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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#57a notes	Notes from 2/11/68 - 4:30 p.m. Senior Foreign Policy Advisors meeting with Rusk, McNamara, Wheeler, Clifford, Taylor [Sanitized NLJ 83-13] Secret 11 pp. <i>open NLJ 92-142 10-5-99</i>	2/11/68	A
#57d draft	Cable draft for Vance from Rusk <i>open 2-9-00 NLJ 99-299</i> Secret 3 pp. <i>exempt 8-19-92 NLJ 92-145</i>	undated	A
#57e cable	Deptel 110828 to Seoul <i>open 2-9-00 NLJ 99-299</i> Secret 3 pp. <i>exempt 8-19-92 NLJ 92-145</i>	2/6/68	A

FILE LOCATION

Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Box 2

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FEBRUARY 11, 1968 - 4:30 p.m.

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SENIOR FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS

Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
General Wheeler
Clark Clifford

General Taylor
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
Tom Johnson

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 12, 1968
2:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Tom Johnson

Attached are notes of the President's meeting with Foreign Policy Advisers on Sunday, February 11, 1968. The meeting began at 4:30 and ended at 6:00 p.m. It was held in the Cabinet Room.

The following were in attendance:

The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
General Wheeler
Clark Clifford
General Taylor
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
Tom Johnson

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NOTES ON THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH SENIOR FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1968

THOSE ATTENDING WERE:

The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
General Wheeler
Clark Clifford
General Taylor
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
Tom Johnson

The group reviewed the instructions sent to Cy Vance in South Korea.
(Attachment A).

The President: Do you think these instructions are sufficient?

Secretary Rusk: I think they are good.

Clark Clifford: They are firm and tough. They are what is needed.

Secretary McNamara: Very good.

The President: Is there anything new on the Pueblo?

CIA Director Helms: They moved the Pueblo into a new position in
the harbor. (Showed a chart.)

General Wheeler: That is a damn good cable to Cy Vance.

Secretary Rusk: We are meeting again at Panmunjom. We proposed
February 12. North Korea proposed February 14. We will compromise
on Tuesday, February 13.

General Taylor: That is a good cable to Vance.

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NLJ 92-142

By cb, NARA Date 9-10-99

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The President: South Korea is putting great pressure on Park.

Secretary Rusk: In hindsight,, I think we should have told the Korean Prime Minister and the Defense Minister more about what we were telling Park secretly. I think Park has a case of the jitters.

The President: Reviewed General Westmoreland's wire of February 9. (Attachment B).

Secretary McNamara: General Wheeler will discuss Westmoreland's wire and the current situation in Vietnam.

General Wheeler:

--- Very little went on yesterday in Vietnam.

--- There were some small actions around Khe Sanh.

--- More people were evacuated from Khe Sanh.

--- A defector was picked up. He said the plan of attack was first to hit Long Vie; then to hit Con Thien; then to hit Khe Sanh at a later time.

--- We had a report of Frog Missiles being mounted on the front of enemy tanks. These missiles are similar to our Honest John. They carry an 800 pound warhead. These could pose problems.

--- In Hue there is still fighting in the Citadel area. We hope to clean this up within a couple of days. The outskirts of the city are clear.

--- In Da Nang, there has been a hell of a scrap. Units of the NVA are leaving.

--- At Dalat there is continued sniping. The situation is in hand.

--- Saigon fighting continues in Cholon. There was an attempted attack on Tan Son Nhut airport last night. Over 170 weapons were captured and 100 enemy left dead.

--- In IV Corps there is some skirmishing around the towns.

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The Joint Chiefs are looking at the entire situation. On Friday we had not seen the Westmoreland cable. His cable put a different light on the situation we discussed at the Friday morning meeting with the President. As you will recall, on Thursday I sent Westmoreland a cable that we had discussed additional materiel but he had said nothing about additional troops. The next day Westmoreland said that he could find use for additional troops like the 82nd and some Marine units. I talked to him again on Friday morning. He said he was then dictating a cable on the current situation. This cable came in Friday afternoon. I had DePuy go over the cable thoroughly to see what it means. The key paragraph says "needless to say I would welcome reinforcements if they became available." He said he would use these reinforcements to do three things:

1. To contain the enemy offensive in the two northern provinces of I Corps.
2. To carry out his 1968 campaign plan.
3. To offset a weakened Vietnam armed forces.

