

933 South Mills Street
Orlando, Florida
21 December 1961

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
United States Senate
Office of the Democratic Leader
Washington, D. C.

119

Dear Senator Johnson:

As a constituent of yours from Crockett, Texas, County of Houston, I would like to take this opportunity to express my viewpoint as an American citizen concerning an international problem vital to us all.

I am proud that so many Americans in high offices today feel that the free city of Berlin, Germany (the western sectors), represents a shining example of democracy's determination to survive in a world subjected to a communistic design of enslavement. The people of that city, I am satisfied, hold the natural longings for freedom that we in America cherish and hold dear.

To the best of my knowledge, the immediate future holds in store for free Berlin and the rest of the free world a direct challenge from the communistic world to push its world enslavement design further. They will no doubt try to coerce Berlin into recapitulation by one means or another as they did in 1948-49. We met the challenge then; we can do it again.


May I as an individual entreat you to do all within your power to see that our nation, united with our allies or alone if such is our fate, protects and defends that city against communistic aggression or coercion, no matter what the cost.

To me, Berlin, today, is what Austria, the Sudatenland, and Poland represented back in the days when another design of world conquest was at work. Appeasement today as appeasement then was interpreted by our enemy as a sign of weakness rather than a gesture for peace. We can never afford such a gesture ever again.

You have probably heard from certain quarters of England the saying, "Better red than dead." Speaking for myself and I'm sure Patrick Henry as well, I say better dead than red. In other words, I am willing to lay my life on the line for what I believe is right. The people of free Berlin have for the past fifteen years done the same; therefore, let's give them all the support they need.

Thank you, sir, for your attention. I pray you consider seriously what I have written here.

Sincerely,


James E. McWilliams
Citizen, United States of America

933 South Mills Street
Orlando, Florida
21 December 1961

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
United States Senate
Office of the Democratic Leader
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Johnson:

As a constituent of yours from Crockett, Texas, County of Houston, I would like to take this opportunity to express my viewpoint as an American citizen concerning an international problem vital to us all.

I am proud that so many Americans in high offices today feel that the free city of Berlin, Germany (the western sectors), represents a shining example of democracy's determination to survive in a world subjected to a communistic design of enslavement. The people of that city, I am satisfied, hold the natural longings for freedom that we in America cherish and hold dear.

To the best of my knowledge, the immediate future holds in store for free Berlin and the rest of the free world a direct challenge from the communistic world to push its world enslavement design further. They will no doubt try to coerce Berlin into recapitulation by one means or another as they did in 1948-49. We met the challenge then; we can do it again.

May I as an individual entreat you to do all within your power to see that our nation, united with our allies or alone if such is our fate, protects and defends that city against communistic aggression or coercion, no matter what the cost.

To me, Berlin, today, is what Austria, the Sudatenland, and Poland represented back in the days when another design of world conquest was at work. Appeasement today as appeasement then was interpreted by our enemy as a sign of weakness rather than a gesture for peace. We can never afford such a gesture ever again.

You have probably heard from certain quarters of England the saying, "Better red than dead." Speaking for myself and I'm sure Patrick Henry as well, I say better dead than red. In other words, I am willing to lay my life on the line for what I believe is right. The people of free Berlin have for the past fifteen years done the same; therefore, let's give them all the support they need.

Thank you, sir, for your attention. I pray you consider seriously what I have written here.

Sincerely,

James E. McWilliams
Citizen, United States of America



A. K. BARACAT

1119 ROSEMONT STREET

PHONE FL 5-2689

AMARILLO, TEXAS July 26-1961

Hon. Lyndon Johnson
The Vice President
Washington D C.

Dear Mr Johnson :

President Kennedy's speech last evening was a master piece of political honesty. I was mostly impressed with one sentence. 'We do not want to fight, but we have fought before'

The only disappointment, not once, the word Christianity was mentioned, the word that Khrushchev dreads most.

Communism and Christianity can never co. exist, and the Communists playing for time to consolidate their gains, once, they feel able to strike for win, they will not give us five minutes time.

Because of traitors in the State Department, and in the Pentagon, Khrushchev is posted as to how far he can go bluffing and to the brink.

Also the traitors in the field of communications

A. K. BARACAT
1119 ROSEMONT STREET
PHONE FL 5-2689
AMARILLO, TEXAS
2

play up and exaggerate Russia's might, and equal play down America's might and power.

The Council on Foreign Relations the self appointed guardians, and world's future Commissars should be identified and their poisonous un-American activities restricted.

Americans are hungry for a courageous man to express their spirit and thinking, Defensive policies never win wars. The initiative is in our hands at the moment, let us not stop here, let us be as firm and offensive, not only to demand justice to Eastern European Countries, but to revive the Yalta agreements, freedom for self determination, ~~but~~ for the Ukrain inside Russia, this will scare Khrushchev more than anything, he does not dare start anything he will need half of his military forces to keep tranquility at home, China with food shortages will be a liability, With our great 7th fleet, and small beach landing in China proper will nullify any threat to South East Asia.

A. K. BARACAT

1119 ROSEMONT STREET

PHONE FL 5-2689

AMARILLO, TEXAS

3

And finally our European Allies must act more naturally for the good of all concerned they are capable of handling the Russian menace and to assume honorable responsibilities for the defense of their home land and their way of life, and the admission that it is their fight, and America is helping them, and is not America's fight, and they are helping America.

Sincerely yours
AK Baracat

P.S.

Just heard it over the Radio that Mr Bernard Baruch is calling on President Kennedy this morning we are now praying asking God to protect our President from the most ominous influence that poisoned the minds of many of our Presidents, and to the detriment of the Christian World.



COPY

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Berlin

August 7, 1961

Dear Mr. Baracat:

I believe you will find that the President is determined to stand firm on the question of protecting the freedom not only of Berlin but of the Western world. In my judgment, he will not be swayed from this course.

Sincerely yours,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. A. K. Baracat
1119 Rosemont Street
Amarillo, Texas

LBJ GER gw

Berlin


November 30, 1961

Dear Mr. Ballagh:

As the Vice President has been away from Washington on a series of visits to the West, the Southwest and to New England, I am taking the liberty of acknowledging your letter, in which you enclose copies of your communications to Secretary Rusk.

Mr. Johnson is expected back in Washington in approximately one week. At this time I shall be happy to bring this information to his attention.

Sincerely,



Howard L. Burris
Colonel, USAF
Assistant to
the Vice President

Mr. Thomas C. Ballagh
1010 Schaff Building
1505 Race Street
Philadelphia 2, Pennsylvania

HLB:mds

BALLAGH & THRALL

INCORPORATED
CABLE ADDRESS "BANDT"
TELEPHONE - LOCUST 4-4020



RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

EXPORT SALES MANAGERS

1010 SCHAFF BUILDING
1505 RACE STREET
PHILADELPHIA 2
U. S. A.

November 9, 1961

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
The Vice President of the United States
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Vice President:

Because of your interest in the question of access to Berlin, I thought you might like to see the attached copies of my letters of September 19th and November 1st to Secretary Rusk.

Any comments would be appreciated.

Very truly yours,

Thomas C. Ballagh

TCB:kr.
Enc: 2

BALLAGH & THRALL

INCORPORATED
CABLE ADDRESS "BANDT"
TELEPHONE - LOCUST 4-4020



EXPORT SALES MANAGERS

Distributing affiliate:
BALTHEX INTERNATIONAL
EXPORT DISTRIBUTORS

1010 SCHAFF BUILDING
1505 RACE STREET
PHILADELPHIA 2
U. S. A.

Trading affiliate:
BALLTHRALL TRADING COMPANY
EXPORTERS & IMPORTERS

November 1, 1961

Mr. Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Washington 25, D.C.

C O P Y

Re: Berlin Negotiations

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Attached is a copy of my letter to you of September 19th. As I have not received an acknowledgement, I would appreciate your confirmation that it was received, and I hope brought to your personal attention.

In the press reports since then, I have seen no mention of negotiations involving suggested concessions by the Russians in exchange for concessions demanded by them.

It would seem worth while to explore my suggestion of physically joining West Berlin to West Germany by a large wedge or corridor of land (through East Germany) under West German sovereignty, in exchange for allowing East Berlin to be the capital of a recognized East Germany; and in exchange for recognizing the Polish domination of German areas east of the Oder - Neisse line, as desired by Russia.

Various people with international experience with whom I have discussed this suggestion, including some Germans, seem to think it worth consideration, prior to any further concessions to Russian or East German pressures. I believe that others engaged in international affairs, the press, and in government will be similarly interested.

Your comments would be appreciated.

Very truly yours,

Thomas C. Ballagh

TCB:kr.

BALLAGH & THRALL

INCORPORATED
CABLE ADDRESS "BANDT"
TELEPHONE - LOCUST 4-4020



EXPORT SALES MANAGERS

Distributing affiliate:
BALTHEX INTERNATIONAL
EXPORT DISTRIBUTORS

1010 SCHAFF BUILDING
1505 RACE STREET
PHILADELPHIA 2
U. S. A.

Trading affiliate:
BALLTHRALL TRADING COMPANY
EXPORTERS & IMPORTERS

September 19, 1961

Mr. Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State
Washington 25, D.C.

COPY

Re: Berlin Negotiations

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As a former Foreign Service Officer, and more recently a businessman member of the U.S. Trade Mission to Germany in 1959, visiting West and East Berlin, may I offer a suggestion?

I have seen no publication of a similar proposal, although perhaps it has been or is being considered, favorably or unfavorably. However, in view of comments as to "what do we have to negotiate?", for whatever it may be worth, I suggest:

1. West Germany to retain West Berlin, and to get a substantial and reasonably defensible corridor connecting West Germany to West Berlin, including airplanes, roads, railroads, canals, and the land between.

2. East Germany to retain East Berlin, as the capital of an East Germany recognized by a peace treaty with the West, East Germans in the new corridor should have freedom to remain, or to migrate to the balance of East Germany, with their land to be purchased by West Germany.

3. Poland to retain German areas now under Polish domination - that is, recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as desired by Russia.

Under the foregoing plan, it seems to me that each side would gain something, Russia would get the Oder-Neisse line and recognition of East Germany as a satellite, neutral or buffer state.

As far as West Germany is concerned, I believe its chief interest is in West rather than East Berlin, and in sovereignty of access to it, without interference from Russian or East German officials. This is also important to the Western allies.

Berlin seems likely to remain divided for some time in the absence of war, and is probably large enough to permit continued division if West Berlin is physically joined to West Germany, as East Berlin is to East Germany.

9/19/61

Some of the West Germans I talked with in 1959 had not only given up hope of reuniting Germany, but were not even sure they wanted it any more. They felt that many East Germans in 15 years had absorbed so much of Communist philosophy as contrasted with democratic and free enterprise principles, that it would be difficult to reabsorb all of them.

