

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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#22a notes	Notes from 1/26/68 - 11 a.m. Pueblo 7 Senior Advisors meeting with McNamara, Katzenbach, Wheeler, Helms, Nitze, etc. Secret 9 pp. <i>Sanitized NLS 92-142 10-5-99</i>	1/26/68	A
<del>#22c cable</del>	<del>Moscow 2585</del> <del>Top Secret 2 pp.</del> <i>open 8-19-92 NLS 92-145</i>	<del>1/26/68</del>	<del>A</del>

## FILE LOCATION

Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Box 2

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PUEBLO VII

January 26, 1968  
11 a.m.

Senior Advisors

NOT SET

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

22

~~TOP SECRET~~

January 26, 1968  
6:00 p.m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Tom Johnson

Attached are the notes of the President's meeting Friday morning on the Pueblo incident. This was the 7th meeting of the President on this matter since January 23.

The following were in attendance:

The President  
Secretary McNamara  
Under Secretary Katzenbach  
General Wheeler  
CIA Director Helms  
Secretary Nitze  
Clark Clifford  
Deputy Assistant Secretary Samuel D. Berger  
Walt Rostow  
Bromley Smith  
George Christian  
Tom Johnson

The meeting began at 11:00 a.m. and ended at 12:02.

The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.

SERVICE SET

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING.

BY DCU ON 10-25-82

NOTES OF PRESIDENT'S FRIDAY  
MORNING MEETING ON THE  
PUEBLO INCIDENT

January 26, 1968

**SANITIZED**

**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**

**NLJ 92-142**

**By cb, NARA Date 9-16-99**

THOSE IN ATTENDANCE WERE:

The President  
Secretary McNamara  
Under Secretary Katzenbach  
General Wheeler  
CIA Director Helms  
Secretary Nitze  
Clark Clifford  
Deputy Assistant Secretary Samuel D. Berger  
Walt Rostow  
Bromley Smith  
George Christian  
Tom Johnson

Prior to the President's arrival the following agenda was agreed upon:

1. An intelligence situation report by Richard Helms.
2. A diplomatic situation report by Under Secretary Katzenbach.
3. A summary of the military proposals on aircraft movement and other actions by Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler.
4. A discussion of the merits of a Presidential address to the Nation.
5. More discussion on Clark Clifford's question of Thursday, "How best to secure the return of the Pueblo if diplomacy fails."

Secretary McNamara: We should not plan on any military action in less than seven days.

General Wheeler: That is correct. That time will be required to get all of our units on the ground and make them combat effective.

Secretary McNamara: We should have working sessions periodically to discuss these matters. We may do this without the President. I suggest that we ask the State Department to call these meetings. We should have one a day. Let's work out a system like we had in the Cuban Missile Crisis.

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
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At 11:00 a.m. the President joined the meeting.

I. INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT

Director Helms:



It is normal procedure to advise Senator Russell and Congressman Rivers. May I do that, Mr. President?

The President: Yes.

II. DIPLOMATIC SITUATION REPORT

Deputy Secretary Berger: The Goldberg text is now being worked on (Goldberg text attached as Appendix A).

- The Japanese were contacted. They replied that this is a very grave situation.
- We have no reply as yet about our notice that we would be sending additional B-52's to Okinawa.
- The Indonesians have told their Ambassador in North Korea to urge the release of our ship and crew.
- The Pakistanis have assured us of their support in the U.N. (The President asked if Berger is certain of this. The President said he had a different reading of the text. The President asked "Did he sign on?"). Berger said, not exactly.
- The tenor of most of the replies have been friendly. The President asked if there was any report on the nine members of the United Nations Security Council. Mr. Berger said there had been no report on their positions.

Walt Rostow: The Security Council meets at 3:30 p.m.

The President: Let me see the draft of the Goldberg statement.

Secretary McNamara: Has there been a response from Moscow yet?

