

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#22 notes	from Tuesday Luncheon 4/30/68 at 1:25 with foreign policy advisors Secret [sanitized NLJ-CBS 38]	4 p 04/30/68	A
#23 agenda	revised agenda for lunch meeting with President secret <i>on NLJ 047-003-1-219-03</i>	2 p 04/30/68	A
#23b memo	to President from W. W. Rostow secret	1 p 04/29/68	A

FILE LOCATION

Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings
April 30, 1968 - 1:25 p.m. Tuesday luncheon with Foreign Policy Advisors, Box 3

RESTRICTION CODES

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23a

April 30, 1968

Sec. Rusk wants to add:

1. Bunker's present plans: hoping to go to Katmandu May 9-14.
2. Further modifications and enlargement of Barrell Roll area in Laos.
3. Mr. Rostow's idea: Possible Thieu initiative with NLF.

NOTES OF THE TUESDAY LUNCHEON
APRIL 30, 1968

SANITIZED
Authority NLS-CBS 38
By is, NARS, Date 10-9-84

THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE:

The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson

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(3)(5)

Walt Rostow: The bombing targets are between 19th and 20th parallels.

Secretary Clifford: The flow is increasing. Captured documents do not indicate an enemy moving toward peace.

There are four targets south of the 20th with military value, but there is a serious political situation. This could indicate failure on quest for sites. It could also show them we mean business and bring them back to reality.

(General Wheeler showed photographs of four sites.)

The President: Dean, (Secretary Rusk) do you have any trouble with it?

Secretary Rusk: No.

General Wheeler: Do locks bother you.

Secretary Rusk: No.

General Wheeler: No civilian casualties would result.

Secretary Rusk: Time is running out.

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The President: Do you recommend it, Buzz?

General Wheeler: Yes.

Secretary Clifford: I would not recommend it immediately. Let's wait and get response from Hanoi. It could disturb relationship we are trying to build with them.

Let's hold up for a reply.

Secretary Rusk: Is that airfield getting muddy?

General Wheeler: Yes. There are significant military implications to the airport.

The President: I do not want to go to Paris. I think they are not in the least interested genuinely in peace. We need to find out what my March 31 speech has done to us.

I do not think Bunker's proposal will get us to the peace table by the elections. I believe they are giving us same treatment they did at Tet.

This is the 30th day of the pause. We are going into our fifth week. We counseled patience, but you have to look at the calendar. We have to start laying the groundwork for what ^{may} must come.

Do you think, Buzz (General Wheeler), that time is limited when we can continue to keep the area above the 19th off limits without hurt?

General Wheeler: Yes sir. They are moving men and equipment south quite rapidly.

(CIA Director Helms gave paper on infiltration into South).

The President: Can't we hit anything in water between 19th and 20th?

General Wheeler: No sir.

The President: What is answer that you use to counter hitting them in nose only rather than going way up?

General Wheeler: There is no nose. There is a network of roads. Plus there is no way to get them all at the "gate."

Secretary Rusk: The boys in Laos want us to extend bombing East.

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The President: Is Sullivan worried.

Secretary Rusk: He is for it.

Secretary Clifford: Sullivan favors alternative A. We prefer alternative B to hit area in Laos.

CIA Director Helms: A is ten miles from 20th. B is 15 miles from 20th.

The President: Let's take out B now. See how it looks.

Walt Rostow: MACV wants a briefing on what is going on in Haiphong -- Hanoi area.

We have three questions: (See Question 8 - Section marked).

Let's lay it out in matter of fact way.

George Christian: We should show the photos and give facts on increase in infiltration.

Secretary Rusk: I do not think we should show pictures. It looks like military pressure on you. We should have quiet backgrounding.

Secretary Clifford: There should be backgrounding in both Saigon and in Washington. I do not think the pictures should have been used. We want to go on with reconnaissance.

The President: Is there anything on Ike.

General Wheeler: He is resting comfortably. Nothing serious at the moment.

We can get benefit without showing pictures. Information on infiltration would be good to get out.

The President: I do not want Ho to get impression he can take this country away from us. We are not reeling under the Dove's attack. I have talked with a number of people. We have left Ho with the impression that we are leaving the country.

We have got to be very careful.

I am going to have a televised news conference later this week. I am not going to give them the impression we are tied down or running out.

President Park agreed to give 5000 military or 6000 civilians.

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The State Department reporters' notes were terrible. I told him we would get him we would get him an additional \$100 million over the \$300 million we had already given him. Park said July 1 was target date.