Lest it appear that we are abandoning the East Germans, it should be proposed that within a specified period of years Russia and East Germany would agree to free elections under United Nations supervision for East Germany to choose whether to remain under a communist society and government, or change to a democratic one, and whether to join West Germany; and at the same time a parallel election in West Germany. However, unlikely it might be that Russia would agree to such elections, their further refusal if publicized would have propaganda value for the West.

If the Russians really prefer some tangible gain to continued crisis or actual war, it seems possible that the Russians might consider such a corridor plan sufficient for their actual or propaganda purposes, postponing or avoiding all-out war.

In any event, I hope that this or other plans you now have will enable you to be successful in your negotiations.

Very truly yours,

Thomas C. Ballagh



COPY

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Berlin

December 1, 1961

My dear Friend:-

Attached is a letter and a transcript of a television program which have just been received from the Department of State with further reference to the Dallas Times-Herald editorial which you sent to me.

I hope that this material will clarify your ideas on this subject and if I can be helpful to you in any other way, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. G. C. Murray

516 Kay Lane

Lewisville, Texas

LBJ:WDT

November 28, 1961

Dear Mr. Vice President:

I have your communication of November 2, 1961 in which you enclosed a letter from Mr. G. C. McMurry of Lewisville, Texas. Mr. McMurry expresses his concern over the allegation contained in an editorial of the Dallas Times Herald, of which he enclosed a copy, that the United States Government is contemplating turning the Berlin problem over to the United Nations for resolution.

The Dallas Times Herald editorial of October 10, 1961, which caused Mr. McMurry's concern that United States policy on Berlin and Germany was growing weaker, is based on a partial statement, taken out of context, which was made by Secretary of State Rusk in an appearance on Meet the Press Sunday, August 20, 1961. The entire transcript of the Secretary's answers on Meet the Press is enclosed as of possible interest to Mr. McMurry. I believe a reading of the full transcript will indicate that there has been no weakening of the United States position on Berlin as expressed by the President, and in statements which you have made on such occasions as your visit to Berlin.

Berlin is a Four Power and not a United Nations responsibility. The position of the United States is, as expressed in the Dallas Times Herald, that questions dealing with the status of Berlin and conclusion of a peace treaty with a unified Germany are responsibilities which clearly devolve upon the Four Principal Allied Powers as laid down in the terms of surrender for Hitler's Third Reich.

In stating, back in August, that the Berlin problem might come before the United Nations, "if the crisis

becomes

The Vice President,
United States Senate.

becomes deep," the Secretary had in mind the possibility that this might occur, not necessarily at the initiative of the United States, if developments became critical. In the event of a failure of the Four Powers to find an agreed basis for peaceful negotiations, a breakdown in negotiations or the outbreak of hostilities, it is quite likely the Berlin problem would find its way into the United Nations.


If I can be of any further assistance to you please do not hesitate to call on me.

Sincerely yours,

Brooks Hays
Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Press Release No. 581.
2. Letter from Mr. McMurtry.



Berlin

COPY

November 2, 1961

Dear Mr. McMurray:

This Administration has absolutely no intention of backing down in its stand at Berlin.

In order to get the full facts on the State Department's attitude in this matter, I am going to ask for a report.

Sincerely yours,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. G. C. McMurray
516 Kay Lane
Lewisville, Texas

Aug
LBJ:GER:mds

Lewisville, Texas.
October 10, 1961.

Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson, V. P.,
United States of America,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Vice President:-

Your attention is called to
EDITORIALS clipped from the Dallas Times Herald
dated October 10, 1961.


Many other editorials, articles and other comments
in the Herald, the Saturday Evening Post and other
periodicals seem to indicate we are growing weaker
and weaker from week to week on our stand in Berlin.

I do not wish to see a war, but I seriously believe
giving the U. S. S. R. any of the things they want
and thereby avoiding conflict at the present time
only gives them more time to get stronger and at
the same time makes them believe we will continue to
give in to their demands as they are made until
such time as we are forced to fight them on our own
shores or become their slaves.

Our President and you have spoken strongly indicating
we will stand up to these bandits and I hope both of
you will back up your statements, but I wonder in view of
such opinions as expressed in these editorials, if the
appeasers will not finally overwhelm you with their
arguments until you will be brought to the belief that
we must give peace at any price.

I surely hope this Berlin question is NOT turned over
to the United Nations to be decided.

Yours very truly,


516 Kay Lane.

ANSWERED OCT 24 1961

THE DALLAS TIMES HERALD

14-B***** DALLAS, TEXAS, TUESDAY EVENING, OCTOBER 10, 1961

EDITORIALS

Giving U.N. Berlin Problem Sounds Like Surrender Plan

THE STATEMENT from Secretary of State Dean Rusk that the Berlin crisis likely will go before the United Nations "if it deepens" sounds a lot like a surrender plan.

It would be a plan that its authors could excuse, of course, just as Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain excused his "peace in our time" deal with Adolf Hitler at Munich.

It would be a buck-passing plan. But

the result would be the same as if we backed down from our position.

In the first place, turning the Berlin crisis over to the United Nations would be an invitation to that body—made up largely of Communists and neutrals—to begin hacking away at the present situation in Berlin. It would be an invitation to them to assume that both parties are partly in the right and partly in the wrong.

The American people do not believe we are in the wrong. We are in Berlin because of solemn agreements—with the Soviet Union a party to them, even though it now wants to scrap them. We are there also because to move out would be to abandon the people of West Berlin to communism and to remove the one beacon of hope to millions in a sea of communism that has engulfed Eastern Europe.

In the second place, the United Nations has nothing to do with the Berlin situation or the agreements and commitments there. They involved four major powers—the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union—and, of course, Germany.

Whatever problems there are concerning Berlin are the principal concern of those countries—not the membership of the U.N.

Secretary Rusk may or may not want to wash his hands of this troublesome problem by letting the United Nations arrange a new American surrender.

But this much is certain. The American people do not.

Clark Speaks Up

"WE'VE SEEN too much weakness since World War II."

With these words one of our nation's most distinguished commanders called for a policy of standing firm against continuing Soviet threats.

Gen. Mark Clark, now president of The Citadel, told a group of newspaper editors that he's convinced "the only thing to do is to be strong and not to give an inch." We've already given down to bed-rock now, the general said.

It's time a lot of us ought to be coming around to that idea. We've seen our nation giving away position after position for years since World War II.

Too many starry-eyed idealists keep hoping that some day the Russians will turn out to be nice people who will only want to get along with us and the rest of the world.

They won't.

At least they won't till they see the entire world dominated by communism. That's their real goal. And weakness on our part only helps them to achieve it.

Berlin

December 18, 1961

Dear Mr. Barney:

So that you will have a clear understanding of my position on the Berlin question I am enclosing a copy of a speech that I made in West Berlin. This speech had the full knowledge and approval of the Administration and I believe it represents a firm determination not to yield. in Berlin.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. C.W. Barney
Mannsville, N.Y.

Encl: Berlin speech

Mannsville, N.Y.,

December 14, 1961.

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson

Dear Mister Vice President :-

At previous Summit meetings, Russia has gained important advantages, even though not immediately apparent.

We are disturbed that some of our best friends in France are horrified at proposals by the United States and Britain regarding the Berlin situation, and we are alarmed by the thinking of some Britons - "Better Red than Dead"

That is not what Patrick Henry and our Revolutionary ancestors thought about liberty.


We are against any deal to buy peace in Berlin at the expense of West Germany - their feelings or what they consider their national interest.

That would undermine and weaken the Western Alliance just when strength and unity are most important.

We hope the Vice President will use his influence to secure a firm stand on Berlin.

Very truly yours,

C. W. Barney



Mr. [illegible]

Mr. [illegible]

Mr. [illegible]

*At previous summit meetings, various proposals
concerning, even though not immediately apparent
the are distributed that some of our best friends in Europe are
convinced to proposals of the United States and Britain regarding the
European situation, and are alarmed by the thinking of some
better that the head
that is not what British Henry and our British
thought about that
the are agreed only deal to buy peace in Berlin to the
that Germany - that feeling or what that would be the
that would be the best and would be the best
that are most important
the best will be the best*

Very truly yours

J. W. [illegible]



Berlin

December 1, 1961

Dear Mr. Pearson:

Thank you very much for your recent letter concerning the suggestion of the Methodist Conference.

I am familiar with those suggestions for a peaceful solution of the Berlin issue and I am happy to have, additionally, the benefit of your views concerning this complex problem.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. L. A. Pearson
1112 St. Benedict
Cahokia, Illinois

LBJ:HLB:mds

Nov. 8, 1961

Dear Mr. Johnson:

The Methodist conference has made a commendable suggestion that we seek ~~new approaches~~ to a peaceful solution of the Berlin issue. Certainly we do not want to get into a war which will destroy us in order to protect the Germans after fighting two wars to stop German aggression. If the Russians want Berlin, let them have it.

Perhaps this at least will stop the Germans from forming a United States of Europe with themselves at the head of it. An organization of this kind would be more dangerous to the rest of the world, including ourselves, than the Russians are likely to be.

Lyle Pearson



Berlin

November 25, 1961

Dear Mr. Donaldson:

Thank you for your recent letter bringing to my attention your idea as to a possible course which our Government might take in its negotiations with Soviet Russia over West Berlin.

I appreciate your interest. As I believe your suggested plan merits the attention of the State Department I am taking the liberty of sending your letter along to the Secretary of State for his consideration.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Coleman duP. Donaldson
President
Aeronautical Research Associates
of Princeton, Inc.
50 Washington Road
Princeton, New Jersey

LBJ:HLB:mds

Tagged to Secretary of State for direct reply

Berlin

COPY

November 14, 1961

Dear Mr. Caskey:

It seems to me that President Kennedy had made good in his promise to stand firm at Berlin and that it is the Communists -- and not the United States -- who are backing down. Of course, there are stories which appear from time to time that a "deal" is in the works to sell-out Berlin. But after all my years in public life I have become accustomed to the rumor mill and I sometimes wonder whether these "inspired" stories are not actually planned by enemies of the United States.

I appreciate your concern about our country and I believe that if Americans continue to stand firm that freedom will survive.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. L.R. Caskey
1031 Milam Bldg
San Antonio, Texas

LBJ:GER:mjb

1031 Milam Bldg
San Antonio, Tex
Oct. 30, 1961

Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson
Vice President
Washington, D. C.
Honorable Sir:

When Mr. Kennedy made his speech about how firm he would be about Berlin I was delighted that finally the Government was to take a firm stand against the advancement of Communism. The speech was fine, provided he meant what he said.

It was not many days afterward that certain high officials in Europe began to express their doubts about how firm the President would be in the end. Then there were disquieting statements by Adlai Stevenson, Chester Bowles and others, so that now not only do the high officials of Europe doubt the no compromise statement but the people of the United States seem to feel the same way.

Not long after the "Berlin Crisis" came up Sen. Smith made the statement that in the end the United States would let Mr. Khrushchev have his way and all of Berlin would be completely controlled by the Communists. Now it looks like the retreat has started, judging by the statement made today by Mr. McNamara.

