to bear on

the "mad arms race". A number of states continued to seek to prohibit all military uses of the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction. On the whole this view has been found among the less developed countries.

The USSR, however, continued to propose that military use of the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond territorial waters be precluded. It has been suggested that the USSR has advanced the proposal to embarrass the United States and, if possible, prevent military use by the United States of its own continental shelf.

The United States proposal to prohibit the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor was endorsed by Australia, Japan, Canada, and our Western European friends, although France suggested that the sea-bed and ocean floor should be non-militarized, i.e., free of armaments.

From the positions taken by the various states in Rio de Janeiro, it seems reasonably clear that we can anticipate opposition in obtaining General Assembly adoption of the United States resolution referring the U.S. proposal to the ENDC, although it might be possible to win support for "non-prejudicial" referral to the ENDC; i.e., leaving unchanged the military aspects

of the mandate of any standing committee established by the General Assembly to succeed the Ad Hoc Committee. Notwithstanding the likelihood of future ENDC study and negotiation of an arms control proposal for the sea-bed and ocean floor, we can expect continued political discussion of the military aspects of uses of the sea-bed and ocean floor within any U.N. sea-bed committee, particularly by the less developed countries.

There the matter rests as of September 30, 1968. The ENDC has included on its agenda for future discussion the question of arms control measures for the sea-bed. The U.S. delegation has not expanded on the statement approved by the President which proposed that the question be referred to the ENDC; principally because a firm and final U.S. position is lacking. The continuing disagreement between State and ACDA on one hand and the JCS and Defense on the other as to how far and how fast the United States should go in these discussions, precludes the presentation of any concrete negotiating proposal to the ENDC at this time.

Congressional attitudes toward restricting possible military use of the bottom are, to the extent known, also divided.

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Some members of the House and Senate wish to prevent hasty action on the part of the Executive Branch toward internationalization of the ocean floor which could have serious repercussions on U.S. security and economic interests. On the other hand, Senator Pell (Dem., R.I.) who has shown more interest in the subject than any other Member of Congress, has proposed several resolutions including one (S.Res. 263 of March 5, 1968) containing the text of a draft treaty. This proposed treaty would, inter alia, ban the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed. The Senator has continued to make public statements on the subject.

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Final Draft

THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY DURING THE  
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION (U)

II. POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS

I. GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

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## GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

### Background

In 1961 the United States and the USSR agreed on the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. This statement, subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly, was the theoretical basis of the ENDC negotiations. General and complete disarmament was declared the ultimate goal, and negotiations were to continue until it was achieved. At the insistence of the United States, the Joint Statement also provided that the negotiating states should try to "achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date" and stated that efforts should be made to agree and implement collateral disarmament measures without prejudicing progress on the total program. All measures of general and complete disarmament were to be balanced "so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all." The Joint Statement provided in general terms for staging, peacekeeping, and verification. A basic difference became evident when the Soviets refused to concur in our position that retained levels of forces and armaments should be verified during the disarmament process.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The Joint Statement appears in Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 439-442. For the American and Soviet views on verification, see exchange of letters between McCloy and Zorin (ibid., pp. 442-444). The negotiations on the Joint Statement are reviewed in Robert W. Lambert, "Historical Review and Analysis of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (U)," (Disarmament Document Series, Memo 198), Confidential.

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Both the United States and the Soviet Union submitted plans for general and complete disarmament to the ENDC in the spring of 1962, and these plans were extensively debated in 1962-1963.<sup>1</sup> Although both plans were modified during the ENDC discussions, the two sides remained far apart on basic issues. The refusal of the Soviets to agree to U.S. inspection requirements affected measures at every stage. Although they were willing to permit inspection of declared production facilities and verification of the destruction of armaments ("bonfires," as they were called), they maintained their refusal to agree to checking retained levels of forces and armaments and would not give the proposed International Disarmament Organization the authority to check for undeclared production facilities or clandestine arms stocks. The United States, after initially suggesting a "zonal" inspection plan, tacitly dropped this idea. ACDA thinking then shifted to a "graduated access" approach to verification, but this was not developed into a broad and detailed verification plan.<sup>2</sup>

Prospects for ultimate agreement were also dimmed by Soviet refusal to contemplate any peacekeeping arrangements that went beyond the existing provisions of the U.N. Charter. Although we did not submit any detailed peacekeeping plans, we insisted that

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<sup>1</sup>For information on earlier U.S. and Soviet plans for general and complete disarmament, see William Nary, "The Origin and Rationale of United States Proposals for General and Complete Disarmament (U)", Secret, and James S. Bodnar (ACDA/RS) and Robert W. Lambert (ACDA/RS), "Origin and Character of Soviet Policy on General and Complete Disarmament (U)", Secret. These papers appear in pt. II, apps. A and B, of "Report of the Study Group on the Review and Appraisal of the U.S. and USSR Draft GCD Proposals (U)", Secret/Noform.

<sup>2</sup>See "The Verification Question in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, 1962-1964" (Disarmament Document Series, Memo 199), Limited Official Use.

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disarmament must be accompanied in the last two stages by the progressive development of a U.N. Peace Force, which would eventually become so strong that no state could challenge it.

Even if the verification and peacekeeping issues could have been settled, however, it would not have been possible to agree on the crucial issue of nuclear delivery vehicles. The U.S. treaty outline proposed a 30 percent reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles and other major armaments in the first stage. Similar across-the-board reductions in the last two stages would lead to the eventual elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles and other major armaments. This plan would thus preserve American nuclear superiority until general and complete disarmament was achieved. At the same time, the Soviet Union would retain its advantage in conventional armaments throughout the disarmament process. The force levels of both countries would be equalized in stage I.<sup>1</sup>

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, wished to begin by destroying all nuclear delivery vehicles and eliminating all foreign military bases (not affected in the first stage of the U.S. plan). It would also equalize conventional forces in stage I.<sup>1</sup> The Soviets claimed that their plan would eliminate the danger of nuclear war at the outset of the disarmament process. We refused to accept a plan which began by eliminating our nuclear power and preventing us from giving effective

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<sup>1</sup>The U.S. proposed that the military and paramilitary forces of the U.S. and the USSR be reduced to 2.1 million for each country in stage I. The USSR originally proposed stage I levels of 1.7 million, including civilian employees of military establishments as well as active military personnel. The Soviets later offered to compromise on 1.9 million, but we did not agree. The difference on definition of forces was never settled.

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aid to our allies. Since the Soviets accepted the progressive reduction of conventional armaments by equal percentages, they would retain their advantage in this field. China, the other major Communist power, was not expected to adhere to the treaty during the first stage. We therefore regarded the Soviet approach as a violation of the "balance" principle accepted by both sides in the Joint Statement.

The Soviets clearly regarded their nuclear delivery vehicles proposals as central to their plan. In an effort to meet some of the Western criticisms, Foreign Minister Gromyko proposed in September 1962 to permit the United States and the Soviet Union to keep a small but unspecified number of land-based ICBMs and defensive missiles after the first stage. A year later, he modified this proposal to allow the two countries to retain them until the end of the third stage.<sup>1</sup>

#### JCS Criticisms of the U.S. Plan

In a memorandum of October 8, 1963, to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found the U.S. treaty outline deficient in the following respects:

(1) It did not require the participation of Communist China or other militarily significant states in stage I.

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<sup>1</sup>The revised Soviet draft treaty appears in Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 77-102. The revised U.S. treaty outline appears ibid., pp. 111-140. See also Robert W. Lambert (ACDA/IR) "A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. and Soviet Plans for General and Complete Disarmament," Jan. 1968, Official Use Only.

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(2) It did not provide for a control organization to be operational before stage I reductions began.

(3) The zonal inspection system had not been tested or evaluated.

(4) The categories of armaments could be disadvantageous to the United States - e.g., strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and antiballistic missile (ABM) systems were given the highest priority.

(5) It would preclude modernization of armaments and testing of new prototypes in stage I.

(6) It did not contain a withdrawal clause.

They saw no need, however, to introduce a revised plan at this time since general and complete disarmament was not attainable within the foreseeable future. "It appears rather," they said, "that GCD should stand as an ultimate goal and that we should turn our attention toward the achievement of more feasible agreements. In the present state of the world, the JCS are opposed to entrusting the defense of the United States to the United Nations or any outside agency." They concluded that the treaty outline presented "unwarranted risk to the security of the United States because of the vague, incomplete, and untested safeguards described therein" and that "entering such a treaty would be detrimental to US interests." They therefore preferred

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more limited steps, especially measures to reduce the risk of war by surprise attack, accident, or miscalculation.<sup>1</sup>

Secretary of Defense McNamara agreed that general and complete disarmament was not attainable in the near future and that attention should be shifted to more feasible measures. He did not think that it would be profitable to negotiate on reductions of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in the near future. In his view, the United States should seek agreement on non-proliferation and a European settlement.

He did not agree with the JCS on Chinese adherence in the first stage, the prior establishment of the International Disarmament Organization, strategic nuclear delivery vehicles reductions, or prototype-testing. On the other hand, he suggested that the United States develop an inspection organization and agreed with the JCS on zonal inspection and the right of withdrawal.<sup>2</sup>

ACDA itself had questioned the zonal inspection plan, and the United States had tacitly dropped it at Geneva. But ACDA was not willing to give up on reductions of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and it did not accept other Defense criticisms. Moreover, it believed that Defense erred in regarding the

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<sup>1</sup>JCSM 776-63, Oct. 6, 1963, Secret.

<sup>2</sup>McNamara to Foster, ltr., Nov. 7, 1963, Secret.

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stages of the U.S. treaty outline as inseparable. The Soviet Union was indeed proposing a single treaty, i.e., no elements in its plan could be implemented until total agreement had been reached. The U.S. treaty outline, on the other hand, assumed that stage I could be carried out before complete agreement was reached on the whole program. When we presented the plan to the ENDC, we avoided highlighting the separability of the stages in order to foreclose Soviet criticism of the "piecemeal" approach that had characterized our previous proposals on general and complete disarmament.

#### British Suggestion for Limited Deterrent

In December 1963 the British Ambassador gave Mr. Foster a paper suggesting the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles to a "limited deterrent" level. The paper also examined the possibility of asymmetrical reductions and suggested that we might trade off our superiority in ICBMs and strategic bombers against the Soviet superiority in MRBMs and IRBMs.<sup>1</sup> The British did not press this proposal, however, and they continued to support us in the ENDC.

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<sup>1</sup>Fisher to Committee of Principals, memorandum, Dec. 26, 1963, Confidential, with attached British paper, "Reduction of Nuclear Delivery Vehicles," Confidential.

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### ACDA Proposal for Separable First-stage Agreement

The ACDA position on separability was reaffirmed in December, when Mr. Foster sent the Committee of Principals a draft proposal for a separable first-stage agreement. The ACDA paper stated:

The concept of separability found in this proposal is of course not new in U.S. disarmament policy. The traditional U.S. approach to efforts aimed higher than individual confidence building measures has been to seek initial package agreements. Our GCD proposals in 1961 and 1962 were put forward in part to neutralize Soviet propaganda efforts by setting forth our long-range goals and also to afford flexibility for discussion of what might constitute our preferred and more realistic goal, the "widest possible area of agreement." Indeed, the concept of first stage separability is in reality a part of our present GCD proposal in that we retain veto rights for transition from Stage I to Stage II and more particularly in that no commitment to a specific course of action for Stage II would be undertaken because the central element of nuclear disarmament would not be negotiated until after Stage I had begun.

The new ACDA proposal called for a separate 30 percent reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles. It would contain a withdrawal clause similar to that in the limited test-ban treaty, and there would be a review conference after five years. The verification provisions were simplified. When the plan was submitted, we would declare our willingness to conclude an agreement based on the first stage of the U.S. treaty outline.<sup>1</sup>

The JCS considered that the ACDA proposal would endanger national security and presented the following objections: Reducing

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<sup>1</sup>Foster, memorandum for Committee of Principals, Dec. 12, 1963, Secret, with attached paper, "The Basic Elements of a Separable Initial Program on Disarmament," Secret.

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nuclear capabilities alone, without any conventional force reductions, would be disadvantageous to the United States and make us more and not less dependent on strategic nuclear weapons, since we would eventually be restricted to "urban/industrial targeting" and lack the tactical nuclear strength to offset Soviet conventional superiority. They opposed reliance on unilateral intelligence and expressed concern about "the apparent erosion of the US position on adequate verification." The Soviets might use the negotiating period to protect several major cities with ABMs. In their view, we could "win in a race for missile quality," and they opposed any arms-control measures which would "significantly reduce or stagnate US military capabilities until major political conflicts are resolved sufficiently to alleviate tensions, create mutual trust and confidence, and otherwise reduce the present threat to national security."<sup>1</sup>

ACDA met one of the JCS objections in its revised proposal of January 8, 1964. The new version excluded tactical nuclear systems, which might be necessary for European defense if NATO failed to meet its conventional force goals.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, the ACDA proposal was not approved by the U.S. Government. It was, however, recognized that there was a need for a new U.S.

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<sup>1</sup>JCS to Secretary of Defense, memorandum (JCSM-16-64), Jan. 13, 1964, Secret.

<sup>2</sup>Foster, memorandum for Committee of Principals, Jan. 8, 1964, with attached paper, "The Basic Elements of an Interim Arms and Production Limitation," Secret.

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initiative on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. In his message of January 21, 1964, to the ENDC, President Johnson proposed that the United States and the USSR explore a verified freeze on the numbers and characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.<sup>1</sup> This proposal was offered as a collateral measure and not as part of our plan for general and complete disarmament, which remained unchanged.

#### ENDC Discussion of the Gromyko Proposal (1964)

Since we had nothing new to say on general and complete disarmament, we avoided discussing it at the opening of the new ENDC session. The Soviets, however, insisted on debating the Gromyko proposal.<sup>2</sup> Ambassador Tsarapkin told the ENDC that the "nuclear umbrella" kept by the two sides would comprise ICBMs, anti-missile missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles. He explained that the last two categories were included because of Western concern that missiles or bombers might be hidden or civil aircraft adapted for an attack. While there would be a "strictly limited number" of retained missiles, he declined to discuss specific numbers or types until the Western powers accepted the Gromyko proposal in principle.<sup>3</sup> He was apparently thinking of

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<sup>1</sup>See "Background Information on the Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles Freeze, 1964-1967". The freeze is further discussed above, chapter E.

<sup>2</sup>See above, p. 4.

<sup>3</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 23.

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very small numbers, for he asserted that "the destruction of 97 or even 99 per cent of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons would not eliminate the terrible threat hanging over mankind."<sup>1</sup> He had previously told us privately that a 90 or 95 per cent reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage would not be enough.<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Foster interpreted the proposal as a plan to eliminate all other nuclear delivery vehicles and to reduce land-based ICBMs to "some very low level" in stage I. He could see no reason for treating land-based missiles any differently than submarine-based missiles. If the former were invulnerable, as Tsarapkin argued, so were the latter. He noted that the Soviet Union would apparently only permit inspection of missiles at their launching pads in stage II, after the reduction had been carried out, and that the Soviet Union did not provide assurance against hidden launching pads or vehicles. And he emphasized that ICBMs were only one element in the rough military balance that now existed.<sup>3</sup>

Later, Mr. Fisher denied the Soviet claim that the Gromyko proposal would eliminate the threat of nuclear war. He pointed out that this claim conflicted with the avowed purpose of the plan, which was to offer guarantees against clandestine retention of missiles. But the guarantees themselves actually involved the

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<sup>1</sup>ENDC/PV.175, p. 29.

<sup>2</sup>See Jeremy Blanchet (ACDA/IR), "Description and Evaluation of the Gromyko Proposal for a 'Nuclear Umbrella,' (U)," Confidential, p. 9.

<sup>3</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 37-42.

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threat of nuclear retaliation and that meant that the possibility of nuclear war would remain throughout the disarmament process and perhaps beyond, since the Soviets offered no assurance that clandestine missiles could not remain after their program had been carried out.<sup>1</sup>

Although they did not endorse the Gromyko plan, the non-aligned Eight placed great emphasis on the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles and were sympathetic to the idea of "minimum deterrence."<sup>2</sup> On March 24, Indian Ambassador Trivedi spoke favorably of the Gromyko plan and called for a detailed ENDC study of the "nuclear umbrella":

...our work could be speeded up significantly and without affecting the position of anyone if we could say that in principle we viewed the "nuclear umbrella" favourably. We could then all go on to a detailed examination of the plan.<sup>3</sup>

The Soviets had previously avoided entering into a detailed discussion, and they had generally opposed proposals to set up technical working groups in the ENDC.<sup>4</sup> When the ENDC summer session opened on June 9, however, they took a different approach. Referring to the Trivedi proposal, Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin stated that the Soviet Union was prepared to meet the Western

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 101.

<sup>2</sup>See James Bodnar, "Summary of Positions Taken in the ENDC by the Non-Aligned Eight on Both the 'Nuclear Umbrella' Concept and the Proposed Creation of a NDV Working Group (Jan. 21-July 28, 1964)", US Ref 41.

<sup>3</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 108-109.

<sup>4</sup>See Robert W. Lambert, "The Question of Subcommittees and Technical Working Groups in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (U)", Confidential.

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request for "a detailed discussion of specific questions" by participating in "an appropriate working body" if the ENDC approved the proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" as a basis for solving the problem of nuclear delivery vehicles.<sup>1</sup> During the plenary discussion of this question, he denied that the USSR was insisting on the destruction of 97-99 per cent of nuclear delivery vehicles, as Tsarapkin's earlier statement had seemed to imply.<sup>2</sup>

Without committing himself on the accuracy of the estimates, he referred to U.S. claims of superiority in the numbers of ICBMs and strategic bombers and suggested that some Americans could be "counting upon changing the situation during the disarmament process in such a way that at some particular moment the United States would still retain the capacity to deal a powerful nuclear blow while the other side would have already been deprived of that capacity." For this reason, the U.S. percentage approach could not "inspire trust."<sup>3</sup> This was tantamount to admission of Soviet nuclear inferiority and contrasted with the previous Soviet claim that the USSR was making a concession by giving priority to the abolition of nuclear delivery vehicles.

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<sup>1</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 211.

<sup>2</sup>ENDC/PV.192, p. 25.

<sup>3</sup>ENDC/PV.190, pp. 30-31.

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Although our delegation realized that the Zorin proposal was one-sided, it recommended that we agree to a working group with terms of reference broad enough to permit discussion of all proposals on nuclear delivery vehicles. The group would comprise the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, and possibly India and Sweden.<sup>1</sup> Washington concurred but foresaw difficulty in maintaining our position on broad terms of reference. While it preferred a small group, it would be willing to go along with a larger group if the Soviets insisted.<sup>2</sup>

On July 6 the Co-Chairmen agreed to try to prepare agreed terms of reference for the working group.<sup>3</sup> In their discussions, Ambassador Tsarapkin insisted that the "nuclear umbrella" must be accepted in principle before the working group was set up, and he defined it as reduction in stage I to a "very small number [of] NDVs and ABMs." The working group could consider the Gromyko plan and any other proposals agreeing with this principle. U.S. Ambassador Timberlake rejected this approach and advocated terms of reference that would be broad enough to cover both the U.S. and the Soviet plans.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>From Geneva, tel. DISTO 1846, June 10, 1964, Confidential.

<sup>2</sup>To Geneva, tel. TODIS 1461, June 15, 1964, Confidential.

<sup>3</sup>From Geneva, tels. DISTO 1929 and 1930, July 7, 1964, Confidential.

<sup>4</sup>From Geneva, tel. DISTO 1940, July 8, 1964, Confidential.

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Ambassador Timberlake said that the Soviet proposal was unacceptable if it meant that the working group would not be able to discuss the U.S. plan. He insisted that it should be able to discuss various levels of deterrence. Although Ambassador Tsarapkin indicated that it could discuss "specific numbers," he concluded that we were not ready to accept the "umbrella" and continued to attack us for trying to retain the nuclear threat as long as possible.<sup>1</sup>

Although Mr. Zorin had used the term "minimum deterrence," Ambassador Tsarapkin notably refrained from using this expression. Our delegation suggested that a compromise formula should be found for the terms of reference, but Washington believed that the ENDC majority would support our original approach. It instructed the delegation to stick to the previous position, since the real issue was not the terms of reference, "but Soviet insistence we adopt [the] Gromyko proposal as [the] basis [of] discussion, which you should continue [to] oppose."<sup>2</sup> Since there was no change in the position of either side, no agreement was reached on a working group.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>From Geneva, tel. DISTO 1944, July 10, 1964, Confidential.

<sup>2</sup>From Geneva, tel. DISTO 1947, July 10, 1964; to Geneva, tel. TODIS 1514, July 13, 1964, Confidential.

<sup>3</sup>For an account of the plenary U.S.-Soviet debate, see ACDA/RS memoranda, "The Soviet Position on an ENDC Nuclear Delivery Vehicles Working Group" and "The American Position on an ENDC Nuclear Delivery Vehicles Working Group" (1966). The Gromyko proposal is examined in a memorandum by Feiveson (ACDA/ST), "The Soviet Position on the Gromyko Proposal (U)," Confidential.

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It still seemed likely, however, that general and complete disarmament would occupy a prominent place at the next session of the ENDC. In a note of September 29 to Mr. Foster, Ambassador Timberlake noted that the Soviets had indicated for the first time that our approach to the nuclear delivery vehicles problem would place them at a disadvantage because of our superiority. "A statement of this kind was certainly not easy for the Soviets to make," he wrote, "and one reason why they did make it may have been clearly to indicate to the US the definite unacceptability of our approach." As a way out of the impasse, he suggested developing a new approach which would avoid the need for disclosing initial levels. He pointed out that the Soviets could hardly afford to disclose initial levels "without seriously affecting their political and military prestige." He suggested that reductions might be made "by specified numbers from both sides." If we proposed specific numbers, however, we would have to rely on our unilateral intelligence, which might be compromised. He thought that nuclear delivery vehicles reductions could be verified by the same measures we contemplated for the freeze. More generally, he noted that we had placed great emphasis on verification and peacekeeping but had not submitted any specific proposals in the context of general and complete disarmament.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Timberlake to Foster, ltr., Sept. 29, 1964, Secret.

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On the other hand, an ACDA in-house study, initiated by General Dean, the Assistant Director in charge of the Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau, questioned our existing plan on other grounds. Noting that it would "tend to enhance and perpetuate" our existing nuclear superiority and reduce our relative position in conventional armaments, the study found that this approach would "threaten world military balance and stability." It also noted deficiencies in our verification and peacekeeping proposals. On balance, however, it concluded that it would be undesirable to revise the plan because change "would most certainly result in a substantial 'hardening' of its provisions and safeguards" and widening of the gulf between the American and Soviet positions. It could possibly curtail the disarmament dialog between the United States and the Soviet Union, without moving the United States any closer to its ultimate goal.<sup>1</sup>

Although the Soviet and American plans for general and complete disarmament were resubmitted to the Disarmament Commission in the spring of 1965,<sup>2</sup> both plans remained unchanged and the whole question of general and complete disarmament thenceforth receded from the limelight. The Indian representative was not greatly exaggerating when he told the ENDC in 1968 that there

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<sup>1</sup>"Report of the Study Group on the Review and Appraisal of the U.S. and USSR Draft GCD Proposals (U)," Secret/Noform.

<sup>2</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 77-102, 111-140.

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had been no negotiations on general and complete disarmament since 1964.<sup>1</sup>

Both the United States and the Soviet Union realized that it was fruitless to continue the discussions on general and complete disarmament. The commitment of large U.S. forces to Vietnam (1965) made it obvious that large-scale disarmament would be impossible in the near future. As Premier Kosygin told the Supreme Soviet on August 3, 1966, "The present moment, of course, when the international situation is exceedingly tense, little favors the adoption of fundamental disarmament measures."<sup>2</sup>

The Vietnamese war did not, however, prevent progress on collateral nuclear measures. The treaties on non-proliferation and outer space were negotiated and signed. The United States continued to advocate and work for a strategic nuclear delivery vehicles freeze with reductions, a fissionable materials production cutoff and transfer, and a comprehensive test ban. With some modifications, these were the stage I nuclear measures of our treaty outline, and they remained in the forefront of our disarmament policy even though the more far-reaching and long-term aspects of general and complete disarmament were no longer being actively discussed.

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<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.387, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1966, p. 504. At the same time, the Soviet representative to the ENDC rejected a UAR proposal for a working group on strategic delivery vehicles on the ground that no working group would accomplish anything while the Vietnamese war was going on (ENDC/PV.272, pp. 31-32).

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Final Draft

THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY DURING THE  
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION (U)

II. POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS

J. CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

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## J. CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

ACDA's role in the establishment and implementation of US policies on the transfer of conventional armaments to other countries is derived from Sections 2 and 22 of the Act establishing the Agency.<sup>1/</sup> The former section stipulated that ACDA was formed to be "a central organization charged by statute with primary responsibility" for the formulation and implementation of United States arms control and disarmament policy in a manner which will promote the national security. This section further specified that the Agency "must have such a position within the Government that it can provide the President, the Secretary of State ... and the Congress with recommendations concerning United States arms control and disarmament policy, and can assess the effect of these recommendations upon our foreign policies, our national security policies and our economy." Section 22 of the Act designated the Agency's Director as "the principal adviser to the Secretary of State and the President on arms control and disarmament matters."

<sup>1/</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 482-85.

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Included within this mandate is the responsibility to play a major role in the US Government's search for ways of encouraging regional arms control and disarmament agreements and discouraging arms races among the developing nations. The Agency's efforts in support of the US objectives in this regard, in the first two years of ACDA's existence, were constrained by its small staff and the very heavy demands on its resources to support negotiations at the ENDC. As a result, the Agency's activity in the arms transfer field was limited essentially to providing a representative, on an occasional basis, to ad hoc working groups organized to review issues relating to the Near East, Latin America and Africa. Once more staff became available, the Agency enlarged its role in the arms transfer field, particularly focusing on a continuing search of the prospects for regional arms limitations and the impact of US arms transfer policies and their implementation on opportunities for such area arrangements.

In proceeding to take on its responsibilities in this field, the Agency, in late 1963 and early 1964, established the framework for a comprehensive program. This consisted

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of three related efforts, i.e., the establishment of a research base, measurement of the magnitude of the US problem in the arms transfer field, and determination of the Agency's proper role. As early as late 1962, the Agency took a major step in establishing proper research backup. ACDA's Research Council approved an external assistance project on the "Political Aspects of Curtailing an Arms Race in the Developing Areas." <sup>1/</sup> A study on "Arms Control Arrangements for Latin America" was produced by the Agency's WEC Bureau in August 1963. In addition, in order to bring together relevant information on past attempts to check the international flow of armaments, an in-house paper was completed, in October 1962, by the Agency's - - Reference Research Staff on the "History of Developments Relating to Efforts to Control the International Traffic in Arms." <sup>2/</sup> Subsequently, similar background material was brought together in "A Summary History of Efforts by the

<sup>1/</sup> The Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Regional Arms Control Arrangements for Developing Areas (U) IR-24, September 21, 1964.