Under Secretary Katzenbach: Yes, Gromyko was negative. They showed some concern. He was less negative than Kuznetsov. They urge restraint. They said they hope we will not over-react to this.

The President: May I see the cable on the Soviet discussion? (Ambassador Thompson's cable is attached as Appendix B).

The President: Is there any chance whatever that this ship was in territorial waters?

Secretary McNamara: It is possible, but the chances are less than 50-50.

General Wheeler: The ship has the best navigational gear we have. North Korea has a rugged coastline. Because of this we can get a good fix by radar. Admiral Moorer has said that it is very improbable that the vessel was even a mile from where it ought to be.

In addition, the intercepts of North Korean radio traffic confirm that the North Korean ships which intercepted the Pueblo were in the same area the Pueblo reported as its location.

Secretary McNamara: The only thing which would have brought the Pueblo inside of the territorial waters was the possibility that they were getting a very good intercept and needed to move closer to get a better product.

The President: Do you have anything more to report on the men and the equipment.

Secretary McNamara: We have nothing more on this.

Director Helms: There is nothing either way.

General Wheeler: There was a North Korean press message which said that the crew should be tried and punished as criminals.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: We interpret this as their response to our calling up reserves.

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The President: Do we harass Soviet ships?

Secretary McNamara: Yes, they harass us to. This is almost a way of life on the high seas.

The President: Let's be more careful about all of this.

Secretary McNamara: We will reassess the whole thing.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: I thought there was a case of our buzzing a ship in Haiphong Harbor.

Secretary McNamara: That was a photo reconnaissance mission to see if the ship was damaged as alleged.

### III. MILITARY PROPOSALS

Secretary McNamara summarized in handwriting his schedule for aircraft movements. (Attached as Appendix C).

---	Sunday	13
	Monday	16 plus 66 from U. S. S. Ranger
	Tuesday	66
	Wednesday	30
	Thursday	24

--- Two days later, we will send in 18 aircraft from Vietnam. These are 18 aircraft which are being replaced and will not be sent from Vietnam until their replacements arrive in Vietnam.

The 26 B-52's will bring the total to 347 aircraft including those aboard the U. S. S. Enterprise. We would like a decision on this whole matter today.

This action will leak. We will try to hold it as tightly as possible, but when men and units begin to move the press gets wind of it.

Secretary McNamara reviewed with George Christian the proposed answers to questions concerning the aircraft movements. The President approved the answers. (Attached as Appendix D).

Secretary McNamara: We would like to alert the units today for movement.

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The President: Is this what you want now General Wheeler?

General Wheeler: Yes sir.

The President: Does State agree with this?

Under Secretary Katzenbach: Yes we do.

The President: Clark, do you agree with this?

Clark Clifford: I have no objection.

The President: What do we say now to the Congress?

Secretary McNamara: Mr. President you have before you a list of authority which we would like to require from the Congress in relation to the Pueblo incident. These are as follows:

1. Authorize the extension of all enlistments, appointments, periods of active duty, and other periods of obligated service of Regular and Reserve members of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force.

Reason required - Extension of tours of duty involuntarily is the quickest way to achieve any needed expansion of force strength. Such extension will add 2200 trained personnel per day. This can be authorized by Joint Resolution.

2. Authorize the call of all individual Reservists.

Reason required - Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1967, authorizes the President to order units of the ready Reserve of an armed force to active duty. Authority to call individuals from units is required in order to fill gaps in units on active duty with personnel possessing special skills. Moreover, extension of tours of those presently on active duty would be inequitable unless individual Reservists are subject to call. This, too, can be accomplished by Joint Resolution.

3. Expand South Korean military assistance program by \$100,000,000.

Reason required - The MAP request for Fiscal Year 1968 was cut 40%. This made it impossible to expand the military assistance given to South Korea, although such expansion is warranted in view of their troop contribution in South Vietnam and the increased level of harassment by North Korean

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forces. A supplemental appropriation under the Foreign Assistance Act will permit the funding of destroyers, helicopters and artillery and facilities needed for counter-infiltration purposes, and the necessary modernization to increase the defense capabilities of ROK aircraft, vehicles, anti-aircraft equipment and patrol craft. In addition, it will fund the required increase in ammunition levels.