When Mr. Kennedy appointed most of his Cabinet from socialist Harvard University, and appointed Adlai Stevenson, Chester Bowles, et al to the State Department Old Nikita knew then that if he threatened big enough that he would get what he wanted.

Mr. Randolph Hearsh wrote a very nice story in his paper yesterday which I think was very appropriate. If you haven't read it I would suggest you do so and get the President to read it also.

Mr. Hearsh travels all over the United States and has the feeling of the people. Maybe he has not been to Texas but I travel around Texas quite a bit and it is my opinion that Texans are tired of our Government always appeasing and retreating from the Communists. They think the time has come to make a definite halt and to stop creating situations where there is forever a crisis occurring. There was no excuse for the Berlin ^{crisis} except for political bungling by Roosevelt and Truman. How are we to have another appeasement? It only makes the Communist bolder and more demanding each time we give in to them.

Why Can't The giving away of our resources to Communism be stopped, and now? I believe in spending all that is necessary for defense but we ought, by all means, stop unnecessary spending both at home and abroad.

Why Can't The Government stop harassing business? How can the Government expect to collect enough taxes to pay the deficit if they keep it up? Why not give some encouragement to business and stop demanding wage increases for labor, while at the same time asking business not to raise prices? That doesn't make sense.

Respectfully yours
L. R. Caskey



COPY

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Berlin

November 13, 1961

Dear Mr. Hart:

Thanks very much for sending me the figures of the survey of opinion in West Berlin. I find them very illuminating and I am happy to know that my visit had such an impact.

It will be a pleasure to see you when you return to Texas and I am looking forward to it.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Henry O. Hart, Director
Audience Research Department
Radio Free Europe
One English Garden
Munich, Germany

LBJ:GER:mjb



RADIO FREE EUROPE

Division of the
FREE EUROPE COMMITTEE INC
One English Garden Munich Germany
Tel. 229421



October 23, 1961

Dear Mr. Vice President:

Periodically I have sent you some of our studies, and I hope that they were of interest to you. As I indicated in my last letter, I was not able to come to Washington and take advantage of your invitation to visit you and discuss some of our work with you, due to a postponement of my home leave. My wife and I still regret very much that you and Mrs. Johnson were not able to visit us in Munich as you once thought possible. I plan to return to Texas on my home leave next summer and am keenly looking forward to seeing you, after so many years, either there or in Washington.

At this time I am very pleased to be able to give you an excerpt of an as yet unreleased public opinion survey, which may be of particular interest to you. After your visit to Berlin two relevant questions were inserted into a survey conducted in West Berlin and West Germany by one of the leading opinion research institutes here. The sample was composed of a representative cross-section of 1,750 West Germans and 205 Berliners.

"Has the visit of Vice President Johnson to Berlin and the declarations he made there convinced the German population of the firm intention of the U. S. to defend the freedom of West Berlin?"

	<u>West Berlin</u>	<u>West Germany</u>
Yes, fully	63%)	39%)
	) 75%	) 59%
Yes, partly	12%)	20%)
No	5%	4%
Don't know	20%	37%

Considering that the visit was made at a time when preceding events had negatively affected confidence in the United States, it is most noteworthy that it succeeded in re-establishing the trust with which the U. S. was looked upon before the events of August 13.

The difference between the Berlin figures and those for West Germany reflects, among other things, the difference between

personal exposure (first-hand knowledge) to an event and mediated knowledge of an event. In other words, the physical presence and actions (including speeches, discussions, etc.) of the Vice President in Berlin are, no doubt, a major reason why Berliners regained their confidence in the United States more rapidly than did the West German population, which was not directly exposed to the influence of the Johnson visit.

The vast majority of Germans hailed President Kennedy's decision regarding an increase in the number of American troops in Berlin and the Vice President's mission in the city:

"Did President Kennedy do the right thing by strengthening the American forces stationed in West Berlin and by sending Vice President Johnson there?"

	<u>West Berlin</u>	<u>West Germany</u>
Yes	83%	67%
No	1%	3%
Don't know	16%	30%

The President's decision was supported in Berlin and in West Germany with practically no overtly voiced disagreement. It was to be expected that the more intimately involved West Berliners would tend to be even more outspoken in their support of measures undertaken to protect their threatened freedom. The differences in the "don't know" percentages seem to point in that direction.

May I add as a personal note that I keep hearing from friends in Berlin of the tremendous impact your visit there had and of the confidence your presence imparted to all West Berliners, improving their morale practically overnight.

With the very best regards and every good wish, I am

Very truly yours,



Henry O. Hart, Director
Audience Research Department

The Vice President
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.



Berlin

COPY

November 14, 1961

Dear Mart:

I have become over the years rather accustomed to the stories that state without authority that our allies are "alarmed" over our actions. Frankly, I doubt whether this is the case.

I have seen the situation in Berlin myself. I have discussed it thoroughly with all of our officials. I think that even though they are determined to be firm they are also determined to be responsible and will take no unnecessary risks.

Of course, it is a difficult situation and no one can clearly foresee the future. I agree with you that we must exercise great care and I hope we will continue to do so.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Mart Cole
Cole's Theaters
Rosenberg, Texas

LBJ:GER:mjb



COLE THEATRES, INC.

COLE THEATRE
Rosenberg, Texas

COLE THEATRE
Hallettsville, Texas

LAMAR THEATRE
Richmond, Texas

STATE THEATRE
Rosenberg, Texas

TWIN CITY DRIVE-IN THEATRE
Rosenberg, Texas

PALMS THEATRE
Sugarland, Texas

Home Office

ROSENBERG, TEX.

MART COLE, General Manager
Phone NORTHfield 2-2866
P. O. Box 711

YOAKUM THEATRES, INC.

GRAND THEATRE - SUNSET DRIVE-IN THEATRE

November 7, 1961

Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson
Capitol Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Lyndon:


I am, as you know, certainly not for appeasement, but I am seriously afraid that a trigger-happy member of our forces in West Germany will trigger off an incident that would bring on total war. I want you to read the enclosed editorial and note that our allies are alarmed by our tactics in Berlin. This has been my view all along. I can't understand why someone doesn't have the power to stop such foolishness as having a display of force to escort American officials into Communist East Berlin. Why is this necessary?

Lyndon, I wish you would send this letter and this editorial to someone that has some authority. Please don't think that I am getting excited over everything; however, our State Department allows so many things to happen that it is dangerous. Also the American people are demanding a reason why we take unnecessary risks.

With kindest regards, I am,

Yours sincerely,


COLE THEATRES, INC.



Mart Cole

MC:LYK

Enclosure



N. A. T. O. ALLIES ALARMED AT U. S. TACTICS IN BERLIN

By Sydney Gruson
1961 New York Times News Service

Bonn---A majority of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization expressed alarm to the United States over its recent display of force to escort American officials into Communist East Berlin, it was reliably reported Sunday.

This presumably played a part in Washington's decision calling off the Berlin command's strong tactics after Red Army tanks had confronted American armor on the intracity Berlin border for 16 hours.

It was not the only reason, and probably not the major one. Washington was unhappy from the beginning over the posture it had to assume to uphold the right of free entry to East Berlin for its officials, in or out of uniform.

Allies' Misgivings -- The Allies' misgivings were expressed to Thomas K. Finletter, the United States ambassador in Paris to the Atlantic Council. They reportedly wanted to know whether the United States show of force on the border represented a change in American policy.

This policy was, in effect, that while the United States was determined to fight if necessary to uphold its right of access to West Berlin, no such risks would be run in regard to East Berlin.

From what is known here of the views of many of the Allies, it is a safe assumption that they told Ambassador Finletter their people would not understand risking nuclear war for the American right to withhold identification documents from the East German Communists.

Civilian Crossings -- Britain's practice in allowing its Berlin civilian personnel or soldiers in mufti to show identification was a factor in the arguments presented to Finletter.

Actually, American officials in mufti or American civilian personnel in West Berlin have also identified themselves to the East Germans since Aug. 13, when the Communists sealed off East Berlin, if they went to East Berlin on the subway.

The point at issue was whether identification was needed for people riding in cars licensed by the United States Berlin Command.

It is also part of the Berlin Command's case that acceptance of the Communists' identification demands at the Berlin intracity border will inevitably invite other restrictions and help ease the East Germans into control positions at the border between East and West Germany.

West German View -- As far as the West Germans are concerned, Washington's acting in holding back the Berlin Command indicates that the United States no longer considers it possible to uphold Berlin's status as a four-power city.



COPY

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Berlin

November 13, 1961

Dear Mr. Wilson:

Thanks for sending me your opinions in regard to Berlin and to the sale of material to Communist countries.

I believe that the measures that we are taking in Berlin certainly couldn't be described as "half-way measures." I believe they are firm and that the Soviets thoroughly understand our position as exemplified by their recent actions.

You are correct, we do need patriots and the Communists are our opponents in this fight to keep freedom-loving nations of the world from being encroached upon. However, we do not wish to push any non-Communist nations into the Soviet camp by ill-advised action.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. L. H. Wilson
4240 Buena Vista
Dallas 5, Texas

LBJ:CKB:yb

4240 Buena Vista
Dallas 5, Texas
October 25, 1961.

Vice President Johnson
Washington, D.C.


Fellow Texan:-

Half-way measures over Berlin are bound to involve us in a war. I think this would suit certain Jewish factions, who hardly would be in any actual fighting themselves.


If the treaty signed by all allies specify we are to go and come across the line, then why has not this been enforced all along? Now that we are at the boiling point, some of our soldiers start barging in. It appears someone is trying to start something to get the fire going. Anyone who provokes are asking for trouble. The government should stop any kids play, such proves no bravery.

Another thing: The U.S. Government should put a stop to anything being sold, or or given to Communist countries. Some people will do anything for a fast buck. We don't need Traitors. We do need Patriots. Now, if Communists are our enemies, then less punish anyone who aids them, or are in collusion with them in any way.

Respectfully,



L.H. Wilson.



Berlin

COPY

November 18, 1961

Dear Mr. Smedley:

Thank you for giving me your evaluation of "Background - Berlin 1961." I am glad that you found it helpful.

Your backing of the Administration stand in Berlin is gratifying. I agree with you that "we must not weaken nor even appear to do so."

All good wishes to you.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. L. D. Smedley
3771 1/2 Fourth Avenue
San Diego, California

LBJ:WDT

get file

San Diego
California
Nov 10, 1961

Vice President
Lyndon B. Johnson
Washington D.C.



Dear Sir, -

"Background - Berlin 1961" which I recently received and have carefully read is a Master-piece. I wish every one could have one.

Any thing, any organization, any system of government that uses evil to promote itself must be and is itself evil - devil.

The firm stand the Administration is making on Berlin is splendid. We must not weaken nor even appear to do so. My belief is that 90% of all Americans are with you on this issue.

Very truly yours
J. O. Smedley



Berlin

COPY

November 8, 1961

Dear Tammy McCain:

Thank you very much for your letter.

It is very gratifying to know that our young people are taking such an active interest in the government of our country. In reply to your question on Berlin I am enclosing a copy of the speech I made to the German House of Representatives during my Berlin trip.