<sup>2/</sup> James S. Bodnar (IR), History of Developments Relating to Efforts to Control the International Traffic in Arms, November 7, 1962.

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United States to Control the Export of Arms," 1/ and  
"The League of Nations' Efforts to Ascertain What Laws  
Nations Had for Controlling the Arms Trade." 2/

As introductions to the problems involved in achieving regional arms limitations, the Agency-sponsored Aspen Summer Study in 1964 produced a chapter of its final report on "Prospects for Arms Control in the Developing Areas." 3/ Relevant information available elsewhere in the Government, particularly on the details of the US Military Assistance Program, the arms export policies and activities of other nations, and the military resources of developing countries, was collected in an attempt to establish a base from which to operate. A large part of the initial in-house research work was devoted to a study of the existing US Government

1/ Alan V. Washburn (GC), A Summary History of Efforts by the United States to Control the Export of Arms, October 23, 1964.

2/ Alan V. Washburn (GC), League of Nations Efforts to Ascertain What Laws Nations Had for Controlling the Arms Trade, November 30, 1964.

3/ William T. R. Fox and Robert Komer, "Prospects for Arms Control in the Developing Areas" in Arms and Arms Control in the 1965-1975 (U) Aspen Institute of Humanistic Studies, Aspen, Colorado, ST-52, Annex Volume 1, pp. C1-C-19 (Confidential)

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organization, legislation, and policies in the field.<sup>1/</sup>

Concurrent with the Agency's review of the legal organization and policy aspects and based on the findings that were obtained, there was underway within ACDA a searching consideration of the role the Agency should play. The objectives of the ACDA program and the mode of operation to meet the goals that were ultimately adopted were based primarily on the recommendations included in a broad-ranging

<sup>1/</sup> Roxanne George (GC) to Washburn (GC), Memorandum, December 9, 1964.

Alan V. Washburn (GC), Memorandum for the File, Current United States Regulations on the Export of Technical Data, Jan 28, 1965.

Alan V. Washburn (GC), Memorandum for the Files, United Nations Efforts Regarding the Arms Traffic, December 1, 1964.

Roxanne George and Alan V. Washburn (GC), Memorandum for the Files, Export Controls Pursuant to the Battle Act, February 16, 1965 (Confidential).

Alan V. Washburn (GC), Memorandum for the Files, A Summary of Current Laws and Regulations Governing the Control of the Departments of State and Commerce Over the Export of Items Useful in a War Effort, December 28, 1964.

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ST Bureau paper.<sup>1/</sup> It set forth the requirement for developing and maintaining close liaison with particular offices in the Departments of State and Defense, the inter-agency groups on which ACDA should be represented, and the outline for a comprehensive in-house and external research program.

As the Agency was developing its research base and establishing the role it was to play, it became progressively more immersed in interagency actions. A major impetus in this regard was the limited test ban treaty of August 1963.<sup>2/</sup> In accordance with the Agency's responsibilities in dealing with problems related to the Test Ban, in the months after the Treaty was signed ACDA was consulted frequently by the Office of Munitions-Control, Department of State, on export applications involving equipment or technology with some actual or potential relevance to nuclear testing. A memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, January 17, 1964,

1/ Jerome H. Kahan (ST), Weapons Transfer and Arms Control, June 12, 1964, SECRET

2/ Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 291-293.

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formalized ACDA's participation in clearing such cases. This was expanded subsequently to the review of applications involving nuclear delivery vehicles or the technology related to their development, including space-related equipment that could have missile applications.

ACDA participated in other interagency actions concerned with export control regulations and the release of restricted data administered by the AEC and the Departments of Defense and Commerce. After National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 294 on "US Nuclear and Strategy Delivery System to France" <sup>1/</sup> was issued April 20, 1964, the Agency provided major inputs to the implementing guidance for use throughout the Government in clearing export cases and was instrumental in expanding the scope of the directive to cover other countries. On the basis of these contributions, the Agency was brought into the Operating Committee of the Advisory Committee on Export Policy (ACEP) in a consultative capacity, and into other interagency groups dealing with the export of materials to Communist China and Eastern Europe.

<sup>1/</sup> National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 294,  
April 20, 1964 (~~Secret/NoFORN~~).

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Research by the ST Bureau,<sup>1/</sup> or for the Agency in ST-monitored contracts, on the proliferation of missiles and missile technology was especially useful in maximizing the Agency's impact on actions involving these subjects. As a result of the broadening contacts within other agencies that resulted from NSAM 294 and the limited test ban treaty, the Agency, during 1964 and early 1965, moved into a position from which it could inject arms control and-disarmament considerations into an ever-widening range of issues. Elements of the Department of State, in particular, became more aware of the role that the Agency could play in arms export problems and consulted Agency officers more and more on specific issues. In this way, the Agency's involvement in conventional arms transfers began to grow.

The Agency's increased activity in conventional arms transfers was spurred by the growing concern within the Executive Branch with the actual or potential races in

1/ Jerome H. Kahan (ST), An Initial Study of Ballistic Missile Proliferation, November 1, 1965 (Secret/NoFORN).

G. E. Hlavka and G. R. Pittman, Jr., Clandestine Production of Missile Components, April 10, 1963, Aerospace Corporation A 63 - 1740 A - 039.

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conventional arms among developing countries and the diversion of scarce human and material resources, critically required for economic and social progress, for the acquisition of weaponry.

The Secretary of State, at a news conference on January 2, 1964,<sup>1/</sup> emphasized how important it was for the major powers to avoid providing advanced weapons, no longer required in their inventories, to the developing countries. He pointed to the sharp increase in qualitative arms races and waste of scarce resources that would result from such a proliferation of sophisticated armaments.

On April 22, 1964, the White House issued NSAM 297<sup>2/</sup> which outlined the policies to be followed in military assistance and sales for Latin America. The guidance specified that major considerations in providing armaments would be that such acquisitions by the Latin American states not interfere with socioeconomic development and that the weapons provided not be of the "prestige" type unrelated to actual defense needs.

1/ Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 1-4.

2/ National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 297, April 22, 1964, ~~Secret~~

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Mr. Foster, at the ENDC on September 8, 1964, <sup>1/</sup> urged that the small and medium powers explore means toward verified agreements providing for regional control of conventional armaments and emphasized that the security of these powers would be better served by such agreements than by regional arms races.

President Johnson, in his message to Congress on Foreign Aid, January 14, 1965, <sup>2/</sup> discussing the needs of the developing countries, emphasized how important it was for these countries to avoid spending their resources "on unnecessary armaments and foreign adventures."

----- At the May 17, 1965, meeting of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, <sup>3/</sup> Mr. Foster, in a wide-ranging review of arms control and disarmament proposals that had been put forth by the United States and other countries, called the attention of the member-states to the threats to world peace arising from regional arms races among the small powers. He referred to the fact that the procurement and subsequent maintenance of advanced weapons systems would constitute a tragic and unnecessary drain on the many countries which are striving

<sup>1/</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 390-95.

<sup>2/</sup> Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 1, 1965, pp. 126-132.

<sup>3/</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 171-81.

for social, industrial and agricultural development. He pointed out that the principal objective of United States assistance to the developing nations is to foster economic and social development and not increase armament levels beyond minimum security requirements. He emphasized that in providing future assistance the United States would continue to regard favorably the efforts of the individual countries concerned to avoid excessive armament acquisitions. He urged self-restraining initiatives taken at the local, and preferably at the regional level which could make great contributions to international stability and security.

The growing interest among top officials of the Government came at a time when ACDA's capabilities to deal with conventional arms transfer issues were expanding. The Agency's competence in the arms transfer field had been increasing as a result of the research base that had been developed, including an in-house study, "Control Over Small Power Armaments," <sup>1/</sup> the MIT study on prospects for regional arms arrangements<sup>2/</sup> and participation on various State

- <sup>1/</sup> Thomas Irvin (IR), Control Over Small Power Armaments, Working Program Paper No. 17. Feb. 2, 1965 (~~Confidential~~).
- <sup>2/</sup> The Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Regional Arms Control Arrangements for Developing Areas (U), IR-24, September 21, 1964.

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Department-organized working groups dealing with particular regional problems.

It became apparent that the Agency's emerging role in the arms transfer field required some internal organizational adjustments in order to maximize its contribution. In September 1965, the Director established an ACDA Arms Transfer Study Group 1/ charged with developing and maintaining a consolidated, comprehensive information base on arms transfers, worldwide. The Group was chaired by the Deputy General Counsel of the Agency, with members drawn from all the operating bureaus and offices. This across-the-board representation was designed to ensure that the political, military, scientific, legal, and economic aspects in the field were adequately covered and closely coordinated in Agency research and actions. The Group met frequently to review ACDA's participation in interagency actions and to initiate research projects. Among the studies accomplished under the Group's sponsorship was an analysis of possible end-use restrictions on armaments transferred by the United States to other countries.2/

1/ Agency Notice, Establishment of ACDA Arms Transfer Study Group, September 16, 1965.

2/ Edmund S. Finegold (WEC) End-Use Restrictions on US Military Assistance to India and Pakistan, September, 1965 (~~Secret/NoFORN~~).

Thomas H. Karas (WEC) End-Use Safeguards on Arms Transfers, September 2, 1966 (~~Secret/NoFORN~~).

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Studies were also completed in the WEC Bureau on the availability of certain sophisticated armaments among developing countries in South Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East.<sup>1/</sup>

One of the first major policy matters confronting the Study Group was a Maltese resolution,<sup>2/</sup> tabled at the General Assembly by Ambassador Pardo, proposing that the ENDC devise a system for publicizing, through the United Nations, the transfers of armaments between states whether by sale, trade, or any other means. This resolution was studied in ACDA as well as in other agencies. On the basis of the Agency's historical studies on previous attempts to publicize or register arms shipments, particularly those under the aegis of the League of Nations, ACDA was in a position to play a leading role in the establishment of the U.S. stand.

Mr. Foster, speaking before the First Committee of the

1/ Edmund S. Finegold(WEC), Jet Aircraft in Latin America, Feb. 1966 (Secret/NoFORN).

Edmund S. Finegold(WEC), Jet Aircraft in Africa, Mar. 1966 (Secret/NoFORN).

Edmund S. Finegold(WEC), Jet Aircraft in the Mid-East, Mar. 1966 (Secret/NoFORN).

Edmund S. Finegold(WEC), Principal Combatant Ships in Latin America, the Near East, and Africa, Apr. 1966 (Secret/NoFORN).

2/ Documents on Disarmament, 1965, p. 586.

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General Assembly on December 2, 1965,<sup>1/</sup> reiterated the concern of the United States for the arms races that were underway, pointing out, however, that the Pardo resolution was no more likely to succeed in "eliminating secrecy from arms transfers" than past efforts to that end. He hailed the Maltese initiative for calling attention to an aspect of arms control and reduction which too often was ignored. On December 2, the resolution was defeated in the voting in the First Committee with the United States and 38 other members abstaining.

1966 was the crucial year in establishing the form and substance of ACDA's participation in arms transfer policy actions within the Government. In Point Seven of his message to the opening of the ENDC on January 27, 1966,<sup>2/</sup> the President set forth the concern of the United States with the nonnuclear arms races that were underway all over the world. He suggested that countries, on a regional basis, "explore ways to limit competition among themselves for costly weapons often sought for reason of illusory prestige." He stated further that if "arrangements can be worked out and assurance can be given that they will be observed, the United States stands

1/ . Ibid, pp. 617- 622.

2/ Ibid, 1966, pp. 7-8.

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ready to respect them." To follow up on Point Seven, a position paper for use at the ENDC on "Cooperative Arrangements to Limit Arms Races and Unnecessary Armaments" was prepared by ACDA and approved by the Committee of Principals on January 21, 1966. 1/

At the ENDC on April 19, Mr. Foster elaborated on the substance of the U.S. position on regional arms races. 2/ He suggested six principles as possible guidelines for the control of conventional arms: that the affected countries neither import nor produce military equipment which they agree to regulate; that the initiative come from within the region concerned; that any arrangement include all states in that region whose participation is deemed important by other participants; that potential suppliers respect the restrictions agreed to; that the arrangements contribute to the security of the states concerned and to the maintenance of a stable military balance; and, lastly, that provision be made for satisfying all interested parties that the arrangement is being respected. He offered the full cooperation of the United States in respecting and implementing regional arms control arrangements.

1/ Position Paper, Cooperative Arrangements to Limit Arms Races in Unnecessary Armaments, February 1, 1966.

2/ Documents on Disarmament, 1966, pp. 226-230.

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At the ENDC, on June 14, <sup>1/</sup> he reiterated the intent and substance of the President's Point Seven urging, in addition, that ENDC members who are suppliers of arms encourage regional initiatives by "signifying readiness to respect regional agreements on the limitation of conventional armaments."

The President, in a speech at the Pan American Health Union in Washington on the Alliance for Progress on August 17 warned the Latin American states of the need to avoid needless expenditures on armaments. <sup>2/</sup>

During the fall of 1966, in preparation for the 21st General Assembly, the Agency prepared and coordinated a position paper <sup>3/</sup> to be used if the subject of regional controls of conventional armaments was surfaced. - In addition, a contingency paper was prepared outlining the U.S. response if the Maltese delegation reintroduced its proposal on the international publication of arms shipments. This, however, did not come to pass.

During 1966, the efforts within the Agency to develop measures for the control of the international arms traffic

1/ Ibid, pp. 345-346.

2/ Congressional Record, Aug. 17, 1966, pp. 18845-18850.

3/ Position Paper, Regional Controls of Conventional Armaments, Oct. 21, 1966.

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and to participate fully in the formulation of US policy on individual arms transfers were stepped up. Contacts were established with key offices, particularly those in the Departments of State and Defense and AID. The Agency was represented in a wide variety of interdepartmental consultations. The tempo of coordinations on policy guidance matters, originating in the Department of State, increased considerably. The research backup required to support these efforts was also expanded.

At the end of 1965, the Agency initiated a particularly promising contract research effort. MIT, which had performed so well in the study on regional arms arrangements, was engaged to study the relationship between arms control and limited war.<sup>1/</sup> As the study progressed, it began to focus on the impact of arms-infusions into trouble areas. From this experience, MIT then proceeded into a detailed review of arms supply policies and activities of major powers. The study, due to be completed in the summer of 1969, will provide a most valuable input to the Agency's work.<sup>2/</sup> In May 1966,

1/ Massachusetts Institute of Technology(MIT), The Control of Local Conflicts, A Design Study on Arms Control in the Developing Areas, Sept. 30, 1967 (WEC 98), Vol. I-IV Unclassified; Vol. V(~~Secret~~)-----

2/ Massachusetts Institute of Technology(MIT), Arms Control and Local Conflict (WEC-135) to be completed by Aug. 15, 1969.

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a study was completed on the "US Military Assistance Program." <sup>1/</sup> In July, an analysis was prepared on the nature and scope of Communist military assistance. <sup>2/</sup> In the last quarter of the year, efforts were initiated with the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, to prepare a declaration on military expenditures for consideration at the meeting of the Chiefs of State of OAS members scheduled for Punta del Este in April 1967. <sup>3/</sup> The Agency, too, participated with the Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, in developing suggestions for curtailing the growing military establishments and arsenals in Africa.

In October 1966, the Agency initiated a pilot study on the prospects for regional arrangements in the Horn of Africa, comprising Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. <sup>4/</sup> The study was

- <sup>1/</sup> Lt. Gen. Dean (WEC) to Chairman, ACDA Arms Transfer Study Group. Memorandum, May 24, 1966 (~~Secret/NoFORN~~)
- <sup>2/</sup> Walter L. Deemer (WEC) to ACDA Bureaus and Offices, Communist Bloc Military Assistance, July 19, 1966 (~~Secret~~) NoFORN/Controlled Dissemination.
- <sup>3/</sup> To Buenos Aires, State Circular 123308, Jan. 23, 1967 (~~Confidential~~)
- <sup>4/</sup> Edmund S. Finegold (WEC), The Control of Arms Transfers into the Horn of Africa, Mar. 3, 1967 (WEC-667) (~~Secret/NoFORN~~)

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designed to examine thoroughly all the factors involved in attempting to inhibit an arms race among developing countries. It was to be policy oriented, with the results emphasizing unilateral and multilateral arms control and disarmament actions, along with other steps which might be required for their implementation. The study was conducted under the sponsorship of the Agency's Arms Transfer Study Group, with full-time participation by analysts representing the operating bureaus and offices of the Agency. The study was completed in February 1967 and was circulated to appropriate offices within the Departments of State and Defense. Among other things, it revealed dramatically the complexities involved in inhibiting a regional arms race and the importance of parallel actions by the major arms suppliers, not only to restrain the flow of arms but also to encourage and support regional economic cooperation among the nations in the area.

In an attempt to establish a comprehensive data base on U.S. arms exports, in April 1967 the Agency's Economics Bureau established a reimbursable agreement with the Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, for the compilation of statistics on all significant U. S. exports of potential military value. <sup>1/</sup> The Economics Bureau also produced

1/ U.S. Bureau of Census, Dept. of Commerce, Data Compilation of U.S. Shipments of Military Hardware, Selected Commodities Associated With Military Programs, and Strategic Materials, E/RA 26 (Confidential)

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the first in a series of annual summaries on "Worldwide Defense Expenditures and Selected Economic Data." <sup>1/</sup> The first report, covering calendar year 1964, included statistics on 120 countries and stressed the fact that defense expenditures among the less developed countries had grown at a much faster rate than those of the developed countries.

The passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 added further momentum to the Agency's endeavors in the arms transfer field. Section 514 (a) of the Act specified that "programs for the sale of defense articles or services ..... shall be administered so as to encourage regional arms control and disarmament agreements and so as to discourage arms races." <sup>2/</sup> The intent of the legislation clearly established additional responsibilities for the Agency.

As a consequence of the growing tempo and expansion in activities, as well as encouragement from Point Seven of the President's message to the ENDC and the section of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 quoted above, it became

1/ Worldwide Defense Expenditures and Selected Economic Data, Calendar Year 1964 (ACDA Research Report 66-1), January 1966.

2/ Foreign Assistance Act of 1966, Public Law 89-583 (HR 15750) 80 Stat. 795, Sept. 19, 1966.

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apparent that more of the Agency's efforts had to be devoted to the search for ways of encouraging regional arms arrangements and inhibiting the flow of arms to the developing areas. During the last quarter of the year, there was under way in the Agency a review of ACDA's role in the field and the personnel required to support the role. This culminated in a directive from Mr. Foster=<sup>1/</sup> establishing the Arms Transfer Coordinating Group, with a full-time executive officer and necessary level of support from the operating bureaus and offices of the Agency, as required. His directive abolished the ACDA Arms Transfer Study Group and set forth the following specific functions for the new element:

1. Maintain Agency contacts with other departments and agencies with respect to arms transfer matters and related export controls.
2. Plan, coordinate, and direct Agency research.
3. Prepare draft position and contingency papers.
4. Recommend Agency initiatives for improving US policies and performance in the field or suggest diplomatic initiatives designed to lead to appropriate actions.

1/ Agency Instruction No. 21, Establishment of Arms Transfer Coordinating Group, November 25, 1966.

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The Arms Transfer Coordinating Group, with a full-time executive officer and a chairman devoting a large portion of his time to arms transfer problems provided the focal point for intensifying and broadening the Agency's contacts with all the government agencies involved in the field. During 1967, the extensive background and policy data holdings of the Agency were drawn together in the office of the executive officer to form a kind of Agency "operations center" for the activity. Close coordination was maintained on a day-to-day basis with key offices in the Departments of State and Defense dealing with arms transfer matters. As a result of this persistent liaison effort, the Agency was brought more and more into major interdepartmental meetings on a routine basis. ACDA participated in the regular meetings of the State/Defense Coordinating Committee on military sales, as well as the sessions of the senior and regional interdepartmental groups dealing with major arms transfer issues.

The importance of increased ACDA participation in the "high councils" where decisions on arms exports are made was highlighted by a staff study of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee published in January. <sup>1/</sup> It attributed

1/ Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 24-37.

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a secondary role to ACDA in arms transfer policy formulation. The study also criticized the Executive Branch's supervision of the military export program and the apparent "inconsistency" in its objectives. It concluded, inter alia, that the U.S. should take the initiative in organizing regional zones free of sophisticated weapons. The staff study spurred the Agency to a greater level of participation in high-level interagency deliberations and also facilitated acceptance of an expanded ACDA role on the part of senior officials in other agencies.

The Agency continued to make substantive inputs on munitions control cases and other export issues relating to space and nuclear technology. It participated in the inter-agency discussions on such questions as US military supply policy for India and Pakistan, regional security for Latin America, and arms policy for the Middle East and North Africa. The declarations that were agreed on at the Punta del Este Conference (April 12-14, 1967) <sup>1/</sup> by the Chiefs of State of the twenty member-nations of the OAS included a pledge to eliminate unnecessary military expenditures. For more than six months prior to the event,

1/ Congressional Record, April 17, 1967, pp. H 4500, H 4201.

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ACDA participated with the appropriate offices in the Department of State in the preparations for this pledge. Backing up its efforts in this regard was an external research project on the political role of the military and prospects for arms control in the region, conducted on a reimbursable basis by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.<sup>1/</sup>

In an attempt to have available a comprehensive body of basic data for "quick reaction" to policy issues, a continuing in-house research program was initiated to compile summaries on the military resources of developing countries and the characteristics and costs of significant armaments produced by the major weapons suppliers.

Prior to the 1967 Middle East crisis, the Agency produced a series of in-house studies on arms shipments to that area, existing weapons inventories, missile proliferation problems and arms control possibilities. In addition, selected regional background material was provided by ACDA contractors. During the crisis, as well as in its aftermath, the Agency participated in the preparation of a wide variety of papers and recommendations

<sup>1/</sup> US Department of State, The Role of the Armed Forces in Latin America (IR/RA 17).

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for the consideration of top-level interagency groups, including the Special Committee of the National Security Council set up by the President. Contributions were made to the question of restraints on arms shipments into the area, the development of the President's registration proposal, an examination of the problems of missile proliferation and the development of the diplomatic effort to hold down a renewed arms buildup. The Middle East crisis added to a growing concern about the role of the major powers in inhibiting regional arms races. The President's proposal in his June 19 Speech to Educators<sup>1/</sup> on a registration scheme by which UN member nations would report all shipments of arms to the Middle East was offered as a major step in the search for means to slow down the flow of weaponry into that troubled area.

In preparation for the Twenty-Second U.N. General Assembly, the Agency developed a Position Paper on the "Control of Conventional Arms Transfers." It included positions on the "International Publication of Arms

<sup>1/</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 263-264.

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Transfers," "Control of Arms Transfers in the Middle East," and "Regional Controls of Conventional Armaments." <sup>1/</sup>

The Agency's capability to deal with the wide range of problems in the field was enhanced by an increasing output of reports and studies from both in-house and contract resources. By the middle of 1968, the reimbursable agreement with the Census Bureau, for example, produced a series of periodic reports, covering the period 1965 through 1967, on U.S. arms exports. <sup>2/</sup> In addition, the Agency's Economics Bureau published an updated version of "Worldwide Defense Expenditures and Selected Economic Data," covering 1965. <sup>3/</sup> These statistical reports were widely distributed throughout the Government and provided a body of collected data that had not previously been available.

- 1/ Twenty-Second United Nations General Assembly Position Paper, Control of Conventional Arms Transfers, Oct. 18, 1967.
- 2/ US Bureau of Census, Department of Commerce, Data Compilation of US Shipments of Military Hardware, Selected Commodities Associated With Military Programs, and Strategic Materials, E/RA 26  
(Confidential)--
- 3/ ACDA/E, Worldwide Military Expenditures and Related Data, Calendar Year 1965, December, 1967.

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The Agency participated in reviewing existing restrictions on the disposition of US arms sold to our allies and eventually made surplus through obsolescence. It was consulted frequently in Executive Branch deliberations on the proposed amendments to the Foreign Assistance legislation to further restrict the amount and type of US military assistance and sales to developing countries. After the passage of the legislation, the so-called Conte-Long <sup>1/</sup> and Symington Amendments, <sup>2/</sup> the Agency took its place as a regular member of the special interagency groups organized to implement the new restrictions.

By the end of 1967, the Agency was so deeply involved in interagency actions and internal research support for these actions that it became apparent that organizational changes had to be made to enlarge the permanent staff devoted to arms transfer problems, formalize the place of

1/ Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1968, 2d Proviso to the Appropriations for Military Assistance and Section 119.

2/ Foreign Assistance Act, 1961 as Amended in 1968, Section 620S.

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the operating element within ACDA organizational structure, and establish a senior policy review and coordinating body for arms transfer matters. The need for some internal changes had been highlighted in a report prepared by a consultant to the Agency.<sup>1/</sup> This report also recommended that ACDA attempt to formalize its status in the inter-agency machinery dealing with arms transfer issues.

On February 1, 1968, the Director established the Arms Transfer Division, within the Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau,<sup>2/</sup> and provided it with authorization for a full-time staff and an expanded mandate from which to operate. He also called into being the Arms Transfer Advisory Council, to be chaired by the Deputy General Counsel, with membership consisting of ACDA's four Assistant Directors, Executive Director, and the General Counsel. This Council was charged with providing general guidance, making recommendations to the Director on policy matters, monitoring the Agency's program in the arms transfer field and furnishing Agency representation at high-level meetings, as appropriate. These actions recognized the

1/ Memorandum, C. Tracy Barnes to Mr. Alexander, Suggested Actions by ACDA Re Conventional Arms Transfers. July 11, 1967 (~~Secret~~).

2/ ACDA Instruction No. 29, Realignment of the Agency's Arms Transfer Effort, February 1, 1968.

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significant role that the Agency had come to play in the field and established a suitable organizational base for an increased role. It gave the activity permanent organizational status within ACDA with an initial staff to deal with the complexities in the field and ensured the active participation of the Agency's senior officials in arms transfer matters. The Agency thus assumed a much improved posture for making a greater contribution to the Government's efforts in the field. It is now well structured to inject arms control and disarmament considerations into major policy issues and to exploit opportunities for achieving US objectives in relation to regional arms limitations.

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Part II, Section K: Other Measures	1968	A
	<del>1. Bomber Destruction 10 p. Secret</del> <i>open 4-17-92 NLS 91-165</i>		
	<del>2. Chemical and Biological Weapons 19 p. Secret</del> <i>open 4-17-92 NLS 91-165</i>		
	<del>3. Foreign Bases and Troop Withdrawals 22 p. Secret</del> <i>open 4-17-92 NLS 91-165</i>		
	4. The Gomulka Proposal for a Nuclear Freeze in Central Europe 19 p. Top Secret <i>sanitized 12-23-93 NLS 91-165</i>		
	<del>5. Military Expenditures 32 p. Secret</del> <i>open 4-17-92 NLS 91-165</i>		
	<del>6. Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons 26 p. Secret</del> <i>[added to file 6-19-92]</i> "		
	<del>7. Observation Posts 17 p. Secret</del> "		

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Final Draft

THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT  
AGENCY DURING THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION (U)

II. POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS

K. OTHER MEASURES

1. Bomber Destruction

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

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NARA. Date 4-15-92

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Number 4 of 11 copies, Series A.