The Joint Chiefs feel that we have taken several hard knocks. The situation can get worse. We do not know the ability of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong to recycle and come back to attack. We know that the enemy committed virtually all of its Viet Cong units to these most recent actions. There have been heavy casualties inflicted.

We do not know what the ability of the ARVN is to withstand recycled attacks.

Secretary McNamara: I have doubts about the ARVN strength but many of them have returned after the Tet Holidays to bring the units back up in capability.

The President: What I am interested in is that line in the Westmoreland cable "shortage of strength in the ARVN units."

General Wheeler: The ARVN are getting the men back to their units.

Walt Rostow: What about the RF and PF units.

General Wheeler: We do not know what the situation is on these units.

The President: As I see it, you have concluded that neither Bob's plan or the JCS plan is workable now, and that we should look at this whole situation tomorrow.

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General Wheeler: That is correct.

Secretary McNamara: Yes, we will talk about this tomorrow.

The President: What about the supply situation and the need for more helicopters?

Secretary McNamara: We are examining the helicopter production schedules. We are in good shape with fixed wing aircraft.

The President: What about Khe Sanh?

General Wheeler: The supplies at Khe Sanh are very adequate. There is plenty of anti-tank ammo and they have used Coraform only once. We may move more C-130's in temporarily.

General Wheeler: The President may want to consider sending a small JCS staff group of intelligence, operations, and logistical advisers either with me to come back with a first-hand report of the situation. I have never found any substitute for getting first hand information.

The President: First let's see what we can do with Cy Vance. If Westmoreland really does not need additional troops, let's don't plan any troops on the basis of what we have.

General Wheeler: The situation could deteriorate. The Joint Chiefs today do not feel the President should undertake the emergency actions we proposed on Friday. Of course this situation could change.

The President: Let's meet tomorrow and see what happens.

Secretary Rusk: Should we plan on Cy Vance going on to Vietnam.

The President: Yes.

Does it concern anybody about those two divisions outside of Saigon?

General Wheeler: General Westmoreland thinks the situation is in hand.

Secretary McNamara: It is not the two divisions that I am worried about. They may be recycling to undertake a second wave. The Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese may have the ability for a strong second attack.

The President: How many enemy do you estimate are available for new attacks.

Secretary McNamara: At least 60,000.

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The President: Do you think they will bomb Khe Sanh.

General Wheeler: They may do one of three things:

1. Surprise us with the Frog Missiles.
2. Use MIG's and SA-2's to come south of the DMZ and try to shoot down the B-52's.
3. Use the IL-28 bombers to attack us in the South.

The President: I want to be completely clear in my mind. Is it true that General Westmoreland is not recommending or requesting additional troops now?

General Wheeler: That is true.

Secretary McNamara: That is my reading of it.

The President: Is it your judgment not to send additional troops today?

General Wheeler: Yes sir.

Secretary McNamara: Yes, that is my judgment.

Clark Clifford: How prepared are we for the second wave of attacks?

General Wheeler: The question is this. Is the government strong enough to withstand another wave of attacks. That I cannot say. Physically we are better prepared. The element of surprise is removed.

The President: What about the extent of desertions and the men on leave?

General Wheeler: We have nothing firm on desertions and on the number of men who have returned from leave.

The President: So you really don't know the state of readiness.

General Wheeler: The only ARVN reported as non-effective are the 5 airborne battalions which were shot down in the heavy fighting around Hue.

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Walt Rostow: I think we should be giving considerable attention to what is happening in the countryside. The RD Cadres moved to the cities as did the Viet Cong.

If the Viet Cong go back into the countryside they may be able to make very quick recruitment drives.

If we have a diplomatic offensive, it would be very bad for the Viet Cong to control more of the countryside than they did before this offensive. It would be good to find out what the RF and the PF are doing. We also need to determine how quickly the ARVN can get back into the countryside to take over that which was previously held. I expect a diplomatic push to pressure us to negotiate.