The President: How many times have we authorized the extension of enlistments and periods of active duty?

Secretary McNamara: Many times.

The President: Get me the number of times we have done it and the reasons for each.

Secretary McNamara: We will do that.

The President: We can only call units now?

Secretary McNamara: This is correct. We can only call units. This request would permit the authority to call individuals from units in order to fill any gaps in units on active duty with personnel possessing special skills.

The President: How many men does this affect?

Secretary McNamara: Roughly 150,000.

The President: How much was cut from the military assistance program?

Secretary McNamara: The Fiscal Year 1968 request was cut 40%.

The President: Nick (Under Secretary Katzenbach) how do we get an expression from the Congress on what our policy should be in regard to Korea? George (George Christian) we must make certain that in the future we notify the Congress before the press announcement is made. There are a few people who are mad because they were not advised of the call up action yesterday.

Secretary McNamara: Mendel Rivers is mad.

The President: Mansfield is also bellyaching about it.

Secretary McNamara: I called Mansfield.

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Under Secretary Katzenbach: If you go all the way down the road you need nothing short of a Tonkin Resolution.

The President: The Tonkin Resolution wasn't very effective. Fulbright is against a resolution of any kind. We should discretely show the Congress copies of the mutual security acts between North Korea and the Soviets. I thought we should have had a resolution on the Israel situation. We have a new ball game with the Foreign Relations Committee.

Let's do what we can to bring them along a little bit.

Let's give some thought to how we can get Congress in on it.

We need more than a toast --- that is all we have on the Israel situation. If they (the Congress) murder us on Vietnam with all those facts including SEATO and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, what are we going to do in a situation like this.

Secretary McNamara: I agree. We need strong Congressional support.

The President: I have always tried to put Congress in on the take-off as well as on the landing. If the Dominican Republic means nothing, if the Tonkin Gulf means nothing, what do we do here. We do not want to exercise power and authority without the support and approval of the Congress.

Let's discuss with Senator Fulbright and Senator Russell what ways we should approach this matter.

At some point we are going to be called upon to put up or shut up. I want Secretary McNamara to set up a meeting with Senator Russell and take Buzz (General Wheeler) along with you. Nick (Under Secretary Katzenbach) you do the same with Senator Fulbright and Senator Mansfield. Also I want you (General Wheeler) to get General Goodpaster to go over this with President Eisenhower.

Get him to ask Ike what is our best constitutional way to proceed.

Paul, (Secretary Nitze) Do you have any thoughts on this?

Secretary Nitze: The key here is Senator Fulbright. He wants to put the Executive Branch in a position where they cannot make a move without

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the approval of his Committee.

The President: Bromley, (Bromley Smith) get me the dates and exactly what we did in the situations leading up to the Dominican Republic and the Tonkin Gulf. Get them to me right away.

Now let us address ourselves to the question of what we do if diplomacy fails.

Walt Rostow: We really cannot do that until we see what happens in the United Nations. In addition we need to get a read-out on photo reconnaissance.

The President: I want you to get your very best dreamers on this right away. Are there no economic sanctions we can take?

Walt Rostow: We will set up a special task force on this.

The President: Get your very best people working on this.

Secretary McNamara: Mr. President, we should remind you of something we pointed out before the President entered. It would not be appropriate to take any military action in less than seven days because of the need to get our units there and get them combat effective.

The President: We also should keep in close touch with the Korean Embassy. Park may be about to blow something and we would be involved.

The President: What about a television address to the Nation?

George Christian: The point of concern is that the President has said nothing publicly on this matter, although I would not recommend any television now, I would think the President might want to consider dropping something into a speech.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: We must remember that Goldberg is coming up on television for the next two or three days, so there will be plenty of Administration talk.

