

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#83a notes	Notes from 8/8/67 - 1:25 p.m. Tuesday luncheon group [Sanitized NLJ 82-42] Secret 6 pp. OPEN NLJ 82-42 7-26-99	8/8/67	A

FILE LOCATION

Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Box 1

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

82
/ AUGUST 8, 1967 - 1:25 p.m. |

Tuesday luncheon group

Secretary McNamara
Under Secretary Katzenbach
George Christian
Walt Rostow
Joe Califano |

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 9, 1967

12:30 p.m.

83

~~TOP SECRET~~

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Tom

FROM: Tom Johnson

Attached are the notes of your weekly luncheon on Tuesday, August 8 in the Family Dining Room in the Mansion.

Those attending were:

Secretary McNamara
Under Secretary Katzenbach
George Christian
Walt Rostow
Joe Califano

The luncheon started at 1:25 p.m. The luncheon ended at 2:50 p.m.

Attachment.

~~TOP SECRET~~

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

BY X ON 12-11-86

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

Luncheon began: 1:25 pm
Luncheon ended: 2:50 p.m.

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

83A

NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH
SECRETARY McNAMARA
UNDER SECRETARY KATZENBACH
GEORGE CHRISTIAN
WALT ROSTOW
JOE CALIFANO

At the Tuesday luncheon
August 8, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5 *82-42*
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *WJG*, NARA, Date *7-22-99*

The following areas were discussed at the meeting:

1. Indian Wheat

The President said he had just completed discussions with Ambassador Chester Bowles, who reported that large quantities of wheat had been damaged by rains.

The President pointed out that he was unsure what course of action we should follow about additional requests for aid to India.

Mr. Rostow said he was forwarding to the President a set of alternatives for his consideration. The President said it would appeal to him if some other nation would recognize their responsibilities in this nation, even the Russians.

2. Justice Tom Clark

Secretary McNamara said a DOD plane had been dispatched to pick up Mr. Clark in Bangkok.

The President said he had been advised that Mr. Clark had a case of hepatitis.

3. Bombing policy

Secretary McNamara said the Joint Chiefs had four recommendations:

- Hanoi thermal power plant.
- Bridge in Hanoi near populated area.

MEETING NOTES COPYRIGHTED
Publication Requires
Permission of Copyright
Holder. W. Thomas Johnson

~~TOP SECRET~~

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

[1 of 6]

SERVICE SET

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

- Eliminate the 10-30 mile donut around Hanoi and the 4-10 mile donut around Haiphong for bombing.
- 10 targets in the buffer zone between Vietnam and China.

Secretary McNamara said he had talked with Secretary Rusk on the matter. He said Secretary Rusk had the following opinion:

- He would not strongly oppose the attack on the thermal power plant since it is now at 75% capacity and is heading toward 100% capacity.
- Opposed the 10 targets in buffer zone.
- No other targets.
- No on the elimination of donuts.

Hence, Secretary Rusk's position is for the thermal power plant.

Secretary McNamara said he favored hitting the thermal power plant. The President asked for Secretary Katzenbach's opinion. No objection. Approval granted.

Secretary McNamara said he feared an ^{invasion} ~~evasion~~ of Chinese air space on the 10 buffer zone targets. President said to emphasize to General Wheeler the dangers and tell him to hit them without going across the border. All caution should be emphasized.

Secretary McNamara said he favored no additional action around Hanoi and Haiphong for fear of civilian casualties, additional difficulties this may create for negotiations, and the domestic controversy it would create on possible escalation. It would, in his opinion, compound the problems with the doves in this country.

The President said it doesn't look as though we have escalated enough to win. Secretary McNamara said hitting these targets would not necessarily mean that we would win.

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEETING NOTES COPYRIGHTED
—Publication Requires
Permission of Copyright
Holder: W. Thomas Johnson

[2 of 6]

SERVICE SET

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 3 -

The question of the Hanoi bridge was discussed, along with the fact that diversionary targets would be necessary. The JCS advised that the chances of civilian deaths would be almost zero. Secretary McNamara said this was incorrect. They would be more on the order of 100-500, possibly more.

It was decided that Under Secretary Katzenbach would look at maps of the bridge after the meeting before giving his judgment on this. If Katzenbach agreed, the bridge would be hit.

On the matter of buffer zone targets, Secretary Katzenbach said he had not yet seen the importance of the buffer zone targets. He said he would be less reluctant if he knew what they were and their importance.

Secretary McNamara said they were primarily transfer points in transportation lines. Secretary McNamara said they were not terribly important targets, but that they were more important than some of the targets we are hitting.

Secretary Katzenbach said, on the matter of eliminating the donuts, that he would approve if the pilots were directed at what targets to hit inside the area rather than being given indiscriminate authority to hit anything inside the donuts. He said there are quite a batch of targets which haven't been hit.

