

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#83g memo	Earle Wheeler to Walt Rostow Secret 1 p. <i>open NLS 89-84</i>	3/11/68	A
#83i memo	Earle Wheeler to Sec. of Defense Secret 2 pp. <i>open-Group 4; 5/27/92</i>	3/11/68	A
#83k lists	Program 5 Status <i>open 9-15-93 NLS 92-414</i> Secret 3 pp. <i>Duplicate of #10, Papers of Clark Clifford, SEA Forces [I]</i>	3/9/68	A
#83m report	Document 5 Secret 12 pp. <i>open 8/6/93 NLS 92-376 Duplicate of #10, Papers of Clark Clifford, "SEA Forces [I]"</i>	3/11/68	A

FILE LOCATION

Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Box 2

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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82
MARCH 11, 1968 - 6:57 p.m.

MEETING WITH FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS ON
ADDITIONAL TROOPS FOR VIETNAM

Secretary Rusk (departed before meeting
began)

Secretary Clifford

General Wheeler

General Taylor

Under Secretary Nitze

CIA Director Helms

Walt Rostow

George Christian

Tom Johnson

SERVICE SET

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 12, 1968

12 noon

air 3 up

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Tom Johnson

Attached are the notes of your meeting Monday night in the Cabinet Room on additional troops for Vietnam.

Those who attended were:

Secretary Rusk (departed before meeting actually began)
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
General Taylor
Under Secretary Nitze
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson

The meeting began at 6:57 p.m. The meeting ended at 8:18 p.m.

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Delt 11-8-82

~~MEETING NOTES~~
~~COPYRIGHTED~~

Meeting began: 6:57 p.m.

Meeting ended: 8:18 p.m.

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83a

NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH

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FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS

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March 11, 1968
Cabinet Room

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Authority NLS 83-24
By is, NARS, Date 11-4-83

The President: Dean, we are very proud of you up there today (testifying before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on Vietnam and Foreign Aid).

Secretary Rusk: As you all know, I testify again tomorrow at 9:30 a.m. I do not want to be caught off guard up there tomorrow by anything which you may be discussing here today. Should I leave or stay?

The President: You have had a rough day. Why don't you go on and get rested for tomorrow. You and Clark can get together later to go over what we have discussed.

(The President and the group then reviewed at length the recommendations and answers to questions which are attached).

The President: I see that Westmoreland prefers Alternative Two. (The President then read: "I prefer the second alternative. By providing seven additional maneuver battalions as compared to three in the first alternative, it maximizes my combat firepower ..." -- from General Westmoreland's cable to General Wheeler 11 March 1968).

This would be roughly 30,000 men?

General Wheeler: Yes, sir.

The President: Was Westmoreland limited in this?

General Wheeler: Yes, we told him this was all that we had the capability of providing in this time period. I recommend that we send him these men as soon as we can. Of course, it will be necessary to call up the reserves to do this.

The President: Can we relate this 30,000 to a specific request from General Westmoreland?

General Wheeler: The first increment he asked for out of the 206,000 SERVICE SE was 90,000. But as I said this is all we can provide in this period.

But this does not relate to a specific request from him.

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Secretary Clifford: In this cable, he says that the second alternative is better than the first.

There then was a general discussion of force levels. General Wheeler said that if the President approves the recommendations the total troop level would be brought up to 578,000 including Program 5 (525,000) completion, the elements of the 82nd airborne and Marine RLT already sent, along with the new troops.

The President: I do not want to be having a seminar on strategy back here while our house is on fire. I want to get Westmoreland what he needs to get him through this emergency period. Let's get those civilian contractors working wherever possible and get some strong, tough strawbosses running things out there.

(About a twenty minute discussion followed on the specifics of the attachments.)

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

March 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Listed below are the questions you have asked with reference to pending subjects involving South Vietnam. For purposes of convenience, the questions are repeated and the answers thereto are included in the attached documents.

I.

Question:

Has General Westmoreland submitted his request for an add-on force package?

Answer:

Yes. See Document 1.

II.

Question:

Has there been a determination of the Marine Corps figures?

Answer:

Yes. Included in Document 1.

III.

Question:

What is the status of the four battalions in the pipeline,

and when will they close in country?

Answer:

See Document 2.

IV.

Question:

What is the status of the three squadrons of tactical aircraft deferred from Program 5?

Answer:

See Document 3.

V.

Question:

What recommendation is submitted regarding the call-up of Reserve Forces?

Answer:

A study is in progress on this subject based upon:

- a) The composition of the forces General Westmoreland has requested.
- b) A call-up without extension of terms and authority to call individuals.
- c) A call-up including extension of terms and authority to call individuals.