The President: I want you to give Rusk and Goldberg an outline of what to say in their speeches. All of you remember that we brought those Russian ships in a while back. They paid \$60 fine and were freed. Our ship, the Pueblo, was not in Korean territorial waters. We had no time to do anything to prevent it from being towed in in the one-and-a-half hour period. Let's be

prepared to answer every question that is being raised by people like Time Magazine and answer them factually.

George Christian: One of the principal questions was why the ship was not protected.

The President: This is simple. We cannot provide an Armada over every ship we have. The Russians do not have their ships protected.

George Christian: Another question they are raising is why there was not more air power in Korea.

Secretary McNamara: We do not have planes assigned to protect these types of ships. This is an advantage that the initiator had. They also had MIGS overhead.

General Wheeler: We could pick up six Trawlers off our shores today if we wish. They don't protect their ships. This type of thing goes on all the time.

Clark Clifford: If these ships were covered by air, their effectiveness would be reduced substantially.

Walt Rostow: There are probably 50 incidents of harassment each year.

Secretary McNamara: The Pueblo would have been much more prepared if he had been inside territorial waters. The fact that he was unprepared reinforces the fact that he was outside territorial waters in international territory.

The President: All of you should meet regularly and get as well organized in this situation as we were in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Get your best people working on this. Let's not have us charged with failure to deal with the situation properly.

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MR. PRESIDENT:

The United States has requested this meeting, as I stated in my letter to you, to consider the grave threat to peace which the authorities of North Korea have brought about by their increasingly dangerous and aggressive military actions in violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement of 1953, of the United Nations Charter, and of international law.

We have asked that the Council be convened at an hour when peace is in serious and imminent danger -- <sup>when</sup> from firm and forthwith action is required to avert that danger and preserve peace.

A virtually unarmed vessel of the United States Navy, sailing on the high seas, has been wantonly and lawlessly seized by armed North Korean patrol boats and her crew forcibly detained. This warlike action carries a danger to peace which should be obvious to all.

A party of armed raiders, infiltrated from North Korea, has been intercepted in the act of <sup>PARACHUTING</sup> ~~invading~~ the South Korean capital city of Seoul with the admitted assignment of assassinating

the President of the republic of Korea, This event marks the climax of a campaign by the North Korean authorities, over the past 18 months, of steadily growing infiltration, sabotage and terrorism <sup>IN</sup> and flagrant violations of the Korean armistice agreement.

Mr. President, these two lines of action are manifestly parallel. Both stem from North Korea. Both are completely unwarranted and unjustified. Both are aimed against peace and security in Korea. Both violate the United Nations Charter, solemn international agreements, and time-honored international law. And both pose a grave threat to peace in a country whose long search for peace and reunification in freedom has been an historic concern to the United Nations and of my country.

We bring these grave developments to the attention of the Security Council in the sincere hope that the Council will act promptly to remove the danger to international peace and security. For, Mr. President, it must be removed and without delay. And it will be removed only if action is taken forthwith to ~~secure~~ secure the release of the USS Pueblo and its 83-man crew and to bring to an end the pattern of armed transgressions by North Korea against the Republic of Korea. My government has stated at the highest level our earnest desire to settle this matter promptly and, if at all possible, by ~~the~~ diplomatic means.

It is testimony to this desire that, in fidelity to the Charter, my government has brought this matter to the Security Council which has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security - and which, together with other organs of the UN, has a special and historic concern for peace and security in Korea.

It is imperative therefore that, the Security Council act with the greatest urgency and decisiveness. The existing situation cannot be allowed to stand. It must be corrected, and the Council must face its responsibility to see it corrected. This course is far preferable to other remedies which the Charter preserves to Member States.



Let me now turn to the facts concerning these two aspects of North Korean aggressive conduct on which the Council's action is required.