I would like to look again at expediting supplies.

General Wheeler: He has 10,000 support troops for men from Korea.

Secretary Clifford: Gave the President a brief memorandum on \$100 million -- how it is to be used.

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Lunch Meeting With the President
Tuesday, April 30, 1968 -- 1:00 p.m.

REVISED AGENDA

1. Site Diplomacy: if any. (Sec. Rusk)

Situation report.

2. Possible initiative by Thieu towards the NLF. (Tab A)

Attached memorandum which I sent to Sec. Rusk. Also attached draft cable which I suggested to Sec. Rusk for transmission to Amb. Bunker, bearing on the proposal.

3. Foreign Affairs Briefings of Major Presidential Candidates. (Sec. Rusk and Mr. Helms) (Tab B)

- Previous experience: State and CIA.
- Ground rules for present campaign.

4. U.S. Policy Towards Greater Proportionate Vietnamese Effort and U.S. Troop Ceiling. The President. (Tab C)

Need to maintain flexibility in terms of unknown Hanoi intentions.

5. Possible Bombing Targets Between 19th and 20th Parallels.

Sec. Clifford and Gen. Wheeler will present a paper.

6. Enlargement of BARREL ROLL area in Laos. (Sec. Rusk and Sec. Clifford)

Enlargement of area permitted for bombing. Sullivan makes a strong case for some enlargement, beyond the area agreed last week, to assist hard-pressed Laos. Defense and State tend to agree.

7. Censorship in South Vietnam. (Sec. Clifford) (Tab D)

As attached indicated (Tab D), the Pentagon, as I now understand it, regards:

- censorship as costing more than it is worth;
- believes the right path is to refine and improve application of Westy's guidelines.

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8. MACV Briefing on Bombing Pause, etc.

At our instigation, MACV plans to brief on intensive enemy supply movements to the South.

The briefing was also planned to reveal -- from reconnaissance data -- the extent to which bridges are being repaired, supplies piled up, etc., in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.

We have held up the briefing for twenty-four hours to get your guidance on three points, on which you may wish to hear discussion at lunch today:

- should MACV proceed to background on intensive enemy movements south of men and supplies?
- should we confirm on background that we are, in fact, running reconnaissance missions?
- should we background on the extent to which the enemy is making the most of the respite in Hanoi-Haiphong?

We want to get the facts out; but we don't wish it to look as if MACV is pressuring you on the bombing pause or undercutting our effort to get negotiations going.

9. Ambassador Bunker's present plans: he hopes to spend May 9-14 in Katmandu.
(Sec. Rusk)

10. New Military Credit Sale for Iran. (Tab E)

11. Other.

Walt. Rostow

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23a

April 30, 1968

Sec. Rusk wants to add:

1. Bunker's present plans: hoping to go to Katmandu May 9-14.
2. Further modifications and enlargement of Barrell Roll area in Laos.
3. Mr. Rostow's idea: Possible Thieu initiative with NLF.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~Monday, April 29, 1968
7:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Tuesday Lunch, April 30: Supplementary Agenda Items

1. Sect. Clifford and General Wheeler will present a paper on possible bombing targets between the 19th and 20th parallels.
2. MACV Briefing on Bombing Pause, etc.

At our instigation, MACV plans to brief on intensive enemy supply movements to the South.

The briefing was also planned to reveal -- from reconnaissance data -- the extent to which bridges are being repaired, supplies piled up, etc., in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.

We have held up the briefing for twenty-four hours to get your guidance on three points, on which you may wish to hear discussion at lunch tomorrow:

- should MACV proceed to background on intensive enemy movements south of men and supplies?
- should we confirm on background that we are, in fact, running reconnaissance missions?
- should we background on the extent to which the enemy is making the most of the respite in Hanoi-Haiphong?

We want to get the facts out; but we don't wish it to look as if MACV is pressuring you on the bombing pause or undercutting our effort to get negotiations going.

W. Rostow

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White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG/jd, NARA, Date 8/31/05

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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Luncheon with the President
Tuesday, April 30, 1968

Agenda

1. Site Diplomacy: if any (Sect. Rusk)
Sitrep.
2. Foreign Affairs Briefings of Major Presidential Candidates (Tab A)
(Sect. Rusk; Mr. Helms)
 - previous experience: State and CIA.
 - ground rules for present campaign.
3. U. S. Policy towards Greater Proportionate Vietnamese Effort and U. S. Troop Ceiling (Tab B)
(The President)
Need to maintain flexibility in terms of unknown Hanoi intentions.
4. Censorship in South Vietnam (Sect. Clifford)
As attached (Tab C) indicates, Pentagon, as I now understand it, regards:
 - censorship as costing more than it is worth;
 - believes the right path is to refine and improve application of Westy's guidelines.
5. Other.