## II. K. 1 BOMBER DESTRUCTION

As noted above, the question of eliminating bombers and other nuclear delivery vehicles arose in the context of general and complete disarmament.<sup>1</sup>

As a separable measure, bomber destruction was first proposed in ACDA Draft Plan #1 (1961). In stage A of this plan, the United States and the Soviet Union would each destroy 30 medium jet bombers a month during the first year and 15 a month during the second year, while they were negotiating on the next stage of disarmament.<sup>2</sup>

While JCS considered the measure as then defined to be militarily disadvantageous to the United States, the Secretary of Defense felt that it could be carried out for psychological reasons as a confidence-building gesture without serious risk of degrading our military capability.

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<sup>1</sup> See above, chapter I.

<sup>2</sup> ACDA Draft Plan #1, Nov. 15, 1961, Secret. This plan was prepared by a disarmament panel Mr. Foster had chaired before becoming ACDA Director.

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The proposed measure was discussed by ACDA Director Foster with President Kennedy, who, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, authorized ACDA to offer 15 B-47 aircraft per month for matching bilateral destruction of medium jet bombers over a two-year period, if it was determined to be in the overall interest of the United States. However, authority to release this measure as an official proposal was withheld pending further developments.<sup>1</sup> This subject was re-opened within ACDA during the 1962 fall recess of the ENDC as a possible separable measure for use in the ENDC negotiations in November and December.

On November 20, 1962, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency asked the President to approve a series of recommendations regarding modifications and elaborations of the United States position on

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<sup>1</sup> ACDA Paper, "Pre-Treaty Bonfires as Specified Armaments," Oct. 19, 1962. ~~Secret.~~

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its program for general and complete disarmament and on a pre-stage I disarmament proposal for the destruction of medium jet bombers.<sup>1</sup> Under this proposal the U.S. and USSR medium jet bombers were to be destroyed at the rate of 30 per month for two years, beginning July 1, 1963, and their destruction verified by an agreed international group. This position was approved by the President on November 21, 1962. As a result of a subsequent reappraisal, the Department of Defense agreed to furnish 30 B-47 aircraft of which only 20 were to be flyable and the other 10 non-flyable from storage. This change was reflected in the U.S. proposal

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<sup>1</sup> ACDA memorandum for the President, "Recommendations Regarding Resumption of Geneva Disarmament Negotiations," Nov. 20, 1962.

~~Confidential.~~

<sup>2</sup> Memorandum for Members of the Committee of Principals, "Recommendations Regarding the Destruction of Medium Jet Bombers," July 12, 1963, ~~Confidential.~~

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discussed informally with the Soviets in the summer of 1963.<sup>1</sup>

A "bomber bonfire" first received public notice by newspaper articles appearing following Secretary of State Rusk's stopover in London on his return from NATO. At a news conference on January 2, 1964, Secretary Rusk stated that there had been informal discussions concerning the possibility and that some physical disarmament, if it could be achieved, would be a good step.<sup>2</sup>

Apparently responding to the U.S. private B-47/TU-16 bonfire approach, the Soviets publicly proposed in the ENDC on January 28, 1964, the destruction of all bombers as one of nine measures for the slowing down of the arms race and easing of tensions.<sup>3</sup>

Mr. Fisher publicly presented the U.S. proposal for the destruction of an equal number of B-47 and

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<sup>1</sup> Circ. agm. CA-7659, Feb. 3, 1964. ~~Confidential.~~

<sup>2</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., pp. 12-17.

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TU-16 (Badger) aircraft to the ENDC on March 19, 1964. We proposed that the United States and the USSR each destroy 30 B-47's and TU-16's per month of which at least 20 would be flyable and the remainder could be non-flyable. A total of 720 aircraft were to be destroyed over a two year period. Aircraft would be destroyed at a facility designated by the United States for the B-47's and by the USSR for the TU-16's. Destruction was to be verified by adversary observers.

The United States viewed the Soviet proposal for the destruction of all bomber aircraft as being one which would raise a series of complex problems such as the question of participating nations, and the question of just what would constitute a bomber for the purpose of the agreement. The great differences among nations in the size, mission and strategic role of the bomber fleet of each was recognized as well as the great differences in the effects which the elimination of all bombers would have on national security of the respective

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nations. The United States considered its B-47/TU-16 proposal as being a sensible first step.<sup>1</sup> The Soviets, on the other hand, considered that the adoption of the U.S. proposal for the gradual destruction of B-47's would not be a measure that could be characterized as disarmament.<sup>2</sup>

The U.S. B-47/TU-16 bonfire proposal was further discussed in some greater detail in the ENDC on July 16, 1964.<sup>3</sup> The U.S. position with respect to the Soviet proposal was restated: that any proposal for the elimination of bombers, even on a phased or limited basis, in isolation from other armaments, presented serious problems.

The Soviet Union, at the same session of the ENDC, while reaffirming their belief in the desirability of eliminating all bombers as a first step toward general and complete disarmament, did

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid, pp. 101-105.

<sup>2</sup> ENDC/PV 176, p. 30.

<sup>3</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 289-293.

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state that their position with respect to the order and sequence of the elimination of various types of bombers was flexible.<sup>1</sup> The Soviet Union again declined to accept the U.S. B-47/TU-16 bonfire proposal.<sup>2</sup>

The Soviet Union, in a December 7, 1964, memorandum to the UN General Assembly, repeated its bomber proposal with the suggestion that destruction be in terms of types within an agreed overall time limit.<sup>3</sup>

The United Kingdom gave its full endorsement to the U.S. B-47/TU-16 bonfire proposal.<sup>4</sup> Burma<sup>5</sup>, Canada<sup>6</sup>, Mexico<sup>7</sup>, and Nigeria<sup>8</sup> also viewed the

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<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV 199, p. 8.

<sup>2</sup> MemCon, De Palma-Mendelyevick, Aug. 1, 1964.

~~Confidential.~~

<sup>3</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 514-515.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 130.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 120.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 413.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., pp. 189-190.

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proposal with favor. To varying degrees, however, they considered it to be too limited in scope.

As a separable measure, bomber destruction became dormant after 1964. In the Committee of Principals, ACDA advanced a series of proposals to accompany a freeze on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles with the reduction of bombers and missiles. These proposals are reviewed elsewhere.<sup>1</sup>

In March 1966, Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin recalled the U.S. proposal in the ENDC and attacked us for trying to pass off the destruction of obsolete planes as a disarmament measure. He noted that we had subsequently reduced the number of B-47s by one-half while greatly increasing the striking power of our strategic nuclear forces.<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Fisher replied that most of the B-47s, though no longer operational, were in the U.S. mobilization reserve and could be promptly

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<sup>1</sup> See above, chapter E.

<sup>2</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1966, p. 120.

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reactivated. Moreover, would-be nuclear-weapon states might seek such planes as delivery vehicles, even though the major powers considered them obsolescent. The United States still thought that the destruction of the planes would be a significant disarmament measure, particularly in connection with a freeze on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.<sup>1</sup>

Inasmuch as the Soviets had shown little interest in the U.S. B-47/TU-16 destruction proposal the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency advised the Committee of Principals on March 24, 1967, that there was no further justification for maintaining any of the B-47's in costly storage for arms control purposes and that the requirement was thus terminated.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 144.

<sup>2</sup> Memorandum for the Committee of Principals, Mar. 24, 1967. ~~Secret.~~

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This document consists of 19 pages.

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Final Draft

THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY DURING THE  
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION (U)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-165

By ing NARA. Date 4-15-92

II. POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS

K. OTHER MEASURES

2. Chemical and Biological Weapons

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
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## 2. Chemical and Biological Weapons

The urgency ascribed by President Johnson during the last four years to U.S. efforts to reach agreement on a nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), together with a number of other policy factors, precluded arms control initiatives by the United States on chemical and biological weapons (CBW).

ACDA, however, did not defer its study of practicable arms control measures in this area. Indeed, concurrent with the negotiations on the NPT, ACDA expanded its research efforts on CBW both in-house and by contract and in April 1966 submitted to the Deputies of the Committee of Principals for their consideration the Agency's tentative conclusions and recommendations on potential CB arms control measures. Equally important, ACDA, in concert with the Departments of State and Defense, participated in a re-evaluation of CBW policy and sought to develop and reach agreement on an interdepartmental draft National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) which, if approved by the President, would have explicitly set forth U.S. policy on CBW and

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enabled ACDA to formulate specific negotiable measures consistent with that policy. This reevaluation of CBW policy was initiated by ACDA in response to a suggestion by the Secretary of State that international <sup>1/</sup> agreement should be sought to ban biological warfare.

ACDA does not expect early agreement on the draft NSAM. It realizes that the overall CBW policy review effort is, in effect, circumscribed by other policy considerations primarily those stemming from the use of riot-control agents and other non-lethal chemical substances by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces in the Viet-Nam conflict. As a result of such chemical operations, some countries have sought to disparage the credibility of our avowed support of the 1925 Geneva protocol, which the United States signed but never ratified. <sup>2/</sup> The Protocol is

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<sup>1/</sup> Foster to Committee of Principals, memorandum, October 29, 1963, ~~Secret~~.

<sup>2/</sup> Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1919-55 (Com. print, 84th Cong., 2d session), pp. 169-170.

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another issue which ACDA has sought to resolve; the Agency has undertaken a study to determine whether the United States should consider ratification at this late date, perhaps with a view to eventual revision, and has taken the position that this option should not be foreclosed.

Thus, in its consideration of the arms control possibilities for CBW, ACDA has had to be most mindful of the need to defer initiatives which could possibly complicate or jeopardize the U.S. military involvement in Viet-Nam. This consideration notwithstanding, ACDA has, to the extent possible and commensurate with agreed implicit, if not explicit, policy guidelines, favored that the United States support international efforts to discuss legitimate measures in this field, including the possibility of updating the Geneva protocol. In the meantime, ACDA has been instrumental in having the United States reaffirm its support of the objectives and principles of the protocol.

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a. Policy Formulation

In compliance with a request by McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, ACDA and the Departments of State and Defense in November 1963 initiated studies on all aspects of U.S. policy on CBW, including arms control. The objective of these related studies was to formulate an agreed inter-agency statement of policy which could serve as a basis for the development of U.S. policy on CBW. Accordingly, the Departments of State and Defense in 1964-1965 developed and circulated for interagency review their respective versions of a draft NSAM on CBW.<sup>1/</sup> ACDA did not prepare its own draft version, but it participated (and still does) in the review process and has contributed to both versions.

On April 19, 1966, ACDA submitted to the Deputies

<sup>1/</sup> See Solbert (DOD/ISA) to Scoville (ACDA/ST), ltr., Dec. 12, 1964, Secret; Thompson (State) to Vance (DOD), ltr., Nov. 3, 1966, ~~Secret~~.

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of the Committee of Principals a memorandum which set forth tentative conclusions on policies which the U.S. should adopt with respect to these weapons.<sup>1/</sup> These policies reflected and were consistent with the general hypothesis that the spread of lethal chemical and biological weapons to states which did not possess them was, prima facie, not in the national interest. Cognizant of the fact that compelling political and military factors might militate against the adoption of the policies suggested in the memorandum, ACDA nevertheless believed such an exposition would contribute most effectively to the ongoing interagency review. It enabled the participating agencies to focus on specific issues having critical implications for U.S. military capabilities and requirements and future U.S. negotiations on CBW arms control measures. The latter consideration was important if the United States was to be prepared for the possible introduction of potentially adverse CBW

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<sup>1/</sup> Fisher to Deputies of Committee of Principals, memorandum, April 19, 1966, Secret.

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proposals by others or to take advantage of an opportune time for initiatives by itself or its allies.

Briefly, the memorandum proposed the basic elements of policy as follows:

1. The United States should continue to adhere to its declared policy of "no-first use" of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. By definition, this policy of "no-first use" would not extend to those non-toxic CB weapons such as tear gas, as specifically designated by the President, which cause only temporary incapacitation without residual injurious effect.

2. The United States should (a) not assist any other state or groups of states to acquire CB weapons of mass destruction, (b) take no actions that would encourage any other state or groups of states to acquire such weapons, and (c) as appropriate, discourage such acquisition.

Consistent with these basic elements, the ACDA memorandum noted the feasibility of certain CBW arms control measures and suggested the following approaches

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toward agreement on them: (a) non-proliferation of CBW -- efforts to achieve a CB non-proliferation agreement should not be sought publicly until after agreement was reached on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty; (b) CB-free zones -- the United States should support the extension of existing agreements for nuclear free zones so as to exclude CB weapons from such zones; and (c) other agreements -- the United States should seek additional, far-reaching agreements aimed at the eventual elimination of CB weapons of mass destruction when adequate means of verification have been developed to insure the security of the United States.

To date, the Deputies of the Committee of Principals have not acted on the ACDA memorandum. Although some gave it sympathetic consideration, it was understood that priority should be accorded to the drafting of a NSAM setting forth the basic U.S. policy on CBW and which could then be used as a frame of reference for further consideration of specific CB arms control proposals.

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interdepartmental draft NSAM on CBW, dated October 14, <sup>1/</sup>1968, included the following major points, which were initiated or supported by ACDA:

(1) In its support of the General Assembly resolution 2162B (XXI), December 5, 1966, <sup>2/</sup>the United States affirms its observation of the principles and objectives of the Geneva protocol. ACDA has consistently pressed for public reaffirmation by the United States of its support of the protocol. The NSAM also duly noted a point strongly recommended by ACDA, namely, that the United States should not foreclose consideration of accession to the protocol and, if appropriate, should participate in international efforts to determine whether revision is warranted.

2. Recommendations on "no-first use". This aspect has not yet been resolved with the Department of Defense. ACDA and State strongly recommended that the President reaffirm policies previously enunciated by Presidents

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<sup>1/</sup> Cutter (ACDA/ST) to Scoville (ACDA/ST) memorandum, October 23, 1968, ~~Secret.~~

<sup>2/</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1966, pp. 798-799.

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Roosevelt and Eisenhower, i.e., the United States should not resort to the use of poison gases, biological weapons, or other inhumane devices of warfare unless first used by enemies of the United States. As the State draft now reads, "the President will not authorize US forces to initiate the use of chemical weapons other than riot control agents and anti-plant weapons, or any biological weapons."

3. On the matter of non-lethal chemical anti-crop agents, ACDA suggested that the NSAM limit their use against crops solely identifiable as military supplies and, if not identifiable as such, to insure adequate provisions for refugees. The version accepted by the Department of State is in line with ACDA's initial recommendation.

4. Finally, at ACDA's request, the draft NSAM includes the statement that the spread of lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons and biological weapons

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to countries which do not now possess them is not in  
the national interest.<sup>1/</sup>

b. International Negotiations

While the absence of an agreed NSAM has, in effect, precluded U.S. CBW initiatives in connection with international negotiations, it has not prevented ACDA from developing contingency plans which would enable the United States under appropriate circumstances to adopt limited, but positive approaches to CBW issues.

Admittedly, positions developed in ACDA and coordinated with other agencies have for the most part shown deference to sensitivities stemming from U.S. and South Vietnamese use of riot-control agents in Viet-Nam and have taken into consideration the fact that U.S. overall policy on CBW is still under review.

In the period 1962-1965, the United States did not go beyond its proposal contained in the U.S. Outline of Basic Provisions for a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament, presented to the ENDC in 1962.<sup>2/</sup> At that

<sup>1/</sup> See Farley (State-G/PM) to Scoville (ACDA/ST), memorandum, July 18, 1968, Secret, with attached ltr. from McNamara to Rusk, Nov. 17, 1966, ~~Secret~~

<sup>2/</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1962, Vol. 1, pp. 111-140.

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time, the U.S. delegate offered to engage in expert examination of the verification aspects of CBW in advance of general and complete disarmament.<sup>1/</sup>

Largely as a result of the growing publicity and diplomatic attention accorded to the U.S. and South Vietnamese use since 1964 of tear gas and herbicides in South Viet-Nam, the United States was required to enunciate its general position on CBW in the course of the 1966 debate in the General Assembly. On November 7, 1966, Hungary introduced in the First Committee a draft resolution which was obviously intended as a condemnation of U.S. employment in South Viet-Nam of tear gases and herbicides.<sup>2/</sup> In coordination with the Departments of State and Defense, ACDA developed alternative language for that resolution and, in concert with other friendly Western delegations, the United States succeeded in amending the Hungarian draft resolution. The resolution, as amended, contained none of the tendentious language of the initial draft and minimized the adverse propaganda

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<sup>1/</sup> Ibid., p. 214.

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid., 1966, pp. 694-695.

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leveled against the United States. The resolution was revised to the extent that the United States was not only able to support it, but also co-sponsor one of its operative paragraphs, namely, calling upon all States to observe the principles and objectives of the Geneva protocol.

In cosponsoring that portion and voting for the resolution as a whole, the United States reaffirmed its support of the protocol and made clear its practices on the use of chemical and biological weapons. At that time ACDA Director Foster and Ambassador Nabrit rejected charges made by Hungary that the use of tear gases and herbicides in South Viet-Nam were violations of international law. The United States also emphasized that it has not used poison gas since World War I, (in retaliation) and has never used biological weapons of any kind, bacteriological or other. As regards the Geneva protocol, the U.S. approach was circumspect in that, by voting for General Assembly resolution 2162 (XXI) B, it neither implied that it would accede to it

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nor foreclosed possible consideration of future  
accession.<sup>1/</sup>

Although the United States managed to overcome the difficulties experienced during the 21st session of the General Assembly, ACDA took a step aimed at obviating a repetition of such events, or at least mitigating any adverse impact such events might have on the diplomatic position of the United States. In a memorandum of October 16, 1967, to the Under Secretary of State, ACDA Director Foster concurred in a recommendation by the Legal Adviser and the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs to request the Secretary of Defense to impose some limitations on the use of riot-control agents in combat operations.<sup>2/</sup> Pointing to the 1966 debates in the General Assembly, Mr. Foster noted that, against a substantial body of opinion to the contrary, the United States held that the Geneva protocol did not prohibit the use of tear gas for

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<sup>1/</sup> Ibid., pp. 800-802

<sup>2/</sup> Habib (State/EA) and Salans (State/L) to Katzenbach, memorandum, Oct. 3, 1967, ~~Secret.~~

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humanitarian purposes, as the United States said was the case in South Viet-Nam. ACDA understood, however, that tear gas was being used in many tactical combat operations where justification on humanitarian grounds was difficult if not impossible, and under circumstances bearing no resemblance to the ways in which police forces use riot-control agents on civilian population. Such use, in ACDA's view, brought into question the U.S. justification presented at the General Assembly and tended to erode the basis for <sup>1/</sup> excepting these agents from the protocol.

The essence of the recommendations contained in ACDA Director Foster's memorandum and Under Secretary Katzenbach's letter has been incorporated in State's <sup>2/</sup> latest version of the interdepartmental draft NSAM. Thus, despite lack of formal action to date, the recommendation in the NSAM, if agreed upon by the Department of Defense, will eventually form the basis of U.S. policy governing

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<sup>1/</sup> Foster to Katzenbach, memorandum, Oct. 16, 1967, ~~Secret.~~

<sup>2/</sup> "Policy on Chemical and Biological Weapons," interdepartmental draft NSAM, October 14, 1968, ~~Secret.~~

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the use of riot-control agents in combat operations.

A situation somewhat analogous to that of 1966 nearly developed at the General Assembly in 1967. The representative of Malta introduced a draft resolution recommending (1) that the Secretary-General undertake a study to determine the effects of the use of CB weapons and (2) that the ENDC examine the Geneva protocol with a view to its revision, updating, or replacement.<sup>1/</sup> Hungary again countered with a draft resolution similar to that it had put forward at the previous session of the General Assembly. Despite efforts to modify the latter and efforts to construct a resolution acceptable to most states, time ran out and both draft resolutions were withdrawn.<sup>2/</sup> The United States was prepared to support the Maltese resolution.

Such support, had it materialized, would have been consistent with some of ACDA's own preliminary estimate regarding the status of the protocol. On the one hand, as ACDA Deputy Director Fisher indicated in Congressional

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<sup>1/</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 625-626.

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid., pp. 633-634.

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testimony, the protocol was in fact a dated instrument and its authors could not have foreseen all aspects of technological advancements affecting CB weaponry.<sup>1/</sup> Consequently, ACDA viewed revision as a plausible approach, if not necessarily feasible at present. On the other hand, ACDA also saw some merit to the idea of drafting a new international agreement to supplant the protocol.

Although ACDA has not yet completed an assessment of these two approaches, it has taken action to prepare for contingencies as regards other possible approaches to arms control measures in the CBW field. For example, it was anticipated that the ENDC would probably discuss CBW in its session of July-August 1968, largely as a result of an initiative by the United Kingdom, and on the basis of a proposal by the USSR, which in the past has often raised the issue, if for no other reason than to belabor the United States for its actions in Viet-Nam.

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<sup>1/</sup> United States Armament and Disarmament Problems: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, First Session, p. 180.

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In preparing the position which the U.S. should take in response to CBW proposals, ACDA remained circumspect, but at the same time made every effort, in coordination with the Departments of State and Defense, to be sufficiently forthcoming and not adopt a totally negative stance which would tend to put the United States on the defensive once again. ACDA believed that the United States should avail itself of opportunities to support initiatives not circumscribed by major policy considerations. Such participation, it was felt, would offer the United States some leverage in discussions on specific or selective approaches to CBW and help ensure that any proposals developed would not infringe on U.S. national interests.

Accordingly, in anticipation of possible initiatives at the ENDC by the United Kingdom and USSR, ACDA developed a position consistent with the approach above. This position allowed the U.S. to support any of the following possible proposals: (1) a study by the ENDC of the Geneva protocol to determine whether it warranted updating, revision or replacement; (2) an ENDC study on

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the methods for dealing with either chemical or biological weapons or both; (3) a study of a ban on production and possession of BW; and (4) a study by the UN Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of chemical and biological weapons.<sup>1/</sup>

In ACDA's view, U.S. support of any of these approaches would not inhibit the United States in its continuing review of overall CBW policy. Coordination of the position outlined above with other agencies was not without some difficulty. The lack of an updated and agreed national policy on CBW rendered complex the task of achieving a more forward negotiating posture, but at the same time allowed for some limited degree of flexibility in developing a position not outwardly negative and one which could enhance future U.S. participation in international negotiations on arms control measures for CBW.

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<sup>1/</sup> To London, tel. 192587, June 28, 1968, ~~Secret~~;  
to Geneva, tel. 209434, July 26, 1968, ~~Secret~~;  
to Geneva, tel. 212214, July 31, 1968, ~~Confidential~~.

ACDA/IR:JSBodnar:das  
November 19, 1968

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Final Draft

THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY DURING THE  
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION (U)

II. POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS

K. OTHER MEASURES

3. Foreign Bases and Troop Withdrawals

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year  
intervals; not  
Automatically declassified

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-165

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By isp NARA. Date 4-15-92

## Foreign Bases and Troop Withdrawals

### Foreign Bases

One of the perennial proposals in the Soviet catalog of disarmament measures calls for the liquidation of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories. It is a measure which the USSR has given general application, but it is also one which has been employed over the years in Soviet campaigns against U.S. forces in Korea and South Vietnam, as a feature in Soviet schemes for settling the German question, and as an element in the Soviet drive to win support in the "third world." The United States and its European and Asian allies have recognized the Soviet proposal for what it is -- a device for undermining Free World alliances and collective security -- and have refused to be drawn into negotiations on a matter which would clearly be disadvantageous to their interests.

While the United States has rejected Soviet proposals on the elimination of foreign bases and troop withdrawals as a separate measure, its

treaty outline on general and complete disarmament contains provisions for dismantling bases in the context of general arms reductions. The U.S. treaty outline states that parties to the treaty would dismantle, or convert to peaceful uses, agreed military bases and facilities wherever they may be located in Stage II. In Stage III, remaining bases would be dismantled or converted in an agreed sequence.<sup>1</sup> The approach set forth in the Soviet draft treaty is quite different; that is, all foreign military bases and depots would be liquidated and all military personnel withdrawn to their national territories in Stage I.<sup>2</sup> The American concept, in brief, is to first freeze the existing military balance and then progressively reduce military establishments. The Soviets, on the other hand, would eliminate at the outset major U.S. components of military power, including foreign bases,

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<sup>1</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1962, Vol I,  
pp. 351-382

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 103-127



to the military advantage of the USSR.

Even though U.S. opposition to consideration of the foreign bases issue precludes meaningful negotiations, the Soviet Union, obviously considering the issue to have propaganda advantages, has persisted in pushing for discussion of the subject in international forums. It won some outside support from the Cairo nonaligned conference which issued a declaration on October 10, 1964, stating that it favored the abolition of all foreign bases.<sup>1</sup> Thus encouraged, the Soviet Union introduced a draft resolution in the U.N. Disarmament Commission on May 27, 1965, calling on all states to liquidate foreign bases in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and to refrain from establishing such bases.<sup>2</sup> Tunisia and Syria, however, were the only non-communist countries to speak in favor of the resolution and the USSR did not bring it to a vote.