At \_\_\_\_\_ a.m. Korean time, on January 23, the USS Pueblo, manned by a crew of 6 officers, 75 enlisted men, and two civilians, and sailing in international waters off the North Korean coast, was confronted by a heavily armed North Korean patrol boat, identified as "submarine chaser No. 35". The Pueblo had been in the same general area for 10 days, pursuing the same course and mission previously followed by other United States vessels over many months, and always under active surveillance by North Korean authorities. Similar activities during the same period, and up to this very moment, have been carried on by vessels of the Soviet Union in similar proximity to the coast of South Korea.

At 12:00 noon on January 23 (Korean time), the United States ship Pueblo, manned by a crew of 6 officers, 75 enlisted men and 2 civilians, and sailing in international waters off the North Korean coast, was confronted by a heavily armed North Korean patrol boat identified as "Submarine Chaser #35". The strict instructions under which the Pueblo was operating required it to stay at least 13 nautical miles from the North Korean coast. While my country adheres to the 3-mile rule of international law concerning territorial waters, nevertheless the ship was under orders to stay well clear of the 12-mile limit which the North Korean authorities have by long practice followed.

The USS Pueblo reported this encounter and its location at the time in the following words: "USS Pueblo encountered one SO- / Class North Korean patrol craft at 03:00 zebra" (that is at 12:00 noon Korean time). "Position 39-25.2 N 127-55.0 E DIW" (I might explain that DIW means "dead in water", the standard navy terminology meaning that all engines are stopped and the vessel was stationary). The exact location of the Pueblo as given in these coordinates is as shown on this map at this spot approximately 25 nautical miles from the port of Wonsan, 16.3 nautical miles from the

nearest point of the North Korean mainland on the Peninsula of Hodopando and 15.3 nautical miles from the Island of Ung-Do.

At exactly the same time the North Korean Submarine Chaser #35 which intercepted the Pueblo reported its location at 39 degrees, 25 minutes, North and 127 degrees, 56 minutes, East. These two reported positions are within a mile of one another and both show conclusively that the Pueblo was in international waters. The report by the North Korean craft of its location, made by international Morse Code, was followed ten minutes later by the following oral message from the craft to its base: "We have approached the target here, the name of the target is GER 1-2." (I interject here that the proper designation of the ship was AGER II, and that this name was painted on the side of the ship. Presumably because of language or distance difficulties it was incorrectly reported.) The message continued "Get it? GER 1-2 -- Did you get it? So our control target is GER 1-2. I will send it again. Our control target is GER 1-2."

Inasmuch as the location of the Pueblo has been a matter of serious dispute it is important to the Council to know that the information available to the United States and to the North Korean authorities was virtually identical, and that the Pueblo when first confronted was in international waters both

by United States and North Korean reports.

The North Korean patrol boat having made its approach, used international flag signals to request the Pueblo's nationality. The Pueblo, replying with the same signal system, identified herself as a United States vessel. The North Korean vessel then signaled: "heave to or I will open fire on you." The Pueblo replied: "I am in international waters."

This reply was not challenged by the North Korean vessel.

However, that vessel then proceeded for approximately an hour to circle the Pueblo, which maintained its course and kept its distance from the shore. At that point three additional North Korean armed vessels appeared, one of which ordered the Pueblo: "Follow in my wake." As this order was issued, the four North Korean vessels closed in on the Pueblo, and surrounded it, attempting to prevent any maneuvering on its part. At the same time two MIG aircraft appeared overhead and circled the Pueblo. The Pueblo attempted peacefully to withdraw from this encirclement, but was forcibly prevented from doing so and brought to a dead stop. It was then seized by an armed boarding party and was forced into the North Korean port of Wonsan.

Reports from the North Korean naval vessels on their location and on their seizure of the Pueblo at this point show that the Pueblo was constantly in international waters.