With all good wishes, I am

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Tammy McCain
1022 W. Louisa Avenue
West Covina, Calif

LBJ:MJB
Encl: Berlin speech

1022 W. Louisiana,
West Covina, Calif.
October 26, 1961

Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson;
Vice-President of the United States
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Vice-President Johnson,

I am a student of Las Palmas
Junior High School in Covina,
California. I would like to know
about the Berlin crisis and how
it is affecting our country. If you
can give any information, I would
appreciate it very much.

Thank you.

Sincerely yours,
Tammy McCain





COPY

Berlin

November 13, 1961

Dear Mr. Ormond:

It seems to me that we are definitely acting and that our actions are having an effect upon the communist world. The communists did not achieve all of their objectives in building a wall across Berlin. In fact, it is obvious that the building of this wall was only one step in a well-planned campaign to extend their power over freedom loving people.

The United States reacted strongly and in a manner that even the most power-mad dictator could not misunderstand. We moved into Berlin with sufficient forces to make it clear that our words would be backed by deeds. Now the communists are beginning to back down from their original position which was that they were going to force a show-down before the end of this year.

In facing the communists, we are facing enemies of freedom who are not going to be discouraged easily. They are determined adversaries and they are dedicated to their evil philosophy. We must be equally determined and equally dedicated to the philosophy of freedom and must not be discouraged just because we do not attain our objectives overnight. It is clear to the communists that we are not afraid of them even though we have a decent respect for humanity and are not going to blow the world apart irresponsibly.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Garland Ormond, Jr.
4041 Woodfox
Houston 25, Texas

LBJ:GER:mjb

November 6, 1961

Vice President L. B. Johnson

Johnson City, Texas

Mr. Vice President;

I am quite concerned about our progress as a nation in setting forth a firm position before the world. In Berlin Khrushchev has already gotten most of what he wanted. The wall and the cutting off of the embarrassing flow of refugees to the West. He built Berlin tension to crescendo for the Moscow meeting of Communists, which was a prodigious help to his standing, showing how tough he was.

Why can't the U.S. seize the initiative as against the reds? Why must we always wait until the Communists act, so we can then react? Wouldn't it not be better to get a move on and do something besides talk and show the world that we mean to move ahead now with determination.

The impression strikes me too often, that we are acting as if we were scared to death of the Communists. Are we really? Wouldn't it pay off in the long run to stand up, talk back and then act. Wouldn't the reds back down when out-faced?

I would appreciate your views as I am concerned about the way we are facing up to ourselves and the menace of today's threat.

Sincerely,

Garland Ormond, Jr.
4041 Woodford
Houston 25, Texas (clan 1962
SWTTC)



Berlin

COPY

November 13, 1961

Dear General Cabell:

Thanks very much for sending me the folder on Berlin. It is an excellent job and brings home the true facts on the situation.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

General C.P. Cabell
2430 E. Street, N.W.
Washington 25, D.C.

Gray
LBJ:GER:mjb

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

9 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Vice President

In case you have not already
seen it, perhaps you would be
interested in looking at the attached.



C. P. Cabell
C. P. CABELL
General, USAF
Acting Director

COPY

Bulfin

October 31, 1961

Dear Mr. Elliott:

In response to your letter I requested the Army for a report on the facts concerning the so-called "Paar incident." I thought you would be interested in the enclosed reply which I have received. If I can be further helpful to you, let me know.

Sincerely yours,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. T. W. Elliott
Route 1, Box 215
Livingston, Texas

LBJ GER gw

24 October 1961

Dear Mr. Vice President:

This is in reply to your letter of October 10, 1961 addressed to the Secretary of Defense requesting information for Mr. T. W. Elliott regarding the Jack Paar-NBC Television Show on Berlin.

Inquiry into this matter revealed that the following Army personnel were present at the Friedrichstrasse (Berlin) Border Crossing at the time of the filming of the Paar show:

- (1) Two officers and ten enlisted men permanently stationed as guards.
- (2) One officer and three enlisted men on a normal jeep patrol.
- (3) The Commanding Officer and two staff officers of the Third Battle Group, the unit on border patrol.
- (4) One officer and fifty-five enlisted men on an operational reconnaissance whose presence was a coincidence, but who because of the filming remained in the area longer than necessary.

In addition, the Commanding Officer of the Second Battle Group, 6th Infantry, was on hand with a squad of thirteen enlisted men solely to participate in the filming.

As a result of this initial inquiry, one officer was admonished and another was reassigned. Upon reinvestigation by General Bruce C. Clarke, Commanding General, U. S. Army, Europe, actions taken earlier against the officers were withdrawn. A copy of General Clarke's announcement is inclosed.

Sincerely yours,

1 Incl
Announcement

C. G. DODGE
Major General, GS
Chief of Information

The Vice President
United States Senate
Washington 25, D. C.

ANNOUNCEMENT

"The USAREUR Commander-in-Chief's statement read:

'Since the report of investigation made on September 9, I have reinvestigated actions of certain members of the Berlin Command in the Jack Paar show incident, have seen the motion pictures of the show, and have conferred with Major General Albert Watson in Berlin. From all this, I have concluded that no one did anything wrong enough to warrant criticism, although on hindsight what was done might have been done a bit differently.

'Therefore, in order to right an injustice, I have directed General Watson to withdraw orally the admonition given to Colonel John R. Deane, Jr., and to remove from the files anything pertaining to this incident which is adverse or derogatory to him, and I will similarly remove from the files anything pertaining to Lt Colonel Dallas W. Hoadley.

'Colonel Deane will continue to command the Second Battle Group, 6th Infantry, in Berlin, while Lt Colonel Hoadley, who has been transferred to Heidelberg, will continue his new assignment in the Information Division at my headquarters in a position I consider to be of equal importance to the assignment he had in Berlin.'"



OCT 12 12 22 PM '61

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

October 10, 1961

Dear Sir:

I am enclosing a communication to which I will appreciate your giving serious consideration, based on its merits.

Please let me have in duplicate as prompt a reply as possible, returning the enclosure, in order that I may inform the writer.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Lyndon B. Johnson".

Lyndon B. Johnson

Defense Department
Washington 25, D. C.

P. S. Please address reply to me, Lyndon B. Johnson, Room 5113, New Senate Office Building, Washington 25, D. C. If additional information is required, telephone Mr. George Reedy, CA 4-3121, extension 2221 or 2222.

9787

Route 1, Box 215
Livingston, Texas
October 3, 1961

The Honorable Lyndon Johnson
Vice-President of the United States
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

I have written to you many times when you were Senator, and was privileged to receive your gracious replies.

I would like your opinion on the Jack Paar incident in Berlin and why orders to the colonels were rescinded. If our army had given this the thought that they should have before making the decision we would not have had to show our weakness in favor of one individual, and given more credit to our military personnel, which are our guardians at home and abroad.

Yours very truly,



T. W. ELLIOTT



COPY

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Berlin

October 10, 1961

Dear Mr. Elliott:

Thank you very much for your letter. Although I have read about the Paar incident in the newspapers I have no firsthand knowledge and therefore am in no position to comment.

I am going to ask the Defense Department for a report on this situation.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. T. W. Elliott
Route 1, Box 215
Livingston, Texas

LBJ:GER:mjb
Tagged to: Defense Dept

Berlin

October 31, 1961

Dear Mr. Byrne:

I certainly appreciate your warm-hearted letter and the strong support that you are giving this Administration. You can be sure that the Administration will continue to do the best that it can to serve our country.

Personally, I doubt whether Chancellor Adenauer takes the short-sighted view that was attributed to him in the column that you sent me. Instead, I imagine that it was some of his supporters because people who have lost an election always feel bitter and always look around for someone upon whom they can lay blame. I, of course, observed scrupulous neutrality between Chancellor Adenauer and Mayor Brandt while I was in Germany.

Sincerely yours,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. William J. Byrne
527 West Second Street, Apt. 5
Dayton 2, Ohio

LBJ GER gw

Apt. #5.

Dayton 2, Ohio.

October 24, 1961.

Vice President.

Hon. Lyndon B. Johnson,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Hon. Lyndon B. Johnson.

Enclosed, please find news item that was published in one of our local papers. Mr. Johnson I do not agree with the opinions expressed by, Chancellor Adenauer, that you are at fault for his setback in the recent German election.

On what grounds does Adenauer base his narrow minded & selfish opinions? I can not believe that you, Mr. Johnson, had any thing to do to oppose Adenauer in his election results?

My personal opinion is this man is, too, old to retain so much power as a leader? While we may respect his past good deeds he had very little to do to blame you for his poor showing. Had you any personal interest in this past election I can not believe you would apply pressure as has been indicated?

I do feel that the present position of Adenauer and his expressed opinions are not helping America's position in the Berlin situation. You do not deserve this form of insult from any one at any time.

I protest the demands of this opposer, General De Gaulle. Why does this old worn out man reserve the right to object to any important big powers meeting to co op with the critical conditions in Berlin? From The Congo, N. A. T. O. United Nations and other locations De Gaulle continues to demand the power to be the only one who wants to be in charge of all operations, world wide.

DE. Gaullle's desire for more power must be curtailed now. This man can not and has not been able to handle the conditions of France let alone World powers.

DE Gaullle did protest so much that America did remove its Air Power from France, but, nothing we do ever seems to please this protesting DE. Gaullle?

Soon I hope, President Kennedy, shall deem it necessary to once again put this one man General in his place?

I want at this time to inform you, I am well pleased with your efforts and I thank you for the wonderful job you are doing and shall continue to do. Not since the days of the former great leader, F. D. Roosevelt, has the American people been considered and many improvements have been granted as has these past Ten (10) months under our actual President Kennedy. Our Congress did support many bills & I hope next year Congress will do much better on several most important bills that were not acted on this past session? My only regret now is the personal narrow minded insults that this parasite Eisenhower and that yes man, Nixon, continue to heap upon our party as the spending too much money group. How could they know after the poor eight years they wasted our Tax paid money for nothing? Mr. Johnson is it any wonder the H. O. P. remains in the minority? One of the biggest evil forces in our country today is the Republican parasites that can and do stoop to the lowest form of insults because the Democratic Party, is the party of and for most of the great American people, not the very few as Eisenhower did cater to.

My prayers are for President Kennedy and you, Mr. Johnson that God continue to bless & lead our great leaders to a everlasting world peace free from all the evils of Russia and Castro's Cuba.

It has been a pleasure to express my views to one in such a high position as is yours.

God bless you and your loved ones Always.

America is our Country and I know we have the best leaders that can and will always defend our rights, under God, for the peace the world does deserve.

Sincerely,

William J. Byrne.



WASHINGTON CALLING

Marquis Childs

Two Elderly Leaders Determined To Stand Off Young President

WASHINGTON—It seems a long time ago that President Kennedy and his beautiful wife moved through the great gilt and crystal halls of Versailles as the guests of President and Madame de Gaulle at a splendid state dinner. And the two presidents spoke in response to toasts glowing words of praise for each other.

