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| #144a notes | Notes from 12/5/67 - 1:18 p.m. meeting with VP, McNamara, Rusk, Vance, Helms, Rostow, Christian, T. Johnson [Sanitized NLJ 82-60] Secret 3 pp. <i>open per Guidelines 9-26-99</i> | 12/5/67 | A |
| #144b memo | Cyrus Vance to the President Secret 8 pp. <i>open 2-9-00 NLS99-245</i> <i>exempt NLS 92-374</i> | 12/5/67 | A |

FILE LOCATION

Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Box 1

RESTRICTION CODES

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DECEMBER 5, 1967 - 1:18 p.m.

| | |
|----------------|--------------------|
| Vice President | CIA Director Helms |
| Sec. McNamara | Walt Rostow |
| Sec. Rusk | George Christian |
| Cyrus Vance | Tom Johnson |

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 6, 1967

11:30 a.m.

144

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Tom

FROM: Tom Johnson

Attached are the notes of your meeting with the Tuesday lunch group on December 5 in the Mansion.

Attending were:

The Vice President
Secretary McNamara
Secretary Rusk
Cyrus Vance
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson

The meeting began at 1:18 p.m. The meeting ended at 2:37 p.m.

Attachment.

144a

NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH
THE VICE PRESIDENT
SECRETARY McNAMARA
SECRETARY RUSK
CYRUS VANCE
CIA DIRECTOR HELMS
WALT ROSTOW
GEORGE CHRISTIAN
TOM JOHNSON

December 5, 1967
In the Mansion

The President congratulated Mr. Vance for an excellent job and an excellent report.

Secretary Rusk said a case study should be made of this. He called Cyrus Vance's actions an example of diplomatic excellence.

The President explained that he thought General Chapman would make an excellent Marine Corps Commandant. Dick Helms called it the "right" man for the job.

Mr. Vance then reviewed his report to the President, stressing the need that the report not be made public or any acknowledgement that a written report was submitted. (A single copy of this report is attached. It is not for redistribution.)

Secretary Rusk said the most important impression that Mr. Vance brought back from his trip was that both Greece and Turkey were anxious to reduce their commitment to Cyprus. The Secretary said Greece could do this only under a dictatorship so we should try to get this disengagement from Cyprus before a democratically elected government comes into office in Greece. Otherwise, the Secretary said public opinion would not permit a democratically elected government to reduce its commitment.

Mr. Vance said he appreciated the fact the President gave the widest latitude possible in handling this situation.

The President then discussed with Secretary Rusk Mr. George Brown's current attitudes, particularly related to a resolution before the United Nations.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines & FRUS Lists
By Julia, NARA, Date 7-22-99

[1 of 3]

SERVICE SET

The President said this might get you where I had feared we would get. I have feared that we would be asked to stop the bombing with nothing in return. We must anticipate the worst and prepare for it.

Secretary Rusk said that no decision had been made whether to do anything at all.

The President said he thought that it was possible to get nine votes in the Security Council.

Secretary Rusk said that Ethiopia agreed to put the matter on the agenda if the United States wished.

Secretary Rusk said that he doubts that much will happen on NPT. He said the question of safeguards is a sticky one and that the Germans have political problems on it.

Secretary McNamara said two cables came in from General Westmoreland concerning possible campaigns in Laos and Cambodia.

General Wheeler said that there are 5,000 troops and supplies in the Tri-Border area. There are three regiments and bridges which are important to the resupply of the enemy operating out of Cambodia. The first North Vietnamese division withdrew. Its headquarters is a mile from the border and 15 miles from Dakto.

General Wheeler said the enemy is not to go in. They are refitting and replenishing their manpower.

We propose the use of B-52s and tactical aircraft for 72 hours. The B-52s could operate at night.

General Wheeler said that General Westmoreland discussed this operation with Ambassador Bunker. Ambassador Bunker concurs.

General Wheeler pointed out that there is no question that all of this is in Cambodia.

"We have known for two years that these people have been there."

Secretary McNamara said this action raises very serious political problems which outweigh the military gains. Secretary Rusk said he would draw a distinction between operations in Laos and operations in Cambodia. He said he would also draw a distinction between full-scale operations and a raid.

Secretary Rusk said that if we hit the enemy in Cambodia and possibly kill Cambodian personnel, this may give them reason to commit their forces against us.