In the debate in the Disarmament Commission, Ambassador Stevenson noted that the bases and troop

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., 1964, p. 446

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 1965, pp. 206-207

withdrawal proposals were "not disarmament measures so much as proposals for bringing about strategic redeployments of forces in a manner which would obviously benefit the USSR, given its central location."<sup>1</sup> Mr. Foster told the Commission that the United States considered the Soviet proposals "outside the context of general disarmament and as measures isolated from the total complex of strategic and political problems of particular regions." He pointed out that there is a relationship between the Soviet proposal on troop withdrawals and dismantling foreign bases and Soviet support for "wars of national liberation." He recalled that the deployment of American forces abroad and the creation of certain bases "was the direct consequence of Soviet threats and aggressive acts" in the post-war period. He asserted that the "success of partial measures depends largely on their not tipping the military balance in favor of

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 75

one side or another. The true nature of military bases and the forces stationed on these locations can be best understood in terms of the idea of interdependence."<sup>1</sup>

In September of the following year, the Soviet Union submitted to the General Assembly a draft resolution inviting "states with military bases in the territory of independent states or dependent territories in Asia, Africa, and Latin America immediately to eliminate these bases and never to establish others."<sup>2</sup> Mr. Foster announced that the United States would reject this "self-serving and sweeping Soviet proposal to condemn foreign military bases." He termed it a propaganda device which would impair the right of individual and collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the U. N. Charter. He charged that adoption of the resolution would be destabilizing and would

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., pp. 175-176

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 1966, p. 648

amount to an "endorsement of the very policies against which countries have reacted by cooperating in joint arrangements for their common defense."<sup>1</sup> The resolution was not voted on; it was replaced, however, by one sponsored by India, the UAR, and Yugoslavia. General Assembly Resolution 2165 (XXI) called for the transmission to the ENDC, "for further consideration and report, all the documents and records of the meetings of the First Committee and the plenary meetings of the General Assembly pertaining to" the elimination of foreign military bases in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The resolution was adopted on December 5, 1966, by a vote of 94 to 0 with 10 abstentions. The United States abstained.<sup>2</sup>

During the 1967 sessions of the ENDC, the subject of liquidating foreign military bases was raised by several communist countries, but the principal attention of the delegations at Geneva

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 796-797

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 804

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was given to the drafting of a treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. In its interim report of December 7, 1967, the ENDC stated that since it had concentrated its major efforts on the non-proliferation treaty, it had not been able to devote sufficient time to the consideration of the foreign bases issue.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, a resolution was submitted to the General Assembly which requested the ENDC to resume consideration of the foreign bases question and to report to the 23rd General Assembly on the progress achieved. Mr. Fisher, in announcing that the United States would abstain on the resolution, asserted that the United States did not consider the proposal a useful subject for discussion in the ENDC on an urgent basis. "It is not an arms control measure as such and, as we have seen time and time again, a resolution of this nature does nothing more than provide a basis for profitless polemics and propaganda exchanges..."<sup>2</sup> The resolution, 2344 (XXII),

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., 1967, pp. 622-623

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., pp. 718-719

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was nevertheless adopted by a vote of 105 to 0;  
there were 13 abstentions.<sup>1</sup>

To underscore the General Assembly's directive,  
the Soviet Union on July 16, 1968, sent other govern-  
ments the nine-point memorandum on disarmament which  
Premier Kosygin had made public on July 1. The  
seventh item in the list of measures proposed for  
ENDC consideration states:

Foreign military bases on alien terri-  
tories create a serious danger to peace.  
Such bases serve as a source of outbreak of  
military conflicts and threaten the freedom  
and independence of the peoples. This is  
convincingly shown by the continuing  
aggressive war of the United States in Viet-  
nam, and by the tension and conflicts in other  
parts of the world where foreign bases  
are located.

The Soviet Government proposes in  
accordance with the decision of the United  
Nations General Assembly, at its twenty-first  
session, that the question of the liquidation  
of foreign military bases should be discussed  
forthwith in the Eighteen Nation Committee on  
Disarmament.<sup>2</sup>

The position of the United States delegation

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 732

<sup>2</sup> A/7134, July 8, 1968

to Geneva remained unchanged. The United States was willing to deal with the subject only in the context of progress on substantial disarmament measures. The base issue was but one element in the complex question of general arms reductions. There were many difficult problems of national and collective security involved in the foreign bases issue, and it could not be treated separately from those problems. ~

#### Troop Withdrawals and Troop Reductions

The subject of withdrawing troops to their national frontiers has often been presented as part of the Soviet proposal for liquidating foreign military bases. Troop withdrawal propositions have also appeared as separate disarmament measures, especially in connection with the German question. A 1955 Soviet disarmament plan, for example, contained a provision calling for the immediate withdrawal of British, French, Soviet, and U.S. troops from Germany, save for limited policing

contingents.<sup>1</sup> Three years later, the USSR modified its approach and suggested that the occupation forces be gradually reduced, starting with a one-third cutback during 1958.<sup>2</sup>

Further modifications in Soviet proposals appeared during the early 1960s. A memorandum of September 26, 1961, proposed a reduction of forces in Germany "by one third or some other accepted proportion," with the "necessary controls."<sup>3</sup> In mid-1963, Premier Khrushchev, in expressing a willingness to discuss the reduction of foreign troops in Germany, argued that troop reductions could be carried out without violating the balance of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.<sup>4</sup> He indicated that there could be controls over the reductions, and in a later press interview he suggested a "policy of mutual example" for

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<sup>1</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1945-59, Vol. I, p. 459

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 1031-1032

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 1961, p. 501

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 1963, pp. 640-644



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implementing the reductions.<sup>1</sup> The bases and foreign troop withdrawal issues headed the list of collateral measures which the USSR submitted to the ENDC in January 1964. Europe and Germany were especially emphasized, but there was no mention of control procedures.<sup>2</sup> In a March press interview, Foreign Minister Gromyko implied that the proposed troop reductions could be implemented by the "policy of mutual example" suggested by Khrushchev.<sup>3</sup>

These various Soviet schemes, obviously aimed at weakening NATO militarily and fragmenting the Alliance politically, received no encouragement from the United States and its European allies. The USSR occupied the heartland of Eurasia and could rapidly deploy its forces into Central Europe, while the United States was on a distant continent. The Western world could defend itself only by a

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 652-654

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 1964, pp. 12 ff.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 74

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strong alliance and the deployment of American strength on the European continent. The United States, Britain, and France also objected to any plan for major reductions in Germany in the absence of a settlement of the German question. In addition, when the Soviets raised the matter of troop reductions in Central Europe at the ENDC, they were told that the proposal was "not appropriate for consideration in this forum."<sup>1</sup>

A variety of political, economic, and military developments converged in the mid-sixties to prompt the United States and its NATO allies to review their attitudes toward troop strengths in Central Europe. This reevaluation found expression in the joint communique issued on September 27, 1966, at the conclusion of FRG Chancellor Erhard's conversations with President Johnson:

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 395-396

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They agreed that a searching re-appraisal should be undertaken of the threat to security and, taking into account changes in military technology and mobility, of the forces required to maintain adequate deterrence and defense. This review should also address the question of equitable sharing of the defense and other comparable burdens, and the impact of troop deployment and forces levels on the balance of payments of the U.S. and U.K., and take into account the effect on the German economic and budgetary situation of measures designed to ameliorate balance of payments problems.<sup>1</sup>

Ten days later, President Johnson suggested the possibility of mutual force reductions. He told the National Conference of Editorial Writers on October 7 that:

We seek a stable military situation in Europe -- one in which tensions can be lowered. To this end, the United States will continue to play its part in effective Western deterrence. To weaken that deterrence might create temptations and endanger peace. The Atlantic allies will continue together to study what strength NATO needs, in light of changing

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<sup>1</sup>Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 17, 1966, pp. 583-585

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technology and the current threat. Reduction of Soviet forces in Central Europe would, of course, affect the extent of the threat. If changing circumstances should lead to a gradual and balanced revision in force levels on both sides, the revision could -- together with the other steps that I have mentioned -- help gradually to shape a new political environment.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile, the perception of a lessening threat in Europe coupled with the growing demands of the Vietnam war and the balance of payments problems were stirring Congressional interest in reducing the expense of the U.S. military commitment to Western Europe. Senator Mansfield (Dem., Mont.) in 1966 and again in 1967 introduced a resolution stating that it was the sense of the Senate that a "substantial reduction" of U.S. forces could be made without adversely affecting NATO commitments. Senator Clark (Dem., Penn.) offered an amendment requesting the Administration to explore with the USSR "the possibilities for balanced reductions

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., Oct. 24, 1966, pp. 622-625

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of United States and Soviet troops and weapons in Central Europe." Senator Javits (Rep., N.Y.) and 11 other senators asked for a NATO study of re-deployment. A combined subcommittee of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees held extensive hearings to consider these resolutions and amendments to the resolutions, covering the questions of U.S. troop commitments in Europe. However, no resolution was reported out of the subcommittee principally because of on-going Administration actions.<sup>1</sup>

The talks between President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard were followed by trilateral talks and in the spring of 1967 the FRG, United Kingdom, and United States announced that arrangements had been worked out which would help alleviate their balance of payments problems.

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<sup>1</sup>United States Troops in Europe: Hearings before the Combined Subcommittee of Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on the Subject of United States Troops in Europe. Senate, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1-4

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Among other things they proposed that 35,000 U.S. troops and 5100 British troops be redeployed from West Germany; the troops would, however, remain fully committed to NATO.<sup>1</sup> They also agreed that a NATO study should be conducted on mutual force reductions.

On May 3, the NSC discussed a possible mutual reduction of forces in Europe, and the next day an informal memorandum was sent from the White House asking for detailed analysis of the problem.<sup>2</sup> A month later the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Luxembourg issued a communique which stated, inter alia, that "if conditions permit, a balanced reduction of forces by the East and West could be a significant step toward security in Europe."<sup>3</sup> The December 1967

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<sup>1</sup>Department of State Bulletin, May 22, 1967, pp. 788-789

<sup>2</sup>Department of State Memorandum from EUR- - John M. Leddy to the Secretary, Sept. 18, 1967. ~~Secret~~

<sup>3</sup>Department of State Bulletin, July 3, 1967, pp. 14-15

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NATO Ministers' Meeting reaffirmed interest in the subject. A report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance stated that "The allies are studying disarmament and practical arms control measures, including the possibility of balanced force reductions. These studies will be intensified. Their active pursuit reflects the will of the allies to work for an effective detente with the East."<sup>1</sup>

With that broad policy guidance, the study of mutual force reductions moved apace under the aegis of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and specifically under the Political Committee at the senior level. The NAC agreed -- as a result of a U.S. presentation to the NATO disarmament experts in late February -- that the study could be organized around five sequential steps: (1) development of standards or yardsticks by which East and West force changes could be measured; (2) construction of several models involving different approaches for reductions which would

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<sup>1</sup>  
Ibid., Jan. 8, 1968, pp. 49-52

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highlight various political, military, and strategic considerations; (3) model analysis in terms of verification capabilities and possibilities as well as various additional "confidence building" measures; (4) development of political-military guidelines upon which levels and modalities of reductions could be based; and (5) testing most promising models by examining the political, military, and economic implications with a view to determining what, if any, mutual reduction programs could be proposed to the Soviets and East Europeans if and when the political climate is feasible.<sup>1</sup>

By June there had been sufficient progress so that the NATO Ministers, meeting in Reykjavik, could announce that "it was desirable that a process leading to mutual force reductions should be initiated. To that end they decided to make all necessary preparations

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<sup>1</sup>From USNATO, tel. 1988, Mar. 1, 1968 ~~Secret~~

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for discussion of this subject with the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe and then call on them to join in the search for progress towards peace."<sup>1</sup> NATO's "signal" had not yet been answered when, on August 20, 1968, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia with massive Warsaw Pact forces.

Reaction in the US Congress to this outrageous Soviet intervention was immediate and vociferous. However, on September 13, Senator Mansfield, while recalling that immediately after the invasion of Czechoslovakia he saw no point in continuing to advocate an immediate reduction in the level of US forces in Europe, stated that notwithstanding events in Eastern Europe pressures for a reduction of American forces in Europe might be expected to resume promptly unless the NATO countries significantly increased their financial and other efforts for their own defense

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<sup>1</sup>Department of State Bulletin, July 15, 1968, pp. 75-77

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and unless US budgetary and balance of payments difficulties were rectified. Senator Symington unreservedly endorsed the majority leader's statement.<sup>1</sup>

After detailed and prolonged preparatory work by the permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council, the NATO Ministers met in Brussels on November 15 and 16, one month earlier than planned, to discuss the serious situation following the armed intervention in Czechoslovakia. The Ministers agreed to proposed quantitative and qualitative improvement of their forces, additional budgetary resources to support them, and cooperation in alleviating burdens arising from balance of payments deficits resulting specifically from military expenditures for the collective defense. While their communique stated that "prospects for mutual balanced force reductions have suffered a

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<sup>1</sup> Congressional Record, (daily version),  
Sept. 13, 1968, S10717.

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severe set back," it continued, "nvertheless, the allies are continuing their studies and preparations for a time when the atmosphere for fruitful discussions is more favorable."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>From USNATO, tel. 5846, Nov. 16, 1968, Unclassified.

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November 25, 1968

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ACDA 3071/Final Draft

# THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY DURING THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION (U)

SANTIZED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 91-165  
By ing, NARA, Date 12-6-93

## II. POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS

### K. OTHER MEASURES

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA  
Unauthorized disclosure of information subject to  
Administrative and Operational Sanctions, handled  
as Restricted Data in Foreign Dissemination  
Section, Atomic Energy Act, 1954.

4. The Gomulka Proposal for a Nuclear Freeze In Central Europe

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## THE GOMULKA PROPOSAL FOR A NUCLEAR FREEZE IN CENTRAL EUROPE

### Background

In 1957, Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki proposed the creation of a nuclear-free zone covering Poland and both parts of Germany.<sup>1</sup> Later, the so-called German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Czechoslovakia expressed willingness to participate. In a memorandum of February 14, 1958, Poland spelled out the plan in greater detail, outlining a system of "broad and effective control."<sup>2</sup> In our reply, we recognized that the plan was inspired by a desire for peace. We considered it unsatisfactory, however, since it did not affect the "central sources of nuclear power" and it tended to perpetuate the continued division of Germany.<sup>3</sup>

At a news conference on November 4, 1958, Mr. Rapacki suggested that his plan could be carried out in two stages and coupled with force reductions.<sup>4</sup> On March 28, 1962, Poland submitted a more detailed proposal to the ENDC Committee of the Whole. It now provided for a freeze on nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles in the first stage and the elimination of stocks in the second stage. Conventional forces and

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<sup>1</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, vol. II, pp. 891-892. A previous Soviet disarmament plan had also proposed the denuclearization of Germany and "adjacent states" (*ibid.*, vol. I, p. 607).

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 944-948.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 1023-1025.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 1217-1219.

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a memorandum to the various governments concerned. Between these two dates, Polish officials were actively engaged in promoting their scheme in the various capitals.

Mr. Gomulka described the plan as the first of five steps to disarmament:

...The freezing of nuclear armaments in central Europe; naturally an appropriate inspection system should be adopted. The question of a reduction of conventional armament should also be considered. Poland is ready to put forward proposals in a definite form.<sup>1</sup>

In subsequent conversations with ACDA and State Department officials, Polish diplomats provided some further details as to what they had in mind:

(1) The nuclear powers would undertake not to introduce additional nuclear weapons into countries covered by the agreement, and the countries concerned would agree not to accept additional nuclear weapons or permit local manufacture.

(2) The freeze would apply to nuclear warheads but not to delivery vehicles, which could be increased in number and/or improved. The Poles explained, however, that their position was flexible on inclusion of delivery vehicles.

(3) The freeze would apply initially to the German Federal Republic (FRG), the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. It would be open to accession by other European powers.

(4) The freeze would be accompanied by a commitment not to change the custody of nuclear weapons located on the territory of acceding states.

(5) The plan would permit replacement or maintenance of existing weapons.

(6) The freeze would affect the proposed NATO Multilateral Force (MLF) only by prohibiting ships carrying nuclear

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., 1963, pp. 651-652. For the initial U.S. assessment of the proposal, see To Paris, agm. TOPOL A-104, Jan. 17, 1964, Secret

weapons from using seaports of the countries involved.

(7) A simple but "completely reliable" system of inspection and verification would be developed.

(8) The Poles did not wish to present their plan publicly or exploit it for propaganda purposes. They desired informal discussions with the powers concerned.

(9) The Poles thought that the plan would not change the existing military balance in Central Europe, freeze the political status quo, or require Western recognition of the East German regime.<sup>1</sup>

The United States thought that the proposal contained many pitfalls and required careful examination in the context of overall European security and ENDC discussions but that outright rejection would be unwise. The general concept had received some support from non-aligned countries, and the United States did not wish to discourage Polish initiative in presenting proposals somewhat different from those advanced by the USSR. We therefore attempted to obtain further clarification before taking a definite position.<sup>2</sup>

In response to our inquiries, the Poles denied that the plan would upset the military balance since the area west of the FRG would not be affected. Stressing East European fears of FRG nuclear ambitions, they denied that there was any great concern in Western Europe, except in the FRG, about the Soviet

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<sup>1</sup>MemCon, Vedeler, Tims, Dobrosielski et al, Jan. 22, 1964, Confidential; from Geneva, tel. DISTO 1506, Jan. 25, 1964, Confidential; MemCon Beam, Dobrosielski, et al, Jan. 27, 1964, Confidential.

<sup>2</sup>To Paris, tel. TOPOL 1006, Jan. 27, 1964, Confidential.

nuclear threat. They envisaged verification along the lines of the Rapacki plan. Shipments into the area would be observed by land, sea, and air. Although their proposal was not linked with any other measures, they indicated that shipments might be monitored by personnel assigned to observation posts if a system of surprise-attack safeguards was established. Fissionable materials production within the area would be checked by an international authority, perhaps the IAEA.

They explained that the freeze would be both quantitative and qualitative, i.e., warheads could be replaced only by the same type, on a one-for-one basis. The plan would not affect the MLF except that it would prevent the force from entering ports within the zone. The Poles opposed linking a European political settlement with arms-control measures but hoped that their plan would constitute a first step toward solving key problems in Central Europe.<sup>1</sup>

For the United States, the Gomulka plan raised many of the problems raised by the earlier Rapacki plan. Furthermore, the United States suspected that the Gomulka proposal was aimed at spreading confusion over existing Western defense arrangements and was an attempt to revive and win ultimate acceptance for the earlier plan. Meanwhile, the Poles could

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<sup>1</sup>From Geneva, tel. DISTO 1554, Feb. 6, 1964, Confidential; MemCon Dobrosielski, Vedeler, et al., Feb. 13, 1964, Confidential; to Paris, tel. TOPOL 1203, Feb. 24, 1964, Confidential.



count upon fostering German suspicion that the Western countries found something acceptable in the Gomulka plan which might lead to disengagement in Central Europe.<sup>1</sup>

The U.S. representative was instructed to tell the NAC that, quite apart from military problems raised by the proposed freeze of nuclear warheads in terms of the NATO strategic concept, the United States considered the Gomulka plan to involve an unacceptable political approach. The problem of inspection raised difficulties. The United States thought that the Poles were more interested in establishing eventual denuclearization of Germany than in developing effective controls to police introduction of nuclear warheads. If the current estimate of Soviet nuclear deployment was valid, the plan involved gross inequity--every warhead for NATO forces moved in or out of the area would be subject to inspection whereas no Soviet weapons would be inspected since the USSR apparently had not stationed nuclear weapons in the area. Moreover, the United States believed that control by mixed teams from both sides as suggested by the Poles would be ineffective and that the Poles knew that they would be. In the area concerned, control by mixed teams at airports, seaports, rail centers, and road junctions would overlap the observation post system we were then studying. The United States thought that the Gomulka plan could be a concerted Soviet-Polish attempt to merge the Rapacki plan with the Soviet

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<sup>1</sup>"Gomulka Nuclear Freeze Plan," ACDA paper, Feb. 25, 1964, Confidential.

observation post proposal in preparation for what they might have hoped was the Western desire to initiate negotiations on a wider observation post system. If so the Gomulka plan could be offered as a substitute for the wider system of observation posts originally suggested by the Soviets. The United States thought that the Poles were primarily interested in a limited area with Germany as a focal point; at any rate, widening of the area would bring in the problem of East Germany.

Until the Poles submitted a concrete plan, the United States intended to withhold a full response. At the same time we would attempt to make the Poles aware of the difficulties we had with their ideas, and if possible head off formal submission of their scheme in a form that we would have had to reject.<sup>1</sup>

The Polish Government now circulated a more detailed version of its proposal in the form of a "Memorandum on Freezing Nuclear and Thermonuclear Armaments in Central Europe" and released it to the press. The memorandum set forth the principal points of the proposal as follows:

(1) The freeze would apply to the four territories already mentioned, but would leave the door open to extending the area through the accession of "other European states."

(2) The freeze would apply to all kinds of nuclear and thermonuclear charges, regardless of means of their employment and delivery.

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<sup>1</sup>Circ. tel. 1555, Feb. 24, 1964, Confidential.

(3) Parties maintaining armed forces in the area of the proposed freeze would undertake obligations not to produce, introduce or import, or transfer to other parties in the area or to accept from other parties in the area the aforementioned nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

(4) To insure the implementation of these obligations an appropriate system and safeguards should be established. Control would include both plants and "proper" frontier railways, roads, waterway junctions, seaports and airports. There would be "joint commissions" composed of representatives of the Warsaw Pact and NATO on a parity basis.<sup>1</sup>

The U.S. Reply

The first draft of the U.S. note, circulated for comment and discussion in NATO on March 12, 1964,<sup>2</sup> was prepared by State. Although ACDA did not object to the substance of the reply, it had reservations about any early U.S. statement. It preferred to wait for an indication of the Soviet reaction to the proposal and wanted time to make a further effort to exploit the similarity of the Polish approach to our proposal for a freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, since both proposals involved what the Soviets called "inspection without disarmament."

State, on the other hand, did not believe that early initiation of consultation in NAC would necessarily prejudice the

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<sup>1</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 53-55.

<sup>2</sup>To Paris, tel. TOPOL 1357, Mar. 12, 1964, Confidential.

possibility of exploiting the similarity of the Polish approach to our own freeze proposal--provided that agreement could be reached within the U.S. Government on the elaboration of the latter. It doubted that the Soviets would react formally to the Polish proposal before ascertaining what the West's line would be. In any event, the State Department said, too long a delay in discussing a reply with our Allies could leave an impression of ambiguity about the West's position and generate suspicions, particularly among the French and Germans, about what the U.S. views actually were.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, the first draft was accompanied with instructions that our reply should be so timed as not to prejudice any possible expression of Soviet commitment to the Gomulka plan which could be used to our advantage in dealing with Soviet criticism of U.S. proposals.<sup>2</sup>

Our NATO allies generally agreed that the Gomulka plan was unacceptable. The allied discussion showed a difference of opinion between the British and the Germans. The latter insisted that the Western part of the Soviet Union must be included in a zone of this kind, since this was where the Soviet missiles that threatened Western Europe were stationed. The British, on the other hand, questioned the desirability of making any

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<sup>1</sup>Tyler (EUR) to the Secretary, memorandum, Mar. 10, 1964, Confidential.

<sup>2</sup>To Paris tel., TOPOL 1357, Mar. 12, 1964, Confidential.

military arguments in replying to the Poles, since they doubted that the U.S. tactical weapons stationed in Germany were intended to counter Soviet missiles in the USSR.<sup>1</sup>

Any doubts about the Soviet position were removed on March 26, when the Soviet representative told the ENDC that the Polish proposal "would have a positive effect primarily because it would be designed to prevent the West German revanchists from gaining access to nuclear weapons." He also declared that observation posts should be coupled with such other measures as the reduction of foreign troops in Europe and the denuclearization of both Germanies.<sup>2</sup>

Our Ambassador at Warsaw delivered the U.S. reply on April 28, 1964. The United States welcomed the importance the Polish Government attached to the search for arms control and disarmament, but pointed out that the following shortcomings made the proposal inadequate:

(1) It would place serious restrictions on the capabilities of important elements of the forces on which the NATO countries must rely for their security. But it did not place comparable restrictions on the capabilities of Soviet forces in the Western part of the Soviet Union that posed a major threat to Europe.

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<sup>1</sup>From Paris, tels. POLTO 1319, Mar. 18, 1964, and POLTO 1354, Mar. 26, 1964, Confidential.

<sup>2</sup>ENDC/PV.178, pp. 52-55. The British had recently introduced a proposal on observation posts to guard against the danger of accidental war, war by miscalculation, and surprise attack (Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 115-118).

(2) Of equal importance were the particular difficulties which would arise in connection with arms control proposals limited to Central Europe, since it would be difficult to separate security and arms control arrangements from the background of unresolved political problems there. Accordingly, the United States considered it supremely important to make real progress toward a settlement of outstanding political problems in Central Europe that could lead to new and important possibilities for the limitation of armaments.

The United States drew the attention of the Polish Government to President Johnson's proposal for exploration of a verified freeze on the numbers and characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.<sup>1</sup>

#### Reconsideration in ACDA

Transmittal of the U.S. reply did not end ACDA's consideration of, or dialogue with the Poles on, the subject of the Gomulka nuclear freeze proposal, particularly since the latter continued to seek discussions on it. ACDA had requested and received a preliminary analysis of the military implications of the proposal in early February and had also begun its own study.<sup>2</sup> In early

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<sup>1</sup>From Warsaw, agm A-962, Apr. 30, 1964, Limited Official Use. For the President's proposal, see Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 7-9.

<sup>2</sup>McCloy to Fisher, ltr, Oct. 15, 1964, with enclosures: From Cdr Kline, "Some Implications of Gomulka Proposal," paper, Feb. 10, 1964, Secret, and From Pachler, Heidelberg, paper, Feb. 7, 1964, Secret/Restricted Data.

May a group within ACDA suggested combining a Central European nuclear armaments freeze with the Johnson proposals to freeze strategic delivery vehicles and to halt production of fissionable material for use in weapons, on the ground that the linkage might increase Soviet willingness to accept the Johnson proposals.<sup>1</sup> This led to the suggestion to reconsider the Polish proposal and prepare a draft paper addressed to alternative draft U.S. counterproposals, in the forms of (a) an informal agreement (with only unilateral verification), and (b) a formal agreement with agreed verification. As a first step, it was suggested, ACDA should ask the Department of Defense (DOD) for a military evaluation of the proposal.<sup>2</sup> In June, the Chairman of the Agency's European Arms Control Study Group forwarded to the Deputy Director an initial ACDA paper on the Gomulka proposal. The paper weighed the relative merits of the proposal in its political, military and verification aspects and outlined some possible variations. It suggested that ACDA request that two studies be made: (1) by DOD-JCS on military implications, including verification provisions; (2) by State on the political implications.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Subcom. on European Deployment Limitations to Chrmn, European Arms Control Comm, Memorandum, May 5, 1964, with attachment, Paper on European Nuclear Freeze, Secret.

<sup>2</sup>Matteson (ACDA/DAS) to Foster, memorandum, May 14, 1964, Confidential.

<sup>3</sup>Matteson (DAS) to Fisher, memorandum, June 19, 1964, with attachment, paper, "Initial Paper on Gomulka Nuclear Freeze Proposal," June 19, 1964, Secret.

ACDA and Defense Studies

Having thus concluded that the Gomulka plan deserved fuller study, ACDA requested the Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs (ISA) of the Department of Defense for an analysis of the proposal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In their report (August 12, 1964), the JCS pointed out that we were committed to introduce [REDACTED] additional nuclear warheads into West Germany during the next two years and that these weapons would have to be placed in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] They noted that some replacement would be necessary because the AEC had to rotate sample weapons for quality assurance testing. They believed that it would be more difficult for us than for the Soviets to move nuclear weapons to Central Europe. Although the Soviets apparently did not station weapons there, their field forces in the area had nuclear-capable missiles, and they could deliver nuclear warheads to them in a few days. The JCS believed that detailed inspection would be necessary to determine whether warheads were nuclear and that weapons characteristics remained constant. Such inspection would in their view be inconsistent with the Atomic Energy Act. Verification would also disclose NATO deficiencies to Warsaw Pact inspectors.

The Soviet Union would not have such serious problems, since it apparently had no nuclear weapons in the area. The JCS therefore felt that a freeze would disproportionately degrade NATO forces, "in that it would affect nuclear weapons



on which NATO relies heavily without a commensurate degradation of the Warsaw Pact nuclear weapons." The technical compromise of our nuclear weapons in Western Europe, [REDACTED] of which were located in Germany, would cause a "net disadvantage to NATO."