W. Rostow

White House
By act NARA 3-7-91

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

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Monday, April 29, 1968, 5:30 P.M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Briefing of Major Presidential Candidates
in 1964

During the campaign of 1964, State Department records show that

Governor Rockefeller was briefed May 16, 1964,

Governor Scranton was briefed on May 21, and

Mr. Stassen was briefed on May 26.

Senator Goldwater turned down the offer to provide briefings on the grounds that it was less than wise and less than wholehearted (see Tab 1 for his letter to Secretary Rusk dated April 23, 1964).

The three who accepted the offer did so on the basis of a letter from Secretary Rusk stating that he, Secretary McNamara, and CIA Director McCone joined "in offering you all possible information that may affect you in the responsible discussion of issues affecting the national security . . . to offer a full account of the existing international situation as it is assessed by the U.S. Intelligence Community and to respond to any questions which you may ask about present American national security policy and the reasons for it."

The separate briefings of Governor Rockefeller and Governor Scranton were held in Secretary Rusk's conference room. Director McCone gave a global intelligence briefing, particularly on relative U.S. and Soviet strength and then covered each continent. Secretary Rusk then discussed European policy in considerable detail. Secretary McNamara discussed the situation in Southeast Asia. The sessions were very informal with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara adding to Mr. McCone's presentation. Governor Rockefeller and Governor Scranton both interrupted to ask questions. The three officials remained for each briefing which lasted nearly the full two hours.

An offer was made at the end of each briefing to provide additional information if the person being briefed desired to do so at any subsequent time.

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- 2 -

All three were invited to the White House after their briefings and each met the President.

Each of the three candidates had spoken extensively on foreign policy matters. Governor Rockefeller was critical of policies on Vietnam, Laos, Indonesia, NATO and troop withdrawal, Soviet wheat sales and the effects of the test ban on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Tab 2 is Governor Rockefeller's list of his foreign policy concerns as well as his understanding that his right to criticize would be unaffected by the briefing.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments - Tab 1 and 2

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United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C.

April 23, 1964

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

President Johnson's offer to provide special briefings for major Presidential candidates, of which your letter was the first official notification, strikes me as less than wise and less than wholehearted.

The striking time lag between the President's announcement and your official action strongly suggests that the offer began as an off-hand political gesture and now is being followed through in much the same spirit.

At the outset, as has been reported, I said that I did not believe such briefings proper. There are a number of reasons:

1. Members of the Congress and the Senate are not without information. Much of the top secret material that the Pentagon has been releasing for political purposes recently has been known to us--but we have not tried to, or wanted to, violate secrecy by throwing the data around as freely as this administration has been.
2. If there are facts that candidates should know about, there may also be facts that the American people should know about--and a careful review of this administration's secrecy policies would impress me as far more useful than this will-of-the-wisp offer to candidates. The State Department's own role in suppressing information regarding Viet Nam and in censoring testimony before Congress might well be included in such a review.
3. The idea of passing along vital and highly classified information to an open field of candidates is basically unwise. When the two parties have actually selected their candidates, such action has been taken as a matter of course. At the moment, as a matter of fact, there might be considerable argument even as to who is or is not a candidate.

after and enclosures, if any
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
PO 1 US

April 23, 1964

4. There is another consideration that has not escaped those who have dealt with such matters before. An offer to hand over secret data, particularly when political motives may be involved, might be used as energetically to silence debate as to serve debate. Having received information in one of these briefings, a candidate, whether he had the information from another source or not, might then be officially or morally inhibited from using the information.

Thus, although I appreciate your personal role in this and your courtesy, I must respectfully decline the offer for the time being. If the Republican convention nominates me, I will, of course, expect that the regular briefings made available to other candidates in the past will be discussed by us as a separate matter.

Sincerely,


Barry Goldwater



STATE OF NEW YORK
EXECUTIVE CHAMBER
ALBANY

NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER
GOVERNOR

THE WHITE HOUSE

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April 24, 1964

Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your instruction, Secretary of State Rusk has offered to brief me, as a candidate for the nomination of my party for the presidency, on information respecting the issues that affect the national security. I appreciate this very much.