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VI.

Question:

What is the status of Program 5 regarding deployment of forces as of 1 March 1968?

Answer:

See Document 4.

VII.

Question:

What is the nature of our agreement to furnish equipment to the following countries, and what is the status of our implementation:

- a) Korean Forces
- b) Thailand Forces
- c) South Vietnamese Forces

Answer:

See Document 5.

Carl M. Sigmond

334

I N D E X

Alternatives for 30,000 Add-On Force Package	Tab 1
Deployment of Program 5 Infantry Battalions	Tab 2
Deployment of the Three Tactical Fighter Squadrons (Program 5) to Southeast Asia	Tab 3
Program 5 Status - SVN	Tab 4
Korean, Thai and Additional SVN Forces	Tab 5

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~~EYES ONLY~~

O 111158Z ZYH ZFF-1

FM GENERAL WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON
TO GENERAL WHEELER JCS WASHINGTON
INFO ADMIRAL SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ MAC 3385 EYES ONLY

REF: A. JCS MSG CITE 2766

B. JCS MSG DJS 02777

C. MACV MSG 061450Z MAR 68 (S)

1. IN COMPLIANCE WITH, REFERENCES A AND B, I AM FURNISHING TWO ALTERNATIVES FOR A 30,000 ADD-ON FORCE PACKAGE. WORKING UNDER THE GUIDANCE STATED IN THE REFERENCES THAT THE 3RD BDE OF THE 62ND ABN DIV AND RLT 27 WERE NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN PERMANENT FORCE PLANNING, AND THAT THE FORCE STRUCTURE DEVELOPED WOULD BE BALANCED, THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE, EXCEPT FOR A SMALL ARMY INCREMENT OF SERVICE SUPPORT TROOPS AVAILABLE IN JULY, CONSIDERS ONLY THOSE FORCES SHOWN IN REFERENCE A AS BEING AVAILABLE BY 15 JUNE. THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE INCLUDES COMBAT AND OTHER FORCES AVAILABLE AFTER 15 JUNE.

2. BECAUSE OF AVAILABILITY THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE GIVES THE LIONS SHARE TO USMC FORCES. THIS PACKAGE PROVIDES COMBAT/COMBAT SUPPORT TO COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT RATIO OF 53 TO 47.

A. USMC

4TH MAR DIV (-)

16,898

4TH MAW (-)

4,550

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

By DCG 91-115 TA 6-830024

NARA, Date 3-1-91

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EYES ONLY

III MAF TO INCREASES

4,264

SUB-TOTAL

25,712

B. US ARMY

IMMEDIATE SUPPORT RQMT

795

ARMY TRPS IN I CTZ, REF C

C. USAF

IMMEDIATE SUPPORT RQMT,

741

REF C PLUS SUPPORT REF A

D. USN

USN WITH USMC UNITS,

1,087

REF A

IMMEDIATE SUPPORT RQMT,

1,665

REF C

SUB-TOTAL

2,752

E. MACV TOTAL

30,020

3. THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE PROVIDES A BETTER FORCE AND SERVICE BALANCE. IT PROVIDES SEVEN MANEUVER BATTALIONS AND AN MP BN WHICH I FEEL IS MORE RESPONSIVE TO THE TACTICAL SITUATION ANTICIPATED IN 1968. THIS PACKAGE PROVIDES A COMBAT/COMBAT SUPPORT TO COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT RATIO OF 59 TO 41. ALL BUT THE ARMY ELEMENTS ARE REPORTED TO BE AVAILABLE BY 15 JUNE.

REVERSE SET

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

A. USMC

RLT 23 (3 BLT)	7,236
4TH MAW (2 TFS, 2 HMM, 1HMH)	4,303
FORCE SPT ELEMENTS	3,292
SUB-TOTAL	14,628

B. US ARMY

MECH BDE (1 INF BN, 1 INF BN (MECH), 1 TK BN)	5,041
AVN CO, SEP BDE	233
ARMD CAV SQDN	1,030
MP BN	955
CBT SVC SPT	3,316
SUB-TOTAL	10,580

C. 7TH AF

2 TFS	1,082
FAC/TACP	191
AIRLIFT	741
SUPPORT	678
SUB-TOTAL	2,692

D. USN

USN WITH USMC UNITS	325
NSA DA NANG SUPPORT	1,775
SUB-TOTAL	2,100

SERVICE SPT	E. TOTAL MACV	33,000
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~~TOP SECRET~~
RECEIVED 10/15/77

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

4. I PREFER THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE. BY PROVIDING SEVEN ADDITIONAL MANEUVER BATTALIONS (AS COMPARED TO THREE IN THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE), IT MAXIMIZES MY COMBAT POWER. FOR THIS SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER COMBAT CAPABILITY, THE TIME DELAY INDICATED IN REFERENCE B IS ACCEPTABLE; HOWEVER, I WOULD HOPE ACCOMODATION MIGHT BE POSSIBLE.