So sharp and so public are their differences now, not only over how to approach the Berlin crisis but on other problems of the Western alliance, that consideration is being given to an effort to bring the two presidents together again.

Doubters at various policy-making levels are skeptical that this would produce anything more than the encounter of last May. The fear is that de Gaulle, having failed to get all or even part of what he asked for in the spring, is now set on a "go it alone" course that will ignore the United States if Washington does not meet his terms.



de Gaulle
... Go It Alone

This suspicion is fed by reports to the state department that de Gaulle is saying privately to his visitors that the United States cannot be counted on to remain in Europe.

The personal letters that President Kennedy is reported to have sent last week to both President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer are understood to stress the vital importance of coming to an agreement on an approach to Berlin. The action of the French, said to have been taken on direct orders from de Gaulle, in abruptly refusing to attend a middle-level diplomatic meeting in London seemed to the White House to be a rather pointed answer.

Chancellor Adenauer's mood is reported to be almost as stand-pat as that of de Gaulle.

Privately Adenauer is blaming the United States and specifically Vice President Lyndon Johnson for his setback in the election of Sept. 17.

When Johnson visited Bonn on his way to Berlin the week after the Communists put up the wall sealing off the two halves of the city, Adenauer was determined to go with the vice president on his mission to reassure the West Berliners.

It was felt in Washington that if Adenauer went along and stood beside Johnson and Gen. Lucius Clay, who also went with him, the Adenauer camp

Berlin

COPY

November 9, 1961

Dear Mr. Sass:

The attached letter and pamphlet have just been received from the Department of State. I believe this summary of the Berlin situation will be of interest to you.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Marlon Hutson Sass
95 Lenwood Boulevard
Charleston, South Carolina

LBJ:WDT

November 6, 1961

Dear Mr. Vice President:

I have your letter of October 2, 1961 enclosing a communication from Mr. Marion Hutson Sass of Charleston, South Carolina. Referring to remarks which you made concerning the Berlin problem before a session of the Southern Governors Conference at Nashville, and to the President's address to the United Nations of September 25, 1961, Mr. Sass suggests that, despite assertions by you to the contrary, the United States is prepared to pay the "blackmail" price demanded by the Soviets for a solution of the Berlin issue, namely, "de facto recognition of, and acquiescence in, the existence of two Germanys."

Mr. Sass' contention that, in stating that the United States is "committed to no rigid formulas", the President meant to suggest that we were prepared to abandon our policy of non-recognition of the East German Communist regime in return for a peaceful Berlin settlement, is completely unjustified. A careful reading of the President's speech reveals quite clearly his belief that "yielding to threats can only lead to war" and there is nothing in the speech which could reasonably be interpreted as a willingness on the part of the United States or its Allies to pay any price for peace which would involve the sacrifice of our principles.

The position of the United States on the question of the division of Germany remains unchanged. It is our view that this arbitrary and unnatural division of the German nation poses a serious potential threat to the peace of Europe and the world. We have therefore sought and will continue to seek to avoid any action, such as recognition of the Soviet puppet regime in East Germany, which would contribute to the perpetuation of this division.

The Vice President,
United States Senate.

- 2 -

The Department agrees with Mr. Sass that the Soviets are in a position to utilize the exposed Western position in West Berlin to attempt to wring damaging concessions from the West. The Department does not, however, consider that the Soviets will be successful in their efforts at blackmail.

I am enclosing as of possible interest to Mr. Sass a copy of the Department's recent publication dealing with the Berlin problem.

If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to call on me.

Sincerely yours,

Brooks Hays
Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Berlin - 1961.
2. Letter from Mr. Sass.



Rudy

MARION HUTSON SASS

ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW

~~95 BROAD STREET~~ 95 Lenwood Blvd.
CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA

27 September 1961

The Vice-President
U.S. Capitol
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Vice-President:

Your assertions before the Southern Governors Conference at Nashville that "we are not paying any blackmail" (to stay in West Berlin), that "we never surrender under threats," that "we shun appeasement," fly in the face of the facts. These assertions are all the more remarkable in view of President Kennedy's having stated only a few hours earlier, in his UN speech, that "we are committed to no rigid formulas." Quite obviously, the President meant by that phrase that we were prepared to pay the price demanded by the Soviets: namely, de facto recognition of, and acquiescence in, the existence of two Germanys.

If the President did not intend for his phrase to convey such meaning, then he should make this clear at once. For certainly the phrase is being taken to mean such. The West Germans have interpreted it as such ("Security of West Berlin to be bought at expense of the reunification of Germany!"). And the Associated Press account of the speech flatly states that the President "indicated readiness to accept temporarily the division of Germany between West and Communist rule."

Is not this exactly what the Soviets were seeking in the first place? The primary objective of the Communist pressure on Berlin was, not merely to force Western troops out of the city, but rather to secure Western recognition of the East German puppet regime and thus of the division of Germany. How then can anyone say that we are not paying blackmail or engaging in appeasement? If our presence in and free access to Berlin is, as we have always claimed, a matter of right, then to pay for that which is already rightfully ours by abandoning the keystone of our whole German policy (our non-recognition of the East German regime) most certainly is to pay blackmail.

It is the same old sad story: the West talks boldly, but retreats. President Kennedy's attack on Soviet colonialism was magnificent, admirable. But when he got down to the one specific situation dealt with in his speech where concrete action is called for:-- he gave the signal to retreat. One can imagine the glee in the Soviet camp: They now know that they have, in this Berlin issue, a wonderfully effective weapon of blackmail. This year, the price they exact for the maintenance of our continued presence in Berlin (ours by right) is recognition of the division of Germany. Next year, when the Soviets once again apply the squeeze on Berlin, perhaps we can buy our way out by agreeing to the demilitarization of West Germany. And the year after that, by agreeing to the dissolution of NATO. And so on, and on. (All the while, of course, we can keep beating our chests and proclaiming loudly to the world that we are determined to remain in Berlin--- that we are "firm" and "resolute," that we "will never retreat." What a sad delusion, what a sorry spectacle!)

MARION HUTSON SASS

ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW


~~100~~ BROAD STREET

CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA

If the Administration really feels that absolutely the only way to avoid nuclear war over the German question is for the West to appease the Soviets by accepting the division of Germany, then the Administration should state this belief openly to the American people, and, in so doing, should not shrink from using the word 'appeasement'. Such a course would at least have a measure of dignity about it. But to attempt to paint appeasement as firmness, and retreat as resolution, is both ludicrous and pathetic.

Our situation is bad enough as it is; surely, we are not going to help matters by trying to pretend to ourselves that we are standing firm, when, quite demonstrably, we are not.


Yours respectfully,



M.H. Sass

MHS:sc

cc: Southern Governors, editors
Hon. Barry Goldwater



Telegraph Station
Fletcher, N. C.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Phone Arden 5411

Berlin

L. C. Langston and Sons

MANUFACTURERS OF
COTTON YARNS

ARDEN, NORTH CAROLINA

November 6, 1961

[Handwritten mark]

Hon. Lyndon B. Johnson,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Vice Pres.

get file
We thank you for your reply to our letter. We are also enclosing another article from Roger Babson. I don't agree with all that Roger Babson article states but do agree on ~~the~~ firm stand against communism.

I am aware of the fact the president can't read all mail so that is why I am addressing this letter to you. I believe that 90% of the American people would not want to give another inch.

Thanking you again for your letter & copy of address to the German people, I am

Sincerely yours,

Lloyd C. Langston, Sr.

P.O. Box 115 Arden, N.C.
We are just 10 miles away
from Miss America 1962
Asheville, N.C. home of
Miss America



Publication or Copyrighted Material not Scanned in Its Entirety

[For Full Access, Contact the Archives of the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library and Museum]

Type of Material: Newsletter

Author(s):

Title of Publication or Description: Bobson's Washington Forecast

Publisher: Business Statistics Corporation

Title of Series/Chapter/Article:

Edition:

Volume Number: 52

Issue Number: 45

Date of Publication: November 6, 1961

Page Numbers: 4 unnumbered pages

Babson's Washington Forecast

CONFIDENTIAL ADVICE ON COMING DEVELOPMENTS

Volume 52, Number 45

BAROMETER LETTER

November 6, 1961 (W-1486)

EAST-WEST WEAPONRY

Would Reds Or Free World Hold Balance of Power In Event Of War?

How well would the U.S. and her allies be able to defend Western Europe against attack? What are our capabilities to fight a conventional...or nuclear...war?

These are questions on the lips of millions of Americans. We'll try to answer them...with the best information available to us thru non-classified channels.

Let's look first at the relative strength of U.S. and Russian ground forces.

Our present ground-force strength (Army and Marines) totals a little over 1 million men. There are 2½ million men in the Soviet Army.

We have 14 divisions...the Soviets claim they have 175 divisions. As indicated by the number of men involved, the division figures do not tell a true story.

In terms of manpower—and recognizing the smaller size of the Russian division—Soviet ground-force strength is more realistically figured at 125 divisions...many of them poorly equipped and tied down to other-front duties (including home base).

Even so, Soviet foot soldiers outnumber ours by 2½ to 1. This ratio decreases considerably if we consider the available strength of our allies and Russia's (her satellites)...including the fact that satellite forces might well be more of a hindrance than a help to the Soviets in a large-scale war.

Western Front: It is estimated that Russia could employ about 45-50 divisions with effectiveness on the Western front.

Our allied mobilization capacity in the same theater would approximate 35-40 divisions.

Because of space limitations, it would be impossible for either side to use full mobilization strength in such a theater.

In terms of combat-effective manpower (in Central Europe), it is estimated that Russia could field about 1½ million men to our 1 million.

Russia, therefore, would have greater reserve strength...could keep throwing fresh reserves into battle longer than could the Allies.

In this connection, it should be noted that most military experts agree that, all other things being equal, about a 3-to-1 ratio of superiority in manpower is needed to conduct a fast-moving successful armed aggression.

Furthermore, an aggressor constantly stretches his supply lines over occupied territory...in which maintenance of a steady flow can become a vexing problem.

Rear-area security is another serious problem for the Russians. Possible defections or revolt by satellite troops, unco-operative attitudes of satellite peoples, and necessary widespread deployment of Soviet security forces would materially decrease the effectiveness of the Russian war machine.

In the light of this, NATO commanders feel that they will have practical parity with USSR forces by the first of the year ...even tho they will not achieve numerical equality.

The Allies are far superior to the Reds in battlefield nuclear weapons. If these were to be used, they would more than make up for numerical disparities in manpower.

Copyright 1961, by BUSINESS STATISTICS CORPORATION. Printed in U.S.A.

*Mr. President: I read & thank you to read this article, I believe
90% of Americans would appreciate a firm stand.
L. Longpré, Arden, N.C.*

Actually, there is a "missile gap"... but it is in our favor and it is widening.

There is no reason why we should not be bargaining with Soviet Russia from a position of strength rather than weakness.

Superior military power can be the greatest conceivable deterrent to war—and the most effective diplomatic tool—if the threat of its use is intelligently employed in international diplomacy.