The past, present and future foreign policy of the United States is of vital concern to the American people and all of the free world. It is not only appropriate but essential that the basic issues be responsibly presented to the American people for their information, discussion and decision, particularly during this presidential year. For the past several months, I have been doing just this.

My concern springs from deep interest in and long years of association with foreign policy and international relations in and out of government, including service as Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs starting in 1940, and thereafter as Assistant Secretary of State, Chairman of the President's Committee on International Economic Development, Chairman of the Defense Department Reorganization Committee, Special Assistant to the President for International Affairs.

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I have already made formal statements commenting upon overall foreign policy, NATO, Latin America and the space race, and have discussed the situation in Laos, South Vietnam, Cuba and Panama. I plan a series of additional specific statements on United States foreign policy including, among others:


- United States policy toward Vietnam;
- United States policy toward Laos;
- United States policy on Indonesian aggression against Malaysia;
- The sale of wheat to the Soviet Union in the context of East-West trade policy;
- The effects of the nuclear test ban treaty on the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
- The withdrawal of American troops from Europe, and United States policy toward NATO.

I have serious disagreements with the administration in each of these areas and particularly with the basic assumption upon which these policies have been based.

I should, of course, welcome receiving a briefing by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, setting forth the relevant facts on our actual international position and national security. The nature and scope of these factual briefings are, of course, for the administration to determine.

As a basis for the briefing, I want to make it clear that I reserve the right to continue to comment on or express disagreement with past policy decisions or actions and present or future policies and actions relating to the conduct of foreign affairs and national defense if, in my judgment, it is in the national interest.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "William A. Carter". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping initial "W" and a long, horizontal flourish extending to the right.

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

24d
INFORMATION

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7
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, April 24, 1968

Call me
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Briefings of Major Presidential Candidates

Foreign affairs briefings of major Presidential candidates in the election of 1964 were handled as follows:

A. On April 20 the President instructed the Departments of State and Defense and CIA to provide all major candidates for the office of President with all possible information helpful to their discussion of American policy". (See Tab A)

B. Secretary Rusk sent appropriate letters to Senator Goldwater, Governor Rockefeller, Senator Smith, Governor Stassen, Mr. Nixon, Governor Scranton, and Governor Wallace of Alabama. In making this announcement, the President said, "We recognize that some of these gentlemen may not consider that they are candidates, but it does not seem appropriate for us to attempt to make that decision for them. Ambassador Lodge is in a somewhat different position. He has access to all information which he needs in discharging his most important assignment, and if at any time this situation should change, we would make whatever new arrangements might become necessary, with pleasure." (See Tab B)

C. Governor Scranton and Governor Stassen accepted the President's offer and were briefed. Ambassador Lodge had information available to him at his Embassy. (See Tab C)

On the basis of recollection of State Department officials, the following practices were used in the elections of 1952, 1956, and 1960:

A. No offers of briefings to Presidential hopefuls in the pre-convention period were made. However, some declared candidates were briefed by the State Department before the conventions, at their request, on both specific subjects and on a global basis.

B. Following the nomination, foreign policy and intelligence briefings were offered by the current Administration to the candidates in 1952, 1956, and 1960.

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ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
RECORDS SECTION
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
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In 1952, President Truman offered briefings to both candidates. Governor Stevenson came to Washington in August and was briefed at the White House by both State and CIA officials. In addition, a middle-grade CIA officer was assigned to each candidate with the intention of providing weekly briefings on the road during the campaign. The briefings were, in fact, much less frequent, although weekly briefing books were made available to the candidates.

In 1956, Governor Stevenson was telephoned by Secretary Dulles. His only briefing, however, was conducted at CIA and contained only intelligence, as opposed to policy information.

In 1960, Allen Dulles personally briefed Senator Kennedy three times -- twice a general briefing (including a long session at Hyannis in July) and once on a single topic. Senator Kennedy also received a policy briefing by State Department officials prior to his election.

Walt Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Remarks on Foreign Affairs at the
Associated Press Luncheon in New York City,
April 20, 1964.

[272] Apr. 20

Public Papers of the Presidents

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be my solemn duty as President to submit supplemental requests for additional amounts until the necessary funds of \$3.4 billion are appropriated.

In these areas, and in other areas of concern, we remain faithful to tested principle and deep conviction while shaping our actions to shifting dangers and to fresh opportunity.