General Taylor: I am out of tune with this meeting. I read General Westmoreland's cable differently from you.

As I read it, Westmoreland's forces are tied down. He has no reserves except some units of the 101st. The offensive in the north is against him. The enemy has 35,000 men already in the area. Westmoreland does not say anything about how he would get reserves if he were to be met with a massive engagement there. It looks to me as if he is operating on a shoestring. I still feel we do not need to do anything today. But I strongly recommend sending General Wheeler out there to get information first hand.

Clark Clifford: Would it be unusual for General Wheeler to go out there? Have you been before recently on a mission of this type?

General Wheeler: I have been out there fourteen times.

General Taylor: It is a natural military mission.

Secretary Rusk: I do not think it unwise for Wheeler to go. I must say if General Westmoreland is requesting troops in this cable he has a poor Colonel doing the drafting for him.

General Wheeler: We are not without reserves, General Taylor. He does have the First Cavalry Division up there. There are ARVN forces not committed. They are some Marines not committed.

General Taylor: What about the logistics of the situation.

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General Wheeler: Westmoreland told me that he must get that road up. In bad weather he would have need of secure land loc. Water loc is not good this time of year.

The President: From my station, it looks as though we felt content with what was happening until the fire crackers started popping. We talked to General Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs on Friday and they felt we should send the 82nd Division and 6/9 of a Marine division.

Bob McNamara countered by saying we could pick up 12 battalions without using the 82nd by putting 4 battalions in South Vietnam and the others off the coast. LST's and in Okinawa.

Westmoreland's wire came in. I interpret it as a man who wanted 600,000 troops last year and was talked down to 525,000. Now he is saying he could use the 82nd and the portion of a Marine division because of all of the uncertainties which face him. He is concerned about the effective fighting capabilities of the ARVN.

I think we should send anything available to get the number up to the 525,000 limit. We should live up to our commitment. "Just before the battle Mother" the JCS is now recommending against deploying emergency troop units.

General Wheeler: At this time yes sir.

The President: If the Joint Chiefs feel secure, if Secretary McNamara feels secure and if General Westmoreland doesn't ask for them, I don't feel so worried.

Secretary McNamara: I do not feel secure. But I do think it is not a shortage of U. S. battalions at issue. It is the stability of the political structure in Vietnam and a lack of motivation by the ARVN and the PF and RF.

The President: But when they are unable to do the job and when we are in a fight to the finish, then don't you think we should give the troops as they are necessary?

Secretary McNamara: Emergency augmentation is not required. We could redeploy forces already in Vietnam such as those that are operating in the Delta.

The President: If Westmoreland asks for the 82nd Division would you give them.

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Secretary McNamara: No, I would not. I read this as a permanent augmentation to forces. We are carrying too much of the war there now. All this would do is to shift more of the burden on us. There is no reason to have those battalions in the Delta.

Secretary Rusk: I do not believe that the deployment of additional forces would have the same effect on deployment as would the placement of 525,000 fresh forces. There may be reasons to redeploy some of the U. S. forces there.

There are no current responsibilities between ourselves and the Vietnamese. We are spread out all over the country. There are none of the advantages of a concentration of forces. I do not think we are really getting the full benefit of our 500,000 U. S. Troops there now.

General Taylor: We may want to provide General Westmoreland with new strategic guidance. Let us not fight this war on the enemy's terms. We need to do what we should to get reserves and wait for favorable weather.

The President: Who deployed the U. S. troops in the Delta.

General Wheeler: This was part of General Westmoreland's battle plans submitted last year.

General Taylor: I think that it may be necessary now to outline our objectives. We should ask General Westmoreland to get set for a major offensive in a particular area when the weather breaks.

The President: I would be glad to get from you any suggestions on re-deployment or any other strategic advice.

Secretary Rusk: I tend to expect Westmoreland and our troops to do everything all at once. I think we need to get clearly in mind what our priorities are.

General Taylor: I think our objective should be to clear the cities first and to recruit forces there to put in reserve.

Clark Clifford: How many men of the 525,000 do we have out there now.

Secretary McNamara: 500,000.