The "brinkmanship" of John Foster Dulles was the nearest approach to sound, sensible, effective cold-war diplomacy that we have practiced in many years.

Lately, there has been a mounting wave of criticism of the foreign policy—or more accurately, lack of foreign policy—of the Kennedy Administration.

It is more than partisan political criticism. It is coming from high sources within the Democratic Party, from some officials within the executive branch of our government, and from a number of editorial sources not normally so outspoken.

Most of these contend that the President is exhibiting "overcaution" lest any tough Western resistance or counteraction to Soviet bullying spark open conflict.

The feeling is that JFK does not really understand the "bluff" element in the Communist posture...hence is fearful to utilize a corresponding measure of "bluffery" in our dealings with the Soviets.

The White House is permitting news leaks of its explorations and deliberations of all possible forms of compromise which might be offered to appease the Russians in Berlin negotiations.

The obvious "message" which is getting across to Khrushchev is that the U.S. is preparing to give him "half a loaf." The natural reaction of the Soviet leader is to increase the pressure...get tougher.

The President is also criticized for his tendency to treat each trouble spot as a separate problem...rather than relate it to the Red plan for world conquest.

While we are fretting over the increasing friction in Berlin, South Vietnam and Cambodia in Southeast Asia are moving ever closer to the Communist camp. In addition, the situation in the Congo has gone full circle...and the Reds are emerging as the winners—with the blessing of the UN! In other parts of Africa, the position of the West is similarly deteriorating.

The final criticism of White House handling of our foreign affairs is that Mr. Kennedy shows reluctance to act in response to minor Red aggressions until it is too late. He allows a "fait accompli" to be confirmed by the passage of time.

Major examples of this: Failure to "bolster" the Cuban invasion; failure to provide the signal for ready military units in Southeast Asia; failure to "reject" the East Berlin barricade by an immediate show of force; and failure to oppose "Operation Big Switch" in the Congo.

Profiles in Courage: It is possible that Mr. Kennedy may justify the addition of his own image to those of the American patriots he so brilliantly described in his "Profiles in Courage"...if he can muster the fortitude and resolution to impress indelibly on Mr. Khrushchev's mind our national determination to resist further erosion of world freedom...at whatever cost.

He must also banish his fear of affronting the architects of world enslavement...put freedom on the offensive by demanding a rollback of the Iron Curtain of oppression which holds captive the people of Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and countless other nations.

We, the people, can bolster the will of our President to emulate the courageous and fearless leadership of many great Americans of the past...by direct appeals to him to stand firm for freedom.

The spirit of great leadership is often born in the voice of the people.

Babson's

All reports, opinions, and advices should be used only under the conditions stated at the bottom of page 4 of our Washington Forecast of May 29, 1961. A copy of these conditions will be sent on request. No portion of this letter may be quoted or reproduced without specific permission. The annual subscription price of Babson's Washington Service is \$30.00. Forecasts are mailed weekly to clients. Address inquiries to BUSINESS STATISTICS CORPORATION, Drawer G, Babson Park 57, Mass.

Mr. President: - Would thank you to read this article if you have not already done so. I for one would suggest you stand firm in dealing with the Russians. Loya & Longston and many more.

Berlin

COPY

October 23, 1961

Dear Mr. Langston:

Thank you for your letter and for the article
by Roger Babson.

The solution to the problems facing us in Berlin
will not come easily, but I am confident that if
freedom-loving peoples everywhere continue to
work together in unity, we shall preserve the
way of life which we cherish so dearly. I am
enclosing a copy of my statement on departure,
for Bonn, Germany, and a copy of the speech I
made to the German House of Representatives
in Berlin, which I believe may be of interest
to you.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Loyd C. Langston
Arden, N. Carolina

LDJ:MJB
Encl: As stated

L. C. Langston and Sons

MANUFACTURERS OF
COTTON YARNS

ARDEN, NORTH CAROLINA

October 16, 1961

Hon. Lyndon Johnson,
Vice-Pres. United States
Dear Mr. Vice-President:

I am inclosing article by Roger Babson about world conditions .

He certainly expresses my views and hope from all the people of the United States. I have felt all along that something should have been done years ago during the Berlin air lift. The air lift should never have happened. The situation at that time could have been cleared without a shot in my opinion. But now the situation is different.

My opinion we should stand firm on further ~~negotiations~~ negotiations . Trust you you will convey my opinions to the President.

Very truly yours,

L. C. Langston

P.O.Box 115 Arden, N.C.



Publication or Copyrighted Material not Scanned in Its Entirety

[For Full Access, Contact the Archives of the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library and Museum]

Type of Material: Newsletter

Author(s):

Title of Publication or Description: Bobson's Washington Forecast

Publisher: Business Statistics Corporation

Title of Series/Chapter/Article:

Edition:

Volume Number: 52

Issue Number: 45

Date of Publication: November 6, 1961

Page Numbers: 4 unnumbered pages

Mr. Vice President: These are my sentiments regarding Russian Communism. The President should read this article. *J. C. Langston* Box 115 ARDEN, N.C.A.R.

Babson's Washington Forecast

CONFIDENTIAL ADVICE ON COMING DEVELOPMENTS

Volume 52, Number 42

BAROMETER LETTER

October 16, 1961 (W-1483)

WE ARE AT WAR

Sacrifice And Courage Required To Meet Nation's Greatest Test

It's time all Americans understood clearly that we are now at war against the World Communist conspiracy.

This is a deadlier, more serious war than any this nation has ever fought...and our security and freedom are more imperiled RIGHT NOW than at any time in our nation's past history.

Make no mistake about it. It's a fight to the death...the death of cancerous Communism or the death of the freedom and dignity of man. There will be...there can be ...no "in-between."

Communist writers since Marx have repeatedly voiced their conviction that one of the two systems must be victorious—completely and irrevocably—and that the other must be destroyed.

The era of Western retreat and compromise which began with the end of World War II—and which was designed by impractical statesmen with a blind yearning for peace at any price—has led to a steady compounding of international tensions, a steady piece-by-piece transformation of the world from freedom to enslavement, and a steady weakening of both our will and power to resist the snowballing drive of Red dictatorship toward world conquest.

History will some day record that the factor which built World War III to such fearful proportions was the incredible failure of Western leaders to recognize the inalterable nature and purpose of World Communism.

Even today, these uncomprehending idealists allow their conviction that war is unthinkable to motivate their suicidal proposals for further compromise and fur-

ther retreat before the demands of the tough, unyielding, implacable Communist dictatorship.

What Could Have Been: For years, we have pointed out in these Letters that fear of war is not peculiar to the Western mind. War is horrifying to all mankind.

Yet, the threat of war, thruout history, has proved a lever that will move men and nations...further weakening the weak and strengthening the strong.

Brinkmanship was not the invention of John Foster Dulles. It has been the diplomatic tool of every great nation thru the centuries...and probably of the cave men before them.

For approximately 10 years after World War II, Russia and her satellites were no match for the West militarily. A war with Communism during that period would have been short, decisive, and relatively sparing of human life.

Soviet leaders knew this...as did our leaders. Even so, the Kremlin bosses correctly estimated that the idea of war was so abhorrent to us that we would do almost anything to have the opportunity to back away...even from a conflict we knew we would win.

Time after time, the Reds probed...and proved their thesis. Their gains—at the hands of our compromises—made them gradually more powerful, more influential ...and more reckless in their threats.

The opportunity for us to turn the advancing tide of World Communism without widespread destruction has been steadily waning.

FL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7
FOREIGN RELATIONS
Berlin

CABINET AGENDA

**September 14
11:00 A. M.**

1. Briefing on Berlin Situation

by the Secretary of State

**2. Discussion of the relationship
between the new foreign aid program
and Cabinet agencies with major
delegations of work in that field.**

**Opening remarks by the
Secretary of Agriculture and
the Secretary of State**

File

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Berlin

PA. 3-5820

LAW OFFICES OF
CLARK R. BELKNAP
1207 BAILEY STREET

SEATTLE 8 Oct. 5, 1961.

Vice President, Lynden Johnson,
Johnson City, Texas. RE BERLIN.
Honored sir;

No one could have done a better job than you did in Berlin, but it appears your government let you down badly. Those honored words, "...our sacred honor,..." were still warm on your lips, when the Russians slammed shut the Brandenburg Gate. Ofcourse, our soldiers should have forthwith knocked it down. But they didn't. In fact they ran from or all things, Water Pistols. Shame on them, or rather on their superiors.


When Hitler first sent his troops into the Ruhr they were instrated to withdraw at once, if the French objected. The latter sat on their hands, so Hitler was off to the races. Now Mr. K is on the march. And why shouldn't he be? We have backed down from the Russians for 20 years. We promised to save Estonia, Latvia, Lithuainia; but we gave innto Stalin. We went into the War for the special purpose of saving The Poles, the Czecks; they, with many other, went down the Russian drain, and without the firing of a shot at their would be protectors.

But Pres. Kennedy had stated, most emphatically, as did you, that as to Berlin we meant business. NEVER WOULD WE BACK UP AN INCH!!! But we did back up, and we are contining to back up. Undoubttedly Mr. K actually believes we will not fight. In fact there is little now to fight over. When we failed to reopen the big Gate, every Beeliner knew his City was doomed, as indeed it is. Split any city into 2 parts, take away all boat, rail, auto freight, all auto travel, and surround it with 100 miles of enemy territory---it will just wither away even tho there are no hostile acts performed. The people of Berlin know they can be wiped out any moment the Russians decide. No city can prosper under such cindidions. And Berlin will not. It will wither away.

We keep contemplating the impossible. We plan to save Berlin(That is if we do, really.) We cannot save Berlin alone. We cannot fight over it. If shooting starts, the Russians will chose the battle ground--right slap dab over the City--there won't be a greas spot left of it. We will save all of East Germany, as we should, or none of it; Berlin will go. Mr. K has kicked us in the seat of the pants; he has slapped our face--he has spit in our eyes. We take it all. And now President Kennedy is sitting down with Gromyko; "Now just what are the intentions of your government?, as if he hadn't been told a hundred times.

We had better get our boys out of that "mousetrap," fast, otherwise we may lose them all, at the will of the Russians. Our soldiers have nothing and can use nothing in the City excepting small guns. If the Russians come in they will bring tanks and plenty of them. They can level Berlin in short order. True, FDR, Truman and Ike are to blame for the original plan, but we who now let the Russians insult us, at every opportunity, and cart off 17 million East Germans to join 100 million other captives, are just as guilty. WE OUGHT TO KNOW DOWN THE BERLIN BARRICADES, but we won't. Shame on us!!!.

Very truly yours,



CRB:SE.



Berlin

COPY

November 1, 1961

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Cawley:

Thank you very much for taking the time to let me know of your support of my recent statement.

Your commendation of my work is deeply appreciated and as long as it is my privilege to serve you in public office I shall strive to merit your continued confidence.