This year is an election year in the United States. And in this year let neither friend nor enemy abroad ever mistake growing discussion for growing dissension, or conflict over programs for conflict over principles, or political division for political paralysis. This mistake in judgment has been made twice in our lifetime, to the sorrow of our adversaries.

Now let those at home, who share in the great democratic struggle, remember that the world is their audience and that attack and opposition to old policies must not be just for opposition's sake, that it requires responsible presentation of new choices, that in the protection of our security, the protection of American security, partisan politics must always yield to national need.

I recognize that those who seek to discuss great public issues in this election year must be informed on those issues. Therefore, I have today instructed the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to be prepared and to provide all major candidates for the office of President with all possible information helpful to their discussion of American policy. I hope candidates will accept this offer in the spirit in which it is made—the encouragement of

the responsible discussion which is the touchstone of the democratic process.

In the past 20 years we have gradually become aware that America is forever bound up in the affairs of the whole world. Our own future is linked to the future of all. In great capitals and in tiny villages, in the councils of great powers and in the rooms of unknown planners, events are being set in motion which will continually call upon our attention and make demands on our resources.

Prophecy is always unsure. But if anything is certain, it is that this Nation can never again retreat from world responsibility. You must know, and we must realize, that we will be involved in the world for the rest of our history. We must accustom ourselves to working for liberty in the community of nations as we have pursued it in our community of States.

The struggle is not merely long. The struggle is unending. For it is part of man's ancient effort to master the passions of his mind, the demands of his spirit, the cruelties of nature. Yes, we have entered a new arena. The door has closed behind us. And the old stage has passed into history.

Dangers will replace dangers, challenges will take the place of challenges, new hopes will come as old hopes fade. There is no turning from a course which will require wisdom and much endurance so long as the name of America still sounds in this land and around the world.

NOTE: The President spoke at 1 p.m. at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York City. In his opening words he referred to Paul Miller, president of the Associated Press.

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the Assistant Secretary, and the Chairman of the National Mediation Board was invaluable. The groundwork for collective bargaining in the railroad industry has been reestablished. We hope it will promote true cooperation and meaningful communication between labor and management.

Thank you, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT. Thank you, Mr. Davidson.

Now I present Mr. J. E. Wolfe, the Chairman of the National Railway Labor Conference. Mr. Wolfe.

Mr. Wolfe: On behalf of the Nation's railroads, I applaud President Johnson's handling of this dispute. We are deeply grateful for his statesmanship that led to today's settlement which should have a wholesome effect on collective bargaining both in railroading and other industries. The settlement promises to restore the morale of our 700,000 employees to its highest level, and bring a rebirth of the spirit of cooperation between management and union leaders. Thus, the settlement we have made, at President Johnson's request, means a brighter future for America's railroads in an atmosphere of free enterprise.

THE PRESIDENT. Thank you very much, Mr. Wolfe.

The White House and the President receive in the neighborhood of 100,000 letters

per week. The other day I received a letter from a little girl named Cathy May.

Cathy May, tonight I am pleased to tell you that the railroads are going to continue to run without interruption. Cathy May writes me and says:

Dear President Johnson:

I am seven. My grandmother lives in New York. She is coming to see me make my first Holy Communion. Please keep the railroads running so that she can come to see me. Thank you.

CATHY MAY BAKER

36 Hemlock

Park Forest, Illinois

So Cathy's grandmother can now go to see her and all my fellow Americans can be proud that the railroad management and the railroad brotherhoods came, labored, worked, and reasoned together and in the American way found the answer.

I am very indebted to Secretary Wirtz for presiding over these deliberations day and night for many weeks. I am sure that all Americans appreciate the contribution he has made.

NOTE: The President spoke at 6:55 p.m. at Station WTOP's Broadcast House in Washington, D.C. The remarks were broadcast over the Columbia Broadcasting System.

WASHINGTON

285 The President's News Conference of April 23, 1964

THE PRESIDENT. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

[1.] Secretary Rusk is sending out letters to all those who may wish to accept my offer to provide all possible information to major candidates this year. Appropriate letters are going to Senator Goldwater, Governor

Rockefeller, Senator Smith, Governor Stassen, Mr. Nixon, Governor Scranton, and Governor Wallace of Alabama.

We recognize that some of these gentlemen may not consider that they are candidates, but it does not seem appropriate for us to attempt to make that decision for

them. Ambassador Lodge is in a somewhat different position. He has access to all the information which he needs in discharging his most important assignment, and if at any time this situation should change, we would make whatever new arrangements might become necessary, with pleasure.