The President: What about a reordering of our priorities at this time.

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Secretary McNamara: Not now while we are in the middle of this.

Secretary Rusk: No I would not recommend it while we are in this situation.

The President: It seems that Westmoreland has inherited this thing by stages. Lets re-evaluate the overall strategy after this is over. The Joint Chiefs and you do not feel that you should recommend deployment of more men at this time? Is that correct?

Secretary McNamara: This is correct.

The President: What about the re-evaluation of supplies.

General Wheeler: The men are satisfied.

The President: Well, it looks like we are generally content with the situation today.

Secretary Rusk: We will meet tomorrow and see how this thing shapes up.

Secretary McNamara: Westmoreland has not asked for troops to avoid defeat. If he does, I recommend deployment of those there.

General Taylor: The function of an overall headquarters is to give strategic guidance. I think we need to give thought to what that new guidance should be.

The President: I am inclined to leave the situation as it is based on your judgments. I think we should tell Westmoreland that if he really isn't asking for more troops and find out if that interpretation is correct. In my mind I think he really wants more troops. I would favor Cy Vance going out there and taking a hard look at all of this.

Secretary McNamara: I would also send Cy there. I think we could send General Wheeler out there if it weren't for this being splattered all over the front page.

General Taylor: I will make one more plea. I think it is important to get a first hand report from General Wheeler after he gets first hand military judgment from his military commanders out there. There is no substitute for that.

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Secretary Rusk: I received excellent response last night to a speech I made to a group of Secondary School Principals.

Director Helms: I am not satisfied on our intelligence on RF, PF and ARVN units. I disagree with Bob McNamara about U. S. units being place with ARVN units. My information is that ARVN fights better with U. S. units around them. The U. S. forces provide the ARVN with the courage they need.

The President: What is the real difference. What makes the North Vietnamese fight so well, with so much more determination than the South Vietnamese.

Director Helms: I think it is a combination of good training and good brain washing. There is a certain heroism about dying for this cause. The North Vietnamese have been damn good fighters for fifteen years. They are well trained, well equipped and well disciplined. Their system eliminates all doubt from their mind.

The President: For a moment let us assume that the ARVN are not doing their part. What is the alternative.

Secretary McNamara: We should not do their job for them. Let them fight it out for themselves.

Secretary Rusk: I think you get better performance when the U. S. troops and the ARVN are billeted together.

The President: Buzz, what is the evaluation of the military effect of this wave.

General Wheeler: There are always pluses and minuses in anything like this. The ARVN has performed and behaved well. No unit defected. They took heavy casualties. Their morale seemed to improve because of the casualties. Destruction has been very bad. Many towns are in shambles and there was one completely flattened.

The President: Are you concerned about the refugees?

General Wheeler: Bob Komer has turned his entire effort into refugee care. Our people are working with the ARVN, sharing food with the Vietnamese and doing all they can.

I think the civilian populace of Vietnam was appalled by the destruction and the cruel, cruel atrocities caused by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. But we are not better off than we were on January 15.

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Secretary McNamara: We need to get the Vietnamese to do more by insisting that they do what they should do. We should refuse to do what they must do. Their Congress has yet to pass a single bill.

The President: Get working on a combined authority by which General Westmoreland would take over responsibility for all allied units and then let's address ourselves to the problem of the Vietnamese. Let's go to work on them. I want them to live up to that decree of drafting 19 year olds.

The President: Should we still not say anything publicly (in the form of a Presidential speech).

General Taylor: We do need to say that there has been a change of strategy on the part of the enemy brought about by losses inflicted on him by the old strategy.

(The issue of the Presidential message was left for consideration at a later time.)

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Meeting With the President
Sunday, February 11, 1968 -- 4:30 p.m.

AGENDA

1. Supplementary Instruction to Mr. Vance. (Sec. Rusk)


Sec. Rusk's draft at Tab A.
2. Response to Gen. Westmoreland's Indication that Troop Reinforcements Would be Helpful. (Sec. McNamara and Gen. Wheeler)
3. Increasing Supply Levels at Khe Sanh. (Sec. McNamara and Gen. Wheeler)

Data at Tab B.
4. Draft Instruction for Emissary to Saigon. (The President)

Draft at Tab C.
5. Other Military Problems. (Sec. McNamara and Gen. Wheeler)
 - Frog missiles?
 - Tanks?
 - Enemy aircraft?
6. What Military Initiatives Can We Undertake? (Sec. McNamara and Gen. Wheeler)
7. Speech.