The JCS concluded that a freeze covering both Germanies, Poland, and Czechoslovakia would be disadvantageous. It would be even more disadvantageous if the area was enlarged to encompass the whole European continent except the United Kingdom, Spain, Turkey, and the Western USSR. Although the adverse effect would be mitigated if the latter areas were included, they could not make a "clear determination of the net effect." They found the Polish verification provisions unacceptable. While an effective verification could theoretically be devised, they believed that it would "almost certainly demand such intrusion into the societies and into the technological bases of the participating nations as to render implementation of the proposal infeasible."<sup>1</sup>

On the last point, ISA proposed further studies and suggested that the problem be covered in the ACDA Cloud Gap field research program.<sup>2</sup> At first ACDA questioned the value of field tests for such a purpose. In view of the fact that the

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<sup>1</sup>Wheeler to McNamara, memorandum (JCSM-688-64), Aug. 12, 1964, Top Secret/Restricted Data.

<sup>2</sup>McNaughton (Defense/ISA) to Fisher, ltr., Aug. 24, 1964, Top Secret.

Gomulka-proposed zone covered extremely active industrial areas involving vast amounts of shipping and transportation, it said, "...any realistic inspection system could provide only-very low levels of confidence that violations were not taking place." Simulation of the conditions that inspectors would face would be impossible. The extent of cooperation or harassment afforded by the host country--the most important factor in determining the reassurance that a verification system could provide--would depend upon the nation's response to a freeze, but such a factor was difficult to predict. However, a freeze could conceivably be made possible by a verification system that provided "other forms of reassurance regarding the overall military posture of Warsaw Pact forces." If an overall military reassurance of the sort that could be estimated on the basis of the experiences of the military liaison missions would justify a nuclear freeze in Central Europe, an ACDA study of the allied Military Liaison Missions "would provide a more realistic basis for the design of such a verification system than would field tests by CLOUD GAP."<sup>1</sup>

In spite of this initial reaction, ACDA was still interested in seeing what use could be made of certain parts of the Gomulka proposal. It was particularly interested in exploring the inspection and verification aspects of a freeze of this

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<sup>1</sup>Scoville (ACDA/ST) to Barber (DOD/ISA), ltr, Dec. 23, 1964, Secret. For the ACDA study of the Military Liaison Missions, see Thomas L. Lough, "The Military Liaison Missions in Germany" (ACDA Research Report 64-1, Mar. 1964), Secret/NoForN.

sort, in order to determine with greater precision the nature of the verification requirements, the resources necessary to fill these requirements, and the feasibility of the required inspection and verification system. The Research Analysis Corporation (RAC) had already completed for ACDA a logistic study of Central European rail and highway movement data on which a technical analysis of the warhead transfer problem would have to be based. Taking advantage of the expertise thus developed by the contractor, ACDA assigned the technical portion of the analysis to RAC and the judgmental aspects to its own personnel.<sup>1</sup> In addition, there were other studies already underway that were pertinent to the needs of this exploration of verification requirements, such as ACDA's support of efforts by the Naval Research Laboratory to develop the technology for detecting the presence of nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup> Such studies, in conjunction with ACDA staff evaluations, have served to identify the critical questions, particularly those dealing with the adequacy of

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<sup>1</sup>Davis (ACDA/WEC) to Dean (WEC), memorandum, Feb. 1, 1965, and Dean to Davis, memorandum, Feb. 3, 1965, Limited Official Use. For the RAC study, see ACDA/WEC-73, Oct. 1967, Secret and for ACDA's, see Finegold, "Inspection and Verification of a Gomulka-Type Freeze (U)", June 1965, paper, Secret/NoForN.

<sup>2</sup>DOD/Navy Dept/Naval Research Laboratory, "Design of a Passive System for Identifying Nuclear Weapons," ACDA/ST/RA-21, Apr. 1965, in progress. For a summary of other on-going studies relevant to this subject, see Dean (ACDA/WEC) to Barber (DOD/ISA), ltr, July 21, 1965, Secret/NoForN.

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sensor technology, that still need to be answered before a reliable system can be designed for verification and inspection of possible nuclear limitations in Central Europe.

The Agency has produced two studies concerned with the non-technical aspects of the proposal. A contract study conducted by the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research analyzed and evaluated international organizational requirements for verifying compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements, including the Gomulka and Rapacki proposals.<sup>1</sup> A staff study prepared by ACDA's International Relations Bureau has been used with suitable up-dating revisions as the basis of U.S. position papers at the ENDC, the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly during 1965-1966.<sup>2</sup> Although the subject has not been active on the public disarmament agenda in recent years, as recently as April 1968 the Poles were reportedly advocating a modified version of the Gomulka plan in private talks.<sup>3</sup> ACDA has recommended "the welcoming and careful consideration of East European initiatives such as the Gomulka Plan even if they are inadequate,"<sup>4</sup> in

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<sup>1</sup>The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University, International Organizational Arrangements to Verify Compliance with Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, Appendix III: "The Gomulka Proposals and the Rapacki Plan (U)", GC-70, June 1966, Unclassified. (Originally Confidential, downgraded to Unclassified.)

<sup>2</sup>Beam (IR) to Fisher (DD), memorandum, Jan. 8, 1965, Secret, with attachment, paper, "Gomulka Nuclear Freeze Proposal: A Reappraisal," Jan. 8, 1965, Secret.

<sup>3</sup>From Oslo, agm A-501, Apr. 5, 1968, Confidential.

<sup>4</sup>Maddox (DAS), memorandum for files, July 28, 1964, attached to covering memorandum in n.2, above.

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response to a National Security Action Memorandum requesting recommendations on "Bridge-building in Eastern Europe."<sup>1</sup> If a proposal to freeze nuclear weapons in Central Europe should be introduced again in the future, past Agency studies and research will continue to be relevant.

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<sup>1</sup>NSAM #352, July 8, 1966, Unclassified.

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Final Draft

THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY DURING THE  
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION (U)

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-165

By 4-8 NARA. Date 4-15-92

II. POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS

K. OTHER MEASURES

5. Military Expenditures

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## MILITARY EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS

### Background

Before 1964, the ENDC devoted relatively little attention to the problem of limiting military expenditures. In the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that a program for general and complete disarmament should contain provisions for the discontinuance of military expenditures. The Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament provided for the staged reductions of military expenditures and their ultimate discontinuance. The Soviets also proposed the reduction of military expenditures as a collateral measure.

The U.S. treaty outline, on the other hand, provided merely for the reporting of military expenditures and a first-stage study of the verification problem and consideration of appropriate measures in the light of this study. The absence of a substantial reduction provision in the U.S. treaty outline reflected U.S. skepticism on the possibility of adequate verification of military expenditures.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>See Ruth Sivard (ACDA/RS), "Military Expenditures" (Background Paper 11, 1962), ~~Confidential~~.

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In a statement of June 4, 1962, to the ENDC, on military expenditures in the context of general and complete disarmament, Ambassador Stelle noted some of the verification problems with which the U.S. was concerned and indicated U.S. willingness to participate in a study by an international technical group<sup>1</sup>

During the latter part of 1962 an extensive staff review of military expenditures in the GCD context led to an ACDA proposal for a revision of the U.S. treaty outline on this subject.<sup>2</sup> Following discussion and approval by the Committee of Principals, a proposed amendment of the treaty outline was submitted to President Kennedy and approved by him on November 21, 1962.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>See Robert W. Lambert (ACDA/IR), "A Comparative Analysis of the U.S. and Soviet Plans for General and Complete Disarmament," January, 1968, Official Use Only, pp. 11-12. The Stelle speech and a statement by Fisher (below pp. 12-13) are the only two public statements the U.S. has made in the ENDC on military expenditures. Both statements dealt with verification problems.

<sup>2</sup>The rationale for this recommended change in the U.S. position was summarized in Ruth Sivard (ACDA/RS) "Reduction of Military Expenditures," October 18, 1962, ~~Confidential.~~

<sup>3</sup>Foster, Memorandum for the President, "Recommendations regarding Resumption of Geneva Disarmament Negotiations," November 20, 1962, ~~Confidential.~~

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The approved revision included provisions for (1) a progressive reduction of military expenditures to reflect the disarmament process and (2) the allocation of ~~released~~ resources released to economic development, through the United Nations and its affiliated organizations.

Amendatory treaty outline language incorporating these revisions was subsequently prepared and approved, ready for tabling at the ENDC when the agenda item on military expenditures was reached in discussions of general and complete disarmament.<sup>1</sup> However, the topic did not come up for discussion as the original agenda was set aside. This amendment of the U.S. treaty outline, therefore, has not been tabled.

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<sup>1</sup> DMP#11/Rev.3, Military Expenditures, Jan. 7, 1964,  
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"Mutual Example" Reductions (1963)

Beginning in September 1963 there was an effort in ACDA to promote a U.S. initiative relating to mutual U.S. and Soviet reductions of defense budgets. However, no official action was taken on this subject prior to the annual official budgetary announcements by both countries.

No records are available in ACDA of the discussions which took place in the Executive Branch during the months immediately before January 1964, when the President's budget recommendations for FY 1965 were announced. It is clear, however, that there was discussion in ACDA of possible courses of action to use the downward trend in the defense budget to reenforce arms control objectives and that this subject was also raised in preparation for a White House meeting at Camp David in December 1963.

On September 20, 1963, the Assistant Director of ACDA in charge of the Economics Bureau, Archibald S. Alexander, proposed to the Director that a reduction of the U.S. defense budget for <sup>fiscal year</sup> 1965, if decided in the next weeks, should be used publicly, or in private talks with the Soviets, in such a way as to emphasize U.S.

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interest in tension reduction and disarmament. He suggested that if effectively used a U.S. planned curtailment in military spending could further the following objectives:

- a. Reenforce the world image, which the President's American University speech created, of his strong leadership for peace and the diminution of world tension.
- b. Encourage the Soviets to respond with a significant cutback in planned military expenditures for calendar 1964 ( or head off Soviet propaganda use of a cutback if one was already planned).
- c. Provide a psychological lift just prior to the resumption of ENDC, creating a climate conducive to forward movement in the next session.
- d. Reaffirm U.S. interest in disarmament measures which could produce significant savings in national defense expenditures and thereby free resources for more constructive world needs.

He recommended that an initiative be taken before the final Soviet decision on their defense budget for 1964, in order to influence that decision. (CIA information was that the Soviet announcement on the budget was likely to be made in December but could be made as early as November.) A U.S. initiative on the budget

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before that time could be taken through the medium of a Presidential address, through private Executive correspondence with the Soviets, in bilateral discussions, or in an address by Secretary Rusk or by Ambassador Stevenson at the United Nations. In Mr. Alexander's view, the first alternative would be the most effective, but any would be more desirable than no effort at all of this nature.<sup>1</sup>

In an ACDA Economics Bureau memorandum dated December 13, 1963, preparatory to a White House meeting at Camp David, further proposals for a budgetary initiative were made. It was suggested that economic trends in the Soviet Union and the natural phase-out of some U.S. procurement programs provided a favorable setting for "informal budgetary agreement" with the Soviets. The proposal was to relate this to the creation of an "economic hot-line" for the exchange of data. The objective would be to increase the flow of information and thereby the mutual assurance that would permit both countries to continue on the path of budgetary limitations.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Archibald S. Alexander, Memo to the Director, "Priorities Relating to Military Expenditures," September 20, 1963, ~~Secret~~.

<sup>2</sup>Ruth Sivard, "Mutual Budget Reductions," Dec. 13, 1963, ~~Confidential~~.

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On December 16, 1963, the Soviets announced their budget for 1964, and indicated that the defense budget would be 600 million rubles less than in 1963.<sup>1</sup>

On December 17, Mr. Alexander suggested to the Director that an important American spokesman, preferably the President, should take note of the Soviet announcement and make a statement along the following lines (the phrase in parenthesis to be used if the United States was not proposing any increase in defense spending for fiscal year 1965 and was prepared to make the fact known):

We have noted with great interest the recent announcement by the Soviet Union of the reduction of its defense budget by 4.4% next year and of its intention to devote more of its national resources for the purpose of improving the lot of the civilian consumer, through increased production of consumer goods and of its farms.

(Coinciding as this action does with a similar leveling off of U.S. defense spending,) we may hope for a continued trend in this direction, which in the future will both improve the lives of ordinary men, women and children throughout the world, and also reduce tension between nations and lessen the prospect of armed conflict.

I believe that one way to increase the likelihood of increased momentum in this direction would be meetings between technical budgetary experts of the major countries for the purpose of improving international understanding of the

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<sup>1</sup>  
The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol XV, No. 51, January 15, 1964, p. 9.

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varied fiscal systems and economies of the world, in order that each nation may place appropriate reliance on these moves towards reduced defense spending. My government will make specific suggestions along these lines before very long.<sup>1</sup>

No such statement was made, but in his State of the Union Address, President Johnson announced that the defense budget would be reduced.<sup>2</sup>

#### ENDC Discussions (1964)

At the ENDC meetings in January and February 1964, several representatives including the USSR and other Warsaw Pact members, NATO states, and nonaligned countries, pointed to the U.S. and Soviet budget announcements as representing a policy of mutual example and expressed the hope it would be continued. The Soviet delegate urged other states to "follow the policy of 'mutual example' in the matter of reducing military budgets."<sup>3</sup> The representatives of the USSR's allies did likewise, and the Czechoslovak and Romanian delegates declared that their countries had reduced their own military budgets or the proportion of military expenditures

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<sup>1</sup> Archibald S. Alexander, Memorandum for the Director, December 17, 1963

<sup>2</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 4

<sup>3</sup> ENDC/PV.166, p. 35

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in the total budget.<sup>1</sup> The nonaligned and Western states also praised the actions of the Soviet Union and the United States and, in addition suggested the studies be undertaken to "draw comparisons between different budgets" and permit assurance that announced reductions "actually correspond~~ed~~ to real reduction~~s~~ of the military effort."<sup>2</sup>

In the Co-Chairmen meetings, the United States sought to use the situation created by the parallel actions of the two superpowers to explore with the Soviets possible means for exchanging technical information on military budgets. When the ENDC reconvened in January, Mr. Foster told Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin privately that our military budget was open to everyone but that we needed a better understanding of the Soviet budget.

Ambassador Tsarapkin replied that "mutual example" reductions did not involve a formal agreement and that there was therefore no problem of verification in this context. Both sides should simply take the announced figures at their face value. Mr. Foster agreed that "mutual example" approach could be useful in certain areas but stressed the need for correct understanding by the

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<sup>1</sup>ENDC/PV.164 p. 28; ENDC/RV.168, p.12.

<sup>2</sup>Statement by Italian representative, (ENDC/PV.160,) p. 31. See also statement by Swedish representative, (ENDC/PV.160, pp. 24-25.)

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two sides of their respective actions. He cited as an example the fact that the Soviets had announced a reduction of their military budget by 4.7% but increased their research and development (R&D) expenditures by 5.2%. He suggested that such questions should be discussed by American and Soviet experts.

Ambassador Tsarapkin stated that Soviet R&D increases simply reflected the fact that Soviet society is based on the development of science. He also challenged Foster on private military research in the United States. He commented that the R&D aspect of the problem could be discussed later. At this stage, to facilitate progress towards GCD, it was desirable to move forward step by step on a "mutual example" basis, without formal agreement.<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Foster was informed that we might nominate Assistant Secretary of Defense Hitch as the U.S. representative for the bilateral talks. At the same time, the talks were not intended to result in a formal agreement on budget reductions. -

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<sup>1</sup> From Geneva, tel. DISTO 1488, 1964, ~~Confidential.~~

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The purpose would be to increase understanding of each side's military expenditures and budgets so that each can react more intelligently to the other. There is, of course, no thought of seeking any agreement on spending levels or reductions. Rather the U.S. envisages a bilateral and private exploration of this problem with the USSR for /the/ limited purpose of trying /to/ obtain better understanding /of/ our respective budgets.<sup>1</sup>

Washington also suggested that Foster might use the Soviet comments on U.S. R&D to promote the bilateral talks.<sup>2</sup>

On January 28 the Soviet delegation tabled an eight-point memorandum which included a proposal for a 10-15 per cent reduction of military budgets.<sup>3</sup> In a Co-Chairman's meeting, Ambassador Tsarapkin suggested that this measure could be promptly implemented. Mr. Foster replied that it was not suitable for agreement, although "mutual example" reductions might continue. He reiterated the need for an improved exchange of information and suggested informal discussions between Hitch and his Soviet counterpart.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>To Geneva, tel. TODIS 1199, Jan. 23, 1964,  
~~Confidential.~~

<sup>2</sup>To Geneva, tel. TODIS 1237, Feb. 4, 1964, ~~Confidential~~

<sup>3</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 14.

<sup>4</sup>From Geneva, tel. DISTO 1524, Jan. 29, 1964,  
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The Soviets were already thinking of an ENDC resolution calling on all states to reduce their military expenditures.<sup>1</sup> Washington objected that it would "radically change" the nature of the ENDC if it was to begin to adopt resolutions. It also recalled that our position was that "any binding obligations to reduce military expenditures must be /the/ consequence of agreed physical measures of disarmament." However, in view of wide interest in reductions in military expenditures and the complexity of this matter, Washington preferred that the delegation rest its case on procedural rather than on substantial arguments.<sup>2</sup>

On February 5, in a Co-Chairman's meeting, Ambassador Tsarapkin proposed an ENDC appeal for budget reductions. Mr. Foster replied that every country must make its own decisions and that our military appropriations were the business of Congress, not the ENDC. He again urged a U.S.-Soviet experts meeting and indicated that this might

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<sup>1</sup>From Geneva, tel. DISTO 1530, Jan. 30, 1964,  
~~Confidential.~~

<sup>2</sup>To Geneva, tel. TODIS 1238, Feb. 4, 1964, Confidential. ENDC precedent would have permitted adoption of a resolution if both Co-Chairmen agreed; in 1962 the ENDC considered adopting a declaration condemning war propaganda, but the project fell through when the Soviet delegation was overruled by Moscow.

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facilitate a further reduction next year.<sup>1</sup> Later, Ambassador Tsarapkin asked whether the proposed bilateral discussion was a pre-condition for U.S. willingness to discuss budgets. He avoided answering specific questions on Soviet military expenditures, and claimed that we were seeking intelligence in the bilateral talks, which would be pointless since we already knew all we needed to know.<sup>2</sup>

At the plenary meeting of February 20, Ambassador Tsarapkin asked the ENDC to discuss the Soviet proposal for a 10-15 percent reduction and to consider making an appeal to other states to follow the American and Soviet example.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Foster replied that adoption of our proposal for a strategic nuclear vehicles freeze would produce significant reductions in the American and Soviet budgets. Alluding to the desire of Brazil and other less developed countries to apply savings from military budget reductions to the benefit of mankind, he said that "concrete, verified disarmament agreements -- not vague, unenforceable resolutions -- are the best means of saving more funds for the betterment of mankind."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>From Geneva, tel. DISTO 1550, Feb. 5, 1964, ~~Confidential~~.

<sup>2</sup>From Geneva tel. DISTO 1603, Feb. 17, 1964, ~~Confidential~~.

<sup>3</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 49-52.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. 52-53

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Ambassador Tsarapkin finally turned down our proposal for an informal bilateral discussion of the technical aspects of military budget in a Co-Chairmen's meeting of March 4, saying that such discussions could only serve to delay agreement on the Soviet proposal for reductions.<sup>1</sup> The delegation reported that the possibility of Soviet agreement on bilateral experts talks appeared "nonexistent" and asked whether it should support a Canadian proposal for an expert study of military budgets by an ENDC working group.<sup>2</sup> Washington agreed that the bilateral approach had almost no chance of Soviet acceptance and authorized the delegation to support an ENDC working group. It added, however, that such a group "would not, of course, negotiate or propose military expenditures, nor assume inspection or verification responsibilities, but would concern itself with technical examination and clarification of national budgetary systems."<sup>3</sup> It later suggested terms of reference for a working group.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> From Geneva, tel. DISTO 1653, Mar. 4, 1964,  
~~Confidential.~~

<sup>2</sup> From Geneva, tel. DISTO 1664, Mar. 7, 1964,  
~~Confidential.~~ For the Canadian proposal, see ENDC/PV.172,  
pp. 9-14

<sup>3</sup> To Geneva, tel. TODIS 1369, Mar. 30, 1964, ~~Confidential.~~

<sup>4</sup> To Geneva, tel. TODIS 1379, Apr. 2, 1964, ~~Confidential.~~

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While the Soviet proposal for an ENDC appeal did not involve any verification, Ambassador Tsarapkin assured the ENDC that there would be no obstacle to considering control for an agreement to reduce military expenditures by 10-15 percent.<sup>1</sup> But he rejected the Canadian proposal and declared:

...Without such agreement, any talk about the form of control over the implementation of an agreement on the reduction of military budgets, and any talk about the scope of that control, would be pointless; it would be a waste of time and would even be harmful.<sup>2</sup>

He thus followed the usual Soviet tactic of refusing to agree to technical discussions of verification until an agreement had been reached in principle.

The United States was not willing to negotiate on a collateral agreement on reduction of military expenditures. We also continued to oppose the Soviet proposal for an ENDC appeal. Although this would not involve the United States and the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the FRG, and other allies were increasing their budgets at this time. At the April 9 plenary meeting, Mr. Fisher said that we hoped that other states

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<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV.166, pp. 37-38

<sup>2</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 85-86

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would find it possible to reduce military expenditures "as far as their special security problems and their peacekeeping responsibilities to the United Nations will permit." He also pointed out that the published Soviet budget consisted of "sixteen words and one sum" and asked a number of detailed questions about Soviet military expenditures. Finally, he stressed the problem of verification:

...Here we are told by the representative of the Soviet Union that we should agree to the proposal now and concern ourselves with verification later. It has been suggested that we can look at the military budget of States, and that this is all that is required. We are told that this is so because we should not distrust the statements of responsible officials speaking on behalf of their governments on fiscal matters.

The Government of the Soviet Union, like all responsible governments, does not rely solely on trust of its officials to ensure compliance with regulations in fiscal matters. It has its own audit procedures to give it assurance that fiscal regulations are being complied with. Surely other States, to which the Soviet Union has proposed mutual reductions of budgets, are entitled to similar assurance. Surely they are entitled to something more than merely reading the sixteen words and the one sum which are available in the published Soviet military budget.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., pp. 152-157

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The U.S. delegation and others were now seeking an April recess, while the Soviets and their allies primately intimated that the ENDC might never meet again unless it adopted the budget appeal. On April 10, Ambassador Tsarapkin warned Fisher that if there was no progress at the current session "some people" might not return to the conference. In a later Co-Chairmen's meeting, he said that he had no instructions on a recess but argued that recess without any agreement would be dangerous for the ENDC.<sup>1</sup>

At the Co-Chairmen's meeting of April 17, Ambassador Tsarapkin again made a plea for a budget appeal. He said that the USSR envisaged only a moral obligation and was flexible on the precise formulation, which should commend reductions made by U.S. and USSR, invite them to continue to make such reductions, and appeal to others to follow their example. He also argued that the appeal would demonstrate the usefulness of the Co-Chairmen institution. Mr. Fisher noted our difficulties with the proposal and emphasized that the ENDC was a negotiating body. He expressed disappointment that the

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<sup>1</sup> From Geneva, Tel. DISTO 1773, Apr. 13, 1964,  
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Soviets had not accepted our suggestion for bilateral expert discussions and added that the American and Soviet reductions were the result of independent assessments rather than "mutual example." He would refer the question to Washington but did not expect a favorable response.<sup>1</sup>

In his report to Foster, Mr. Fisher was not unsympathetic to a budget appeal. He saw no way of preventing a Soviet propaganda blast unless we agreed to a modified appeal which would note budget reductions made by US-USSR, express hope that the reductions will continue and that other countries will be able to follow their example, "taking into account their own military and security situations." He guessed that the Soviets might accept such a formulation and might even agree to an expert committee following it. He believed that it would be advantageous except for British objections. Since the British could not be expected to change their position on short notice, he wrote, "I do not now feel I can recommend agreement on this kind of appeal, although I believe it should be considered." He therefore proposed to go ahead with the recess.<sup>2</sup> Washington concurred.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>From Geneva, tel. DISTO 1793, Apr. 17, 1964, ~~Confidential.~~

<sup>2</sup>From Geneva, tel. DISTO 1792, Apr. 17, 1964, ~~Confidential.~~

<sup>3</sup>To Geneva, tel. TODIS 1407, Apr. 18, 1964, ~~Confidential.~~

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U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Talks (1964)

During the summer and autumn of 1964 ACDA considered how the U.S. might use "mutual example" and the budgetary trends to ease tensions and benefit the work of ENDC. A wide range of schemes was discussed within the Agency and a number of possible joint U.S.-Soviet statements brought before a Committee of Principals meeting on August 12. Secretary Rusk rejected the idea of publicly expressed satisfaction at Soviet announcements of reduced military budgets because we did not know what these figures meant. The Principals agreed only to statements proposing technical discussions and the submission by all states of reports to the U.N. on the levels of past and projected military spending.<sup>1</sup> It does not appear that this decision led to any serious discussions with the Soviets in Geneva, but later in the year they were resumed in New York.

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<sup>1</sup> Meeting of the Committee of Principals, Summary of Action and Memorandum of Conversation, Recommended Content of a Joint Statement Relating to a Reduction of Military Expenditures, August 12, 1964, Secret; William C. Foster, Memorandum to Members of the Committee of Principals, Recommended Content..., August 11, 1964  
Confidential

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In November and December 1964, in private talks between top U.S. leaders, including Secretary Rusk, Mr. Foster, and Ambassador Stevenson, and Soviet delegates to the U.N. General Assembly, the United States raised the subject of defense budget plans in a way which was intended to influence Soviet plans.<sup>1</sup>

On November 30, Secretary Rusk told Gromyko that as far as we could see and in the absence of special circumstances the U.S. military budget in FY 1966 would be \$1.25 billion lower than it had been in FY 1965. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin inquired whether this implied a reduction as compared to the actual military expenditures in 1965 or the original figure, which had already been reduced by \$1.25 billion. Secretary Rusk said he would look into this question, but that in any event, U.S. policy was, in the absence of special circumstances, not to increase but rather to seek possible reductions in military spending. In reply to an inquiry by Gromyko why the United States could not lower its military budget

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<sup>1</sup>Prior to these meetings, on November 27, ACDA/E was asked by the Special Assistant to the Deputy Director of ACDA to estimate the timing of the Soviet budgetary announcements and to sketch out alternative approaches to the Soviets on this subject. The information supplied indicated that the Soviet public announcement would be made about December 9, 1964.

