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#26c memo	more info released NW 97-285 to Holders of NIE 11-14-67. secret (dup. #314, NSG memo to the President, Rusk, (Vol. 75))	1 p 05/03/68	A
#26d memo	to Holders of NIE 11-14-67. secret (dup. #314, as above) Open 8-13-09 NW 97-285	6 p 05/02/68	A

FILE LOCATION

Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings
May 5, 1968 - 21 p.m. Tuesday luncheon with Foreign Policy Advisors - Rusk,
Clifford, Wheeler, etc.
Box 3

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MAY 7, 1968 - 1 p.m.

TUESDAY LUNCH WITH FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS

The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow

General Johnson
George Christian
Tom Johnson

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 8, 1968

10:00 a.m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Tom
FROM: Tom Johnson

Attached are notes of the President's Tuesday Luncheon on May 7, 1968. The meeting began at 1:00 p.m., ending at 3:00 p.m.

Those attending the meeting were:

The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
General Johnson
George Christian
Tom Johnson

Also attached is the agenda for the meeting.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By Delt, NARA, Date 3-7-91

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Meeting began: 1:00 p.m.

Meeting ended: 3:00 p.m.

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~~MEETING NOTES COPYRIGHTED~~ NOTES ON TUESDAY LUNCHEON, MAY 7, 1968

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-31

By ing NARA, Date 6-20-89

THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE:

The President
Secretary Clifford
Secretary Rusk
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
General Johnson
George Christian
Tom Johnson

Secretary Rusk: The delegation is small. Daniel Davidson is a good man. The Staff is very good, and I would go ahead. We are bringing Kaplan in to help on press problems. Also, Bill Sullivan has a personal knowledge of NVN's chief negotiator. Do you have any objections.

The President: No objections.

Secretary Clifford: No objections. It is better to start with a small staff.

Secretary Rusk: I told Cy and Averill to expect the President to be involved with these decisions.

General Johnson: Who would substitute for General Goodpaster when he is due to report to Vietnam.

The President: Maxwell Taylor has a lot of diplomatic and military background.

Secretary Rusk: I agree with you about Max Taylor, but a lot can happen between now and June.

Secretary Clifford: The best thing we can do is to get peace in Vietnam.

The President: I want Rusk and Clifford and Helms to brief Bobby when he wants it.

Secretary Rusk: If I were a candidate I would not accept a briefing.

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The President: Why? A man's judgment is no better than his information.

Secretary Rusk: They aren't interested in information.

George Christian: It wouldn't appeal to the group he is appealing to.

Secretary Clifford: I had a good visit with Fulbright.

Secretary Rusk: Do you know the difference between rape and seduction?

Secretary Clifford: I have read about both, I have not been involved in either (Laughter).

Secretary Clifford: Friday, May 17, is date we have chosen on MAP program. We had good discussion about Vietnam. He wanted Mansfield and John Sherman Cooper at the discussions in Paris.

Fulbright wanted to know how seriously the President wanted peace. I told him, "Bill, about 50 times as much as you do."

The President: I have told the press that consultations would be helpful. I rely closely on Rusk, but I would hear from Ball, Rostow, Goldberg and Clifford.

Everybody's judgment is important, if we reached point where we need the judgment of Congress, we would go to Mansfield and McCormack and Dirksen. I told the Leadership that we have to depend on senior people like Mansfield and Dirksen.

Secretary Rusk: We would like to use Leonhart and Wyn Brown while Bundy is so involved. Both are discreet men.

Walt Rostow: Leonhart has responsibilities to a staff of 15. He doesn't want it to collapse.

Secretary Rusk: We need the best backstopping team we can get.

The President: Any matters arising where Congress is concerned, we will take up with Mansfield and Dirksen, McCormack and Ford. The normal procedure would be Senator Mansfield and Senator Dirksen. The ranking Committeeman is Hickenlooper.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON USSR.

Secretary Rusk: Russia seems to be reducing manning of equipment

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in Eastern Europe and Western Soviet Union.

We must be on guard for false alarms. What we do about this advice is a problem. We could cause problems with allies and others who might think we are laying the groundwork for a reduction of our own forces in Western Europe.

Secretary Clifford: Our best course of action is to say this is a continuing study. NATO allies are very concerned about us getting ready to cut our forces.

The President: Should we have a second meeting with Harriman and Vance?

Secretary Rusk: Yes, we should have another meeting. "Our side, your side" approach is a good one. We should not pull our punches. We should not understate our own case. I hope Averill will start off with a firm position. We ought to press for more than the Clifford formula. We need to make them face up to the hard issues including the no advantage formula.

The President: You (Secretary Clifford) and Dean go over everything with them. We want them to be tough traders. Let's not put our minimum condition on the table first.

BOMBING BETWEEN 19th and 20th PARALLEL

Secretary Clifford: We are now confining bombing below 19th.