I shall try to get you before 4:30 an outline of a Presidential speech.
8. Other.

W. W. Rostow



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Amembassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-299
By is, NARA Date 1-27-00

EYES ONLY FOR VANCE FROM RUSK

Please ask Ambassador Porter to show you my NODIS 110828 ^(attached) as back-ground for your talk with President Park.

The views contained therein are a fair reflection of the problems of public and Congressional opinion toward Korea which we would have here if the Koreans themselves are not careful. This type of material should not be used by you as a direct threat from one President to another but it should be used with great force to expose the kinds of problems which our President will face in trying to maintain our support for the Republic of Korea. On that basis, you can be very tough indeed because the problems are real.

If the matter of reduced ROK participation in Viet-Nam comes up, you should not hesitate to point out that that would require a reduced US participation in Korea. A ROK division in Viet-Nam can only be replaced by a US division now in Korea. Further, Viet-Nam is where the battle is, and from a military point of view the problem of infiltration can be handled by the large forces present in South Korea. Of course, if North Korea launches an all-out invasion, that is another ballgame.

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But it is not in our interest, or in the interest of the Republic of Korea, to have another all-out war in Korea. Hence, it is folly for the South Koreans to take steps which would translate an infiltration problem into general hostilities. It's easy to get into such hostilities but very hard to bring them to a successful conclusion.

If President Park attempts to extract commitments which go beyond the terms of our Treaty of Alliance, you should state quite simply that no alteration of that treaty lies within the constitutional power of our President. The treaty stands as agreed and is the primary source of the Republic of Korea's ability to maintain itself as a secure and independent nation. It is elementary, for example, that our President cannot remove the phrase "in accordance with its constitutional processes" from a Treaty of Alliance. We cannot entertain suspicions about the loyalty of the United States to its alliances at a time when we have just lost 900 killed in a ten-day period in Viet-Nam in the course of demonstrating our fidelity.

Your object is to combine an assurance to President Park of our steadiness and seriousness of purpose with an understanding on his side that we, too, have national interests engaged in the safety of his country and in peace in Northeast Asia. We expect from him the same

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degree of cooperation that he expects from us. If we each have internal public problems, which differ somewhat, the point is that our two Presidents should in consultation decide how to proceed in a way to deal with both sets of problems. We cannot give overriding priority to his problems. If, by doing so, we undermine the very basis of US support to the Republic of Korea.

All this means (a) we must maintain our war effort in Vietnam (b) we must use available channels at Panmunjon to free Pueblo and crew (c) we must act together to insure security of Korea (d) we must not take action on our side to convert infiltration problem into a major war if it can be avoided and (e) we must each give leadership in our own countries to press and public opinion in the interest of our common purposes.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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PERSONAL AND EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

As one who has been intimately involved with Korea since the drafting of Japanese surrender terms, I am deeply disturbed by the present atmosphere of our relations. I know that we are dealing with an especially sensitive people, sometimes called the QUOTE Irish of the Far East UNQUOTE. I also am aware of other moments of tension even worse than the one we have today, particularly when I think back to the Syngman Rhee period. I think I understand fully the genuine concerns of the South Koreans even though I get impatient about their super sensitivity.

The one thing which is not tolerable back here is their suspicion about our basic motives and purposes. We have invested over 33,000 battle deaths, 20,000 non-battle

Drafted by:	Dean Rusk:mab 2/6/68	Tel. No.	5171	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:	The Secretary
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S/S - Mr. Read

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NLJ 99-299

By: 142, NARA Date 1-27-00

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deaths, and over 100,000 wounded in the security of an independent Republic of Korea. We have maintained large forces in that country for 17 years. We have invested over six billion dollars (almost half the total Marshall Plan) in economic and military assistance. We have recently massively reinforced our air power in Korea and the immediate adjoining areas. We have carried the banner for Korea in the UN over and over again. You should find ways to make it clear that Korean suspicion against this record is simply incomprehensible to the American people. The danger is that it will be deeply resented back here with potentially disastrous results for both countries.