The Pueblo itself sent an SOS at 1:45 Korean time, at which time it expected to be boarded; it reported its position as 127-54.3 East and 39-25 North.

At 1:50, just 5 minutes later, North Korean vessels reported their position at 39-23N 128-02E or about 21.3 miles from the nearest North Korean land. This is the point on the map here.

This map also shows the points of location of the main ships involved - the Pueblo and the SO-1 - at various times during the encounter. You will see that the location of the Pueblo was constantly far away from Korean shores until it was taken into the Bay by the North Korean vessels. The locations of the Pueblo are shown on this blue line, and of the SO-1 #35 on the red line.



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Mr. President, it is incontrovertible in the light of this evidence from the North Koreans themselves, that the Pueblo, when first approached and when seized, was in international waters, well beyond the 12-mile limit; and that the North Koreans knew this.

I turn now to the second category of offensive action taken by the North Korean authorities: Their systematic campaign of sabotage and terrorism across the armistice demarcation line in gross violation of the Armistice Agreement. In many cases these acts have perpetrated deep in the territory of the Republic of Korea -- culminating in their recent raid on the capital city of Seoul.

The background of this campaign is already known to the Security Council. Last November 2 I conveyed to the Council a report from the United Nations Command in Korea summing up the evidence of a drastic increase in violations by North Korea of the Military Armistice Agreement and subsequent agreements pertaining thereto. This report noted that the number of <sup>SIGNIFICANT</sup> incidents involving armed infiltrators from North Korea have increased from 50 in 1966 to 543 in the first ten months of 1967; and that the number of soldiers and civilians killed by these infiltrators had increased from 35 in 1966 to 144 in the same period of 1967. The report further pointed out that, although North Korea had refused <sup>VIRTUALLY</sup> all requests by the United Nations Command for investigation of these incidents by Joint Observer Teams pursuant to the Armistice Agreement, the

evidence that the attacks had been mounted from North Korea was incontrovertible.

This terrorist campaign, Mr. President, has now reached a new level of outrage. Last Sunday, January 21, security forces of the Republic of Korea made contact with a group of some 30 armed North Koreans near the Presidential Palace in Seoul. In a series of engagements both in Seoul and between Seoul and the demilitarized zone, lasting through January 24, about half of this group were killed and two captured. The prisoners have stated that the infiltration team totalled 31 agents all with the rank of Lieutenant or higher dispatched from the 124th North Korean

Army unit; that these agents had received two years' training, including two weeks of training for the present mission, in special camps established in North Korea for this purpose; and that their assigned mission included the assassination of the President of the Republic of Korea. ~~Equipment captured from the same terrorist group include a Model PPS-43 (automatic rifle?) and four Model TT-33 semi-automatic pistols all of which are manufactured in the Soviet Union.~~

I might add, Mr. President, that the North Korean authorities make no secret of the political strategy and motivation behind these attacks. Their daily propaganda vilifies the Government of the Republic of Korea as an outlaw regime with no right to exist. They remain completely silent about North Korea's solemn obligations under the Armistice Agreement, but if that Agreement had never been written and as if North Korea had a perfect license to settle accounts with South Korea by any means it deems fit. <sup>Quote</sup> (USBIS if available)

Mr. President, it is obvious that this long series of attacks by North Korean infiltrators across the demilitarized zone-- and by other groups which, traveling by sea, have penetrated into even the southern

portions of South Korea - have steadily increased and in its tempo and its scope -- until it threatens to undermine the whole structure of the Armistice under which peace has been preserved in a divided Korea for 14 years.

In the interest of international peace and security, this deterioration cannot be allowed to continue. It must be reversed promptly. The Armistice Agreement<sup>173</sup> must be restored to ~~their~~ full vigor and the weight of the influence of the Security Council must be exerted to this vitally important end.