5. IN THE MATTER OF PROGRESS IN THE DIRECT HIRE CIVILIANIZATION PROGRAM USARV REPORTS HIRING 73 OUT OF 1,421 PROGRAMMED SINCE THE LAST REPORT; NAVFORV 8 OUT OF 189 PROGRAMMED; III MAF 43 OUT OF 84; AND 7AF HAD NONE PROGRAMMED.

6. TIME HAS NOT PERMITTED COORDINATION WITH EACH COMPONENT COMMANDER PERSONALLY, BUT THEY WERE REPRESENTED IN THE PLANNING EXERCISE AFTER I GAVE MY GUIDANCE THIS MORNING AND AFTER MG KERWIN TALKED TO GENERAL SPIVY. THEREFORE, SOME ADJUSTMENTS MAY BE NECESSARY. YOU WILL BE ADVISED SOONEST.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-3107-68

11 MAR 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Deployment of Program 5 Infantry Battalions (C)

The following information concerning departure and closure dates for the four Program 5 infantry battalions is submitted in response to your query this morning.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>Scheduled Departure</u>	<u>Scheduled Closure RVN</u>
5/12 Inf Bn (199th BDE)	Lewis	1 Apr 68	6 Apr 68
6/31 Inf Bn (196th BDE)	Lewis	1 Apr 68	6 Apr 68
5/46 Inf Bn (198th BDE)	Hood	24 Mar 68	29 Mar 68
4/21 Inf Bn (11th BDE)	Hawaii	11 Apr 68	15 Apr 68

(Sgd) EARLE G. WHEELER

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Copy to:
Secretary of Defense

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 89-84
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date *7/9/92*

~~SECRET~~

GROUP - 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

82

3

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THE JOINT STAFF

~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED

CM-3104-68
11 March 1968

Authority Group 4
By OP, NARA. Date 5/27/92

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Deployment of the Three Tactical Fighter Squadrons (Program 5) to Southeast Asia (U)

1. (S) CINCPAC and COMUSMACV have requested three additional Tactical Air squadrons contained in Program 5 be deployed to South Vietnam, as soon as revetments could be made available, to support the recently deployed ground augmentation forces. On 29 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended deployment of three squadrons when revetments became available. CINCPAC states revetments are now available for one additional TFS each at Chu Lai, Phan Rang, and Phu Cat.

2. (S) The three squadrons, two Air Force and one USMC, can be provided for immediate deployment to SVN. One USMC A-4 squadron would be deployed from Iwakuni, Japan to Chu Lai. The following alternatives are available in order to provide the two Air Force squadrons:

Alternative One:

Two CONUS Air Force recalled ANG F-100C (18 UE) squadrons, one each to Phu Cat and Phan Rang. These two squadrons are available for immediate deployment.

Alternative Two:

Two CONUS Air Force regular F-100D squadrons, one each to Phu Cat and Phan Rang. This alternative would require the incorporation of ANG pilots and equipment into the CONUS training base which would delay movement of the two F-100D squadrons to SVN approximately 30 days.

GROUP - 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

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Alternative Three:

One ANG F-100C and one training base F-100D squadron. Deployment of one F-100D unit would also have a significant impact on the CONUS training base, similar to that as stated under Alternative Two, as would the 30-day movement delay.

3. (S) Recommend approval of Alternative One for the two Air Force squadrons. Alternative One will provide the recalled ANG units with an operational mission in the current SVN effort and have minimum impact on the established CONUS training base. In this connection, the two ANG active duty squadrons are fully combat capable and ready for immediate deployment.

4. (S) Recommend that the one USMC A-4 squadron in Iwakuni, Japan and the two ANG squadrons be deployed to SVN immediately.