[2.] I do not intend that we should lose sight of those Americans who do not share in the general prosperity of this country, so tomorrow I plan to visit several areas which suffer from heavy unemployment and poverty, or need special attention for the relief of economic distress. I will visit South Bend, Ind.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; Paintsville and Inez, Ky.; Huntington, W. Va.

I am inviting the Governors of the Appalachian States to meet with me in Huntington to discuss problems of that particular area. I will be accompanied by several top officials of this administration who are responsible for leading our attack on the problems of unemployment and poverty. These will include Secretary Wirtz, Secretary Hodges, Under Secretary Roosevelt, and Secretary Celebrezze.

[3.] I am glad to report that our decision to cut back on the production of unneeded nuclear materials, and the parallel announcements of Chairman Khrushchev and Prime Minister Douglas-Home, have been warmly greeted throughout the world, and also by responsible opinion in this country. We have made it very clear that these announcements do not constitute a new international agreement or contract of any sort.

We reached the decision here in the United States on our own initiative as what we, in the United States, ought to do. We did it in a prudent and reasonable concern for our strength and for avoiding excess, and we then explained our intention to the United Kingdom and to the Soviet Govern-

ment. They, in turn, acting on their own responsibility, announced parallel decisions.

This is the policy of restraint by mutual example. I discussed it yesterday in detail with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, at breakfast, and I believe that the discussion resulted in general understanding and agreement among us all.

[4.] We have an encouraging report this morning from Ambassador Unger in Laos. His latest information indicates now that the Government of the National Union under Prime Minister Souvanna is continuing and has the support of all, including the Revolutionary Committee. The important thing now is to concentrate once again on working for the peace and the unity of Laos under the principles established by the Geneva agreements.

[5.] I have had a most cordial telegram from General de Gaulle in response to a message of sympathy which I sent him as soon as I learned of his indisposition last week. We are very much encouraged by the reports from Paris that the General is making a strong and good recovery.

[6.] I am happy to announce that Mr. Robert Anderson, our Ambassador, will be making a brief visit to Panama early next week to meet with Special Ambassador Illueca and other Panamanian officials for the purpose of having a preliminary exchange of views.¹ At that time, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Illueca will arrange between them how they will conduct their talks on the problems to be worked out between the two countries.

I am also sending to Panama in the near future a team of economic experts for the

¹ Former Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson was appointed as U.S. representative, with the rank of Special Ambassador, to carry out the objectives of the U.S.-Panama joint declaration of April 3.

[516] Aug. 15

Public Papers of the Presidents

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Could you help us out on that?

THE PRESIDENT. The administration strongly favors the King-Anderson bill. No one speaking for the administration has ever made any statement at variance with that. I do not want to assume the responsibility for keeping accuracy in reporting, but this is the first question that has been raised since that report about the administration's attitude, and if I had been consulted by the reporter who made the report, I would have answered him as I am answering you.

We favor the King-Anderson bill. The administration has favored it for several years. We will continue to favor it and do everything we can to get it enacted.

[10.] Q. Mr. President, you say you feel Senator Goldwater has performed a disservice to the national security and to world peace. Do you feel he should now publicly recant what he said and join you in setting the record straight?

THE PRESIDENT. That is a matter for the Republican candidate and his own conscience.

[11.] Q. Mr. President, in this same connection, sir, do you plan to renew your offer to make intelligence files available to Senator Goldwater so they can be of use to him in the campaign?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't see any necessity or requirement to renew it or restate it. It still exists. We made the briefings available to all the candidates. Governor Scranton accepted them, Ambassador Lodge had them available to him and utilized them, and even Governor Stassen came here and was thoroughly briefed. We have made that offer to the Republican nominee. If he does not care to have the information or the knowledge that would be contained in those briefings, that is a matter for him. I would say it is a matter entirely for his judgment and for his conscience.

The administration's record is clear that we want every person seeking the office of the Presidency, every responsible candidate, to have responsible and accurate information, and full knowledge, on the position of our Government and conditions in the world. If he does not desire to receive that knowledge, that is entirely a matter for him.

[12.] Q. Mr. President, there have been some public comments that Mr. Yarmolinsky² had been offered as a sort of a sacrifice to the southerners in exchange for support of the poverty program. I wonder if you would care to make any further comment on that?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't want to get into another running discussion here like we are in on nuclear weapons. What public comment? Who said what, so I will know what I am answering and what I am saying.