General Johnson: The Air Force wants to go up to 20th. Others do not want to do anything to upset the sitting down at the table this week on the 10th. A violation might occur.

Secretary Clifford: If a plane go over the 20th Parallel, we would kick ourselves forever.

The President: When would the first meeting be?

Secretary Rusk: Friday.

The President: What's happening in the South?

Walt Rostow: The attack squads are being contained.

General Johnson: (Showed map of Saigon).

The President: I am uncomfortable about infiltration.

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NATO TROOP MEETING

Secretary Clifford: Why should we agree to rotation principle?

Secretary Rusk: It was part of balance of payments program. We are coming up with discussions with Germany on offset. We can get a good balance of payment situation on short term.

General Johnson: We are at stage where we can distinguish between defense of Europe and in capability to defend ourselves if called upon.

The President: You and Dean agree on statement. I don't want them to come home this year and let the new President decide if he wants to bring them home.

I am worried about our reserves. If we are called on, God help us.

General Johnson: We do not have ready men now. We would like to bring reserves in gradually. The draft call is based on overall need. Re-enlistments have been reasonably stable.

Secretary Clifford: We are bringing back 34,000 from Europe. Russell will go for one-year extension of your authority to call.

POOR PEOPLE'S MARCH

Secretary Clifford: They have asked for cots and blankets. Should we give it to them.

The President: Check it out with the Appropriations Committees. (Senator Russell and Congressman Rivers.)

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OFFICIAL RECORD

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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Lunch with the President
Tuesday, May 7, 1968, 1 p.m.

Agenda

1. National Intelligence Estimate on USSR General Purpose Forces
(Secretaries Rusk and Clifford)

Guidance for USIB meeting next Thursday on estimate which bears on troop requirements in Europe and Mansfield-type withdrawal resolution (see Tab A).

2. Negotiating Issues (Secretaries Rusk and Clifford)

Secretary Rusk should have a paper for the lunch. The requirement is for us to sharpen the issues and prepare for a second meeting with the negotiating group before they depart.

3. Bombing Between the 19th and 20th Parallels (Secretaries Rusk and Clifford)

Should we bomb above the 19th parallel before our men go to Paris in the face of the enemy attack on Saigon?

4. Force Goals at NATO Meeting of Defense Ministers in Brussels (Sect. Clifford)

Should we support an increase in NATO force goals? A decrease?
Hold at present level?

5. Poor People's March on Washington (Secretary Clifford)

The Defense Department has been asked for equipment (beds, blankets, etc.). Should it be made available?

6. Aid Authorization Bill in Senate (Secretary Rusk)

The issue was: When Sect. Clifford should go up on the Hill on military aid. He settled the date with Senator Fulbright Monday afternoon. The date is May 17 at 10:00 a.m. Sect. Clifford would like to report his conversation with Senator Fulbright.

7. Other.

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White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By Delt, NARA, Date 3-6-91

W. A. Rostow

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence and Research

MAY 6 - 1968

DNM/DMX

3 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-14-67: SOVIET
AND EAST EUROPEAN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

1. The attached draft Memorandum has been approved by the Board of National Estimates after consideration by the USIB representatives.

2. Recipients are reminded that National Intelligence Estimates are releasable to foreign governments only by USIB action. This draft Memorandum to Holders deals with questions which have important implications for current US foreign policy. It is therefore regarded as particularly sensitive, and recipients are cautioned against any unauthorized disclosure.

3. This estimate has been placed on the agenda of the USIB meeting scheduled for 1030, Thursday, 9 May.

JOSEPH SELTZER
Executive Officer
National Estimates

6.2(c)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2 May 1968

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF NIE 11-14-67: THE SOVIET AND
EAST EUROPEAN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

THE ESTIMATE

Foreword

1. NIE 11-14-67 (16 November 1967) expressed uncertainty regarding the actual equipment holdings of Soviet line divisions, as follows (paragraph 14):

Hitherto we have estimated that all divisions in Categories I and II had a full set of equipment on hand or immediately available. It now appears that this may not be true of many divisions in the USSR, but we are as yet unable to determine with confidence the actual extent of the shortages that may exist.

2. An intensive study has been undertaken to resolve this uncertainty and, eventually, to reassess the combat and reinforcement capabilities of Soviet ground forces. This study is far from complete but our findings to date with regard to the actual

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holdings of major items of equipment by Soviet line divisions in East Germany and in the Belorussian, Carpathian, and Kiev Military Districts (MDs) in the USSR require the issuance of a Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-14-67.

3. We take occasion to include, in paragraphs 11-12 below, an updating of the discussion of Soviet theater air defense in paragraphs 42-43 of NIE 11-14-67 and of new attack submarines in paragraph 56.