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-414
 By , NARA, Date 4-13-93

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(Rev) 9 March 1968

PROGRAM 5 STATUS - SVN

Program 5 Total Authorization 525,000 + 12,545 = 537,545

Deployment Status as of 1 March 1968

	<u>Auth Mil Strength</u>	<u>Total Deployed</u>	<u>To Be Deployed</u>	<u>NUMBERS ARE CONSTANTLY CHANGING DUE TO AUTHORIZED IN-COUNTRY STRENGTH CHANGES, ACTIVATIONS, INACTIVATIONS, ETC.</u>
Army	358,491	333,382	25,109	
Navy	37,497	34,038	3,459	
USAF	59,289	57,421	1,868	
USMC	82,268	81,374	894	
Total	537,545	506,215*	31,330**	

- * Does not include emergency reinforcement listed below.
 ** Includes two USMC VMA/VMF squadrons at Iwakuni (str 720) and one USAF F-4 squadron (str 680) approved in Program 5 but not authorized for deployment. (COMUSMACV/CINCPAC requested and JCS recommended deployment of two USAF F-100 squadrons (str 818) and one USMC A-4 squadron (str 297) to fill these requirements. Decision is pending.) Also includes one USAF A-1 squadron (str 352) now in Thailand supporting MUSCLE SHOALS but scheduled to move to Pleiku, RVN in July 68.

Program 5 Forces to be Deployed

<u>CLOSE DATE</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE TOTAL DEPLOYED</u>
Mar 68	4,615	78	13	1	4,707	510,922
Apr 68	4,694	258	4	0	4,956	515,878
May 68	2,053	232	8	1	2,294	518,172
Jun 68	1,513	403	0	4	1,920	520,092
Jul 68	2,824	15	352	0	3,191	523,283
Aug 68	586	566	39	0	1,191	524,474
Sep 68	602	527	0	0	1,129	525,603
Oct 68	833	423	0	1	1,257	526,860
Nov 68	1,196	238	0	0	1,434	528,294
Dec 68	348	0	0	0	348	528,642
Jan -						
Mar 69	1,753	556	0	0	2,309	530,951
Unknown	1,295	166	600	167	2,228	
Ready TFC			680	720	1,400	
Debit/Credit Account	2,797	- 3	172	0	2,966	
Total	25,109	3,459	1,868	894	31,330	

Significant units yet to deploy are listed in the Enclosure.

service set

Emergency Reinforcement of COMUSMACV

27th Marine Regiment (Reinf) - In-country	5,941
3d Bde/82d Airborne Division	<u>3,702</u>

Total 9,643

27th Marine Regiment (Reinf) Sea-tail scheduled to deploy in April	<u>1,422</u>
--	--------------

Grand Total 11,065

Civilianization

No Program 5 civilianization has been accomplished.

SECRET

Prepared by Pac Div, J-3, Joint Staff

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

SIGNIFICANT UNITS TO DEPLOY

<u>ARMY</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CLOSE DATE</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
--	Field Advisors	Mar - Nov 68	3,100
10	Helicopter Companies		2,811
	6 Light Co	Dec 68-Mar 69	(1,860)
	3 Med Co	May - Nov 68	(863)
	4 Heavy Plat	Mar - Jul 68	(88)
2	Long Range Patrol Cos	Mar 68	236
3	Field Artillery Bns	Mar - Jul 68	1,812
1	Civilian War Cas Hospital (Units)	Mar - Jun 68	671
1	LT Maint Co DS	Mar 68	154
1	Aviation Ctr Material Management	Mar 68	159
1	RVN Regional Exchange Aug	Mar 68	418
25	Avn Airfield Opn Units	Mar - Jun 68	590
4	Separate Inf Bn - Str 920 ea	Mar - Apr 68	3,680
1	Engr Combat Bn	Apr 68	794
1	USA Data Processing Ctr	May 68	302
1	Med Hosp Evac Semimobile	May 68	313
3	Trp, Air Cav - Str 194 ea	May - Jul 68	592
12	FA Countermortar Radar Sec	May 68	108
1	CS Co Hvy Eq Maint	Jun 68	292
2	Ord Co Ammo	Jun - Jul 68	434
11	TC Acft Maint Units	Jun 68 - Jan 69	1,001
5	Med Helo Ambl Units	Nov - Dec 68	350
	Other Army Units		<u>7,604</u>
		TOTAL	25,109

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USMC

2 Ready TFS (VMA/VMF Iwakuni, Japan)	720
1 Fixed Wing Recon Sqdn	164
Other USMC Units	10
TOTAL	894

USAF

3 Herbicide UC-123 Aircraft	Aug 68	39
1 F-4 Sqdn (Ready Status)		680
1 CE Squadron	Unknown	600
Other USAF Units		549
TOTAL		1,868