Secretary McNamara said that the President could veto a "stop the bombing" resolution in the United Nations because of world and domestic reaction. The Secretary said the action against Cambodia would destroy us in the U.N.

In addition, the Secretary said that the U.S. cannot run B-52s around the clock without public knowledge of that.

Dick Helms said he would like to look at this before making a recommendation. Secretary Rusk asked if U.S. forces were going on with night and day raids against infiltration routes used by the regiment which is being brought into South Vietnam.

General Wheeler said yes, to the best of our ability. General Wheeler said the proposal was to use a South Vietnamese Airborne Brigade in area 607 to destroy troops and ammunition. He said it is occupied by supply centers and troops. He said the raid would take three days and would involve 1,500 to 1,600 South Vietnamese troops along with about 30 U.S. advisors.

Secretary McNamara said the Laos situation is different. He said the border is ill-defined. He said the chances of getting caught are much different.

Secretary Rusk said there is not a fraction of as much a problem in Laos as there is in Cambodia.

Secretary McNamara said he recommended going ahead with the Laos operation. Secretary Rusk agreed.

The President approved.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-245

By is, NARA Date 1-27-00

December 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The immediate threat of war in the Eastern Mediterranean has been lifted. Greek troops are withdrawing from Cyprus on a scheduled basis. Turkey is reducing its state of military readiness and its forces are being withdrawn to their normal cantonments. The complex question of improved and augmented pacification measures on Cyprus will be debated in the halls of the United Nations, instead of on the landing beaches of the island. My Mission has, therefore, been completed.

When I arrived in Ankara on November 23 to carry out your peacekeeping instructions, I found the Turkish Government and people poised for war in direct reaction to the destruction on November 14-15 of the Turkish Cypriot villages of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou by the Grivas-led National Guard. The Turkish Prime Minister told me this was too much. Now the killing had to be stopped. Turkey was prepared to invade Cyprus unless its demands were immediately met. The reality that this action would plunge the area into war, seriously damage NATO, and destroy the dreams of the Demirel Government for economic progress was immaterial. Logic had lost to passion in its age-old battle to control the Turkish mind. With a war-course set, executive control had passed into the hands of a 20-man War Cabinet operating by consensus and dominated by passion. Turkey and its government was not an edifying sight.

Had you not taken the decision on November 22 to send our Mission to the region immediately, it is our judgment that Turkey would have gone to war the following morning with extremely serious consequences for the countries involved, for NATO, for US interests, and perhaps for the peace of the world.

The classified communication and public announcement of your intent to send the Mission immediately to Ankara caught the Turks by surprise. In view of the political consequences involved, they had to accept the reality that for the second

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time in three years you had intervened to check their course to war. While your decision was a ray of hope to some Turkish officials, to others it was simply pernicious interference.

Under these circumstances, our reception bordered on unfriendliness and rudeness. In the first instance, we were diverted from the civil airport to a fighter strip allegedly to avoid unruly demonstrations. When we tested the Turkish mettle that evening, we found the Prime and Foreign Ministers in truculent, haranguing moods, prepared to alter their war course only on ultimatum terms.

Our immediate task was to obtain a first-hand assessment of the basic objectives and requirements of the Government of Turkey and to interpose a calming presence between them and their potential Greek and Cypriot war opponents. In harsh and lengthy sessions in Ankara, we obtained commitments that the Government of Turkey wished neither political victory nor the humiliation of Greece and that it would permit limited time to obtain Greek agreement to withdraw their illegal troops from the island and Cypriot agreement to enhanced pacification measures including the disarmament of the National Guard which had perpetrated the savageries of November 14-15. Failure to develop a formula acceptable to the three parties would almost inevitably result in war, and time was very short.

That same evening the Mission flew to Athens and held its first meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Pipinellis and subsequently with King Constantine and Prime Minister Kollias. We found the Greek Government anxious to maintain the peace if this could be done without humiliation, but fatalistically resigned to a conflict which they did not want because they lacked a means of communications with the Turkish Government. Our Mission revived their hopes and they offered their cooperation. Since they were willing to withdraw their illegal troops from Cyprus, it appeared to us that sufficient elements of basic understanding existed between the two countries, providing a face-saving formula could be devised. We concluded that this could take the form of an appeal from the UN Secretary General to which the two countries could respond, with the Greeks announcing their intent to withdraw and the Turks to

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reduce their readiness levels.

