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#135 list	attendees at NSC meeting Secret 1 p. [sanitized - placed in open file on 4/25/86] same sanitization 3-14-03 NW/RAL 99-162	n.d.	A
#136 memo	Tom Johnson to the President, Secret 1 p. [sanitized - placed in open file on 4/25/86] SAME SANITIZATION 3-14-03 NW/RAL 99-162 OPEN 8-15-05 NLJ 05-77	12/1/67	A
136a notes	NSC meeting, 11/29/67 Top Secret 5 p. [sanitized - placed in open file on 4/25/86] same sanitization 3-14-03 NW/RAL 99-162	11/29/67	A

Tom Johnson's Notes of Meeting

FILE LOCATION

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NOVEMBER 29, 1967 - 12 noon

National Security Council Meeting

Vice President	Lucius D. Battle
Sec. Rusk	<input type="text"/> - CIA
Sec. McNamara	Walt Rostow
General Wheeler	Bromley Smith
Director Helms	Harold H. Saunders
Director Marks	Tom Johnson
Gov. Price Daniel	

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1) > 25Yrs
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SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 99-162

By ebm, NARA, Date 1-22-03

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 1, 1967

Rec'd 5 30 p

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Tom
FROM: Tom Johnson

Attached are the notes of the NSC Meeting held in the Cabinet Room November 29. The meeting began at 12:0t and ended at 12:55 p.m.

Those attending were:

The President
Vice President Humphrey
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
General Earle G. Wheeler
CIA Director Helms
USIA Director Marks
Director OEP Governor Price Daniel
Assistant Secretary of State, Lucius D. Battle
Roland Inlow, CIA
Walt Rostow
Bromley Smith
Harold H. Saunders
Tom Johnson

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E.O. 13232, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 05-77
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136a

NOTES ON NSC MEETING, NOVEMBER 29, AT 12:00 NOON

The President asked Secretary Rusk to report on the latest in our efforts. Secretary Rusk, after saying how fortunate we have been to have Mr. Battle following this crisis hour by hour, asked Mr. Battle to brief the Council on the present situation.

Mr. Battle said we have made "astonishing progress" largely due to the superb efforts of Mr. Vance. We now have Greek-Turk agreement on a statement of principles which would lead to withdrawal of Greek and Turkish military forces from Cyprus in excess of the levels established in the Nicosia Treaties of 1960. The Governments of Greece and Turkey did assert these principles in response to an appeal by the Secretary General. Action will be required in the United Nations, and the Secretary General will have to decide whether he can increase the UN force on Cyprus as required by these agreements within his current mandate and without another meeting of the Security Council. The second problem is to win Makarios' agreement to these terms. He has argued for total demilitarization of Cyprus and refuses to accept any agreement which would appear to reaffirm the London-Zurich agreement.

Mr. Battle, saying that he had been asked why we need Makarios at all, pointed out that Makarios has the power to undercut the agreement by calling a Security Council meeting, attacking the Turk-Cypriots and charging that the Greek Government sold out the Greek people, etc.

In sum, Mr. Battle said he was "on the whole optimistic"; there are still problems; but at the minimum Mr. Vance has delayed and we hope averted a war. The basic problems still remain because the London-Zurich arrangements are a Rube Goldberg contribution politically and can't work. We hoped we could get at the basic problem through the UN. In any case, we have an opportunity for a new start.

Secretary Rusk added that we have somewhat succeeded in taking the heat off us. The problem of expanding the UN mandate is now between Turkey and the UN Secretary General. If the UN fails to carry out its part of the agreement, it may be easier for Turkey to accept the Secretary General's failure than to accept US or Greek failure to see the agreement successfully implemented. He concluded by saying to the President that it had been of the utmost importance that "you put in your own stake by sending Cy Vance."

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The President asked General Wheeler to describe the military situation. General Wheeler said that while there has undoubtedly been some relaxation of tensions in the last few hours, forces on both sides remain on alert. Turkey has the advantage in the area and on the ground. Greek air bases are too far away and Turkey could easily win air superiority over Cyprus within 24 hours. Greece has the capability to move airborne forces but would run into Turk air superiority. In the overall balance, Greek seapower is superior, but in the vicinity of Cyprus, Turk air cover again would be decisive.