NAVY

1 Navy Spt Unit, Danang	Apr 68	123
2 Landing Craft Repair Ships (ARL)	May - Jun 68	418
1 Mobile Base II	Jun 68	60
1 Mine Squadron Det	Jun 68	130
1 LST	Aug 68	134
9 Armed Helicopters - HA(L)	Aug 68	72
2 River Assault Sqdn (RAS)	Aug 68 - Jan 69	974
50 River Patrol Boats	Sep - Nov 68	315
2 Barracks Ship (APB)	Jan 69	384
22 Armed Helicopters - HA(L)	Unknown	134
Other Navy Units		715
TOTAL		3,459

COORDINATION:

Army - Col Darden Air Force - Col Larson (concur in AF portion)
 Navy - Capt Gerhard Marines - MG Leek
 ASD/SA - LTC Fife

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Enclosure

service set

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DOCUMENT 5

a. Korean Forces

The Government of the Republic of Korea agreed to send an additional "light division" of 6 battalions to South Vietnam, if we would equip and support these forces and provide additional assistance which, by improving the counter-infiltration capabilities of ROK forces in Korea, would make it politically feasible for the Government to send these additional troops. The total increase of ROK troops in Vietnam would be 6,000. The total "light division" strength of 11,000 would be obtained by switching to a combat role 5,000 Korean Army spaces currently assigned to logistics activity. This logistics work would be taken over by 5,000 additional Korean civilians.

Our total commitment for these additional troops involves non-recurring costs of \$54.7 million and annual costs of \$77 million. The major item in the non-recurring costs is a counter-infiltration package of \$32.3 million, much of which has already been delivered. The rest, and all the other items, including 2 destroyers and 12 helicopters, are now on schedule. One destroyer will be delivered by April 30 and the other by December 31. Delivery of the 12 helicopters will begin in the fall of 1968. The equipment for the "light division" has been shipped and is being held in Okinawa pending deployment. This deployment of the Korean "light division" was scheduled to commence on March 1st, but has been delayed because of the current Korean situation. Ambassador Porter believes that these forces can still be obtained and, in fact, the ROK Prime Minister is now talking of the possibility of sending an additional 2 regular divisions (about 36,000 men). This proposal has not yet been explored.

Entirely apart from the assistance agreed to in connection with the additional troop deployment, we have undertaken to commit during Fiscal Year 1968 an additional \$100 million in military assistance, because of North Korean aggressive actions. Details on the equipment involved both for the troop package and for the \$100 million supplement are attachment A.

In short, we have done everything up to this time that we have agreed to do and will make our future deliveries on time. The delay is due entirely to the South Koreans.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-376
By 40, NARA, Date 7-22-93

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b. Thailand Forces

We have agreed to underwrite the costs involved in the deployment to Vietnam of a Thai "light division" of 10,000 as well as to provide certain other military assistance. The total costs involved for Fiscal Year 1968 are \$58.85 million and, for Fiscal Year 1969, \$120.81 million. These costs are in addition to the previously agreed military assistance of \$60 million annually.

We have completed delivery of virtually all of the equipment requisitioned for the first increment of the Thai "light division." Equipment deliveries have been running 10 days to 2 months ahead of schedule. The training facilities will be completed by the target date of April 15th. Training of the first increment of 5,000 men is now in process and the training schedule will not be delayed by either equipment or facilities. The first dispatch of Thai troops is scheduled for July of this year and the remaining troops will be sent by January 1969. General Westmoreland and the Commander of US Forces, Thailand have determined that the present state of the training of the Thai forces prevents acceleration of this deployment schedule. This conclusion was confirmed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Details of our support are attached. (Attachment B)

We are on or ahead of schedule and will remain so.

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c. Additional South Vietnamese Forces

We have no specific commitment to furnish equipment or other assistance in return for additional South Vietnamese forces. Because they are fighting for their own country, no quid pro quo arrangement has been considered. General Westmoreland has, however, requested certain items of equipment and ammunition supplies to permit mobilization of additional South Vietnamese forces and to improve the effectiveness of existing units. For example, 108,710 M-16 rifles and nine other items were requested on November 21, 1967 for delivery by September 30, 1968. Since the Tet offensive, an additional 268,000 M-16 rifles have been requested for Regional Force/Popular Force units. Half of the regular ARVN maneuver battalions are now equipped with M-16s and we believe it will be possible to equip the rest of their maneuver battalions by the end of August. By the end of the year, the high priority RF/PF units should be equipped with M-16s.