The President pointed out the need for a very thorough briefing to Admiral Sharp before he appears to testify Wednesday before the Congress. He said Sharp should be told that we did not want to do more in terms of bombing while Kosygin was out of his country, and that we needed several more weeks to allow him to get back before more bombing was authorized.

The President said he would authorize all targets except the cities and the buffer zone if General Wheeler can do it without going into China.

The President said he would seriously consider taking out the Hanoi bridge if it is that essential to transportation.

The President said, "We have got to do something to win. We aren't doing much now." The President said Secretary McNamara should worry about the heat he has to take on the Hill about bombing limitations.

The Secretary said he was not worried about the heat as long as he knew what we were doing is right. He questioned: "Does this help get it over."

~~MEETING NOTES COPYRIGHTED~~
Publication Requires
Permission of Copyright
Holder: W. Thomas Johnson

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

[3 of 6]

~~SERVICE SET~~

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 4 -

Secretary Katzenbach said that bombing alone "isn't going to be the magic." He said that total pressure, a combination of strong ground action in the South and good bombing in the North, was the combination for progress.

Katzenbach said "constant pressure adds up."

4. Congo

The President asked when the last C-130 would be brought out. Secretary Katzenbach said it would come out on the 10th.

The President mentioned a story in the morning newspapers which said that the planes had been taken out because of the Congressional pressure to get them out. The President said this was not true. The planes were taken out because the job was completed, not because of any congressman.

The President told Secretary Katzenbach to make sure in the future that when the Secretary or anybody else is told to clear something for the President to make sure that it is cleared. He said that he was told the matter of planes in the Congo had been cleared by Secretary Rusk with Senators Fulbright and Russell. Later, he found out that these two Senators were the ones who criticized the most about sending the planes into the area.

5. Discussion of Memorandum from two Frenchmen who returned to Paris after visit to Hanoi.

These individuals were debriefed in Paris by Mr. Kissinger, a consultant to the Department of State. They related that Hanoi was willing to negotiate after a cessation of the bombing, even a de facto cessation. They agreed to negotiate secretly on matters affecting North Vietnam without the Vietcong but said the VC must be represented on issues affecting South Vietnam.

They said they recognized the need for U.S. troops to stay in Vietnam until after a political settlement. They recognize the need for a coalition government. Hanoi will not push for reunification until after a political settlement.

The most important part of the memorandum, Rostow and McNamara said, was that Hanoi told the Frenchmen they would not take advantage of the bombing cessation.

~~MEETING NOTES COPYRIGHTED~~
~~Publication Requires~~
~~Permission of Copyright~~
~~Holder: W. Thomas Johnson~~

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

[4 of 6]

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 5 -

Secretary McNamara said it was the most interesting message on the matter of negotiations which we have ever had.

The Secretary said there will be further discussions on the 16th. The President questioned about the reliability of the two men. Secretary McNamara said to his knowledge, they were completely reliable and that Kissinger is a tough, shrewd negotiator.

The President said he saw no need until the facts become clearer to slow up the bombing. He said the moment they are willing, we certainly are ready to sit down. We will discontinue all bombing north of the 17th parallel if we know they will not take advantage of it.

But we will not quit until we have their assurance they will not take advantage of the bombing halt. If at the end of that time they take advantage of it, we will answer it with interest.

It was agreed to send Chet Cooper to Paris with Kissinger.

On the matter of bombing policy, the President asked Rostow for his suggestions. Mr. Rostow made the following proposals:

- Hit the thermal power plant
- Hit the bridges
- Take out the transportation links within the donuts
- Attack the northeast railroad.

The President said that propaganda about a stalemate has us wobbling now, that he no longer was worried about the stop the bombing pitch.

There was then a discussion of the effects of bombing on infiltration.

Mr. Rostow said some reports showed that as much as 50% of the infiltration was impeded by bombing.

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~MEETING NOTES COPYRIGHTED~~
~~Publication Requires~~
~~Permission of Copyright~~
~~Holder: W. Thomas Johnson~~

[5 of 6]

~~SECRET~~

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 6 -

Secretary McNamara disputed this. He said some reports showed only 1% of the infiltration was stopped by bombing. He said much of the infiltration flow was cut down by disease such as malaria -- not by the bombing.

6. National Guard Training.

The President said he wanted Secretary McNamara to go over this problem with the President's Special Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders and recommend changes.

Secretary McNamara said work already was underway on this. He said three elements were vital:

1. Get better leadership. In Detroit, the commander was 73 years old.
2. Get better training. This is now under way.
3. Introduce more Negroes into the National Guard.

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEETING NOTES COPYRIGHTED
Publication Requires
Permission of Copyright
Holder: W. Thomas Johnson

[6 of 6]

SECRET