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to the Soviet level, he said that his government would like to discuss what a military budget really meant because the United States and the USSR did not apparently include the same items. Although the Secretary of State again expressed an interest in technical talks on the subject, Mr. Gromyko did not respond. Following discussion of other subjects, the conversation returned to reductions in military spending, at which time the Secretary made it clear that although his government wanted to stop the spiral of the arms race, in talking about reductions in military spending he did not have in mind any arrangements involving loss of freedom of action or formal agreement.<sup>1</sup>

Further U.S.-Soviet discussions on reductions of military budgets continued during the next few days. On December 2, the Secretary of State informed Gromyko that our budget for FY 1966 would be \$1.25 billion lower than in FY 1965. Mr. Gromyko replied that taking this information into account, his government was prepared to take similar action and would cut its military budget by half a billion rubles. According to Gromyko, this reduction represented a proportion comparable to the reduction in the U.S. budget. He then observed that

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<sup>1</sup>MemCon Rusk-Gromyko, Nov. 30, 1964, ~~Confidential~~.

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the announcement of the reduction would be made on December 9 and remarked facetiously that the Soviet announcement would prevent the United States from re-treating on the question. There was again some discussion on the composition of the Soviet military budget--whether R&D was included--but no conclusion was reached before the talks moved on to other subjects.<sup>1</sup>

When Mr. Foster and Ambassador Tsarapkin met two days later, budgetary reductions were briefly discussed. Ambassador Tsarapkin said that he thought the reduction of military budgets was an area where the two sides appeared to have already reached mutual understanding. He inquired about the size of the proposed reduction in the U.S. military budget. Mr. Foster noted that we were not yet in the final stage of developing our military budget. However, it looked now as if our FY 1966 budget would be about \$1.25 billion lower than the budget for the previous year.<sup>2</sup>

At the final meeting of this series, Secretary Rusk provided more exact figures on the U.S. military budget by giving Gromyko the text of a public statement made by Secretary McNamara on November 10. This indicated that even with the absorption of a pay increase defense

<sup>1</sup>MemCon Rusk-Gromyko, Dec. 2, 1964, ~~Confidential~~----

<sup>2</sup>Mem Con Foster-Tsarapkin, Dec. 4, 1964, ~~Conf. - Lim. Dis.~~

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expenditure could be held to under \$50 billion in 1966, or at least \$1.25 billion below expenditures of \$51.2 billion in FY 1964.<sup>1</sup>

Public announcement of the Soviet budget was made by Premier Kosygin in a speech to the Supreme Soviet on December 9, 1964. He declared that the USSR considered reducing military budgets an especially important means of limiting the arms race and was therefore submitting a defense budget for CY 1965 500 million rubles below that of the previous year. Then he continued:

Representatives of the U.S. Government have given us a relevant statement on the plans of the U.S. Government. It follows from this statement that the U.S. Government also intends to reduce its military expenditures for the 1965 and 1966 fiscal years. Thus the reduction of Soviet military expenditures in the 1965 budget and the expected reduction of U.S. military expenditures represent a certain positive step in the direction of reducing international tension.<sup>2</sup>

Domestic press interest in the matter became apparent at once. On the same day, the White House Press Secretary, George Reedy, was questioned about the Kosygin statement. He said: "There is no agreement between the two countries on budget cutting, nor any effort

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<sup>1</sup>MemCon Rusk-Gromyko, Dec. 5, 1964, ~~Confidential~~.

<sup>2</sup>FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, Dec. 10, 1964, p. cc-22.

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whatsoever at mutuality in this matter." He said that the Secretary of State during some of his conversations with the Soviets had transmitted the substance of what Mr. McNamara publicly said on November 10.

Senator Carl Curtis (Rep., Neb.) wrote to the Secretary of State to get his assurance that "diplomatic considerations" did not play a part in the decision to close 95 military bases and save some of the \$1.25 billion.<sup>1</sup> In reply, the Secretary reported what had occurred at his meeting with Gromyko, emphasizing that the statements by McNamara and Kosygin did not "represent an agreement of any kind", and that the United States had retained its freedom of action.<sup>2</sup>

#### The Vietnam War and Later Developments

Developments during 1965 rapidly altered U.S. budgetary plans. In May 1965, the decision to expand U.S. activity in Vietnam forced the Administration to request supplemental defense funds for FY 1966. Additional requests in August 1965, and January 1966 brought total defense appropriations for the fiscal year to \$55.4 billion.

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<sup>1</sup>Curtis to Rusk, Dec. 10, 1964

<sup>2</sup>Rusk to Curtis, letter, Dec. 23, 1964

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The response from Soviet leaders to the increases in the U.S. defense budget was sharp. Swedish Prime Minister Erlander, for example, reported that in private conversations in June, Kosygin had seemed bitter about what he considered U.S. reneging on an unwritten understanding to reduce military expenditures.<sup>1</sup>

Publicly the Soviet Premier declared in a speech at Volgograd that because of the international situation, the USSR could not "economize on defense." According to various American observers the speech implied that the Soviet leadership had been forced against its will to divert money from butter to guns.<sup>2</sup>

Premier Kosygin displayed the same bitterness in talks with Governor Harriman a few days later. The United States, he said, had not kept its word when it increased its budget to pay for the war in Vietnam. "The Soviet Union always keeps its promises and had done so in cutting its military budget by 500 million rubles." Governor Harriman replied that Kosygin's complaint was disingenuous because the Soviets' declared reduction was

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<sup>1</sup>From Stockholm, tel. 10, July 6, 1965, ~~Confidential~~.

<sup>2</sup>N.Y. Times, Washington Post, July 12, 1965

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unverified and unverifiable. Still, he commented, "we cannot exclude the possibility that Kosygin was sincere in reproaching the U.S. for not carrying through with what Moscow had intended to be another round of mutual example."<sup>1</sup> In a conversation held a week later, he informed Kosygin that U.S. defense expenditures would still be reduced for FY 1965 and might be even lower for FY 1966 depending on developments in Vietnam. The Premier held out the prospect of technical talks on reductions in military expenditures if the Vietnam situation would disappear.<sup>2</sup>

Talks on budgetary limitations continued in New York alongside the General Assembly meeting. On September 29, after Secretary Rusk brought up some of the technical difficulties in comparing budgets, Mr. Gromyko expressed hope that it would be possible to return to a discussion of percentage reductions in the two budgets. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin recalled the earlier discussions and pointed to a \$5-6 billion increase in the U.S. defense budget after an "agreement" had been

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<sup>1</sup>MemCon, Harriman-Kosygin, Jul. 15, 1965, Secret-Exdis.

<sup>2</sup>To Moscow, tel. 190, Jul. 17, 1965, ~~Confidential~~;  
From Moscow, tel. 217, Jul. 21, 1965, ~~Secret-Lindis~~; MemCon, Harriman-Kosygin, Jul. 22, 1965, ~~Secret-Exdis~~.

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reached. Secretary Rusk objected to use of the word agreement, and Mr. Gromyko concurred in his statement that "the arrangement had been merely a statement of intentions barring unforeseen developments." Further conversation on the components of defense budgets led to another suggestion by Rusk that the two countries "sit down and discuss reliable figures." Mr. Gromyko agreed that this could be a subject for discussion, but not at that point.<sup>1</sup>

In a conversation on October 1, 1965, it was Gromyko who raised the subject of budgetary limitations, saying that he gathered from Rusk that the United States considered it an important matter. Could the two countries not again consider the possibility of reducing military budgets? Secretary Rusk took a negative attitude this time, saying that we are unable to agree to reduce budgets without regard to events in the Pacific. Also, the United States required some kind of verification. He realized that the Soviets could obtain all the information they needed from our open society and that therefore he was asking them for a unilateral concession,

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<sup>1</sup> MemCon, Rusk-Gromyko, Sept. 29, 1965, ~~Secret Exdis.~~  
See also Talking Paper-Foreign Minister Gromyko: U.S.  
Military Expenditures (Twentieth General Assembly,  
New York-September 1965) Sept. 17, 1965, ~~Confidential.~~

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but nevertheless the United States could not accept Soviet figures on good faith. He therefore suggested that the Foreign Minister appoint someone in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to study ways of how the USSR could provide us with the necessary assurances on verification, etc. He left this problem with Gromyko with the assurance that the United States did not want to pry, but wanted some basis of confidence that an agreement would be lived up to.<sup>1</sup>

U.S. explanations apparently did not assuage the feelings of Soviet leaders that they had been double-crossed. In late September 1965, Viktor Karpov, a Soviet diplomat in Washington, told Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Barber "not /to/ underestimate the damage done by the United States ignoring the defense budget 'agreement'." Moscow no longer believed that the United States could be trusted because it had broken its promise. When Mr. Barber denied there had been any agreement, Mr. Karpov replied that the United States could at least have told the Soviet Government before making a public statement. In that way, he

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<sup>1</sup>MemCon, Rusk-Gromyko, Oct. 1, 1965, No. 2, ~~Secret Ends~~

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concluded, "you would at least have given some indication that you considered the exchange which did take place politically valuable. Now the impression is created that you do not care about these matters."<sup>1</sup>

Premier Kosygin expressed similar sentiments in October to the Danish Prime Minister. According to Krag, the Soviet leader said that the confidence necessary to disarmament had been hurt by U.S. violation of an unofficial understanding to cut defense budgets.<sup>2</sup>

In October 1965, Mr. Alexander raised this matter in the Director's staff meeting and also transmitted a memorandum to the Director suggesting "a determined effort to keep alive the dialogue with the Soviets on military budgets."

He recommended:

a. A communication through Ambassador Kohler prior to the Soviet budget announcements for CY 1966. This would update the budgetary information provided by Harriman in July.

b. A communication from the President to Kosygin before the January budget message.

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<sup>1</sup>MemCon, Barber-Karpov, Sept. 28, 1965, ~~Secret~~

<sup>2</sup>From Copenhagen, tel. 275, Oct. 21, 1965, ~~Confidential~~.  
See also from Paris, tel. POLTO 555, Oct. 20, 1965, ~~Confidential~~

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The Director said that no additional clarification appeared needed now, but that the Assistant Director (E) should discuss the second proposal with the Bureau of the Budget.<sup>1</sup>

#### 1966 And Subsequent Years

During 1966 and 1967 on several occasions the Soviets again referred to this example of what they considered U.S. bad faith, but no further bilateral conversations occurred between the two-superpowers. In April 1966, Ambassador Roshchin said at ENDC that the principal obstacles to an appropriate atmosphere for progress on general and complete disarmament are the U.S. failure to follow through on mutual examples of reduction of military budgets and the aggressive war in Vietnam.<sup>2</sup>

In December 1966 in a visit to Ankara, Premier Kosygin was reported to have stated in private talks that the Soviets once had a verbal agreement with President Kennedy under which each country informed the other of the size of its military budget and sought to bring

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<sup>1</sup> Archibald S. Alexander, Memorandum to the Director, "Communicating with the Soviets on Military Budgets," Oct. 26, 1965, ~~Secret~~.

<sup>2</sup> ENDC/PV.259, p. 33.

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about an annual reduction in military expenditures. But the United States had stopped providing the USSR with this information and had increased its military budget.<sup>1</sup>

In July 1967, he reportedly told DeGaulle that the Soviet Union had made a tacit agreement with the Americans two and a half years ago to limit military budgets. This had been satisfactory and both sides had-at first effected reductions but with the rising costs of the Vietnam war, the Americans had not kept their side of the bargain. Nevertheless, he thought that the Soviet Union would persist in trying to reach an agreement with the Americans on limiting military budgets. He also said that it would be a good thing if other countries would also limit military budgets.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>From Ankara, tel. 3074, Dec. 29, 1966, ~~Secret.~~

<sup>2</sup>From Paris to UK Foreign Office, tel. 704, Jul. 4, 1967, ~~Confidential.~~

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Final Draft

THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY DURING THE  
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION (U)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-165

BY ~~128~~ NARA. Date 4-15-92

II. POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS

K. Other Measures

6. Non-use of Nuclear Weapons

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

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
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## NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

As long as there have been nuclear weapons, there have been attempts to prohibit their use. Proposals have been advanced to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons unconditionally or simply to ban the first use of such weapons. In the non-proliferation context, the Soviet Union has proposed to ban the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states without nuclear weapons on their territory, and the United States has proposed to ban use against non-nuclear-weapon states not engaged in an armed attack assisted by a nuclear-weapon state. When it signed Additional Protocol II to the Tlatelolco treaty, the United States had subscribed to the last kind of undertaking with respect to Latin American states. This protocol has not yet been submitted to the U.S. Senate.

### Background

During the 1950s, we opposed various Soviet proposals to prohibit the use or first use of nuclear weapons and took the position that use should not be prohibited until the weapons were eliminated. In 1961, over our opposition, the General Assembly approved an Ethiopian resolution condemning the use of nuclear weapons and asking the Secretary-General to consult U.N. members on convening a conference for signing a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. In his reply to

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the Secretary-General, Secretary of State Rusk said that a ban on use would be valueless in the absence of general and complete disarmament. The United States would not use any weapon aggressively, but it had to be prepared to defend itself and to participate in collective defense. The Ethiopian proposal and similar Soviet proposals were consistently opposed by the United States in various forums. They nevertheless attracted considerable support from the nonaligned nations.<sup>1</sup>

#### Chinese Communist Proposals

When they exploded their first nuclear device in October 1964, the Chinese Communists declared that they would never be the first to use nuclear weapons. They also proposed a world summit conference to ban the use of nuclear weapons and draw up a nuclear disarmament agreement.<sup>2</sup> The USSR was the only nuclear power that responded favorably. The Chinese obtained some favorable responses from non-nuclear nations, but most of the latter favored a world disarmament conference, including China, with larger terms of reference. We did not make a formal reply to the Chinese proposal, which Secretary of State Rusk labeled a "smokescreen." Our attitude toward the move for a world disarmament conference was cool, but we were willing to participate

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<sup>1</sup>See "Proposals To Ban the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1961-1967" (Disarmament Document Series, Ref 516).

<sup>2</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 455.

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in an exploratory group, including China, to determine whether there was a "constructive basis" for such a conference.<sup>1</sup>

In a press interview of April 10, 1966, Premier Chou En-lai said that a world disarmament conference under existing conditions would "yield no useful, practical results" and only give the United States a "smokescreen of peace" for expanding its "war of aggression against Viet-Nam."<sup>2</sup> On May 10 he delivered a public address in which he denounced the United States for rejecting the Chinese proposal, attacked the United States and the Soviet Union for engaging in non-proliferation negotiations, and declared that China had to conduct nuclear tests in these circumstances.<sup>3</sup>

Periodic meetings between their Ambassadors at Warsaw were the only direct diplomatic link between the United States and Communist China. On May 23, Washington instructed Gronouski to ask Wang for clarification of the Chou statements. He was to tell Wang that we hoped the April 10 statement did not mean that Peking considered it impossible for an exploratory group for a world disarmament conference to make "progress toward meaningful disarmament" and give him a letter requesting Chinese views on participation in an exploratory group. He was also to ask

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., 1965, p. 537. See also Robert W. Lambert and Jean Mayer, "Recent Proposals for a World Disarmament Conference" (RS memorandum, 1965).

<sup>2</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1966, pp. 210-212.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 280-281.

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whether Chou's May 10 statement meant that Peking would consider a test ban if it was linked with a non-first-use agreement.<sup>1</sup>

At the May 25 Warsaw meeting, Ambassador Gronouski inquired about the Chou statements. On the May 10 statement, he asked:

...Mr. Ambassador, does this statement indicate that your government would consider an agreement to ban nuclear tests if it were linked to a non-first use agreement? This is an important point and I would like to ask you to seek clarification from your government...Perhaps you could let me know about this matter at your earliest convenience after you've gotten instructions from your government. While we believe that any disarmament agreement must be a rounded one which covers all types of forces and weapons, we are interested in any serious proposal that would contribute to disarmament. We are willing to explore disarmament issues with your government either here at Warsaw or elsewhere...

This demarche was made in the middle of a polemical exchange of views on the war in Vietnam. Ambassador Wang made no immediate comment.<sup>2</sup>

On June 3 the New York Times reported that Gronouski had raised, "on a tentative, exploratory basis," the question of Chinese adherence to the limited test-ban treaty if the United States accepted a non-first-use agreement.<sup>3</sup> Exploiting this leak, Renmin Ribao asserted on June 20 that we had proposed that the Chinese consider linking their non-first-use proposal with accession to the limited test-ban treaty. Denouncing this demarche as

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<sup>1</sup>To Warsaw, tel. 1752, May 23, 1966, ~~Confidential~~/Limdis.

<sup>2</sup>From Warsaw, agm. A-877, June 2, 1966, ~~Confidential~~.

<sup>3</sup>New York Times, June 3, 1966, pp. 1, 4.

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fraudulent, the Chinese claimed that our "promise" to consider a non-first-use agreement was false and that our real intention was to "fasten China to the tripartite nuclear test ban treaty," which remained in their eyes a "criminal concoction by the two nuclear overlords." After attacking our role in the Vietnam war, they also declared that they would not attend any world disarmament conference, either "at the United Nations or outside."<sup>1</sup> On September 26 our Embassy at Warsaw received a formal reply to Gronouski's letter, which called our offer to participate in an exploratory group a "sheer swindle" which should not be "mentioned in the same breath" with the Chinese proposal for a summit conference to prohibit nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup>

#### Non-use and Non-proliferation

Since many nonaligned, non-nuclear nations had supported the Ethiopian and Soviet proposals, it was not surprising that they also showed an interest in obtaining the "negative" security assurances that a non-use agreement would provide in the context of a non-proliferation treaty. The Soviets were willing to oblige. In his message of February 1, 1966, to the ENDC, Premier Kosygin offered to include in the non-proliferation treaty a provision banning the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear

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<sup>1</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1966, pp. 355-359.

<sup>2</sup>From Warsaw, tel. 539, Sept. 7, 1966, ~~Confidential/Limdis.~~

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parties which did not have nuclear weapons on their territory.<sup>1</sup> The proposal was widely welcomed by the nonaligned members of the ENDC. Even some of our allies might have accepted it if it was amended to apply only to nonaligned, non-nuclear parties.

The United States did not accept the Kosygin proposal because it discriminated against allies with nuclear weapons on their territory. As a counter-measure, we attempted to develop a U.N. resolution to provide "positive" security guarantees to non-nuclear parties that were the victims of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used.<sup>2</sup> During the examination of this problem by the Committee of Principals (February 1966), the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed any form of non-use obligation on the ground that this would deprive us of the advantage of the "deterrent effect of U.S. nuclear superiority."<sup>3</sup>

The question of "negative" security assurances remained very much alive. In the summer of 1966, the Italians advanced the idea of a three-year moratorium on proliferation and proposed to combine this with both positive and negative security assurances, i.e., the nuclear powers would both agree not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear, nonaligned nations and to support them in the event of nuclear attack or blackmail. Although

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<sup>1</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1966, pp. 17-18.

<sup>2</sup>See above, chapter B, pp. 60-64.

<sup>3</sup>JCS to Secretary of Defense, memorandum (JCSM-138-66), Mar. 4, 1966, ~~Secret~~.

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we were not willing to accept non-use provisions for a moratorium, our reply did not exclude them in the context of a non-proliferation treaty.<sup>1</sup>

At the 21st General Assembly, we were confronted with a nonaligned draft resolution endorsing the Kosygin proposal. In the face of our objections, the sponsors were willing to drop the phrase "which do not have nuclear weapons in their territory." ACDA proposed that we support the resolution and declare that we would not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear party to a non-proliferation treaty that was not engaged in aggression supported by a nuclear power. Over JCS objections, this formula was accepted in Washington. The Soviets, however, insisted on restoring the full Kosygin language and the sponsors agreed to do so. Although a British compromise referring to "any other proposals" was also accepted by the sponsors, the draft resolution remained unacceptable to us, and we were unable to surface the new formula. In the end, our delegation asked for a separate vote on the non-use paragraph of the resolution, which was approved 98 to 0, with 4 abstentions (the United States, Spain, the Cameroons, and France).<sup>2</sup> The resolution was approved November 17 by an overwhelming majority, including the United States.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>See above, chapter B, pp. 87-88.

<sup>2</sup>See *ibid.*, pp. 127-129.

<sup>3</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1966, pp. 748-749.



The United States and the Soviet Union had not yet agreed on security guarantees when the draft non-proliferation treaty was tabled on August 24, 1967. Our position was not yet settled. The Soviets favored "positive" security assurances in the form of pledges by the nuclear powers to act through the Security Council and the "negative" assurances that the Kosygin proposal would provide. Six of the eight nonaligned members of the ENDC favored including the Kosygin proposal or some non-use provision in the non-proliferation treaty. India did not favor the Kosygin proposal, probably because she was chiefly concerned with the Chinese threat and it was quite obvious that Peking would not sign the treaty. Sweden did not push non-use because of the difficulty it would cause the United States.<sup>1</sup>

It was not until October 28, 1967, that Mr. Fisher received instructions, and these only covered "positive assurances" through the Security Council and declarations by the nuclear powers.<sup>2</sup> The Soviets asked us whether we could not add some non-use provisions. We then produced the following addition to our draft declaration, which we sent to Ambassador Cleveland on November 23:

The United States affirms its intention to refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State that has undertaken not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or devices, and is not engaged in an armed attack assisted by a nuclear-weapon State.

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<sup>1</sup>See above, chapter B, pp. 237-238.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 380-383.

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Ambassador Cleveland explained to the North Atlantic Council that nuclear weapons could still be used "in the event of a war in Europe in which the Soviet Union provided assistance" and that the alliance would therefore retain the nuclear deterrent against Soviet aggression.

At the same time, we opposed a German proposal to add to a preambular paragraph to the non-proliferation treaty in which the nuclear powers would resolve not to use nuclear weapons "for the purpose of political pressure, political threat or political blackmail against non-nuclear-weapon powers." We told the Germans that our draft resolution and declaration offered more to the non-nuclear powers and that their proposal might be interpreted to ban us from "threatening [the] use of nuclear weapons against [a] threatened conventional attack by a non-nuclear state which was supported by a nuclear-weapon state." While nuclear blackmail would not violate the non-proliferation treaty, a serious threat to use nuclear weapons could be grounds for withdrawing or implementing security assurances.

In the NAC discussion, the Italian representative criticized our proposal because it did not cover alliance members and suggested that it might make them more vulnerable to nuclear attack. Ambassador Cleveland commented that this was far-fetched and pointed to the assurance that Italy enjoyed under the North Atlantic Treaty.

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At Geneva, Mr. Foster told Roshchin that this was the only kind of non-use proposal we could accept. He explained that it would be presumed that any attack by a NATO or Warsaw Pact country had the assistance of the nuclear ally and that each nuclear power would be free to exercise its own judgment.<sup>1</sup> On January 22, 1968, Ambassador Roshchin told Foster that our proposal was not acceptable since it would equate states without nuclear weapons on their territory with nations where nuclear weapons were stationed. After further discussion about the possibility of each side using its own formula in its declaration, the Co-Chairmen agreed to delete non-use altogether. The British representative, who participated in these talks, had no instructions on the subject.<sup>2</sup>

After the ENDC completed its work on the non-proliferation treaty (March 1968), the question was referred to the resumed 22nd session of the General Assembly. It was anticipated that the nonaligned, non-nuclear nations would again raise the question of "negative" security assurances and that the United States and the Soviet Union would defend their positions. The JCS, however, objected to allowing the American delegation to reaffirm our proposal. While they recognized that this was intended to induce non-nuclear nations to sign the non-proliferation treaty, they argued that it would weaken the credibility of the nuclear

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 309-394.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 426 ff.

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deterrent and that the risks to national security outweighed the supposed political advantages:

...the extent to which this nonuse guarantee is effective politically is the same extent to which the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent will be weakened. A US nonuse commitment could encourage increased "adventurism" on the part of US enemies or potential enemies who view themselves as free from the threat of US nuclear attack and relatively safe from a significant conventional attack because of heavy US commitments elsewhere, such as in South Vietnam. Moreover...it would almost certainly have a divisive impact on the NATO Alliance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, again recommended that the US policy on nuclear nonuse be changed to reject any form of nonuse commitment other than required by the Treaty of Tlatelolco.<sup>1</sup>

On Foster's recommendation, Secretary of State Rusk sent the President a memorandum urging reaffirmation of our proposal and stating that this was essential to get General Assembly endorsement of the non-proliferation treaty. He believed that our proposal was flexible enough to preserve the credibility of our deterrent "in situations in which we would want to threaten or actually use nuclear weapons." He found it inconceivable that we would wish to use them in a situation in which the aggressor was not assisted by a nuclear power, and he pointed out that it would leave us free to decide in each case.<sup>2</sup> When the question was put to the President on April 23, he deferred approval, apparently on the ground that he did not wish to override the JCS on a hypothetical issue.<sup>3</sup>

At the General Assembly, the Japanese considered introducing a resolution which would call on the nuclear powers to control their nuclear weapons in the interest of the "maintenance of

<sup>1</sup>JCS to Secretary of Defense, memorandum (JCSM-249-68), Apr. 17, 1968, ~~Secret~~.

<sup>2</sup>Foster to Secretary of State, memorandum, "Negative Security Assurances in Connection With Non-proliferation Treaty," Apr. 19, 1968, ~~Secret~~, with attached memorandum for the President, n.d., ~~Secret~~.

<sup>3</sup>Bohlen to Rusk, memorandum approved by Rusk, Oct. 18, 1968, ~~Confidential~~.

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international peace and security"-and to make their "utmost efforts" towards an "international system for the effective control of nuclear arms." In private discussions, Ambassador Buffum suggested adding a paragraph requesting the powers possessing nuclear weapons to "assure that they will not use such weapons in any manner inconsistent with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the United Nations Charter." The use of the word "control" was unclear, and Ambassador De Palma told the Japanese that their proposal would not be acceptable to the Soviets, who had always opposed control of existing weapons. He considered that the proposal was separate from the question of non-use.

The Japanese revised the resolution to include Buffum's proposal and to eliminate the term "control." In this form, Washington was willing to support it. But it encountered Soviet opposition, and our delegation asked the Japanese to postpone it. For their part, the Soviets reluctantly agreed to drop non-use at this session, where the fate of the non-proliferation treaty was at stake. At the same time, they privately suggested that the nuclear powers undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear parties to the treaty which were not members of alliances with nuclear powers. We reacted negatively.<sup>1</sup>

We opposed a Maltese proposal to add to the draft resolution endorsing the non-proliferation treaty a clause on not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons "in any manner inconsistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 498-503.

the United Nations."<sup>1</sup> And we told the Romanians that there was no prospect for agreement on amendments incorporating a pledge by the nuclear powers to act through the Security Council to assure non-nuclear parties that "they would not be subjected to a nuclear attack and would not be threatened with such an attack."<sup>2</sup> In the face of American and Soviet opposition, the Yugoslavs agreed not to surface a resolution inviting the nuclear powers to make declarations on non-use in conformity with the General Assembly resolution of November 17, 1966.<sup>3</sup>

In more general terms, the Mexicans proposed an additional preambular paragraph recalling the Charter principle that states should "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force." Although they agreed among themselves that any non-use formula would be divisive, the Co-Chairmen agreed to accept the Mexican amendment, and a paragraph was added to the treaty preamble.<sup>4</sup>

The Security Council approved the U.S.-U.K.-Soviet "positive" security assurances proposal on June 19, and the non-proliferation treaty was opened for signature on July 1. There remained considerable sentiment among the non-nuclear nations for some

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 516-517.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 515-516.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 527.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. 519, 522; International Negotiations on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 168-173.

form of non-use agreement, and this feeling found expression in the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. Most of the proposals were not formally surfaced, including:

(1) A Yugoslav resolution reviving the Ethiopian proposal and calling on states to issue unilateral declarations incorporating the Kosygin proposal until a convention was concluded.