Q. Sir, I believe there were some published columns from various sources.

THE PRESIDENT. I would think that probably you ought to seek the columnist and see what the source of his information is. Mr. Yarmolinsky is employed by the Defense Department. And the Defense Department, the Labor Department, the Health, Education, and Welfare Department, and the Justice Department are jointly interested in the poverty program, so they all shared a part in preparing it. No one, to repeat, to emphasize, no one, at any time, any place, anywhere, suggested to me anyone for any of these places. The first information that I had that Mr. Yarmolinsky was, in effect, appointed to one of these places that did not exist was the columnist rumor that you talked about.

I was informed by the leader of this task force, Mr. Shriver, that he had made no recommendations to anyone, that he had

² Adam Yarmolinsky, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

Monday, April 29, 1968, 1:30 P.M.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Level of U.S. Military Effort in Vietnam

In your March 31 television address you made two references to the level of U.S. military effort in Vietnam and the indicated references to the South Vietnamese role.

- a. "On many occasions I have told the American people that we would send to Vietnam those forces that are required to accomplish our mission there." (page 622)
- b. "I cannot say and no man could say that no more will be asked of us." (in Vietnam) (page 625)
- c. "Our presence there has always rested on this basic belief: The main burden of preserving their freedom must be carried out by them--by the South Vietnamese themselves.

"We and our allies can only help to provide a shield--behind which the people of South Vietnam can survive and can grow and develop. On their efforts--on their determinations and resourcefulness--the outcome will ultimately depend." (page 621)

- d. "We shall accelerate the reequipping of South Vietnam's armed forces--in order to meet the enemy's increased firepower. This will enable them progressively to undertake a larger share of combat operations against the Communist invaders." (page 622)

Secretary Clifford, in response to press questions at a news conference on April 11 said:

- a. "We are giving our forces the preference on the M-16's and our other most modern weapons because we were taking the brunt of the effort and the fighting in South Vietnam. Now that the policy decision has been made to turn over gradually the major effort to the South Vietnamese, we are now starting to give them a degree of preference in our most modern weapons." (page 6)

- b. Question: "Sir, you said in response to an earlier question that a policy decision had been made to turn over gradually the major effort to the South Vietnamese. Could you tell us when that decision was made and how it might relate to General Abrams' appointment?"

Secy. Clifford: "Well, it has been in the process of being made. I don't know that it occurred on any one date. But for some months that I have been aware of, consultations have taken place between our military leaders and the South Vietnamese leaders, and plans in this regard have been in the process of formulation.

"I noted a comment by President Thieu within the last week in which he stated that his hope was that sometime in the foreseeable future their forces could be developed to the point where they could start in and take over areas that our forces occupied so that our forces could be relieved and be drawn back. That is the program and that is the one we are looking toward." (pages 9 and 10)

- c. Question: "Mr. Secretary, we are dealing with a new policy situation in South Vietnam. As you say, President Thieu says that his forces could take over more of the fighting so that our forces could be drawn back. What role, then, do you see the American forces playing? What does "drawn back" mean?"

Secy. Clifford: "I think no one can give the details at this time.

"By my answer, I do not mean to suggest that there was any immediate plan for that. It is a long-range plan But it seems to me that it is the ultimate aim that we have for a final determination there; that is, work ourselves into a posture where the South Vietnamese will take over the war." (pages 10 and 11)

Secretary Clifford in a speech to the Associated Press in New York on April 22 said:

"We concluded that Americans will not need always to do more and more, but rather that the increased effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Government and its fighting forces will now permit us to level off our effort--and in due time to begin the gradual process of reduction.

"The review established to our satisfaction that Southeast Asia is not for us a 'bottomless pit.'"

"The review confirmed the judgment, already reached by President Thieu, that the South Vietnamese were ready to take on more of the responsibility and to carry more of the military burden.

"As we level off our contribution of men, we are accelerating our delivery to the South Vietnamese armed forces of the most modern weapons and equipment." (pages 6 and 7)

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

P. S. As you can see, Clark has eased over from your concept of a "larger share" for the Vietnamese to the idea that "we level off." Clark's concept will, of course, work if Ho doesn't put into the South such large additional forces that we have to increase total allied strength faster than the South Vietnamese can build up.

W. W. R.

SERVICE SET



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS

29 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FRYKLUND

SUBJECT: Censorship in South Vietnam

Censorship in South Vietnam has been studied several times, including a team of officers who visited SVN in 1966. The team developed a rough plan on how it would be implemented. Other examinations have developed about the same approach. Basically, if censorship is to be imposed, it would require initial implementation by SVN. All communications going out of SVN would be censored, including personal mail. The censorship mechanism probably would involve a combined SVN-U.S. operation, together with other countries which contribute forces to the war.