The Equipment of Soviet Line Divisions*

4. We have very good evidence regarding the major items of equipment held by two divisions in the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG); one a motorized rifle division, the other a tank

* Maj. Gen. Wesley C. Franklin, the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes the methodology utilized in the study has provided useful additional data. However, in his opinion, the findings must be regarded only as tentative indications of what major equipments may currently be held by Soviet divisions and may create an erroneous impression that the capabilities of line divisions have been reduced. Since the intelligence community cannot state with certainty the subordination and location of all divisional elements, unit holdings for any given division in the USSR so far considered in this analysis may be somewhat larger than indicated. Gen. Franklin believes the methodology employed in this analysis includes many judgments and assumptions which tend to minimize the estimates of divisional holdings and should not be used as the only basis for judging readiness of any given division. He believes that as more is known about the divisional equipment and the many as yet unsubordinated units located outside known divisional areas, the number of divisions which the Memorandum to Holders has designated as combat ready, will increase. He also anticipates that the total number of Soviet divisions throughout the USSR will rise during the conduct of this analysis.

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division. Our analysis indicates that the motorized rifle division has about 2,300 major items of equipment, the tank division about 2,200. The provision of major items of equipment thus indicated is some 25 percent lower than we previously believed. The number of tanks and artillery pieces, however, remains essentially the same. The difference lies principally in the number of wheeled vehicles and major items of support equipment organic to the division. This difference would not affect either the firepower or the initial mobility of these divisions.

5. We have not examined the other 20 Soviet divisions in Germany and Poland sufficiently to be able to compare them with these two divisions, but we believe this particular motorized rifle division to be typical of the 10 Soviet motorized rifle divisions in Germany, and this particular tank division to be typical of the 12 Soviet tank divisions in Germany and Poland.

6. We have no doubt that the Soviets consider all of their line divisions in Germany and Poland to be "in a full state of readiness for immediate operations." We take the two divisions cited to reflect the Soviet conception of what is required to qualify as "ready for immediate operations" and have used their indicated holdings of major items of equipment as the criterion

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by which to judge the readiness of the 34 other Soviet line divisions that we have examined to date.*

7. On the basis of this criterion and good evidence, we conclude that nine divisions in the Belorussian and Carpathian MDs should be judged to be "in a full state of readiness for immediate operations." Five are motorized rifle divisions, four of them in a cordon close to the western frontier of the USSR. Four are tank divisions belonging to a tank army located not far west of Kiev.

8. We judge that the other 25 divisions in the Belorussian, Carpathian, and Kiev MDs (11 motorized rifle divisions and 14 tank divisions) fall short of the GSFG criterion in their holdings of major items of equipment. In most cases, their equipment amounts to 50-75 percent of that standard.

9. We must stress that our study to date has been directed solely toward determining the quantities of major items of equipment actually held by Soviet line divisions. We find these to be lower than we had previously supposed in the case of "combat ready"

* Six of the line divisions in the Baltic MD and the five line divisions in the Moscow MD are also relevant to the reinforcement problem, but we have not yet examined them sufficiently to include them in this analysis.

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divisions, and much lower in the case of other line divisions. This reduction in our estimate of the amount of equipment held by these divisions would imply some reduction in our estimate of their manning, but we have not as yet studied the direct evidence regarding manning and are as yet unready to present an estimate on that subject.

10. We must note also that we have not yet studied the army and front level supporting elements in the Soviet ground forces, and consequently are as yet unable to reassess the Soviet organization for combat as a whole. Neither have we studied what would be required to bring a "reduced strength" division up to combat strength, how that could be accomplished, and consequently how quickly such divisions could be made ready "to proceed to areas of concentration." These matters will be addressed in NIE 11-14-68.

Theater Air Defense

11. Since the publication of NIE 11-14-67, we have obtained firm evidence of Soviet efforts to strengthen their theater air defense particularly against low-altitude attack. The ground electronic environment has been improved. At most operational airfields aircraft revetments have been constructed, dispersed

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aircraft parking patterns employed, and antiaircraft artillery positions occupied. The SA-3 missile system has been deployed to tactical airfields in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary. We now have evidence that the Soviets have begun deployment of both the mobile SA-4 missile system and the radar-controlled, quad-mounted 23-mm weapon system, ZSU-23-4, with their field forces.

12. We now have firm evidence of the construction of two new types of torpedo attack submarines in addition to the new class of nuclear-powered attack submarine noted in paragraph 56 of NIE 11-14-67. All three of these new types have streamlined hulls and large rounded bows suggesting high speed, lower noise levels, and improved sonar capability. At least two of the three new types are probably nuclear-powered. These two may be capable of speeds up to 30 knots and operating depths on the order of 1,300 feet. All three types will probably be operational by mid-1968. We continue to believe that some 45 to 60 new attack submarines will be in service by 1977.

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