While our first round of exchanges had thus revealed a rudimentary formula for a peaceful solution to the crisis, the written statement of Greek views which we promptly carried back to Ankara had no chance of acceptance.

In an early morning meeting on November 25 with Foreign Minister Caglayangil, the Greek proposal was flatly rejected accompanied by threats of almost immediate military action. We then demanded to meet with President Sunay prior to any final decision by the Turkish Cabinet. The affirmative response was a close thing, probably reflecting Turkish reluctance directly to affront you. In the meeting which then took place with the President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, we sought and obtained a commitment from Sunay that there would be no invasion while the Mission continued its efforts. We also obtained some modification in the Turkish position, although the proposal which we then carried back to Athens was harsh and unreasoning.

Enroute back to Athens that evening, we concluded that the time had come to alter our role and more directly engage our national prestige by preparing our own synthesis of the essential elements of the position which had been conveyed to us. We conceived a compromise which would be fair to both but with which neither would be fully happy.

Meeting with Foreign Minister Pipinellis shortly after midnight on November 26, we presented the Turkish counter-proposals without substantive comment and with the understanding that the Greek response would be forthcoming later that day. On the Greek side, intense Cabinet discussion then occurred; while on our side, we developed our conceptual consensus into a precise formulation.

In a subsequent meeting in the evening hours, Pipinellis presented us with a written statement of Greek views, accompanied by a specific schedule for withdrawal within three months. After assuring him that we would honor the wish of his Government to present those views to the Turkish Government we told him

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they were doomed to failure. We then discussed our synthesis with him and obtained a commitment that, if the Turks rejected the new Greek proposal, we could present our synthesis in the knowledge that he would do his utmost to obtain the subsequent concurrence of his Government. Prior to returning in the early morning hours to Ankara we again met with the King and fully informed him of the status and prospects of our Mission. He was friendly, hopeful, and determined to enhance our prospects by maintaining rigid control over the movements and mobilization status of the Greek forces.

In an early morning meeting on November 27 in Ankara, Caglayangil quickly dismissed the Greek proposal and fatalistically concluded that peace prospects had failed. At that point our synthesis was presented and favorably received. Following an initial favorable reaction by the Cabinet, the Prime Minister undertook extensive discussions with the opposition leaders only to encounter charges of bad faith for engaging in negotiations prior to the actual withdrawal of Greek forces. This had the effect of stiffening the position of the Government and reviving the truculence of the opening day of discussion.

When we met again at 0200 on November 28 with an exhausted Caglayangil, the chances of peace had seriously deteriorated. We were informed that our synthesis had been rejected, that Greek withdrawal must take place within 30 days, and that the Greeks must agree to a poorly drafted Turk proposal without delay. For nearly six hours we strived to reverse those decisions. Each of our counter drafting proposals was passed into the adjoining Cabinet Room for review by all 20 Cabinet members who were in a vengeful mood. Finally, we had to settle for a marginally improved document and a 15-day extension in the withdrawal period. This was the final Turk position.

We then flew to Athens conscious that war would occur if the Greeks did not accept the Turk proposals. We met promptly in Athens with Pipinellis and frankly explained the situation which then existed. While we could not commend the

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defective Turkish draft, we did express our view that it would result in prompt reductions in Turkish war threats and that a means might be found to obtain some extension in the withdrawal period if an extension were technically necessary. Following extensive Cabinet discussions in which the King, Prime Minister Kolliian, Foreign Minister Pipinellis, and Junta Colonel Papadopoulos played positive roles, the Greek Government made the courageous decision to accept the Turkish terms. With the final hour close at hand, the Greek decision was transmitted to Ambassador Hart and immediately conveyed to Caglayangil. The corner had been turned away from war.

Secretary General Brosio, who was helpful throughout this venture, then flew to Ankara on our behalf and obtained Turkish concurrence to a 15-day extension in the withdrawal period if this proved technically necessary, and we flew to Nicosia to meet with the most formidable person in the Eastern Mediterranean, Archbishop Makarios. In lengthy sessions stretching into the morning hours of November 30, we sought his concurrence to the formulation covering the Turkish demand for improved pacification measures and the disarming of the National Guard. The best that we could obtain from the wily and stubborn Cypriot leader was a written statement acknowledging the Greek-Turk decisions to withdraw and to reduce the level of military readiness, accompanied by a verbal assurance from the Cypriot Foreign Minister that they would accept an appeal by the Secretary General covering these points, and a careful formulation of Cypriot views about the pacification provisions of the agreement.