We do not expect the Republic of Korea to be a satellite of the United States nor do we expect the United States to be a satellite of Korea. We have elementary and basic common interests and the United States has done its full share in supporting these common interests. We expect no less from the Koreans.

I assume that the South Korean press has had its attention called to everything I have said about Korea in my QUOTE Meet the Press UNQUOTE interview. If they got mad because I could not swear in blood what happened to the Pueblo during a ten-day period of radio silence, they must not be angry because I cannot pledge in advance to be a liar. I have no doubt that they have been misled by some of the excessive

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speculation by some American reporters on that particular point. But I thought I hit hard on those subjects of direct interest to the Republic of Korea, including the infiltration and other threats by North Korea during recent weeks and months.

By separate cables we are sending you another letter from the President to Park and answers to other specific questions you have raised.

I would appreciate any further suggestions you have as to what can be done to clarify these matters with key Korean leaders. I have just seen tickers of a backgrounder someone out there apparently held ^{which} ~~was~~ helpful. Keep giving us your best judgment and we will give you our best from this end. With warm regards. END

RUSK

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Harold W. Thomas Johnson



Sunday, February 11, 1968

Following is the text of a cable sent by General Westmoreland this morning.

This is the seventh report on the Khe Sanh area and covers a period of 24-hours ending at midnight last night.

During the reporting period the Khe Sanh combat base and the surrounding area continued to receive sporadic shelling from mortars, rockets and an occasional artillery round. Between 7:17 February 10 and noon February 10 units had brief exchanges of small arms fire and grenades on the western end of the perimeter and western outposts resulting in three enemy killed. At 7:15 February 10 a trip flare exposed 14 enemy just west of Khe Sanh near the wire. An exchange of fire resulted in one enemy killed. At noon February 10 lights were spotted moving between Hills 861 and 881S, and metallic noises were heard. Lights and noises were fired on with unknown results. Tactical air strike runs during the period resulted in four secondary explosions.

Several enemy encroachments toward friendly positions and increasing enemy pressure was noted during the period. Marines in the area continued to improve their defensive positions with emphasis on anti-tank defense. On February 10, 136 mines were emplaced southwest of the airfield. A review of all 106mm recoilless rifle, 3.5 rocket launchers, light-antitank weapon, and tank positions has been conducted to ensure complete coverage of all likely tank approaches.

Latest information received on the Marine C-130 crash which was reported yesterday reveals that the aircraft is believed to have received 50-caliber machine gun fire on its approach. The aircraft was loaded with POL which caught on fire and burned upon landing resulting in two killed and four wounded in critical condition and three missing. Search continues for the missing. During the period a total of 2,985 rounds of various caliber and types of mortar/artillery was fired in response to enemy efforts in the area.


Marine tactical air flew 64 sorties, and the Navy flew 102 missions for a total of 207 sorties. Aside from the tactical strikes mentioned, there were five additional secondary explosions, 14 secondary fires, 42 enemy killed, two bridges damaged, and 193 military structures destroyed.

Weather continues to hamper visual reconnaissance and strikes. There were no sightings of enemy vehicles.

Thirty-eight B-52 aircraft ran six strikes during the period delivering a total 975 tons of ordnance in the Niagara area.

The airfield at Khe Sanh is back in operation following the C-130 crash of yesterday, and received a total of 53 short tons of supplies. The resupplies

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~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

represented four of the five classes, class I, rations, excepted. Unfavorable weather continues to effect air resupply in the northern highlands; however, early sorties were able to land on February 11, without the aid of the ground control facility. Requisitions received from Khe Sanh on the night of February 10 are being scheduled for air delivery or air drop on February 11.