(2) A Pakistani resolution urging the nuclear powers to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear nation which had renounced nuclear weapons and had none on its territory. The Pakistanis also wanted stronger "positive" security assurances than the Security Council resolution provided.

(3) A proposal by Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia for a conference to conclude a convention or protocol to the non-proliferation treaty providing that the non-nuclear powers would not attack non-nuclear nations or each other and that parties would come to the aid of any state attacked by nuclear or conventional weapons.

(4) A Belgian proposal to invite the nuclear powers to "solemnly subscribe, individually or collectively, without detriment to the right of legitimate or collective defense reaffirmed in the UN Charter, to the commitment not to lend themselves, directly or indirectly, and in any place (territory) whatsoever, to any military initiative whatever involving or engaging the use of nuclear weapons or the threat to use such weapons."

(5) A FRG proposal that the nuclear powers undertake "not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State, unless requested to act according to a decision by the Security Council or to assist in the exercise of the right of self-defense."

Although the Yugoslav and Pakistani resolutions embodied the Kosygin formula, they encountered Soviet opposition because they were not restricted to parties to the non-proliferation treaty. We requested a NAC discussion of the Belgian and German proposals, and Ambassador Cleveland was instructed to oppose them, since we did not consider it possible to develop a "broadly acceptable formula" in view of the conflicting interests of various groups of states. The British representative supported him at the September 18 meeting of the NAC, and the Belgians and Germans agreed not to push their proposals.

The Germans, however, went ahead with a resolution reaffirming (1) the principle of the non-use of force, (2) the "right to equality, sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-intervention in internal affairs and self-determination of every State," and (3) the right of self-defense under article 51 of the Charter as the legitimate exception. In spite of American and Soviet opposition, the German resolution was adopted on September 27 by a large majority.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>See above, chapter B, pp. 568-575. The NNC resolution may be found in Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 671-672.



Additional Protocol II to the Tlatelolco Treaty for the  
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

Attached to the Tlatelolco treaty, opened for signature on February 14, 1967, was a protocol in which the nuclear powers would undertake to respect the treaty and pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against treaty parties.<sup>1</sup> We had questioned the desirability of this protocol during the negotiations<sup>2</sup> and did not immediately take any formal action on it.

The Mexicans kept pressing us to sign, and their support was needed in the non-proliferation negotiations. Eventually, we decided to sign the protocol with an interpretive statement. President Johnson informed Diaz Ortiz of this decision on October 26, 1967.<sup>3</sup>

On April 1, 1968, Vice President Humphrey signed the protocol on behalf of the United States. At the same time, he gave the Mexican Foreign Minister an interpretive statement including the following paragraph on non-use:

As regards the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties, the United States would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon State, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party's corresponding obligations under Article 1 of the Treaty.

We also stated that the treaty did not affect transit rights, and we reaffirmed our view that it did not permit the parties to develop or use peaceful nuclear explosive devices.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 83.

<sup>2</sup>See above, chapter D, p. 35.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 45-48.

<sup>4</sup>Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 29, 1968, pp. 555-556.

It had previously been agreed within the U.S. Government that the protocol would not be submitted to the Senate until a substantial number of Latin American countries had ratified the treaty and that the Department of Defense would then have an opportunity to consider the security implications.<sup>1</sup> President Johnson did not submit the protocol to the Senate during the remainder of his term of office. Of the other nuclear powers, only the United Kingdom has signed and ratified the protocol.

Although the Soviet Union has been an enthusiastic promoter of nuclear-free zones in various regions, it has generally abstained from voting on General Assembly resolutions endorsing efforts to create a zone in Latin America. This Soviet policy was probably influenced by Cuba, which insisted on denuclearizing the Panama Canal, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands and declined to sign the Tlatelolco treaty because it did not do so. In January 1967, the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico informed the Latin Americans that the Soviet Union was disposed to undertake an obligation to respect the status of the zone when the interested states had concluded the treaty and the attitude of other nuclear powers was known.<sup>2</sup>

Speaking in the First Committee of the General Assembly on October 27, 1967, Ambassador Mendelevich found elements of "ambiguity" in certain treaty provisions. As the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico had previously noted, the provisions on peaceful nuclear

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<sup>1</sup>See above, chapter D, pp. 49-50.

<sup>2</sup>COPREDAL 60.

explosions were unclear.<sup>1</sup> Ambassador Mendelevich pointed out that the treaty contained no ban on the transportation of nuclear weapons and that we had refused to stop sending nuclear-armed warships through the Panama Canal. U.S. nuclear weapons would also remain in Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, and "other Latin American areas" that we did not wish to include. Moreover, the wide boundaries of the zone included international waters in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.<sup>2</sup> The Soviet Union abstained from voting on the General Assembly resolution of December 5 inviting the nuclear powers to adhere to the protocol.<sup>3</sup>

During the non-proliferation discussions of May 1968, the Latin Americans tried to press the Soviets to sign the protocol in exchange for obtaining their support for the non-proliferation treaty. The Soviets successfully resisted this pressure.<sup>4</sup> On September 27 the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States approved a resolution on non-nuclear-free zones sponsored by 16 Latin American states. Soviet allies abstained from voting, both on the resolution as a whole and on a paragraph deploring the fact that all nuclear powers had not signed the protocol.<sup>5</sup> The Soviet Union and its allies again abstained from voting on a similar General Assembly resolution of December 20.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>COPREDAL/AR/47 (prov.), pp. 1-3.

<sup>2</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 539-546.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 620-621.

<sup>4</sup>See above, chapter B, pp. 521-522.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 580-582. The resolution appears in Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 672-674.

<sup>6</sup>Pt. B of res. 2456 (XXIII); ibid., p. 799.

### Recent Soviet Proposals

On September 22, 1967, Foreign Minister Gromyko submitted to the General Assembly a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The parties would give a "solemn undertaking to refrain from using nuclear weapons, from threatening to use them and from inciting other States to use them," and they would also undertake to make every effort to agree on nuclear disarmament.<sup>1</sup>

During the First Committee debate, ACDA Deputy Director Fisher attacked the unconditional character of the draft convention. He also pointed out that it would undermine the principle of mutual deterrence, which was "the most effective way of minimizing the risk of nuclear war" in the absence of nuclear disarmament. To reduce and eventually eliminate the risk of nuclear war would require the reduction and elimination of national nuclear arsenals in the context of general and complete disarmament. He thus reaffirmed the position taken by Rusk in 1962. At the same time, he argued that the Soviet proposal would weaken the security assurances the non-nuclear countries were seeking in connection with the non-proliferation treaty, since it would make it impossible for nuclear parties to respond in kind to nuclear aggression by powers which were not so bound.<sup>2</sup>

On December 8 the General Assembly approved a Soviet-sponsored resolution urging the ENDC to examine non-use and the Soviet draft

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., 1967, pp. 419-421.

<sup>2</sup>Proposals To Ban the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1961-1967, pp. 11-14.

convention and "such other proposals as may be made on this question." Since the Soviets had watered down their original proposals, the United States and its allies were able to abstain from voting.<sup>1</sup>

We believed that the Soviets intended to follow up the non-proliferation treaty by pushing this proposal, and it headed the list of disarmament measures in a nine-point memorandum circulated by the Soviet Government on July 1, 1968.<sup>2</sup> Our delegation at the 14th session of the ENDC was instructed to oppose the Soviet proposal on the following grounds: (1) it would be ineffective in time of war, (2) it would raise false hopes that the danger of nuclear war had been eliminated and thereby reduce the incentive to negotiate effective disarmament measures, and (3) the Charter already prohibited the use of nuclear or other weapons for aggressive purposes.<sup>3</sup>

At the initial Co-Chairmen's meeting, Mr. Foster tried to discourage Roshchin from pressing a proposal which stood no chance of U.S. acceptance.<sup>4</sup> In a later conversation, Soviet delegate Timerbaev observed that each side could interpret our earlier proposal and that the Soviet Union could conclude that any member of a military alliance including a nuclear power was "assisted" by it. The Soviets felt, however, that it should make

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<sup>1</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 626-627.

<sup>2</sup>A/7134.

<sup>3</sup>ENDC position paper, "Soviet Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons" (U), July 16, 1968, ~~Confidential~~.

<sup>4</sup>From Geneva, tel. 4039, July 13, 1968, ~~Confidential~~.

a difference whether an ally had nuclear weapons on its territory, and this was the basis of the Kosygin proposal. George Bunn told him that the proposal was no longer current and noted that it was only a declaration of intention and not a binding treaty obligation.<sup>1</sup>

We remained silent in the public debate. Ambassador Roshchin argued that a non-use convention, combined with the limited test-ban and non-proliferation treaties, "would be an important step towards eliminating the danger of a nuclear war" and facilitate further disarmament measures.<sup>2</sup> U.K. Disarmament Minister Mulley denied that a ban on use would eliminate the danger of nuclear war, which would exist as long as nuclear weapons existed. In his view, it was only realistic to expect nuclear weapons to be used in the event of war between nuclear powers, regardless of legal prohibitions. Even if a ban could be enforced, he feared that it would only give the impression that "aggressive action could be undertaken without risking nuclear war."<sup>3</sup> Ambassador Roshchin rejoined that the very willingness of governments to conclude a non-use convention would assure its effectiveness. He also asserted that the British argument was an "all or nothing" thesis which would block all disarmament progress.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>From Geneva, tel. 4141, July 20, 1968, ~~Confidential~~.

<sup>2</sup>ENDC/PV.381, p. 13.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>4</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 554-555.

General Burns (Canada) saw value in assurances that the nuclear powers would not use nuclear weapons against nonaligned, non-nuclear nations and considered that the Security Council resolution was tantamount to providing such assurances. He also endorsed Additional Protocol II to the Tlatelolco treaty and suggested that the same principle might be applied to an African nuclear-free zone. A general non-use convention, however, would not provide any more assurance than the mutual deterrence that already existed, since the only sanction would be reprisal. A promise not to use nuclear weapons would not be credible in the absence of nuclear disarmament. And he warned that NATO could not renounce the possibility of the defensive use of nuclear weapons unless and until considerable progress had been made in both conventional and nuclear disarmament.<sup>1</sup>

Except for the German resolution, all non-use proposals failed in the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.<sup>2</sup> It was possible, however, that they might be revived with better prospects of success at the 23rd General Assembly. This was the view of Leonard C. Meeker, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State. He pointed out that the question was bound to be discussed in the First Committee and that there would be broad support for the Soviet draft convention, the Kosygin formula, and the German proposal. He therefore urged Rusk to revive our

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<sup>1</sup>ENDC/PV.392, pp. 6 ff.

<sup>2</sup>See above, pp. 14-15.

previous proposal and argued that this would remove an obstacle to acceptance of the non-proliferation treaty by non-nuclear states and also serve to reduce the risk of nuclear war.<sup>1</sup>

Since it did not think it possible to develop a non-use undertaking "that would satisfy the wide variety of conflicting national interests" at this time, ACDA concurred in Bohlen's opposition to Meeker's suggestion. In the spring, Ambassador Bohlen had supported ACDA's attempt to preserve our non-use proposal against the JCS. Now that the non-proliferation treaty had been widely accepted, however, he no longer saw any need for taking an initiative in the non-use field. To do so would "almost certainly stimulate" the Soviets to press the Kosygin formula, and he saw no possibility of reconciling the American and Soviet positions. In any case, he did not think that it would be in our interests to join the Soviets in an undertaking of this kind "in the wake of the occupation of Czechoslovakia." Secretary of State Rusk agreed.<sup>2</sup>

As it turned out, non-use received little attention at the 23rd General Assembly, where the non-nuclear nations expended most of their energy in an unsuccessful attempt to continue the NNC in some form or other. But the question of security assurances

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<sup>1</sup>Meeker to Rusk, memorandum, Oct. 10, 1968, ~~Confidential.~~

<sup>2</sup>Bohlen to Rusk, memorandum, n.d., Confidential. Secretary Rusk approved the memorandum on Oct. 18, 1968.



was still alive, and Mexican delegate Tello told us about a project to draft a protocol to the non-proliferation treaty which would include the existing assurances of the Security Council resolution and new non-use assurances along the lines of Additional Protocol II to the Tlatelolco treaty. Our delegation told him that we were not in a position to provide any additional assurances.<sup>1</sup>

On November 30 the Soviet delegation informed us that it had been instructed to consult the United States and others about a draft resolution on the Soviet proposal.<sup>2</sup> The resolution was similar to the one adopted by the General Assembly in 1967.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Foster advised Roshchin and Malik not to push the resolution. He warned that it might lead to a revival of the German proposal and raise the question of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Moreover, it could only get in the way of strategic arms limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>4</sup> The Soviets then decided not to introduce their resolution.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>From New York, tel. 8090, Nov. 27, 1968, ~~Confidential~~.

<sup>2</sup>From New York, tel. 8189, Nov. 30, 1968, ~~Confidential~~.

<sup>3</sup>From New York, tel. 8190, Nov. 30, 1968, ~~Confidential~~.

<sup>4</sup>From New York, tel. 8218, Dec. 2, 1968, ~~Confidential~~.

<sup>5</sup>From New York, tel. 8267, Dec. 5, 1968, ~~Confidential~~.

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Final Draft

THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY DURING THE  
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION (U)

II. POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS

K. OTHER MEASURES

7. Observation Posts

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-165

By ing NARA. Date 4-15-92

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

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## OBSERVATION POSTS

### BACKGROUND

Ground control posts to guard against surprise attack were first proposed by the Soviet Union in its comprehensive disarmament plan of May 10, 1955. At the Geneva summit meeting (July 1955), President Eisenhower introduced his "open-skies" plan for aerial inspection as a safeguard against surprise attack. Later negotiations in the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission (1956-1957) dealt with both aerial inspection and ground control posts in the context of partial disarmament. During these negotiations, the Soviet Union proposed a zone 800 kilometers east and west of the line of demarcation in Europe, and the Western powers proposed various alternative zones. In spite of some rapprochement of positions, the two sides were unable to agree on the zones.

After the collapse of the Subcommittee negotiations, President Eisenhower persuaded Khrushchev to agree to a conference of experts to study the surprise-attack

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problem. At this conference (1958), the Soviet Union introduced new zonal proposals and linked them with partial disarmament measures, which the Western side was not prepared to discuss.

After it announced its first plan for general and complete disarmament (1959), the Soviet Union showed little interest in surprise attack. In the Ten Nation Committee (1960), it declined to discuss Western proposals to study the problem. Although it renewed its ground-posts proposal in an eight-point memorandum (1961), it opposed American attempts in the ENDC to discuss measures to reduce the risk of war by observation posts and similar methods.<sup>1</sup>

On December 12, 1962, the United States submitted to the ENDC a working paper on the reduction of

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<sup>1</sup> See Robert W. Lambert (ACDA/RS), "Soviet Policy on Surprise-Attack Ground Control Posts and the '800 Kilometer' Zone (U)," ~~Secret~~, and Ruth Ihara (ACDA/RS), "Review of Negotiations on an Arctic Inspection Zone, 1957-1960 (U),"

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the risk of war through accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication. This document discussed the purpose of ground observation posts, the elements of a ground observation post system and the extent of geographic coverage. Additionally, it noted that ground observation posts, while representing a major improvement in the then existing conditions, ought to be supplemented by aerial observation, mobile teams, and overlapping radars.<sup>1</sup>

In the months that followed the tabling of the U.S. working paper at Geneva the USSR, at one time or another, frowned on most of the suggestions put forth by the paper, including observation posts. The USSR used three principal arguments against the U.S. working paper: (a) it was aimed at creating conditions for espionage; (b) it would work only in the context of general and complete disarmament; (c) it did not provide for a non-aggression pact or

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<sup>1</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1945-59, vol II, pp. 1214-1215.

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elimination of foreign bases.<sup>1</sup> It is interesting to note at this point that the USSR did not attack the U.S. suggestion for a "communication link" and the result was the establishment of the "hot line" in June 1963.<sup>2</sup>

Shortly after he decided to agree to the limited test-ban treaty, Premier Khrushchev privately told Spaak that he favored stationing observers at airports and rail centers in the Soviet Union and the United States to guard against surprise attack. He was opposed to mobile control but recognized that both countries could photograph each other.<sup>3</sup> In the ENDC, the Soviet delegate recalled the 1958 Soviet proposal which detailed certain geographic areas where control posts could be located, referred to the establishment of such posts in connection with European troop reductions and concurred in

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., 1963, pp. 56, 156-160

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 236-238.

<sup>3</sup>See Lambert, op. cit., p. 1

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the establishment of such posts at airfields, a measure to which the Soviets had previously objected.<sup>1</sup>

U.S. POLICY REVIEW (1963-1964)

During the late summer and early fall of 1963 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested to review their position on ground and air observation posts with particular reference to U.S./USSR negotiations on the establishment of such posts.<sup>2</sup> In September, the JCS promised to spell out their preferred locations for observation posts meanwhile discussing several negotiating alternatives as requested: (a) agreement limited to control posts alone; (b) agreement limited to control posts plus aerial photography, and (c) agreement provided for control posts, aerial photography and a reduction of foreign troops in Europe<sup>3</sup>. One

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<sup>1</sup> ENDC/PV. 148, p. 11; Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 383-386; ENDC/PV. 156, p. 52.

<sup>2</sup> The JCS had previously given their views in JCSM 170-62, Mar. 1962, by commenting on a draft U.S. position paper of Mar. 1962. The position paper (Confidential) was later laid aside and a more generalized discussion of observation posts resulted in the U.S. working paper of Dec. 12, 1962. The JCS voiced little objection to the March paper, but cautioned that our allies must be consulted.

<sup>3</sup> JCSM 685-63, Sept. 3, 1963, ~~Secret~~.

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month later the JCS provided a "tentative" listing of observation posts in Warsaw Pact countries.<sup>1</sup> This is where matters stood when President Johnson assumed office.

As the opening of the ENDC approached (January 1964), the U.S. interest in observation posts reached a peak. It was decided to move forward on a detailed plan for observation posts to be discussed with out NATO allies. Utilizing the two JCSMs noted above plus two draft papers of November 15, 1963, ACDA prepared a draft position, covering political and military considerations, which was submitted to the Committee of Principals on December 18, 1963.<sup>2</sup> Subsequent ACDA revision of this paper on January 6, 1964, and revisions directed by the Committee of Principals on January 8, 1964, resulted in an approved paper which could be negotiated with our European allies.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> JCSM 773-63, Oct 4, 1963. ~~Secret~~

<sup>2</sup> Memorandum for the Members of the Committee of Principals: U.S. Position Paper on Observation Posts, Dec. 18, 1963, Secret.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Suggestions for NATO Consideration in Connection with the Establishment of Observation Posts, January 9, 1964. Secret.

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JOHNSON PROPOSAL

President Johnson in his statement to the ENDC on January 21, 1964, called for the reduction of the dangers of war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack. As a move in this direction, the President stated that, "in consultation with our allies, we will be prepared to discuss proposals for creating a system of observation posts."<sup>1</sup>

SOVIET PROPOSAL

One week later--January 28, 1964,--the Soviet representative tabled a memorandum at the ENDC on measures for slowing down the armaments race and relaxing international attention. The amount of space devoted to observation posts in the Soviet memorandum was minimal. The Soviets took the position that

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<sup>1</sup> Annex E on Operational Modalities was issued at a later date, Feb. 1, 1964, to be exact. The Joint Chief of Staff in JCSM 49-64, Jan. 25, 1964, voiced some reservations with Annex E particularly in the matter of aerial surveillance and ground mobility.

<sup>2</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 8.

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the "establishment of a system of observation posts may prove to be useful only in conjunction with concrete measures for reducing the threat of war." These "concrete measures" obviously referred to withdrawal of foreign troops and reductions in armed forces.<sup>1</sup>

#### ALLIED CONSULTATIONS

Meanwhile, we were consulting our NATO allies. In the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the United States submitted its January 9 position paper, and the United Kingdom a military evaluation of an agreement on observation posts. Most of the allies were in favor of exploratory talks with the Soviets. However, the French and Germans, who in the past had expressed serious reservations on the desirability of establishing observation posts at all, attacked the proposals. As the discussions continued, it became evident that they "were attempting to prevent NAC agreement to proceed in Geneva on OPs on the basis of their alleged

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 16

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military inutility."<sup>1</sup> Both contended that, at best, an observation post system could be of only limited military value, while in some situations it might be a dangerous source of misunderstanding or even serve as a means for deliberate deception by the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup> Both objected to the "unacceptable conditions," i.e., regional denuclearization and troop reductions in Central Europe, which the Soviets linked to their proposals on observation posts.

The FRG wanted assurance that any proposal we made would distinguish between "international boundaries" and "other territorial or administrative demarcations or dividing lines established or confirmed by international agreement or practice," as President Johnson wrote to Premier Khrushchev with regard to

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<sup>1</sup>Freund (IR) to Fisher (DD) and Beam (IR), memorandum, Feb. 13, 1964, ~~Confidential~~

<sup>2</sup>From Paris, tels. POLTO 1048, 1053, 1066, Feb. 3, 4, 5, 1964, Confidential. For an assessment by the German military, see "German Military Comments on a System of Observation Posts in the Areas of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, paper for Ad Hoc Meeting of the Committee of Political Advisers, Feb. 3-5, 1964," ~~Secret~~

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territorial disputes on January 18, 1964.<sup>1</sup> It feared that any solution to the problem of European security based on a divided Germany would tend to perpetuate the division. In addition, it opposed the stationing of military observers in either the FRG or GDR. However, it was prepared to consider a maximum of three or four posts in its North Sea ports, if pressed by the Soviets to do so. If the observation post system was to be confined to Europe only, it had to be accompanied by progress in solving the German problem.

France had similar views. It was convinced that the political risks of an observation post system far outweighed its limited military advantages. It opposed placement of any observation posts on its territory. It thought that elements of the proposed observation post system favored the Soviet objective of creating an area of disengagement in Central Europe

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<sup>1</sup>In response to Khrushchev's proposal to ban "the use of force for the solution of territorial disputes," For text, See Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 5-7; for German request, see from Paris, agm POLTO A-620, Jan. 29, 1964, ~~Confidential~~.

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which would maintain the existing division of Europe. In the French view, the danger of contributing to the creation of such a special zone would remain even if the Soviets were to drop their "unacceptable conditions."<sup>1</sup>

On March 4, the NAC approved an approach to the Soviets based upon the January 9 paper. Initially the approach was to be made in general terms, with emphasis on the advantages of such posts, their role in creating peace and stability and the consequent increase in confidence which would lead to progress on other measures of disarmament. France and Germany joined the consensus reluctantly, hedging their approval with conditions. Despite the fact that NAC approval was given with the explicit understanding that the talks would be purely exploratory, that the NAC would be kept closely and continuously informed, and that such talks would not commit either the countries involved or their allies, France stipulated that any prospective agreement--on which it fully reserved its position--had to be

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<sup>1</sup> To Paris, tel. TOPOL 1148, Feb. 14, 1964, and from Paris, tels. POLTO 1129, 1140, 1147, 1187, Feb. 15, 17, 18, 25, 1964, ~~Confidential~~.

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discussed in the NAC. Germany said that it would not oppose the talks if the conditions it had laid down were met.<sup>1</sup>

#### BRITISH PAPER

One vehicle for making an approach to the Soviets was the tabling at the ENDC of a U.K. working paper on the subject on March 26, 1964.<sup>2</sup> A parallel approach was made directly to the Soviets by the United States as a Co-Chairman.<sup>3</sup> The U.K. paper was a "sanitized" version of the NAC paper which had been revised in consultation with the United States. It reflected the U.K. desire for a plan showing how observation posts "should be manned and operated, and clarifying the principles which would govern their location," in order to facilitate discussion.<sup>4</sup> Since the United Kingdom was "very keen

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<sup>1</sup>From Paris, tel. POLTO 1234, Mar. 4, 1964, ~~Confidential~~.

<sup>2</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 115-118.

<sup>3</sup>Instructions on how to proceed are found in tel. 1360 to Geneva, Mar. 24, 1964, ~~Secret~~.

<sup>4</sup>Butler to Gromyko ltr, Nov. 1963: see "General lines of oral communique to be made to Mr. Gromyko," attachment to memcon Heath Mason (UK)-Thompson (State), Oct. 31, 1963, and memcon Thomson (UK)-Ausland, McIntyre (State/BTF), Nov. 20, 1963, ~~Secret~~.

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on taking an initiative," the United States, on ACDA recommendation, decided that it would not table a paper of its own, provided it was reasonably satisfied with the U.K. draft.<sup>1</sup> According to the British, the Soviets had "made the running" on military budgets,<sup>2</sup> the West needed a proposal on its part, and observation posts seemed to be the most promising item. The U.K. paper was intended only to set forth in general terms "the elements of, and the arguments for setting up, a system of observation posts," for the purpose of supporting the exploratory talks and to focus conference attention on the subject.<sup>3</sup>

#### SOVIET REACTION

Both in the February ENDC and in the Co-Chairmen's meetings, the Soviets refused to be drawn into a

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<sup>1</sup>From Beam (IR) to the Director, memorandum, Mar. 10, 1964; to Geneva tel. TODIS 1336, Mar. 13, 1964, ~~Confidential~~.

<sup>2</sup>See above, Chapter K5.

<sup>3</sup>"UK Statement in NAC on Observation Posts," memorandum for the files, Mar. 24, 1964; to Paris, tel. TOPOL 1437, Mar. 24, 1964, and from Paris, tel. POLTO 1348, Mar. 25, 1964, ~~Confidential~~.

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discussion of observation posts unless we would first agree to link them to the denuclearization of Germany and troop reductions in Central Europe.<sup>1</sup> This we could not and would not do.<sup>2</sup> Subsequent brief references to observation posts in the ENDC and in Co-Chairmen's talks drew the same response from the Soviets: discussions could only take place on their terms, which included linkage of observation posts to European measures distasteful to the United States and its allies.

#### LATER DEVELOPMENTS

There was a brief flurry of renewed interest in observation posts in December 1964, when the Secretary of State, in the course of his private talks with Foreign Minister Gromyko, referred to observation posts in the following terms:

The Secretary went on to say that the second area where he believed progress could be achieved was that of measures against surprise attack. Establishment of observa-

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<sup>1</sup>From Geneva, tel. 1739, Mar. 26, 1964,  
~~Secret.~~

<sup>2</sup>See U.S. Talking Points Paper, Mar. 26, 1964,  
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tion posts could be a constructive step and rather than conditional on reductions in force levels, it could open the way for such reductions.