We then returned to Athens, hopeful that this would be sufficient to permit the Secretary General to issue his appeal, thus starting the Greek-Turk deescalation process. This hope was shattered by the statements of the Cypriot Permanent Representative in New York that his Government had rejected the Greek-Turkish agreement. With hopes for peace again fading, we returned to Nicosia and pressed Makarios to concur, starkly outlining the likely consequences of continuing intransigence. This resulted finally in his written agreement to discuss in the Security Council all the elements of

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pacification demanded by the Turks. While during the morning hours of December 3 the Turkish Government pondered and finally rejected this proposal, we engaged in extensive teletype conversations with Washington and New York developing plans for a preemptive appeal by the Secretary General which might yet save the peace. We also sought and obtained in Ankara a modification of the existing Turkish position on Paragraph 4 which might conceivably be sold to Makarios.

The final session on December 3 with the Archbishop was grim. Our stark exposition that war or peace hung in balance over the bagatelle of semantic differences was met with a serene rejection. We then played for time in an attempt to prevent a final negative decision prior to the issuance of the Secretary General's appeal, including a final ploy that he not inform us of his decision prior to our arrival in Athens late that afternoon.

In a tight squeeze this worked. The skillfully drafted appeal was issued and promptly accepted by Greece and Turkey. This left Makarios with no feasible alternative to compliance. Thus, peace has been maintained in the Eastern Mediterranean, the withdrawal of Greek troops and reduction of Turkish military readiness has begun, and the extremely thorny issue of the future of pacification measures on the troubled island of Cyprus has been remanded to the United Nations.

Before closing this Report, certain observations would appear pertinent:

1. The crisis of late November erupted from the savage events of November 14-15. But its origins are rooted in history, including the unworkable nature of the London/Zurich Accords. Hatred and suspicion are endemic infections in Cyprus and in Greek-Turk relations.

This may be a turning point in the history of the region. War has been averted but all the interested parties expect dangerous crises to recur in the months and years ahead unless a fundamental solution can be developed acceptable to all.

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Since both the Greeks and Turks have told us of their wish to reduce their involvement and vulnerabilities on the island, and the Cypriots yearn for a viable solution, it may now be possible to make progress in this respect.

As a world power we cannot avoid being an interested party to developments in the region. Our Mission properly eschewed responsibility for long-term solutions to this terrible problem. With similar appropriateness, it now recommends an urgent US effort to formulate proposals and modalities to resolve this explosive issue. This effort should dove-tail into the imminent Security Council review of the extension of the UNFICYP mandate.

2. Only the United States Government could have prevented war from breaking out in the area in the past two weeks. There are some who will not approve our actions but all should respect our motivation and capability. Only we, and particularly you, had the will, the sense of purpose, the executive leadership and the technical capacity to accomplish this extremely difficult task. Our people in Washington, New York, Ankara, Athens and Nicosia were superbly competent and, perhaps more importantly, fully capable of operating as a team in a fast-moving crisis situation. Arthur Goldberg's performance in New York was simply superb. Without his sense of time and powers of persuasion, we would have had little chance of success. Surely, this reflects an aspect of great inherent strength in our society. Similarly, our technical competence was a vital factor in the success of the Mission. Without a KC-135 we simply would not have arrived in time and would not have had the mobility to shuttle between the capitals in search of a mutually satisfactory formulation. Likewise, without our nation's marvelous capacity to communicate virtually instantaneously by radio, telegram and teletype, we could not have held the vital strings of command in our hands. Finally, none of this would have been possible without purposeful leadership by the President of the United States.

My final comments are personal in nature.

I cannot adequately express my admiration, respect and appreciation for the superb professional skill and judgment of the members of our Mission. Mr. John Walsh, Mr. John Howison


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and Captain Hollyfield have demonstrated wisdom and professional skill which are in the great tradition of our nation. Without their invaluable advice, courage and wisdom, we could not have successfully completed our Mission. I thank God that we have such men in the service of our country.

Respectfully,


Cyrus Vance

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