The Khe Sanh dump or ammo supply point status reported as number of days on hand on February 11 is as follows: Class I: Rations, 10 days on hand; Class III: Aviation fuel, 12 days on hand, jet fuel, 4 days on hand; motor fuel, 6 days on hand and diesel fuel, 6 days on hand; Class V: ammunition, 60mm and high explosive, 12 days on hand; 81mm, 17 days on hand; 90mm, 34 days on hand; 4.2 inch shells, 36 days on hand; 105mm, 10 days on hand and 155mm, 25 days on hand. Class V (firecracker). 105 mm, 5 days on hand; 155mm, 5 days on hand; 40mm, 5 days on hand and hand grenades, 10 days on hand. The ammo supply point status of anti-tank ordnance, not including basic loads on position is as follows: 90mm head, 478 rounds; 66mm rocket, 190 rounds; M19 mines, 100 mines and 106mm head, 316 rounds. NOTE: Firecracker ammo is COFRAM.

No COFRAM type ordnance was used during the period.

For the next 24-hour period Marine tactical air plans 44 sorties in support of Khe Sanh, while the Air Force has 76 scheduled and the Navy has 100, for a total of 220 sorties. The Marines will have 16 aircraft on call for additional runs, and the Air Force will have 120 alert sorties on call. Five Arc Light strikes (33 sorties) are scheduled in support of the Khe Sanh area.

The weather for the afternoon of February 10 was marginal and deteriorated to poor after noon EST with zero visibility in fog by 3:00 PM EST, February 10. Weather conditions continued to be poor through the morning of February 11. The forecast for the afternoon of February 11 is for marginal weather conditions. By 8:00 AM EST fog and low clouds will cause poor weather which will last until 10:00 AM EST on the 12th of February. Conditions should improve to marginal with cloud ceilings increasing to 1,200 feet by mid-night February 11.

There is no change in enemy unit identification in the area.

Lao personnel evacuated from Khe Sanh and now located at DaNang for on-shipment to Laos, total 114. Four persons remain to be evacuated on February 11, including the BV-33 battalion commander. Arrangements are underway to transport the Lao personnel to ultimate destination by Lao aircraft.

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You will make an independent assessment of the military and political situation, with special reference to the following.

1. The situation of the ARVN, including the RF and PF.

- How many of the 50% who were on leave during Tet have returned?
- What measures are being taken to assemble the rest?
- With maximum effort, how rapidly could the rest be assembled?
- What is the situation with respect to the RF and PF?

What efforts are being undertaken to reestablish their links with the central government and to insure that they hold a maximum part of the countryside and engage, along with ARVN forces, in exploiting the possible weakness in certain areas of Viet Cong, guerrilla and provincial main force units?

- How soon can Hue and Saigon be thoroughly cleaned up?
- When are the weak corps commanders, divisional commanders, and province chiefs to be removed?
- What is the earliest possible date when they can get through the new provisions for drafting of 18 and 19 year olds?
- In the light of the changed situation, does some redeployment of U.S. forces within South Vietnam make sense? For example, movement of some battalions of the 9th Division out of the Delta make sense?

2. In general, you will convey the view from Washington that the enemy is putting us to the maximum military test of which he is now capable. He may have other surprises for us aside from the scale and weight of the attack on the cities. He may be planning to achieve a situation of maximum advantage and then try to force us into a negotiation on his terms. It therefore seems essential to us that every military and political resource inside South Vietnam be pushed to the limit, not merely to survive his attacks but to present to the enemy and the world a picture of:

- Military initiative with respect to both the cities and the countryside;

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- Political vitality on the part of the government; and
- Maximum political unity between the government and non-Communist political groups.

3. In talking with Thieu and Ky, you should make clear that we wish to see it through at their side. If we are to be permitted to do so by American public opinion, they must move fast to bring their forces back to strength; wherever possible to get the forces ⁱⁿ under direct pressure into an active role to exploit the weakened position of the enemy; to assure that those who did not perform well in the current crisis are promptly replaced; to exploit the present crisis for a ruthless attack on corruption; to reestablish total security in the cities.

The enemy is obviously involved in a do-or-die offensive. He may confront us soon with a diplomatic offensive. No one can do the job for the Vietnamese that must be done in the days ahead. They must do it for themselves. If the Vietnamese can act with political and military vigor, we can stay together and turn the enemy's urban offensive to our advantage.

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