Mr. Gromyko replied that the Secretary was familiar with the additional measures which, in the Soviet view, should accompany the establishment of such posts. He added:

The Soviet Union regarded those measures as inseparably linked; indeed all of them were parts of the same measure. If agreement were reached on that basis, it was difficult to say whether it could be implemented on the basis of mutual example or of a formal agreement, but he believed some formal agreement would be required inasmuch as observation posts would be located on the territory of the other side.<sup>1</sup>

Since that time the Soviet position on "linkage" of observation posts to other measures has remained unchanged.

Reflecting early U.S. interest in observation posts, a field test of observation post inspection teams, GC-12, Military Activity Monitoring, was conducted by Project COULD GAP in the spring of 1964.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Memcon Rusk-Gromyko (SecDel/MC/46), Dec. 21, 1964, Secret.

<sup>2</sup>For a description, See section III-G of this paper.

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This testing was never carried through to the development and testing of a complete observation post inspection system, nor is there, at the present time, an agreed JCS-ACDA position on the more important modalities of such an observation post system. FT-15, described elsewhere in this paper, was conducted in the United Kingdom, June through September, 1968. It was a test of inspection systems using controlled area inspection techniques rather than the observation post concept. FT-15 may, nevertheless, yield information of use in the development of observation post system modalities. The results of this field test will be available in the summer of 1969.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>For details see:

(a) ACDA/WEC Working Paper: The Process of Establishing Requirements for CLOUD GAP Field Test Operations, Mar. 7, 1967. Secret

(b) FT-15 Test Plan, Oct. 1967. Official Use Only

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	<p>Part II, Section L</p> <p>2. Limited Test Ban Treaty 21 pp.</p> <p>Secret</p> <p><i>sanitized 10-5-89 NLJ 88-174</i></p>	1968	A

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Final Draft

THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY DURING THE  
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION (U)

II. POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS

L. IMPLEMENTATION OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

1. The Antarctic Treaty

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II L. - IMPLEMENTATION OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

1. The Antarctic Treaty

The Antarctic Treaty which was signed at Washington on December 1, 1959, and entered into force on June 23, 1961, specifies that Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. It specifically prohibits "any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons." Any nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material are explicitly prohibited. Article III of the treaty provides for the open exchange of scientific findings and personnel.

Article VII, in order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the treaty, establishes the right of inspection in Antarctica by the original parties to the treaty<sup>1</sup> or acceding states which undertake substantial scientific programs in Antarctica. Each contracting party is required to inform the others of any expedition to and within Antarctica

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<sup>1</sup> Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the USSR, the U.K., and the U.S. are original parties to the treaty. Several other states (Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Poland) have acceded.

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on the part of its ships or nationals, of all stations occupied by its nationals, and of any military personnel or equipment introduced into Antarctica. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations and ships or aircraft arriving or departing from the area, are open to inspection. The inspectors (or, in the language of the treaty, "observers") must be nationals of the inspecting country and their names must be communicated to the other contracting parties. In addition, article VII provides for unlimited aerial observation of the continent by any of the contracting parties having the right of inspection. There are no explicit limitations on the number or duration of the inspections.<sup>1</sup>

The United States has conducted two inspections since the treaty entered into force in 1961. The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was primarily responsible for planning, managing and evaluating these inspections. Such a role fell within the basic statute establishing ACDA which states that:

...It must be able to carry out the following primary functions:

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<sup>1</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, vol. II, pp. 1550-1557.

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(d) The preparation for, operation of, or as appropriate, direction of United States participation in such control systems as may become part of United States arms control and disarmament activities."<sup>1</sup>

First Inspection

Planning for the implementation of the inspection provision by the United States began in late 1962 by ACDA and the Department of State. Following various ACDA studies and inter-agency staff consultations, ACDA engaged in a series of meetings with State/IO, which led to agreement that, under the overall responsibility of the Secretary of State for the implementation of the Antarctic Treaty, the Director of ACDA should exercise primary responsibility for planning a proposed Antarctic inspection. Former Ambassador Paul C. Daniels (one of the two officials who signed the treaty for the United States) was engaged as a part-time consultant to serve under Jacob Beam, the ACDA Assistant Director for International Relations, in planning the inspection. He entered on duty March 21, 1963. An inter-agency Operations Coordinating Group was established with representation from all concerned agencies.

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., 1961, p. 483.

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A Personnel Advisory Group was also established to decide on criteria for the selection of Observers and to advise the ACDA Director on observer personnel. The observers are appointed by the Secretary of State on the recommendation of the Director of ACDA.

On August 30, 1963, the Acting Director transmitted to the Secretary of State a draft memorandum for the President which requested his authorization for the initiation of the proposed Antarctic inspection for the 1963-64 austral summer season. The Secretary approved and forwarded the memorandum on September 3. It was approved by the President the following<sup>1</sup> day. It was contemplated that the inspection would be small in scale, low-key in conduct, and would not interfere with the existing scientific program or international cooperation. As required by the treaty, the other signatories were informed of the names of the United States Antarctic observers.

The objective of the inspection was to promote confidence among all the Governments involved that all activities in Antarctica were open and above-board and that the inspection

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<sup>1</sup> See Beam to Foster, memorandum, "Report on First United States Antarctic Inspection", April 29, 1964, Confidential.

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operation was a useful contribution to this end. The United States Government had clearly expressed its intention to exercise its unilateral treaty right to conduct routine inspections to ensure compliance with the treaty. It was deemed desirable to preserve the principle of inspection and avoid any possible impression that this right might atrophy through non-use.

It was planned that each team would consist of at least three observers: an FSO team leader, a military scientist, and a biologist. A Russian-language officer was added to one team. All personnel appointed were United States Government civilians; none was currently or previously engaged in scientific research in Antarctica; all passed a rigorous Navy physical examination and all were security cleared for access to information through Top Secret.

The observers formed two teams and inspected ten stations. A three-man team visited two stations operated by each of the following: Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom. A four-man team visited two stations operated by the USSR and one station operated by New Zealand, and conducted an aerial over-flight survey of a French base. The U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker

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"Eastwind" transported observers to stations in the peninsular area of West Antarctica. United States aircraft based at McMurdo station were used to transport observers to stations in East Antarctica. The observers examined almost every building or structure at each of the stations they visited on the ground. They looked for any violations of the treaty, particularly for any failure to give advance information on activities or equipment. The observers were greeted with the utmost courtesy at all stations. No arms<sup>1</sup> were observed and neighboring wildlife was undisturbed. The observers made the following statement in their report:

Observations made by the United States observers during the inspection of ten Antarctic stations indicated that the activities of the stations visited were being conducted in consonance with the provisions and spirit of the Antarctic Treaty. No evidence was revealed by these inspections which would indicate that Antarctica is being used for other than peaceful purposes.<sup>2</sup>

#### Second Inspection

Inter-agency planning for a second Antarctic inspection was approved in principle by the Secretary of State in

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<sup>1</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 195-203.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 197.

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February 1966. Detailed planning proceeded on the basis of this approval under ACDA direction, as in 1963-64, of an inter-agency Operations Coordinating Group and a Personnel Advisory Group. The purpose and scope of the inspection was the same as in 1964, that is to promote the objectives and insure the observance of the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty.

In February and March 1967 the United States sent a team of five Observers who inspected one station each of Argentina, France, Japan, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, the USSR, two stations of Australia, and a Danish ship unloading at Australia's Wilkes Station. Observers made the trip around Antarctica on board the Coast Guard icebreaker "Eastwind", which was engaged in a scientific and surveying voyage. The results -- adherence to treaty provisions and cordial receptions -- were the same as in 1964.

As on the previous occasion, the stated conclusions of the United States observers were that:

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1 Fisher to Rusk, memorandum, "Proposed Antarctic Inspection in 1966-1967 (U), February 3, 1966, Confidential. Approved by the Secretary, February 11, 1966.

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There was no evidence to indicate any violations of either the provisions or the spirit of the Antarctic Treaty. All the information obtained at these stations indicates Antarctica is being used solely for peaceful purposes.<sup>1</sup>

In the late fall of 1968, inter-agency discussions had commenced looking toward the initiation of planning for a third United States Antarctic inspection either in the austral summer 1969-1970 or an early subsequent year. The experience of the prior inspections will undoubtedly prove invaluable for any such planning. ACDA has also commenced preparation of an Observers Manual which would provide a concentrated source of information concerning the inspection process and the environment under which it would be conducted.

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<sup>1</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 282-290.  
For photographs taken during this inspection, see the State Department print cited ibid.

ACDA/IR:JFLippmann:MW Boggs:das  
December 6, 1968

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Final Draft

THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY DURING THE  
JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION (U)

II. POLICY AND NEGOTIATIONS

L. IMPLEMENTATION OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

2. LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 88-174  
By kip, NARA, Date 10-3-89

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L. 2. LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY

The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, which was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, and entered into force for the United States on October 10, 1963, provides in article I, paragraph 1:

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or

(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted . . . <sup>1</sup>

Since early 1965, questions have arisen on various occasions as to whether or not the requirements of the treaty have been fully met. The United States and the Soviet Union have questioned the compatibility of certain tests with the treaty's provisions.

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<sup>1</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 291-293.

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A specific definition of what constitutes a violation of the treaty has never been agreed upon, even within the U.S. Government. ACDA has supported Dr. Seaborg's definition as stated during the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the treaty:

. . .The treaty would prohibit a test which resulted in a quantity of radioactivity debris delivered outside of the country's territorial limits in amounts sufficient to establish that such contamination resulted from a recent test within that country.<sup>1</sup>

There has been some opposition to fixing a firm definition for the reason that any definition which specified a limit to the amount of radioactivity which could cross national borders would tend to favor the Soviets because of their larger land mass.

January 15, 1965 - Soviet Test


On January 19, 1965, Secretary of State Rusk met Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and inquired about a Soviet underground test of January 15 in the Semipalatinsk area which had resulted in some amounts of radioactive material being detected outside the borders of the USSR.<sup>2</sup> The Atomic Energy Commission also

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<sup>1</sup>Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-eighth Congress, First Session, on Executive M. p. 206.

<sup>2</sup>Memcon Rusk-Dobrynin, Jan. 19, 1965, Secret.

issued a news release disclosing the fact that we had detected some radioactive debris and that the Department of State had asked the Soviet government for information.<sup>1</sup>



On January 26, 1965, William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, was questioned about the January 15 test by the House Foreign Affairs Committee. In a response which had the approval of the Committee of Principals, Mr. Foster replied in part that "this particular event i.e. the venting<sup>7</sup>-- which on the basis of what we now know appears to have been accidental -- may have been a technical violation -- but again, on the basis of what we know now, it does not by

<sup>1</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1965, p. 5

<sup>2</sup>Memcon Rusk-Dobrynin, Jan 25, 1965, ~~Secret~~.



~~SECRET-NOFORN~~

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itself represent a threat to our national security or to the purposes of the test ban treaty, nor standing alone does it represent a resumption of testing prohibited by the treaty."<sup>1</sup>

On February 15, Ambassador Thompson gave Ambassador Dobrynin an aide-memoire in which the United States presented evidence of its detection of radioactive debris outside the USSR and requested further information concerning the January 15 explosion.<sup>2</sup> The United States was later informed that the USSR had nothing to add to its oral statement of January 25.

On April 8, Mr. Foster wrote a letter to Representative Holifield, Vice Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, explaining the U.S. position on the January 15 test and relating the evidence of the presence of radioactive debris outside the territorial limits of the Soviet Union. Mr. Foster said:

We wish of course to preserve the integrity of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This militates against any course of action which gives the Soviets the impression we regard the January event as not being a serious matter but rather one which can be ignored.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 9-10.

<sup>2</sup>Memcon Dobrynin-Thompson, Feb. 15, 1965, ~~Confidential~~ with attached aide-memoire.

<sup>3</sup>Foster to Holifield, Ltr, April 8, 1965, ~~Secret~~.


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KIWI - U.S. Reactor Destruction of January 12, 1965

On January 22, 1965, three days after we asked the USSR for information about the Soviet explosion, Ambassador Dobrynin handed Ambassador Thompson an aide-memoire questioning the compatibility with the treaty of the deliberate destruction of a nuclear reactor of the "Kiwi" type by the United States on January 12. This test was in connection with the U.S. program on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The aide-memoire said



<sup>1</sup> (It should be noted the treaty prohibits all atmospheric nuclear explosions whereas it only prohibits underground explosions which cause radioactive debris to be present outside territorial limits).

On January 26, Ambassador Thompson handed Ambassador Dobrynin the U.S. reply to the Soviet aide-memoire of January 22.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Memcon Dobrynin-Thompson, Jan. 22, 1965, ~~Confidential~~, with attached Soviet aide-memoire.

<sup>2</sup> Memcon Dobrynin-Thompson, Jan. 26, 1965, ~~Secret~~.

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In this aide-memoire, we stated that "neither reactor safety experiments nor reactor accidents which they are designed to simulate or reproduce constitute nuclear explosions. Therefore, they do not fall under the prohibition stipulated in the Treaty."<sup>1</sup>

On March 6, the Soviet Union replied that we had not provided sufficient information to reach the conclusion that the KIWI experiment "was not a nuclear explosion." The Soviets may have misinterpreted our explanation, for they also stated that the "Government of the USA maintains that a device of the 'KIWI' type is not adaptable for use as a weapon, and on this basis maintains that experiments with it do not constitute nuclear explosions and do not fall under prohibitions provided for the Treaty".<sup>2</sup>

In a note of March 30, the United States confirmed its position that the KIWI test did not constitute a nuclear explosion.<sup>3</sup> This note had been approved by a meeting of the Deputies of the Committee of Principals.

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<sup>1</sup>Memorandum for Committee of Principals, Jan. 26, 1965, ~~Confidential~~/Limdis, with attachment.

<sup>2</sup>Memcon Dobrynin-Thompson, Mar. 6, 1965, ~~Confidential~~, with attached Soviet aide-memoire.

<sup>3</sup>Memcon Dobrynin-Thompson, Mar. 30, 1965, ~~Confidential~~, with attached U.S. aide-memoire.

~~SECRET-NOFORN~~

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U.S. Explosion of April 14, 1965

On April 14, a U.S. underground nuclear cratering test (Palanquin) vented radioactive debris into the atmosphere. The Soviet Union stated in an aide-memoire of April 29 that there was "reason to believe that with the conduct of this explosion there took place a violation. . ." of the treaty.<sup>1</sup>

On May 16, the United States replied in an aide-memoire that:

The experiment was permitted to take place only under meteorological conditions carefully chosen to avoid the escape of radioactive debris from the territory of the United States. As has been announced, the experiment did produce a crater and small amounts of radioactive debris were projected into the atmosphere. . . in the vicinity of the site of the experiment. In accordance with meteorological predictions, the small quantity of radioactive debris which went further was blown northward. . . and then southeastward over the. . . United States. During this time, the airborne concentrations of radioactive debris were determined by measurement to have been diluted by fallout, radioactive decay, and dispersion to extremely low levels. . . .

The United States took the opportunity to question the Soviets once again about their January 15 explosion and stated that

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
<sup>1</sup> Soviet aide-memoire, Apr. 29, 1965, ~~Secret/Limdis~~

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"if the Soviet Government were more forthcoming in response to the request of the United States Government for further information concerning the January 15 Soviet test, the United States Government might be better able to conclude that there was no intention on the part of the Soviet Government to violate the terms of the Treaty. . . ."<sup>1</sup>



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<sup>1</sup>Mencon Dobrynin-Thompson, May 18, 1965, ~~Confidential~~

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Palomares Incident of January 17, 1966

On February 16, 1966, the Soviets presented an aide-memoire regarding the crash on January 17, near Palomares, Spain, of a U.S. bomber carrying nuclear weapons. The Soviets claimed that the circumstances surrounding the crash, including the alleged explosion of the detonator "of at least one of these bombs," conflicted "with generally recognized principles and norms of international law and with obligations assumed by the U.S. Government under international treaties and agreements now in effect, in particular under the 1963 Moscow Treaty . . . As is well known, the most important purpose of that treaty was to prevent radioactive contamination of the atmosphere. . . ." The Soviets publicized the text of this aide memoire.<sup>1</sup>

On February 25, the United States replied by rejecting the allegations made in the Soviet aide-memoire of February 16. The United States noted that "the Government of the USSR must be aware -- or could easily have ascertained--that no nuclear weapon test, no nuclear explosion of any kind, and no radioactive pollution of the sea were involved in the unfortunate

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<sup>1</sup> Documents on Disarmament, 1966, pp. 22-24.

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accident over the coast of Spain. Consequently, there is no question of a "violation" or of "actions in conflict with". . . [the test-ban treaty]. . . It seems clear that if the Soviet Government had been genuinely concerned about possible violations of international agreements and law, it would have requested, and awaited, a reply and clarification from the United States Government instead of resorting to tactics designed to advance purely propaganda objectives."<sup>1</sup>

U.S. Test of April 25, 1966

On April 25, an American underground test (Pin Stripe) accidentally vented, occasioning criticism in the Soviet press and elsewhere in the world press, although the Soviet Union did not officially protest. The U.S. Embassy in London asked for information to assist the Prime Minister in replying to a Parliamentary question about the venting and requested information to assure him that there would be no further tests until it could be certain there would be no leakage.<sup>2</sup> In reply, the Department of State informed the Embassy that neither this nor any other U.S. test caused radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the U.S.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., pp. 59-60.

<sup>2</sup> From London, tel. 5242, May 5, 1966, Limited Official Use.

<sup>3</sup> To London, tel. 6667, May 6, 1966, and agm. A-2800, May 19,

U.S. Test of September 12, 1966

On October 10, the Soviets inquired orally about a U.S. underground test (Derringer) of September 12. Ambassador Dobrynin said

[REDACTED]

1.3  
(4)(3)(5)

] Ambassador Dobrynin that:

...a very small amount of radioactivity was accidentally released into the atmosphere and detected only by sensitive measuring instruments located within the immediate vicinity of the test area. However, since this explosion was not in an environment prohibited by the Limited Test Ban Treaty..., and since no radioactive debris was caused to be present outside the territorial limits of the United States, no question of action inconsistent with the treaty arises.<sup>2</sup>

Soviet Test of October 27, 1966

On November 11, we made an oral statement to Ambassador Dobrynin in which we noted that we had collected outside the Soviet Union radioactive debris under circumstances indicating

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<sup>1</sup> Memcon Dobrynin-Thompson, Oct. 10, 1966, ~~Secret~~

<sup>2</sup> Memcon Dobrynin-Thompson, Oct. 28, 1966, ~~Secret/Indis.~~



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that it could only have come from the Soviet explosion of October 27, and requested further information.<sup>1</sup>

On December 1, Ambassador Dobrynin orally replied



the explosion conformed to the treaty.<sup>2</sup>

Soviet Test of December 18, 1966

Mr. Foster orally noted to Ambassador Dobrynin on January 5, 1967, that we were seriously concerned about a recent Soviet underground test which appeared to have taken place on December 18, which had been noted by the Swedes and others. Debris from it appeared to have been detected in both Sweden and Finland.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> To Moscow, tel. 83502, Nov. 11, 1966, ~~Secret~~.

<sup>2</sup> To Moscow, tel. 95903, Dec. 2, 1966, ~~Confidential/Limdis~~.

<sup>3</sup> Memcon Dobrynin-Foster, Jan. 5, 1967, ~~Secret/Limdis~~.

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On January 14, Deputy Under Secretary Kohler gave Ambassador Dobrynin a statement noting, in part, that:

. . . During the week beginning December 21, 1966, the United States collected outside of the Soviet Union fresh radioactive debris. Meteorological and other considerations indicate that this radioactive debris originated from the Soviet event of December 18, 1966.<sup>1</sup>

Possibility of Bilateral Talks

At the January 14 meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, Mr. Kohler also referred to the unsatisfactory nature of the exchange with respect to the Soviet test of October 27, 1966, and said that both this event and the one of December 18, "which had been detected by others as well as ourselves, and the previous accusations on both sides, raised questions which both of us would have to face from other countries with respect to observation of the Nuclear Test Ban. In addition, we would certainly face questions in the Congress. Rather than have a series of unsatisfactory accusations and denials, it was clearly preferable that we have a clear understanding as to our interpretation of these events and of the restrictions of the Test Ban Treaty." He then provided the Ambassador with a statement proposing "a thorough discussion between our governments, aimed

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<sup>1</sup>Memcon Dobrynin-Kohler, Jan. 14, 1967, ~~Secret/Lindis~~, and attachments.

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

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at clarifying and, if necessary, reconciling such differences as may exist in our understanding of the Treaty restrictions. . ."<sup>1</sup>

On February 11, 1967, Ambassador Dobrynin read an oral statement to Kohler in reply to the January 14

U.S. statement. The Ambassador said:

"The underground nuclear explosion taking place in the Soviet Union on December 18, 1966, was conducted according to data of the competent Soviet organizations in conditions entirely excluding the appearance outside the border of the Soviet Union of radioactive debris.

As regards the proposal of the American side concerning discussions between the USSR and the USA on the question of eliminating differences in the interpretation of the understanding of radioactive debris which is contained in the Moscow Treaty on nuclear tests in the three environments, this, in our view, deserves attention. We will be prepared to return to this at a later date. . . ."<sup>2</sup>

In a letter to Under Secretary of State Katzenbach on December 13, 1966, AEC Chairman Seaborg pointed out one possible source of misunderstanding between the U.S. and the USSR as to the treaty's requirements:

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Memcon Dobrynin-Kohler, Feb. 11, 1967, ~~Confidential/Liadis.~~

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If...we are going to state publicly that we believe the Soviets violated the treaty, a different set of consequences will result. We can expect that the Soviets will take issue publicly with such a charge. We would then be obliged to make public the basis for our belief, including the details of the evidence and a particular interpretation of the phrase in the English text, "causes radioactive debris to be present". In rebuttal, the Soviets could point to the Russian language text of the treaty and make a case that none of the U.S. evidence shows that the explosion evolved "in falling out of radioactive deposits" outside the territory of the USSR. The press would then have a field day with stories concerning equally valid but apparently different texts of the treaty. Members of Congress, who had initially raised the question of the difference in literal wording of the texts and who had been assured by the Administration that there was no difference in substance, would not remain silent. . . .<sup>1</sup>

Secretary Rusk, in a letter to Chairman Pastore of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on September 20, 1963, had addressed this issue by stating that:

"Concentrating on the substance of the sentence in question, I am satisfied that the meaning of the two texts is the same, and that the Soviets also believe that they are the same. . . . Our experience has been that literal re-translations back into the original language [i.e. from the English into Russian and back into English/frequently produce variances in the text. . . . Since the United States as well as the Soviet Union will be bound by both language versions, it is necessary that the substantive meaning of the Articles be the same, as they are in this case."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Seaborg to Katzenbach, ltr December 13, 1966, ~~Secret~~.

<sup>2</sup> Rusk to Pastore, ltr., Sept. 20, 1963, Limited Official Use.

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The views expressed in this letter had the concurrence of the Committee of Principals, including Dr. Seaborg.

Although on March 10 and March 23, 1967, we reminded Dobrynin of our proposal, the Soviets have not responded further to our request for talks in order to reach a clear mutual understanding of the Treaty's restrictions.<sup>1</sup>

• U.S. Test of June 29, 1967

On July 10, 1967, the Soviets requested information about a U.S. underground nuclear explosion of June 29.<sup>2</sup> On July 17, the United States replied that "...there was a small release of radioactivity to the surface from that test..." but that "the test did not cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the U.S."<sup>3</sup>

U.S. Test of March 12, 1968

On April 2, 1968, the Soviets inquired about a U.S. underground explosion (Gasbuggy) on March 12, charging that radioactive materials were carried "outside the territorial limits of

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<sup>1</sup>Memcons, Dobrynin-Kohler, Mar. 10 and 23, 1967, ~~Confidential/Lindis.~~

<sup>2</sup>Memcon Chernyakov-Kohler, July 10, 1967, ~~Confidential.~~

<sup>3</sup>Memcon Vorontsov-Stoessel, July 17, 1967, ~~Secret/Lindis.~~

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

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the United States."<sup>1</sup> Deputy Under Secretary of State Bohlen told Ambassador Dobrynin that "our understanding was that the explosion of the 12th of March in no-sense violated the Treaty in that such infinitesimal quantities of radioactive material were put into the air there could not conceivably be any crossing into other countries."<sup>2</sup> Once again, the Soviet Government failed to present any evidence that radioactive debris was present outside the territorial limits of the United States.

#### Conclusion

On November 28, 1967, in response to a letter from Senator Carl Curtis, Assistant Secretary of State Macomber wrote that "we do not regard any of the three Soviet incidents described to be a closed matter. We continue to regard as an open and important question the clarification of the precise limitations imposed by the Test Ban Treaty, and believe that both the USSR and the United States should exert every reasonable effort to avoid violations of the Treaty."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For the ACDA response to questions concerning the U.S. "Plowshare" excavation program and its relation to the limited test ban treaty, see Fisher's memorandum for the Acting Secretary of State, Oct. 25, 1966.

<sup>2</sup> Memcon Dobrynin-Bohlen, Apr. 2, 1968, ~~Secret.~~

<sup>3</sup> Macomber to Curtis, Ltr., Nov. 28, 1967

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

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A January 19, 1968, report by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee on the venting of Soviet underground nuclear tests provides various details about [REDACTED] Soviet underground tests detected from August 1963 through January 19, 1968.<sup>1</sup> (a)(4)

The following table provides information on all U.S. tests which have vented since the treaty came into force:

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<sup>1</sup>JAEIC Rept. 1-68, "Venting of Soviet Underground Tests," Jan. 19, 1968, ~~Secret/NOFORN~~.

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

U.S. VENTINGS<sup>1</sup>

(Since the test ban treaty of 1963)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Test</u>	<u>Planned Type of Test</u>	<u>Scale of Venting</u> <sup>2</sup>
12/12/63	Eagle	Contained	I
3/13/64	Pike	Contained	II
12/16/64	Parrot	Contained	I
12/18/64	Sulky	Cratering	I
2/12/65	Alpaca	Contained	I
4/14/65	Palanquin	Cratering	III
5/7/65	Tee	Contained	I
6/16/65	Diluted Waters	Contained	I
3/5/66	Red Hot	Contained	I
4/25/66	Pin Stripe	Contained	I
6/15/66	Double Play	Contained	I
9/12/66	Derringer	Contained	I
12/6/66	Sterling	Contained	I
1/23/67	Nash	Contained	I
6/29/67	Umber	Contained	II
8/31/67	Door Mist	Contained	I
1/18/68	Hupmobile	Contained	II
1/29/68	Cabriolet	Cratering	II
			
3/12/68	Buggy	Cratering	II

6.2(a)

~~SECRET~~



<u>Date</u>	<u>Test</u>	<u>Planned Type of Test</u>	<u>Scale of Venting</u>
4/24/68	Scroll	Contained	I
8/27/68	Diana Moon	Contained	I

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<sup>1</sup>The table was prepared by P.J. Long (ACDA/ST)

<sup>2</sup>Category I - Not detectable near borders.  
Category II - Detected near U.S. borders.  
Category III-Detected outside U.S. borders.

ACDA/GC:DRRobinson:ryw 10/29/68

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