All good wishes to you.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. and Mrs. Richard S. Cawley
29 Falcon Street
Needham, Massachusetts

LBJ:WDT

Mr. & Mrs. RICHARD CAWLEY
29 FALCON STREET
NEEDHAM, MASS.

October 30, 1961.

Dear Vice President Johnson:-

We have just read the remarks which you made recently concerning this nation's determination to stand firm in the face of the Berlin crisis. Your statement is one which makes us proud to be Americans.

Keep up the good work.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. & Mrs. Richard S. Cawley



Berlin

COPY

October 31, 1961

Dear Miss Halbert:

There is absolutely no doubt about the intention of this Administration and of the President to stand firm on Berlin. The issue here is clear-cut.

I am enclosing a copy of a statement that I made while I was in Berlin. This statement was made with the full knowledge and approval of the President and it represents American policy.

I appreciate very much your confidence in me and I hope I can always live up to it.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Miss Grace G. Halbert
507 E. Putnam Avenue
Porterville, California

LBJ GER gw

507 E. Putnam ave
Porterville, Calif
28 Oct - 1962

Vice President Johnson
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Johnson

There is grave concern among many people who voted for Mr. John Kennedy, that he is not going to stand up against the Communists over West Berlin

He let us down on Cuba but that may have been the anti-Communists fault as well as President Kennedy that we didn't write in & let him know that we expected him to not allow the Communists to take over Cuba.

There is no doubt but that the Communists are writing thousands of letters asking him to not get us into war while we know that that is not their motive.

If they thought they could win a war they would start one at once not caring how many Christians they slaughtered

They only want to put West Berlin behind the iron curtain & then they will try for West Germany.

I, a registered Republican and a

member of the First Baptist Church
not only voted for Mr. John Kennedy
and you but I campaigned for you.
as I had confidence in both you and
Mr. Kennedy, however if he yields to
the Communists again, I will most
certainly join in having him im-
peached.

He has promised time & again
to stand by West Berlin -

We all know that if you give the
Communists an inch, they take a
mile -

We must be firm -

Sincerely.

Grace H. Halbert



Berlin

November 2, 1961

My dear Friend:

Thank you for your card in which you express your views regarding our present situation in Berlin. All of our leaders are working to solve this problem and I, too, hope that a solution will be found without the necessity of war.

It is always very helpful for me to have the thoughts of my fellow Texans and I am grateful to you for giving me the benefit of yours.

All good wishes to you.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. V. F. Love
P. O. Box 72
South Houston, Texas

LBJ:WDT

South Houston Tex - 10-27-61

Dear Mr. Johnson: I don't believe we should provoke matters in Berlin, it settles nothing in my judgement. Lastly I think its the German people must settle between themselves, also same in Korea.

We have everything mixed up in both places and at times it seems there is no solution but maybe there is a way out, short of a hot war.

We must not have a War for no one can win now, as we didn't complete our task in 1945 so now its a compromise, and the German and Korean people should speak for themselves.

I saw your Helicopter near Ft. O'Connor in Sept.
Take care of yourself
Yours friend
V.F. Love P.O. Box 72
South Houston Tex

NOV 10 1961
10-AM
TEX.



THIS SIDE OF CARD IS FOR ADDRESS

Hon Lyndon Johnson Vice Pres. U.S.A.
Washington
D.C.
U.S.A.

Berlin

COPY

October 30, 1961

My dear Friend:

The attached letter has just been received from the Department of State with reference to your letter concerning Berlin.

I hope that this information will be of interest to you.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Earl W. Ross
433 North Park Boulevard
San Antonio 4, Texas

LBJ:WDT



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 26, 1961

Dear Mr. Vice President:

We have received your communication of September 18, 1961, enclosing a letter from Mr. Earl W. Ross of San Antonio, Texas.

The Department has examined the proposal that, as a possible solution to the Berlin crisis, the city be removed to a site in the Federal Republic of Germany. We have concluded, however, that it would not be practical or proper, under the circumstances, to attempt to arrive at a solution of the Berlin problem on this basis. The proposal does not appear to give due weight to the following factors:

a. Berlin is an enormous and well-developed city. West Berlin alone has a population as large as that of Connecticut. In addition to homes, stores, churches, schools, hospitals, and other such buildings, Berlin has a large number of modern industrial plants and offices and agencies of the Federal German Government. Even if other factors were not considered, and even if room could be found for Berlin in densely populated West Germany, the moving of the city would be an enormous, unprecedented and incalculably expensive task.

b. While the idea of moving Berlin might not seem preposterous in terms of American experience such as the purchase of Louisiana or Florida, it must be borne in mind that Berlin, to the Germans, amounts to much more than just so many square miles or so many buildings. Berlin is the traditional center of German political, economic, and cultural life and has a history and tradition going well back into the Middle Ages. To the Germans, Berlin is a sort of New York, Washington, Boston, and Philadelphia combined. It is, furthermore, the principal symbol of the national unity which the Germans rightfully desire to reestablish.

c. The

The Vice President,

United States Senate.

c. The removal of West Berlin, even if it were practicable, would represent a hardship for the population of the city and a bitter disappointment for the population of the Eastern Zone of Germany, for whom the continued existence of free Berlin is perhaps the best hope of eventual freedom.

d. The proposal overlooks the fact that the problem of Berlin is merely a part of the greater problem of the continued division of Germany. The objective of United States policy is to achieve the reunification of Germany in peace and freedom and within the framework of a European security system which will assure the continuation of peace.

e. There is no reason to expect that the proposal, even if practicable, would be negotiable. The problem of Berlin stems solely from the refusal of the Soviet Union to abide by its international agreements. If we could bring the Soviet Union to honoring its responsibilities, there would be no need for moving West Berlin. Conversely, if we cannot bring the Soviet Union to honoring its responsibilities, we could hardly obtain Soviet cooperation in carrying out a proposal of this sort.

Mr. Ross's letter is returned, as you requested. If we may be of any further assistance to you, please do not hesitate to call on us.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

John S. Hoghland 2d
Acting Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations

Enclosure:

From Mr. Ross.



433 N. Park Blvd.
San Antonio 4, Tex
Sept 15, 1961.

Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson
Dear Sir:

I am acting in the belief that every possible effort should be made to try to settle the Berlin problem without war.

For sometime I have had a strong feeling about away a settlement might be worked out.

It would surely seem drastic to the people of West Berlin but we

know it would be better for West Germany if it has to remain a divided nation.

I would suggest that a new division line be drawn across Germany as far east as possible. Move all the people out of West Berlin and help them build a new city in West Germany and let the Russians move their people over the line.

I think Khrushchev might agree to give this territory in exchange for West Berlin with all its

buildings.

This might prove to be a
big job and rather
expensive but not as
costly as war.

Hoping that this or some
similar plan may be tried.

Most sincerely yours,

Earl H. Ross



COPY

September 18, 1961

My dear Friend:

Thank you for sending me your ideas on a
solution for the Berlin problem.

I am referring your letter to the appropriate
authorities for their consideration and comment.

All good wishes to you.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Earl W. Ross
433 North Park Boulevard
San Antonio 4, Texas

LBJ:WDT
STATE

COPY

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Berlin

October 26, 1961

Dear Captain:

Jake Pickle sent me your letter and I was strongly impressed by the clear manner in which you express yourself on the Berlin situation. The President has stated and restated and sent me to Berlin to state that we are determined to maintain our rights in Berlin and I hope the Soviet understands us.

I can't believe that they could mistake our dislike for war as softness since that day in late August when we brought a new battle group through Communist controlled East Germany to West Berlin in order to show them we meant what we said. The Russian checkpoints on the highway were the crucial points but each time the battle group was cleared through without undue delay.

Thanks for sending me the letter and any time in the future you want to lend me the value of your thinking, I would appreciate it.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Capt. H. Y. McCown
2524 Tanglewood Trail
Austin 3, Texas

LBJ:CKB:yb

cc: Mr. J. J. Pickle
Texas Employment Commission
Austin, Texas



TEXAS EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION
AUSTIN, TEXAS

J. J. PICKLE
Commissioner
Representing Employers

October 17, 1961

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
Vice President of the United States
LBJ Ranch
Stonewall, Texas

Dear Mr. Vice President:

Captain H. Y. McCown came by my office last week with the request that I pass this letter on to you personally, and I am happy to do so by way of this letter.

Captain McCown was in charge of the Naval R. O. T. C. at the University immediately after World War II, and then stayed on at the University as a vice president and registrar. Currently, he is serving as the motivating force behind our Navy League here in Austin.

He is a conservative voter, and I imagine he has voted conservatively in the past. Nevertheless, he is a good and strong citizen who is greatly concerned about our national situation today.

Sincerely yours,


J. J. Pickle

JJP:lc

Enclosures

2524 Tanglewood Trail,
Austin, 3, Texas
October 6, 1961

The Vice-President
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Mr. Vice-President:

The general tenor of the attached article from the "Austin American" for September 23, 1961, emphasizes the serious reports from numerous sources and sectors of the country that reiterate an alarming refrain; namely, that the President is being pressured by a determined group of advisors who are earnestly urging him to adopt a soft, permissive attitude toward the Soviets, particularly as relates to the Berlin situation.

I am aware of the rising tide of desperation and anger among many Texans as to our foreign policy. This letter is an attempt to acquaint you with the frustration and concern evinced by many people here, and with the frantic, almost last-ditch hope that the President can be persuaded to stand firm. At this fateful juncture in our history we cannot afford to have our foreign policy toward the Soviets shaped by well-meaning people who are willing to meet Russia's demands in order to avoid the possibility of war. Such a policy will enhance Russia's prestige at our expense and will tend to drive the countries of western Europe, particularly West Germany toward neutralism.

In spite of the risks which a tough policy will involve, I earnestly hope that you will use all your considerable powers of persuasion to urge the President to stand firm. There is a growing belief among many Americans that we have already lost the Cold War, but I feel that the turning point is now, as the talks with Russia begin to take shape. There is still time for a realistic approach to these complex and dangerous problems.

The Soviets have been impressed with the loyal support given to the President when he takes a strong stand on foreign policy. However, the Communist leaders know that a minority group is advising the Chief Executive and attempting to convince him that we must negotiate and make concessions to prevent war. Being astute poker-players, the Soviets will exploit their claim to rocket superiority to the limit and will go to the brink of war to obtain their goals. There is always the chance that they will mistake our dislike of war for softness. If the President can convince them of our unwavering determination to maintain our rights in Berlin and the freedom of that city, perhaps war can be avoided. Therefore, I again most respectfully urge you to advocate a policy toward Russia built upon and backed by the one thing in the world they fear and respect- strength!

Very truly yours

Henry Y. McCown
Henry Y. McCown

Washington Report

Berlin 'Softies' Ahead

By ROBERT S. ALLEN
And PAUL SCOTT

WASHINGTON — A sharp policy dispute has developed within the Kennedy administration over whether the US should fight a nuclear war to defend the West's access rights to West Berlin or make concessions to Russia to avoid a military showdown.