An additional 115,000 trained personnel are needed in order to reach the strength of 685,739 authorized for the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam by June 1, 1968. General Westmoreland believes that these can be obtained by recovering 40,000 trained personnel currently in reserve, prisoner or absent-from-duty status, and by training an additional 75,000 recruits. President Thieu has mentioned possible increases ranging from 65,000 to 125,000. General Westmoreland estimates that a total RVNAF strength of 751,739 can be reached by December 31 of this year. This would mean 66,000 recruits in addition to the 75,000 anticipated by June.

The ability to equip these additional South Vietnamese forces and to modernize existing forces will be affected by any decision to deploy additional US troops to Vietnam. Details on RVNAF modernization plans are attached. (Attachment C)

~~SECRET~~

~~Classified~~

ADDITIONAL U. S. COMMITMENTS OFFERED

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>FUNDING</u>	<u>ESTIMATED COST</u>	<u>DELIVERY</u>
1 NRT In-commission Destroyer	Korea MAP-FY68	\$ 2.1 million	30 April 1968
1 Reserve Fleet Destroyer	Korea MAP-FY68	3.9 million	31 Dec. 1968
12 UH-1 Helicopters	9 Korea MAP-6 FY68 3 FY69 3 Army-funded	3.2 million	Begin Fall 1968
ROK Requirements in UNC USFK Counter-infiltration Plan of 3 Oct 1967	Service-funded-FY68 (USA, USN, USAF, USMC)	32.3 million	Already begun
O&M for Special strike force of 8 battalions	Korea MAP	1.0 million annual	As occurring annual
1 Battalion 8" SP Howitzers	Korea MAP-FY68	3.2 million	FY 1968
Re-equipping 6,000 ROK troops in Korea <u>2/</u>	Army-funded	10.0 million	To be determined
'Net additional' Costs	Service-funded	4.0 million annual	To be determined
In-Vietnam support for additional Korean forces and civilians	Service-funded	72.0 million annual	As occurring annual
		<u>\$131.7 million</u>	

1/ Counterinfiltration materiel for ROK forces is assigned a priority below only that of supporting and sustaining SEA requirements. Airlift for critical items has been authorized.

2/ In lieu of re-equipping ROK troops in Korea, initial equipment will be provided for the "Light Division" going to Vietnam. Division's old equipment to be used for re-equipping in ROK.

~~SECRET~~

\$ 32 MILLION COUNTERINFILTRATION PACKAGE

As an inducement for the dispatch of additional Korean Troops to Vietnam and to counter increased North Korean activities in the Republic of Korea, the U. S. has agreed to provide \$32 million in counterinfiltration equipment for Korean forces in Korea.

This equipment is being provided by the U. S. military services as a Vietnam "related" cost. Equipment is apportioned to ROK forces as follows:

<u>MILITARY SERVICE</u>	<u>AMOUNT (\$ millions)</u>	<u>MAJOR ITEMS</u>
ROK Army	\$ 22.8	Barrier fencing (142 mi. Xenon searchlights, star light scopes, night observation devices, communications equipment armored personnel carriers, vegetation and control items, ammunition, including mines and flares.
ROK Navy	5.4	Radar and communications equipment, patrol boats, ammunition and weapons.
ROK Marine Corps	\$ 0.8	Xenon searchlights, anti- personnel detectors, radar, ammunition and weapons.
ROK Air Force	\$ 3.3	Radar, aircraft communications equip- ment, combat vehicles, ammunition and weapons.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

COUNTERINFILTRATION ITEMS SHIPPED TO KOREA

ARMY

Chain link fence	32 miles
Barbed wire fence	20 miles
Night observation devices	102 ea
Starlight scopes	553 ea
Xenon searchlights	78 ea
Anti-intrusion device (AN/GSS-9)	139 ea
Anti-intrusion device (PSR-1)	83 ea
Telephones	302 ea
Antennas	500 ea
Defoliation sets	22 ea
Armored Personnel Carriers	95 ea
Pipes and pickets	23 carloads
Gravel mines	1000 ea
40mm projectiles	1640 ea
40mm white starclusters	3200 ea

To be shipped: Additional Starlight scopes, telephones, additional fence, radios, ammunition, additional night observation devices, and xenon searchlights.

NAVY

81mm mortars	30 ea
81mm mortar ammunition	-
Pontoon assembly	4 ea
Shotguns	60 ea
Shotgun ammunition	-
1 ton trucks	5 ea
Various radios	20 ea
Mooring buoys	4 ea
Various electronic test equipment	

To be shipped: fast patrol boats, additional communications and electronic equipment.

AIR FORCE

Shotguns	196 ea
Grenades	2020 ea
Binoculars	80 ea
Rifles	150 ea
Jeeps	4 ea
Various radio sets	28 ea

To be shipped: aircraft (and radar), additional electronic equipment.