Mr. President, such are the stark facts of this threat to peace created by North Korea's provocative action on sea and land. With all earnestness I appeal to the Security Council to act firmly and swiftly to reduce and end this dangerous situation. My government knows well the need to avoid rashness and the value and necessity of restraint. Indeed, we have practiced, and do still practice, great restraint in this matter. We seek to give the proper processes of peaceful action all possible scope, and

and we believe those processes can work swiftly and effectively, if the members of this Council and of the international community so will it.

But, Mr. President, these peaceful processes must work. The present situation is not acceptable and it cannot be left to drift. This great and potent organization of peace must not let the cause of peace in Korea be lost by default to the high-handed tactics of a lawless regime. Such a course would be an invitation to catastrophe.

Therefore, let the Security Council with its great influence, promptly and effectively help to secure forthwith the safe return of the Pueblo and her crew; and to restore to full vigor and effectiveness the Korean armistice Agreement.

Fellow members of the Security Council, we have a clear and urgent responsibility under the Charter to help keep the peace. I trust the Council will discharge this responsibility.

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APPENDIX B

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONTROL: 6546Q

RECEIVED: JAN 26, 1968  
8:46 a.m.

00 RUENC  
DE RUENCR 2585FD 0261205  
ZNY TTTT  
O 251152Z JAN 68  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7588  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-145

By ju, NARA, Date 8-12-92

NODIS

REF: STATE 104325; MOSCOW 2579

1. I DELIVERED TO GROMYKO PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO KOSYGIN AT 12:45 TODAY. AFTER READING MESSAGE, GROMYKO ASKED ME IF I HAD ANYTHING TO SAY ORALLY. I REPLIED I HAD NOTHING TO ADD TO WHAT I HAD SAID IN MY CONVERSATIONS WITH KUZNETSOV, ABOUT WHICH I ASSUMED GROMYKO WAS INFORMED.

PAGE 2 RUENCR 2585FD ~~TOP SECRET~~

2. GROMYKO SAID HE WOULD, OF COURSE, TRANSMIT MESSAGE TO ADDRESSEE, AND SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNMENT WOULD BE INFORMED OF ITS CONTENTS. BY WAY OF PRELIMINARY COMMENT, HOWEVER, HE SAID HE HOPED US GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE SOBER POSITION IN THIS MATTER AND NOT SUCCEED TO MOMENTARY SENTIMENTS WHICH, AS ALSO INDICATED IN PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, NOW EVIDENT IN US. SITUATION, FACTS AS WELL AS CONSEQUENCES, SHOULD BE WEIGHED VERY CAREFULLY. HE SAID THAT FOR OBVIOUS REASONS HE DID NOT WISH TO DISCUSS AT THIS TIME POSSIBLE SOVIET ANSWER TO MESSAGE.

3. STRESSING THAT HE WAS NOW SPEAKING OUTSIDE CONTEXT HIS PRELIMINARY REMARKS, GROMYKO EXPRESSED DEEP REGRET US VESSELS TOOK SUCH LIBERTIES. ASSERTED US MILITARY COMMAND APPARENTLY SEES NOTHING WRONG IN US VESSELS COMING CLOSE TO SHORES, CITIES, AND INSTALLATIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. US MILITARY COMMAND SEEMS TO BE IN HABIT OF DISREGARDING INTERESTS OTHER STATES. FOR EXAMPLE, SOVIETS HAD SENT NUMEROUS NOTES TO US CONTAINING SPECIFIC DATA ABOUT LOCATION, TIME, AND IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS US AIRCRAFT WHICH HAD BUZZED SOVIET SHIPS BUT IN EACH

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-2- MOSCOW 2585 Jan 26

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CASE US GAVE STANDARD REPLY THAT SOVIET INFORMATION NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH FACTS. THIS REDUCED GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS TO LEVEL WHERE THEY COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS SERIOUS.