In Thrace, Turkey has five infantry divisions and one armored division. Greece has three infantry divisions and one tank division. If a conflict occurred, JCS believes that the Turks could advance as far as Salonika. He doubted that would go farther.

On Cyprus, the Turks have the capability to land a division on the north coast of Cyprus near Kyrenia, and to put three divisions ashore in two or three weeks. He believed that Turkey could control the Island in that time.

In summary, General Wheeler said that, if shootings started, the war would probably begin with Turk preemptive air strikes on Greek air bases to be followed by an invasion of Cyprus. It was problematical whether the Turks would invade Thrace. He felt they would simply maintain a defensive position there.

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
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
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


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


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


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The President then made the following remarks:

-- Last July George Woods of the World Bank told me that the Bank wanted Secretary McNamara to succeed him.

-- Last April Mr. Woods urged Secretary McNamara to accept this position.

-- In October Woods again approached Secretary McNamara about this job.

-- Secretary McNamara told me he wanted to stay as long as I needed him as Secretary of Defense.

-- Then on Monday there were leaks from the Latins and to the London Financial Times that Secretary McNamara had been recommended for this post.

-- The current situation is that the Board is considering the matter. The Bank has not offered Secretary McNamara the job. Secretary McNamara has not accepted the job. That is where the matter stands.

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-- The one thing I want to make abundantly clear is that no member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has ever talked to me about resigning.

There has never been a Cabinet Secretary or a member of the JCS who has threatened to resign.

General Wheeler said any report that a member of the JCS had threatened to resign was absolutely untrue. "As far as I am concerned any report like that is a lie."

The President said in the four years he has been in this office he has never been able to tell if Rusk is more of a hawk than McNamara. "There has never been a decision when we haven't all agreed. That includes Secretary Rusk, McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There have been no divisions in this government. We may have been wrong, but we have not been divided."

"I believe that the JCS feel as I do that no man has served more faithfully or with more competence than Bob McNamara. If anything, all of us, including Bob, are moderates. There has never been a period when the diplomatic and military and staff advisors have had less acrimony or division. We discussed with reason and we are in general agreement.

"General Westmoreland has sent me no letter recommending anybody for Marine Corps Commandant. Both Secretary McNamara and I talked at length this morning with Reston about his column in the New York Times. We cannot make an announcement about what the World Bank might do. ---or what Secretary McNamara might do.

"But I think all of you know my feelings that there has never been a person who has performed more effectively than Bob.

Secretary McNamara said he resented the newspaper reports implying that any member of the JCS would think of resigning. "We owe a great deal to the chiefs. They are being hurt by irresponsible comment.

"We must remember that every chief was recommended to the President by me and appointed by the President."

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The President pointed out that there had been some criticism of the fact that General Wheeler was not attending meetings at the White House. "In the past 50 weeks, General Wheeler's record shows he has been to the White House to confer with me 43 times. General Wheeler knows my door is always open to him and to the other Chiefs. They do not need clearance from anybody to get to see me."

Secretary Rusk said he feels like he is a man who is about to lose his brother. He said there has never been a time that compared with the recent years in the total cooperation between the Department of State and the Department of Defense.

The President then read a letter from Mr. Brzezinski of the State Department Policy Planning Council. One of the points the President mentioned in the letter was "Brzezinski's assertion that 'as the light at the end of the tunnel in Vietnam becomes more evident, the threat of Chinese intervention grows stronger.'" He concluded that the Chinese could not let North Vietnam be defeated in its efforts to take South Vietnam without committing itself.

The President said he did not necessarily agree with this but it was a statement which he thought should be brought to the attention of all the members of the National Security Council.

Secretary Rusk said we must keep in mind that the other side must make a very difficult decision. They must determine whether they are going to do more for Hanoi as failure appears imminent in South Vietnam.

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