MARINE CORPS

Barbed wire	900 spools	Anti-intrusion devices	9 ea
Starlight scopes	36 ea	40mm ammunition	-
Xenon searchlights	9 ea	Trip flares	3600 ea
		Antennas	30 ea

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\$100 MILLION FY 68 KOREA MAP SUPPLEMENTAL
(MILLIONS)

	<u>Country Team</u> <u>ROKG List</u>	<u>Alternate</u> <u>List #1</u>	<u>Alternate</u> <u>List #2</u>
F-4E Squadron (UE-18)	58.3		
F-4C Squadron (UE-18)	-	39.0 <u>a/</u>	
F-4D Squadron (UE-18)			50.5
Small Arms for Homeland Reserve Force	13.8	13.8	13.8
Airfield Improvement and Hardening	6.1	6.1	6.1
Korean National Police (\$5 million)	5.0	<u>b/</u>	<u>b/</u>
Army-Marines M-16 Rifles (10,000)	2.4	2.4	2.4
Mobile Communications Package	6.6	6.6	6.6
Fast Patrol Cutters (4)	2.2	2.2	2.2
Counterinfiltration (CI) Package	5.6	28.9	18.4
PCH&T		<u>1.0</u>	<u>c/</u>
TOTAL	<u>\$100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>

NOTES: a/ \$19.3 million from F-4C saving distributed to provide \$1 million PCH&T and to increase counterinfiltration package by \$18.3 million.

b/ Support for KNP carried in counterinfiltration package.

c/ PCH&T will have to be absorbed from above amounts.

STATUS: Alternative List #2 is being recommended to the Secretary of Defense. This recommendations has the concurrence of COMUSKOREA, Embassy Seoul, CINCPAC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of State.

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ATTACHMENT B

U.S. Support of Thai Vietnam Troop Contributions

The United States has agreed to underwrite the following costs attendant to the deployment of the Thai light division to Vietnam:

<u>Category</u>	<u>Estimated Cost</u> <u>(in \$ million)</u>	
	<u>FY68</u>	<u>FY69</u>
TOE Equipment	23.0	
Rehabilitation Training Facilities	3.0	
Training Equipment		14.0
Training Consumables	4.0	6.0
Related Budgetary Costs <u>1/</u>		
Subsistence	.5	1.4
Inspection Visits	.05	.1
Office Equipment & Supplies	3.75	2.75
Morale Equipment	.35	.98
Family Relocation Allowance		.6
Mustering Out Bonus		.6
Return Home Transportation		.02
Mobilization Expenses	1.0	1.0
Training Supplies & Expenses	1.1	1.1
Representation Funds	.1	.1
Logistic Support for U.S. Advisors	5.0	8.0
Construction for U.S. Advisors	2.0	
Logistic Support in Vietnam		63.0
Increase in Military Assistance <u>2/</u>	15.0	15.0
HAWK Battery <u>2/</u>		
TOE		4.18
Augmentation		1.96
Transportation		.02
Total Cost to U.S.	<u>\$58.85</u>	<u>\$120.81</u>

1/ Portion of extra budgetary costs still awaiting SecDef approval

2/ Although not directly related to deployment, Thai agreement to provide additional forces was contingent on increased MAP and the deployment of a HAWK battery.

ATTACHMENT B

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Status

U.S. Personnel:

SecDef has approved 764 personnel for USARSUPTHAI and 22 for MACTHAI to train the Thai force. Personnel are scheduled to arrive by 31 March 1968. In the interim, TDY personnel are being provided from theater assets.

TOE Equipment:

Action has been completed on 779 of the 787 requisitions received in CONUS for the first increment of the division. Equipment required by 8 January arrived on 29 December; that required by 22 January arrived on 4 January, and that required by 19 March arrived on 13 January. Training schedule will not be delayed for want of necessary equipment.

Construction of Training Facilities: Work has begun on all necessary facilities. • Deadline date of 15 April will be met.

Funding Actions:

All funding requirements were approved by SecDef or DA, as appropriate, in January, except for certain related budgetary expenses, a memorandum on which has been submitted requesting SecDef approval. His decision is expected by 15 March.

Increase in MAP:

FY68 \$15 million add-on has been approved; item content currently being reviewed by OASD(ISA). SecDef memo should be ready for submission by 22 March. FY69 \$15 million add-on has been included in FY69 DOD budget; however, Embassy Bangkok has indicated revision will be submitted in April.