4. REPEATING I HAD LITTLE TO ADD TO WHAT I HAD TOLD KUZNETSOV, I POINTED OUT US CONCERNED ABOUT PATTERN OF INCIDENTS ALONG DMZ IN KOREA, WITH LATEST SUCH INCIDENT HAVING BEEN INFILTRATION 31 NORTH KOREAN AGENTS INTO SOUTH KOREA. COMING ON TOP OF THIS, PUEBLO INCIDENT COULD NOT BUT ADD TO SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE VIEWED SITUATION.

5. GROMYKO ASSERTED OTHER SIDE HAD INFORMATION AND FACTS RE INFILTRATION OF AGENTS IN KOREA WHICH WERE OF ENTIRELY OPPOSIT NATURE, BUT HE DID NOT WISH DWELL ON THIS. HE CONCLUDED BY STATING PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WOULD BE STUDIED AND REPLY CONVEYED TO US IN DUE COURSE.

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6. IN RESPONSE MY QUESTION WHEN KOSYGIN DUE BACK FROM INDIA, GROMYKO SAID KOSYGIN WOULD BE IN INDIA ANOTHER TWO OR THREE DAYS AND MIGHT STOP FOR DAY OR TWO IN AFGHANISTAN ON HIS WAY BACK.

GP-1. THOMPSON

~~TOP SECRET~~

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APPENDIX C

Statement of Combat Aircraft in Korea following Pueblo Incident						
Decision Date	From	Date	Arrival "Korea"	Unit	Aircraft Type No.	"Daily" Limitation Increment Total
-	Japan	1/23	1/23	Enterprise	F4B 24 A4E 23 A4A 12 RASC 6	73 73 -
-	Oke.	1/23	1/23	Air Force	F105 12 RF4C 3	15 88
1/26	Phil.	1/28	1/28	64 F1 Sq.	F102 13	13 101
"	Oke	1/29	1/29	12 TFS	F105 12	
"	Japan	1/29	1/29	80 TFS	F105 4	16 117
"	Viet.	1/29	1/29	Ranger	F4B 24 A4C 11 A7A 14 A6A 12 RASC 5	66 183
"	US	1/28	1/30	4537 CCTS	F105 6	
"	US	1/28	1/30	336 TFS	F4 24	
"	Oke	1/30	1/30	15 TRS	RF4C 11	
"	Oke	1/30	1/30	82 F1 Sq.	F102 25	66 249
"	US	1/29	1/31	335 TFS	F4 24	
"	US	1/29	1/31	19 TENS	EBLL 6	30 279
"	US	1/31	2/1	334 TFS	-F4 24	24 303
"	US	1/31	2/3 (Viet)	355 TFS	F100 18	
"	Viet.	2/4	2/4	Air Force	F4 18	18 321
"	US	2/3	2/5 (Comm)	Air Force	B5V 15	15 336
"	US	2/3	2/6 (Comm)	Air Force	B5V 11	11 347

Killing Hawk

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A. PENDIX D

SERVICE SET

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Question: I understand that the 457th Tactical Fighter Squadron At George Air Force Base, California, has been alerted for movement to Korea. Is this true?

Answer: As we have said, the United States is taking certain precautionary measures to strengthen our forces and to reinforce our tactical air capabilities for the current situation. Certain units have been alerted for possible movement. For reasons of military security, we will not discuss the identity of any unit which has been alerted, the number of units which have been alerted, their bases or any details concerning their possible deployment.

Question: Air Force officers at Langley say that their squadron was alerted 48 hours ago and has now been ordered to Korea. They are selling their cars and we know that they are leaving tomorrow. How many other units are moving?

Same Answer.

Question: That's ridiculous. The enemy can read the papers and listen to the radio as well as we can. The movements are breaking from a dozen different bases. The only people being denied the facts are the American people. The people have a right to know whether you are leading us into another war in Asia or not.

Answer: We have said that we are taking precautionary measures to strengthen our forces and to reinforce our tactical air capabilities for this situation. To confirm or deny each report or news story of a possible alert or movement would be to give out information of military value. We do not intend to do this.