The fight-or-surrender dispute has been going on at the very top of government for the last three weeks and President Kennedy has been receiving conflicting advice from his principal advisers in the White House, State Department, Defense Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and Congress.

One group of advisers, who appear to temporarily have gained the upper hand, are urging the President to make concessions to Premier Khrushchev on West Berlin rather than risk a showdown in which nuclear weapons would be used.

This group consists of Secretary of State Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, special assistant to the President for international affairs; Walt Whitman Rostow, deputy special assistant to the President; Jerome B. Wiesner, special science adviser to the President; Paul H. Nitze, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, CIA Director Allen Dulles, and Senator J. William Fulbright, D., Ark., chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee.

The other or "tough" group of advisers are urging the President to be prepared to use nuclear weapons, if necessary, to fight for the freedom of access to Berlin. They contend that a surrender of Western rights there, even if only piecemeal, will lead to complete disaster for the US and our NATO allies.

This group consists of General Maxwell D. Taylor, military representative of the President; Dean Acheson,

former secretary of state under Truman; the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and Vice President Lyndon Johnson.

They are warning the President that if he doesn't take this firm position and announce it to the world Khrushchev will miscalculate and try to seize Berlin by cutting off its lifeline — West Germany.

While the President has made a number of important decisions on West Berlin, he still has not made the really big one — Should the US use nuclear weapons, including the big ones, to defend Berlin?

President Kennedy has already made it clear that he is ready to use conventional military force to fight any blockade of the West's access routes to West Berlin.

This decision is not a clear-cut victory for either of the groups of presidential advisers.

Both groups have indicated their support of plans to use conventional force, if necessary, to open the way to Berlin should the East Germans or the Soviets try to slam the door on the corridors or try to block an airlift.

However, the "soft" or Rusk group scored a major victory by getting the President to adopt a policy whereby the US will assert diplomatic and economic pressure on the Kremlin before resorting to the employment of conventional military forces.

The diplomatic pressure will invoke a US move to get the United Nations, if it can function, to condemn any Communist blockade of West Berlin.

The economic warfare will consist of the US and other NATO nations breaking off all trade with Russia. The Allies will bar Russia and East Germany from two crucial waterways.

They are the Skagerrak,

lying between Norway and Denmark, and the Dardanelles, Turkey's long narrow strait between Europe and Asia. The latter connects the Aegean Sea with the Sea of Marmara that opens into the Black Sea, on which are important Soviet cities and bases, chief among them Sevastopol.

The "tough" group headed by Acheson and Taylor contend that the chance of this strategy working is very marginal.

They point out that it is next to impossible for the US and its European Allies to exert enough diplomatic and economic pressure on Russia at this time to change Khrushchev's plans to throttle West Berlin.

This group argues that only a US threat to go to all-out nuclear war will deter Khrushchev. They support the position of the French government that there should be no Allied conference with the Soviet Union on Berlin and Germany under present circumstances.

President Kennedy is caught in the middle of his advisers. He would like to try to keep the "peace" by negotiating with Khrushchev, but he also wants to go down in history as a President that "saved" the freedom of West Berlin.

The US Army is being given intensive training daily to defend West Berlin against a Soviet-sponsored putsch. American authorities, on the basis of intercepted documents, believe the Communists may stage a full-scale "civil rebellion," using street brawlers infiltrated from East Berlin in its hot-war campaign against that encircled city. The riots would be used as an excuse for East German troops to move in "to restore order." The US garrison in Berlin is being given relentlessly realistic training in riot suppression, in which part of the troops don civilian clothing and

Berlin

COPY

October 24, 1961

Dear Friend:

Thank you for your letter advising that you are now identified with Grumman Aircraft. I appreciate your invitation to visit the plant if I am ever in the vicinity.

I am especially interested in your feeling that our country should stand firm at Berlin. I agree with you that we must maintain and honor all of our commitments.

I am enclosing a copy of my remarks to the House of Representatives of Berlin, which I made on August 19. This statement had the full approval and the full knowledge of the President and high officials of the administration.

With best wishes, I am,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Ora E. Graham
29 Ketay Drive No.
East Northport, New York
LBJ:ACP:dlc
encl.

GRUMMAN AIRCRAFT ENGINEERING CORPORATION

BETHPAGE, LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK

CABLE ADDRESS
GRUMAIR



October 20, 1961

Lyndon B. Johnson
Vice President,
The United States,
Senate Office Building,
Washington 25, D.C.

55

Dear Mr. Johnson:

I have refrained from writing you in the past few months for several reasons; principally, because I realize what a tremendous burden you have and the amount of your time consumed in carrying out the duties of your office.

I am inordinately pleased at the change of pace you and President Kennedy have initiated in both our domestic and foreign policies. At last the world knows where the United States stands.

Is there any possibility of a weakening on our stand in Berlin? From your statements, and those of Dean Rusk, and the President, I would assume not. However, I, like millions of others, need periodic re-assurance that "we will not have another Munich."

Since I returned from Europe in 1958 as a Supply Consultant to the Army at Orleans, France, I have more or less retired from government service. However, if at any time I am needed in any capacity I would return.

At the present time I am with Grumman Aircraft. No doubt you are familiar with the Grumman planes. If you should ever be in the vicinity of our plant it would be a great privilege to arrange a tour for you. In this way you could see what Grumman is doing for our defense effort.

With my kindest personal regards, and sincere thanks for past favors I am

Very sincerely yours,

Ora E. Graham
29 Ketay Drive No.
East Northport, New York

OEG/pb



COPY

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Berlin

October 6, 1961

Dear Miss Howard:

Thank you for your note in which you request that we stand firm on Berlin. Please be assured that this Administration has no intention of abandoning our commitments.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Miss Ethel Howard
122 East Seventh Street
Newton, Kansas

LBJ:WDT

's owe them nothing - they
we America millions & have
never paid one cent


President Kennedy
V Pres Johnson

we all feel
this way out
here

Gentlemen:

stand firm do not
give in one single mite to
him - do not let him bluff
you out - Do not give one
single inch - get that back-
bone straight & stand erect
& say NO do not back
down - we are Americans
for America - don't go
Red -

Respectfully
Ethel Howard
122 East 7th
Newton Kansas



Berlin

October 13, 1961

Dear Friends:

Thank you for your telegram. I appreciate very much your advising me of your feelings that our country should stand firm at Berlin, and I certainly agree with you that we must maintain in honor all of our commitments.

I also appreciate your taking the time to give me the benefit of your thinking in regard to the admission of Red China to the United Nations. As you no doubt know, the Administration has expressed its opposition to this course of action.

Kindest regards and all good wishes.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. and Mrs. C. Eldon White
2815 Granada Avenue
San Diego, California

LBJ:RFS:wlj

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a fast message unless its deferred character is indicated by the proper symbol.

WESTERN UNION

TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

SYMBOLS

DL=Day Letter

NL=Night Letter

LT=International Letter Telegram

SF-1201 (4-60)

The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is LOCAL TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is LOCAL TIME at point of destination.

LLE393 0B187

O SDA491 PD SANDIEGO CALIF 29 335ST

VICE PRESIDENT UNITED STATS

US SENATE EASHDC

STAND FIRM ON BERLIN NO RED CHINA IN U.N.

C ELDON WHITE PAULINE WHITE 2815 GRANADA AVE.

19 SEP 29 PM 8 09

DLT

E- 19241

COPY

Berlin

October 12, 1961

Dear Keith:

I'm happy that you got to talk to General Watson and Mr. Lightner. I know that your discussions with them made you much more conversant with the situation in Europe and Berlin.

You should be a fountain of good information for the many people you contact, and hearing it from you will give it more authenticity than reading it in the paper or hearing it from some radio or TV commentator.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Keith Kahle
Central Airlines
Amon Carter Field
Fort Worth, Texas

LBj:CB:mjdr

COPY

Berlin

October 10, 1961

Dear Mr. Hopkins:

The only question at stake in my trip to Berlin was whether it would be an American mission conducted exclusively by Americans or whether we would let members of the German government become a part of it. That is why I first visited Chancellor Adenauer and then visited Mayor Brandt.

The Berlin question is a very complicated one. There will be no easy solution. But you may be sure that this country will do everything that it can to help the German people who are free remain free.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Ralph J. Hopkins
Public Relations Advisor
Box 94
Canton, Missouri

LBJ:GER:mjb

RALPH J. HOPKINS
PUBLIC RELATIONS ADVISOR
BOX 94 CANTON, MISSOURI

October 1

Hon. L.B. Johnson
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Johnson:

It seemed like wise politics at the time that you refused to let Conrad Adenaur ride in your plane to Berlin.

It is hard to take that the German vote knocked out the only candidate that was for standing firm with us on the Berlin issue. Krushchev evidently knows Power Politics.

The papers carry the story that only the fact that it might touch off large scale war prevented us from a more complete mobilization. Isn't it tragic that in the giant game of chess we are playing the very moves to protect ourselves are ruled out for fear of offending the Russians. Almost daily I think of your talk in the Debate Park at Quincy last year when you said the Russians better watch out. Pardon correction: You said Krushchev had better watch out. What are we going to do now. Is it possible to give Adenaur any help to get the German people to stand firm with us in the crises?

Sincerely,

Ralph J. Hopkins.

Mr. Perry what chance is there of Mr. Johnson reading a letter sent him?



Berlin

COPY

October 10, 1961

Dear Mr. Mohr:

Thank you very much for your letter. I am confident that this Administration has no intention of appeasement in Berlin.

You may be interested in a copy of the statements I made while I was in Berlin. This speech had the full knowledge and approval of the President and I think it speaks for itself.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. V. A. Mohr
President, Southern District
The American Lutheran Church
408 West 45th Street
Austin 5, Texas

LBJ:GER:mjb
Encl: Berlin speech

The American Lutheran Church

SOUTHERN DISTRICT
408 WEST 45TH STREET • AUSTIN 5, TEXAS



OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
VERNON A. MOHR, D.D.
GLENDALE 2-2300

October 3, 1961

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
Vice President
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Vice President:

On June 19 I wrote to the President of the United States for the first time in my life. Since I haven't as much as received an acknowledgement, even from some minor secretary, I conclude that at least in the opinion of those close to the president, it wasn't worthy of an answer.

But let that rest! I know the turmoil must be terrific in the White House!

I take heart in the fact that you have always responded to correspondence and therefore the following. Surely you are receiving stacks of letters from alarmed citizens regarding the current crisis among many, namely Berlin. Will you please do all you can to keep the appeasers from another Munich or worse! For once, Dean Acheson seems to have the right idea - maybe he has learned from 10 years ago! I was thrilled over your words to the West Germans, Bowles, Rusk, et al, notwithstanding. Let's keep it on that basis. I disagreed with much of Eisenhower's policies, but I have to admit his words recently, that "there is nothing to negotiate" on Berlin, fit my sentiments exactly. Let's call the Russian's bluff! They'll have to back down for a change.

Thanks for your reaction.

Sincerely,

V. A. Mohr, President
Southern District
The American Lutheran Church