HAWK Battery:

Memorandum is being prepared requesting SecDef approval of what HAWK equipment should be provided at no cost to Thai MAP. Will be submitted by 13 March. Meanwhile, the RTG has taken virtually no action regarding preparations to receive battery. Deployment date for battery is tentatively set for 1 September.

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FACT SHEET

Subject: RVNAF Modernization Status

Background: On 21 November 1967, General Westmoreland asked for certain items of equipment and ammunition supplies which he regarded as necessary to, increase rapidly the effectiveness of RVNAF. The requested "10 Items" and delivery dates to accelerate the modernization of RVNAF firepower, mobility and communications are:

M16 Rifles - 108,710 by 30 Sep 1968
M79 Grenade launchers - 4,183 by 30 June 1968
M60 Machine guns - 2,489 between June and Dec 1968
M29 Mortars (81 mm) - 824 by 31 Dec 1968
M101 Howitzers (105 mm) - 108 by 31 Dec 1968
M114 Howitzers (155 mm) - 72 by 31 Dec 1968
M606 Trucks (1/4T) - 200 by 30 June 1968
M602 Trucks (2-1/2T) - 1,702 by 30 June 1968
PRC-25 Radios - 6,000 by 30 June 1968
Ammunition Allocations - 105 mm H.E. 1,577,000
RDS/Fuses by 31 Dec 1968

In December 1967, General Westmoreland requested equipment and funds to expand the ARVN Airborne Division from eight to nine battalions, plus necessary combat and support troops. This expansion is to provide a balanced division capable of sustained, combined operations. Equipment for this expansion includes critical M60 machine guns, M79 grenade launchers, M29 mortars, plus signal and vehicle items.

In early February during the enemy TET offensive, General Westmoreland stated that RVNAF required additional help. He recommended acceleration of issue to ARVN units of M16 rifles, M60 machine guns, M29 mortars, plus the new requirement of 234 M113 armored personnel carriers and 27 H34 helicopters.

On 28 February, General Westmoreland again stated the importance of equipping RVNAF promptly with modern weaponry - particularly the M16, M60, M79, M29 and the M72 light anti-tank weapons (LAW). This message also contained requirements for an additional 11,200 M79 grenade launchers and 268,000 M16 rifles for RF/PF units, and because of the appearance of enemy armor requested 10,000 M72 (LAW) 66 mm HEAT rockets.

Present Status: The status of the original "10 Items" of the November package is:

ATTACHMENT C

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M16 Rifles - Approved 108,710 by 30 Sep 1968.
M79 Grenade launchers - Approved 4,183 by 30 June 1968
M60 Machine guns - Approved 2,489 phased from June - Dec 1968.
M29 Mortars - 275 approved; 549 deferred pending further decision on call-up of two Reserve Brigades.
M101 Howitzers - 36 approved; 72 deferred pending approval of FY 69 RVNAF Force Structure.
M114 Howitzers - Deferred pending approval of FY 69 RVNAF Force Structure.
M606 Trucks - Approved 200 by 30 June 1968.
M602 Trucks - Approved 1702 by 30 June 1968, however substitution of more expensive US Army M-Series vehicles may be required
PRC-25 Radios - Approved 6,000 by 30 June 1968.
Ammunition Allocations - 105 mm Ammo projections are under study.

On 26 February 1968 the increase in the Airborne Division was approved.

In emergency response to requirements imposed by the enemy TET offensive, the following actions were undertaken in support of RVNAF:

M16 Rifles - 17,169 shipped to APOE by 9 Mar.
M60 Machine guns - 1025 airlifted to MACV 4 Feb;
1,464 available 1 Apr.
M29 Mortars - 25 airlifted 4 Feb;
176 shipped 8 Mar;
49 available 6 Mar;
549 deferred pending further decision on Reserve call-up.
M72 LAW - 10,000 airlifted 27 Feb.
M113 APC's - 29 airlifted 15 Feb
50 sealifted 26 Feb (ETA 25 Mar)
64 sealifted 25 Feb
143 (ETA 27 Mar)
H34 helicopters - 14 USMC airlifted 24 Feb
12 USA airlifted 8 Mar
4 available now

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The U.S. Army in Vietnam has been authorized to allocate 105 mm artillery ammunition to RVNAF as needs demand.

There is a direct relationship between the speed with which RVNAF is modernized and the number of US units activated and/or deployed to SVN. US activations and deployments probably will not affect the status of the "10 Items" package, but may affect the provision of additional M-16 rifles and M-79 grenade launchers for RF/PF unless we add to our procurement and production capacity.

ISA/11 March 1968

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