Mechanics for censorship could be worked out; however, the following are some of the problems involved:

--An elaborate set-up would be required for field press censorship. About 200 trained personnel would be needed for the press alone; we have none today.

--Censorship would have to be accomplished under the authority and consent of the SVN Government. (The SVN Government is now in the midst of passing legislation insuring freedom of the press.)

--Problems of censoring third countries would be immense---politically and mechanically (e. g., among the censors would necessarily be some that speak Japanese, German, French, etc.)

--TV---U.S. and foreign---now ship their unprocessed film out of country. Censorship will require it be processed and edited in country. Great expense to someone will be involved in setting up these facilities in SVN. In addition, the film just will not move as fast as it does now. In general, TV will be late with the news.

SERVICE SET

--Much of the press corps in SVN is constantly turning over. How is a newsman to be censored after he leaves the country? If he cannot be, larger bureaus can run newsmen in and out of country to effectively negate censorship.

--The thought persists in my mind that censorship with the U. S. press simply will not work unless the U. S. press is convinced it is necessary. Even then, censorship will be looked on as evil and must withstand frequent attacks as to its necessity.

Defense and the Services have up-to-date regulations and field manuals on field press censorship. Some training is planned this summer at the Defense Information School for some USAR detachments. But, as stated above, we have no people trained in field press censorship at the present time.

In the broader context of controlling the release of information, General Sidle indicated on the phone this morning that MACV was considering the idea of lifting the embargo on Operation Delaware in increments. The first increment was released yesterday; it gave the press the go-ahead on stories and film prepared up through 22 April, provided no mention was made of future plans.



L. GORDON HILL, Jr.
Colonel, USA
Special Assistant, SEA

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file date:
23 Apr 68
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESS

SUBJECT: Interpretation of Ground Rules

1. A MACOI Memorandum to the Press of 29 January 1968, reminded all press members of the ground rules involving ground combat to which they agreed when they were accredited by MACV. A follow-up memorandum of 26 February further explained one of the rules.

2. As the result of these memoranda, members of the press/^{intelligence} have been most cooperative in attempting to stem the flow of important/information to the enemy. However, based both on logic and the many queries received from newsmen, it is obvious that no set of ground rules can cover every tactical situation encountered by newsmen in the field. Although relatively few in number, "gray areas" cannot be entirely eliminated.

3. To assist newsmen in correctly interpreting these ground rule gray areas, MACV will provide 24-hour service to anyone who obtains information which he feels is subject to interpretation under the ground rules. Any newsman in the I CTZ who has doubt about the intelligence value of material he wishes to use in a story should contact Colonel Faser at the MACV Press Center, DaNang, Phone: DaNang 6259. Elsewhere in Vietnam, queries should be addressed to MACV extensions 3163 or 3939 where someone able to make a decision will always be on duty.

help insure

4. We hope that this service will provide a maximum flow of information while insuring the necessary protection to our troops.

5. For your information, a copy of the key ground rules is attached.

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The following information is not releasable, unless and until released by MACV.

1. Future plans, operations, or strikes.
2. Information on or confirmation of rules of engagement.
3. Amounts of ordnance and fuel moved by support units or on hand in combat units (Ordnance includes weapons or weapons systems.)
4. During an operation, unit designations and troop movements, tactical deployments, name of operations and size of friendly forces involved.
5. Intelligence unit activities, methods of operation, or specific locations.
6. Exact number and type of casualties or damage suffered by friendly units.
7. Number of sorties and the amount of ordnance expended on strikes outside of RVN.
8. Information on aircraft taking off for strikes, enroute to, or returning from target area. Information on strikes while they are in progress.
9. Identity of units and locations of air bases from which aircraft are launched on combat operations.
10. Number of aircraft damaged or any other indication of effectiveness or ineffectiveness of ground antiaircraft defenses.
11. Tactical specifics, such as altitudes, course, speeds, or angle of attack. (General descriptions such as "low and fast" may be used.)
12. Information on or confirmation of planned strikes which do not take place for any reason, including bad weather.
13. Specific identification of enemy weapons systems utilized to down friendly aircraft.
14. Details concerning downed aircraft while SAR operations are in progress.
15. Aerial photos of fixed installations.